JPRS ID: 9438 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 19
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/9438
11 December 1980
Wes~ Europe Report
CFOUO 52/80) ~
- FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2
NOTE
JPRS publications con[ain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials ~rom foreign-language -
sources are translated; those from English-language sources ~
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and ~
- other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
_ last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclos~ed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the tody of an
- item originate with the sourr_e. Times within items are as
' given by sour.ce.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OW~IERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIV REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF TfIIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300064419-2
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/943F3
11 December 1980
W~ST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 52/80) _
CONTENTS
~ THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
_ INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Views on Security, Cooperation Conference in Madrid
(DEFENSE ET DIPLOMATIE, 17 Nov 80) 1
~ SPAIN
Ore~a, Ruperez Formulaee Spanish Positions on CSCE Issues '
(Antonio Sanchez-Gi~on; EUROPA-ARCHIV, 25 Oct 80)............ 4
ENERGY ECONOMICS
F~ .
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Progress in Conserving Energy Reported
(Kurt Breme; STERN, 30 Oct 80) ............................o.. 15
CdUNTRY SECTION
INTERi1ATI0NAL AFFAIRS ~
Briefs
Tank Outlook Reviewed 17
F ItANC E
PSF's Dilemma, IVumerous Candidates Mark 1981 Election
(Thierry Pfister; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 27 Oct-2 Nov 80).... 18
How Garaud Affects RPR's Chirac in 1981 Electfons
(Georges 2�famyy LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 3-9 Nov 80)............ 23 -
- PSF's Mitterrand-Rocard Duel: Analysis of Styles, Beliefs
(Robert Schneider; L'EXPRESS, 18-24 Cct 80) 26
On Opposite Sides, by Robert Schneider
Mittei~.rand's Position, by Arthur Conte
- a - [zzi - WE - 150.FOUO~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Manufacture, Modernization of Tank Turrets Described
(Pascal Gambiez; ARMEES D'AUJOURD' IiUI, Oct 80) 33
Briefs
Conscientious Ob~ectors 37
SPAIN
Markiegui Defines Political Philosophy of L~uskadiko Eskerra
(Xabier Markeigui; C.AMBIO 16, 26 Oct 80) 38
Ultrarightist Carmona Reveals Biographical Details, Former Contacts
(CAMBIO 16, 19 Oct SO) .......................e............... 40
_b_.
" FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
THEAT~R NUCLEAR FORCES INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS _
VIF.?vS ON SECURITY, COJPERATION CONFERENCE IN MADRID
Paris DEFENSE ET DIPLOMATIE ir. French 17 Nov 80 pp 3-5
[Text] CSCE--The Chances of Detente and the Frospects of Disarmament _
The Madrid Conference has just opened in an atmosphere of uncertainty:
During the hours following this opening, nobody was able to say anything
about the conference's survival chances. The very definite hardening of
the Soviets over the past several days caused many worries particularly _
among the member countries of the Warsaw Pact and the neutral and nonalined
countries which were afraid that a failure or even an adjournment might
jeopardize the entire CSCE process and, through it, whatever is left of _
detente. Nobody wanted to appear to be responsible for a rupture which
would have serious diplomatic consequences in Europe. On top of that
there is another factor of paralysis: The results of the American elec-
tion, the vagueness r.egarding the intentions of the president-elect and
his team regarding questions of defense and arms controls and a possible
reorgani2ation c~f American-Soviet relations would lead one to think that,
so long as thi.s situation lasts, there will be no real prospects ~f
specific results at Madrid. For the Soviets, the overall balance seems ; `
to be in doubt: The new Congress has little chance of ratifying SALT II,
such as it was si~ned in June 1979. Washington will ui.3oubtedly have a
different and more stubborn approach regarding SALT III and there is
already talk in circles close to Reagan about the neutron bomb. Under
these conditions, discussions or pro~ects pertaining to security and
cooperation in Europe, considered in Moscow (and, by the way, in
Washington) as depending on strategic ratios between the two super powers,
have little chance of leading anywhere. To the extent that the conference
continues its work in spite of everything, we will be able only by the
_ start of next year to evaluate the chances of success or failure of the
CSCE process. Until such time as we know what the modalities of a
"wait-and-see compromise" might be, one can evaluate the prospects of
the conference concerning the issues of security and disarwament.
USSR--Trying to Be Patient
The Americans have hinted that the participation of the United States
has good chances of being maintained after 20 January. Right now,
there appear to be two major limitations that guide the attitude of _
1
F~R OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2
- FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY -
the Amer.~can delegation: First of all, the fact that the debate on the
review of the implementation of the Final Act and above all the problem
~f humar. rights and the prob lem of the invasion of Afghanistan, must ~
not be short-circuited or pushed through too fast; then there is the
fact that the questions of security and disarmament must in the future
not be separated from other p roblems. Over the past several days,
aeveral diplomats from the State Department admitted the worthwhile ~
naCure of a conference on security and confidence-building measures
but they stressed the fact that such an undertaking could be accepted
oiily within the formal framework of the CSCE process.
The Soviets seem to be trying to be patient. The USSR is waiting for
_ the end of the storm (the debate on the review) and for the clarification ,
af the situation on the new rules of the game of detente which the team
of Mr. Reagan will come out with. In the meantime, the delegations from
the countr~as of the Wars,aw Pact are concentrating their efforts on the
military aspects of detente within the context of CSCE and are trying
to promote one of the key concepts of Soviet diplomacy, military deCente.
Moscow counts very much on the interest expressed by most of the countries
of Western Europe (members of the alliance, neutrals, or nonalined) for
the organization of an All-European conference devoted to the military
aspects of detente. In view of the remote prospects of SALT III and the
- lack of progress in the MBFR, such a forum would renew and formalize the `
East-West dialogue on arms coatrals. 5everal conference proposals are
y ready for filing: The Polish conference project on military detente
anci disarmamen~ in Europe which would be held in Warsaw (confidence-
_ building measures, nonexpansion of blocs, nonuse of nuclear arms in
a first strike), a Finnish p roposal, several proposition5 coming from
neutral and nonalined countries aimed above all at the nature and con- ,
ditions of the application of confidence-building measures. Finally,
there is the French conference project on disarmament in Europe (EDC),
announced since 1978; since then it has been the object of numerous
dlscussions with the principal countries concerned, especially the FRG
and the USSR. Tne French pro~ ect for the EDC has already been backed
by [he Yine, the Council of Europe, and the Atlantic Council.
Zone Against Mandate: Prosnects of EDC Project
- The French project was from the very begiuning divided into two phases.
The first portion concerns the insti~ution of confidence-building
measures. The second portion deals with possible limitations of con- ~
ventional forces on that territory. Paris is very.hostile to the
Eurostrategic framework and rules out all nuclear arms, feeling that a
European framework (including the USSR~ the countries of the Pact and _
the We;tern Europe countries but not the United States) makes it im- ,
- possible to define the conditions that would satisfy a limitation of
these arms. This exclusion of atomic arms for the time being remains
a point of profound disagreement with the countries of the East and
2
FOR OFFICI~`.L L'SE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300064419-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
n~kes the second stage of tiie EDC project rather uncertain to say the
least. Discussions might therefore be st~rCed early in 1981 on the
ba~is of the ~DC project reduced to its first half. Together with the
other proposals, this project--if it were possible to get things going
un the first level--might be filed with the conference (in other wor.ds,
undoubtedly prior to an examination of the review) in order to be
studied in committee.
The confidence-building measures proposed by France dealing with
rnilitary activites by air and ground forces on European territory
present two main characteristics which differentiate them from those
provided and applied in the framework of the Final Act and those
proposed in the other projects: Inforniation on activities by military
forces, notiticati_ons regarding maneuvers and verification through the
participation of observers would be mandatory and would be applied to
= the entire European territory (from the Atlantic to the Urals}, that is
to say, also t.o all of Soviet territory. The basic idea behind the
EDC project, as presented by Quai d'Orsay [French Foreign Office] is to
wind up once again bringing up the question of ~he zone of appiication
of the confidence-building measures provided for in the Final Act. These
confidence-building measures as a matCer of fact apply only "to maneuvers
taking place within a zone having a depth of 250 kiiometers from the
border whicf~~ faces any other participating European state," in other
words, they exclude almost all of Soviet territory. It is said in Paris
that, regarding tt~e problem of extend~ng the zone, a stubborn position
will he maintained regardless of what may happen.
The USSR would very much like the Madrid conference to come out with a
decision to summon a European conference on disarmament. The latter
would enable the countries of Western Europe to dissociate themselves
. from the positions of NATO and the United States; it would cor.stitute
an excellent political-military "movir.g force" for the development
of. economic and technological cooperation; it would finally satisfy
ttie wishes of the other countries of the Warsaw Pact cohich are concerned
with strengr.hening detente and iimiting treir military ef�~rts. In
Paris it is felt thus that concessions on the zone would be the price
to pay by the USSR so that a mandate for a such a conference would be
obtained at Madrid.
'The Soviet hardening and the procedural blocka~es in any case have a
tendency to stiffen thE respective positions oF the countries of the
~ A.lliance and ttiose of the Warsaw Pact. The former have made the
problem of the examination of the review an imperative condition for
' the continuation of discussions and France, for e~cample, does not
expect to drop that demand in order to save the EDC. The latter,
and especially the US~R, seem to believe that the benefits to be
cierived fromthe conference could well be less i.mportant than the nega-
tive fallout.
COPYRIGHT: 1980, GrouFe Jeune Afrique
5058 3
CSO: 3100
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2
. `
FOIt OFFI('IAI, I~SE ONI,Y
THEATER NIICLEAr~ FORCES SPAIN
OREJA, ~IIPEREZ FORMUI~ATE SPAAISH POSITIOAS OA CSCE ISSUES
Bonn EUROPA-ARCHIY in German 25 Oct 8C pp 615-624 ~
~rticle by Secretary General of (Madrid) Institute for Inter-
national lftairs Antonio Sanchez-Gi~on :"Spain as Host of Second
Follm~w-IIp Meeting of CSCE~7
~ezt7 Cha.nges in Spain's Foreign Policy Outlook
The choice of Madrid as a CSCE site following the first two meet-
ings in Helsinki and Belgrade aeemed to indieate tbat this third
- conterance dedicated to the preservat~on of detente and European
dialogue was once more being held in the capital of a neutral or
- non-aligned country. But l~i;adrid doea not really ~it the pattern;
it is the otficial seat of a weetera government negotiating for
admission to the Buropean Community and intent on ~oining 1~AT0.
The cha.ngee in appearance are as pronounced as the changes in
actual fact. V~hen the Final Act of Helsinki wae signed in 1975,
Spain wa6 still going through the last atages of the authoritarian
Franco regime; it was isolated from the rest of S~rope politically, -
wae scarcely interested irr world a~faira and racked by internal
controverey. By the time the Belgr~de meeting ended Spain had elec-
ted ita first democratic parliament and was in the process of draw-
ing u~ the most modern constitution in E'urope providing far a demo-
cratic eyetem of pariiamentary monarchy. Internationally, however,
the government appeared to be pursuing a somewhat selective policy
vis-a-vis Europe, giving preference to the Suropeaa Communitq and
not to NATO. The governmen~'s policies were based on econoffiic re-
lations with ~cirope and political relations with I,atin America and
the Arab world, wi~th a growing tendency tor+ard non-alignment which
cu+minated in a Spa.nish "observer delegation" taking part in the -
1979 conference af non-aligned nations in Havana. 1~oM, in 198U,
at the outeet of the third round of CSC~, Spain has a conslitution
which embodies the political a.nd human rights as well as the basic
principles goveirning European cooperation as contained in the Hel-
sin~i Final Act . But Spain also ezperiencee the unpleaeant feel-
ing that the outside world it has traditionally ignored and to
which it has paid some attention ix~ the recent past i~ aold, tough,
selfieh and that it ig not too well equipped or well-placed to
4
FOR OFF[C[AL USE dNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2
FOR OFFICIAI, 11~~: ONL.Y
deal rvith this outaide world skillfully and euccessfully. On the
otherhand, Spaia for the firet time in yease ia ~aced with a
eerions domegtic contro~ersy oqer a foreign policy isaue-�- that
- of ~ofniag a0T0 by 1983. ~~e debats on th~a is~uo will ogen in
1981, shortly after the conclusion of the Madrid conf~rence.
To what an extent ie this apparent cb.a.ngs in 3pa~in' e internrationa.l
poeition due to greater maturity on tha part o~ the polf tice~l tor- _
cee which constitute the government formed by the IICD un.der Minis-
ter Preeiden~c Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez or which ~uppo~t thie govern-
ment or to the doctrinal an~ political ad~ustment8 of its foreign
policy goals ? To vha.t an extent ia {t due to adapting to an out-
- side world which turns out to be leas friendly than was hoped and
is less prepared than wae ezpe~ted to let itself be discomfited by
a new an3 unconstrained member of the international community ?
- These queat~ons are diff icult to answer, since there are no poli-
tical criteria bp which to ~udge thetn: there haa been no ma~or
de~nate on foreign policy in the Spa.nish parliament $ince it was
' conatituted following the elections of 1 March 1979. During the
election campaign, for~eign policy i~suea were scarcely mentioned.
Thealection results by and large reflected the tendency of the
country to rally around two moderate par~iea-- ane of these, the
U~D belmngs to the center by its o~vn definition, and the other,
the PSOI:, belongs to the l~ft wing. The parties of the right
suffered aevere losses while the PCE regietered amall gains. The
election reaults, however, r+ere not marked by this confirmation
of baeic poli~ical preferences but by the vigorous showing of
regional and nationalistic partiee which hae given rise to great
- concern with resgect to the organization~.l. structure of the
Spa.nish state. In 1980, the decisive ~uestion is not what Spain's
role in the E~ropean eystem will be, but how the Spanish system
itself will be structured.
Under the circumstances, the criteria which determine Spa~i$h
foreign policy are difficult to make out. Things become even more
difficult, if one takes into account that this foreign policy con- _
eiders mere gesturea as important ar even more important than
official declarations. As a rule, it ie the Minister Pre$iden~
who makee the gestures. Mfh~never there is a question of laying
d~wn a concrete, official political courae domestically or inter-
nationally, he uaually is quite tight-lipped. But he becomes posi-
tivelg garruloua on world and security issaes whenever the oppor-
tunity ari8es for talks with a ma~or international figure or for
letting hie light shine in the exclusive circles to which ~ourna- _
liats on his special list and influential members of Spa.niah
eociety have accesa. One of his unforgettable gesturea was the
first embrace of Y~esir Arafat by a weat European head of govern-
ment; also his conversation with a mini$ter of the sa-called In-
, dependent ~~mocratic Republic oY Sahara, which Spain does not
recognize; h3s didactic co~versatiQn witi~ President Carter in the
course of which he appears to have afforded the American President ~
~ 5
F'OR OFFICIAL [iSE ONL,Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300064419-2
F()R OFFI('!AL UtiF ONI.Y
a deep inaight into the aecreta of the Arab queation; hia open
eupport ~or the social damocratic Presidential candidate in Yene-
zuela, whose opponent ~hen won the election; the Quito declaration
of ~979 abaadoned ite traditionally neutral poeition and condemned
the authoritarian regimea of I,atin America~ and the Lima declaration
- of summer 1980 condemning the military coup in Bolivia which etill
ia part of the community of Hispanic peoples, an endQavor to which
_ the Spaniah head of government has assigned high priority in the
interna~ional field.ia
Baaic Policy on A~adrid Meeting
The cumberaome task of spelling out the government�s official
foreign policy fell to Marcelino Ore~a Aguirre, who wae ~oreign
minister for 4 yeara untll early Septembe~ 1980. Ore~a is an e=-
perienced and patient diplomat. Throughout hia term in office, he
wae at pa~ne to effect an intellectual and political reconciliation
between the many different tendenciea which have a bearing on Spain's
role in international affaira. Nonetheless, there is some dispute
. ae to his record, since he neither appears to have been a mere exe-
cutor of Adolfo Suarez' foreign policy aime, nar for that ~atter
one of the main architects of government policy in the internatio-
~ nal field. The fact that he was replaced by Joae Pedro Perez Llorca
in the coure~ of the cabinet c~ieis in September 1980 doea not
point to important changee in basic Spaniah policy vie-a-vis CSCF;
the criteria for thi$ policy having been laid dorun previously. Im-
mediately after he was sworn into office, Peres I?lorca made his
firat public appearance when he opened the CSCT preparatorp meet-
ing on 9 September. Afterrrards, he told the preas: "The cabinet
reehuffle will not bring a change in policy. This is a UCD govern-
ment, and I will fol~.ow the aame line ae my predecessor."
There ie some ~u~tification therefore to base any analysie of the
Spanish position on the statements made by Marcelino Ore~a over
the paet monthe. ~e looked at.CSCE along strictly rvestern lines,
underscoring this attitude of his by charging Ambaeaador Javier
Ruperez with the preparation of the conference as well a$ its
diplomatic and political direction. Ruperez belma~gs to the Atlantic
wing of the foreign aff~i~a communitp and until recently held the
post of IICD secretary for international affairs.
Ore~a's assessment of CSCE'e Yuture and of the ?sadrid conference
ie based on a pessimistic eetimate of the w~rld situation: '~The
- start of the eighties is characterized bp a marked reversal in the
climate of detente which has been dom~nant in the relations between
the auperpowers over the past aeverai yea~3.n2 He added that "a
criais atmosphere guch as has not ezisted. since World War II" hae
arisen. To meet this challenge, "the we~tern world must take con-
certed action and demonstrate solidarity in order to devise a
eontainment strategy and to work toward political negotiations
6
~OR OFFICGIL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300064419-2
i~Oit UFF7('i:11. l'tiH: O'~L.Y
aimed at le$sening teneion in areas which t~uch on European inter-
ests directly or indirectly." The reference to containment etrategy
is of particular relevance in ~ieW of Oreja'~ naving stated some ~
weeks earlier that Spain would apply for NATO membership. In Ore~a s
viewo the conflict situation takee fn a"crisis arc" reaching "from
- Afghanieta.n to the frontiera of the Maghreb"-~- which means right up
to S ain's backyard (even if the minister declined to saq so out
loud~. Detente can be reetored, if canditiona are created which
favor the salutiora of the American hostage c~isis in Iran as well
as a negotiated settlement leading to the complete and final with-
drawal o~ Soviet '~rvops from Af~haaietan and a s~aluticn of the
Near East problem rvhich is where "the kep to peace, security and
stahility for the whole are~ is to be found," according to Ore~a.
The Spa.nish miniater st~ongly denied the contention tha.t the hold-
- ing o~ the CSCE Follow-U~ Meeting in Madrid might have a bearing
on Spain's pla.ns to ~oin NATO which had after..ali been made part
of the governing party's platform prior to the eelection of Madrid
as the eite of the new CSCS meeting. "It seems as though some
countries thought t~ey might bring some influence to bear on
questione concerning Spain alone in connection with the CSCE meet-
ing," ~re~a tol~ the press on eeveral occasions. "That is unaccept-
able."3 It may be as$umed that Oreja was referring to the Soviet
Union, among other countriea. In fact, a number of high-ranking
Soviet spokeamen had let it be laiovm that the Soviet Union was
oppoaed to Spain's ~oining the alliance, stating that they con-
' 8idered it inadvisable to expand the power blocs at a time when
detente was bearing practical re$ults. Furthermore, they said,
the choice ot I~Iadrid as the eite for CSCE could be viewed as a
= kind of recognition of Spain"a impartial policy toward the blocs.4
- The connection between the Afghani8tan probleID a.nd Spa.in'e deci$ion
to move more quickly toward AATO membership ia reflected in the
following statement by Ore~a: "We hope the Soviet Union wi11 be
coming to thi~ (CSCE) meeting after making a.n effort toward a
eolution of the Afghani8tan crisis. This crisis is the reaeon fo~
a certain cooling-off o~ relations between Madrid and Moacow which
had been developing quite eatiefactorily over the past several
months prior to the Afghanistan issue'a becoming acute.~~5 But thi3
statement left the question una.nsr+ered of how far the invasion of
Afgha.nistan hae in~luenced a Spaniah government decision which
might equall~r well have been taken one year hence.
But the minister was at pains to deny any trace of a militant,
anti-Soviet attitude and laid stress at all times to the fmportance
Spain attaches to a continuation of the detente proceas. In his
vierv, the following criteria were characteristic of detente:
1. Detente can neither be equated with peace, nor with cold war.
2. It is a dynxmic situation; a continuing process with its ups
and downs. 3. Detente goes beyond a purely military dimension to
7
FOR OFF[CIAL USE O~IL Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2
Hc~K oF~~trt:~i. ~.~sE: ~~v~.~~
include the broad areas of security, cooperation and the respect
for human rights. 4. Detente must be of global and nc~t merely
Euro~ean scope. 5. There is no detente without aecurity; but there -
can be ao ~ecurity without d~velopment and no sievelopment without
a respect for human rights.
Spain's ambaseador to the Madrid conference, Javier Ruperez, con-
cur~ wit~ Ore~a on the value of detente, but has taken a polemical
stance in opposition to unxarranted assertions concerning Spanish
fareign policy. p0ur goal of ~oining ~1AT0," the ambaasador told
~ournaliste, "does not have an untoward effect on the con~erence =
for aecurity and cooperation. The role of hoat daes not make Spain
a captive a,nd its freedom of action in the western world is not !
impaired thereby."6 The ambassador stresaed that "the govArnment
has not agreed to any conditions eo ae to have Spain aelected as
the site o~ CSCTs. On the other hand, the Soviet Union may have
harbored $ome illusions in this regard. It is also possible that
there will be a vote to have the nezt CSCE mesting take place in
eome Ea~stern or weatern country-- a~ter all, each of the 35 parti-
cipating countriea en~oys equal righte."7 -
Since the ~oreign policy of democratic Spain has no~ yet gone
beyond the formative stage, one may well ask hox much of an in- _
fluence individuals have had na its formulation. Tn Buperez' case, -
one must take hia extensive knowledg~ of the origins, the prin-
ciples and proceedinge of the H~lainki conference into aecount
which he attended from start to finiah. He ~old of his ezperiences
in a book entitled "Europe between Fear and Hope."8 As chief of
cabinet to foreign minister Oreja, he had preferred access to
diplomatic data and first-hand reports. I,ater on, as the UCD'e
$ecret~ry for international relations, he was given the ~ob of im-
proving the image of the party as a member of the allia.nce of the
other centrist, conservative partie8 of Europe and to give it more
vieibi].ity. In this poat, he also had an opportunit~r to help alter
the goverr~ent's vi~ws regarding the Maghreb crisis by modifying
the latent anti-Moroccan post~~re of the "elita8" ot a centrist
party which v+as un~+illing to drop nornaally progreasive positions
to benefit the left xing, auch ae ~he de~ense oP the Sahara.n people
and of the Polisario Front. Kidnapped bq the Ba.sque terroriat orga-
nization ~TA in Novsmber 19?9 and released one month later, his
pereonal ezperiencea were bound t~ lead to eatremely negative ~~ew~
regarding the connections betrreen Karxist-Leniniat, seceasi~:~ist ~
Basque terrorism and the so-called revolutionar~r regimes the _
Arab world. Chargee that ETA hae been receiving support from the
governmenta of Algeria, Zibya and South Yemen as well as from the
PLO in the establishment of train3.ng camps in Leba.non have had a
salutarg e~lect in moderating Spa~eish policiee, which geaerally
favor the Arab cause a.nd have returned them to the plane of
realism.
8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 20Q7/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R04Q34Q06Q019-2
,
I~OR OF'I~l('I.til, l~tiF' OtiI.Y
At any ra~e, Ruperez' appointment as amba.ssador to CSCE hag led to
. eeveral hard and deci9ine statements. When Ruperez was asked fo~r -
hia viewg on Spain's participation in the non-aligned aumr~it in
_ Hanana in 1979, he csaid: "That was a calamit~r."9 When asked to
comntient on Brezhnev's warnings to Spain not to ~oin IagTO, Ruperez
answered: pIn this world we all have our own ideae as to what
othere ehould do. For m part, I would advise other countriea to
leave 1;he Warsaw Pact."~d
_ Do ~t~.temente such as these by the CSCE ambassador. indicate that
- Spain will adopt a hard and hostile poeition vis-arvis ths Sovi~t
tinion ? Certainly not. Without a doubt, theae atatemants reflected
the splrit of the u~oment and not matter~ of substance. Besidea, ~
Ruperez was not going it alone; this position was by and large
adopted by the governJaent particularly im~eediately following ~he
viait by~ Soviet foreign minister Gromyko to Madrid in Noveffiber
19?9 and the invasion of ~fghanistan. Both events had a negati.ve
impact on political circles and on publ.ic opinion-- lfghantst~n
particula.rly oa the latter. The substance of ~1ne Spanish poaition,
at least ineofar as it is represeni;ed by ambassador Ruperez (who
also is an important source of information as regards the diplo-
- matic decisione affecting CSCE) w~s given concrete expresaion by
him in the following statement:"I am in favor of optimistic skep-
ticiam. I am not one for a great many illusions. I]mow very well
what the conference can bring ab~ut and what it ean.not. I hope we
cau get a step ahead there."'i~
Which conditions need to be met in order to make thia step ahead
- poe~fble ? The id~a of bal~.ncing out the gariaus CSCE compon~ents
is of decieive importance. "We are going on the assumption that
it is important for the work of the con~erence to strike a balance
between the different aspecte of it. The idea is," Ruperez says,
"to achieve a balance between the two great tasks entrust~d 'co this
conference: between the thoroughgoing assessment ae regarde the
fuliillment of the provisiona of the Final Act by all signatories
and the preaentation o1' new proposals designed to intensif~ tha
efYorts already undertaken to improve securitg and develop co-
operation."12
This balance concept can be widened to include the subject matter
of the CSCE negotiations. "Success or failure of the Ma.drYd CSCE
- meeting will depend on whether real pro~;ress can. be made in gimul-
taneously continuing to develop the chapters or baskets comprising
the Helsinki Final Act," Rupere~ said. "It is therefore inconceiv-
able that agreements on, let us say~ economic or milita~r coopera~
tion could be reached in Madrid rithout at the saame time arriving
at certain concrete deciaions a~out human rights practices in the
countries Mhich took part in the Helainki del=berations."13
~
.
9
FOR OFFICIAL I~SE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060019-2
F'OR