JPRS ID: 9219 EAST EUROPE REPORT POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070002-9
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9467
. 2 January 1981
Near East ~lar~ h Africa R~ ort
. p
CFOUO 1 /81)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE -
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JPRS L/9467
2 January 1.9 81
.
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT ~
(FOUO i/s~)
CONTENTS
JORDAN
Success of al-Ghawr Agricultural Project Described
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 7-?3 Nov 80) 1
LEBANON
Raymond Iddah Discusses Domest~~; Regional Issues
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 14-20 Nov 80) 4
Citizens Exploit Urban Chaos, Take Over Property of State
(AL-WATAN AL-'AR.'~BI, 7-13 Nov 80) 13
_ LIBYA -
UK.Correspon~:ant Interviews al-Qadhdhafi
(Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi Interview; NOW!, 5 Dec 80)............ 19
'THE TIMES' Accused of Spreading Rumors
(Karan Thapar; THE TIMES, 13 Dec 80) 22
MOROCCO
Rabat Intensifies, Diversifies its Diplomatic Effort
(t1ARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 14 Nov 80) 23 -
PERSIAN GULF AREA
- Correspondent Describes Gulf Reactions to Iraq-Iran FTar
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 21-27 Nov 80) 26
WESTERN SAHARA
- Briefs
Cuban, Saharan Officials Meet 31
- a- ~III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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JORDAN ,
SUCCESS OF AL-GI3AWR AGRICULTURAL PROJECT DESCRIBED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7-13 Nov $0 pp 44-45
[Article: "The Jordanian Garden of Eden: $10 Billion Worth of Iiivestments,
_ Installations and Services in the al-Ghawr"]
[Text] The Jordanian garden of Eden rises over the mounds and hills that look
over the Jordan River. This barren Arab country looks to transforming this para-
dise into a garden to supply the Arab world with fruits and vegetables.
The agricultural project for the Jordan valley, which during the 1970's was an
enormous ongoing concern, now represents one of man's most su,ccessful conquests
in the face of the desert e~cpanse on one side, and on the other cutting down the
migration from the country into the cities.
The land here is fertile (most of it had not been cultivated since the days of the
Mamlukes when Jordan's al-Ghawr used to supply sugar to the Arab world. The water '
here is abundant up to a certain point. The area that is planted with vegetables
extends 15 kilometers wide and is up to 100 kilometers long. The hopes run high
on this land.
- The Jordanian government became seriously interested in the al-Ghawr since 1972
when it allocated $1.5 billion to develop the agriculture and irrigation in the
valey. The government was set on realizing some of the goals that the Jordanian
economic planners were so concerned with such as reducing dependency on foreign
aid in order to defray budget deficits, and also reducing foreign imports of ineats
and grains.
The government's interest in the Jordan Valley project was embodied in the allo-
cations revealed for this year's fifth development plan and which will expire at
the end of this year. The agricultural goal for the plan is to increase the
agricultural productivity by 40 percent. In order to realize this goal, the allo-
cations depend to a great deal on developing the al-Ghawr project.
The valley, which lies 200 meters below sea level, fumishes two crops each year:
about 150 milliot: kilograms of watermelons per year in addition to 17~million
kilogr~ams of citruses. Jordan used to export portions of these crops tio Syria; .
but l~~tely when the relations between t~e two countries soured, the Syrian authori-
ties :~topped all imports as a penalty to the Jordanians. However, the Jordanians
found more than one resource avaflable to them for their exports--to other Arab
countries and to the Gulf regiari especially.
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Cultivating the al-Ghawr valley began during the first half of the century when
bedouins began planting wheat and barley. During the 1950's, vegetable and fruit
crops began to flourish with the increase of Palestinian refugees.
The serious interest in ~he al-Chawr began at the end of the 1960's. The govern-
ment decided to construct a canal along the Jordan river. As the canal was expanded
southward, farmers moved in that direction sowing vegetable seeds along. And thus,
15,000 hectares of land became to be cultivated and the population increased to
60,000.
The project suffered two setbacks: the first was during the 1967 war and the
_ second when ~alestinian guerrillas began launching t'.zeir attacks from the valley
towards the occupied land. But then the project was revitalized and was expanded
after Jordan resolved on putting an end to all guerrilla activities ~aunched from
its territories.
As for developing the agricultural land in Jordan, priority was given to the
- al-Ghawr valley. The first stage which ended this year was quite successful:
20,000 hectares of land were cultivated (equivalent to 200,000 dunums), and 22
villages were constructed including complexes, schools and hospitals.
The seconct stage of the project will begin next year and will continue untii 1986.
It shall consist mainly of constructing a dam on the Yarmuk river which is located
_ north of tl-~e Jordan as weli as completing the construction of the villages men-
_ tioned above. 'Che end result ot this stage is to cultivate 11,000 hectares of ].and.
The cost for constructing the al-riuqaran dam is estimated at $850 million. Its
- wall will be ]_SO meters high and it will hold behind it 350 million square meters
- of water, enough to irrigate 22,000 hectares of land (equivalent to 220,000 dunums).
Tl-he Jordanian government depends on financing the project on foreign aid and loans.
But the American government which had promised $150 million in aid to the project,
reversed its decision and blocked the funds statin~ that Israel also holds claims
to the watsrs of the Yarmuk river. Besides this, there is Jordan's policies which
oppase the Camp David Accord and this leaves the Americans feeling uneasy.
As for investments, the projact of the al-Ghawr would be a unique one for the
Tliird GJorld. The majority of the investments are placed by the private sector.
The government tries to keep at a distance as much as possible from guiding or
_ contributing in any way to the project.
However, the government's role consists mainly on expending funds ~n projects in
the ~eneral services areas such as ensuring supplies of drinking water, electricity
a~:d schools, as well as dividing the farm lands into small units (4 hectares)
' which would benefit mainly the small farmers and ciffer them loans at low inte~est
ra~es (5 percent).
Private sector investments in small land ownerships were indeed proven successful
as far as cultivating the al-Ghawr valley. There are now 90,000 farmer�s and
peasants work~ng in the valley. Their nimmber is expected to reach 50,000 during
the 1980's.
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Currently, the agriculture has reached the stage where it began to reap the bene-
fits of advanced agricultural technology such as making use of enclosed farm
lands beneath plastic roofs. It could be said that investments in the Jordan
- river valley are estimated at $10 biilicn including installations, services and
crops.
a Government experts divide the farm land in Jordan into five categories: The Amman
section; the Jordan Valley; Irbid, located to the north; al-`Aqaba, located to
the south; and the barren Ma'an section.
As an end result to the interest in the Jordan Valley, there has been talk about
cultivating the valley of 'Arba which extends 200 kilometers south of the Dead Sea
to the Port of 'Aqaba. But the main problem facing the cultivation of this vital
section is ensuring enough supplies of water for its irrigation.
It is true that water supply is the distressing obstacle racing any agricultural
J expansion in Jordan. From this point on, Jordan puts high hapes on a project to
draw the water of the Euphrates River across the desert.
The Iraqis have expressed profo~and understanding of Jordan's hopes and wishes in
this regard. Indeed, a preliminary agreement has been reached earlier this year
- between the two countries to study possibilities to draw the waters of the Euphrates
200 :neters across the desert.
Perhaps .Jordan's futuristic dependency on the waters of the Euphrates could be ex-
plained as a reason for the narrowing p~litical gaps between the two brotherly
countries.
Each year Jordan consumes S00 million square meters of water; four-fifths of this
quantity go to irrigation.
COPYRIGHT: AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
9770
- CSO: 4802
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LEBANON
RAYMOND IDDAH DISCUSSES DOMESTIC, R$GIONAL ISSUES
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 14-20 Nov 80 pp 19-21
_ /Article: "Raymond Iddah Sounds the Warning Bell: International Forces Must ~e-
_ place The Forces of Syria and Israel in Lebanon"/
_ /Text/ Raymond Iddah, the conscience of Lebanon the permanent candidate for the
Lebanese presidency who has faced more than one assassination attempt because of
his stand of opposition to the presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon, recently re-
turned from his visit to the United States to take up his pasition in his room in
the Hotel Prince De Galles in Faris and conduct a number of contacts every day in
order to defend Lebanon and protect :.ts unity and sovereignty.
When AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI met with the Lebanese deputy and leader and the head of
the National Bloc Raymond Iddah this week, it was anxious to record his impr~ssions
following his visit to the Unit~d Statea and his expectations of what the coming
days could be bringing for Lebanon. In his response to the questions, Raymond
Iddah was clear, biunt--and violent.
_ The first question AL-WATAN Ai.-'ARABI asked of Dean Raymond Iddah concerned the
declaration the Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat recently made to the effect that
partition had occurred in Lebanon and that a Christian state would be established
in Lebanon under the presidency of Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil. The dean responded:
"There is no doubt that President al-Sadat said what he said as a result of infor-
mation he is still discussing fram time to time with IsraeZi officials. There is
no doubt, either, that F'resident al-Sadat is of course informed about the relations
between the Phalange leadership and the Israeli authorities. President al-Sadat
also knows Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil and. greeted him recently on the occasion of
the opening of the Suez Canal to shipping.
"Here I reiterate what I previously declared, namely that the plan to establish a
diminutive Maronite base is an old one which goes back to the time Ben Gurion was
the prime minister of Israel. A meeting was held on 17 February 1954 among Ben
Gurion, Moshe 6harett, Lavon and Moshe Dayan to set out plans for Israel's invasion
of Egypt and Syria. During the discussion Ben Gurion changed the eubject and said,
'The time has come for us to encourage the Maronites in Lebanon to create a Chris~ian
state:' Tiowever, Moshe Sharett opposed the idea, saying 'The Maronites are divided,
and those who hold t~ the idea of partition are a minority. Bstablishment of a
Christian Lebanon will mean that they will have to give up Sur, Tripoli, and �
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al-Biqa'. No power can bring Lebanon back to its condition of before World War One,
that is, 1914, and if it did Lebanon would lose the justification for its existence
from the economic standpoint.' Ben Gurion insisted on the plan to establish a
diminutive Christian state in Lebanon, although the idea was not carried out, be-
cause Israel embarked on the Suez war in 1956.
~ "In addition, I have been anxious to state time and again, since early September
1974, that there is a project to cypriotize Lebanon and balkanize the Middle East
region. In 1975, after the murder of the former deputy Ma'ruf Sa'd, I said that
the entity which killed [he late well known journalist Nasib al-Matni in 1958 was
- the same one which killed deputy Ma'ruf Sa'd in~early February 1975. The goal was
the same, to create disturbances in the hope that a change in the situation of
Lebanon would arise from that. .
"Thanks to oil, the American Sixth Fleet came to Lebanon after the murder of
/Iraq's/ King Faysal, and Lebanon managed to be spared the plot to partition it
or merge it into the United Arab Republic at that time. Perhaps if it had been
merged et that time Lebanon would have stayed small, with a Maronite majority ex-
- tending through Mount Lebanon to Zahlah, to the cedars, to Zagharta and to Juniyah.
Thus Leb~anon would have become smaller than the little Lebanon of before the 1914
war.
"The c~n~~~.racy whoc~ implementation began with the killing of Ma'ruf Sa'd is still
going on. As you know, I personally refused, as did my party (the National Bloc),
. to join ~ha Leb~nese Front, which thought that it would be able through arms to do
away with the Palestinian presence and to establi~h a little Lebanon with a Maron-
ite majority, and that thanks to its relations with 'the devil' it would be able
to reach i.ts objectives.
"Any informed person cou:d easily conclude that it was out of the question that
r.he Lebanese Front could win and realize that Israel's objective was to stand be-
tw~en the Afaronites and Moslems in order to reduce the number of Maronites in
1~ebar,on by emigration, because Israel wants to dominate the region and the Arab
J countries itself and Lebanon, through its composition, has formed an obstacle to
the gl.an which Israel had drawn up because of its good relations with the neighbor-
ing Arab countries.
1~ "T'he resul~ of the events which have occurred since 1975 was as I had expected;
- the Maronites in the front have today become split. President Sulayman Franjiyah
is in the north and cannot go to thc Kasrawan area, or to al-Ashrafiyah in Beirut,
oi~t of fear of the Phalange, and Pierre al-Jumayyil cannot go to Ar'z al-Rabb
after the crime that he and the political council of the Phalange Party (except
for a fe~.~ people) agreed to against the Franjiyah family and some families in
Zagharta. '~oday there is the role of Camille Chamoun, the person who is most re-
sponsible for Pverything that went on since the ~aginning of the events and the
one wn~, planned them. His first objective was to make the Lebanese forget the
events of 1953, including the famous issue of the earthquake tax and the develop-
ment iunds. His objective also was to impose himself again as president, although
this time the calculations of the field were not applied to the calculations of
the r.reshing-floor.
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"Today, following the slaughter of Last 7 July, in which hundreds of young Maron- ~
ites were killed (523 according to Danny Chamoun, 200 according to the Maronite _
patriarch, but let's take a compromise figure of 300), a slaughter which the
Phalange Party coirm~itted by Agreement of Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil certainly and
which was greater than the Black Saturday massacre (and it later became apparent
tha~ it was a battle which was necessary in order to purge the national ranks, as
if all the thieves, smugglers and people with a past had been from the Liberal
Party),the result has been that Chamoun was compelled to meet with Shaykh Pierre
Jumayyil the following day rather ~han visit the families of the victims, since he
considered it better not to visit them, fearing the mothers' reactions against him. _
"In addition, 2 weeks ago events occurred in the outskirts of Beirut, where the
Liberal Party had some positions ~.n Furn al-Shibbak and 'Ayn al-Rummanah, and again
the Phalange P arty defeated the Liberal Party. This time the number of people
killed was much smaller but the result brought the final defeat of Chamoun and his _
party, and ~oday in what I have cal~ed from rhe outset the Maronit~ ghetto only
one party remains, and that is a Nazi party arw~, a fascist party in every meaning
of the word .
This party wants to emerge fram this ghetto and liberate Lebanon fram the Palestin-
ians and Sysians. This is the talk we are hearing and reading in the Lebanese
press. However, the Phalange Party has no~ once mentioned liberating Lebanon from
Israel and the Israeli presence in the south, because it does not want to disturb
- or anger its ally, the 'devil'.'
"Today we sea that this is the result of the plan Camille Chamoun drew up, the plan -
which came out of his head as it came out of the heads of others.
"I reiterate that Egypt's President Anwar al-Sadat is no doubt aware of the plan
which Isra~l has drawn up; that is the same plan that Israel had drawn up, as I
said previously, in 1954, and its goal is to create a diminutive Lebanon which
would be headed by Pierre al-Jumayyil, if his son Pierre agreed to it."
The Wolves Are Eating One Another
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI turned to the second question, on the Maronite state (if estab-
lished) and the likelihood that fighting would arise between the members of the
single party in the coming stage. Dean Iddah replied to the question by saying,
"Although we are anxious not to emulate the French revolution, we have seen how
~ those who made ~t liquidated one another. There is a familiar expressi~n which
states 'the wolves eat one anothere' In my opinion it is in the ~.nterests of the
Lebanese people and in the interests of the legitimate authoritie:: in Lebanon
� rhat the wolves eat one anothero The goal of the skirmishes taking place from _
time to time is to liquidate the armed personnel so that legitimacy may prevail;
however, while there is an Israe.li plan which is aimed at creating an atmosphere
of disruption in order to make the Palestinians leave Lebanon for Syria, or go to -
Jordan by way of Syria, the notion of the Palestinian withdrawal from Lebanon ia
receiving support �or the first time from Chrfstians and Moslems alike.
- "In addition, in my opinion, the incidents will cantinue as long as Israel is pres-
ent in person on Lebanese soil and as Long as the Syrian army also is present in _
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r~ux ur�r�lc~t, u5r; UNLY
Lebanon. This :s because the conspiracy has broken down into a number of conspir-
- acies. Some pet~ple criticize me for having used the word 'conspiracy' from the
outset. They say that it is easy to place the responsibility with people who are
- not Lebanese, while it is the Lebanese who are responsible for the events which
l;ave occurred. My answer is that this is true and that the Lebanese are responsible,
- because some of them took part in the conspiracy, but that when a pol~cy or a plan
results in the death of more than 5~,000 Lebanese, the diapossession of more than
500,000 Lebanese, and the infliction of damage and destruction costing billions of
doi.lars, I can ~ise the word conspiracy, and I say for the second, third and fourth
time that the ~onspiracy is continuingo However, if the foreigner has decided to
_ come, as we have seen throughout the history of Lebanon, let him put a limit to
the conspiracy."
International Forces Are Necessary
AL-WA'TAtv .~,L-'AR.ABI asked Dean Iddah about the way the foreigner would come in order
to end the conspiracy against Lebanon. He replied,
- "My theory is this: that will take place through the international forces which
will take tr~e plsce of the Israelis in the south and the Syrian army in all areas."
When AL-4~~1TP.iV AL-'Ac2ABI told Dean Iddah that such an act would have the effect of
internar.ionalizing the Lebanese issue, he replied,
- "Interr~a!-.xonalization exists today in all Arab countries. Not to dwell on the num-
ber of CC.JLS in r.he Arab region, let us just mentien Syria as an examplea Inter-
naLional .ELrces have been present in the Golan in Syria since 1973, and the Syrian
presi~ent, Hafiz al-Asad, is not disturbed about their presence--although he was
dis~urbed r-ai~en the Lebanese governnent thought of demanding that international
forc~s be concentrated on the Lebanese-Israeli borders. Today also, as everyone
kncws, th~re are hundreds of Soviet foreign military experts in Syria. This is
anotr:e-t kztid of internationalization.
"As regarcis what is said about 'arabizing' the Lebanese crisis, I consider that
the r.esulr.s oi this 'arabizationP have brought Lebanon under the Syrian 'mandate,'
and 7 w�nt T.ebanon to remain united, sovereign and independent.
"In an,.*.her *~rea, I do not agree that Israel should take part of Lebanon, as it
did some 3ays ago when, in spite of the existence of a truce agreement, it laid
- it~ h~.nds ~aithout hesitation on the source of the al-Wazzani, which provides 50
millin cu~ic m~ters of water per year, and 5 million square meters of land in
southern territory adjacent to the source of the al-Wazzani. I do not agree that
Lebar.on sha~ild be under Syrian mandate while waiting for Syria to sever the areas
i.c wants to incorporate, which, it has become known to everyone, are al-Biqa',
Tripoli and 'Akl:ar.
"Tr~ addition, if a Maronite ghetto and diminutive Maronite state are established,
Syria ~�ri.ll try to take the port of Beirut. If it does not take it, it will try to
~ share it with Lebanon."
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The Maronite State Will Not Survive
/4uestion/ But will this Maronite sta~e be able to survive? What future awaits
it?
/Answer/ This Maronite state cannot survive economically. Even Moshe Sharett
said that in his 18 March 1954 letter to David Ben G~rion, in which he stated "The
old Mount Lebanon has been absorbed into an regular union with Sur, Sayda, al-Biqa'
and Tripoli. This merger has made Lebanon, including the city of Beirut, a state
which has the scope for a balanced economy." He added that reverting to a diminu-
tive Mount Lebanon would mean fragmenting Lebanon, and that would lead to the end
of the state. He said, finally, "I cannot imagine that a serious organization
would agree to participate in a plan which would mean the economic suicide of
Let~anon . "
Thus a diminutive Christian state cannot lfve and keep going.
/guestion/ Why in your opinion shouldn't this state survive, wk?en some Maronite
Christians are saying that Christian Lebanon could survive as the principality of
Monaco survives?
/Answer/ The answer to that question is very ea.sy. First, countries must recog-
nize the establishment of a new country and establish relations with it, and that
is not likely yet. I do not believe that that will ever be likely with respedC to
Lebanon. Second, in order f or a diminutive state like the Principality o~ Monaco
- to continue to survive economically and political.ly, the environment in which it
~ lives must help it, accept its existence, and interact with it com~nercially and
politically.
If Lebanon becomes a diminutive Lebanon or a Maronite ghetto, the environment sur-
- rounding it will become hostile to it.
This diminutive Lebanese state, as I said p:eviously, will be a state of expatriots,
- since the Leb~nese by nature refuse to live under the dominance or a single party
and do not accept any dictatorship, be it civilian or military. Nor can the Leban-
ese live economically on a limited area. Before the events occurred, :-hat is, be-
- fore 1975, emigration from Lebanon started to increase greatly, especially from the
south, whose people headed to Africa, and from the north, whose people headed for
Australia. Lebanon was more than 10,000 kilometers in area; how could the Lebanese
- people live on an area of land totalling just 1,800 square kilometers (that is, if
they succeed in getting Zagharta in northern Lebanon)?
People Who Commit Crimes against the Nation
/guestion/ What about the future of the Syrian forces in Lebanon?
_ /Answer/ From the outset, that is, on 8 June 1976, I s2nt an appeal to the Leban-
ese people stating 1 June must be the first day of the Lebanese people's struggle
against the Syrian regime which has ordered the invasion of Lebanon," I said that
our country, Lebanon, had borders which were "the borders of its independence and
sovereignty." I mentioned some articles in the Penal Code and said that the first
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dity of every citizen was to preser~e the unity of his country~ I said, "If every- -
one has his own view of the country and what national duty imposes on him, that
will be the end of the country." To this end, the Lebanese Penal Code, in Article
274, stipulates the following:
"Any Lebanese who intrigues with a foreign country or gets in contact with it to -
prompt it to initiate aggression against Lebanon or to provide it with the means
to do so will be punished by hard labor for life. If his action leads to results,
he will be punished by death."
Finally, I said:
"The night before (that was the night of b July 1976), Beirut and its suburbs went
- through the worst of times. It was a night of conspiracy which I could not describe,
a night of Syrian terror ~shich sowed death, fire and b2ood without discriminationo
That is the Syrian peace that some people have promised and others have wished."
Finally, I said:
_ "You, with your federation, Christians and Moslems, will crush the invasiono By _
ignoring the causes of dissension among you you will save Lebanon. Lebanon cries
out to you and waits for you to answer its call."
However, the result was the opposite, and there is no hope for the person who calls.
In spite of all that, a day must come when the Penal Code, and Article 274 specific-
ally, are applied to the persons who conspire against Lebanon and they must not
count on the principle of letting time pass to cover their crime against the country, ~
since there is an international interpretation dealing with war criminals which the -
_ Lebanese legislators can draw upon tomorrow with retroactive effect in ~rder to
cstch up with them and punish them. .
My Camplaints a~ainst Sarkis
L~1.,-WATAN AL-'ARAB I repeated the questian about the future of the Syrian forces in _
Lebanon. Dean 7ddah replied,
- �1Some time ago I recommended a solution, which is the only solution in my opinion,
and thae calls for iaternational forces to come to Lebanon. If the Uni ted Nations -
- and tne big powers decide to save Lebanon, the Security Council must decide to send
international forces to take the place of Israel and the Syrian forceso"
_ /C~uestion/ Such a matter would require an initiative on the part of the Lebanese
president. Do you consider that the Lebanese president, Ilyas Sarkis, has the abil- ~
ity to perfoim sych an initiative?
/Answer/ This questian could be directed to President Ilyas Sarkis. I personally
have my complaints--political, of course--against President Sarkiso ~'rom the first
moment I asked him to go abroad, discuss the situation and fate of Lebanon with
heads of state, and to go to the United Nations and give a speech defending the
Lebanese cause, because there is a Lebanese cause, and not, as some people say, a
Lebanese problem. They said "There is a Palestinian cause and a Lebanese problem,"
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I say there is a Palestinian cause and there is also a Lebanese cause, Why doesn't
PresidenC Sarkis go abroad, as most heads of states do, and present the Lebanese
- cause?
+ I am amazed today, now that Isr ael has put its hands on the source o� the al-Mazzani
and a plot of land 5 million square meters in area, that the president did not im-
~rediately summon [he ambassadors of the five big countries and ask ther~ ahout each
, of their countries' position. How can one agree that the case of the al-Wazzaniis
~ dealt with the way the issues of Israels' daily raids against southern Lebanon are
dealt wi[h?
In my opinion, Israel's recent conduct is very serious, because it constitutes the
start of the implementation of a process of taking over southern Le,banon up to the
al-Litani. After a while, Israel will contrive an incident to exploit in order to _
justify overrunning Lebanese territory until it reaches the al-Litani River, after
having driven out 250,000 villagers, Shiites especially, as it did during its March
= 19?8 raid.
Today I would like to direct the attention of the Lebanese president and premier
to the fact that Israelis able to dig a tunnel 3 kilornete;s long near Dayr Mimas -
to take the al-Litani water from near the al-Khardali Bridg~ (in southern Lel~anon), -
and I do not think it is possible f or Sa'd Haddad to prevent rhata
The president must discuss and study this ~rave possibility with the ambassadors
of the big powers, and the foreign minister must ask international observers to go
to the al-Wazzani and al-Mitullah and observe the area in order to confirm that
Israel is not starting to dig a tunnel. Today it is building a wide road to the
al-Wazzani. Will the Lebanese president be serious about this issue, or will he
answer with the customary indifference?
If the Syrians Suddenly Withdraw: -
Since Mr Raymond Iddah had recently returned from the United States, AL-WATAN AL-
'ARABI asked him:
"The Syrian forces entered Lebanon after getting the green light from America.
ts the green light still on?"
/Answer/ That question is per tinent, but I will only be able to answer it after
- the new American president, Ronald Reagan, assumes his responsibilities and the _
reins:power. In any event, if the Syrian army suddenly withdraws from Lebanon
international forces do not take its place, terrible fighting will start among
Lebanese, and as long as there is the possibility that the Syrian army may withdraw
- ~uddenly, we must think of an alternative, especially since the Lebanese army, as
we see it, is not able to fill the security vacuum. This alternative, in my opin-
ion, is the international forces.
/suestion/ What are the impressions you brought back from America regarding the
situation in Lebanon?
/Answer/ The people I met with, top figures in the Republican and Democratic
parties, asserted to me that Lebanon would remain united within its internationally
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r~uK ur r~l~ ~L u5~ UNLY
recognized boun~iaries, but, although they said this, the Lsbanese war. has lasted
S years snd we do not feel that this statement has been applied. Therefore I told
them that people who are beaten with a stick are not like the people who provide _
_ it, and that Lebanon has had enough blows with the stick in the interests of others
- during the S years. I would like to believe that the new era in America will pre-
serve the sovereignty and unity of Lebanon, but the officials in Lebanon must get
moving, e~:rlain the Lebanese cause, and prove to the Americans that an independent
soverei~n Lebanon constitutes a political dna economic necessity for them. Natur-
- ally, when I say political I do not mean that Lebanon should embark on aggressive
acts against any Arab country, and I do not and never will agree that Lebanon
should be a center of conspiracy against any Arab regime; every Arab country has
full freedom to choose th~ political system which conforms to the interests of its
people. America, thP mother of democracy, must protect Lebanon, because it is the
only Arab country which enjoys a democratic parliamentazy systema Israel~s system
is sectarian, contrary to what it claims, and it does not have a written constitu-
tion, but Lebanon does have a written, non-sectarian constitution, except for
_ Article 95 which stipulates the following:
"In temporary fashion, and 'beseeching justice and reconciliation, the factions will
be fai_ly represEnted in pub;.ic positions and the composition of the cabinet, with-
- out that bringing harm upon the interests of the state."
This is che only article which mentions sectarianism. This article wa: set out to
preserve ehe coexistence among all the officially recognized factions, which are
1? in nun~ber. Where in this sectarian coexistence ia lsrael, which has tried to -
- put its f~ands on the grave of the Messiah, put its hand in ?948 on two Christian
~-iilages r.ear the Lebanese-Israeli border, Ikrit and Kafr Bar'am, and to this day
does not ~llow the Maronites and Roman Catholics of the ~~illages to return to their
hones and land and has not compensated them? ~
Ar..other Vi~it to America--Maybe ~
I
Regar~ing the psrtition of the Middle East ai~ea and his view on that matter, the !
dean said:
"Isr.ael wants to dominate the region. Therefore, for the hundredth time, I repeat
the ~x~cessian 'balkanization of the region;' Israel has an interest in having a
number of sectarian statelets established in this region in order to justify the
existence o~: the Israeli Hebrew state. But will this scheme be carried out after -
- Ronsld Reagan becomes president of America? This question is raised today but it
cannor_ bP answered untilReaggn takes the reins of powero"
Regarding the fect that Am~ricans of Lebanese stock voted for President Reagan,
rhe dean said:
"Americans of Lebanese stock are heavily concentrated in Brooklyn (that is, New
York;, 3oston (Massachusetts) and Detroit (Michigan). Most of their votes, I be-
lieve, went to Reagan."
/guestion/ Do you intend to visit the United States again?
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The answer was in one word:
"Perhaps."
A President in an Independent Country ,
The last c~uestion AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI directed to the dean was on the poll a Lebanese -
_ magazine made, which states that the overwhelming majority of Lebanese preferred
Raymond Idd ah as a future president. -
The daan smiled and answered,
"I only want to be the president of an independent sovereign state. That does not
mean thaG I am evading my responsibilities; that is because I in my political activ- -
ities, which I have not ceased practicing as a deputy and head of a party, the
National Bloc, have had as the prime goal restoring union to Lebanon and consequent- -
ly regaining its sovereignty from those who have taken it over. I believe that it
is possible for me to work on behalf of Lebanon as a united sovereign independent
state without being president." _
COPYRIGfiT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI -
- 11887
CSO: 4802
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LEBANON
~ CITIZENS EXPLOIT URBAN CHAOS, TAKB OVBR PROPERTY OF STATE
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7-13 Nov 80 pp 47-50
/Article: "Beirut: The Republic of Violations"/
/Text/ Beirut, the city which has not slept for 5 years, exhausted by war, many
of its features changed, now is called "the republic of violations and contradic-
tions."
The open war in Lebanon, which began on 13 April 1975, turned the Lebanese capital
into an open city without laws or statutes. Even sameone wandering about in the
sections of Beirut--if spared the sniper's bullet or the shrapnel of an explosive
charge--csn plainly and without exertion see the phenomena of change and the dif- `
fe*ence between 3eirut of today and Beirut of yesterday. The battles which went
on in the heart of the Lebanese capital were a cause of the change in the cultural
and demographic face of Beirut; some eections have been totally obliterated and
there are areas which have been fundamentally transformed. Some population concen-
trations no Ionger exist. These and other things have of necessity prompted the
emergence of other sections, at the expense of state lands or the property of other
people. This a11 happened through the neglect of the law, at the time Beirut was
subjected to one law, the law of war. These developments occurred when the stat-
utes in eff~ct and the laws observed were hidden in the civil war shelters and did
not have the power to appear, and there were no rules, no barriers and no limits
to confrocit the 1,3w of arms and the stipulations of the "influential strongmen."
Thus the process of occupying apartments and homes continued, and towering build-
ings were erected on state lands witheut building permits or any legal procedures. _
The process of pnrchasing and selling came to a stop, while some people managed to
build where they wished without questions or answers. The government is standing
with its hands tied, unable even to spell out the policy it will follow to cope
with this situation.
An informed souzce in the "civilian organization," who for personal reasons refused
to give his name states, in this regard, "The government has not yet settled its
affairs or determinad its position on the illegal buildings which have gone up -
through the neglect of the law. This may be ascribed to the absence of a clear
1aw which will observe this issue and to the proliferation of bodies concerned
with this issue. There is a tendency which calls for the issuance of a law con-
taining an order to destroy the various illegal buildings, and there is another
- view which calls for recourse to the technique of negotiations to create a
~ compromise solution."
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Whatever the officiaL position of the government may be, it does not possess the =
security tools to carry out its desires to destroy or even conduct negotiations
between trespassors and persons trespassed against. In apite of all that, it is
correct to say that numerous "republics,'' based on violations which have their laws
and their limita, their leaders and coumtianders and guardians, have grown and made
their appearance in Beirut:
- Beir~~t before the War
In the absence of accurate statistics on the status of the capital before the war,
one cannot talk about the changes in the construction activity which the Lebanese
- war has brought to the fore, with its various domestic and foreign complications.
The Lebanese government constantly tried to avoid carrying out a cultural and pop-
ulation census, in view of political circumstances and the domestic balance of
power. In spite af that, some tabulating activities, and studies on construction
centers in Beirut in particular did appear; the most important of these were stud-
ies conducted by Alexander Gibb in 1944, the American (Ibrefd) mission in 1959,
the Frenchman Claude Masure in 1963, and the Ministry of Public Planning in 1964
and 1970.
Today, carrying out new studies and statistics on the cultural and demographic sit-
uation is nearly an impossible task in view of the state of disruption the civil
war has imposed and because mobile war is daily t!:*owing more masses of people out .
of the places where they reaide and c onsequently redrawing the map of construction
activity in the country, especially in the capital--to the point where the Lebanese
citizen has come to resemble a land bird carrying its possessions in its beak and
moving from area to area, in search of new lodging, escaping the struggles of com-
batants and the dangers of war.
' The Central Department of Statistics in Beirut issued a statement in November 1970
shedding light on the population of Beirut, which totalled 474,870, or 22.3 percent
- of the total population of Lebanon. The statement pointed out that the city of
Beirut and suburbs, or what is known as "Greater Beirut," is considered the main
center of concentration since it contains 45 percent of Lebanon's total population.
That may be attributed to the fact that Beirut houses most official departments
and economic and industrial sectors, and the importance of this fact--that is, the
fact that Beirut is very densely populated--fac~litates the task of shedding light
on the changes which have occurred during and after the war.
The War and the Destruction
The civil war changed the cultural and population situation and redrew th~ cultural
map in accordance with new equations in which numerous interconnected elements en-
tered. The most important thing the war brought to the fore, through the war of
_ dispossession, was, as we mentioned above, the appearance of new districts and sec-
tions after the deterioration of old ones. Figures stress that Beirut is basically
the foremost Arab capital in terms of population density, but the destructive war
which ground on inexorably in the densely populated areas caused 21,881 families _
comprising 166,563 people, to be uprotted. These families are Lebanese and Pales-
tinian--92.32 percent Lebanese and 6.67 percent Palestinian. These figures appear
in the aid data of 19 April 1979.
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After most of r.hese families' dwellings :vrre destroyed and they were prohibited
from returning to their areas as a consequence of the partition which had occurred
in the ceuntry, some people tried to procure lodging and housing by one of the fol-
lowing means:
1. Occupying empty apartments, especially in the al-Hamra', Verdun and al-Ramlah
al-Bayda' areas. The situation prompted them to occupy whole buildings which were
finished or in the process of being built.
2. Occupying hotels, seaside cabins and some buildings of official and private
organizations.
3. C