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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/9490 16 January 19~1 Sub-Saharan Afri~a Re ort ~ No. 705 FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE - FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 ~ NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those frcm Er.glish-language sources are transcribed ur reprinted, with the original plirasing and other characteristics retained. = Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text) or [Excerpt] in the first of each item, or following the last line of a brief, i.ndi~ate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- ~ mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names r~ndered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parer~theses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. _ Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item uriginate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in r.o way represent the poli- cies, views or uttitudes of the U.S. Government. COPYRIGEIT LAWS AND REGULATIOtdS GOVERNING OWi~1ERSHIP OF MATERIAI,S REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFIC7AL USE 0~1LY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY _ JPRS L/9490 16 January 1981 , SUB-SAHARA~! AFRICA REPORT _ ~~UO No. 705 CONTE!vTS INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS Qadhdhafi'8 Chadian Operations Worrying Sahelian Nationa (Jean Grandmougin; VAZEURS ACTUELLES, 1 Dec 80) 1 French Interventions, Policy 'At Origin' of Chadian Chaos - (Antonia Blis; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 24 Nov-7 Dec 80) 5 Chad Leader Interviewed on Tiea With Libya~ France (Goukouni Oueddei Interview; PARIS ~,~lATCH, 2 Jan 81) 9 MultipArty States of Africa Examined (Patrick David, Amadou Konate; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 5 Nov 80) . 13 Official Discueaea We,st African Economic C~mnuniry Activitiea (Mouasa Ngom Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 3 Dec 80) 15 Developmenta in Indian Ocean Examined (AFRIQUE-ASIE, 24 Nov 80) 18 Simon Ma11Py Editorial on Reagan Victory (Editorial; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 24 Nov 80) 20 Briefe A1.-Qadhdhafi Againat Barre 24 Guinea-Biasau-Cape Verde Tranaportation 24 Forthcoming Benguela Railroad Conference 24 Libyan Airstrip in Chad 24 Upper ~loltan 'Qadhdn.~fi' 24 ANGOLA Briefs . Captured Soviet Airmen 25 - a- ITII - NE & A- 120 FOUO] FOR OF~'ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CAPE VERDE Briefs Election Statietice 26 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Franch Undertake OperaCion To Aid Birao (MARCAES TROPICAIIR ET I~DITERxANEENS, 2~ Nov 80) 27 Brie~a Pataeae Out on Bail 28 Increasing Budgetary Deficit 28 CONGO Briefe Party Central Committee l~eeting 29 Riaing Inflatior 29 French Bank Loan 29 EQUATORIAI; GVIN~A � Brief~ Preaident's Visit to France 30 French Cooperation Stronger 30 Malabo's Electrical System 31 GUINEA , Briefs FAD Rural Development Loan 32 Toure's VisiC Canceled 32 IVaRY COAST _ Riae of the Young Lions (Siradious Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 5 Nov 80) 33 LIBEP.IA Briefs IDA Credit 36 Sovi~t Air Agreement 36 MALI Briefs - HauBing Technology Financing 37 Tx~de Agreesnent With Libya 37 ~ormation of Dieaident Front 37 " - b - - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 k'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MOZAMBIQUE Briefs Sabotage Claime~ by NRM 3~ Romanian Agricultural Cooperati~n 38 NAMIBIA Newe Reportere Visit Roesaing Uranium Mine (MARCHES TROPYCAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Nov 80) 39 , NIGERIA Oil; Weapon Againet Apartheid (.TEUNE AFRIQIIE, 15 Oct 80) 42 Export Salea Yrice Decline (MARCHES TROPICALIX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 10 Oct 80) 43 Briefs Poets, Teleca~nunications Training 44 RWANDA Increased Capacity for Packagi~g Tea (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 17 Oct 80) 45 SENEGAL Details of 1980-1981 Budget Provided (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS, 28 Nov 80) 46 Briefa Government Food Aid 49 CCCE Loans 49 French Loan 50 Use of Dunkerque Port 50 TANZANIA ADB-Financed Dakawa Rice Project Described (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEt7S, 14 ~1ov 80) 51 Tanzania lnvestment Bank Celebrates lOth Anniversary - (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERP,ANEENS, 28 Nov 80) 52 ~ Briefs Power Rationing Ends 53 Air Agreement Enda 53 , Tobacco Production Drops 53 ~ Azrport E:cpansion, Zm~ro-.�~ment 53 ~ . FOR OFFICIAL USE OIdLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAi, USE ONLY TOGO ~ Briefe ~~ir A.greement With Switzerland 54 Jripanese Health Vehicle Donation 54 ZAI~IA Attempted Coup in October Diecuesed (Tania Vaeconcelos; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 24 Nov 80) 55 - - d - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS ~ _ QADHDHAFI'S CHADIAN OPERATIONS WORRYING SAHELIAN NATIONS Paris YALEURS ACTUELLE5 in French 1 Dec 9o pg 37-38 ~rticle by Jean Grandmougin: "The Colonel's Legions"] ~ex~ "It is time for Chad to appeal for United Nations troops~" Senegalese ' President Leopold Sedax Senghor said xith anxiety. Like an echo, the Quai d'Orsay proclaimed on 24 November: "France is in contact xith the Africa~n states on this ~?atter and they~ like ourselves, are concerned by the woraen- in~j of the situation." Th~,se concerns are quite late in coming: the UN troops rYSk arriving like - Offenbach's carabineers. F - Traversing the 1,500 km separating the Libyan frontier froa Ndj~tnena, 3,A00 Arab and African "volunteers," lured and equipped by Tripoli (with 3eeps and Land Rc+vers armed xith heavy sachine guns~ Llral rocket-launchiru~ trucks or _ trucks equipped xith Soviet automatic guns. T~+ tank-carrying platforms. - and Cascavel or Ferrett armored and automatically firing tanks), have pene- trated to the gates of the Chadian capital. A ttacked in a position of retreat, Hissein Habre, , commander of the Armed Forces of the North (FAN) ~ launched a"solemn and urgent appeul to all coun- tries of Africa and the world" to help him combat "Chad�s invasion try Libya." ~ Presided over by Weddeye Goukouni, xho so~ourned in Tripoli before accom- p+~nying Colonel Qacihdhafi on a tour of in~ ction in northern Chad~ the Pro- _ visional National Union Government (GUNT~KOUld like to see an end to the rebellion of its former minister of defense, Hissein Habre. Colonel Kamou- que, GUNT's vice president Nho represer~ts the ethnic groups of the south, - explainst "He must be physically elininated; otherNise, xe shall see him foment new insiirrections in Chad." Ever since the last Fr~nch troops x~ere ~ithdraxn last May, the country has been sp11t bet~raen the Islaiaic forces of the north and the Christians and 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ON*.,Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY animiats of the south. Their hostility, Which stems from the color of their - sk'_n~ is bound to break out again; but for the ti~ee being, in order to eliminate Hissein Habre, the southerners have joined forces Kith the north- ernerss 2~500 soldiers of the Chadian Araed Forces (FAT)~ commanded by - - Colonel Kamougue, rrere taken to Nd~affiena on board Libyan helicopters. His ar~um~ntc "Frgnce havin~ adoptE,d a neutral position and the Western countries having remained indifferent~ the Chadian Government r+as forced to knock at al~ _ _ doors, even if it had been that of the devil." _ Colonel Qadhdhafi is pursuing a threefold objective: Faced ?rith increasing internal opposition, principally in Cyrenaica, he hopes ' to stifle any Libyan dissiderts so that they Will not dare compromise any ~ far-react~ing operation outside the c4untry's bord.ers. He xants to plant the Islaraic flag ever farther toward the south. He is nourishing the "grand design" of seeing a large portion of Central Africa fall under his thumb. _ President Senghor has accu~ed ColonelQadhdhafi of wanting "to convert a number - of Sudanese-S ahelian black states (Chad, Niger~ Mali~ Mauritania) into a con- federation under his domination. Thus~ reproaching the Ni~er Govarnment for taunti its Tou'oou minority (r~elated to the Toubous of the Libyan Fezzan and - Tibesti~~ Colonel Qadhdhafi incited them to revolt. It should be noted that Niqer ranks fourth in the World ~ong countries xhich produce uranium. Senegal itself is threatened. In the " plot" xhich the Senegalese forces xere called upon to suppress in Gambia~ Leopold Sedar Senghor revealed the hand oE'Colonel Qadhdhafi: in order to turn Senegal touard the south, the _ Libyans xere planning to install a Radio-Tripoli relay sta.tion in Bathurst. Moreaver~ in pillagin~ Cha.d~Colonel Qadhdhafi, who is endeavoring to replace Al~eria, in its role of supp~.ier of arms to the POLISARIO Front, could convey armaments directly to Western Sahara xhere a hotbed of conflic~ could be aaintained. The ultimate ob~ective~ a"United States of the S ahel." The Sahelian countries do not agree~ but they are vixtually incapable of de- fending themselves. The ball is therefore in the liestern camp. But the United States, ir~ a period of transition betraeen a president xho is leaving and a president-elect~ is leaving the xay open. The State Department simply remarked that it "was profoundly concerned" (a term identical to that used by Paxis). As for Eqypt, it is supplying Hissein Habre's troops xith ~sms thraugh - Sudan. President Senghor 3ourneyed to Ca1ro carryin~;; a message from Giscard 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFP'ICIAL USE ONLY d'Eetaing. According to certain sources, President Sadat had. sought to take _ sdvnnta~e of Libya's engagement in Chad to attack I,ibya. A unique opportun- ityi but the A~eericaus supposadly dissuaded hia fron that plan. - COPYRIGHT: 1980 "Yaleurs actuelles" _ 8568 CSO: 440U ~ ~ - 3-4 - FOi: OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS , FRENCH INTERVENTIONS, POLICY 'AT ORIGIN' OF CHADIAN CHAOS Paris AFziIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Nov-7 Dec 80 pp 1.5-16 [Article by Antonia Blis--passages b etween slantlines originally published in ttalics] [Text]..should not be forgotten that the main. danger lies in France's maneuvering to remain in Chad by whatever means. Eight months af ter the outbreak of Ndjamena's second civil war, 21 March 1980, the Chadian conflict has just taken on a new dimension. While the /ad hoc/ OAU mission continues with difficulty in its efforts to get the belligerents to accept a ceasefire, fighting has widened and intensif~ed. And if, up to mid-- November, one could not yet be absolutely certain of the ecope and nature, Libya's concmitm~ent to the side of the Transi tiona~ Nationai Union Government (GIINT) headed by Goukouni Oueddei lef t no doubt. We know, moreov~r, that the GLiNT leader has said on several occasions that he would call on Chad's frienda in case of necessity. And on 15 June a treaty of friendship was ratified between Tripoli and Ndjamena. In this document--which has not received any publicity-- the two sideg are supposedly committed to exchange of information in the militar}? domain, both that respecting int;rnal and that respecting external security, and to give each other the necessary support in case one or the other of the sides is confronted with a direct or indirect danger. To strengthen cooperation between th~ two countries in the economic, political, and military domains; to struggle against colonialism under any of its forms and to repel any foreign aggression: such are the aims apparently envisaged in this accord. Up to mid-November, thE leaders of the G'JNT ubserved great discretion with reapect to Libya's actual commitment on the ground. The most spectacular signs of this enhanc~d aid from Tripoli to the governmental coalition w2re given, we ' know, in the bombardments inflicted an the Northern Armed Forces (FAN) positions of Hisaene Habre, both in Nd~amena and in the northern part of the country, etarting 9 0 ctober. However, on 13 November, in a co~unique published in Paris, Ahmat Acyl, minister of state for foreign affairs and cooperation in Che ~TNT, stated that the Trans- itiona.l National Union Government /"reserves the righL to call upon all its friends wIw may be able to help it. Libyans and Chadians,"/ he added, /"are united by [ties of] blood, histoay, geography, aad culture, and they constitute a single people."/ 5 FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY For hie part, Col Wadal Abdel-kader Kamougue, vice-president of the GUNT and _ leader of the Chadian ~rmed Forces (FAT) also went to Paris on 7 November to s meet with the French minister ~f cooperation, Robert Galley, and said, in response to a question on the Libyan military presense in Chad: /"We are a govQrnm~ent - ~aced witfi a rebellion. We had to find help to regain control of the situation."/ Ih any case, it was learned that the president of the GUI~'T, Goukouni Oueddei, had juat made, from 2-5 November, a visit to Libya at the head of an important dele~ation, and had held with Col (;adhdhafi a s~eries of talks bearing oa /"relations between the two fr:czrnal peopZes of Chad and Libya as well as on the situation in Chad."/ ~n 4 November, the Libyan chief of state went, accompanied by the GUNT president, to Faya-Largeau, principal town of the northern _ , region of Chad, to make what the Libyan press agency Jana called /"an inspection visit to tfie quarters of the city recently liberated by the GUNT forces.'~/ , Col Qadhdhafi also went into one of the military barracks of the city, where he - was welcomed by the chief of staff of the GUNT forces, Adam Togoy. /"With the liberation of Faya-Largeau,"/ commented th~ Jana agency, /"the gover~uental forcea achieved a decisive victory over the mercenarq forces of the rebel Hissene Habre."/ At that time the leaders of the GUNT were expressing a great deal of optimism as to '~he outcome of the fighting which, according to Col Kamougue, may have resulted in between 5,000 and 6,000 deaths, at a minimum, since last March. In the course ~f a press conference held in the Libyan town of Sibha on 5 November, ~oukouni Oueddei stated that /"the situation (should) soon be resolved completely in a military sense, in favor of the legal governmenC."/ Several days later, Col Kamougue for hia part predicted, during his second trip to Paris, that /"the armed conflict in Chad (would) end quite soon. Within about 10 days,"/ he said, /"the situation will change, the balance of forces being such that Hissene - Habre will be unable to do anything more."/ Making much of /"the uninterrup ted and unlimited assistance furnished by the Libyan Jamahiriya to FROLINAT,"/ the president of the GUNT stated, in the Sebha presa conference, that this la~.�f+~l assistance, supplied in implementation of the resolutions of the last African summit in Freetown, /"consisted of food products, medicines, and in the presence on the ground of military advisers."/ Goukouni Oueddei also denounced again the aid given to the Nortnern Armed Forces of Hissene Habre by reactionary forces, and espe~ially by Egypt, whose airplanes coming from - Sudan land at Abeche (east of the country) loaded with material destined for the FAN. According to the GUNT, Cairo and Rhartoum sup.plied military experts t~ tne FAN forces, and Egypt allegedly installed diplomatic representation equipped with telecommunications equipment in Abeche. It goes without saying that the differences which divide the Chadian belligerents seem today more intractabZe than ~;er. If, for Goukouni Oueddei and Ahmat Acyl, _ the alliance with Libya is a vital necessity for Chad's survival and future, then by contrast for Hissene Habre's FAN everything goes to prove that Tripoli con- stitutes the principal threat. 6 Rf1R l1FF7~'T4T TTCF. (1NT.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The Nor tYiern Armed Forces were constituted af ter the notnination, under France `s auspices, of Hissene Habre to the post of prime minist~r in August 1978, in the Malloum g~vernment--the old Toubou rebel at that time had oaly a handful of inen-- _ and FA~T ciaims to have benefited from the dynamica of the war, first of all from the civil war in Ndjamena in February 1979, and then more especially from the one w~tich broke out last March; f~r, in recent months, Habre`s troops are believed _ to have grown tremendously in number. Claiming themselves ready to seek support Erom anywhere--even from Israel if necessary--the spokesman for FAN sap that they will continue their "patriotic" fight through any means available, in order to - preserve the integrity and the sovereignty of Chad. According to them, the Libyan i.ntervention could hdve repercussions all the way to the south of the country, where the population, which is becoming increas ingly dissatisfied with the military-administrative measures and structures put in place by the Kamouguists, could rally behind the FAN. Tt must be said that the arguments and propaganda of the F.~:J are finding fertiia ~oil not only in the West, but also in Africa, where the Libyan involvement in Chad has aroused, especially in the francophone capitals linked to Paris, an outcry of protest such as war never provoked by the repeated French interven- _ tions in Chad or elsewhere. While transiting France, the Senegalese president, whose country broke dtplomatic relations with Libya last June, suggested the convocation of a special conference - of mi.nisters of foreign affairs of the OAU. Describing the situation as /"grave"/, he stated that /"Libya is training an army of 5,000 in order to create confusion in Chad, in Niger, 3.n Mali, and in Senegal, to promote the creation of a Republic of the Sahara to be put un,der the control of Golonel Qadhdhafi."/ Not so long ago it was the Cuban specter which was raised whenever one wanted to obfuscate a problem and av~id the necessity of pointing the finger at the real destabilizez�s of the continent. For some time now, the scapegoat has been Libya and the fine hand of Libya is searched for everywhere as soon as discontent and problems break out in an African country. In such circumstances several states, inclu~iing Gambia, Gabon, and Central Africa, have also broken with Tripoli. No Illusions If this new diversion can only be satisfying to Paris, it is no less true that L~byan diplomacy, as it has shown itself to date, l.ends itself ready to harsh and not easily disml.ssed suspicions of Tripoli an3 scarcely promotes its popularity south of the Sahara. , Also in Africa we have seen the urgent appeal for peace in Chad launched by presidents Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroor,; and Seyni Kountche of Niger, who, in a ~oint public communique published on 12 November at Maroua (Cameroon), denounced /"the foreign interference which stirs up factions and contributes to prolonging - the increasingly murderous fighting."/ Egypt, as one could have expected, denounced /"Libyan intervention"/ and urged the OAU to put an end to it. 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY In the West, fin~lly, it was the United States (an American company holds the monopoly on oil prospecting i;z Chad) which reacted first, on 7 November, by - declaring itself /'~deeply concerned by the Libyan armed intervention."'/ In Paris, by contr~st, where the prevailing attitude seems to be to let Chings go on by themselves for a while before pulling the chestnuts out of the fire, the tone is more moderate. From this point on, at least if one believes the ieaders of the GUNT, everyth~ng could unfold much more rapidly. On 14 November, there was a great commotion over the near total encirclement of Ndjamena, which up to that point was three-fourths under tfie control of the FAN of Hissene Habre, by forces of the governmental - coalition, including Col Kamougue's FAT which, after being withdrawn from the south, �o.tlowing the murderous fighting of June and July, took up new positions near the Chagoua bridge. In the interior, the eastern soad, by which the FAN was supplied, is supposed to have beeu cut. It retaains no less true khat the ultimate outcome of the Chadian tragedy is still _ uncertain. Above all because the danger of internationalization of the fighting - has grown. France's appaient neutrality should fool no one. France is in effect - present in the south through its Pconomic and diplomatic agents stationed at the _ consulate in Moundoun; it is also ~resen~ militarily un the southern borders of Chad: on the Central African base of Bouar, commanded by Colonel Forest, former of the French intervention force in Chad, and also in a less concrete manner ~ut no less systematically, at Cazneroon border crossings wh.ere French military elements are patrolling. Tn fact, and this is the main point, the Libyan involvement must not in any case - make cne forget that the main danger lies in the maneuvering of Paris and in its de.termination to remain present in Chad by whatever means. In the extremely confused skein of the Chadian imbroglio it appears, from the evidence, that it is foreign interference--France's repeated military inter- ventiona and the policy of division which it has followed ur~ceasingly since the independenca of the country, in the first place, but also the pressure exerted . by some of Cnad's neighbors---which is basically at the origin of the situation of murderous chaos in which the country is plunged. _ If it is urgent to break through the present impasse, it is still difficult to - see how Chad could survive this long and bloody fratricidal tragedy without a - settle~ent decided upon and imposed, ultimately, by the Chadians themselves. CUPYRIGHT : 1980 Af rique-As ie 9516 CSO: 4400 8 - = FOR OFF' i CTAT. iTSF ~NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 - FOR OFFIC~AL USE ONL~ INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS _ CHAD LEADER INTERVIEWID ON TIES WITH LIBYA, FRANCE LD311143 Paris PARIS MATCH in French 2 Jan 81 p 41 [Interview with Chad President Goukouni Ouec?dei by Patrick Forestier in Nd~amena: "With the Libyans to the Death"--date not given] [TextJ Patrick Forestier: What will your relations wxth the French Government be like in f uture? Goukouni Oueddei: I am not displeased with the French Government. Before the conflict broke out I thought that the French forces were going to form an alliance with the Northern Armed Forces [FAN]. A few days after hostilities started I noted that the French forces had not been involved with Hissein = Habre in thia conf lict either directly or i~tdirectly. However, we still have cultural cooperation ties with France. - Patrick Forestier: What is Libya's precise role in Chad today? Goukouni Oueddei: First, Li'~ya has supported the Chadian National Liberation ~ Front since 1969. Since that date it has always given material and moral aid - to the Chadian people. The Chadian people and the Libyan people are tied by blood and geographical position and will fight together to the death. Patrick Forestier: Does your country's interest now lie with the Libyans? Goukouni Oueddei: My country's interest requires that I maintain g~od rela- ~ tions with Libya. Otherwise, it would be in danger. All countries, including several African countries are mobilizing against Chad on the pretext that Libya is supporting the National L'nity Transition Government [GUNT]. Why? From 1966 until our arrival here, the Tombalbaye government received material and manpoT:aer aid from France and other countries. So did Malloum. Why should we not? Why not? We govern a country. Patrick Forestier: How do you intend to reconcile the cooperation you want with France and with Libya, your preferred ally? Goukouni Oueddei: Are there not French technicians in Libya? Libya buys - Mirage aircraft. France trains Libyan technicians. So why could we not - maintain relations with both France and Libya? We are entitled to do so. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Patrick Forestie~-: Are you aware of the reaction which the situation i;~ Chad is prompting in the United States and among the big Western powers? Goukouni Oueddei: The United States and the other powers are not aware of our detennination. If the United States or other countries are unaware of the situation they only have to send diplom~tic missions to find ~ur own view and our political opinion. Patrick Forestier: I think that they are, above all, very worried about the Libyan penetration in Africa. Goukouni Oueddei: When the Gambian president had an internal problem, Senghor sent in his soldiers. Did anybody then mobilize to talk about a 5enegalese thrust in Gambia? Nobody said a word. When Tanzania sent troops into Uganda to overthrow Idi Amin Dada, did the world make a fuss? I am entitled to appeal to Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger or anybody prepared to come to our aid and put down the rebell~on. Patrick Forestier: Can you give more details about the material~ and manpower placed at your disposal by Libya. Goukouni Oueddei: I will never tell you. You can write that there are 200 _ or 200,000 tanks. Say what you like, it makes no difference. Say anything which comes into your head. Do what you like. The main thing is that we know what we are receiving from Libya. We are completely happy. It was in - full knowledge of the facts that we appealed to Libya. Patrick Forestier: Did Colonel A1-Qadhdhafi ask you for anything in exchange, for instance relating ~o the uranium mines? Goukouni Gueddei: Libya is rich enough not to ask us for anything in return. It is for us to ask for the necessary means to rebuild our country, which has been completely destroyed. We must hold out our hand to Libya and anq country willing to come to our aid. Now is the time to rebuild this country which is destroyed and shattered after 14 years of war. Therefore, any aid coming from another country does not mean that anything has been given in return. Patrick Forestier: What did you say in the message which you sent to Mr Giscard d`Estaing after your victory? Gou kouni Oueddei: There was an explanation by the French Government ~ustifying its intervention in Chad in favor of. the rebels. After discussing that ex- planation, we summoned the charge d'affaires to explain our displeasure. We gave him a letter whose contents will possibly be commaunicated to you by the recipient. It is not for me to inform you of it before the letter is handed to your president. Patrick Forestier: Was the letter intended to reassure him? 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR.OFFICIAL USE ONLY Goukouni Oueddei: It is not for me to answer your question. Patrick Forestier: Are you planning to organize a parade to celebrate your - victory? Goukouni Oueddei: No, indeed my first concern is to restore order in Ndjamena and dress our wounds. Later perhaps we might be able to talk about a parade or a people's ra'_ly to celebrate our victory. _ Patrick Forestier: DQ you need aid in thP sanitation and medical spheres? Goukouni Oueddei; We need such help badly. We are living amid ruins. Patrick Forestier: Will you ask for aid from France? If what kind of aid? Goukouni Oueddei: Yes, but I will not ask France to give us military aid. We are entitled to ask it for help in the medical, food, technical and cultural spheres. Patrick Forestier: Would you have been surprised by a French military inter- vention, or did you never really believe that such a thing would occur? Goukouni Oueddei: I never thought that Giscard's gove~rnment, which had observed a completely neutral stance for 9 months, would decide to inter- vene to help a dying rebellion. Patrick Forestier: Did you have assurances from France, or is that your personal impression? Goukouni Oueddei: It is an entirely person:il impression. I never received any assurances; however, I know that in its correspondence President Giscard's government vigorously confirms our legitimacy. Patrick Forestier: Noneth eless, the French Government is showing its anx ie ty? Goukouni Oueddei: We are a government, a state. It should aak us.... It should send a delegation to tell us, to confirm that we have military agreements: "If you are in difficulty, tell us. Otherwi~e~ do not aek for aid from another country." The French ~overnment should put the problem tb us in specific terms instead of beating about the bush, as it has. Patrick Forestier: I have met officials who were displeased with the aid which France apparently gave to Hissein Habre. Have you any proof of Fr ench military aid to the FAN? Goukouni Oueddei: I attach no importance to that type of speculation. To tell the truth, I never thought that ~rance would help Hissein either militarily or materially. The question which still has to be answered ia _ why France placed a press service, a news service at Hissein's disposal.... 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I also wonder for whose benefit France is trying to stir up a number of countries against Chad. I wonder why France is prompting some aisgraced ministers or former politicians from Chad to make inappropriate remarke here.... Af ter the stance taken by the French ~over~ent, I co uld say that France, if it did not supply arms [directly] to Hissein, did help him either vn the f inancial plane or by means of the weapons which Hissein is receiving from Egypt and for which France is paying. In the final analysis France, - wh ich is an ancient and intelligent nation, should not take the riak of indulging in such maneuvers. It is not worthy of France and its past, or of its intelligence with regard to th e present and the future. COPYRIGHT: ?~981 par Cogedipresse S.A. ~ - CSO: 4400 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS ~ MULTIPARTY STATES OF AFRICA EXAMINED Parie JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Nov 80 p 19 [Article in Che form of an answer by Patrick David to the question asked by Amadou Konate of Man, Ivory Coast: Which Countriea of Afr.ica Allow Party Pluralism?"] [Text] A magazine like JEUNE AFRIQUE is duty bound to be useful to its readers and to play au educator's role. Therefore, each week in this space from now on we will answer questions of general interest which pou puC to us. The prol,iferaCion of political parties and liberation movements-most of the time clandestine - which orchestrate nationalist activity during colonial times has moat often~ once independence fias been obtained, led into the strictest monolithic style of politics. In this connection the figures are instructive: ouC of the 50 member atates of the OAU, 37 have adopted the single-party system or have suppressed any kind of political party formation pure and simq~le. The reasons put forward by lead- ers are varied. Some have chosen the path of Marxism-Leninism and therefore they stick to the dogma of the single party. By dominating the machinery of government it holds a monopoly on truth and action. One class is worth.y of intereat, that of the "workers"; one party ie legitimate, the one supposed to be responsible for their aspirations and to be Cheir spokesman. Inconceivable In theae conditions any pluralist solution is inconceivable and electoral consulta- tion useless. This is the argument championed by Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique. In Ethiopia the military ~unta has not yet suc- ceeded in setting up its revolutionary party. Some other single-parry countries belong to "moderate" Africa, even though several display support for some form of socialism. For them pluralist democracy is a luxury. It must be sacrificed to achieve more pressing objectivea: economic devel- opment, and the primacy of naCional solidarity over ethnic solidarity. The govern- ments want to be able on Che economic level as on the political level to act without 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY any conaCraint: they do not tolerate opposition and do aot a~cept debate, both of which are interpreted as being aources of division and of losing time. About 30 st~ties are in t~is situation. This is perhapa no ].o�nger the case for Ivory Coast which is attempCing an experiment of "leader-led democracy." Authoriaed Whether they are Maracist or not, whether they are governed by militaxy men or by civiLia,ns, these states maintain the idea of a"uuanimous" saciety grouped together behind its ].eader. Private poliCical groupinga are invited to dissolve themselvea _ and be intQgrated into Che aole party, which is held out as the expression of a unity which is proclaimed and set out by decree. Whatever the ~ustifications given for the single-party system, it represents a particularly Pffective technique for governing without sharing power and at the same time for holding on to power. However, there is a minority of countries which accept and operate within the multi- party syatem: Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Morocco, Mauritius, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. It is true the dominant parties generally have an overwhe7.ming ma~ority in Par- - liament. With the exception of M~orocco, these countries are imbued with British _ parliamentarianism. Limited Some other more cautious countries accept the idea of "limited multiparty govern- ment." Thie is the case of Upper Volta, Senegal and Zesotho, which nonethelesa put together the ingredients for open political activity. In other cases, aucn as Egypt~ limited mu].tiparCq government is a mere surface democracy. There remains Madagascar, a country claiming to draw on Marxism-Leniniam, where _ certain parties are authorized but they are contained within a Front which is in power. Certain penple have been wont to see in this movement from single party to limited multiparty government a progression towards democracy, a moderating path. However, there is cauae to be mary, for such a mulCiparty system c~n deviate in practice to- wards something little different from a single party.� ' Finally, in Chad 11 factions are tearing each other to pieces, and in Uganda leg- islative elections are supposed to be held in 1981 with several parties in attend- ance. BuC the current situation hardly gives one any room for illusions. COPYRIGHT: JEUNE AFRIQUE - GRUPJIA 1980 9631 CSO: 4400 14 F(1R ~FFT~TAr. TTCF. f1NT.Y ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IN:ER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS OFFICIAL DISCUSSES WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMIJNITY ACTIVITIES _ Paria JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 pp IO-11 [Interview with CEAO Secretary General Mouesa Ngom, date and place not given] [Text~ The success of a regional cammunity certainly dependa on the will of the chiefs of state who created it and the deter- mination of the peoples it camprises. But it also depends on - those who work therein daily, such as the secretary general, Mioussa Ngom, who has just been reappointe~�to his post for 4 years. [Question) Mr Secretary General, are you satisfied with the way the conference of chiefs of state developed? Moussa Ngom: Certainly, for at a time when there might have been doubts about the community, the chiefs of state decided to continue along the path we have aet for ouraelves to achieve the economic integration of our countriea. "The effort under- taken will be continued" President Leonold Sedar Senghor stated. It might be noted moreover that this desire for solidarity which to date has been only a concept, an intention, has become a reality. The impact of cnstoms cooperation on intra- cammunity trade is an example. Such trade increased by 241 percent between 1976 and 1979. And thie was thanks to the arsena2 of toolc and technical and institutional - mechanisms established eince 1976. For example custama declarations and certificates of origin were standardized, as were the main customs syetems. Moreover, crop, fishing and livestock products circulate �reely without hindrance, as do craft producta, which have just been coordinated with thia regime. Finally, approved induetsial products benefit from privileged tax treatment-~the regional cooperation tax. And it is our firm hope that a true co~unity can be achieved soon, by 1 Januery 1986. On that date, cu~toms duties snould have disappeared within the ~ CEAO and a joint foreign rate ahould have been established. I should add that my satiefaction ia not purely formal. I am happy that the confide:ue of the chiefs of state of CEAO countries was evidenced in ~iamey, the capital of a country which symholizea African simplicity, tenacity and dignity, and which sets an example of - courage and firmness in the search for just solution~ to the inequitieR of the economic system in the modern world. (Queation] Free trade has itc limits. For example, MaLi and Senegal had to reach mutual agreement on contingenta in the textile sector this year. FOR OI~FICTAL U3E ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Moussa Ngam: In certain very sensitive aectors, in fact, there are protectioniat - reflexes here and there. Recently bilateral agreements have resolved the majority of dieputea. But ~ve do not want to oome back to the baaic principlea of the CEAO with one arrangement after another. Even within the framework of the General Aaree- ment on Tariffe and Trade (GATT) there are agreementa of thia type. Thie atate of affaira is the reault above all of the disparities in development policies. These arrangements can thua be explaiaed but not justified. In Niamey it was agreed to _ retain 1 January 1986 as the date for the total elimination of custama barriers _ within the community, deapite a delay of twa years. [Question] But aren't some of the products which benefit fram the regional co- ~ operation tax (TCR) Froducts imported fram Europe, the local added value of which _ ia emall? - Moussa Ngom: Without question it is necessary to refine the TCR syatem, which along ~ with the Community Development Fund (FCD) conetitutes the foundation of our structure. It is urgent that we draft discriminatory measures reserving the various preferential facilities the co~unity offers for community enterprises alone, soYely for the products of atrategic value to our economies. [Queation] Are the member nations of the CEAO entirely up to date in their coc~nit- ments with regard to the Co~nunity Development Fund? Moussa Ngom: For two years, the economic eituation has been the reason that certain nationa have not met their obligations. Our tregaury cannot tolerate thie situation for long. But let ua note the warning voiced by President Seyni Kountche himself at the closing aesaion of the conference of chiefs of state: "We cannot overlook the negligence of our financial offieers wi~?enever it becomes a question of honoring our - commitments." For our part, we find ouraelves forced to limit compensatory paymenta _ in favor of states which cio not pay up their ~~ack deb+ts. [Question~ Stress has been placed in the austerity of the budget of the secretariat general. Moussa Ngom: This bud~et is conristent with the d~mande of the situation in each nation, as well as our needs as we have been a~;~~ to egtablish them in the past three years. It is certainly very auotere (tt?e 1981 operational budget comes to 878 million CFA [African Finuncial Co~nunity] francs, in other words slightly lese t~an that for 1980, wilile at the same time the FCD estimates come to 6.76 bi!llion CFA - france), but we want to show by this that we are ready to accommodate the realities of the national administrations. This budget was i.mpreasive and doubtlesa the source of the praise ~e have received. [Queation) What development actions are accorded priority? Mouesa Ngam: Water remaina the top priority and the village and pastoral water resources program will thus mobilize a major part of our e�forts. But we have many othar ambitions. We are working on a program with the CILSS and FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization~ aid to establish food stocks, as well as on problems of - farm mechanization and seed aelection. In brief, it is a matter of attacking first of all the main farm production factors: vater, fertilizer, seed and machine tools. Moreover, four aectors are the focua of our attention in the realm of economic 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL,Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY cooperation: transportation (we have drafted plana for a maritime transportation company and a truck factory); t6e development of tourism, as well as pharmaceut_ical - supplies of modern and traditional medicinee; and finally fishit~g, with the estab- liehment of a pilot fiah farm at Bouake, in the Ivory Coast. But if we know that almost ii1 percent of the population of our subregion ia rural, we also know that 90 percent of our income comes from the citie~. Thia is why we are working with the UNIDO ~United Nations Induatrial Development Organization] to perfect an industrial program on a community scale, involving on a priority basie the pro- cessing of raw materials and Farm products. We envi~age not only small national units, but also regional centers which would be open to adjacent countries, in par- ticular in the reslm of applied research and training. In fact, the CEAO ~ction ahould seek on the one hand to meet the neede which are cammon to all the nationa but which cannot be achieved by a aingle na2ion alone, and on the other hand, to coordinate, indeed redirect, the actions wi~ich are undertaken simultaneoualy in several nations at the same time. Finally, we must not forget information and the perfecting of our cadres, w~ich will be guaranteed in part thanks to our community inatitutions for the technical training of cadrea and directors in the mining, textile, fishing and management sectors. [Question] What relations do you maintain with other regional organizations? Moussa Ngom: With aome of them we have excellent relatione. This is the case with the Inter-State Committee to Fight the Drought in the Sahel (CILSS), the West - African Development Bank (WADB), and the Council of the Entente, with which we are purauing Celecommunications and transportation projects and the village and paetoral water resources program, at ite origins. We have frequent contacte with the Mano River Union, which brings together countzies as varied ae Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea. The Central Bank of the Weat African States (BCEAO) hae sided ue in the drafting of an agreement pertaining to the free circulation of capital and payment . facilities. Obviously, we maintain relationa with the Econamic Cou~aunity of West African States (ECOWAS). Our trade exchange goal goes beyond the geoeconomic area of our six member nations, which are all adjacent to other no~ember nations. Whether it be a queation o� the ECOWAS or the future Afriean common market, we are prepared to serve as a laboratory for all of the mechanisms, all of the taxation procedures, for the trans- portation and customs handling of goods, to provide useful experience, Co show the stagea to completed, the concepts to be applied, Che auccesa which is poasible, on condition that we are not asked to sacrifice our palpable gains for distant and "hietorical" objectives! Finally, a list of all of the international bodiea with which we have established relations would be too long--the OAU, the ADB [African Development Bank~, the United Nations organizations (ECA [Economic Comnission for Africa], UNDP [United Nations Development Program], UNCTAD, UNESCO), th~ Arab cooperation institutiona (BADEA [Arab Bank for African Economic Development], Islami~ Development Bank, Arab League, Arab funds), not to overlook our partners at the source, the EEC and iCs member - nations, basically France and the FRG. COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 198U 5157 CSO: 4400 17 ~ FOR OFFICT.AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 _ FOR OFFICIAI., USE ONLY INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIAN OCEAN EXAMINED Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Nov 80 p 25 [TextJ Squeezed by the progressive opposition in his country, sub3ect to the pressure of the OAU, the prime minister of Mauritius has ~ust made a 90-degree ' turn in his foreign policy. In October, at the plenary meeting of the United Nations, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam astonished the world by taking a very firm position with respect :o tdashington and London on the sub~ect of the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean. He officially demanded the complete retrocession of the Chagos archipelago (of which Diego Garcia fs a parr) to the isle of Mauritius, its legal owner under international law. He contested the ~uridical existence of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) and demanded its dissolution. ~ Since then, the prime minister has held talks with Edmund Muskie and members of the British government. ?'romises--but what?--are supposed to have been made by the Americans, whereas the B*itish seem hesitant. In India, at the beginning of November, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam obtained the support of Mrs Ghandi and did not hesttate to describe the London government as neo-colonialist and imper ialist. While he was at it, he accused the imperialists of wanting ceaselessly to appropriate new colonies. One will recall, however, that the same Ramgoolam asserted, barely ~ Z months before, that /"the English were in their own home on Diego Garcia"/: The opposition, the Mauritian Militant Movement (P4IM) for its part does not believe in the miracle: this maneuver could well be a smokescreen for a plan to regularize the American presence in Diego Garcia. In fact, the atoll could be retroceded legally to Mauritius, then a site leased out for the base immediately following. This legal legerdemain would put an end to the objurgations of the OAU, the 3.sle ~ of Mauritius being free tr~ "lease" a parcel of its own territory to whomever it pleases. Bravo: " While these shady dealings take place, a meeting between Le Pen (extreme-right candidate for the presidency of the French Republic) and Gaetan Duval (leader of the Mauritian Social Democrat Party, reactionary and member of the Maur itian governmental coalition) may have occurred during Le Pen's trip to Reunion and Mauritius. The newspaper of the Reunion Communist Party (PCR), TEMOIGNAGES, and the Port-Louis ~ournal LE MAURICIEN report in this connection a statement by a Reunion advocate, Mr Alix Morel. In a press conference on 25 October Mr Morel (who describes himself as representing Le P~n in Reunion) stated that the two men, Duval ~ and Le Pen, could organize an anti-communist front directed against the I~AfM in the Indian Ocean. This weuld find its actualization starting with the independence of the isle of Rodrigues, detached from Mau*_-itian territory. 18 4l~D I~477T/`T AT TTCF l1NT V APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ It is known t`.iat, for some time, Gaetan Duval has l~en brandishing the threat that Rodrigues would secede if the A4SM ehould win the general elections in December 1981-January 1982. No one believes that Le Pen has the slightest chance of being elected in France, but everyone guesses what lobby is acting through him in the Indian OceBn. The fact that the Mauritian government lets Duval a~t and does not bar his access to the territory of Rodrigues is moreover a scandal pregnant with meaning. That it authorizes a meeting between Le Pen and Duval in Mauritius in such a'n avowedly secessionist context is incomprehensible. Or, perhaps, all too understandable... In any case, the [game ofJ musical islands continues in the Indian Ocean. So many possible bases coveted by you know who... COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie 9516 CSO: 4400 ~ 19 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL~f APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS SIMON MALLEY EDITORIAL ON REAGAN VICTORY Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Nov 80 pp 6-7 [Editorial "The Prey of the Hawks"--passages between slantlines published in boldfac~ ] [Textj Any activity that could politically, militarily and economically destabilize the progressive African, Ara, Asiatic and South American regimes--by meana of mercenaries, saboteurs or puppet organizations such as UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] and the FNI,A [Angolan National Liberation Front] in Angoia, the MNR [Mozambique National Resistance] and the F1R [expansion unknown] in Mozambique--will be encouraged. The nuclear potential of South Africa, Israel, Pakistan, and, conceivably, Morocco and Egypt, will be developed. All means will be employed to bar access to nuclear power to any Arab country labelled "progressive." All step s and effor~.s will be taken to establish, in the short and medium te:-m, a "diecreet" Cairo-Riyadh-Tel Aviv axis--which Tehran, perchance, might re~oin if" the present re$ime fell back into America's lap--an axis whase ob~ectives would be fixed in a framework conforming to the vital strategic interests of Washington. It will be neceseary, through diverse means, to foment a military conflict--limited in duration and geographic scope--between Damascus and Tel Aviv, in such a way that an overturning of the internal Syrian situation facilitates the coming to power of a regime simiiar that that in Cairo and ready to negotiate a Camp David II. Strong pressure will be put on Jordan and Saudi Arabia for the former to return to _ - ita demand for the Palestinian territories occupied bq Israel ia~ 1967--despite the Rabat accords--and for the latter (Saudi Arabia) to support that position. Morocco's def ense and offensive armament will be strengthened, arith ~he prospect of a gradual aubatitution of Washington for Paris in the Maghreb countries where the latter still plays a preponderant role. The accession of Nambia to a sort of "independence" will be assured: but in the framework of a close association with - the racist regime of Pretoria, which must remain the main power of southern Africa and oblige Cuba to withdraw from Angola, making it all the more wlnerable to the blackmail of Pretoria. The American intervention fleet in the Sea of Oman, in the Indian Ocean, and in the Mediterranean will be enhanced in ord er to "hold back" the Soviet Union. Border incidents between People's China and the Soviet Union will increase and the renewal of war between Hanoi and Beijing will be hastened. The "side-effects" of Ostpolitik will be eliminated and thwarted; perhaps the SALT II accords will be buried forever, and an effort will be made to confuse them with SALT III . 20 F(lR nFFTf:TAT. iiSE 7NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ Bizarre? Inconceivable? Unrealistic in the present international conjuncture, taking into account the balance of power in the world? Doubtle~s. But all the - same, such are the bsoad lines of the policy which, for several months--and especially since the nomination of Reagan as a presidential candidate by the Republican convention--dozens of political, military and economic advisers, experts from the special "private" services, have patiently refined in connection with the r~ce to the White Hou se, which came to an end on 4 November. If it turned out to be feasible--even "step by step"--thia policy would open up one of the darkest pages in the international policy of the United States since the end of W~rld War II. It assumes, in reality, both considerable increases in the war budget o� the Pentagon, and close though problematic coordination of moves between Washington and its principal friends and allies in Europe, Asia, the Arab world, Africa and Latin - America. But Ronald Reagan should stop and think before going too fast and teo far. The history, for more than 30 years, of the defeats and disappointments suffered by , his country should remind him that the balance of power in the eorle'saforcesgin~ that Washington is no longer the only nuclear power; that the p p the 'I'hird World, not to speak of those in the West, will not permit him to lead ~ his country back to the good old days of the imperialist conquests of the Nineteenth Century and the beginning of the 'itaentieth; that the oppressed peoples have--and can have recourse to--objective allies who know that their own vital interests depend in large measure on those of the Third World; that peace today is indivisible, even if most of the wars, if not all those we have known since the end of World War II, have taken place principally on our own territories, in our own countries. Jic~�ny Carter did not understand the essential needs of the American people, traumatized by the d eath of thousands of compatriots in Indochina and by the humiliating defeat of the formidable military power of the United State~ by a people whose primary weaponry consisted of conviction and the determination to defeat the aggressor; hE suff ered the backlash and was the f irst Democratic president since Grover Cleveland--in 18~8--and the tenth president in the history of the United States to not be reelected for a seconn term as provided for in the Constitution - of the United States. He wanted to manipulate, to fool the electorate by accepting, for example, on the eve of the elections, the conditions imposed--six months earlier--by Tehran for - the freeing of the hostages, and by fostering the belief that their liberation was imminent; nevertheless, he was re~ected by the Southerners, even though, for - the first time in more than two centuries, he was their own.elected candidate. He failed to control inflation, or reduce unemployment, or improve the continually _ declining standard of living of his compatriots, or put forward serious thoughts about the future; Georgia, his native land, was the only state of the "Deep South" that he carried. He threw East-West detente into jeopardy by paralyzing SALT II; he manifested gross contradictions in the implementation of his famour "human ~ rights"--on the one hand supporting the bloody repression of the Shah of Iran, and - the detention of thousands of political prisoners in I.atin America, Asia, Africa and elsewhere, ar_d by contrast criticizing the policy of countries whose regime did not happen to please him: his credibility, the confidence that he wanted to - get from his people had been seriously compromised among the liberal intelligentsia, [many of whom] pref erred either to abstain or to vote for a marginal candidate who had no chance to win. 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY He did nothing to force the fascist South African regime to modify its policy; _ he continued to let it develop its nuclear weapons; he ignored too the legitimate socio-economic dema~nds of the black Americans, failing also to take into account their rights to equitable legislative representation in accordance with the Constitution; he shamelesaly disavowed the first b7ack ambassador to the United _ Nations, Andrew Young, thereby yYelding to the preasure of the anti-black, pro-South Afric~n and pro-Israeli lobby, which ultimately eliminated him; Jimmy Carter loet the ma~ority in the traditionally Democratic states, like New York, [where voters] preferred to abstain or to vote for Ronald Reagan. _ A man of 70 years of age, ultra-conservative, thus arrives at the White House with, for the first time since the Eisenhower Administration of the Fifties, a Republican ma~ority in the Ser.ate and, for the first time since 1966, a Aouse of Representatives that alsa has a Republican majority [s3cJ. Many spokeamen for the liberal and in some respects prcgressive--wing were likewise brought down in the fall of their - president; senators like McGovern, Church, Bayh, A4agnuson, Culver, etc. The fateof Ca.rter was def~initively sealed when, ~ust a few days from the election, Reagan, in a televised brcadcast, posed the question: /"Amer.icans, ask yourselvea for a moment if today you are happier than when Carter took office in 1g77..."/ The biting response came back from the ballot-boxes: out of 538 electoral votes, Reagan got a total of 489, and Carter only 49. The 40th president~of the United Statea, who is to go into the White House on 20 January, inflicted on the Democratic - Party one of its most serious defeats since I932 [sic], this party whlch has held _ Che reins of power during 32 of the 48 years that have elapsed since the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. How could the American p.eople, in fact , answer "yes" to the skillful question , Reagan posed? /"This is exactly what scared us so much,"/ commented one of Carter's _ collaborators subsequently. /"When he posed that question, we knew it was all over for us..."/ How could Americans, from the poorest to the weaTthiest, pretend to be - satisfied with the dismal record of the 4 years of the Carter Administration? Galloping inflation reaching 14 perc~nt per year; interest rates topping 18 per,cent; millions of ~obless; no serious prospects for improvement of the quality of life of the average citizen; a policy that was impulsive, contradictory, ambivalent and confused on the international level; "cool" war with the USSR and its allies; a neglected and hostile Europe, whose contempt for Carter ~rrestled with profound distrust; an Arab World almost unanimously hostile to the Gamp David accords; " Africa where one ltstened to and supported those regimes that were neo-colonial and close to the racist South Africans more than those that en~oyed popular _ support; Asia, where the bizarre decision, inspired .by Brzezinski, to, support China against the S~viet Union could not fail to produce both anxiety and a hardening in the Kremlin; Latin America, where, on the one hand, no effort was spared to _ impede the advent of the revolution in Nicaragua and where, on the other hand, the bloody repression of El Salvadar is c~untenanced and the conspiracy against the progreseive regime of Michael Manley of Jamaica is openly financed. From the protection of the Shah's regime and SAVAR to the hostage affair in Tehran and the American commando attack at Tanriz; from the coup fomentecl by the American secret services in Turkey to ~he vain attempt to impose mandatory sanctions against the USSR becauae of Afghanistan; from the refusal to impose sanctions ugainst Israel for the annexation of Jerusalem to the casual atance adopted with reapect - 22 ~ Fnu n~Trr ~T ncu nui v APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE (1NLY to Zimbabwe-�-whose president, Robert Mugabe, receiv~=_d only a token $25 million, while a billion had been promised him; from military aid t.. Morocco, despite formal assurances by Carter to Algiers, to the recent decision of the Senate to,authorize the CIA to finance new subversive operations against Angola; from the deployment of American force in Che Gulf with a view to the application of the "Carter doctrine" against the independence and sovereignty of the region to the installation of a ~ aeries of sero-naval bas e s across the len~th of the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and _ - the Sea of Oman: everything fits. _ Ttie Carter policy was nothing but a successio~ of threats and blackmail [directed] against the socialist camp and especially the Third World. Will Carter's successor in the White House understand the lesson that the American people have just inflicted on Carter? It is diffic ult, very difficult, to believe so in light of what is known of t he deep convic t ions and the statements of Ronald Reagan and the - advisors that surroundtiim. Certainly, scenarios can be modified; positions can be nuanced; the players, replaced. What will remain is the [enduring) nature of American imperialism. As long as the peoples o f the Third World do not succeed, through united coordinated action, in resisting the designs--whether avowed or not--of their oppressors, in frustrating the real or poten~ial schemes of the aggressors and their allies; as long as they do not uae their real economic, financial, strategic and political - , power to demand the placc~ that is rightfully theirs in the international scene; as long as they do not re~alize that nothing fundamental can change in American policy, that it's Tweedl edum and Tweedledee, they will be the easy prey of the "hawks" who are building their nests in the White House. - COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie 9516 - CSO: 4400 23 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY " INfER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS BRIEFS AL-QADHDHAFI AGAINST BARRE--A1-Qadhdhafi wishes to destabilize the regime of Siad Barre in Somalia. He has offered military and financial support to certain lead- ers of tribes in the Sosaf known for their autonomist tendencies. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Dec 80 p 38] , GUINEA-BISSAU-CAPE VERDE TRANSPORTATION--Guinea-Bissau's State Commissioner for Transportation Manuel Santos arrived in Praia on 6 December to discuss questions relatec~ to transportation between his country and Cape Verde. The two countries run a~oint maritime transports company. Manuel Santos was supposed to be received by Aristides Pereira, president of the Republic of Cape Verde and meet with Herculano Vieira, Cape Verdian minister of transportation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3472] FORTHCOMING BENGUELA RATLROAD CONFERENCE--Zambian Minister of Energy, Transportation j and communications Lufoma announced on 5 December that the Zambian, Angolan and Zairian ministers of transportation will meet in mid-January in Livingstone, Zamb~.a, to discuss the reopening of the Angolan Benguela railroad. This railroad, built es- _ pecially to provide an outlet for Zambia and Zaire, has been closed to international traffic since 1975 following the damage caused by UNITA guerrillas. The railroad could expedite shipments of Zambian and Zairian copper to the Angolan port of Lobito on the Atlantic Ocean. However, all previous attempts at reopening the rail- road have failed because of the insecurity created by the guerrilla war in the eastern part of Angola. (Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3427] LIBYAN AIRSTRIP IN CHAD--For i,he last ferr days Libyan troops 1,~ve had access to an airstrip in the Douguia area, 70 I~n from Ndja~ena~ suitable for large planes. The terrain had been prepared by a French parachutist unit in Sep- tember 1979. a fex months before the total xithdraxal of the French troops from Chad. ~ex~ ~Paris VAL~"'URS ACTUEI~LES in French 1 Dea 80 p 2~ 8568 UPPER VOLTAN 'QADHDHAFI'---This is wha~ we may suppose ~xam the. past q~ the new Ouagadougou leader~ Col S aye Zerbo~ class?fiad fr~r a].ong time in African dossiera as a progressive. Houghouet-Boigny's entourage is concerned about - this aspect: after the destabi?_i.zation of Ghad, Ghana, Liberia. the txo Guineas and Upper V olta, Ivory Coast is the only stable point on the I~est African chessboard. And it employs a million Upper V oltans. ~Tex~ ~Paris VA~LEURS ACTUELLES in French 1 Dec 80 p 2~ 8568 CSO: 4400 24 ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR OFFICIAL USB ONLY ~ l - ANGOLA BRIEFS CAPTURED SOVIET AIRMEN--In a communique ~hat reached Paris on 4 December, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), has confirmed that during the month of November its forces captured two Soviet military belonging to the USSR air force. They are mechanical er.gineer Ivan Cherniestsky, 46, and pilot Mollaeb Kola, 3g, The Antonov-26 aircraft was downed on 23 November in Kuando-KubangSovietiin ~ 250 kms east of Menongue (formerly Serpa Pinto). According to UNITA, volvement in the Angolan theater of operations has become more flagrant and more direct," because, it reports, of the reluctance of "Cuban and East German pilots to participate in combat, given the "efficiency of the anti-aircraft defenses of UNITA, which downed 3 Antonov-23 planes and 5 MI 8 helicopters between 7 and 24 November." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3427] _ CSO: 4400 25 FOR 0~'FICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CAPE VERDE BRIEFS ~ ELECTION STATISTICS--The African Party for tlhe Independence of Guinea-Bassau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) won 92.48 percent of the vote during the 7 December elections. The percentage of voters was 75.01 percent. A total of 88,309 persons voted for the PAIGC and 7,052 against, while 125 ballots were annulled. The to*_al number of registered voters was 126,028, and 95,486 ballots were cast. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3472] CSO: 4400 ' 26 FnR nFFT~TAT. tT~R ~N1,Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC FRENCH UNDERTAKE OPERATION TO AID BIRAO Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEI3S in French 28 Nov 80 p 3168 [Text] The French detachment in the Central Africazt Republic has ~ust taken part in a humanitarian operation iz the Birao region, in the northern part of the country, where famine struck, the French minister of defense announced on 21 November. This operation was organized following a request for aid directed to the president of the French Republic by President Dacko. The miasion, which was carried out in two phases (from 10 to 16 October and from 4 to 12 November) was directed fro~m the co~and post of the French detachment stationed in Bangui. IC involved airlifting 96 tons of food to Birau, and then distributing 66 tons to the villages located within a 150-kilometer perimeter. To dietribute this aid, 60 members of French parachute units and Ground Forces Tactical Air Support (ALAT) experts used 2 Transall C-160 military aircraft flown in from Libreville to carry the food supplies to Birau, and 2 Puma SA 330 helicopters based in Bangui to distribute aid. The operation required the establishment of a logistic base at an aerodrome 800 kilometers from Bangui which - had no infras*_r_�~;.~~~ o;. oll: The French detachment in the Central African Republic is made up of rotating companiea stationed in Bangui and Baraoua. There are currently some 850 men, some of them in the 3rd and 8th Marine Light Infantry Parachute Regiments (RPIMA) and the Toulouse llth Parachute Division, and some in a mechanized infantry ~ regiment of the Saint-Malo 9th Marine Light Infantry Division, according to the French minister of defense. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980 515 7 CSO: 4400 27 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC BRIEFS PATASSE OUT ON BAIL--Ange Patasse, head of the Central African People's Liberation Movement (MLPC) and former prime minister under Emperor Bokassa, was released on bail by the Central African authorities because of the de terioration in his health, among other factors. The former prime minister, who was arrested in October 1979, is being prosecuted by the Central African courts on charges of threatening the internal security of the state. A nwnber of observers in the Central African capital believe that the release of Mr Patasse on bail comes with- in the framework of the measures planned by the chief of state to "relax the political atmosphere." President Dacko did in fact announce "measures benefiting peraons currently deprived of freedom for crimes of opinion" during a meeting with public officials on 19 November. [Teat~ [Paris MARCSES TROPICAUX ET I~:DITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3168] 5157 : INCREASING BUDGETARY DEFICIT--The status of public finances in the Central _ African Republic involves a growing deficit and a budget impasse in the amount of 13 to 14 billion CFA francs. The Central African authori ties believe that this ~ situation is not at all temporary. I~ reflects a structural imbalance and merits a direct explanation to the whole of the nation, the AFP, which carried this report, stressed, noting that the Central African government plans to undertake a series of specific measures pertaining to budget discipline and the modernization of government departments. Let us recall that in presenting the main options of the government which has just been established in Bangui, the new prime minister of the Central African Republic, Mr Jean-Pierre Le Bouder, announced on 18 November that the correction of state finances and the trial of Bokassa and his accomplices, as well as the clarification of the fate of the others arrested, were the government priorities. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3168] 5157 CSO: 4400 28 _ F(1D n~pTrTer TiCF. nxT.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CONGO BRIEFS PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING--President Denis Sassou-Nguesso delivered in Brazzaville on 7 November 1980 the opening speech at a meeting of the Central Committee of the PCT [Congolese Labor Party], the single party. In the economic field, the head of state declared, "the conference of state enterprises has drawn up a document containing the conclusions of the nearly 7 months of diacussions involving political cadres and technicians, representaCives of workers, and for foreign jurisdictions. An important proposal was made. What is involved is the charter on state enterprises. This charter, which will become a public law after its examination and approval by the People's National Assembly, deserves � all our attention. After everyone's approval each one will have to abide by _ that law or be sub~ect to the pertinent sanctions. We shall concentrate...on program 1981~. That will be the occasion to penetrate in more depth this sad reality of the contradiction between our needs and our means to satisfy them considering our nearly complete lack of funds and the existing state of our finances. Program 1981, dubbed a stopgap program by the party's Third Special Congress, prepares the initiation of the 5-year plan that we propose to discuss next year. Once again the people will be consulted to a large extent and a democratic discussion will be mandated. For the time being it should be stated that the 1981 budget prompts us to adopt a rigorous attitude. You will find that our financea are still carefully checked and we shall have to hold on firmly to our present stance." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3040] 2662 RISING INFLATION--According to information published by UNICONGO [Interprofes- sional Employers Union of the Congo] which draws up twice a year, in April and ~ October, a statement of essential expenditures for a household of one childless European couple, the general price index computed on 109 articles reportedly rose by 14.32 percent between October 1979 and October 1980. For the same period of Che preceding year (October 1978 to October 1979), the aggregate increase computed on the same basis was only 10.33 percent. [Text] [Paria MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3040] 2662 FRENCH BANK LOAN--The government of the People's Rep~lblic of the Congo recently aigned a financing agreement involving 5 billion CFA francs (100 million French francs) with a French banking consortiimi made up of the International Bank for West Africa (BIAO) and the Financial Company, an affiliate of the Rothschild _ group. This is an overall agreement allowing the financing of French exports to the Congo in the form of buyers' credit through a loan under advantageous conditiona. The Congolese government will subsequently determine the detailed allocation of this overall amount. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3170] 5157 29 CSO: 4400 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ EQUATORIAL GUINEA _ BRIEFS PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO FRANCE--From 13 to 17 November 1980 the president of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Lt Col Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, is paying ~ an official w~orking visit to France. On the evening of President Obiang's arrival in Paris on Thursday, 13 November, Jean Francois-Poncet, French minis- ter of foreign affairs, offered a dinner in his honor at the French Foreign - Ministry. The next day, Friday, 14 November, President Obiang was the guest of France's President Valery Giscard d'Estaing for luncheon at the Elysee Palace and was the dinner guest of Robert Galley, French minister of coopera- _ tion. The visit of the president of Equatorial Guinea will end in the French provinces. On Saturday, 15 November 1980, President Obiang will visit installa- tions of the BRGM [Geological and Mineral Prospecting Office--France] and will have lun,~h at the urPfecture. On Sunday, 16 Novembe.r, he will visit a refinery of the CFP [Frencti~ Petroleum Company] in the environs of Marseilles and, in the afternoon, he will go to Pau and the Lacq gas deposits. He is scheduled to leave France on Monday ~aorning, 17 November 1980. [Text~ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3039] 2662 FRENCH COOPERATION ~:"nUNGER--In October 1979 Robert Galley, French minister of ~ cooperation, paid a visit to Equatorial Guinea, a visit which led on 28 No~ember 1979 to the signing of cooperation agreements between the two countries. Earlier, French aid to Equatorial Guinea, an independent country since 1968 and whose population was estimated to total 300,000 in 1979, was provided through the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which had budgeted an amount of 650,000 French francs for 1979. This aid, now under the ~urisdiction of the Ministry of Cooperation, has been increased (11 million French francs). The new agree- ments which involve the technical, cultural, and scieatific fields concern the reconditioning of the port of Malabo, the initiation of the first stage of mineral prospecting, and the supply of fishing nets and outboard engines to ocitfit pirogues. Other projects are under study, namely, the improvement of the M~;abo and Bata airports, the maintenance of roads, the development of tourism, the construction of a dam on the Rio Ilachi, the improvement of crops (market garden crops, coffee, banarras), and the rea].ization of a pilot farm. Equatorial Guinea would also like to receive assistance for the construction of a hospital in Malabo and evidenced the desire to set up a program of advanced scholarships in medicine, agronomy, engineering, and French philology. Drilling opera~ions have been undertaken off the coast of Equatorial Guinea with the participation of French f irms--ELF-Aquitaine [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France- Aquitaine] and CFP [French Petroleum Company]--drillings which have reportedly yielded positive results. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS _ - in French 14 Nov 80 p 3039] 2662 30 17AD /~L'L'TI'TAT ttC~7 /111TT V APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MALABO'S ELECTRICAL SYSTEM--Within the framework of Equatorial Guinea's capital equipment program the CEM [Electrical Mechanical Company) raas awarded a contract Co build the intermediate- and low-tension electric distribution network and che public lighting system of the capital, Malabo. The various sectors of the city will be served with low-tension current by substations fed in 15 kilovolts by a hooked-up network. The CEM's supply system will include the source, namely, the thermal power station, intermediate-tension overhead and underground links, the 19 intermediate-tension and low-tension substations, the low-tension dis- tribution network by overhead and underground lines, and public lighting. This realization, which falls within the diversification policy initiated by the CEM, will be put into service at the end of 1982. The financing of this order is provided by the EDF [European Development Fund]. Let us recall that at the time of the fall of Nguema Masie (Macias], Malabo was the only capital in the world not to have an electric distribution network. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3040] 2652 CSO: 4400 _ 31 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL IISE ONLY GUINEA BRIEFS FAD RURAL DEVELOPMIIJT LOAN--The Agricultural Fund for International Development (FAD) granted Guinea a 12.5 million dollar loan for the development of rural areas in the Siguiri region on the left bank of the Niger River. The agreement was signed in Rome on 10 December. Approximately 6,000 families will be affected - by this pro~ect aimed at increasing agricultural produc tion. The annual income of these families should increase from $225 to $650. In terms of the national economy, this project will foster an increase of 16,000 tons in the production of - paddy. The total cost of the project amounts to 26.2 million dollars. Besides the FAD, other contributors are the African Development Fund (8.4 million) and Guinea (5.3 million). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3473] TOURE'S VISIT CANCELED--Expected in Paris on 8 December, the Guinean chief of state, ' Ahmed Sekou Toure, canceled his visit~at the last momen t. He was supposed to be received by Giscard d'Estaing, in the name of the Islamic Conference, together with King Hassan II (Morocco) and President Zia U1-Rahman (Bangladesh). Sekou Toure was convinced that security measuzes for his protection were not adequate in the French capital. Moreover, following Giscard's official visit to Guinea in December 1978, he believes he can only visit France under the same conditions. [Text] (Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Dec 80 p S1] CSO: 4400 32 Af1R (1'G`RT('TAT. TTCF. nNT.V APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ IVORY COAST RISE OF THE YOUNG LIONS Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Nov 80 pp 30-3Z [Article by Siradious Diallo: "The Rise of the Young Lions"] (Text] "It ie important that we older generation have constant concern for that borderline age group including those who were born 15 years before independence and those who have been born since then." Did not Chis statement of President Houphouet-Boigny's before the 7th congress of the PDCI (Democratic Party of Ivory Coast), which took place 29 September - 1 October, mirror the classic speech given by all. professional politicians on the eve of elections? Everything a priori might have made one think that. Did not the presidenti~al elect~ons occur scarcely 10 days after the cLosing of the congress? "Ivorianization" We are forced however to admit that, in the mind of the chief of state, thia atate- ment is a genuine expression of faith in the future, thaC is to say in young people, more than being a mere campaign program. That can alreadp be seen via the effort displayed for the education of young people. On the eve of independence~ the government devoted less than 12.5 percent of its budget to education, the level of children attending school was less than 10 per cent, and higher education was provided exclusively outside the country. In 19 80 the portion of the b udget devoted to public education is 33 percent, the percentage of children attending school is reaching 75 percent, and 9,000 Ivorian students, _ boys and girls, are enrolled in ivory Coast eatablishments of higher learning. So it ia hardly surprising that people talk a lot about "Ivorianization." But at - the same time the p rocess seems slow and tricky. Employers, the ma~or part of whom are foreigners, need a lot of persuading to put this policy into effect and they hold it up as much as they can. The result is that yo~mg cadres who have recently left university and who increasingly have trouble finding a job are no longer hiding their discontent. They do not undersCand it when, 20 years after - independence, Frenchmen c~ntinue to take pride of place. As a sign of the times, Ivorian cadres are nf technocratiteobstwithafatrpaYchecks. through minisCerial antechambers in search o ~ Here they are, long shuC away in a position of being silent grown-ups, of being concerned most of all about being effective and advancing in Cheir ~obs without FOR OFFICIAL USE ONi,Y ' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY miesteps, now bounding forth suddenly on the political scene. Like springs com- presaed for a long t~me that an invisible hand incautionusly lets go, the young lions, starved for politics, are unwinding and bursting out, letting looae ex- traordinary energy. Theae are "mischievous kids whose mouth still smells of moth- er's milk~" confided to us one of those old soldiera of the party whoae only claim ta fame ie having talked back to a colonial administrator in 1949! "Theae mischie- vous kids~" he added, "must be patient. The country still has need of our experi- ence to prepare for their future in the best condiCions." In the Ring Except that here they are, these "mischievous kids," whose age varies from 35 to 50 years of age, not wanting to learn anything more. After having been patienC and listened for a time, seated under the palaver tree without saying a word, they now intend not only to break up tine monologue of the "o].dtimers," but to take over, - even if it means tearing the baton away from them by force. This irreaistible rise of young people is first finding expression in the place being occupied from now on by the under-50 set in Che new governing bodies of the party. In fact, even though they still are only a Chird of the members of the po- litical bureau, they make up on the other hand nearly half of the steering couanit- tee complement and are seven out of nine included on the executive committee, that is to say the mini-government, not to mention the fact that it is the nerve center of the party. Without even meationing that they also took the lion's share at the time of elections of PDCI section secretary general slots in July and August. _ On that occassion, two thirds of the jobs were grabbed in open competition by the new conquietadors of Ivorian politics. The shock was so violent and unexpected - that it was fatal to some oldtimers. Such a one was that o1d companion of President Houphouet-Boigny who died in a dazed state a few days after his defeat at Lakota. But after the definite attempt they made during the 7th Congress, it will be most of all the time o� the legislative and municipal elections that the young cadres intend to achieve the transformation which, in their eyes, wil~ establish them po- - litically. Presumably the prospect of being elected by and for themselves, on their own merits, and not coopted from above by being favored by the "party" or the president, has something in it which whips up their blood and galvanizes into action the strength of the new wave politicians. In any case, it is not the hope of getting rich quicklp through a career in poli- ~ tice that makes the rivals of the old Coothl.ess partp barons run. Some of them - who have shown proof not only of their technical competence but also of their spirit of initiative if not their capacity to undertake, create and succeed in business - are not starving; quite the opposite. They have alreadp ~ade their fortune though the circumstances of their getting rich are sometimes questionable. What then makes them run? Basically it is the taste for risks, not to mention the sme11 of blood which rises and hangs heavy in the air as the atmr~sphere of the bullfight heats up. For all these cadres suffocating in the bureaucratic yoke, constrained by adminis- trative routine, lost in balance sheets, graphs and tables, electoral competition could only bring a breath of fresh and revitalizing air. Besides, does not power constitute, as per Henry Kissinger's expression, "the best aphrodisiac there is"? "It doesn't matter much if I win or lose," one of the newcomers on the political scene confided to us, "the important thing is being in the ring. I like that." 34 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY That is the kind of state of mind that is driving all Chese young lions. For want of experience they are armed with their fangs and claws. Whether they win or lose, - they will certainly make trouble in all the constituencies they are entered in. = People like Konan Bledou, 43 years old, banker. former aT~sinftheeaesaulthon`the pany for the Financial Management of Houaing), taking p' Bouake fiefdom which has been ruled over for 30 years by Deputy Mayor D~ibo Sounkalo, 71 years old, schoolteacher; like Emmanuel Dioulo, 30 pears old~ former chairman and managing director of ARSO (Southwest Region Development Authority), fighting to succeed the current mayor of Abidjan, Mr Konan Kanga Antoine, 60 years old; like Amon Leon, 47 years old, a diplomat turned businessman who wi11 oppose in Dimbokro Mr Kone Samb a Ambroise, 71 years old, and o1d militant from heroic times; and like Fouabi Kouaho, a young science professor who {s giving b attle in Bouafle to the local mayor~ Vame Doumouya, 61 years, a former clerk in administrative _ services. Ambitions ~ There is a veritable galaxy of young cadres in which people stand out lik.e the engi- neer Amangoua Aime Loo Kensy, the former boss of the BNETD (National Office for Tech- nical Development Studies); Ben Soumahoro, a journal~st, the form~er director general ef the Information Ministry; Jean Kambire, another journalist (radio) Who is running in Bouna; Mrs Achy Brou Marthe, an electronics engineer; and D3edje Mady, a doctor. This last one~ fo rmer president of the MEECI (Movement of Students and Pupils of Ivory Coast), who has ,just made his much-noticed entrance into the PDCI's political bureau, does not lack ambition. In any case, of the six newcomers to this political coterie, D~ed~e Mady is the oniy one to be t aking a place at the startinR line alonfzside the 600 candidates competing for the 147 positions of deputy. It is true that, as the youngest member of the political bureau, and himse~f alone being a symhol of the political authorit- ies' desire for rejuvenation, he has his whol.e future in front of him. Which is not the case for everyone any more. COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1980 r 963L CSO: 4400 35 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ LIBERIA - BRIEFS IDA CREDIT--The International Development Assoc~.ation, an affiliate of the World Bank, annaunced on 20 November that SDR [Special Drawing Rights~ credit in the amount of 3.2 million ($4 million) has been granted to Liberia for use in its small and average enterprises. This credit will be redistributed through the Central Bank of the country. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3164] 5157 SOVIET AIR AGREEMENT--Under the terms of an agreement signed in November in - Monrovia between a Soviet delegation and the People's Redemption Council, Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, was authorized to establish a link between Moscow and the LibQrian capital beginning in 1981. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEIlITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3164] 5157 - CSO: 4400 - 36 ~nD n~CTnTAT iiCF f1NTY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ MALI - BRIEFS � HOUSING Tr,CHNOLOGY FINANCING--The Malian government signed a financing agreement f o r a center of adaptable technology with the UNDP and the U.N. Center for Social Habitat. Thie agreement, which was signed in Bamako on 11 December, amounts to an eati~ated 867.12 million Malain francs. The UNDP is allocating a grant for $1,374,000 (567.83 million Malian francs) and Mali will raise 290.29 million Malian francsf or the implementation of this project aimed at "research and development in the f ield of urbanism and housing." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEFSIS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3472] . TR.ADE AGREEMENT WITH LIBYA---Libya and Mali gigned a trade agreement and a man- p ower agreement followin� the first session of the mixed cooperation commission b e tween the 2 c ountrfes which was held from 9 to 12 December in Bamako. The two delegations approved the statutes for a mixed bank for foreign trade and development and amended the statutes of the Mixed Libyan-Malian Company for Cattle Development (SOLItSA) . Libya will specif~cally participate in the renova- t ion of the Gao slaughter-house and in the improvement of. the road network, as well as in the construction of the Village of the Hegira in Timbuctu. [Text] [Paris MARCHBS TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3472] , FORMATION OF DISSIDENT FRONT--Three dissident movements opposed to the regime of - President Moussa Traore formed a Malian National Front during a secret meeting held at the beginning of December in a West African capital. Constituted by 1 eaders of the former US-RDA (Sudanese Union, in power until 1968), but also by yoLn~ cadres, dissidents from the sole official trade union and by student 1 eaders, the Front does not include, however, pro-Libyan dissidents. [Text] ~ [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Dec 80 p 38] CSO: 4400 37 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFIGIAL USE OAiLY MOZAI~BIQUE . BIiIEFS = SABOTAGE CLAIMID BY NRM--One of the stations of the giant hqdro-electric Cahora Bassa complex was reportedly destroyed in part by a guerrilla movement opposed to the Maputo government, entailing blackouts in South Africa, the Johannesburg STAR states. A spokesman for the ESCOM company, which is in charge of South Africa's electricity network confirmed that the supply of electricity from ~ Mozambique--which constitutes approximately 10 percent of total South African consumption--was interrupted. The Johannesburg paper notes that the NRM (National Resistance of Mozambique) reportedly claimed respor~sibility for the 29 November sabotage. The NRM also declared that it damaged the oil pipeline between the Mo2ambican port of Beira and Umtali in Zimbabwe, and that it recently o~cupied thxee cities in the sauthern and central regions of Mozambique. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3495] ROMANIAN AGRICULTURAI, COOPERATION--A pro~ect for the agricultural development of 400,000 Y~ectares iG underway in Mozaa+bique in the provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa. A total of 275 Romanian technicians is in charge of this pro~ect which will be carried out over a period of 20 years and will affect not only the agri- cultural sector, but also animal husbandry, the fndustry, the forest industry, mechanization and research. It is envis~~ned ~hat cotton, corn, beans, sunflowers, meat and milk will be produced, as ;aell as animal feed; a project for the extrac- tion of oil and another for an i~idustrial meat processing center are also planned. The project will eventua]ly employ 20,000 persons, of whom 460 will receive special training. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MF.DITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3495] CSO: 4400 38 - Ff1R r1FFTr'TAT TTCF. (1NT.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY E NAMIBIA NEWS REPORTERS VISIT ROESSING URLINIUM MINE Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Nov SO p 2980 (Article: "Uranium Mining in Roessix~g"] - [Text] For the first time, news reporters have been allowed inside the _ I~amibian Roessing mine, the largest uranium mining undertaking in the world. Let us recall that in 1966, the Rio Tinto Zinc qroup, headquartered in London, had undertaken a systematic geological and geophysical survey of the Roessing site where uranium ore had been discovered in 1929. After positive clues had been found, 8oessing Uranium Limited was created in 1970. Contracts were negotiated with many discreet c1iP.nts, and the first ship- ments of Namibian U-308 left Reessing in 1976 for destinations which, even now, still raise many questions. On 13 December 1974, the UN . Council for Namibia published a decree prohibiting foreign undertakings and from "prospecting, exploit- ing or selling" Namibian natural resources. The decree also stipulated (Article 5) that "any vehicle, ship or container found carrying mineral resources of Namibian origin could be confiscated by the UN Council - for Namibia, or in its name." As is known, this council is considered by the ~ General Assembly to be - the only legitimate authority on Namibia which, at present, is occupied by - South Africa in violation of international regulations. Nevertheless, the South African Republic has refused to give Namibia back to the United Nations because it believes that the latter are not the heir of the Socl,ety of Nations which had entrusted the mandate on the former German Southwest African colony to the Union of South Africa. This is why the exploitation of the Roessing uranium goes on almost clan~estinely. The principal sharehol~iers of Roessing Uranium Ltd are: Rio Tinto Zinc (Great Britain, 41.35 percent~, Industrial Development Corporation (South, 13.47 percent), Rio Alc~om Mines Ltd (Canada, 10 percent), Minatome (France, a joint subsidiary~ of Total and Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann, 10 percent), and General Mininq and Finance Corporation (South Africa, 2.3 percent). 39 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The other shares are held by undisclosed shareholders who, according to Mr Craig Bigson? general manager of Roessing Uranium Ltd, "wish to remain anonymous." Accor.ding to information received from London through AFP, Namibian uranium is again exportec? to Europe on ships via the South-African enclave of Walvis- Bay, after a temporary airlift organized by the French Air Transport Union and South Afircan Airways (the national South-African airline) was suspended (at the end of 1979) . The 350-kilo metallic drums in which the yellow cake (U-308 powder) is placed at Roessing are said to be loaded in containers and shipped on freighters of the West Gern.?an Deutsche Africa Linie. According to the same sources, the uranium is unloaded at night in the Belgian port of Zeebrugge from where it is said to be forwarded to the various purchasers. A study published in Great-Britain in January 1980, the "Roessing File;" recalls that the British Nuclear Fuels Ltd had bought 7,500 tons of Namibian yellow cake and that deliveries started in 1977. The RoessXng File also suggests that France, West Germany and the Netherlands have received or are still receiving uranium from Roessing, despite the injunctions of the United Nations. - During the first visit of reporters to Roessing, tne AFP reporter was not able to check the accuracy of all this information; however, there were containers of the Deutsche Afrika Linie and of the Dutch Nedlloyds on the loading platforms of the mine station. Answering questions about this situation, the head of Roessing Uranium Ltd public relations department,� . Mr Clive Algar, stated: "We are a company with a majority of British shareholders, and we aline ourselves on the pnsition of the British Govern- - ment." Mr Algar then gave to understand that, should the British Govern- ment order Rio Tinto Zinc to stop exploiting Namibian uranium, that company would obey the order. in this connection,experts note that the present Foreign Office Secretary, Lord Carrington, was a member of the board of directors of F:io Tinto Zinc until his appointment as a member of Mrs Margaret Thatcher's cabinet, in April 1979. . About 3,000 people are now employed at.the Roessing site of whom 900 are white, 600 "colored;" 800 Ovambo, 470 Damara and 200 Herero. The mine management, who do not fail to underline that if Roessing were to be closed all of its employees would lose their jobs, also indicate that present salaries are never less than 202 rands per month, i.e. approximately 1,100 French francs, for 8 hours per day, and that they are "much higher" than the average for Namibia. They also stress the quality of the housing placed at the disposal of Roessing workers for rents which rarely exceed 50 rands (about 265 francs). 40 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY For the managerial staff of the mine--which produces more uranium than all of South Africa, i.e. somehwat under 5,000 tons per year--the "main trump" is that all racial seqration had been eliminated at~toessing long before the Windhoek government had modified its position on the question. The AFP correspondent in South Africa also noted that Roessingshareholders are not the only ones to ignore the position taken by the United Nations: between diamonds and uranium, foreing investors are literally jostling each other in the former German colony. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1980 9294 CSO: 4400 ~ 41 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLk APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NIGERIA. OIL; WEAPON AGAINST APARTHEID Paria JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 15 Oct 80 p 45 [Text] Nigeria is brandishing for the first time the threat of the oil weapon for an eventual "holy war" against the Pretoria regime. The 56 year old Nigerian F esident, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, in an interview xith American ~ournalists from _ME Magazine and the NEW YORR TIMES on the occasion of th~: rinniversaxy on - 24 October of the return of civ:Llians to power, "This war is ~just as much ours as it is that of the oppressed people of South Africa.t1 Nigeria, Mr Shagari ex- _ plained, is arriving at an end of its patience in the face of occidental pas- sivity with regard to the murderous extortions of Pretoria. "I am convinced" he eaid in speaking about the occidentals, "that if they really shared our sentiments with regaxd to apartheid it would have disappeared by naw." President Shagari benefitted from a favorable set of circumstances for this inter- view. The deterioration of the political situation in the Gulf--from which theq obtain half of their supplies of oil--is disturbing the United States, and a Nigerian embargo would have very grave consequences for the American economy: half of their imports of crude oil (1,000,000 barrels a day) comes from Nigeria. "We don't have the least doubt," an American diplomat in Lagos had admitted "that Nigeria would cut aff deliveries if it determines that we are weakening in our sapport for a ma~ority government in South Africa." To Boycott, a Solution? The subject dominated the convereation between Presidenta Jimmy Carter and Shehu Shagari who was received in Washington from the 6th to the 8th of October. Mr Shagari said once more, "Tiie United States thinks that the apartheid regime can be convinced by good words to cease its monstrous blows against humanity. But I do not believe this." According to him the only way to lead Pretoria to listen to reason would be to boycott "all of those who engage in commerce with South Afric3." COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980 9353 CSO: 4400 FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONI,Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ON?.Y NIGERIA EXPORT SALES PRICE DECLINE Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS isi French 10 Oct 80 p 2484 [Text] The Central Bank of Nigeria has prepared a table indicating the decline registered during a year between January 1979 and JanuarY of this year in the export eales price of the ma~ority of industrial agricultural products. This decline varies according to the products between 7 and 82 percent, the least - being registered by rubber and the largest being ginger. Only coffee and sesame have recorded aa increase. We are reproducing below this index table covering these variations and giving the percentages of the differences (the base year is 1974 whicI~ ie 100): ~1 Dif f erence ' Januarp 1979 January 1980 Sp,ercent Cocoa 217.2 164.3 -32.1 p 107.5 $~'S -43.4 Co ra ~2.1 Peanuts 103.4 -81.9 Ginger 211.4 116.2 -36.5 Coconut 107.3 78�6 Rubber 169�~ 157'9 -~~4 - Coffee 224.6 247.9 +10.3 109.7 92.8 -18.2 Soybeans 134.1 +13.7 Cotton Linters 117.9 +8.~ Sesame 119.7 130.2 Palm Oil 95.4 86.9 '9�~ COPYRTGHT: Rene M~oreux et Cie Paris 1980 9353 CSO: 4400 43 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL,Y ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NIGERIA BRIEFS POSTS, TELE~OIrAtUNICATIONS TRAININs--The Posts and Telecommunications training achool in Lagos, which closed for more than 2 months following atrikes and brawls - which occurred, reopened in November. The students were not admitted again to their courses until they signed an agreement to behave themselves and not to provoke any further disturbance. [Text] [Paris MARCRES TROPICAL"X ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3408) CSO: 4400 44 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR OPFICIAL USE ONLY RWANDA - INCREASED CAPACITY FOR PACRAGING TEA Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Oct 80 p 2565 [TextJ The Rwanda association for production and marketing of tea (Sorwathe) is going to double its capacity for packaging in its factory at Cyohoba-Rukeri in- - creasing it from 1,300 tons to 2,600 tons. The financing of this expansion which will cost $1,051,000 consists of two loans of $226,000 each furnished by the "Societe Financiere Internationale" (SFI) which is an aff iliate of the World Bank and also by the Qverseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in the United States and a third loan of $148,000 furnished by the "Banque Rwandaise de Developpement." (Rwandan Bank for Development) A _ capital participation of $209,000 by the Tea Importers of the United States, one - of the most important North American firms for the importing of tea and $242,000 of self f inancing completes the financing plan. These investors conjointly with the tea departsent of the Office "des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda" assisted in financing the initial phase of this venture which began operations in 1978. This enterprise was crowned with success and produced tea of high quality on reclaimed marshland. The small planters have rapidly increased their production and without the new packaging facilities a portion of their production would be lost. Aside from the advantages for the small planters this pro~ect ought to realize net gains in foreign exchange of a $1,000,000 a year. The completion of this project is anticipated for the fourth quarter in 1981. The modalities of financing the expansion of the tea factory of Cyohoba-Rukeri, let us recall, were the subject of negotiations on the part of the Rwandan dele- gation which accompanied President flabyarimana when he made his last trip to the United States in September (see MTM of 3 October page 2433~. COPYRIGHT: Rene Morewt et Cie Paris 1980 9353 CSO: 4400 , 45 FOR OFFT~TAT. iISF, nNT.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENEGAL DETAILS OF 1980~1981 BUDGET PROVIDED Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3154 [Text] The considerations taken into account in drafting the Senegalese budget ~ for the 1980-1981 fiscal period (1 July through 30 June) were set forth in our issue No 1805 dated 13 June 1980 (p 1500), while that budget was still in the planning stage. The budget was approved by the finance law of 26 June 1980, published in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU SENEGAL on 1 October. , The budget total comes to 191.6 billion CFA francs, an increase of 11.1 percent over the 1979-1980 budget, distributed as follows in billions of CFA francs: Resources Expenditures Public debt 34.6 Public debt 34.6 _ Ordinary income 115.6 Ordinary expenditures 115.6 Extraordinary income 22 Cap ital expenditures 22 - Other special treasury Ot:~er special treasury accounts 19.4 accounts 21.2 Total 191.6 Total 193.4 With lower estimates (-3 billion CFA francs) than in the draft 1979-1980 budget, operational expenditures were set at 115.6 b illion CFA francs (+9.6 billion in comparison to the final 1979-1980 budget). The grand total for the equipment budget was reduced from 24 to 22 billion CFA france, said budget being covered by loan funds. _ The 1980-1981 budget includes the following sums, by income category, in billiona of CFA francs: Ordinary Income: - Taxea on income 25.1 (+3.2) Real estate and other direct taxes 2.4 (+1.6) Customs duties on imports 52.7 (+5.7) _ Cuatoms duties on exports 2.9 (-2.1) bomestic consumer taxes 11.1 ~-~�8~ 46 ..nn nTTT/~T AT rTCr. n*rr V APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Taxes on transactions and production 13.2 (-3.3) - Registry fees and stamp duties 5.8 (+1.2) Revenue from state-owned property ~�6 ~+0'3~ Income from services ~�2 - Miscellaneoue income 1.6 (+1.1) To tal 11S . 6 � 6~ Extraordinary Income: 2 ~+0.5~ Deduction from the equipment budger 1~ (+2) Loans Price equalization and stabilization fund (-4.5) ~ subsidq 3 Total 22 ~-2~ . The income expected from direct taxation was increased in comparison to the pre- ceding budget. The same is the case with regard to customs duties and taxes on importa, while the estimates of income from customs duties on exports and taxes on consumption and transactions were reduced. The main allocations for operational. expenditures were for the following miniatries (in billions of CFA francs): National Education (20.1), ArmeheYOrces (14.1), Interior (11.7), Foreign Affairs (6.8), Public Health (6.7), g ~ Education (6.7), Finance and Economy (6.2), Equipment (3.2), Rural Development (2.7), Scientific and Technical Research (1.3), Youth and Sports (1), Urban Affairs, Housing and Environment (0.9), Water and Forests (0.7), etc. Apart from the 22-b illion-CFA-franc equipment budget, special treasury accounts include various special investment allocations: road fund (3 billion CFA francs), local collective eq uipment fund (4 billion), national energy fund (1.5 billion) and investments on foreign loans (1 billion). Also, the special treasury accounts include, under income and expenditures, a transfer of 30 billion CFA francs to the autonompus amortization fund, iecluding 16 billion taken from the income from the tax on added value. Credit allocated to the 1980-1981 equip~c~ent budget is distribute~i by sector as follows, in billions of CFA francs: Social and community equipment 6.8 (+3.8) Adminiatrative equipment 6�1 ~~�2~ Rural production 2.9 (+2.4) Financial investments 2.6 (-6.7) General studies 1'4 ~~~3~ - Water resources 1.2 (-0.1) Transportation and teleco~nunications 0.7 (-0.7) Non-agricultural p roduction 0.3 (-0.1) Operations carried forward (-3.1) Total 22 ~-2, The finance law authorizes the negotiation of loans up to 17 billion CFA francs (15 billion by the finance la*~ dated 25 June 1979) on foreign financial markets and/or with international or foreign financial bodies. 47 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ Similarly, the finance law of 26 June 1980 authorizes the floating of inedium- and long-term loans on the domestic market to cover treasury costs, recourse to advances from the Central Bank of the West African State, and the rediscounting with thia issuing body of guaranteed obligations payable to the treasury. The ceiiing for guarantees the state can provide during the 1980-1981 financial period is established at 10 billion CFA francs (5 billion authorized by the finance law of 25 June 1975). COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980 5157 CSO: 4400 48 L'(~A l~AFTf`TA7 TTCF nxt.v APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENEGAL BRIEFS GOVERNMENT FOOD AID--During the 1979-80 season the Senegalese Government spent 3,254.19 million CFA francs, the Dakar daily, LE SOLEIL, indicated on 9 November 1980 to assist [drought) stricken populations. This financial effort was applied to the purchase and transportation of 42,000 tons of local millet as well as the shipment of gifts from foreign ports. This transpired from the survey made by the Commissariat for Food Assistance. Despite a difficult eco- nomic situation the government will have to continue as in the past to take over from the international community whose gradual disengagement since 1978 has been evident. This is because the donors wish to become more concerned in insuring the food autonomy of assisted countries rather than responding to specific situa- tions. On its part Senegal has undertaken to build up a reserve food stock using available local cereals. Failing this it will resort to imported sorghaT~ inhe Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, and France are taking p the establishment of this stock, either by financing the building of storage facilities or by taking charge of purchasing products.[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3026] 2662 - CCCE LOANS--The French CCCE [Central Fund for Economic Cooperation] has just granted to Senegal 3 loans for a total amount of 291 million French francs (equivalent to 14.55 billion CFA francs), namely,(1) a loan of 11 million French francs (SSO million CFA francs) slate d to insure 90 percent of the financing of an emergency program which the Senegalese Radio and Television Office must initiate with the technical assistance of the TDF [French Televi- sion Office) to preserve the existing production and broadcasting capabilities and avoid in the coming years very costly expenditures involving the complete renovation of equipment and installations; (2) a loan of 80 million French francs (4 billion CFA francs) and a loan of 200 million French francs (10 billion CFA francs) to the National Development Bank of Senegal which will assist the - Sene~alese Government in keeping its self-finaYicing commitments in the invest- ment programs tha.'. have been initiated. These l~ans constitute one of the ele- ments of French participation in the international assistance which Sene- gal has solicited to face the economic and financial difficulties it has exper- ienced for several years now. phis assistance PariseMARCHES TROPICAUXtETlishment of a government rehabilitation lan. (Text] [ MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3026] 2662 49 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 i FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FRENCH LOAN--France has granted Senegal 10 billion CFA francs (200 million French francs) for the f~nancing of Senegalese projects under the terms of an agreement signed in Dakar on 11 November 1980. This loan complements the 21.:i billion CFA francs which France had com~?itted to place at Senegal's dis- posal to enable it to restore the equilibrium of its rural sector and the reactivation of its economy, strongly affected by drought and inflation. This assistance of which part (11.5 billion CFA francs) has already been paid had been negotiated in July 1980 by Abdou Diouf, Senegalese prime minister, on a visit to Paris. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Nov 80 p 3026] 2662 USE OF DUNK~RQUE PORT--At the beginning of December, the port of Dunquerque will welcome the first vessel flying the Senegalese flag. The new national shipping enterprise, the Senegalese Maritime Navigation Company (COSEIQAM) will begin activity on that date and has already established this northem port as a ma~or base. At a time when the efforts of all Dunquerque personnel need ta be focused on the regular shipping lines, the inclusion of a new one reflects the greatest confidence in this port. It is true that Dunquerque leads the European ports in sh~pping links with Senegal. The COSENAM will 'ue represented locally by the Delmas-Viel~e~ Maritime Shipping Company. 'I'he COSENAM announcement that it will - serve Dunquerque comes a year after the por~ authorities made an "African tour," visiting Senegal among other countries, at which time the national shipping . company and the interest of the Dunquerque authorities in Senegalese shipping was discussed. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERREINEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3154] 5157 - CSO: 4400 _ SO FOR OFFICIA.L USE ONI,Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAT. USE ONLY TANZANIA ADB-FINANC~D DAKAWA RICE PROJECT DESCRIBEA Paris MARCHES TROPICAL'X E.f MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3043 [Article: "ADB Financing for the Dakawa Rice Project"] [Text] On 28 October 1980 the ADB [African Development Bank] approved a loan of 4.5 million units of account [UCs) (approximately $5.9 millior.) to Tanzania for the financing of the revised Dakawa rice-growing pro~ect. The loan is re- imbursable over 20 years with a 5-year grace period for repayment. The loan will be used to finance 18 percent of the aggregate cost of the project, which represents 26 percent of the total c~st in foreign exchange. T'he project fulfills three major goals: The reduction of grain imports; the provision of jobs to unemployed and underemployed individuals living in the ~ villages and communes around the project area; and the exercise of a stimulat- ing effect on small growers working land close to the zone. The pro~ect, whose execution will be spread over 4 years, will cons3st in clear- ing 2,110 hectares of which 2,000 hectares will be improved for irrigate~' paddy cultivation with 980 [sic] hectares of sorghum as the second crop. It also in- � cludes the installation of a rice mill where the paddy will be ginned. Credits - are anticipated, too, for the purchase of mat~rials, vehicles, and agricultural equipment. The project also involves the construction of infrastructural ele- ments such as local service roads and plantation tracks, functional buildings, and housing. Finally, the project includes credits for the purchase and instal- lation of irrigation pumps as well as for the remuneration of consulting engi- neers and technical assistance personnel. ' The breakdown proposed for the financing by the ADB group is the following: For ~ the ADF [African Development Fund], improvement of the land, housing, and func- - tional buildings, consulting engineers, and fixed agricultural installations. For the ADB, the rice mill. The total cost of the pro~ect before taxes, esti- mated on the basis of prices prevailing in 1980, comes to 262.85 million Tan- zanian shillings. The aggregate cost in foreign exchange is the equivalent of 190.5 million Tanzanian shillings. The revised project will be financed by the ADB group, the EEC [European Economic Community], the Tanzania lnvestment Bank, and the Tanzanian Government. The exe- cution of the project will be done by the Dakawa Rice Farm Limited of Dar es- - Salaam. The work began in 1978-79 and will continue for 4 years. All the invi- tations to bid already published have been issued according to the directives of the ADF and the bids have been processed in satisfactory manner. - COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreuac et Cie., Paris 1980 2662 (;SO: 4400 51 Rl1R (1F~'T('TAT TTC?7 (1NT.V APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE O:JLl� TANZANIA TANZANIA INVESTMENT BANK CII.EBRATES lOTH ANNIVERSARY Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3173 [Text] The Tanzania lnvestment Bank (TIB), established by a law promulgated in November 1970, has ~ust celebrated its lOth anniversary. Its purchase was to guarantee the deveiopment of Tanzania through the granting of inedi~- and long- term loans to industry or other economic sectors and the encouragement of the establishment of large enterprises in the farm, foreat or fishing sectors. The government of Tanzania holdg 50 percent of these stocks, the National Bank of CommerCe 40 percent, and the NationaZ Corporation the other 10 percent. This capital totaled 100 million (autho*_-iaed) and SO mf.. ~ion Tanzanian shillings (paid up) in 1970. It totals 100 uiillion (paid upj a:.d 20'' million (authorized) today. In June 1980, the bank granted 178 loans to 138 companies. It also provided technical assiatance (feasibility or production capacity improvement studies) to some enterprises. Tanzanian Vice Minister for Finance Veaance Ngula asked the TIB to increase its - logns for fa~m or agroinuustrial ~iro~ects in connection with the lOth anniversary of the bank. According to the annual report of the TIB for the 1979-1980 fiscal period, the bank granted ~oans totaling 408.96 million shillings for industrial or agroindustrial pro~ects in the course of that fiscal period. This comes to - more or lesa half the sum allocated for loans for infrastructure projects or "vital" economic sectors. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980 5157 CSO: 4400 52 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TANZANIA BRIEFS ~r, ` POWER RATIONING ENDS--The rationing of electrical energy in Tanzani,s, the imposition of which we reported on page 3107 of our 21 November 1980 issue, was ended on 20 November by the Tanganyika Electric Supply Company (TANESCO) because of the return of the rainfall regime in the southern part of Tanzania to normal. [Text] [Paris MARCftES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3173] 5157 AIR AGREEMENT ENDS--The national airline, Air Tanzania Corporation (ATC), has announced that the contract it signed with Caledonian Airlines, a Beirut-based company which leased it to Boeing aircraft, has been broken off fol.lowing renewed disagreement. Henceforth, the SOBELAIR com~any, a SABENA affiliate, will lease the ATC a Boeing 707 to allow it to carry out its intercontinental flights. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3173] 5157 TOBACCO PRODUCTION DROPS--During a conference of i~arld Bank experts held in Arusha at the end of October, it was stressed that Tanzania's production of tobacco will henceforth be limited to 18,000 to 20,000 tons, while the processing capacity of the domestic plants is 51,000 tons. Soil eah$ustion, the shortage of fuels for the processing of fire-cured tobacco and a shortage of warehouses were given as the main causes for the production drop. The Iringa region, Which has produced up to k,000 tons of tobacco alone, now produces only half that. Some 20 to 30 percent of the total ~omestic production might be lost due t~o lack of adequate warehousing for the tobacco. Where Iringa is concerned, the director general of the Tobacco Authority of Tanzania (TAT), Mr J. Kiboda, expressed the belief that an improper dosage of fertilizer as well as the lack o~ wood for fuel, because of massive d.eforestation, were the reasons for the decline in preduction. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3173] ~ 5157 - . . AIRPORT EXPANSION, IMPROVE'TFNT--The Tanzanian Ministry of Public Works will = proceed with the expansioi: of the Mafia airport whose runway will be extended to 1,800 meters in length and 30 meters in width compared to its present 1,219 meters by 18 meters. The Kilwa airport will_ witness analogous improvements and the two airports will then be upgraded to grade C airports. The Tanzanian National Assembly had al].ocated 4.2 million Tanzanian shillings for the recon- ditioning of these airports. The funds, which had been lacking, halted the pro~ected work in 1977-78. Funding has finally been secured and the work is slated to begin momentarily. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3043] 2662 CSO: 4400 53 _ TnT /~T}TT/~T ~7 ?tI~T7 !~\T V APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TOGO BRIEFS AIR AGREF~hIENT WITH SWITZERI,AND--Switzerland and Togo signed an air agreement on 3 December, according to which the two airlines, Swissair and Air Afrique, will fi11 the needs of air traffic between the two countries. Swiss cooperation is active in many sectors, notably the Namiele project in Mango and the training of pilota at the airlines school. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 3481] JAPANESE HEALTH VEHICLE DONATION--Japan offered Togo on 3 December a total of 28 vehicles, which include 15 ambulances, 10 trucks, 2 vehicles equipped with X-ray machines and a bloodmobile. The total value of the donation amounts to 300 mil- lion CFA. [Taxt] [Paria MARCHES TROPICAUR MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 p 34$1) CSO: 4400 54 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ZAMBIA AT~'EMPTED COUP IN OCTOBER DISCUSSED - Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Nov 80 pp 17-18 [Artic.le by Tania Vasconcelos--passages between slantlines originally published in italics] [Text] *On 27 Cctober Zambian President Dr Kenneth Kaunda deaounced an attempted coup, following which curfew was instig~ted in all the towns of the country. A aeries of individuals was arrested, among them a minister, officers of the army, and businessmen. Tfte same fate hit AFP correspondent Francois Cros--subsequently released--accused of having lent moizey to one of the plotters. If this allegation rema~ns up to tfiis point to be proven, this arrest, which aroused some protest almost everywhere, is in any case testimony to the climate of esasperation and extreme vulnerability which reigned in the leaderahip circles of Lusaka during th,e events oP October. M~oreover, none of the plotters having been arrested red-handed in the act of, while, on the other hand, the social situation was ready to explode, the discovery of this attempted coup left most western observers quite skeptical. One cannot, ho~ever, fail to be struck by the coincidences observed between the actions denounced by President Kaunda and the unfolding of events. ~ The firet symptoms of the plot, which resulted altogether in 2 deaths and several injuriea, were, accord~ng to the 2ambian president, appeared in incidents created by Zairian "mercenaries" led by Zambians and supported by Pretoria. When mercenaries attacked the Zambian A rmy some 15 km south of Lusaka as well as in the copper- producing region of the north, South Africa dispatched warships and two ferry-boats onto the Zambezi R iver with a view toward a possible invasion. At _ the same time, offi~ers from Pretoria tried to make contact with the Zambian garrieon installed on the border at Sesheke~which, under threat of bombardment, wae to adopt a position of "neutrality." The att~ck on strategic objectives in Lusaka, including the seat of government and - the presidential residence was se~ for the night of 16-17 October, the day of the 16th anniversary of the independence of the country. Some 40 /"heavily armed"/ Zaireana, who were allegedly part of a group of some 200 mercenaries, were arrested. *[Preface]: The economic situation after 16 yeara of independence is liable to in.spire any kind of conspiracy or social explosion, despite the efforts toward recovery made by the Lusaka government. ~ 55 F(1R (IART(:TAT. TT~F. (1NT.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Uncontrolled Bands The Zambian president als o claimed that a longtime Zambian businessman, Elias _ Ktienga, had recruited Zambian dissidents as well as "ex-Katangans" at the beginning of the year to be trained in the mining region of Bindura ~nd in Rhodesia with a view to overthrowing the Zambian government. Thie action was prepared in case Blshop Muzorewa should win the general elections in Rhodesia. It seems thrt a link with the ~llegal opposition can be made if one adds to this - series of ~avents one other fact, which also came into the picture last October: th~e discovery, in a farmhouse belonging to an advocate of British extraction, Pearce Aunfield, a well-known figure in the Zambian political world, of a hundred armed m~en. Pearce Annf ield, who is presently being sought by the police, had been ' responsible for representing the two Zambian opposition parties, the ANC as well as the tTPP [United Peoples Party], of which Simon Rapwepwe, who died a year ago, tzas tfie leader. It wi.ll be recalled that Simon Rapwepwe, who had played an ~nportant role in the government of Dr Raunda in the early Seventies, had been accused of plotting against the Zambian state, in league with Pretoria. Relations between the formenters of the disorders which periodically afflicted western Zambia (a fiefdom of the SNC and the UPP), the Portuguese colonialists, - and the South African se cret services had been openly denounced during the period of the liberation struggle waged by the MPLA [Popt~.tar Movement for the Liberation of Angola] in Angola. The activities of uncontrolled bands on the border between Zambia and Angola--wher e the ethnic groups are mingied together--ceased after the independence of the RPA [Peoples Republic of Angola]. By contrast, along the border with Zaire, where similar bands were also at large at the time, the situation - never returned to normal; which is because of the instability which characterizes the provinces of this part of Zaire. A dispute over the delineation o� the borders has, incidentally, been put on the diplomatic agenda recently. In the region between Lake Moero and Lake Tanganyika, along a 150-km-long track, the boundary hao never b een established with precision, and the Zambians attribute the chronic infiltration of bandits, who may be responsible, especially in recent days, for the insecurity in the northern copper-belt regions of Zambia, to the abgense of control along the border. The increase in crime had also excited serious anxi.ety among the expatriate technicians working in the Zambian mines, to such an extent that some of them fearing for their safety, left the country. Last September, Interior Mir~ister Wilthed Phiri hacl already announced that means would be deployed for s trengthening border surveillance in order to reduce crime and banditry, phenomena which do not seem to spare the rest of the country either. - The economic problem.s which have further increased the number of jobless and considerably reduced the purchaaing power of the workers, go a long way toward explaining this solution. When one realizes that a special allocation of $2 million was put at Wilthed Phiri's disposal to provide for the "scouring" of the towns, one has an idea of the scope of the malaise, especially in Lusaka where plots against the state, crime, banditry, and popular discontent have an additive - effect and intermingle to produce an explosive and complex situation. 56 ~ = FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONL~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - Copper and Cobalt And so the Zambian president, with his first statements concerning the abortive plot, labelled the recently perpetrated criminal acts in the capital as destabilia- ing events /"probably not unrelated to the plot."/ The chief of state went so far as to accuse Mr Chiluba, president of the ZCTU [Zambia Congress of Trade UnionsJ, who had threatened to unleash a general atrike if the demands of the workers went unanswered, of being in liaison with the conspiracy movement. These - accusationa, made heatedly, in the grip o� emotion, were however to be withdrawn _ several days later, following a meeting with the syndicates and UNIP [United National Independence Party]--the government party--which was asked to examine _ th.e situation and create a special tribunal to judge the conspirators. On that occasion, Mr Chiluba vigorously defended himself from [the charge ofJ ever having thnught to plot against the state, and he published a communique inviting /"tl~e workers, in particular the labor leaders, to abstain from any statement that could be exploited by the enemy."/ GIhich did not prevent a inquest from being opened _ _ to determine whether the Zambian labor movement had been infiltrated, from abroad, by elements liable to try to overthrow the present Lusaka government. The regime in Lusaka thus remains confronted with especially grave immediate problems. To try to surmount these problems unfortunately implies the restructuring of the very foundations of the Zambian economy which is excessively dependent, as everyone knows, on the export of copperi and cobalt2. The distortions inherited from the colonial period could not be corrected. On the contrary, they seem to be aggravated with the collapse of agricultural production, which is we11 short ~ . of national needs. Providing, as they do, the bulk of the nation's resources, with all that entails by way of hazard--the prices of raw materials being dependent on the caprices of the world market--the ores of the Copper Belt are extracted by companies bringing together the Zambian state and British, American, and South African capital. As one might image, the situation which results from this is rather uncomfortable-- es2ecially when it comes to a country which supports the movements for the liberation of southern Africa, and this is the case--and it presents aspects which function as strong constraints to the policy of economic development. It is true that the nationalizations effectuated up to now have not brought about the anticipated results, primarily because of the inefficiency, indeed often the corruption, of functionaries of the state who took the place of the private companies. But as for the delays in the im~lementation of the gradual "zambianization" of the technical cadres in the mining sector, the multinationals involved in the exploitation of the minerals are not really strangers to such delays. ' Second largest exporter in the world. 2 13 percent of the world's exports. 57 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY This iaeasure, as well known, was to go along with control b~? the state of this vital national sector and atem the hemorrhage of currency due to the transfer [out of tlie country of the salaries] of thousande of foreign technicians. So 16 years a�ter independence, the Zambian state redistributes 30 million kwachas ($45 million) per year to foreign nationals. A situation which ia moreover at the origin, several years ggo, of a quasi-revolt by Zambian students in technical courses who had obtained from the state th~ formal promise that the best atudents ~rom tlze specialized s chools would be systematically signed up for work. This promise, which was~recently re-issued, is not to the taste of the Zambian state's economic partners, thPse latter not f~eling very comfortable with the eventuality in the near future of a massive sub-situation of [Zambfan] nationals for foreign natio nals, while the latter are fighting to obtain an increase in their own - numbers. The insuff ic ient numbers of importe:d gersonnel, no less than the lack o~ spare parts, are in fact spelled out by the annual report of Zambia Copper Investmenta, in con,junction with the Zambian state, as the major reasone for the diminution of registe~ed produccion. This decline has certa inly barely affected the partners of the Zambian state. The profita of the countries engaged in operati~ns3 have in fact grown by 50 percent, where they ~ave not actually doubled, in the period 1979-1980. It remaina true that ~amb ia--w!-.ich lives to the beat of the copper market pulse-- being the fifth larges t producer in the world, and copper being the mainstay of the GNP--can only view with concern this decline in production. Especially as the market prices establ.ished at the shim of the importing capitalist countries ha~~e a strong tendency, over the long run, to weaken. And one recalls the catastrophic political consequences created in the case of Allende's Chile by the vertiginous fall of prices that came on the eve of the 1973 coup. And, which is more, the mining industry in Zambia continues to suffer from outlet probletas. - The railroad that links the copper belt to the port of Dar Es Salaam has built up, according to recent statements by the Za.mbian minister o~ transport, a deficit _ o� $ 25 million since i ts construction by the Chinese in 1976. A large part of ' production must still be forwarded through South African ports. The recent import from the Federal Republic of Germany of 14 electric-powered - loco~otives, will replace the Chinese engines, which have inadequate power, wh.en loaded, to traverse the 500 km through mountainous regions to the TanzanLan- Zamb ian border, should in part alleviate these problems. Out of wind on several fronts, the regime of President Kaunda is doubtless going through a particularly delicate phase, the issue of which is yet to be seen. Aware of the neceasity of a change in the predicament in the country~ide, the Zdmbian chief of state has just made a one-month trip to the Euzopean and Asiatic socialist countries where he ob tained the financing and equip~ent necessary for the launching of a vast operation, the Food Production Program, at a total cost of 400 million kwachas (approximately $500 million). The pro,ject envisions the creation in each province of the country, of two state farms endowed with modern equipment and the setting up of several peasant cooperatives, establishment of which is moreover everywhere encouraged, Raan Consolidated Mines and Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines. SB FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074425-4 FOR QFFICTAL USE ONLY - Distribution of Provisions This is obviously a long term pro,ject, the results of which will not be visible for several years. As for more immediate prospects, there is predicted a mfld increase in the production of maize (from 3.6 to 4 mi113on bags), which represents = fialf the annual consumption. Meanwhile, in order to cope with the danger of famine in the regions of Senanga and Sesheke, affected by the South African raids which prevent the pe~sants from cultivating their land, some $800,~D00 of provisions have been distributed to the population. For, beyond its internal problems and the fall-out of the international economic _ crisis, Zambia is also paying its of t-painful dues as a"Front Line" co~intry in th,e face of the racist South African regime. COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie 9516 CSO : 4400 E~ 59 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070025-4