JPRS ID: 9225 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070008-3
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9473
~ 6 January 1981
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Ja an Re ort
p p
- (FOUO 1 ~'81)
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FBIS FOREIGN ~ROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE ~
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- other characteristics retained.
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_ Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
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~ JPRS L/9473
6 January 1.9 81
JAPAN REPORT _
(FOUO 1/81)
CONTENTS
MILITARY
- Defense Efforts, Policies Assessed
_ (Shiro Udamura; KOKUBO, Nov 80) 1
Hawks, Doves Discuss Defense Issues
(YOMIURI SHIMBUN, various dates) 12
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Development of Full-Automatic Ion Etching Device
(BUSINESS JAPAN, Nov 80) 40
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- a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
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MILITARY
- DEFE~NSE EFFORTS, POLICIES ASSESSED
- Tokyo KOKUBO in Japanese Nov 80 pp 8�~�21
[Article by Shiro Odamura: "Is Japan Making Efforts on National Defense?"]
[Text] Foreign Minister Ito, who came to the United States last September to _
attend the UN General Assembly, met with both the secretaries of state and defense
~ on 19 September 1980, As far as defense matters are concerned, the newspapers
have reported th3t the following transpired in the meetings. The U.S. side briefed
that ~he Western camp must make further efforts on national defense to meet the
increasing Saviet military power, that the United States cannot confine its
defensive capability to only Europe and Asia but it must also extend to the Middle _
_ East, that it wiJl be saddled with increased deficits of sever.al billions of
dollars to dispatch a task force, built around two aircraft carriers, to this area,
etc. To Japan, t':e United States rPquested that "steady and significant" defense
. effort be made on a"long-range and continuous ba~is," and for the moment, in
terms of c~ncrete actions, to accelerate by 1 year the Defense Agency's "Medium-
Term Operation Estimate." In reply, the foreign minister is reported to have said
that: (1) a 9.7 percent increase in defense expenditures was specially approved in
the budget request estimates for the next fiscal year and maximum efforts are
being made; (2) it is making efforts to provide economic aid to ~eveloping countries
and to countries in the conflict areas; and (3) that having the consensus of the
people is necessar;~ to increase defense spending. The handling of the defense
expenditures has become a diplomatic issue between the United States and Japan buC
- how do r.he Japanese think about this problem?
1. Are the U.S. Requests Unreasonable?
Y.ow should Japan react to the foregoing U.S. requests? On 14 January 1980, with
_ respect to the request to increase defense spending by Defense Secretary Brown, who
visited Japan on his return trip from the PRC, former Prime Minister Ohira is re-
ported to hava shown a cautious attitude, sayingy "Probably, there are changes in
~ the international situation. The state of economics and financES in Japan must
" also be considered. As fa~ as dQfense is concerned, the consensus of the people is
- necessary. I want to handle it as a domestic problem of Japan." (14 January evening
edition of NIKKEI newspape~.) I want to believe that this type of attitude has been
corrected but the Japanese G~overnment's response is not quite definite. It is lack-
- ing a clear-cut expression of intention as to whether or not it will meet the U.S.
demands. I want to e~x~~mine, in the rest of this article, the propriety of U.S. _
requests and Japan's ~~sition.
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First, Article 3 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty specifies that, "The partizs,
individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and
effective self-help and mutual aid, w~.ll maintain and develop, sub~ect to their -
constitutional provisions, th~ir capacities to resist armed attack." In other
words, the development and enhancement ot defense capability are treaty obliga-
tions of both Japan and the United States. Therefore, it is a natural right fur
a party to the treaty to request its partner country to fulfill its obligation -
and the latter must respond to it with sincerity.
Secondly, Article 5 of the Security Treaty stipulates that, "Each party recognizes
that an armed attack against either part}~ in ttie territories under the administra-
tion of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it
would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional pro-
visions and processes." Needless to say, an armed attack against "territories
under the adminis~ration of Japan" is a vialation of Japan's sovereigr?ty and an
act of aggression. Tfiat is, the United States has an obligation to defend Japan
against invasion and for the United States, which is trying faithfully to carry out
treaty obligations, to demand that Japan make defense effort is an apparent right.
~ (?n the other hand, in its "National Defense Program Outline" ["Outline"] (adopted
at a cabinet meeting in October 1976), Japan denotes that "against nuclear threats,
it will. rely on U.S. nuclear deterrent power," that "as a matter of principle, it
- will independently repel l~mited, small-scale aggression," and that against larger
scale aggression, it wi.ll "seek U.S. assistance in repelling the attack." Japan !
recognizes that its national safety can be guaranteed enly by reliance upon U.S.
military poo~er. Thus, it can be said that Japan is justly bound to respond with
sincerity to requests by an ally that has promised military cooperation which is
a matter of life or death for Japan.
Thirdly, the world situati6n has greatly changed in the past i0 years. The United =
States madP official requests to Japan to increase defense spending since only a -
year ago and the change in international affairs is an underlying reason. The
varic~us NATO countries have already adopted a"long-term defense plan" and agreed
to a real increase of 3 percent annually in defense spending at the summit con-
ference held in Washington, D.C. in May 1978. It is only natural that the United
States shuuld demand ~hat defense capability be strengthened in the Far East.
The surprisingly rapid increase of Soviet military armament and the countering -
defense effort of the Free World have been related in detail in the U.S. Defense
Secretary's report to the Congress and in Japan's White Paper on Defense and will
be omitted [from this articleJ but at any rate, the overwhelming supremacy of U.S.
military power of the l~'60's is a thing or the past dnd unless they jointly and
earnestly make defense efforts, the Free Countries cannot cope with the Soviets.
= Moreover, the tense situation in the Middle East area, created by last year's
Iranian hostage incident and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, activated~~.the U.S.
"swing" strategy and from early this year, caused the disappearance of U.S, air-
craft carriers irom Far Eastern waters. Althocigh subject to future trends of the
Middle Eastern situation, it is a fact that the deployment of U.S. military forces
in the Far East has thinned out. Under these circumstances, it is only proper for
- the United States, which has shouldered the defense responsibilities of Japan, to
ask Japan to carry its share of the defense burden while Japan should be giving
serious thoughts ta making its own defense effort for the sake of its own national
" security instead of criticizing the U.S. requests.
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Fourthly, ,Tapan has developed its economic power. In tk~e total GNP, Japan
attained second position in the Free World in 1968 but even then, in the early
n 1940's, Japan's national income p er capita was only one-fourth that of the United _
States (1965) and 31 percent of the United States (1967) in labor productivity
(manufacturing enterprises). However, at present, Japan's nationa]. income per
~ capita is nearly 90 percent that of the United States (1978), ranks first in the
_ world in labor productivity and its share of world production of main industrial
products is approaching 20 percent. Furthermore, this economic development is not
limited simply to the economic f low aspect but even in stockpiling, Japan has
reached a level comparable t~ Europe and the United States (for details, refer to
- the 1980 Economic White Paper}. It has become imp~ssible to exclude Japan in dis- _
- cussions of world economics. Out of co~on sense, it is difficult for the woY~ld to
understand how a na~ion with such economic power says it can afford to spend only _
0.9 percent of its GNP nn defens e needs. Fram this standpoint, too, U.S, requests
to Japan for increased defensE effert can be said ta be ~ust and right.
Therefore, Japan cannot refuse t he U.S. demands on the grounds that it is in a
financial strait. It is a fact, through, that Japan's finances are collapsing and
recovery is an urgent necessity. However, financial difficulties are a common
problem of various European coun tries and the United States and not limited to
Japan. It is illogical to say that expenditures for economic cooperation can be
increased but not for national d efense. It should also be pointed out that Japan's -
taxation rate is 2]..8 percent, which is markedly below that of various European _
- countries and the United States (this is not to say that rationalization of expendi-
tures should be neg~ectPd). In the light af this enormous economic power and the
status of the Self-Defense Force s[SDF], which is described later, the U.S, request =
to accelerate the "Medium-Term Operation Estimate" by a year must be ragarded as an
extremely modest one.
James C. Abegglen, a management counsellor who is knowledgeable about Japan, re-
po rted the following in Jan~iary of last year: "In spite of the fact that ir is
practically on the brink of bankruptcy with the decline in dollar value, the United
States is making a real inerease in its defense budge~ to protect Japan and West
Germany. Naturally, the United States is engaged in military preparedness to pro-
tect itself but it should be po inted out, on thiG occasion, that it is maintaining -
a military presence to assist co untries, such as Japan, which spends a xidiculously
small amount for national defens e." (April 1979 issue of CHUO KOROPl magazine.)
Fifthly, constitutional restrict ions do not serve as excuses for hesitation in `
building up defense capabiJ.ity. Article 9 of the Constitutio;~ renounced war "as a
means of settling internationa.l disputes," but it "did not deny in any way the
inherent right of self-defense possessed by Japan as a sovereign state." "The _
pacifism expressed in Japan's ~onstitution did not specify nonarn~ament or non-
_ resistance," and "for Japan to t ake self-defense measures necessary to maintain and
preserve its peace and security must be considered as the proper execution of the
State'G ;nherent function." (De cision passed, 16 December 1959, by the Supreme
Court in the Sunakawa incident.)
In Article 5 of the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty, permission was given to Japan, _
_ as a sovereign country, to posse ss the right of self-defense, individually or
collectively, as stipulated in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (Japan
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~oined iJN laeer in 1956). To substantiate this right, the SDF was organized in
- 1954 "with the main duties to protect Japan's peace and independence, maintain
national security and defend Japan against 3irect and indirect aggression" (Article
3 of Self-Defense Law). Through the annual budget allocations and revisions of
the law, defense capability has been gradually built up. In doing so, the govern-
- ment has taken the stand that "aside from weapons which are utilized, because of
their performance characteristics, solely for the utter destruction of other
countries (E.g., ICBM, long-range strategic bombers, et~.)," depending on the
international situation, military tec`~nological l.evel, etc. of the time, the main-
tenance of the minimum defense capability needed for self-defense is not prohibited ~
by the Constitution.
Therefore, the 1-year acceleration of the "Medium-Term Operation Estimate" re-
quested by the United States will not infringe upon the Constitution and the re is
no basis whatsoever for Japan tu complain about the difficulties of building up
defense power because of constitutional restrictions. -
Sixthly, it is c~aimed that the people's consensus is required to increase d efense -
spending (it seems that Foreign Minister Ito also said so). But what is meant by _
the "people's consensus?" Since it is impossible for 100 million persons to ho.ld
the s~.me view, the principle of maj~rity rule is ~ised in parliamentary polit ics.
In the Diet, what is decided upon by majority vote becomes the intent of the Diet
and in turn, it is regard.ed as the wishes of the people. In actuality, up to the
present, budget and legislative Uills concerning defense have a11 been approved by
majority vote. Since the Liberal Democratic Party [LDPj gained a stable ma3 ority
in the recent Lower and Upper House elections, under the parli3mentary cabin et
system followed by Japan, the policies of the majority party government may be said
to have received the consent of the populace. Therefore, representatives c~f the
majority party government cannot claim that the people's consensus has not b een
obtained (that is a renouncement of its qualification as the ruling party). if
they so claim, the government and the LDP are throwing on the people tiie blame for
not having defense policies. Such excuses will not be accepted by foreign ceuntries.
However, since defense is the Uackbor..e o� national security, it is desirable, if
possible, to obtain the consensus of the entire populace and in politics, a supra-
party agreement (that is what takes pi.ace in a normal country). It does not
signify, in any way, a ready consent of the people. With resp2ct to what it be-
lieves in, the government must strive to explain them to the people and the ogposi-
tion parties and win ove.r their agreement. Particularly, since defense is an -
inherent function of the nation, unli~Ce economic matters, the governm~nt must strive
to gain the people's understanding by fully briefing them on the actuaZ sit uation
and clearly setting f.orth the government policies. Unfortunately, one cannot be- ~
lieve at all that the sovernment has made such an effort. Although it had excel~ ~
lent opportunities to obtain the people`s consensus in the two general elections
held since last year, the LDP did not make the defense problem a political is~ue
to fight over openly. This is laziness an the part of the government and the LDn.
Ttzis is strictly a domestic matter and an appeal cannot be made to the Unite3
States.
Trus, as noted above, U.S. reqnests on defense matters are en.tirely proper and
modest in substance and conceivably, there is no reason at all for Japan to refuse
them. This is a prob]_em of completely different order from that of the aut amobile
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export issue which is said to be a cause of U.S.-Japan economic frictions or that
of the U.S.-Japan Air Agreement which is claimed to be an unequal agreement. "Firm
maintenance of. the Japan-U.S. security setup" is a phrase inevit3bly expressed by -
succeeding Japanese prime ministers but the security arrangement cannot be strongly
maintgined by lip service alone. Its maintenance is possible only if botli countriES ~
- faithfully carry out the treaty obligations and ea:.h party performs its role aG an
allied country. Furthermore, the present security treaty is a one-sided one with
= the United States alone shouldering the responsibility for ~apan's defense, and of
course, it has great merit for the United States but it is a matter of life or
- death for Japan.
In contacts between countries, because of tha :iifferences in language, customs, '
national traits, political setup and moreover, racial makeup, or because of one-
time conflicting interests, misunderstandings ~.nd retaliationc occur no matter how
_ close the countries might be. (For examp.i.e, wasn't the Iraniar~ oil import incident
_ of November 1979, a confusion created by taking lightly the importance of the `
United States as an allied couatry?) Unless Japan resolves to treat the U.S.
requests in earnest, the pre:,ervatian of the security arrangement may become diffi~
cult and it mig'nt face the crisis ~f a security setup "existing in name only."
2. Has Japan Been Ma~ing Defense Efforts On Its Own Will?
Since the buildup of defense capability is a matter. of r.ational secvrity, it is
above alI a domestic task rather than an international duty. Therefore, needless to
say, it is not accomplished simply beca~lse there is a request from a foreign
country but it must be carried ~ut by Japan indapendently on its own free wi11 ' _
jForeign Minister Ito seems to have said so, too--20 September evening edition of
MAINICHI newspaper). Although the firm maintenance of the Japan--U.S. security set-
iit~ is mentioned, U.S. citizens cannot be expected to shed ~lood to protect a
country which does not strive to help itself so Japan's independent defense effort _
is a prerequisite of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement ;in that sense, to have to
be asked by the United States to make d~fense effert is in itself, a sorrowful
� occurrence for an independent, sovereign nationl. Actually, how much effor.~t ~
" toward defense did Japan make until now?
At the Japan-U.S. administrative level secu~ity meeting, held in Hawaii from late
June till early July of this year, t~e U.S. side is reported to have made the
following severe criticism about the SDF; "The present defense strength is not su�-
ficient to cope witF~ a small-scale, lili~ited aggression and does not even constitute
the necessary, minimum deterrent power" (5 .July evening edition of SANKEI news~
paper). This year's [Jhite Paper on Defense touches on the sh~rtcomit~gs of the SDF
(this can be assessed as an epochal remark but it is still lukewarm) but without
being told by the U.S. side, the Defens~: Agency should ~e fully aware of them. The
Ground Self-Defense Forces is poorly supplied, n~:= weapons whic~ are becoming
obsolescent, lacks mobility, does not have enough tanks and antitank capability,
_ being deprived of maneuver grounds and is inadequate.ly f4rtified. The Maritime Self-
_ Defense Forces lacks: ships, anti-air and antiship armament, mine warfare capability
and the capability for landing and counter-landing operations. The Air Se1f~Defense ~
Forces lacks: sufficient aircraft, defensive capability of bases, including radar
_ si.tes, and adequ~te air space for training. Thioughout the three services, there
are: inadequa~y in unified combat capab~lity, in command communications, and in -
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el.ectronic warfare; insufficient stockpile of ammunition, torpedoes, etc.; and
deficiency in intelligence capability. Shortcomings are too numerous to mention.
Furthermore, emergency legislation and measures to cope with surp~ise attacks have
not been prepared and nothing has been done yet to improve the social status of _
SDF officers. With the situation as it is, conducting warfare, let alone repelling -
invasion, might be difficult. These shortcomings must be rectified speedily and
that is possiY~le, depending on the Taili of the government (of course, interceptor
aircraft should be equipped with missiles and naval ships with torpedoes but the
government must be criticized, above all, fur being derelict until today). 'I'he
question is why, after 26 years have elapsed since its formation, the SDF has be-
come so woefully defective and has been so neglected until now?
On tt~is point, the Defense Agency itself must be criticized for its laziness (this `
rariter, who formerly sen~ed in the Defense Agency, is one of those who feel -
strongly about this). For their attitude the mass media must also be criticized.
Fundamentally, however, the blame must be placed on the LDP government, which has
been in power for over 30 years but has neglected defense matters, because it felt
secure under the U.S. military umbrella. In other words, during this period,
the government has been vague about the proper role of defense in state affairs.
It can be said that civilian control, in its true sense, had not existed at all. _
~
This is true of all the administrative facets, including budget, legislation, etc., I
but in the following paragraphs, the problem concerning budget will be taken up. ~
The reason is that tne biggest bottleneck in building up defense capability had '
been the budget and presently, form~ilation of next year's budget is in the lime-
light. Also, the government's political stand can be reflected numerically by the
budget.
Usually, when speaicing of the functions of finances, the following three are men-
tioned: distribution of resources, redistribution of income and business ad,justment.
~ i'he first funciion, "distribution of resources," can be considered as the basic
mission of f inances. In other words, the basic functions of finances are to deter-
mine, out of the total resources produced annually through the people's economic
activities, how much should be allotted to public finances, to secure this share ,
through the public right of taxation, and to decide how much of the public finances ~
should be allocated to which category. Therefore, in its formulation, the budget +
must be coordinated from an overall standpoint by carefully considering the suita- ~
bility of the various policies and evaluating their priorities. Finally, it w311 be
decided throu~h the judgment of the government and ruling party on its political
merits. Therefore, preparation of the defense bud~et may be said to reflect the
government's political assessment.
_ The share of defense spending in the total expenditures of general account has con-
tinued to decli_ne annuaZly since the 13.8 percent of 1956 and it dropped to 5.2
gercent in 1980. The increase rate of defense spending has been below that of the
annual total expenditures. During this period, although defense outlays are highly
political in nature, they have not reflected the highest ~udgnent of the government i
- or ruling party. For the first time, during formulation of the JFY-80 budget,
defense expenditures could not be resolved at the ministerial level and was taken
- up by the triumvirate of LDP executives. Because of this situation, even if the :
finance authorities had a grasp of d.efense matters, they were forced to place low
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priority on defense expenditures. (Furthermore, the ruling party showed practical=
_ ly no interest in the lst throuFh 4th defense b uildup plans and as for the approved -
plans, because of the budget formulation problems noted above, only the maximum
buildup permissible for the 5-year period was sp ecified and plans were never fully
implemer~ted.) As a result, the ratio of defense spending began to decline as
mentioned previously.
Defense expenditures and various types of other expenditures became noticeably un-
- balanced. In the past defense buildup p?ans and in the "Outline" of 1976, it was
understood that in a,;tually carrying out the buildup plans, "the financial situa-
tion existing at the time will be considered and the implementation will be in -
harmony with the various other policies of the nation." However, to take the
JFX-80 budget as an exampl~, is there "harmony" when defense-related expenditures
are 2.23 trillion yen as compared with the 8.2 trillion yen for social welfare
services and 6.65 trillion yen for public works (expenses for local public badies
must be added to both categories)? Within the 5-year period since 1975, social
welfare expenses increased by 4.28 trillion yen (109 percent) and public works
expenses oy 3~68 trillion yen (137 percent) while defense expenses increased by
only 900 billion yen (68 percent). As a result, the level of social welfare bene-
- fits exceeds the worlci standard (e.g., see "Japan is the World's Biggest Welfare -
_ State" by Hachiyo Nakagawa in the August 1978 issue of CHUO KORON magazine, _
"Expenditures Handbook" edited by the Finance Ministry's Budget Bureau, etc.) and
public works investments have wiped out the bad reputation of the past and except
- for parks and sewer system, attained the world level (1980 White Paper on Economy).
Nevertheless, the SDF is still hampered by mult itudinous shortcomings, as noted
previously.
Secondly, what is the present status of defense expenditures? Broken down, expenses
show that personnel and food supplies occupy 50 percent ar~ci with over 10 percent for
- base maintenance included, capital investment expenses such as for weapons procure-
- ment, technolo~icai develo~,ment and facilities b uildup amovnt to a little over 540
billion yen or only 24.5 percent of the total e xpenditures. To show how insuffi- ~
- cient this amount of capital investmer.t expens~s is for a modern military force,
comparisons can be made, although not necessarily appropriate, with large-scale
economic entities such as the Nippon Telegraph a~~ Telephone Publi.c Corporation
which has a JFY-80 budget of 1.5 tri.llion yen fo r plant and equipment'in~~estment
and the Japanese National Railways (including the Japan Railway Construction Cor-
poration) which has 1.32 trillion yen (590 billion yen even if e~enses for con-
struction of new RR lines are omitted). The above comparisons will give an idea as
to the situation. Moreover, since Japan produce s weapons on a limited scale, the
unit cost is relatively high compared internationally.
However, what is inadequate is not only the capital investment expenditures. As
far as personnel and food costs are concerned, it should be noi-ed that because of
budgetary limitations, the ground forces i.s shor t 25,000 men and the tri-services
a total of nearly 30,000 men. It would be diff icult to ~ecruit all these men at
once but without sufficient personnel, fighting power suffers. To speedily in- _
crease the recruitment rate is an urgent task b ut to do this, personnel and food
expenses must be increased. Funds for maintenan ce and repair of ordnance and for
training activities are also believed to be inad equate. In parkicular, lack of
- fuel is hampering unit training exercises and is a serious problem ("No Oil! SOS"
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- in 30 September issue of SANKEI. Last month, when i visited the Chitose base, the
command staff was complaining ataou[ this.) Training is crucial for the SDF and
unless there is enouKh funds for training, the SDF cannot accomplish its ~nission.
Thirdly, ~lmost simultaneously with the cabinet adoption of the "Outline" in 1976,
- the cabinet decided on the "guideline of not permitting" defense-related expendi-
tures "to exceed" 1 percent of the GNP for the year. These two decisions are
' conzradictory. To reach the troop strength ment~ioned in the "Outline," the Defense
Agency drafte~ the "Medium-Term Operation Estiiaate" (so-called "Medium Operation"),
a 5-year p~an broken down by each year. `~he final year is 1984 but since the plan
depends on budgetary appropriations, the buil.dup might be 4 or 5 years hence. Even
if the "Medium-Term Operation" plan is carried out, the troop strength in the
"Outline" will not be reached. Needless to say, the troop strength in the "Out; ine"'
is regarded as the "basic defensive power" and is considered the minimum troop _
strength needed to independently repel "small-scaYe, limited aggression," Why is
it that 7 or 8 years (over 10 years since the cabinet decision) have passed and
even that troop strength has not been reached? That is because the "Medium -
Operation had to function under rhe restriction that "defense spending must be
below 1 percent of GNP." In other words, as long as defense expenditures have this
restriction, one cannot predict when the troop strength in the "Outline" will be
reached. This is clearly a contradiction. As long as the troop strength in the , ,
"Outline" must be rapidly built up for Japan's d~fense, restrictions on c3efense
spending must be lifted. There is no indication that the government, on its own, ~
tried to resolve this discrepancy. On the contrary, Foreign Minister Ito is re-- -
ported to have stated that the GNP 1 percent is the consensus of the people.
Since the present defense expenditures amount to only 0.9 percent of the GNP, some
~ might think that the defense bui~dup will not be obstructed even i~ the restrict ion
is not removed. That is a mistake, The reason is that as long as the restriction
is imposed, the Defense Agency cannot draft concrete plans to reach the troop
- strength in the "~utline." For tasks which require a long period and long-range
outlook, such as the defense capability buildup, plans are indispensable.
Ir should be added that the "Overall Security Research Gruup" is advocating that
- defense expenses be 1.07 percent of GNP (see the September issue of this periodical).
Close examination reveals that the group is suggesting a reduction of SO billio n
yen in personnel and food expenses and no change in funds for training exercises.
As mentioned previously, these funds are sorely inadequate and with these calcula-
tions, the group must be called irresponsible for saying that 1.07 percent is suf-
f ic ient .
Fourthly, in the budgetary requests for next fiscal year, a 9.7-percent increase
- was approved ~or defense spending over thE 7.5 percent for other general accoun t _
expenditures. The foreign minister emphasized to the U.S. side that this was an _
indication of Japan's effort toward defense but can one say that this is truly a
defense efFort? _
An increase o� 9.7 percent is mentioned but in monetary amount, this is only
- 216.2 billion yen. ':ince this is only a budgetary request, it is inconceivable
that the finance authorities would noL make revisions. Depending on future price _
trends, a considerable decrease in real value can be envisioned. As mentioned
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' previous~y, adding a little over 200 billion yen to an absolutely inadeqnate
budget for this year cannut be considered much of an izqprovement. It is not pos~
- sible to compare, in the same vein, Japan's SDF which is full of shortcamings, as
noted above, and the military forces of various NATO countries, whir_~t are already
- developed as fighting forces with combat plans to cope with variuus types of con--
tingencies. What is necessary for Japan is to r.apidly build up the SDF as a true
fighting force and it is inconceivable that~that is possible wi.th an annual in-
crease of only 200 billion yen plus. It is true, however, that since the procure~
ment of armament for defense buildup and the training of personnel require a long
period and furthermore, since there are limitations in facilities and other
physical items, the funds required for the various years are necessarily limited.
The possible increase in spending for JFY-81 would probably be~limited to 300 or
400 billion yen. That ~his amount of increase was not approved in the budgetary
request raises the question as to whether Japan is sincere in its defense effort
(incidentally, the increase in public works expenditures amount to over 470 billion
yen). I am positive that the answer is "no." The NIKKEI newspaper also reports
that, "The request to consider defense funds as separate allocations must be
seriously regarded as the 'security cost' that Japan has to pay and r_annot be
taken lightly even by finance authorities. Many point out that they [defense
expenditures] cannot be put in the same category as others." (29."July evening
edition.)
Next, is the 9.7 percent increase a special appropriation of def.ense funds? The
- Finance Ministry has approved, as special allocations, expenditures ~or payments of
treasury bond liabi.lities, etc, which are absolutely required to implement inter--
national treaties. The finance authorities probably did not regard defense
expenditures as special ailocations. In reality, at the NHK TV broadcast on
22 September, Prime Minister Suzuki stated, in response to a question by a partici~
pant, that defense expenses were treated the same as economic cooperation and
- social welfare expenses and not as spec ia]. allocations, such as those required by
law or international agreements. If that is the case, Japan should not be able to
assert to the U.S. side that special allocations are made as a defense effort. I~
they were truly thinking of national security and sincerely trying to grapple with
the defense problem, they would not have taken such a makeshift step.
Fifthly, key personnel in the government and the LDP are making statements that
raise doubts as to Japan's defense effort. For example, Welfare Minister Sonoda
said in a press interview that, "I am against the argument to 'get on the band-
wagon' to increase defense ~~apability and to decrease social welfare in order to
increase defense." (25 September and 2 October issues ~f MAINICHI newspaper.)
M4reover, he made the same complaint to the director general of the Defense Agency.
(27 September, NHK; 28 September, NIKKEI newspaper.) The welfare minister is free
- to discuss the welfare budget but why did he allude to defense and who made the
argument? This is extremely rude. Why did he make a complaint against the defense
director general who has no authority whatsoever over the welfare budget (the
welfare minister should have been fully aware since he had served previously as
cabinet secretary)? He is not only all wet but terribly disrespectful. By ignoring
such remarks, can the government be said to be sincere about its defense effort and
can it obtain the people's consensus on defense? Mr Noborizaka, vice chairman of
the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council, is said to have made the following reply to
a question by the NIKKEI newspaper: "No matter how many aircraft are procured to
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= strengthen the farces, they are useless in the nuclear age so their augmentation _
- is made merely to uphold the honor of tlle United States~' (1 October issue of.
NIKKEI newspaperl. These words reveal an utter lack of understanding o~ the de--
- fense problem and worse still, disgrace the 260,000 SDF personnel who serve on the
front line of tiational d~fense. Under these circumstances, one cannot expect the
SDF morale to rise or. the people's defense awareness to increase.
3. Establish Defense Policies Expeditiously
In the foregoing paragraphs, I have explained the significance of the U.S. request
to Japan and criticized the indeci.sive response and the lack of defense effort on
the part of Japan. This writer served only briefly with the Defense Agency and
is not a military expert. However, as one of the people, I cannot believe that the ~
security of this country can be Preserved under the present circumstances and do not
think that Japan can surmount the tensing international situation. Furthermore, -
- it is impossible for Japan to occupy an "honorable position" in ~.he international
society. To protect the country's independence and security which were handed down
_ by the ancestors, and to transmit them perpetually to future generation~ is the
responsibility of the government and the ruling party which control political power. ~
I would like to ask the government to establish defense policies expeditiously.
Since I am running out of space, I will touch on i.t only briefly, ~
= First, among the various policies of a country, national security must be given top
priority. This is because t~?e independence and security of a country are the founda-
tion of other policies of the nation and the economic and cultural activities of
the people. This is conunon sense to the world.
_ Therefore, in the prime minister's administrative policy speech to inform the people
- of the government's policies, diplomatic and defense matters must be taken up first
(regrettably, the defense issue was ~onsidered as an individual item only once by
the Fukuda Cabinet of 1978). Together with the speeches on foreign policy,
finances and economy, shouldn't there be a defense speech by the director general of
the Defense Agency? As with the monthly economic ministers' conference, the
National Defense Council' meetings should be held monthly fur the purpo3e of
briefing on the military situation, present status of the SDF, etc..
� Secondly, national security policies mLSt be comprehensive including military and
nonmilitary items. Since security is defined as "to protect the safety of a
country against external aggression" (Shin Horitsugaku Jiten jNew Legal Dictionary]
published by Yuhikaku, Kojien [Concise Cyclopedia], etc.), the policies must be
- c~ntered on the military and diplomacy and especially in internal affairs, defense _
shoula be the focal point. The above policy must not be confused witr,the cur- -
. rently popular "overall security policy." (The so-called "overall security policy"
only confuses security concepts and this writer has criticized it on another _
occasion--15 September issue of the weekly GENRON SHUNJU -iagazine--~31so, refer to
perfinent criticisms by Seiichi Ishigaki in the 23 September issu:~ ~f the weekly
- ECONOMIST,) The policies must be comprehensive but focused on the s~rengthening
- of defense capability, prevention and repelling of aggression and m ust not be
merely a colle~tion of administrative policies.
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= Relatedly, a point which should be regarded most seriously is the people's will to
_ defend their homeland. In the "Basic Policies for National Defense," adopted by
the cab inet in 1957, one of the ob~ectives is "To stab ilize the public welfare and
enhance the penple's love for country, thereby establishing the sound basis essen-
_ tial to Japan's security." Measures to stabilize public ~~elfare have been carried
out and the standard of living now cannot be compared to then but as for enhancing
the people's love of country, how much effort has been expended, e.g., in school -
educatinn? Isn't the value of "protecting one's country" neglected in the courses
on social studies, history, language, etc.? Previously, Education Minister Araki
talked ahout revising the basic education law and Education Minister Nadao about
= the need for "national defense education," but the ideas have nat materialized and
the educational environment remains unchanged. As Justice Minister Okuno pointed -
out, the revision o education is the most urgent task. -
Thirdly, as for defense capability, the level of troop strength specified in the
"Outline" must be attained as soon as possible and both in name and reality, the
_ buildup of defense power with true fighting ability must be clearly stated as the "
policy of topmost priority. To implement it, restrictions on defense spending
- must be abolished and a reappraisal of the "Medium Operation" be accomplished
_ speedily. Legislation for emergencies must also be drafted iimmediately and the -
task should not be left to the Defense Agency alone but undertaken in earnest with
- the cabinet as the nucleus (Shuzo Hayashi pointed this out 2 years ago in the -
SANKEI newspaper).
Furthermore,as for the "Basic Policies for National Defense" on which the "Outline"
is based, its philosophy and outlook of international situation cannoi be main-
tained today (this writer has criticized it on another occasion---at a round~ta~le
discussion on security, "Security Considerations," 1 January 1979 issue) and should
be revised. The troop strength might require some revisions but iti is probably =
unnecessary to change it drastically for the time being. As for the defense capa-
bility described in the 'butline," it should be pointed out that the nuclear arma-
ment or concept of massive military buildup proposed by a segment (e.g., the ideas
of the military science research group cdrried in Ikutaro Shimizu's "Japan, Become a
a Nation") arE phantasies which are impossible to materialize and if arguments,
_ giving false impressions that they would be realized soon, become rampant, they
would thoughtlessly confuse discussions abo~iu defense. (Article dated 5 October
1980.)
COPYRIGHT: Asagumo Shimbunsha 1980
9134
CSO: 4105
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MIL ITARY
HAWKS, DOVES DISCUSS DEFENSE ISSUES
Tokyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN in Japanese 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30 Sep 80
and 1, 2, 3, 4, S, 6 Oct 80
[For serialized articles 1-6; Discussants: Hosai Hyuga, Mitsuo Tomizuka,
Tokuma Utsunomiya and Osamu Kaihara]
[ 20 S ep 80 , p 2]
[Text] (1) Defense Issues: Arguments and Rebuttals by Hosai Huyga (Chairman,
Sumitomo Kinzoku, Ltd) and Mitsuo Tomizuka (Secretary General, General
Council of Trade Unions of Japan)
The focus of attention today is on defense issues. There are active debates ~
concerning the improvement of defense capability, the Soviet thr~at, con-
stitutional amendment, military draft and many other issues. These debates
will probab ly also take center stage at the upcom3ng extraordinary Diet
sess ion. The YOMIURI SHIMBL'N has, therefore, taken this opportunity to
- ~ather experts from various circles, ~aho are deeply concerned with "defense" _
relative to basic national security, for an in-depth discussion of the _
issues from their respective positions.
(Hyuga) When I suggested at the Kyoto seminar (his lecture at the 18th Kansai -
seminar f~r busiaess leaders, 7 February) that a study should be conducted on
the military draf t system, it feelinkehaspalways beenathatisifethedpeoplecare
some oppositiQn. However, my g
to equally defend their country, the milit2ry dxaft is the fairest system.
Nonetheless, it is obviously not feasible under the present Constitution and,
since the Constitution cannot be amended, I intend to argue that the Selflven
Defense Forces, which defend the nation on behalf of all the people, be g' -
greater respect. Also, the men of the SDF should be provided with adequate
training and eqaipnvadefJa ~dern Wo~drnot hold o tyforhatweek.enUnablettok
divisj.ons shoul P
defend even Hokkaido, morale would be low.
(Tomizuka) ThP defense debate began to heat up around 1977 and the issue
rapidly caught the attention of the rukuda Cabinet. And there was a statement
by you, Mr Hyuga . Also, amid ~the overwhelming victory by the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party in the recent "double elections," there was a series of statements
on the revision of the Constitution, as well as talk of a separate framework
of defense sper~ding, and the defense debate seemed to move very rapidly to the
~ forefro nt. -
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- However, I believe we are about to turn frow the cold war posture of East-West
confrontation to a multipolar situation. Under such conditions, the peoples
of the world are giving serious thought to full detente, but the concept of
- East-West confrontation is still at the root of the Hyuga statement,
(Hyuga) Military spending in Switzerland, which is permanently neutral, is
1.9 percent of its GNP. I think that, if Japan's present defense spending
of 0.9 percent is increased by 1 percent, it should be adequate. Also, it
can be paid with half of the natural revenue increase in the FY-80 budget.
If the lives, pr~perty and welfare oF the people--and the nation, which
_ constitutes the basis for all these facets--could be defended with this
money, I believe it would be well spent.
(Tomizuka) The next issue I wish to point out is the question of how Japan's
national interests are being viewed. I wonder if the emphasis is not being
placed on business interests and an attempt is not being made to shift the
issue to economic growth through arms production. I wonder if we should not -
watch the key ch anging trends of the world, carefully observe the situation
at home and abroad, and then take measured steps.
, (Hyuga) Regarding the question of why the SDF should be strengthened, all
nations are spending three or four times as much as Japan for defense. _
Although our nation is under the U.S.-Japan security pact, it is equipping
the SDF at the rate of 0.9 percent. Will this be adequate. I do not think so.
Also, the increase in defense strength is alleged to be for the benefit of
indu:-try, but, despite the modernization and buildup of the present Self-
Defense Forces, Japan's annual arms production equals only 0,38 percent of
total industrial production, Even if the Self-Defense Forces were to be
doubled, defens e production would equal only about 0,2 percent of steel
production,
(Tomizuka) Although the Self-Defense Forces have been considered as a viola-
tion of Artic],e 9 of the C~nstitution, its formation is an established fact.
What shall the future direction of the Self -Def ense Forces b e? The trend
seems to be moving according to America's wishes toward improvement of the
Self-Defense Forces' capability. I am opposed to its expansion.
' (Hyuga) You say th at you are opposed to th e buildup of the Self-Defense
Forces, b ut it is not wise to leave the Self-Defense Forces with useless
equipment, unable to function as a modern military force. In view of Japan's =
- lon~ coastline, some buil:dup of the Maritime Self-Defense Force is necessary.
It would probab ly suffice if the defense fleet was doubled from the present -
190,000 tons to 400,000 tons.
(Tomizuka) As usual, your argument is based on the hypothesis of the Soviet
Union as the enemy, at a time when the multilateral and multipolar evolution
of detente is an issue. It appears in the form of "emergency" legislation, ;
the Pan-Pacific solidarity concept and the buildup of the Self-Defense Forces,
based on the hypothesis of a potential enemy in accordance with U.S. strategy.
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(Hyuga) There is no hypothetical enemy. However, a military force exists
b efore our eyes. We must maintain a balance with it. Basically, we should
avoid wars, including nuclea: ones. Without local deterrent power, we would
_ b e susceptible to intrusions which would invite a large-scale war.
(Tomizuka) If the increase in next year's defense spending could be raised
by 15.4 percent, the defense-related budget for FY-83 would be about
3,500 billion yen. Defense industry praductivity would exceed 1,000 billion
y en. It seems that the business cor~munity has its eyes set on the nation's
- f inanc~~i measures. Under conditions where the steel, automobile and heavy
ch emical industries are unable to advance satisfactorily into overseas _
' markets, thern appears tc be undercurrent efforts to link them to the revival _
- o f the arms industry .
(Hyuga) The ratio to GNP iri West Germany is 3.4 percent; in France it is
3.3 percent; in Britain, 4.7 percent, and, even in Switzerland, it is
1.9 percent. They ar~ keeping the wolves from the door with the people
sharing the burden. There is no need for them to become military powers.
- [ 21 Sep 80, p 2J i
[Text] (Tomizulca) Do the Self-Defense rorces belong to the people or the I_
s tate? Civilian contro 1 sounds good, literally speaking. But when one
- considers its feasibility from a practical viewpoint~ with Japan's political -
power it does not seem very plausible, If the trend is toward revival of
the arms industry desired by the capitalists, civilian control would be left _
o ut nilly-willy, making it i.mpossible to adopt a form in favor of the people.
That would be a dangerous situation. Such talk is most popular during
- elections. There is no guarantee that the Self-Defense Forces would not
o ccupy the newspapers and broadcasting stations, and stage a coup d'etat.
Japan should closely embrace the spirit of the Peace Constitution, whereby _
~ it renounced wars, and it should uph~ld the concept of unarmed neutrality. _