JPRS ID: 9422 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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FOR OF'FI('IA1. I;SE OtiLI'
JPRS L/9422
2 December 1980 -
/ rth Af rica Re ort -
Near E~st No p
CFOUO 42/80) -
FBeS FOREICN BF~C~ADCAST INFORti'IATION SERVIGE
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JPRS L/942't
: 2 Decembe~c 1980
NEAk EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
- 6
(FOtTO 42/80)
CONTENTS
nvrr~-~ ~~s
Sympathet;c Study of Libyan-Syr~an Merger OY~ered -
- (~-wA~rr ~-t~sz, 19-25 seP 80) 1
- IS7~A~C AF'FAIl?S
Developtnent oi N~.tslim Brothernood in Syria Bescribed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 26 Sep-2 Oct SO) 11
- ALGIIZIA -
Agreements Augur Turn in Aigerian-French Relations
(YouceP Ad.rari; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 29 Sep 80~ 15
- P'i.ve-Year Plan for 1980-198~+ Reviewed
(r~c~s ~o~CAV~c ~ ~nrr~~s, 3 oct 80) i7 -
Natural Gas Pricir.g Goals Opposed
(MARCEES TROPICAtJX ET I~ITEftRA~TS, 3 Oct 80~ e... 20
Brieis
- Gas Price Incree.se Thwarted 22
- ~a
~I:~3her Education Minister Interviewed on War Pol~cy
(Moha~ad Khalaf Interview; I~iIHON ~IZAI SHIl~UN, 19 Oct 80) 23
IS~RAFL,
Zsraeli Nlilitary Supplies to Iran
(Patrick Seale; THE OBSERVgZ, 2 Nov 80) 25
"I'FiE TIl+~' Reports More Restriction Orders Fiaced on West
- Bank Arabs
(Christopher Walker.; TSE TIl~S, 5 Nov 80) 27
_ a_ (III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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- Former Ambassador to tJN on 'i?estern Ignorance of Middle Ee~st' 29 -
(Chaim Herzog; THE T~, 4 Bov 80}
Robot Aircra~t Spy on Palestinians in Leb~non 32
(Robert Fisk; T~ TII~iES, 3 Nov 80) ...............o..~���
- b -
_ - .Y
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INTBR-ARAS AFFAIRS
SYt~ATHBTIC STUDY OF LIBYAN-SYRIAN MBRGE~t OPFSBBD
_ Pari� AL-wATAN AL-'AxABI in Arabic 19-25 Sap 80 pp 23-26
~Article: "A Calm Reading of ~he Syrian-Libyan Union"/
/Taxt/ The first act o~ the Libyan-Syrian union Was a drama of variou� dimnnsiona.
Ths ~taRe Wae prepared for the celebration of the 1 Septea~er holiday vlaen sudden-
ly Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi atood up to r~nnounce "t par~onally aa praposing a
mergsr union batyeen Syria and Libya in which the Libyan paople wi,ll baar the re-
sponaibilitiea of the Syrian paaplt, a~d tha Syrian peopla will bear the ruponai-
bilitiea of th~ Libyan peop le."
al-Qadhdhafi follavod hia dsclaration, which was carried on radio and tale~?ision
ia Liby~ ard Syria at rhe aame time, with a threat: "If Libya is not tranaformed -
into a confrontation and unity state, and aork does not taka plac� as of today to
achieve a msrger uaion ~rieh Syria, I`rill join tha Palastinian reaiatanca."
The first act ended on the Libyan political ataga and etarted on ths Syrian polit-
ical stage. The televieion lights turaod on and Yruident al-Aead hastened over
ths airwavea to ~enc: a cable to Col al-Qadhdhafi from Damaacua velco~ing his invi-
taticn, oa grounda that "evnrq Gall to union and aerious action for its aake move
che feelings of the ma4sea of the SqriAn Arab people and ca~t an i~mediate echo _
and gnnuine responee in their spirite. Sie extend our h~uds to 4hake your hand,
Mhich ii axtended to us, for the sake of the goal or unity, so that We may work im- _
a?~diately together to achiev~ this great goal." =
= Th~ acts followed one ~nother with striking apeed between Dr~a;~ue and TripoZi,
and in leece than a week after al-Qadhdhafi's appsal President a1-Asad reached the _
Libyan capital at the head of a party and govarmwent delegation, to meet ~+ith the
dalagatfon of the Libyan Jamahiriyah a~?d ita revolutionary co~itteee under the _
- chairmanship of Mu'aamar al-Qadhdbafi.
- Ova* a period of 2 days of diecuasions Which took place in the midst of deawnatra-
tiona, conferences and revolutionary committees in the jamahiriyah, agreement was
~ reached on the "unity resolutinn" by the tvo presidents. _
~ Political observers noted that the designation of "the unity reeolutioa" was made
officially to the natioual and regional coo~and of the ruling party in Syria and
the popular coa~itteeB of the Liryan Arab Socialist People's Jamahir'.yah, which
. 1
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dec?.ared that they had held exceptional meetings on 2 September, the day follos+ing
[he peraonal offer of union, as Preeident al-Qadhdhafi aaid in hie epeech. It hap-
paned that the Syrian pre~ident replied to the latter, accepting by i~ediate per-
sonal cabla the same day, directly after al-Qadhdhafi had finirhed giving his
opsech.
~ Ia th~ cable, the Syrian preeident expreseed that by eaying, "Your cdll, the en-
thusiasm With which tha ?.ibyan Arab masaes greetmd it, and the warm crie+s of the
ma~oes pres~ing for union touched my feelinga, ad they maved the fealing~ of the
maa~e~ of the Syrian Arab paople."
Although nothing hai been publiahed cancerniug the deciaions of the national and
= ragional ccmmand of the ruling party in Syria or the papular conferencaa of the
' Arab Jamahiriyah, and conaequently concesning the baseo, conditions or terma to
Whicn aach party is ca~,mitted in carrying out ths union aad~ determining its form,
natura and content, itis clear that "the announced unity resolution reflncts
almost co~pletely al-Qadtdhafi'e well-1caoWn thoug~ts sud sympathiea on unity,
which are focussd on two ba4ic pointo, firat, that it be "im~sdiate" and aecond
that it be a "merger."
In this context, the "unity rneolution" specified five guidelinee:
- Firat, establishment of a aingln state out of the two countries.
Sacond~ enjoy~snt by this state of compl�te sovereignty over the two countriee and
pos~ao~ion of a single international paraenality.
Third, the lnadarship of the tvo countries will be united.
Fourth, the unity atate will hava a general national coafnrence.
Fifth, the unity state will have a siagle executive power.
. Tha "unity reaolution" en~ed by binding the las.dership of both countriea to promul-
gate dmcre4a and exacutive measurea for thia serious re~olution in a pariod not to
axc~ed 1 month, which will end next 9 October.
Some sources vith atrong bonds to PIr "Abd-al-Salam Jallud, the aecond man in the
Libyan regime, have rapeated that thara ia ~ co~on conviction among officials in
the two countrias conceraing the estahlish~nt of a merger union state wiCh its
varioua ma,~or institutions bafore the period of 1 month alapaea--specificallq on
6 Octobar, tha date of the asventh auniversary of the October (Ramadan) waro Thua
tha ~nrger union of Syria and Libra Will, according to an expreasion attribute~ to
'Abd-al-Salam Jallud, be a second Octobar war, not againax Ieraal Alone but also
against al-Sadat'e rsgim~, th~ United Statas, and all the reactionary and feudal
. forcea in Che Arab aation.
Hith the iasuance of The a~i~hereublicisnectacls whic'h~Col~l~iuha~narhal-4adhdhafi
over tha political atage P P
began with his apeech vhich burned with paasion and enthueiaem.
�
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_ Behind the Winga
However, political obaervers and journalists do not content themaelves with the
acenne on the stage on Which their aye~ fa13.~ Rather, they rueh into the Winge to
_ sesrch out, penetrate and ask abaut the �acts and aecreta behind the visibl� apec-
tacls~, great and sn~all alika.
Theae observers quote a Libyan official who holda a distinguished position in the -
ruling circles, has solid contacte with Col Mu'a~ar 81-Qadhdhafi and ~aid that
the noti.on of the union began ~o ferc~nt in hia head 2 weeke bafore the date of
the celebration of the anniversarq of 1 Septnmb~r and that it Was not rgstricted
to Syria, but rather, in his conception, incl~d~d Algeriu, Democratic Yemen, and
_ th~ Paleetine Liberation Organizatfon and had the ob~ective of turning the members
of the Pereeverancm and Steadfastaess Front into a"single mergnr etate" of a kind
new not just in the Arab world but in the entire world.
Theea observera continue:
Col al-Qadhdhafi took the advice of 'Abd-al-Salam Jallud and 'Ali al-Turayki not
to embark on a aerioua ~tep like this before first makiMg faelero in an indirect
manner.
That was becauae the failure of some or all states and members of the Perseversnce
and Steadfaatnees Front to respond would have th~ e~fect of afflicting Libya (and
President al-Qadhdhafi) with re~al gross damage at a time when it waa facing incseas-
ing danger from domestic and foreign opposition, not to apeak of Libya'a Arab isola-
tion, ite disputes of varqing degreeo within the Perseverance Front itself~ and thn
grawing crisis in its relatioae with Malta sad Africa, to which one ehould add the
- military mobilisation al-Sadae'a regine inae conducted on the Libyan-Egyptian bordere.
The Pracess of Bxtending Feelars
The matter ended With al-Qadhdhafi aubmitting to the advice and using the occasion -
- of the invitation of th~e Feraeverance and Steadfa~tneas Front co~nt~iea to partic-
ipate in the 1 September celebrations at tha higheat level te extend feelera on
the eubject of the union.
~ The process of extending feelers produced obvioua negative position~ on the p~rt -
of all countriea and membere of the Perseverance front except S~j:ia, which welcomed
a diecuseion of the notion of the union and aent a high-leval delegation to take
part in the celebrations headed by al-[aeim, the prime minister, while the othera _
contented themselvee With sending delagations at an ordinary protocol level.
A~ource with aolid links with the Sprian delegation at the celebratioua denied
that Preaident al-Asad or hia priIDe minister had previous knc~wl~dge of al- _
Qadhdhafi'a plan to eatablish an immediate merger union bet~aen tha tWO eountriea.
All the inatructions al-'l.aeim had were to enter into discusaiona on common basee
to eetablish more eolid military-economic-political cooveration betvaea the two
countries to pave the way for aome form of a union. Ho~ever, it happened on the
. day prior to the celebra~ion thdt Mu'amaiar al-Qadbdtaafi asked al-[asim to have
Syrian radio combine its fr~quency ~ith that of Libyan radio ia order to broadcast
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hia epeech in both Libya aud Syria at t~ie eame tim~, atre~asing that he Would de-
clare "unlimlted moral and material aupport for Syria, the base of the Axab perae-
ferance," and that the speech would include "news gladdeaing" to Presidant al-Aead.
al-[a~im cablad Damascu~ al-Qadhrlhafi'a requast and recaived an an~var of agre~-
_ msnt. al-[asim vaa eurprie~ eo learn that ths gladdening nsws vas tha demand for
an iumsdiat~ m~rger union.
The Syriac~ source esys "?hus We Were tak~n unaware. ~ihat could we do? We could
- not reeist ur hesitate in tha face of aay appeal for union whatever. It ia an ap-
peil which W6, for the firet time~ in the history of our relstions with Libya,
~ broadca~t ova~ our radio, ae if we had been in previoua agreement."
After that evarything proceeded with tpeed and enthu~iasm. al-Qadhdhafi's ardor
~ affe:ted averyone and left its mask on the courae of avsnt~. Bvea one Libyan of-
ficfal waraed, as the "unitv resolution" was on ths verge of baing declared, that
the document contained oaly "the Chriatiaa date" aad ignored "the Islamis hegira
date" which al-Qul~dhafi in paaticular always inaista pracede the Chriatian date
- in documenta, whea he dosa not contnnt him~elf with iC aloue. The Libyan official
confided hia 9baervar.ion to al-Qadbdhafi, Who augrilq waved his hand aWay mnd eaid
_ "'_L'b,s date is not ia~portant, what ia im~portant is that the declaration be iaeued
now, im~ediatnly, With any date there i~."
A Fourth Attempt
In fact, the declaration of the i~ediate merger union between Syria and Libya ia
- the fourth try al-Qadhdhafi has made to give body to his special idaas on this eub-
ject. Three attampts preceded it ~hich were not foreordainad for euccass but rath-
ar subeequently met with collapae. The first, tovard the end of Presidsnt 'Abd-el-
Nasir's ers, was with xgypt, the Sudan and Syria, in the form of a federation of
republice. The second, after President al-Sadat asaumed the poeition of preaident,
Wat with Bgypt and Syria. The third was with Tunisia.
= It goea without eaying that Arab unity wag and r~maina the ~asic ob~ective of the
Arab maases over the length and breadth o~' the Arab nation. This goal hae acquired
decisive, overwhelming forcn on the Arsb stage, to the point where it has come to
as~uma priority in the programe of all operating political partiea an+d organfza-
tion~ and ha~ c~ased to be confinad o~ly to the Arab Socialiot Ba'th Party or other
national partieo and movemente.
Hawever, the experience of the Sgyptian-Syrian merger, through its a~tablishmant
in 1958 and iCs collapae in 1961, through the pasitive and negative aap~ct� which
_ unity in practice ha4 revaaled, contributed to the davelop~snt of the theory and
practice of unity fra~m a theoretical framswork stripped of reality and problams,
with a national s~otionalism disdainful of political, social and �conomic diacrnp-
ancia~, to the frame~ork of a combativa national acientific act which challenges
the actual atate of fr~gmantation, atavisation and backwardne~a, not ignoring it,
but aetaching it to othare through ths procesa of unity itself and through prepara-
tion of the objective and subjective circumstancaa for tha e4tabl.iahment of ~he
union on the batie of th� foundati~n of free maa8 vill and joint n~tional intere~te
through effective democratic formulae Which ara able tn challenge, pravail and de-
velop. Without thie viaion of unity and exercisa of unity, any hasty uastudisd act
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union fram above which doea n~t epring from a free mass choir.e will have the effect
of cauaing the regres~ion of the national unity movement as x whole th~ough furth-
er r~egativn featurea and sowing disappointment among the Arab pnople ove~ unity--
their main weapun in the atruggle against imperialism, Zioniem and bacicvardness.
It ia a aCruggla ~hase scope ezpanded and Who~e gravity aecalated fo~.lowing the
Camp David agreements and al-Sadat'~ regim~'a initiative of conc~luding a separate
peace between E~ypt and the enemy. .
Intereat and a iiarning ~
`~herein liea the intense ineereet, also accompani~d by an intense warning, in the
- declaretion of "immediate merger union" between Syria and Libya by governm~nt de-
crae ofc the leadsrs of the two countrinar Wi~h thm stipulation that the ingredienta
of the union, ard the establiahment of its agenciea within a single etste, be.com- -
- pleted within a maximum of 1 month. _
It is true that the goal which wes declared ae a motive for this union--to atand
- faat againat the i~uperialiet Zioniet al-Sadatiat schen~eo againat the Arab p eople
in genaral and the Paleaeinian pe~ple in particular--remains the contemporary -
na~tional goal which will require ths mobilization of various Arab capabilities in
order to be achievsd, whether in the form of broad nffective Arab sol~darity, ae
occurred at the Baghdad summit conforence, or in overal~l or partial Arab unione.
~ However, it ia also true that the heat of the national struggle is growing intense _
and complex, so that what is required is not Arab e~lidarity in any form Wha~ever
or unity in any form whatever; ra~her, the eixuation requiree an effective Arab
~ solidarity, groWing in atrength, setting �orth fro~m th~ minimum which the B aghdad
conference referred Go to higher and more aggresaive limita. Thie is what hap-
pened with the unanimoua Arab poeition on the Iraqi-Saudi declaration of confront-
ing "Iarael"'s ettempt to devour Jerusalem and declare it as its capital~ leading
- t~ a rapid poeitive reeponee on the part of tho interna~ional community, the Secur-
ity Council and the countriea which have diplomatic representation in Jerusalem to
boyzott "Israel" snd refuse to conaidar Jetusalem aa ite capital, within the limits
of a month apecified by the Iraqi-Saudi declaration, with the Arab and internation- _
~ al force and economic, petroleum and political force this statement acquired.
~ So That Lie May Avoid the Negative Peaturea of the Paet
- The same ia the case with respect to union between two Arab coun~ries in this
aphere. Unity ia needed, needed intensely and urgently, but on condition that it _
be affective end influential ir, the battle af confrontation, be purged of the neg-
ative features of the past, and not otop at tactical limite for purposes of ooten-
tation or for the attainment of particular intrinsic goals for one regime or anoCh-
er under the guise of national unity.
Moreover, unity does not lie in a vacuum; rather, it is an act within an ac tual
6ociopolitical aituation on numeroua international and Arab level~. ~lhat is import-
ant is that the resulta of the act ultimately be positive. There is no way Co
achieve that thtough enthusiastic wishes, emotiona and revolutionary elogans;
rather, it will come through the ability to build a"tool of action" whi.ch will
possese the resourcae for psevailing and interacting in a creative manner with the
circumstances ~urrounding it.
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Thn Syrian-Libyan union, in apits of the declaration of the unity resolution and
the comaitment to build a unity etste within a month, etill and in reality rernains
juat a plan on paper.
If thi~ plan i. proparly encouraged it will turn into reality and will not leap :
fram pape~c into life not by appla~u~a and enthu~ium but by putting the plan, pro-
cending from the premiie of unity, undar strong light, With ita varioua local,
national and internatianal economic, social, political and military dimensions.
The firet thing which attracts one'~ attention in the Syrian-Libyan unity plan is
tha urgent nature with which it ie characteriaed, to the point where one can wondar
how much rasponsibility and awaren4as of the danger� and circumatancea facing ir..
it containe.
The union ie eo astablish a marger atructure between tWO countries more than 1,200
kilometers apart, one of which li~s in the continent of Asie and the other in the
continnnt of Africa, in a maximum of 1 month. The question ia how can thia atate
= achieve u a?erger between ita two ~egm~nts,which are separated by thia enormous dis-
tance which tr~verse8 a number of countriee~ among them Egypt, where al Sadat's
- regime is located, supporeed by Camp David and Amerfcan military baees?
The iasue here concerns not just a union between two countriea on tvo continents--
a matter without precedent in ancient or ~i alhaeete and evenein their~inteles
which are radically different in their polit Y
lectual pr4mi~as and the format of atate in aociety in each.
- ~lhoever Playa Politica Is a Traitor
Syria is governed by a party which the Syrian con~titution explicitly atipulates
is the Arab Sociali~t Ba'th ~arty, which i~ prnaumed to have ita own socialiat and
nationaliet ideological premires. The format of the atate ia closeet to a presf-
- d~ntial ~ystam with a parliament posse~sing epecific powara. Libya, meanwhile, ie
baead on the principla that "whoever playe politics ia a traitor" and is fundament-
~ ally and abeolutely against the paxty ~ystnm. It haa its particular intellectual
_ .praTaisea, known as "the third international idaology," Which Preaideat al-Qadhdhafi
" haa ineluded in hie famoue green boole. Tha in~titutions of the stata sre founded
on a basis of ma~a government, a unique format without precedent in hiitory or
without a aimilar manifeatation in the p:esent. It ie founded on what are called
popular conferencea and revolutionary coumittees run by aecretari~s loyal_to the
- third ideology and "the aecretary and co~o~aad~r of the great 1%September/
revolution."
The question facing both Yresident al-Asad and President al-Qadhdhafi is What
format of atate and aociety the merger union state will rely on--the format of the
Ba'th Party and the preaidential ets.te or the format vf the popular confarences
and ~~s $androocial coursee willlitcbe~therida logy
ofnthenBaath Pattynorgthe@
political
third ideology?
4lhile the declaration of the union apacified a data of no more than 1 month to
construct the unified merger state, will this period be adequate to settle this
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profound difference between "the former Libya" and "the former Syria" in the
new etate?
It ir well known that Libya and Syria axe tWO charter n~mbare of tha Perenverance
- and SCeadfa~tne~s Front, the front which has di~tinguished itself within the frame-
_ work of the broe~d Arab aolidarity whiah wao con~olidated at the Baghdad auanmit con-
ference, in accordance with the premiae of confronting the new Lionist-imperialiet
onelaught via Cam~ David with a com~wn minimum which could be increased. The mem-
bers of thia front were to have comonitted themoeLves to a higher degree than th~
B~ghdad aumr*' *_'s minimum of confrontation struggle. Although it haa been observed
that thie maximum hae not been translated in�o practical influential acta and posi-
tiona--as happened with the members of the conf_erence o~ the minimum--does this
mean that d~.aputes between the membero of the Perseverance Front have inhibited
agreement over practical poaitions, and thQ implementaCioa of these positions, in
the proceea of confronting the Camp David treaty? The merger union between Syria
and Libya is a union between two members of the Perseverance Front in the faca of
' the other members of the front, who differ with them.
iihat are the pointe of agr.eement and pointa of dispute between Libya and Syria,
_ and with the other r~egimes? iihat ultimatelq ia the deetiny of the Pnrseverance
- F;ont ite~lf, following thi~ Syrian-Libyan polarization aro~and a aingle mergar
atat~?
Accord i::g to the political terminQlogy used on the ecene, Syria is a direct military
con�rontation etate With Iaraal, whereaa Libya ie a politieal, ~eonomie and militarq
~ support etdte.
However, the merger union between the two states into one ntate menns Libya~'s trane-
formaCion irom a support stste to a state in confrontation with Iarael. This, in
- ita subatantiva, not formal, ssnee, means, on the one hand, that Libyan military
power, with ita manpower and arm~unenta resourcea, will be shifted to the Syrian
front line with Iarael; on the other, it meana that Libya is preparing itself for
the p robability that Israel will atterapt an aggression against it by air, eepeci-
ally ~ ince Meaachem Begin, the enemy'a prime miniater and miniater of defanse, and
Rafae 1 Eytan, the Israeli chief of staff, have seiz~d the opportunity of the unity
declaration and its objectivas to claim that that constitutes "a probable military
danger to Israel" and will, in accordance with aell-known Israeli custom, be the
cover far aggreasion. This probabilitq with regard ta Isra~l rec;uires, on Libya's
part, aleo, the presence inside Libya of Syrian forces experienced in fighting the
enemy.
Personal Struggles
The queation therefore in the face of zh~se dangera and bu~rdens involves the poesi-
bility of inerging the Libyan and Syrian military forcea, with their human and arma-
ment resource,~, into one command in a long front line extending from Syria in Asia
- to Libya, within the limits to which thia merger can reach, its effectiveneas and
speed of movement, and the increasing domeatic opposition facing the regimea in
both countriea--not to mention the burdens Syria is bearing through ita military
- preaence in Lebanon and the burdena Libya is bearing with its African neighboss,
moat of which are turning into enemies. The aamn ia true of Libya's former ally
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Mintoff, preeident of the Republic of Malia. All observera axpect this opposition
will becon~ more intense in caming weeka because of th~ dispute between the tWo
countriea over the righta of each to drill for oil in the continental shelf, and
each parey's threat to use military foice against the other.
Before and after all cnis, there remains the fact that the struggle between the
~Ryptian regim~, which has made a conciliation with Iarael, and the Syrian and
Libyan regimea, has gone beyond the objective national cause over Camp David to
intense personal struggles between the three chiefs, al-Sadat, al-Asad and al-
Qadhdhafi, ir which the isaue, ae far as al-Sadat goes, is to get rid of al-Asad
and al-Qadrdai;., and convereely tha iasue, as far as both al-Aead and al-Qsdhdhafi
go, is to get rid of al-Sadat.
Theref ore the clash between Egypt and Libya, and reciprocal terrorist action be-
tween Egypt and Syria on each other's territory, create a aituation between the
heade of the thrae regimes, with ite own subjective explosive problems, which the
Syrian-Libyan unity etate must take into careful coneideration.
On the international level, with resgect to the connection with the current American-
5oviet atruggles in the A:ab r.egion, it i~ to be obeerved that Syria and Libya have
lately been prograsaing, in their international policb, whatgthelleadersiofVthe two
international polarization, in the aense that, going y

~ coe~ntriea have declared, if the United States of America ia the aodfather af Camp

y David and the e~eparate peace agreement between Bgy~t and Israel, and is baeically
intending to invade the a~xea by oolarizing Egypt along with a number of Arab count-
riee and eetablishing military bases there, the answer to~se~hi~~iC~eDavidlwithgthe
ment of all Arab countrias and powers hoatile to and opp
Soviet Union, on grounds that that is the international force which supports Arab
rights.
Syria and Libya are al4ne in declaring this poaition, because the other Arab count-
riea and forces, ahile not diffnring in def ining the nature and role of the posi-
tion of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Arab area in general and the
Arab-Ieraeli atruggle in particular, are, in the context ef the Baghdad eummit, op-
poaed to the policy of polarization in the region, because that would shift the
strugglea of the cold and hot war betWaan tha two giants to the Arab countries in
a way which Would turn the Arab-Iaraeli atruggle into a marginal part of the pro-
cees of internetional etruggla, instead of being tha focue of the collective action
of all Arab forcea poasessing an indnpendent poeition.
By virtue of the huuusn, economic and military powers it poseesses--if properly mob-
ilized and ueed--thia collective independent Arab poaition can also be the key to
Arab international relations, either by putting presaure on America and its iriter-
eeta in the rGgion or by formuldting selationahips of mutual cooperation on a baeia
of equality with the Soviet Union, whoee constructive role regarding Axab righte
is not danied, in the words of Prince Sa'ud al-Fayaal, foreign minister of the
~ingdom of Saudi Ar~bia, along with the incraaeing enticemant of forcea in Weatern
Europa from the American-Ierasli aphere to the Arab-Islamic �phnre and the third
werld. This ie aometiiS~a~aB Yenime if some$ofdtherArab nationfiatpolarizedtwith
Amarica, Israal and a 8
Washington and the reat with Moacow.
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Ar had been expected, a1~Sadat's regime and hia information media ventured to

= l~unch a~ AtCdck c,n the Syrian-Libytn union, from th~le �tand~point apecifically, -
- claiming that any Azab movament out~ida of or appos~i ta Caap David bore the marke
of th� Sovist� and did not arise from fre~ capable Arab vill, sincR, aa the Cairo
newspapsr AL-J(JI~4NRIYAH wrote, the baric point from which the Syriaa-Libyan uaion
plan proceede ie what the Perae~?erance and Steadfastneac Front atatae agreed on ~t
their last conference in Tripoli, Where the Soaiet Onion was promoted fram the rank
- of "friend" to that of "brother." -
Tha Sovfete, :~ha, in a significant aad limited way, welcomed the mergtg union,
hastened to imp lant the impreasion thst they, like others, were surprised at its
- declaration of it and that the union had objective conditions which had to be ptea-
ant along~ide the feelings of enthusiasm wbic~h accornpanied its declaration.
Thie iaitiative, in the estimation of ob8ervere, wa~ a clear c~essage to the Arabs -
and Amsricans together "not to make erroneouo calculatians and mix imQre~eiona of _
the facta on the aubject cf the Syrian-Libyan union." .
There remaf ns, firyally, the fact that the Syriaa-Libyaa union will from now on in ~
actual practice be facing the imsue of apell.ing out ita posttion on "united Arab
action" to oppose Camp David and of ehifting it frum the minimum levels to the
levela of poaitive defense and preparation for offenaive sites--action which pro-
ceeds from the Baghdad summit to the Tunis suu~i.t and the strategic economic-polit-
- ical summit which will be tuld in Jordan in November. _
This ig because this united Arab action, which has aaaumed the forn~at of broad Arab
eolidarity, is baee3 on the premise that the current etage is the etage of the -
national liberation of territory, the ecomomy and Arab resourcas fram colonialism,
Zioniem and Can~p David and the cetablishment of basee for building d camprehensive
developmental Ara~b economic integration. Coneequently, without ignoring or neglect-
ing the need to redistribute national reveaue in a juat manner and pxovfva basic
- freedom for Arab pPOple, the prevailing basic character ia the national character,
while the d ocumsnts on the Syrian-Libyan merger union and the speeches by Yreeidente ~
al-Ased and al-Qadhdlufi concentrate on the fact that the social isaue is the basic
prevailing chAracter of the curren~ stage, and that the iesue of socialiat conatruc-
tion ia the means to bring down Camp David and defeat the new Zionist-colonialist
onslaught.
In the declaration announced by LIBYAN JAMAHIRIYAH NEWS AGENCY u~.~cier tkie title
"The Tripoli tTnion Declaration" on 10 September, observPrs no[ed witla intereet the
fifth varagraph, which stipulated that "thP construcCion of Rocialism, in addition _
to being a necessity which arises from the needs of Arab socialism, is a basic
means Co cauae the powere of the massea to buret forth and move them forward in
their struggle for unity and aaainst Zionism, imperialism, and all elementA of
hack~ardness and reactien. Therefore, the struggle t~ build socialism in the
- union s~ate ia basic."
The union state, a^~ording to the text of the declar.ation~ ie first a base for the
mnvement of the Arab revolution (Peragraph Six), then a base a~ inotrument for con-
fronting the Zionist preeence in the Arab nation and liberating Palestine (Paragraph
Seven).
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The queation is, What poaition will the Syrian-Libyan uaion atate take, by giving
; the socialist cauee predomi.nance over the cauee of national liberation in this
atage of resistance to the Camp David onalaught? What will be its position on
united Arab action and its formula for salidarity, which i.ncludaa conservative re- -
ginat� aad countries, or at leaat ~tatee which do not accept socialism while in
ptactice ~tanding against Israel and Ziani~m?
. The que~tions concerning the Syrian-Libyan union are numerous and serioua.
= It would not be objective for ua to anticipate evente, or at least the period of a "
- month �tipuleted far establia!~ment of the staCe, in answering thsse que~tions.
Whatever the viewpoints, and Whatever the extent of the enthusiasm here or the
cau[ion there, the objective criterion for judging the Syriaa-Libyan union will Xe-
main a calculation of the gaina and losaea regarding the role of the new union
sta[e, in aupporting a~d devalaQing unity of Arab action for ito varioua pawera in
the vicious, multidiII?enaional battle of confrontatioa againet the Camp David treaty.
I;OP~IRIGHT: 1980 "AL-WATAN AL ARABI"
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ISLAMIC AFFAIRS -
DEVELOPMENT OF rNSLIM BROTHERii00D IN SYRIA DESCRIBED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 26 Sep-2 Oct 80 pp 21-26
[Article: "Question Seeking Answer: M~ualim Brotherhood"] -
[ExcerpteJ It is needlesa to say that the current poBitioa of the Muslim Brother-
hood is connected in oae way or another with the Brotherhood's initial start in
Egypt and with the pol~tical, social and iatellectual atmoaphere in which Shaykh
Aa~an al-Baana, the Brothexhood founder, grew up.
Brotherhood in Syria
Fundamentally~ Hasan al-Banna's call was not conf ined to Egypt. fle wanted this -
call to cover all parta of the Islamic world.
It was natural for al-Banna to send his advocates to the Arab countriea in an
attempt to dieseminate the Muslim Brotherhood's priaciples. If we review al-Banna's
book--"Memo3.rs of Call and of Advocate," publishQd by al-Maktab al-Islami (Islamic
Office], p 200--we can read a chapter entitled "Our Ca].1 in the Fratexnal Countries."
The flrst two envoys sent by the Brotherhood to Palestine, Syria and Lebanon were
'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sa'ati and Muhammad As'ad al-Hakim. The brotherhood's magaaine -
publiahed this report on the visit: -
"The readers have learned the newa of the dispatch of 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sa'ati and
Muhammad As'ad al-Hakim to visit the fraternal country and to sp~ead the ca11 in ~
all pa~ts of Syria and Palestine. We have received reports from them that they
arrived safely in Jerusalem on the moraing of Sunday, the Sth of Jumada al-Arawal,
in the company of Tunisian leader 31-Ta'alibi wha left Cairo with them on the
- evening of Saturday. His Eaainence *Suhammad Amin al-Husayai, the grand imam and
the chairman of the Supreme Islamic Council [in Palestiae], has accroded tl~e two
brothers warmeat welcome and sympathy."
A1-Banna tt~en devotes a chapter to discuas the Muslim Brotherhoad in Damascus and
a chapter to discuss the Brotherhood's caYl in Beirut (p 202, same refereace), noting
that al-Sa'ati and al-Halcim held contacts with the Islamic organizations ia these
two capitals and that the Charitable al-Maqasid Society had asked the general head.-
~ quarters to send it one of the brothers ro teach legislation and literature.
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Thus, the call started to spread in Syri.~, Palestinso Sudan, Lebanon, the Arab
Maghreb and other places as of the 1930's. _
Because the epace available to us here does not permit us to discues the Brother-
hood's development in all these countriee, we will focus here on the Muslim
Brotherhood in Syria because af this Brotherhood's recent rise to the surface of
- the events there and because of ite daily clashes with the re~ime.
' If we cast a glance on the history of the Muslim Brotherhood rise in Syria, we
would find that in the wake of Hasan al-Banna's emergence in Egypt in the 1930's,
the Syrian students in al-Azhar--who numbered in the hundreds at the time--were
influenced by the call and tried to aet up similar organizationa. Upon their -
retur:? to Syria, they established in it Islamic societies which spread throughout
the various governorates. The Muha~amad Youth Society rose in Damascus, Dar al-
Arqam Society rose in ~+leppo aad the Islamic Society Rose in Damascus.
When those societies gaiaed a degree of stability, they coatacted the muslim Brother-
hood in Egypt and eatabl.iehed such firm relations with it that it was decided to
set up a united Muslim Brotherhood arganizatioa iu Syria including all thoae _
societies. The Muslim Brotherhood's centera of influenca were in Hamah, AlepPo
and Damascus.
W'hen the Brotherhood was formed in Syria, its leadership was asswned by Dr Muatafa _
al-Siba'i, the well-kaown leader from Soms, who retained this leaderehip in the
1940's and 1950's and until the move~meat was dis~olved in the wake di the S~rian-
Egyptian unity in 1958.
Political inactivity then dominated the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Aowe~ier, the
movement coatinued its campaign to revive the idea of the Islamic syatem. -
Reaumed Activity and Subsequent Ban
During the secession period, i.e. ia 1961, the Muslim Brotherhood organization ~~as
permitted to resutne its activities.
_ In that atmospherQ, the Islamic groups in Syria held in 1962, under t~e umbrella of
- the Muslim Brotherhood, the biggest Islamic conference in the hist~ry of Damascus.
'Isam al-'Attar was elected grand rnaster (muraqib 'amm] of the Muslim Brotherhood
in Syria in the presence of Dr Mustafa al-Siba'i who died in 1964.
'Isam al-'Attar played a prominent role in Syria's political life and was elected
- deputy for Damascus in 1962. But whea a coup was staged in 1963, the Muslim
Brotherhood organizatioa was banned.
Zn 1964, 'Ieam al-'Attar went to perform hie pilgrimage. Dpon his return~ he was
prohibited from eatering Syria despite hie repeated attempts. He thus went to
the city of (Akhen) in West Germany where he hae headed the Islamic Center (Bilal's
Moeque) and fram where he has been directiag the Muslim Brotherhood organization.
The Syrian arena has not been confined to the aforameationed Muslim Brotherhood
organization but hae also seen the emargence ~f radical Islamic movements,
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including the Islamic Liberation Partq [hizb al-tahrir a1-Islami] which was founded -
- bq Taq~.-al-Din al-Nabhani, a Palestinian, in 1951 and 1952~
. This party still relies on cells that are epread in a number of Arab countries.
Let ue retura to the Muslim Brotherhood Armed Organization which is domiaating the
Syrian arena at present. This is an organlzation which broke away from the Muslim
Bootherhood (of al-'Attar) and called itself the Strugglers' Fighting Vanguard
[al-tali'ah al-�muqatilah li al-mu~ahidia]. It started with political assassinations~
- and with the issuance of a publication called AL-I~'ADHIR ~The Herald] which carries
the organizat{.on's political and military etatements.
This organization was founded by the late Mazwan Hadid, a leader from Hamah who
led the Hamah revolt of Y964.
However, the atrugglers appeared in lxrge r.umbere in 1975 when Marwan Hadid decided
to tranefer the battle to Damascus and m~tde hie famous announcement that "the
regime will not disappear except with the formation of armed groups to aseaseinate
the regime'a leadera."
In fact, Hadid did actually atart leading the operations in Damascus and young men
and women not exceading 15 years o~ age started to join the organization.
Marwan did not laet long. The special uaits and the defense garrisone arrested him
after a heated b attle which was led by Rif'at al-Asad personally and in which a
helicopter was used to land troops on the top floor of the building occupied by
Marwan and his comrades. Maxwan died in prisoa ae the result of cruel torture.
~ But Marwan Hadid's death strengtheaed the resolution of the organiza~tifln atrugglers
and motivated them to carry out further assassinations which caused the regime to -
lose ita composure. However, the organization lost its leaders one after the other _
and Sal im Muha~ad al-flamid, the son of Muhammad al-Hamid who is considered one of
Syria's prowinent imams, was killed. -
The Strugglers' Fighting Vanguard's leadership was then asaumed by Engineer 'Adnan
'Uqlah [who was either killed or arrested~ at hie headquartere in Aleppo. Moreover,
the other Muslim Brotherhood leaderc have been disperaed, including Sa'id Hawa, the
author of "God's Soldiera" which is considered the combat constitution and the
- revolutionary course of the Muslim Brotherhood groups in Syria.
Hawa was released in 1977 a~d lives presently in one of the Gulf states.
A part of the military aupport received by the Muslim Brotherhood can be traced
to the Muslim Brotherhood group in Lebanon.
There is no doubt that the Muslim Brothers with their various inclinations have
constituted and contiuue to conetitute a source of major concerns for the Syrian
regime. Perhaps the biggest concern is the degree by which the Muslim Brotherhood
gupporters have infiltrated the policy and the army. The previous experiences of
the Brothers in Egypt and in Syria did prove that the movement had succeeded in
creating extensions for f.tself in the military sectors. This is the bone that the
regime is trying to avoid swallowiag and this is what explains the changea that
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- [Haftz] al-Asad has made in the army and military police co~aands aince last July
when four members of the military police, led by the first lieutenant, hurled two ~
grenades. which did not explode, on his car. `
This, briefly, is the Brothers' trip from Egypt to Syria.
Naturally, the movement raises a big and many-sided question that deals with the
real program that thia movemeat is trying to carry out, with the movement'R relations
with the other inf luential forces exiating on the A~ab arena, with the future of _
these relations and with the "syetem" that the movemc~at believes must be eatablished,
not to mention the future of the movement itself.
The Brotherg are trying nowadays to put back together the "image" of al-Banna and
of hia movea:ent which has been ahaken by the passage of time. To what degree will
they succeed':
The t~ig queation continues to be raiaed for discussion.
CUPYRIQiT: 19~8~0 AL-WATAN AL-AP.ABI -
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ALGERIA
AGREEMENTS AUGUR TURN IN AI.GERIAN-FRENCH RELATIONS
Paria AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 29 Sep 80 p 34
(Article by Youcef Adrari: "Algiera-Paris--The Thaw"]
[Text) The agreements signed in Algiers inaugurate a new pha8e
in the relations between France e.nd Algeria. But it is etill -
necessary for Paris to do ite part!
- Relationa between Paris and Algiere, frozen for several months, have just undEr-
gone a significant detente, marked by the signing, in the Algerian capital, of
an agreement on a number of points, thereby lightening the heavy diapute between
_ the two countries.
' The negotiationa, which lasted several months, were laborious, intenae. And had
it not been for the real deaire of the two countriea to achieve at least an
egreement capable of thawing the situation, they wou~d have led to nothing, ae
- had been feared at the beginning o� this summer. _
In effect, Jean Francois-Poncet, miniater of foreign affaira, wao to pay an of-
fi~ial viait to Algiers on 12 July in return for the visit made by hia Algerian
- counterpart Mohamed Benyahia at the beginning of this year. His ciait was poat- ~
poned "for schedule reasons." It was doubtleasly deaired, both in Algiers and
in Parie, to let the decieions ripen further and to clear the ground in such a
way that--as was the case--this visit would be crowned with success.
_ Some Major Trump Cards
In both capitals, the clima~e of serenity and cordiality that pre~ai