JPRS ID: 9509 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Page Count: 67
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• Sequence Number: 44
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9509 ~
28 Ja~nuary 1981 `
Nec~r E ast ~orth ~frica R~ ort
_ p
CFOUO 4/81)
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FB~S FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9509
28 January 1981
,
' NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 4/81)
CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Political Will Needed To Bring About Maghrebian Solidarity
(Moncef Guen; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 26 Nov 80)...~ 1
Story of Libyan Liquidation of Imam al-Sadr Related
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 12-18 Dec 80) 3
ALGERIA
~ Ben Bella Free, Plans Yolitical Comeback
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABIy 7-13 Nov 80) 9
, Country's 1980-1984 Five-Year Plan Examined
- (MARCHES TROPICAL'X ET I~DITERRANEENS, S Dec 80) 18
Status of Gas Price Negotiations With French Company Reported
(MARCHES TROPTCAUX ET I~DITIItRANEENS, 5 Dec 80) 22
IRAQ
; Sweden's Volvo Caught Between Ira~n, Iraq in Truck Deals
_ (WECKANS ~iFFARER, 18 Dec 80) 23
' ISRAEL
- ~ Israeli, Syrian 3hips Suspected of Carrying U.S. Arms to Iran
~ (.4~L-WATAN AL-'.ARABI, 7-13 Nov 80) 25
i
~ Arabic Journal Views Abu Hatzera Scandal
~ ~ ~ (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 7-13 Nov 80)
I ~
~ Current Status of Peaee Now Analyzed
, (Hillel Schenker; NEW OUTLOOK, Nov-Dec 80) 31
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LEBANON
Military Situation in Nation Analyzed, Condemned
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARASI, 5-11 Dec 80) 36
Christian Leader Calls for National Union, Peace
(Florence ~a'd; AL-WATAN AL-`ARABI, 5-11 Dec 80) 44
MOROCCO
Analysis of Saharan Conflict's Impact on Country
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS, 12 Dec 80) 53
Briefs
Oil Shale 57
Moroccan Troops in UA~. 5~
SUDAN
Country Said Using U.S. Influence To Obtain Loans
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 7-13 Nov 80) 58
~
~'UNISIA
State Control Continues To Hamper Econom}?
- (Philippe Simonnot; JEUNE AFRIQUF, 24 Dec 80) 60
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~ra
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS `
POLITICAL WILL NEEDED TO BRIlVG ABOUT MAGHREBIAN SOLIDARITY ~
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Nov 80 p 17
[Article by Moncef Guen of Tunisia, Dr of Economic Sciences, ex-President of the
Econom3c and Social Council: "This United Maghreb, Which Depends On No One But Us"]
[Text] To talk about Maghreb w:ien Libyans, Algerians and Moroccans confront each
other on a bit cf desert, may appear utopian.
_ But, the Maghrebian solidarity [movement] has a strong appeal. There's no need here
to recall the common fight against the colonial invader; various attempts to organ-
ize this solidarity after independence, especially in 1958; the daily bonds which ~
- unite the pop~~~ations around artificial borders, which are, consequently, permeable.
It suffices t., note two recent events: First when, by a mere administrative deci-
~ sion, the Algerian Government allowed the influx of Algerian tourists to Tunisia, -
second, the construction of the oil pipeline across Tunisia, allowed that country
to support itself on an energy basis of Algerian origin.
Creative Diversity
Some estimate that the previous policy is indispensable, But, it is the best way -
to alienate some against the others, government officials and the people will not
~ allow interf erence, not even from brothers. It is in our diversity, a crNative but
interdependent diversity that we should look for support points for our unity.
Maghreb of the States of Maghreb of the people? What good are slogans if the
states feel sufficiently popular! _
; i!Fdt our people and, more particularly, what our youth demand is not extraordinary.
They demand that the officials also be pract3cal in the Maghrebian approach and tliat
! they attempt to be practical in their national actions.
+ What they want is that when we should buy foreign goods the.advantage be given to
i Maghreb; when we sell goods abroad, preference should be given to Maghreb; when we
~ deal ab~oad we should close ranks; when we invest we should reason on the Maghrebian
scale; when we educate we should inspire co~on values.
~ liarmonizing
It is undeniable that it is on the economic and cultural levels that the horizons
are opened for Maghreb. On the commercial level the changes can be considerably
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developed if a common customs takes form, progressivF+ly. The advantage of such a
formula i~ that, according to a predetermined calendar, it will allow the establish-
ment of a zone where the movP.ment of goods and servic~s will be liberated. The
common customs will be preferable to a freeport zone. Firstly, because it is
superior� to the freeport on the course of economic intef;xation. And sec~~ndly, it
will allow the uniformization of customs processing of goods of foreign origin. l.t
' will be a decisive step towards the creation of a comrson marker..
With the subsequent hai-monizing of macroeconomic policies, a true economic union
could be solidified on a market of more than 70 million consumers with the most ele-
~ vated per capi"ta income in Africa.
Integration in a single econamic plank will be accomplished when the budgetary, mon~�-
, tary and investing policies become uniform.
What will aid the acceleration of this process are strong factors of cultural class =
_ cohesion. We, Maghre3ians, speak the same Ianguage, we practice the same religion,
we have Che same customs, we aspire to the same ideals. We should bring forth
these elements of cultural unity by adopting cammon programs c`. education; by favor-~
ing contacts between our universities,.studQnt and experience exchange; by putting
our technological resources to the service of the society we want to create; by form-� -
~ ing ascending generations in the Maghrebian discipline.
_ Second Wind
It is certain that the Tunisian prime minister, Mohame~.l Mzali, by ded3cat~ng his
; first official trips to Morocco and Algeria, succe:;s.;'.�aely, has powerfully raised
the Maghrebian ic'seal. These visits restore a tone ~~nich our sol?~?~~~cy has lacked
for a long time. It is in the pursuit of this fruitful dialogue, the elaborati~n of
pre;,ise programs of cooperation, the untiringly follow up to their realization and
- the responses of mass organizations that we will see if the 20 years which have just
elapsed will help make the Maghrebians sufficiEatly superi~r to becoma self-confident.
-I COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afriqu= GRUPJIA 1980
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! INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
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STORY OF LIBYAN LIQUIDATI4N OF IMAM AL-SADR RELATE9
� y .
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Rrabic 12-18 Dec 80 pp 28, 29
/Article: "The Ful~ Stary of the Liq uidation of Musa al-Sadr and His Two Comrades'f
/Text% After many stories and tales have qeen repeated on the killing of Imam Musa
al-Sadr, after a long period of time has elapsed in which a game of nerves has gone
on against the partfsans of Musa al-Sadr and his supporters in Lebanon, and after
~ numerous attemp~s have been made to conceal the true criminal, one can present the
full details on this crime today.
' The date: 18 July 1918.
;
; The place: The ernbassy of the Lib.~an Jamahiriyah in Algeria.
;
On that day, the telephone rang. 0:~ one end was an official in the embassy, and on
! t he other Mr 'Isam Makki.
; A pleasant conver~ation took place between the ~two. ~
~
~ 'Tsam Makki said that he was repres~nting Imam Musa al-Sadr and speaking on his
behalf, transmitting the imam's desire to visit Libya.
~
, The official in the embassy was confused. He said: 'All I can do is cable Tripoli -
transmitting this desire. I wish yo u wouldleave me your telephone number so I can -
j contact you as soon as the answer arrives." '
i b
~ 7he conversation ended at that point, and the imam's representative in Algiers con~
tinued to await the embassy's respon se. However, instead of going to Algeria, the
~ Llbyarr response went by way of Beirut;~ tbe�charge d'aFfaires in the embassy of the
~ Libyan Jamahiriyah in Beirut contacted Imam Musa al- Sadr and informed him that the
~ 1~,)'aR government w~uld arelcome his visit. Incfeed, more than that, ~he government
` h~ped that that visit would take pla ce as soon as possible.
The ~imam asked for some time to study th~ issue and promised to inform the charge
d'affaires of the date of the visit as soonas he de~id~d on it.
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Two days passed in which Musa al-Sadr uiscussed the issues he wanted to discuss -
~ with Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi with the staff of the Shiite council. He .then got
in touch with the charge d'afifaires and told him that he would like to visit Libya
_ in the second half of the month of Ramadan.
qfter a discussion by telephone, agreement was mad~ to set the daf;e of 25 July
_ 1978 for the trip. ~
On that day, Imam Musa al-Sadr went to 8e~rut inter�national airport. Accompanying
him to Libya were Mr Muhammad Ya'qub and �he journalist 'Abbas Badr-Din.
r
Reception before the Meeting -
Meeting him at the airport wer~e Mr Nazzar Farahat, charge d'affaires of the
Lebanese ~mbassy in Tripoli. _
The Lebanese charge d'af~`aires to;d the imam that he had rec~ived n~ws of the visit ~
from the Libyan Foreign Ministry. _
- Imam al-Sadr, his two comrades, and those who met bhein went from the airport to the -
Coast Hotel, where they stayed as offi;.i~; ~uests of the Libyan governm~:nt.
' On the ever~ing of 27 August i9%8, an official dinner party ~?as helct in the imam's
honor.
During the par~y, the imam inquired about a date for meeting with Col Mu'ammar al-
Qadhdhafi.
The reply came that the date would be set soon, because the colonel wanted to niaet
him as soon as possible.
The dinner party ended but the imam did not manage to learn what the expression
"as soon as possiblP" might mean. He whi~spered into the ears of persons close to
him that he was afraid the statement could mean a week's wait before the meet~ing
took place.
Are You a Coward?
Two days elapsed after the dinner party, and Imam Musa al-Sadr received a telephone
call informing him that the date for the meeting had been set at 31 August.
The imam began to prepare for this meeting ar+d arrange the s~.abjec~s he would'discuss
with Coi Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. The fighting in Lebanon was heated and no ray of
hope of a total armistice appeared. It was necessary that al-Qadhdhafi take part
in trying to resolve some positions. Therefure, the imams visit to Libya was more
than necessary, and to that end more than one ~arty had encouraged it and helped
arrange it. Syrian personalities and promir~ent leaders in the Liberation Organiza- _
tion participated in preparing this meeting. They encAUraged Imam Musa al-Sadr to
meet with Col Mu'ammar a1~Qadhdafi.
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31 August came and the meeting took p~lace.
- From the start of the meeting, a dispute in views and in evaluations of positions
emerged.
' An unfriendly atmosphere dominated the meeting.
;
,
Then voices and pitches rose. -
; al-Qadhdhafi proposed to Imam al-Sadr that the AMAL organization launch a religious
revolution to take power in Lebanon; al-Qadhdhafi expressed the Libyan Jamahiriyah
readiness to finance such a revolution and support it militarily.
However, Imam al-Sadr immediately vent~r~i~undamentally to re~ect this:'nation.
He declared clearly and decisively that he refused to use the AMAL organization to
carry out an action which was r~ot consonant with its goals. He expressed the
: impossibility of carrying out such a goai in Lebanon and described it as a ruse and
a trap set against the AMAL organization itself. -
When the conversation had reached that point, Col al-Qadhdhafi exploded in wrath
and cried out in a loud voiGe:
"you are afraid. You are a coward. You are not fit to be a leader of the Shiites
: in Lebano;~
;
Liquidation of the Imam and His Two Colleagues -
i
When the conversation reached this degree of tension and disputatiousress, Imam al-
Sadr faund that continuing the meeting was fruitless and therefore decided to shorten
~ the conversation and reduce the time remaining in the meeting.
When he and his two comrades emerged from the Libyan president's place, the imam
whispered to his two companions:
~
' "As we emerge we are bearing a deep wound. We have been treated with contempt and -
have not achieved any goal at all from this meeting.�
;
Some distance from the imam and ~is�comrad~es-was~standing Capt"Bashir Sa'd secretary
, of military affairs in Col a1~Qadhdhafi's office.
; Capt Sa'd had attended al-Qadhdhafi's meeting with imam and his two companions and
; had observed the colonel's excitced reaction to the imam's answers from close at hand. ~
It appears that Capt Sa'd heard Col al-Qadhdhafi mutter something he could not make
i out. -
Relying on the prin~iple of giving personal interpretations to the colonel'~
~ mutterings, Capt Bashir Sa'd intrepreted these mutterings as the desire vn the
colonel's part to get rid of Imam Musa al-Sadr and tho$e who were with him.
~
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As a result, he suggested to the lst Lt F~raj Abu Ghaliqah (an officer in the office
of the chief of military intelligence} that the imam and his two comrades be liq}.~ida-
ted .
lst Lt Abu Ghaliyah tiastened to execute these orders. He took the imam and his twa
comrades off in thr-ee Peugeot 504 cars cthe first black and the other two white),
which had been waiting outside the building.
From there Abu Ghaliyah took them to a military area 9 kilometers west of Tripoli
known as Janzur which is used as a firing range. -
At Janzur four noncommissioned offic~rs who had accompanied lst Lt Anu Ghaliyah car-
r~ed out the order givpn them to execute Imam al-Sadr and his two comrades.
The three were buried at the same ran~e where they were killed!
When the news was conveyed to Col a-Qadhdhafi that his arders to liquidate the un-
wanted guests had been carrie~ ~uc, panic siezed him, his nerves failed him anc:
great upset overwhelmed h~m. He declared that he had not issued such an order.
In the midst of his distur~,ance arrd upset, he issued an immediate order that the in-
strument of the execution, ist Lt Faraj Abu Ghaliyah, and the four noncomn~ssioned
officers who had executed al-Sadr and his two companions be arrested.
Some officers tried to mediate with C~1 a?-Qadhdhafi to change his mind, on grounds
that Abu Ghaliyah and his group had just carried out the orders given to them and
that they had considered the colonel's orders "revolutionary decrees in.the service
of the nation and the revolution."
However, al-Qadhdhafi insisted on arresting Abu Ghaliyah and his group, expelled
everyone from his room, sat down on the coucfi across from his desk, and immersed him-
self ir deep thought on the new crisis in which he had become engulfed.
A Makeup Operation
The only idea which occured to Col al-Qadhdhafi he was contemplating the ceiling
of the room in his office in searcf~ of a solutio~- was to seek the aid of Lt Col
Mustafa al-Kharrubi, the man in charge of general intelligence.
al-Qadhdhafi asked his secretary immediately to get in touch with Lt Col al-Kharrubi
and summon him urgently on a very important matt~r.
In a quarter hour, Col a1-Qadhdhafi and Lt Col al-Kharrubi were looking at one another
and a question was growing and growing between them:
What to do?
An idea flashed in Lt Col al-Kharrubi's mind. He said,
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"A plane belonging to the Alitalia company is leaving today for Rome. We must put
~ three persons who are disguised as tf~e imam and his two companions on board this
airpyane and send them all to Rome, so that when the new~ of their disappearance is
known we can say that tt~ey left libya and disappeared or were kidnapped in Rome."
~ Col al-Qadhdhafi agreed to the idea without hesitation. Lt Col al-Kharrubi hastened
- to carry out the idea. -
At the hotel, he col'lected the suitcases of the imam and his two companions and every-
_ thing belonging to them, especially th~ passparts.
He ordered his assistan ts to provide three people and perform the makeup necessary to
. make them look like the imam and his two comrades.
He then ordered three first class seats ~e reserved on Alitalia's Flight 881 to Rome. -
In a few minutes, Lt Col al-Kharrubi's secretary came in to inform him that Alitalia
had apologized for failing to provide the three seats, since there was only one empty
- one in first class. He could only tell him,
"That doesn't concern me. I want three first class seats on this flight in the name
of the imam and his two c~mrades. Arrange to detain two passengers any two pass-
engers." _
The intellig~nce men laboriously studied the passenger list. Among the passengers
they found two Italians, Mr Valentini (an employee of an Italian firm workfng in Tri-
poli) and Mr pon Silone, who was accompanying him.
Orders were issued to cancel the two perspns' reservations because they were wanted
for investigation. They were in fact detained for investigation.
These two men still do not know the charge for which they were detained for 24 hours
before being allowed to leave Libya for Italy.
' Thus the way was paved for the three imposters disguised as Imam al-Sadr and his tw~o
companions to board the plane.
To reassure himself further, Lt Col al-Kharrubi went to Tripoli airport to make it -
appear, on the one hand, that he had come to say goodbye to these important persons,
a;;~i on the other hand to ascertain that the makeup was proper and 1:hat matters were
proceeding as they shoul d.
~!~cn the Alitalia airplane took off from Tripoli airport, Lt Col al-Kharrubi rushed
to his car and spoke to the colonel in his office by radio, telling him:
~ "Eua.ry~}~ing ~s complete. The airplane has taken off and we have now moved the ball
into the Italian court."
When the colonel asked him:
- "Have you taken specific measures in Rome?"
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- Lt Col al-Kharrubi answered, -
"Instructions have been issued to Lt Muhammad al-Rubati (the intelligence official _
in the Libyan embassy in Italy) ~o complete the remaining procedures."
The Fantastic Stories Coilapse
The expression of anxiety and bewilderment disappeared fr~m Col al-Qadhdhafi's face~
the matter h~d been arranged in a manner which would eliminate all charges which cou7,, _
be directed against Libya and against (~im personally.
What, however, might happen if the issue becomes c~mplicated in the media? .
Here the colonel requested intelligence, media and foreign agencies to fabricate fan-
tastic stories about the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr and his two companions, _
deal with every emergency which might appear in this context, prep~re statements in
an attempt to be rid of the blood of ~he imam and his two companions, to engage in
flexibility (and bargain) with the Shiite factional leaders in Lebanon, and t~ mo-
bilize personnel in Lebanon for this purpose. He issued an authorization to the
Libyan embassy in Lebarton ta spend unlimited amounts in this regard.
Thus some spokesmen and writers in Lebanon and Iran were recruited to propagate the
Libyan version of the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr in Libya.
' Two years after the various contradictory concocted stories, the facts have begun to
be discovered, ripping apart ail the veils of the old stories. The imam and his two
comrades were ~iquidated in Libya, in a military area named Janzur, 2 years ago!
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI '
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ALGERIA ~
BEN gELLA FREE, PLANS POLITICAL COMEBACK
Pa ris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 1-13 Nov 80 pQ 31-33 `
' LArticle: "What Future Awaits Him? Today Ben Bella Plans To Start His Second
Pol itical Life"%
/TexJ The people ~vho were there did not believe their eyes. At 1100 hours in
th~ morning of the 26th anniversary of the outbreak of the war of liberatior~ in
Algeria (1 November 1954), one of the main leaders of this war, the first presi-
dent of independent Algeria, and the most senior political prisoner in the world,
in the third world in particular - Ahma~ Ben Bella, returned to life. It is not
a common thing in this world tf~at a political prisoner of this class should re-
turn to life after such a long absence, but the miv~acle happened, if only for
once. At 1100 hours in the morni~g this 1 Piovember, the door of the villa in Msila, -
about 250 kilometers east of the capital, opened and Ben Bella made his first free
steps before the threshhold of the villa so tf~at some photographers in attendance
~ could take commemorative pictures of him and so that the contents of the speech
Chadli Bendjedid gave on,the eve of the anniversary, when he told his people that
the last and most prominen~c political prisoner in the Algerian nation had become -
free under his orders, could be cor+firmed. Ben Bella had been staying in the
villa, which belonged to his wife's family, since 4 July 1979, when President
Chadli took the first step in releasing him and lessened the restrictions imposed
on him,
The first rapid appearance of Ben Belja was effective and successful a throng
of old friends, fighting men and young people were around tha door to the house:
His wife Zahra, in the peak of her joy and exultation, could hardly believe this
blessing whi~ch she had long dreamed of since she had decided to join her husband
in this difficult course when they were married in his prison in 1971. Zahra ~Nas
brimming with vitality on the morning of that day, going back and forth to greet'
the we11-wishers with whom the villa was packed and prepar~ng journalists for a
; ~uick appearance by her husband; we would not be exagge~^ating if~we said ~that
Zahra Salami, the obscure journalist who became Mrs Ben Bella in the harshest and
, most difficult of circumstances, has also entered on every lip and tongue in A~geria,
anri that regarding t~er history will record that she helped save the first president
- of independent Algeria from the clutches of isolation, gave him two daughters by
adoption, and in tf~e last 10 years created around him something close to a family
life which raised his morale and made him stick more tenaciously to life and the
future. ~
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A Young Man Despite the Years of Prison
. Sen Bella is taking his first free steps, anci everyone is amazed at thE youth ,~nd
vitality apaearing in him, as if these ldst 20 years are not in fact to be r,ouri~~~~~
as part of his life. ~he step still is elegant and the gaze is still penetrat~?r.o. .
Zahra hurries alongside him, invites journalists and calls her daughter Mahdia _
"arwahi ya Mahdia" - that is, come - so that the unique family circle could be ~o~T~
plete before the ~ournalists and the world. One of tfie journalists asks him, "Wh~:
will you be doing now? Will you go back to politics?" The answer is given at once;
~"I will venture on any subject at all now. That is a cor~nitment I made to myself.
My freedom is complete but I want ta think quitely about what I should do in the fG-
ture."
- Another journalist asks him, "Are you really free?" 7he answer comes assertively,
"Yes, I am completely free, without any restrictions whatever."
A Spanish journalist approaches the group. Zahra c~lls him and Ben Bella greets him .
- in Spanish. Up to now he has been usin~ French in his conversation with the fir~st
group of journalists that has managed to approach him after this long seclusion:
"I came out to greet you out of a commitment on my part to the rules of etiquette, _
but T have no statements now."
Everyone appreciates this noble signal from the most senior political prisoner in :
the world, who still retains such a degree of magnanimity. .
The only thing which the first group of journalists to meet the free Ben Sella could
ascertain was that "the former president," as was stated in the decree of his re-
lease for the first time since the coup against F~im, would at the outset make a
visit to the grave of his mother who dies about 8 years ago without seeing him.
- Ben Bella Goes Back to Moghnia
In addition, Ben Bella determinedly tied up his luggage in order to move out of the
vilta where he had been confirmed in the town of Msila southeast of the Algerian
_ capital.
The former president, Ahmad Ben Bella, told a number of his close friends that he
a would move to his birthplace, the town of Moghnia near the Algerian-Moroccan border,
at the outset. There he would busy f~imself planning his movements for the future
for a number of weeks. Ne has not yet decided whe~her he will move from his birth-
- place to the capital itself or to one of its suburbs3 alth~ugh it is certain that
his stay in Moghnia will be a temporary, transitory one.
It is well known that the decree on the complete release of independent Algeria's
first president after the triumph of its revolution was postponed from 1 November
' 1979 to 30 October 1980, from the date President Chadli Bendjedid had set in a
direct conversation he held with Algerian journalist last year. It was bruited -
about that this 1-year delay in the implementation of this decree could be attrib-
uted to the emergence of disputes between President Bend~edid and a number of poli-
tfcal bureau and.government members over his weli-knoWn pc~licy of political liberali-
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~i
_ zation and a review of the socio-economic experiment after the death of the late
President Hauari Baumediene. These disputes wer~e resolved - in favor of President
Bendaedid; thereby, a number of Algerian officials were removed from the political
' bureau an~ government, and the command agencies of the Liberation Front party and
the government were rearranged in accordance witf~ the poiitical liberalization
; polic:y and the review of the experimenti.
Thus the former president, Ahmad Ben Bella, returns to freedom in a new social and
political atmosphere di~ferent from that in which he was arrested in the term of ~
- the late president, Boumediene, after a total absence of more than 15 consecutive ~
' years from the political scene in the country.
- Perhaps this is the fiirst time - not only in Algeria but also in the whole Arab
world - that an Arab leader has been granted circumstances to aegin a new life for
himself after the twilight of his first brilliant life in his country and his fa11
from the presidency, whici~ lasted from the triumph of the revolution of a million
and a half martyrs in 1961 to 1965.
What will Ben Bella do with i~is new life? ~
A Book Waiting To Be Published
~ It is clear that Ben Bella himself has not yet revealed his plans in this reaard.
A11 one has been able to see of these plans is f~is determination to publish "a book
on autogestion" wf~ich totals more than a thousand pages and which he reviews criti-
~ cism and analyses of his poli~y and his positions as a fighting man, official and
= prisoner and his view of the current situation and the future.
' It is well known that Ben Bella actually offered his boo k to a French publisher and
that it was to be published in a few months. However, he has just requested him to
suspend publication. Conflicting reasons are given for refraining from publishing
' the book, among them that the publisher asked that some details which were not es-
_ sential from his viewpoint be a~breviated but that that did not meet with ~en Bella's
approval; that "friends" advised Ben Bel'la not to venture to publish the French ver-
sion lest Arabs read his book in a imprecise translation from the French; and finaliy
~ that President Bedjedid asked him not to publish the book before issuance of the de-
~ cree on his full release so that f~is adversaries would not exploit it to obstruct
the process of carrying out the decree.
In any case Ben Bella has been careful not to respond directly or explicitly to the
question "what will you be doing wit~ your new life and wf~at are you preparing for
the future?" However, at the same time, he has not hesitated to declare his opinion,
, from time to time, in meetings at f~is i~eadquarters in Msila with his frier~ds and
A1gerian compatriots. Tf~e opinions he f~as expressed i~ave produced contradictory re-
' actions; some consider them a symbol of the political and intellectual matur~ity of
' the former president, after the long period of reflection and study in prison, and
- some rebuke him for regressing from f~is former positions and views on the Arab
~ socialist and nationalist revolution to wF~at is called the Islamic revolution.
~
, However, the question on Be~a Belta's new life and future poses itself insistently in
; Algeria, the Maghreb ~n qeneral, the Arab nation and ~he whole world, and various an-
' swers and possibilities arise over the question.
~
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There is unanimity among observers of various tendencies on Ben Bella's point c~
departure toward the future in his n~w life. That is that the f~rmer presidentr b;~
virtue of his combative struggle and his nature, which is characteriied by posi-
tiveness and boldness, cannot be satisfied by the iife of a"former retired pre:si~~~
dent" or the position of a theoretical politician-thinker who squats in an iva~;~
tawer of his own choice, cantem~lating, criticiZing, writinq history and giviny ~
vice ~Yithout venturing into the sea of poiitics.
According to a view expressed by someone ~lose to him "Si Ahmad is a political risi~
who can live only in the sea of politics and strugg~e, even if he is given tota1 fr~-~.�
dom and tota1 glorification."
~~c~st recently, at the ~.tart of the flareup of the Iraqi-Iranian war, it was re~ai:~a
that he said "The first act I will perform when freed is immediately to travel to
Tphran and Baghdad to work to stop the war and establish peace and brother~hood bE:-
tween the two fraternal Moslem couni:ries." However, when the decree for his total
rplease v~as ~ssued at the end of tf~e last month, he made a further decision to re-
stiudy the subject of the Iranian-Iraqi struggle in greater dep~n, following the
develapmert of events and the emergence of tf~eir deep-seated historic complexities
a~~d serious compiications, and would need time before embarking on a step on this
road.
7'he proper question regarding Ben Bella's future is not whether his new life will b~
political or non-political, b~at rather "what political life will he choose?"
The Release Is Followed by Support
Some of these possibilities are based on ttie assumption that the full release of
Ben Bella was not easy and that President Bendjedid was compelled to delay implement-
ing his promise of this release for a full year, wf~ich t~e spent resolving intense
struggles within the political leadership in the party, the government and the armed
forces over his policy of political liberalization and his review of the negative
features of the Boumediene experiment. One of these struggles was the issue of
giving of Ben Bella his full freedom as a citizen.
Peop~e who consider this possibility are inclined to believe that a complete politi-
cal agreement must have been signed between President Bendjedid and the former presi-
- dent Ben Bella tf~at the latter would not venture on a political movement or take posi-
- tions outside the scope of the regime. Some of these people tend to believe that the
agreement went ~urther, including a commitment,on Ben Bella's part to put all his
weight on the side of President Bendjedid and his policy~ a policy to whose general
support Ben Bella alluded during his residence in tht ~town ~f Msila in talking witP~
his visitors, and when persons performing the prayer greeted him at this first Fri-
day prayer after he set~led in Msila with salutations, when he raised his hand in
greeting and replied "greetings to Algeria."
- The people who stress this possibility consider that President Bendjedid needs Ben
Bella's suppart and historic weight, which still have relative significance in the
Algerian conscience, in confronting the "group of hard-line Boumedienists" who say
that President Chadli's policy of reviewing the experiment is in reality a regression
from the socialist experiment.
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In another area, Ben Bella has an interest in rounding out President Chadli's vic-
tory over the group of hard-line Boumediznists for the sake of his political future.
7hus commond ground for cooperation between the first president and the third pre-
sident of Algeria exists - but how will the cooperation take place?
A recommendation is being bruited about that the party and National Assembly grant
the former president an honorary politicai t:tle, sucb as "first citizen" or "father -
of the Algerian revolution," which his com6ative hi~tory and status will retain ;~or
him, and that his advice be taken on ~ssential political decisions, although he him- -
self not work directly in this political field.
There is another recomnendation which has been bruited about sincz Ben Bella's par-
tial release on 4 July 1979. One of the causes of the struggle which went on in
the political bureau of the Liberation Front Party was that the bureau had called
for an emergency party meeting in.which Ben Bella would be elect~d honorary presi-
dent e` tF~e party for life out of appreciation for his long combative history. The
recommendation was raised again after the political bureau was purged of people op-
posing the political liberalization policy and the review President Bendjedid was
leading. It is not yet known whether Bendjedid and Ben Bella agreed ove~r perpetua-
tion of the unified political structure of the Liberation Front Party as it was or -
agreed to change it in a manner permittiny~a proliferation of currents and politic;al
platforms within the party in conformity with ti~e new pol~cy of lib~ralization. One
of the clearest opinions which former president Ben Bella expressed after his tempo-
rary release was his direct c~^iticism Gf the Liberation Front Party and its role
following the independence of Algeria and the triumph of the revolution. Although
he considered that th~ united Liberation Front political organization was necessary
during the revolution, he concluded, following the expertment, that "After indepen-
dence we removed the shingle of the front and replaced it with the shingle of the
party. However, the party was weak and the weakness remained, becoming just a shin-
gle with no 7ife behind it, and we consequently lost its influential leading role. -
Why? We did not :,tudy this probiem with the necessary seriousness. Some trends
call for pluralism. Is that possible or necessary for democracy? Where will the
- place for it be? Inside the party or outside it? Is it necessary for us to per- -
petaate the form of the party, or must we change it so that it includes the form ~
and organizational format of the front? These are questions I asked myself for 14
years and I am asking them again,now. I do not claim that I have categorical ready
answers." However, at the end he is concerned to sumnarize his position with care
and accuracy, saying "In general, I have a group of preliminary ideas for discussion.
Tt~ey ure a matter which only the people themselves will resolve."
~ Among the possible expected responses on Ben Bella's future in his new political
life is that he will start rearranging and collecting what are known in the Algerian
' c~ntext as the "Benbellien forces." These, in Ben Bella's first life, before his
; fall from the Qresidency and his ar~~st were a mixture of numerous tendencies pro- _
ceeding from the premise of interaction and concurrence between Arabhoo~i and social-
ism. 7hey included Islamic and national socialist elements, especially Trotskyist
currents, among whose most prominent proponents was the well-known Algerian thinker
Mohamed Houbi Ouezzan, in addition to Mehsas and Bechir el-Hadj Ali, representatives
of the national socialist current, an~ the late Malek Bennabi, the well known Islamic
thinker. Nowever, outside the context of the point of interaction between Arabhood _
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and socialism, th~ method for building the party, relations between it and the gov-
ernment in general and the army and particular, the notion of Arabhood, and the cri-
teria for international relations, especially with France, the Soviet Union and Rmer-
ica, have been intense.
In Ben Bella's first politicai ~ife after independence, a clash occurred between him
and a number of historic le~ders of the likes of Hocine Ait Ahmed, Mohamed Boudiaf
and Karim 8elkacem concerning democracy, the establishment of national unity and
the most appropriate ways of bui7ding socialism. 7his led to bloody clashes which
were resolved by the interventian of t[~e arntiy under Boumedien~'s camnand on Ben
8ella's behalf. Tha~t was followed 6y a clash between Ben Bella and Mohamed Khider
- who attracted the support of the Islamic forces a~ainst what were known as "the
- ~orces of the left and imparted socialism" in .4lgeria, then finally by the decisive
struggle between Ben Bella and ti~e army on the issue of the relationship of the party
to the army and the combatants who were raised in its embra~e. The army re~iected the
establishment of a parallel party military organization under the name of the popular
militia to protect socialist achievemer~ts, especially the experiment of autogestion,
against the forces of reaction and apostasy against the revolution. That clash led
to the removal of President Ben Bella on 19 June 196~.
The Question now deais with the identity and reality of these "Benbellien" forces
today, 15 years after the end af Ben Bella's first political life.
Algerian society witnessed radical changes during Boumediene's term which had effects
of differing importance on the Ben Bella forc~s and their leadership personnel, to
the point where some of them veered toward Soumediene in his movement to bring down
Ben Bella, foremost among them Col Tahar Z6iri, chief of the war staff of the army,
who was the object of Ben Bella's trust and whom he had appointed in early 1965, dur-
ing the trip Boumediene (who at that time held the position of defense minister) made
to the Soviet t~nian, to oversee and restrict Boumediene's movement and dominance of
the army command.
_ Shortly after, in a few months, he joined Boumediene. He personally forced his
- way into the home of the former president at dawn in the name of the 19 June move-
ment and arrested him. Then Tahar Zbiri subsequently soon turned against Boumediene
and made an unsuccessful attempt at a mutiny to overthrow the regime in December 1967;
this ended with his flight abroad. Similarly, Ali Mehsas, minister of agriculture,
and Bechir Boumaxa, minister of information, diffe~^ed with Ben Bella and joined
Boumediene, then took a position opposed to Boumediene's regime and in favor of re-
building bridges with Ben Bella; Boumaza ended his exile in Switzerland and started
going back and forth to Algeria from time to time, after the partial release of Ben
Bella, holding a number of ineetings with him. As a r~~su7t it was said that the two
- men had reached a joint program for united activity in the context of support for
what Boumaza called President Chadli Bendjedid's positive steps.
However, the changes in Algerian society as a result of the experiment in socialist
development, the agricultural revolution, and the reconstruction and politicization
of the armed forces, the party and the institutions of the government during Bou-
- mediene's term gained him overwhelming popularity which appeared in powerful popular
mourning at his death. Successive statements by the army, the federation of workers,
youth, and women and peasants in the agricultural revolution stressed the need to con-
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tinue alor.g Bo~nnediene's road 3nd adhere to the charter issued in 1975 as a working
guide for tF~e Alyerian people. These changes caused the Ber~ Br~lia forces to lose
part of their r es~rve of support. However, it is necess~ry, today, in evaluating
_ this stage, to give consideration to the split in t~e Boumediene forces among wh~t
~s called the polif;ically-moderate liberal wing which is represented by ~resident
- Cha~ili, the hard-line wing headed by Moham~d e~-Saley Yehyaoui, who was removed
from actual pa rty leadership in th~ latest party and yovernment cnanges and who
seems to enjoy tF~e support of influential gros~ps in the armed forces, and the group
of national te c hnical s taffs possessing a socialist platform which is headed by
- Abde~selam Belaid, nicknamed the father of Algerian inc~ustrialization, who was also
- recently r~-,~oved from the parLy and is accused of being the ~erson primari1y respon-
sible for the e rrors of the Boumediene experiment.
Thi nki ng wi th an I sl ami c Background
On what basis, t hen, and how can the new organization of Ben Beila forces in Ben
Bella's second political life arise?
_ It is clear that the former president himself has changed many of his political,
economic and so cial ideas and tendencies; a1though he still believes in the Arab~
- hood and socialism of Algeria, he has started to proceed from a clear Islamic back-
ground and in his new political life believes that "Islam is a religion and a goy-
ernment." ~
Does that orien tation mean that he will resume attracting the current religious
forces in Algeria, the growth of whose organizations has been observed, after he
lost them in his struggle with the late Mohamed Khider, losing the forc~,s of the
left and scien tific socialism which remained an ally of his in general until his
fall in 1965, ~t hough some forces remained loyal to hirn ~n~il h~ was totally re-
leased?
What will be th e position of Ben Bella's new group, if ~ts organizatian consists of
- personnel and fo rces which differed with him and withdrew their support from him to
Boumediene in his move against him, though they later d~clared opposition to Bou-
mediene?
What will be th e position of the popular army and the national technical staffs
which have weig h t in Algerian society an that or.ganizationY Their positions con-
tr~~ii~te~ his in the latter part of his term, shortly before he fell, and some of
thNf~ ~today have entered into a strugg7e with the pres~'nt regime under the 1`eader-
ship of President Chadl i Bendjedid.
ldhat :~i 11 be th e posi ti on o f the hi storic 1 eaders of the A1 geri an revol ut ~ ~n, who
are still leading organized opposition movements inside and outside Algeria, like
M~hamed Boudiaf and Hocine Ait Ahmed movem~nts which remained opposed to the re--
gime cF Ben Belia and Boumediene's regime in an absol~te fashion, and sti11 are re-
lative(y opposed to Chadli Bendjedid's regime, with their insistence on the need
. for a proliferation of parties and tE~e imposition of a limit on the Algerian Libera-
tion Front Party's monopoly of organized political activity?
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F~~ ~1FFIGi~, i.iS~ Ot ~Y '
It is clear that President Chad1i Bendjedid anr] L'n~ 4ur~~ent poiitir.ai ;etidt~r:h~o
in Aloeria have in A1geria have deciared ~that the,y wi11 not per~ni~. a mu1tia7ic~~:1~
of parties, that the Algerian Liberation Fr~~ot Part,y is tP?e sn1~ uczl~:tir.a: ~fant - _
cle far various fiorces although its door is operr tc, ever,yone wEto wants to ~
in organized poiitica1 activity, without discri~nir~ation and zh~L there i~ ~-.i:~.~
for another political organizatian out~sjde the Fror.~ P~~~.y b~t ~here can unl,y oe
- independent i~dividua~i politic~ans be they suppor~~cers or~~upp~n~nts.
~
A New Current within the Agreement
The question is, will Chadli Benjedid ailow Ben Be11a, as an exception, to fcrr~r, an
independent pnlitical organization outside the ~.iberation Frrnt Parf.,y or~ w~l'1 n:
at least avert his gaze from his actual presPnce without officially a~~roving ~r -
him?
Well info rmed sources in Algeria emphasize that even if there was a tenden~.y on ~
President Chadli's part at the beginning a~tually to improve of Ben Bella's ~:n-
depend~nt organization, that is impossible today, especia'11y with the appaaranc~
of early signs of solidarity between the politico-religious trends arising ~~n
Algeria and the group of ideas which Ben Bella has started to express on ~h~ ~~~::~,~~;c:
of starting his new pol9tical life.
Nonetheless, a number of observers tend to declare that there is a'iikelihood c>I'
- indirect talks between President Chadli and former President Ben Bella through
intermediaries. After that, it is possible that Ben Bella will head an independen~.
political current in the Liber~tion Front Party which will have the right of expres~
sion and action.and whose members who have not joined the Liberation Front Party
wi11 be given party membership as soon as they apply for it, without going througn
red tape.
It appears that this is the most likely possibility, although the matter will ~f
necessity need time to emerge in a reasonable form which does not clash with 1:hP
"hardline Boumediene forces" and is compatible with Lhe steps tawa~d po~itical
- liberation which President Chadli Bendjedid leads.
Mr Taieb Ibrahimi, the minister counselor at the p�residency who is knawn as the
architect of the new liberalizatior~ ~licy in Alc~eria and was one of the most in-
tense opponents of Ben Be11a, who imprisoned him for many years, has beeri quoted
as saying "When Ben Bella was in power, he closed all tNe doors in our faces and
put our hands in chains. Taday, however, now that we are in power, we are opening
the doors to him and all the Algerians and are uncluing all the chains on him and
them."
Thus all observers look rrith interest at Ben Bella's future in his second polii;ic~.l
life, as he keeps wary silence and contents himself with transitory signals which
imply numerous possibilities.
However, the essentia~ truth in all this is that Ben Bella is a"political fish" wh~
lives only in the turbulent sea of politics. Therefore, the "legendary Ben Bella"
is returning again to poiitical life after an absence of 15 years in order to begin
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a new struggle, as he nears age 63 and has become ~[~e head of a family which he
formed in his prison thv~ough f~is wife Zahra and two adopted girls, the older of
Whom i s 11 and i s cal l ed Maf~dia .
What possibilities do you supposE Abu Mahdia is headed for in his new life?
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
11~87
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AI~GERIA
- CUUNTRY'S 1980-1984 FIVE-YEAR PLAN EXAMINED
Pazis MAR(~iES TROPICAU% ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Dec 80 pp 3331-3332
[Article:"The 1980-1984 Algerian Plan Aims Prunarilq to Restore Basic Balances:
400 Billion in Investments; 1 Million Jobs"]
[Text] Algeria this year undertook a 5-year plan (1980-1984) with an overall
financial budget of 400 billion dinars (1 dinar = about 1.24 f.). In doing this,
it emerges from a].ong period of economic pause and of politica~. reflection on the
future of its development, followed by a year of debates at the highest level on
the new econumic strategy of the coimtry, taking into account the resulta of a
10-year period of efforts in all sectorr~ of the economic and social life (see MTM,
3 October, p 2407).
In fact, the first Algerian 5-year plan, elaborated in 1979, had been appzoved at
the beginning of the same year at a special general meeting of the FLN, the highest
- political instance of the country. On the basis of the econamic orientations of
this program, the government last year had proposed to the National People's
Assembly a budget plan that constituted the first annual portion of the 5-year
plan,.whi~h was consequently begun at the beginning of 1980. This document was
adopted by the national assembly on 19 November, after a 1-month debate.
Thus it took more than a year of discussion, study, and publi~ debate for the
highest political instance and the legislative instance to approve the 5-year plan,
since the most recent 4-year plan (1974-1977) had been concluded in principle
in 1978. The death of President Houari Boumediene at the end of this same year and
matters concerning his succession relegated the econamic problems of the country to
second place. Chadli Bendjedid, who succeeded th~ former chief of state in
February 1979, preferred to gather all of the data oa the economy of the country
and directed the economic officials to draw up a detailed and accurate balance
sheet of the preceding 10-year period, in order to gauge the distance covered and
to indicate as clearly as possible the covmtry's 10-year prospects.
Benefits and Gaps In a Rapid Development
This balance sheet and this national reflection show that the economic strategy
applied during this past 10-year period produced some noteworthy results: the
setting up of a basic industry, based on the exploita~ion of the natioual wealth
entirely recovered from the hands of foreign companie~; the building of a
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production apparatus that guarantees the development of thE country and i.ts ~cono~ic
independence; responeibility for full control of the eccnomy by the country, etc.
' While paying tribute to th.e work of Preai3ent Boumediene, the new Ieadership team
' did not fail to cal.l attention to the gaps engendered bq the rapid development of
the eco,tomy: huge investments effected over a period of 10 }~ears in the industr~al
sector (55 percent of overall investments) xesult:ed in imbalances to tt~e extent
that oth?r sectors now considered as priority in comparison were relegated to
second plac~. :~�e ex~ple uf agriculture aad hydraulics which, along with fishing,
were accordeci only 9 percent of these invesbments, is the most striking. What is
more, the present leaders realize thatr this industrial investment effort did not
achieve the hoped for results by far. Not only that, it had ended by losing a1.1
effectiveneaa and an}r coherence, but it had also aggravated "inter-sectorial and
intra-sectorial, in:.er-regional and intra-regional distorsions.'' Tn short, the
production apparatus that was set up is used only to 30 percent or 40 percent of
capacity, whereas the ever-increasing needs of consumer and iadustrial goods ob lige
the country to resort to a huge amount of importations. In short, Algeria, whose
ma~or objective was to render its economy less dependent on foreign countries,
realizes that its economic independence is more threatened than every by Che consi-
derable increase in importations of all kinds of cons~mmer goods that the industrial-
ization process t:~at was undertaken 10 years ago should have reduced.
' In,fact, this propens3ty to import went from 23 percent in 1967 to more than 48
percent in 1978, which greatly affected the equilibrium of the trade balance of
Algeria, whose recourse to foreign countries reaulted in increased foreign
, indebtedness and limited the hoped for results of expansion and accelera~ion within
its economy.
; Overall, on the level of production, the PIB-(gross damest3.c prQduct) evolutton from
- 1967 to 1978 is far fram satisfactory. While the objectives were 9 percenC annually
for the first 4-year plan (1970-1973) and 11.2 percent for the second 4-year p lan -
(1974-1977), actual realizations were only 5.9 percent and S.S percent reapectively. _
On a per capita basis, the PIB (gross domestic production) experienced only some
slight rates of increase, between 2 percent and 3 percent a year. The low amount -
of productivity occasioned a significant increase in the accumulation of goods and
services ~more than 50 percent of the PIB). And this low amount, illustrated by
a more rapid increase in value added with respect to the services sectors thaa with
chat of the production sectors of material goods has, as has been seen, greatly
benefited foreign economies. _
On the .financial Ievel, the amount of revenue increased conaiderably as a c~nsequence
of the great amount of investments; it increased at the rate of 8 percent during the
~ 1967-1969 period; 11 percent during the first 4-year plan, 1970-1973; and 17 percent
during the second 4-year period, 1974-1977. Moreover, this revenue, which did not
evolve in an identical manner in different social categories, was affected by an
ever-increasing inflation at an average rate of 10 percent in the 1967-1978 period.
_ Still with respect to the financial aspect, the inadequacy of the distribution of
- monetary income, along with the p"roduction effort aad a wPakness in the PIB sector,
~ 19
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_ engendered some chronic shortages of goods, price increases that considerably
affect the purchasing power of low income and fixed income categories, and the
great recnurse to importations of goods and seraices. The rate of rapid increFa~
in the amdu.'~t of money (23 Fercent per year) campared with that of tne PIB (7.2 ~~`i~
cent) has increased ;.nflationary tensions. Thus, the loans of the Central Bank
of AlgeY~a to the treasury, which depended on circwnatances up to the eve of the
firbt 4-year plan, became almost systematic since then and aggravated distorsians
in the oper~.tion o.f the econrnny and increasecl inflationary tensions, which ~.n
- turn caused social tensions.
- On the social plane, however, there have been considerable efforts to improve th~
standard of Iiving of the population. The employment situation, for example, has
changed remarkably during this period in that 1 million nonagricultural ~obs hav~e
been created. The school attendance rate has reached the respectable .figure of
73 percent, even though a disparity persists in this regard between the rural
sector (53 percent) and the urban sector (88.5 percent) and between the schooZ
attendance of girls (59.6 percent) and that of boys (80.8 percent).
All the same, the reverse of the good level of employment and of the school attend-
ance attained is stil~ disquieting. There is a relative decrease in qualitative
education, with a training policy that is not always consonant with the real needs
of the economy, incoherence between the teaching sector and that of the occupa-
tional training sector, illustrated by the existence of a floating population of
a million youn~ people, 15 to 20 yeara old, unemployed because they are excluded
fram the educational system, for which these young people are too old, and from
the employment market, because they are too young.
In the health sector, the signif icant efforts that have been undertaken are mani-
festly inadequate. Of course, free medicine has been an outstandiag measure and
some real progress has been noted in the increase of inedical centers and the
nimmber of doctors. But, the mediocrity of the medical apparatus, the inadequacy of
preventive medicine, and the shortage of reaources in the face of the enormous
- needa of a population that is more and more nimnerous and demanding are known.
Finally, in Algeria the housing crisis has reached disquieting proportions, which
the government, in spite of the f inancial means and materials that it expects to
allocate to it during the next 10 years, will ha.ve a great deal of difficulty in
- alleviating,_since the deficit in the housing sector is estimated at more than.
a million dwellings.
The Priority Of Improvement In Living Conditions
In general,.~nd while awaiting the pub].ication of the details of the 5-year plan
af ter its adoption by the national assembly, improvement in the living conditions
- of the people constitutes the priority obj ective of the economic and social pollcy
of the government during the future 5-year period (1980-1984).
20
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For 198]., an annual plan, with a total o� 83.8 billiom dinars, was adopted this
past 16 November by the govern~ent and will b~ submitted to the national asaembly.
AmQng nther things, this annual p].an provides for the creation of 200,000 ~obs
during the next year, which is coneonant with the provisians of the 5-year plan,
_ which aims to create 1 million jobs.
- T1~e average rate of growth of the Algerian economy during the 5 years of the plan
would be at least 8 percent a year; that of industry, 12 to 13 percent; that of
agriculture, 4 percent. The rate of increase in importations for its part will be
limited to 6 perceat a year, compared with 20 percent during the past 4 years,
_ while some draconian measures are envisaged with a view to limiting foreign tech-
nical assistance and to alleviating the burden of the balance of payments, which
includes service for the debt evaluated at 22 percent of exportations (25 billion
. dinars) . '
Without renouncing the economic plan of President Boumediene's strategy for the
- industrialization of the country, the new team in power intends to center the major
portion of its efforts on the restoration of the basic balances of the economy
- during the first 5-year period of this decade, before resuming, in a second stage
and at a more sustained rate, the industsialization process which, one says in
- Algiers, meanwhile wi11 not be called in question at all.
Moreover, the induatrial sectos, although in slight regression in the 5-year plan
in comparison with the preceding 4-year plans, remains predominant, with a credit
; of 154.5 billion dinars. Sowever, it is to be noted that the ma~or part of these
industrial investments, that is, more than 90 billion dinars, will serve to finance
~ some overdue projects fram the last plan. Moreover, more than 40 percent of
industrial investments, that is, 63 billion dinars, will be allotted to hydrocarbons,
which furthermore have always had the lion's share of these investments, but
which this time had to yield ground to the advantage of other industrial sectors,
for which hydrocarbons remain "the financial backers" (96 percent of foreign
currency receipts).
Three sectors--agriculture, hydraulics, and housing--which in the two preceding
plans were the "poor relatives" of the investment policy, this time ~enefit from
clearly more important credits and in addition are considered by the government
as priority sectors. Agriculture and hydraulics would thus be allotted credits
~mounting to 47 billion dinars. As a consequence of the serious housing crisis
that has been rampant for several years in the country, more than 60 billion dinars
have been allocated to housing. It is envisaged that 2 million dwelling~ will be
- built during ~he next 10 years.
, COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreuz et Cie, Paris 1980
8255
CSO: 4400
~ 21
~
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ALGERIA
STATUS OF GAS PRICE NEGOTIATIONS WITR F'RENCH COMPANY REPORTEn
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS i~n French 5 Dec 80 p 3330
_ [Text] For want of an agreement in Algiers, Gaz de France will have to continue
gas price negotiations.
- As was again emphasized very recently in a press conference by Mohamed Shanoun,
Algerian ambassador to Paris, if Algeria indeed intends to sell its gas at a price
that is in line with that of crude oil, it nevertheless does not exclude that this
alignment will be realized progressively. Negotiations are being carried out along
these lines not only with Gaz de France, but also with the other partners that are _
concerned--the United States, ~elgium, Spain, West Germany, and Italy (MTM, ,
28 November,p 3132).
~ After the failure of the 5 and 6 November Paris meet3ng (MTrt, 14 I~ovember, p 3019) ,
a new phase of the negotiation took place, apparently without any more success,
however,in Algiers, where a Gaz de France delegation so~ourned on 30 November and
1 December. It appeaxs that if the French aide is in agreement on the principle of
price indexing LNG [liquified natural gas] and oil, which is what the Algerians
said after the meeting in Algiers at the end of October of Andre Giraud, French
minister of industry, and Belkacem Nabi, Algerian minister of energy and � _
petrochemical industries (M~I of 7 November, p 2955), the negotiat3on is stumbling
on the definition of the upset price of a new contract and above all on the indexing
formula.
Under the terms of the old contract, Gaz de France, which pays an advance of
$3.20 per million BTU (British Thermal Unit) for the GNL received from Sonatrach,
should pay $3.60 beginning with this coming l January. This price is now considereci
insufficient by the Algeria.ns, who envisage an upset prire that is greater than
- $4.00 ahd that will progressively go to about $6.00 per mil~ion BTU.
In informed circles in Algiers, one lets it be unde~stood that another round of
negotiations between Sonatrach and Gaz d~ France will not take place before the
beginning of next year, especially because of Belkac~n &a~i's full calendar. In
fact, on 15 December Nabi is to participate as chairman at the next ministerial
session of OPEC in Bali (Indonesia); and o:i 25 December, in the work of the central _
- committee of the FLN, the single Algerian party, for the purpose of examining -
energy matters in Algeria.
COPYRZGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1980
8255
CSO: 4400 22
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,
IRAQ
SWEDEN'S VOLVO CAUGHT BETWEEN IRAN, IRAQ IN TRUCK DEALS
Stockholm WECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 18 Dec 80 p 7 ,
_ [Text] Even before Christmas the first of atotal of 2,140 Volvo trucks will begin to
roll from Sweden to Iraq. Volvo brought home the order, amounting to 730 million
kronor, back in the summer, but until now the war between Iraq and Iran has pre-
vented deliveries,
For Volvo, with manufacture of motors for irrigation pumps, etc., in Iran, the de-
liveries may become a politically sensitive question. The concern is also involved
in a legal fight with Iran concerning compensation for the nationalized truck fac-
tory in that country.
! However, more and more political observers are saying that the conflict, which now
; has the character of a stalled war of position, may perhaps be on the way to a
! peaceful solution. An Iraqi indication of t}-?e desire to "normalize everyday life"
; was the industry fair in Bagdad that opened this year--a month late--on 15 November,
; "The only signs that the country is in the midst of a war were the daily air-raid
~ alarms ar.d the fact that the public had no access to the fair," says Hans G.
~ngzell at the Export Council. "No formal opening took pl ace, either, and the
participants we;~e not allowed to indicate the co~intry of origin with flags or other
national symbols."
For Sti~edish firms the "normalization" means that, for example, the Skanska �
, Cementgjuteri's conference hotel construction is now getting under way again.
; Some 250 previously evacuated Swedish construction workers --as the first inter-
~ national entrepreneurs--are back on the job in Bagdad. "The work on the hotel
~ buildin~ is continuing at a rate that is diminished only by temporarily reduced
i electri.c power and the night blackouts, which interfere with shift work," says Knut
i Jonsson, SCG [Skanska Cementgjuteriet; Scanian Cement Cast ingJ. The building is
worth 700 million kronor today to SCG, which has also taken up discussions of com-
~ pensation for damages with the Iraq3. authorities. "But," says Knut Jonsson, "as
i long as,the war is going on no figures can be settled on. For the same reason we
do not know how much it will be delayed."
In addition to the reconstruction that will be necessary after the end of the war,
Iraq is planning ten or so extensive construction projects, including harbor ~
23
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construction at Sasra. Dredging the Tigris also enters into the plans. "SCG
be competing for several of these projects," says Knut Jonsson.
After the United States and Saudi Arabia, Iraq is Sweden's biggest non-Euronean
trading partner. ~xports to Irac{ increased by 126 percent last year to 1.4 billien
kronor and were on the way to a further increase this year when the war broke o�ut.
Imports from Irac{, chiefly oil, rose during the first half of this year to 680 mi.:-
lion kronor and according to the oil agreement signed in 1979 are to increase graciu��
ally to 2 billion kronor a year.
_ The larger Swedish businesses in Iraq (19 are represented in all), in addi.tion to '
SCG and Volvo, include Saab-Scania, the country's chiefr supplier of trucks, with an
assembly plant in Iraq and sales last year of 4,000 vehicles.
COPYRIGHT: Ahlens F~ Akerlunds tryckerier, Stockholm 1980
8815
CSO: 3109
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i
' ISRAEL
s; .
~
;
ISRAELI, SYR.IAN SHIPS SUSP$CTED OF CARRYING U.S. ARMS ~0 2RAN
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7-13 Nov 80 pp 16, 17
/Article: "A Secret Revealed by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI: Two Ships, Israeli and
Syrian, Transport Massive Arms and Spar~ Parts Cargo fram a Belgian Port
/Text/ Znternational shipping circles have observed two ships, one Israeli and
~ the other Syrian, which came together at dock in the w~ll known port of Antwerp
in Belgium on behalf of a group of arms merchants 2 weeks ago. ~
~ Thia group of arr~s merchants proceeded to load the tw~ ships with large quantities
~ of American arms and spare parta, especially ones related to Phantom jets, BB mis-
silea, and Israeli Gabriel torpedoes.
I Theae circlee confirn~ed that Che Israeli veasel, on its journey from the port of
; Haifa to the port of Antwerp, traneported some arcas manufac~ured in Israel and com-
; pleted~its load with some other American arme and spare parts from the Buropean
marke t .
i
The 9yrian vesael loaded up with as-~ns and spare parts manufactured in America
which a group of arms merchants had recently imported from the United States.
I
Znternational shipping'circles tracked the movement of the two ships from the time -
' they left the port of Antwerp in Belgium on Che night of 17 November.
IC was learned that the Syrian ship headed for the port of Tripoli, Libya, where
it unloaded its cargo in the presence of a joint Libyan-Iranian team.
! The Israeli ship set sail for South Africa and unloaded its cargo, which was re-
i loaded onto a Portuguese vessel to the account o� a commercial arms office in
j Lisbon. In the Portuguese capital the entire cargo was del.ivered to an Iranian
military delegation.
I Qbservers' estimates on the value of the cargoes of the two ships ranged from $100 -
to $125 million.
i
~ The conclusion of these maritime arms transactions through Brusaels, Tripoli,
- Damascus and Lisbon was accompanied by a process of polftical flirtation which
; has searCed waxing again between Washington and Tehran, reaching its zenith
i
~
i
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with Carter's declaration that his country had tiited toward Iran in its armed
atruggle with Iraq.
A number of Western diplomats are inclined to believe that Tehran asked the United
States for a apecific action which would give strong indications of its cotmnitmenL-
to its declared stands. While he was in New York Raja'i, the prime minister of
Iran specified throuoh Chinese intermediaries that the requisite American action .
would consist of two things:
First, urgently providing Iran with quantities of American spare parts and arms,
especially Phantom airplanes and Israeli torpedoes, which the Israeli navy uses,
through Washington, as an earnest.
Second, putting pressure on a number of Western Buropean countries which are com-
mitted to contracts to supply Iraq with arms to stop executing these contracts>
- When in the course of discussions the problem of transporting the "arms-earnest"
from non-American locations to Iran by American, non-European means arose, think-
ing at the outset favored Chinese ports as a site and Chinese ships as a means>
However, the American National Security Agency protested against this thinking,
offering two arguments:
Firsts usi.ng China as a 2ocation for the export of American and I~raeli arms would
come up against political obstacles which would take great effort to reduce> In
addition, the length of the ~oute would mean losing precious time for the United
States and the Iranian regime Uoth. Second, the use of China for this operation
would mean provoking the Soviet Union, which would certainly respond with force in
the same region or another one. That is something that would confuse America~s
calculationa, especially in the circumstances of the presidential elections.
In the face of this objection, Iran offered the solution of using Libya as an ex-
port site and ships bearing the Syrian flag as means of transportation.
However, the difficulty of carrying this out in Che case of the Israeli weapons
required by the Iranian navy became obvious. After discussion, it was possible
to arrive at an agreement by adopting Belgium as the point of departure for the
e7cport vayag~, since the requisite arms would be loaded in the Belgium port on one
Syrian ship which would go to Tripoli and from there to Zran and on one Israeli
ship which would go to South Africa and thence to Portugal then Iran.
At the same time, a campaign erupted in America, Western Europe, especially France,
and Israel against the continued execution of the Euror:an arms contracts with
Iraq, which had. been concluded before the war broke out. The press campaign was
concentrated against the French government.
When the news that Izan was being supplied with American and Israeli arms leaked
out, both Washington and Tel Aviv hastened to deny the newse However, as the news
spread and the approach of the various groups was exposed, Walter Mondale, the
American vice president, was compelled, in an American television interview he
held at the end of last week, to say that he was in a situation where "he could
not confirm this news or deny it."
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Hovever, the matter did not stop with America and Israel providing an "arms earnest"
to the Iranian regime. Iran decided to form a tripartite alliance with Syria and
Libya through which, after the earnest was paid, the transaction would be carried
out in a more comprehensive fashion, also including the improvement of American
~ relations with both Libya and Syria and an attempt to create a settlement with
Israel along the lines of the Camp David settlement, but in the context of what
is called an "Islamic solution," provided that Bgypt not participate in it, at
lease not at the beginning, lest severe doubts and complications be stirred up in
Iran, Syria and Libya.
Politicans and analysts are observing the course of events carefully, now that
both America and Israel have paid the "arms-earnest" to Iran, Libya and Syria,
and they are watting for the implementation of the new tripartite transaction and
the reactions of the Egyptian regime, which has temporarily kept away from it.
COFYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-~ARABI
- 11887
CSO: 4802
r
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ISRAEL
AR.ABIC JOURNAL VIEWS ABU HATZERA SCANDAL
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7-13 Nov 80 p 35
/Article: "A Series of Israeli Scandals--from the ~finistry of Religious Affairs
to the Interior Ministry: Abu Hatzera Plots His Revenge"/
/Text/ Before Yosef Burg, the Israeli minister of the interior and chairman nf
the ministerial committee on the autonomy negotiations, set out to the United
States recently to resume the sutonomy negotiations, he comanented that the accusa-
tions which had been made against his mir~istry, revolving about embezzlement in _
the special budget of the ministry, were empty ones, and added that the reason the
issue was raised at the present time was very obvious and could be attributed to ,
the coming round of Israeli elactions. ;
The Ministry of the Interior scand~l is focussed on speculation with private funds
and bequests which the Miniatry of the Interior transfers each year to various re-
ligious.institutes through the municipalities and their local councils. After
eome police personnel had investigated the matter, it appeared that some of these
institutes do not exiet at all b~t are imagina~�y.. Anvi.her ~ortian of funds wE~
transferred to political bodies and ordinary people connected to the Mifdal relig-
ious party which is headed by Yosef~Burg, in order to prepare for the coming
elections.
The start of publication of news about this case coincided with the approaching
conclusion of the investigation into the Ministry of Religious Affairs scandal,
to which the Israeli press has devoted prominent space on its pages in the pas~
few months. Aharon Abu Hatzera, miniater of religious affairs, was accused of
distributing payoffs to a number of his relatives and senior officials in the min-
istry as well as embezzling funds allocated to the Israeli religious schools or
Yeshivot. '
Following the investigation the Israeli police made after inva@ing the building
of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and appropriating a quantity of documents and
evidence on directions from Yosef Burg, it appeared thaC most of the names of the
religious schools were imaginary, and the same was true regarding the names of
students. Developments in the investigation in the recent period led to the in-
.terrogation of the minister of religious affairs himselfe
One of the most impartant outcomes of the case of the minister of religious affairs
~was the shedding of light on the "racism" which the artificial atructure of Israeli
.society is suffering from. People in the oriental g~oups, the Sephardim, rebelled
_ 28
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'
in the face of the charges directed against the minister of religious affairs, Abu
Hatzera, since he is of Moroccan origin. They accused Yosef Burg and police of-
~ ficiele of weaving an "Aahkenazi plot" against him.
Abu Hatzera's Negotiations
It is worth mentioning that the ministera Xosef Burg and Aharon Abu Hatzera belong
to the Mifdal religious Party, which is made up of three main blocs, moat important
of which is the (Liyemefna) Bloc led by Yosef Burg, the party chief, followed by
the Likud and Torah Block headed by Aharon Abu Hatzera and the List of the Young
- headed by Zevulon Ha~er, minister of culture.
Recently negotiations took place between the two ministers Abu Hatzera and Zevulon
Hammer to consolidate activities and seize the party leadership from Yosef Burg.
That was on~ of the most important reasona for Burg's fear and his consequent firm
stand behind the investigation into the Ministry of Religious A�fairs case--to
damage Abu Hatzera's reputation and assure himself of the party leadership.
In affirmation of this goal, he encouraged the expansion of this investigation in
order to compel Abu Hatzera to resign and have Gad Navon, the chief rabbi of the
Israeli army, appointed in his place.
Thus it is not to be ruled out that Abu Hatzera is behind the revelations on the
lateat Ministry of Interior scandal, becauae of his knowledge of what was going on
within the wings of the Mifdal party. Therefore, the similarity of the accusations
directed against the two ministries does not inspire amazement; the issue of the
~ exploitation of funds by various ministriea, specifically Interior, for electoral -
! interests is not new to the ruling circle in Israel.
' From the first days Yosef Burg stood behind the investigation on the case of the
~ Ministry of Religious Affairs, p.bu Hatzera demanded that his supporters gather in-
' formation on Yosef Burg, and they actually managed to obtain documents from some
local councils which constituCed a"pipeline" for Ministry of the Interior funda
to special party cormnittees.
The Ministry of Agriculture on the Way
' In another sense, the embezzlement cases in the Ministries of Religious Affairs
and the Inrerior are not new, but had been bruited about for a long time. The
iiewspaper HA"'OLAM HAZEH published an investigation 2 years ago into speculation
i with funds allotted to the Jewish religious schools, the Yeshivot, and Che state
supervisor presented a similar report on the conduct of the Ministry of the
! Interior.
~ Thus exposing these cases at the present time and directing all the expoaures
against the Mifdal Party cannot be isolated from the internal game of leadership
- ~ among party members on the one hand and the iasue of the Israeli elections on the
= other, since the incorporation of the Mifdal Party into the Likud bloc constitutes
. one of the main means for obtaining a ma,jority in the Knesset.
Therefore the Likud leadera did not look with satiafaction upon the negotiations -
which went on recently between the leaders of the Mi~dal party and the Maarakh
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opposition bloc to establish an alliance a�ter the coming electLons ended and ~
new government was to be formed. Yosef Burg met repeatedly with Shimon Peres to
study thia matter.
In addi[ion, the rfifdal leaders, in particular Yosef Burg, support the notion of
halding the Iarg~li elections earlier than their apecified daCe November of next -
year, and others have reservations on the approval of a special plan to impoae
Israeli law on the Golan Heights and incorporaCe them inCo Israel.
It is probable that some members of the financial /sic/ government will play a
part in shattering the unity of the Mifdal party in calculating the circumatances ,
bearing on the Israel elections. ~
Thus these cases show the degree of the blatant corruption in the agencies of the
Israeli regime, which recently afflicted the Israeli military establishment itself,
resulting in the fall of the Maarakh government in the last elections.
The ques~ion which raises itseZf now is, Will the police break into the office of
the minister of the interior to put its hand on the ministry's documents, as h~p-
pened in the case of the Ministry of Religious Affairs?
In this case, the police will be taking a car~ful stand, since they are directly
subordinate to the authority of the minister o� the interior himself.
A 8enior official in the ministry, following the publication of news about theae
- charges, comanented by saying "The anawball has atarted rolling and it is difficult
to 8top it."
He went on to say that it was possible to lighten the load on the Ministry of the
Interior by revealing similar cases in other ministeries. He hinted at the
Ministry of Agriculture, which has been assumed by Arik Sharon:
COPYR.IGHT : 1980 AL-WATAN AI~- ~ AR,ABI
11887
- CSO: 4802
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- ~ ISRAEL
CURRENT STATUS OF PEACE NOW ANALYZF.D
Tel Aviv NEW OUTLOOK in English _1ov/Dec 80 pp 25-29
- [Article by Hillel Schenker]
jText]
Marsha Pomerantz published an article covering ~ the lobby outside the auditorium there
5 columns on the back page of the "Jerusalem a display of Peace Now T-shirts, stickers,
Post" two days after Peace Now's recent Pop-political art against occupation and for
ideological rally at "Binyanei Ha'uma" in peace, as well as postcards to be signed and sent
: lerusalem. Among other thin&t, she wrote: to Shimon Peres, demanding that he and the
; "Peace Now represents a brand of humanism~ ~bor Party unequivocally oppose the proposed
- but there are no ve s cific instructions bill to annex the Golan Heights. One sign
rY P~ contained a quotation from David Ben-Gurion:
around for being human, or humane, in Israel �'p~t desire for peace between the Jewish -
1980. She added that people from across people and the Arab people is one of the ~
the country came wondering what is to be organic comer~tones of Zionism. Without that
done, and left without an answer after 3 hQUrs
aspiration, everything is distorted. Another
of speeches". In the end. she wrote, "No one poster contained countless photographs, Andy
; told the assemblage of professors and soldiers~ Warhol-style, of the "Gush Emunim" settle-
~ teenagers and grandmothers what is to be done. ment at Elon Moreh. Pasted on top of the -
We'll have to figure it out together. 'I~?e general pictures, in chronological order, were naws-
' direction was cleu. The people were there. paper headlines reflecting the "progreu" of the
; 'Ihat's something. Israeli-Acab conflict: 12/6/67 "Eban: The Time _
~ This may not be the most penetrating or Has Arrived For Direct Contacts Between Israel
~ sophisticated analysis of the utuation, but it qnd The Arab States." 13/6/67 "Dayan: We
_ does describe how many peopk feel today. Are Waiting For A Telephone Call From The
' Yes, the people wece there. 3,000 came to Arabs." 8/10/73 "Difficult And Bitter Fighting
fill up the huge "Binyanei Ha'uma" auditorium. Towuds ~ctory.�' 18/I1/77 "Welcome Presi-
; This was quite an achievement~ considering the dent Sadat" (in Hebrew, Arabic, and Er.glish).
fact that the meeting, unlike other demonstra- There wen piles of a pamphlet on Peace
; tions, was not caUed in response to any specific Now's approach to Zionism, containing quntes
_ i event or crisis. Rather, it wu a culmination of a from Amos � Oz, Amnon Rubinstein, A.B.
series of ideolo8cal seminazs that Peace Now Yehoshua, Ya'acov Talmon~ Albert Memmi~
: has held in Jerusalem during the past few Iyavid &n-Gurion, YA. Brenner, "The Tear-
' months. Cas Monologue" (which appeared in "New
~ Oudook" - H.S.), Meir Wizeltier, Natan
( Alterman, Yehudah Amihai, Martin Buber, and
j a Peace NoW statement on Zionism.
,
; ~ 31
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~ Another pamphlet contained proposals pre- rrot. tiarkab~ ac~mitcea tnat ne did not know
sented by 6 workshops that were held ai the what to recommend to Peace Now on the
ideological seminars. The statement on Zionism programatic or tactical level. His main point
and the 6 workshop-reports are important, and was to call upon Peace Now to serve as a
de~nitely should be studied and circulated. But catalyst for a profound national soul-searc}ung
- statements and reports are static, intellectu~l, about the lewish-Arab conflict. He said that
_ passive, though undoubtedly political expres- until 1967 the Zionist moveme~i was guided by
sions. Until now, Peace Now's strength has been a realistic perspective~ but the post-67 period
in its action, it's extra-parliamentary activity in introduced an increasingly unrealistic view,
the streets. with greater stress on myth and leRend. The
Which brings me back to the live part of the climax of this trend towards unreality was the
evening. risc of the Likud to power. Prof. Harkabi said
The biographies of the four guest speakers that we must take moderate positions, not
were an efi'ective symbolic expression of the because the Arab world has changed, but
moral and political weight that Peace Now because moderate positions are the only feasi-
carries in lsraeli society. General (Res.) Avra- ble ones. We must also take into account the _
ham Adan ("Bren") has a long and brilliant world's attitudes.
military record, and he was "the other general" S. Yi~ar stressed his feeling that there is a
who crossed the Suez Canal during the Yom lack of rymmetry between the Israeli peace
Kippur War. Prof. (General Res.) Yehoshophat forces and the Palestinian activity (or lack of
Narkabi was the Chief of Military lntelligence, it) for peace and compromise. He wished to
and one of Israel's main ideologues in its ap- hear mor~ assertive Palestinian voices calling
proach to the Arab world. A.B. Yehoshua is for peace, comparable to Peace Now's voice.
one of israel's leading younger writers, whose Although 80% ~of his remarks were devoted to
book "The Lover" is, among other things, a this lack of symmetry, he added at the end
sensitive portray~l of the piight of an Israeli that~ we should be ready to take ~very oppor-
Arab. Writer and educator, S. Yizhar, who was tunity to talk with Palestinians who are ready
once the Number Two man in Rafi's ICnesset to talk with us. He also said that even if there is
list, following David Ben�Gurion, wrote stories a lack of symmetry, we have to continue to act
in 1948 (such as Hirbet Hiz'ah) which are still unilaterally for peace as if there was symmetry.
moral touchstones for the israeli society. (Prof. A.B. Yehoshua said that Peace Now made a
Harkabi and A.B. Yehoshua participated in decisive contr;bution to the first stage of the
"New Outlook's" Israeli-Palestinian Dialogue peace process, to Camp David and the Israeli-
, in September 1978, and S. Yizhar in the Egyptian peace treaty. He believes that there is
~ Washington Symposium in October 1979.) no reason to be pessimistic now. He noted that
Gen. (Res.) Adan said that the Govemment a Peace Now spokesman had talked pessimis-
likes to talk about how greal a strategic asse� tically on T.V. about the struggle against the
Israel is to the West, but actuaUy, it is insigni- settlements in the West Bank. He reminded the
ficant compared to the large geopolitical audience that Lova Eliav had been the only one
strategic assets that the Arabs have to offer. to raise his hand in the Labor Central Committee
Additional points included the fact that our in Z972 against the establishment of Yamit and
lack of consideration for the Palestinians dces the I'~~fah settlements, and now they are being
not serve our interests, and that a partial peace evacuated.
will not last. Since we are srill faced with Yehoshua compared the current situation to
threats on the Eastem Front, General Adan the Act Four of a classical drama: the lull, the
- supports the principle of aspiring to defensible intermediate period before the conclusion of
borders, but adds that unreasonable demands the action.
on the part of lsraet end by hurting the reason-
able needs.
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Yehoshua concluded by saying that the Yeace Now is tacing phase two. Yhase one
"Palestinian problem" is very much our own was the period between February 1978, when it
problem. He said that if things will be good for evolved in response to the delaying tactics of
the Palestinians, they wiil be good for us. He the Begin government against Sadat's initiative. -
also said that we have to have greater faith in 'Ihis phase reached its successful climax with
what they say. When the Arabs said they the signing of the Camp David agreements _
wanted to throw us into the sea, we believed (following the movement's 100.000-strong
them. "Now, when an Arab syas that he wants demonstration, that Begin admitted had
to compromise, to live alongside us, I believe haunted him at Camp David) in September
him." 1978, and finally, with the successful conclu-
Yohi Amir of Oz V'~halom spoke eloquently sion of the Isr~eli�Egyptian peace treaty in
~ about the reliQious principle "Ye shall seek March 1979. Peace Now's activity in the streets
peace and pursue it," rejecting Cush Emunim's had served as a counterbalance to obstructionist _
claim to be the sole irustee of the religious actions by Cush Emunrm, and to the hawks m
legacy. He reminded the audience of Abraham's Hentt and the right wing of Labor. They en-
appeal to his nephew Lot to divide the land if couraged Sadat to continue to work towards a
they could not agree to live on it together. political solution. -
Gari Brenner of Kibbutz Hatzor spoke 7rtiis is pfiase two. As General Adan said at
passionately about the importance of Peace the rally, "A gartial peace will not last," or
Now among youth who have grown up with 13 as the workshop on Peace Now and the Pales-
years of occupation as the only reality they tinians concluded, "'~'he Palestinians are at the
know, and among Diaspora Jewry. A. Vilan, of core of th~ problem." Peace Now activists
Kibbutz Negba, spoke about the need to know that a comprehensive peace, which in-
de-emphasize street demonstrations in an cludes a resolution of the Palestinian problem, _
election year. He said that Peace Now should is necessary for the movement to attain its goal
be ready to take to the streets again after the of building a sane Zionism.
- next government takes over, to counteract any The question is, whai tactics should the
obstructionist tendencies to the completion movement adopt during this phase of the peace
of the peace process from extremist fringe process. There was a very simple symmetry -
elements. during the first phase: President Sadat, head-of-
Naftaii 'ttaz said that the movement should state of the leading Arab country, was ready to
place greater stress on educationa! activities, recognize Israel's right to exist, to live alongside
' and that Peace Now should be known as a it in peace and all israel had to do was to give
- political-educational movement. He also in� back Sinai (of course with appropriate security
formed the audience that IsraeG television had arrangements), in order to conclude a solid
refused to cover the gathtring. agreement. All the Prime Minister of Israel had
it was good to hear the guest speakers, and to do was to reach out and accept that pro-
the spokesmen. But, as Marsha Pomerantz ferred hand. Peace Now was there to make sure
wrote, after three hours of speeches, the that he didn't hesitate too much, or falter.
audience did not feel it had the answer to the It is true, as S. Yizhar said at the rally, that
' question "What is to be done?", there is no such symmetry between Peace Now
1'he truth is that it is not easy to formulate in Israel and the peace forces in the Palestinian
guidelines for action today. How Peace Now camp. But how could there be? - Unlil:e Sadat,
shoutd act in the current circumstances did not no Palestinian spokesmen or leader (Arafat or
become clear at the rally, and activists are ready anyone else) can approach an Israeli leader on
, to admit the dilemma, which must be solved equal footing, as head of a sovereign govem-
soon to enable the movement to have the ment. (Of course Stiimon Peres and others say
maximum impact in the near future. that King Hussein of Jordan could do this - _
but Hussein insists that he is not a Palestinian,
; nor is he a spokesman for the Palestinian
,
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~GU~1C.~ iuus UICIC cari oe nu symiuruy ~ecsuse ha5tern Jews are unused to gtBSS-ro0t5
- betwcen the Israeli peace forces a:~d the Pales- political action, or are they too preoccupied
tinian peace forces. As the workshop report with day-to-day ecbnomic hardships to deal
concluded: one side (the Israeli) will speak with the "esoteric" question of peace and
with a public voice, which can be loudly security? In the words of one Peace Now
expressed because of its open society and activist, "The Right talks about security and
political security, and the other side (the power in very simple terms - guns and land.
Palestinian) will speak more quietly, because Our concept of security is much more sophis-
of fears of occupation and fanatical farces." ticated and complex. It's based on the strength ~
Peace Now is facing three major problems and justice of' our society, and on eliminating
today. The first is how to function during an the external factors that create conflict. This is
election year in Israel. As one key activist puts much harder to explain."
it, "We must make our weight feli in the Since Camp David the movement has lost
political process, that is, we must affect the some of its momentum. It has not responded
party platforms, and the party representatives." as consistently as it could to the new develop-
ln other words, lobbying to try to implement ments in the peace process, and to the latest
the 8 principles articulated at the "lnterparty obstructionist tactics. This is due partly to the
~ Workshop" will become one of Peace Now'a unexgected sucass of the first stage of the
major tasks. Examples of this type of activity peace process, partly to fatigue, and pardy to
include the present political forum attended by the complexities of the current phase of the
MK Shulamit Aloni (Citiuns Rights PartY), process.
MK Haika Grossman (Mapam), Dr Meir Pail I4 is good to hold ideolo~cal seminars, and
(Shelt~, Moshe Kol (Independent liberals), to formulate statements and workshops reports,
_ MK Yossi Sarid (Labor) and MK Mordechai but if the movement wants to maintaln its
Virshuvsky (Shlnur~, meetings with individual impact, it has to cantinue to translata its
MKs, and appearances before platform com- positions into direct action.
mittees. At the same time, Peace Now musi The only current issue dealt with at the
condnue its activities in the streets, in order to Binyarrei Ha'uma conference was the proposed
back up its lobbying power. ~olan Annexation Bill. No reference was made ~
_ The second problem concems the Palestinian to the exiled mayors, who are still awaiting the
question. Peace Now activists attended the New decision of the High Court of Justice, though
Outlook Washington Symposium in October they are, if one can judge from their state-
1979, and held discussions with Palestinians in ments, the very type of moderate Palestinian
the occupied territories during the past year. leaders that Peace Now is seeking. Nor was
'i'his dialogue was broken off in the spring, there much reference to the repressive activities
following the violent murder of Palestinians and carried out by the military authorities in the
Jews~ the cxpulsion of the mayors, and the occupied territories. One heard little protest
assassination attempts on the three mayors. The about the huge sums of money being poured
spokesmen of Peace Now expressed the hope into ihe West Bank (uItimately in vain). _
that the Palestinians will be ready to resume Should Moshe Dayan be the only one to
this dialogue in the near future, and are seeking raisc questions about the current policy of
ways to bring it about. 7hey have also estab- "preventi~~" bombings in Lebanon? After the
lished good relations with the Palestinian press Yom KipPur War, many Israelis, including all of
in East Jerusalem. tt?e militaTY conespondents and analysts in the
The third problem concems the Eastem major newspapers, resolved never again to allow
Jew~. Peace Now leaders admits that they have m~itary decision�making to be a sacred cow,
not found the formula to reach these masses� secure from criticism. This is what Prof. Yeho-
~"Money for tlne poorer neighborhoods instead shaphat Harkabi meant when he called for a
of for the settlements" is a wonderful slogan, national and individual soul-searchin~t.
but has not generated a great enthusiasm for
Peace Now in those neighborhoods. Is it
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lkspite all the above, Reace Now supporten since it is not shared equally. The cost of peace
, are united in the convicdon that the movement we shall all share. Peace, like love, grows
will continue to function until there is a real stronger the more' it is shared. We must do
breakthrough in resolving the Israeli-Arab everything we can to cease being a people that
conflict. At present there are no serious lives on the sacrifice of its sons.
thoughts about forming a political party (which
could possibly kill the movement), and aciivists (See PEACE FRONT � on "Peaa Now ldeological
say that they will continue to functio:i under Works4op,^~ -
an Alignment govemment, to "keep the leaders
of Labor Parry honest", and to make sure that
- the Right dces not try to sabotage a potential
peace agreement with the Palestinians and the
Syrians.
Perhaps the most important, and artainly
the most dramatic, statement was made by
Mrs Rivka Guber, who lost two sons in the War
of 1948: "I know about the cost of war. The
- cost of war is hiQher than the cost of neace.
_ COPYRTGHT: 1980 by NEW OUTLOOK
CSO: 4820
I
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;
~ LEBANON
.
- MILITARY SITUATXON IN NATION ANALYZED, CONOEMNED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI ln AI^d61C 5-11 Dec 80 pp 24-21
' /Article: "The Future of the Legitimate Aut6orities and t~e War of the Militias;
Aho Is ProP~tting fro~a tE~e Defeat of tfle Le6anese Ar~oy?"J
~ LText% The most important event on the Lebanese state is the open war 6etween the
ar~ny
and the mil itias, in wfiic~. tfie 1 egitimate artny has not yet recorded any objec-
tives at all. T6e main beneficiary of tfiis confrontation 6as been S~aykh Pierre al-
, Jwnayyil, cauoroander of tbe "LeSanes.e .Forces" ~tbe Cfiristian militta), who is trying
to impose a. gra~p of sma11 consecutive cE~a.nges on t6e 9round to const3tute a sort
of new "fai't acco~pli" tn any possiG.le discourse ~efore Prestdent Ilyas Sarkis
~ ternu ends. The main loser, everyone is convinced, is the legittmate pow~r. It
has come to b.e feared t6~at the legi~tmate power.w~ll ffnd itseif incapable of re- -
cw?d~r~g real security tnttiatives during t6e re~nain~ng pertod of the pres~ident's
~ feature. -
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has considered it appropriate to open the file on the arn~y and
t6e mil~tias and try to respond o6jectively to tfie questton: ~lho is 6enefiting
from tfie defeat of ~tfie "ne~[ le6anese arrt~y? In t~e context of this answer, a group
~ of questtons ~tere dtrected to Sfiay[cf~ Pierre al-Juroayyil ~n a dialogue wtwse ~pur- ~
' pose was to s~etch. out tEie fra~ne~or[c of dangero~us profi~ab.il fties rr~ic~ recent de= -
ueloproents fwve [~en preparing for. ~
What the Lehanese do not dispute today is the fact t6at it was Henry Kissinger's
"gen~us" that he was abl~ to ~ring the bill.iger~nts in tbe Middle East together
~ to one ta~le, naroely Le6anon, eacE~ according to 6is appetite, to w~at hi~s hand
cautd grasp and to what ~is stomacb could digest.
, What the Leh.anese dispute is that the domestic parties which have torn the
~ "Lebanese tahle" apart since t6e beginning of the war are~ today waging a new
; battle whose goal is to attain tf~e power for wf~icf~ tfiey developed a taste
! during the f~ghting and whose gains they f~ave not failed to enjoy. In fact,
i there are parties wbich are trying to monopolize power tn an indomitable long-
! i.ng for damtnance.
~
~ BEtwee~ the au~:tro rities' struggle to survive and the aut~ority of struggle which
, , those with designs on power are hinting at, Lehanon, nare t6an at any time, seems
ljke a"country up for sale", tf~e legitimate power in, it represents the majority
hut does not represent itself, the nw3ority is distributed,among 8ell.igerent ~ _
~
~
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minorities, and democracy consists of forms which are exercised ~n a ridiculous,
sorrowful way among the 6arricades along tf~e lines of contact in the heart of the
capital .
In the heat of the recent developments, which began with the operation of last
7 July (the battle between the L9berals and the Phalange) and ended with the
"Ayn al ~Rummanah operation {the expulsion of the army fmm tE~e Ba'abda Palace
area, a big question is 6eing raised: is the Lebanese military establ ishment ca-
_ pable of existing? By ~v6ose power do the Christ~an mi1itias exerc9se all this in-
- fluence in their areas? WE~ere is Le6anon, its form and institutions, headed?
Today AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI ts trying to answer this question:
The mil itias are a Le6anese phenomenon ~thic6 started in the fifties and they ex~
press three significant features, at least, froro the standpoint of the nature of
their growth and emergence:
1. The weakness of the central authorities and tfieir instrument, the national
array.
2. The anxi.ety of olittcal and popular parties over the futura and their tend-
ency to depend on t~selyes rather tfian relying on tfie prntection nf the state.
3. Tf~ natural craYtng for porter - indeed for tnonopol ization of power.
It is no secret that the Lebanese regime, its state and institutions, has never
at any t~.me, from the time LeEaanon gained independence, 6een a si~rong one. After
the. ~~storic ~argaining ~rh~ic~ resul ted in Le6anon's independence in 1947, al though
Syr~ia did not recognize t~.is independence, t~e era of Sf~ykh Bishara al-Kh~ari, the
f~rst actual independence president, ended in do~estic cris~is. When President
Camil l e Charpoun tootc oQ+rer, tFie construction of tfie army (~ad started however,
~ that arJOy did not ena~l e tfie central autEwr~ties to contro1 t6e domest~c situation,
rvh~cE~ erupted in 1958 in .[~loody events rrf~ose declared cause was Le6anon's partial-
ity toward suspect Arai~ a17 iances 6ut wbose undeclared cause was the struggle for
power a~ng the Lebanese themselves. When Gen Fu'ad Shihab assumed the presidency
" after the "]95~ revo~ution" he tried to establish a sort of developmental and
pol itical balance tn the administration of t~e country. However, his era, fo~ its
part, ended in something reserti~l ing a dilerr~r~a. At tFiat time, the phalange Party
had started to taste t~e gains of po=;er and had started to establish its armed
groups. Concerning this stage, SE~aykE~ Pierre al -Jumayyil relates a convers~tion
which took place between h~m and Presid~~nt Shiha~a toward the end of his term, say-
ing "7he general told me tha~ it has become pflssi6le to :^ely on you in the Phala.nge.
. There wiil fa~e no one fi.estdes you on the stage ~rfien my term ends. Train the young
men rvel l , Pierre!"
The head of the Phalange relates this story to those who are close to him; it ~
stresses what no one arg~es a6out, namely tbat the maron~te presidents who fo]
lowed one another in power since independence realized deep down that the equa-
tion on wf~ich the Le~anes~ regiroe was 6ased, wf~ic~i g~ves icey posts in the Maronites
is an ohsolete one w~ich cannot survive. AltfLOUg6 Fu'ad Sh~thah tried to esta6lish
what was cal l e~i the "tndependence state," t~i s attempt fai 1 ed to achi eve i ts goal s,
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and he felt that ~oatters ware proceedtng in a direction contrary to that of the
existing "state." Althnugh a second term was availa6le to him, he chose not
to return to tt~e presidenc,Y 6ecause Lebanon, as he said in his famous message,
had become "a country wbic6 is not possi6le to govern."
- What Fu'ad Shif~ah an~icipated Before his term ended turned out to be correct, be-
causr~ the "era of tbe Phalange m~litia" 6egan very early - at the end of the sixties
- specifically, in the days of Presiden~c Cbarles Helou. At that time it was apparent
to everyone that the Lehanese army 6ad 6een adequately mot~tl~zed for domestjc pur-
- poses, that is, to resist tFie Le6anese group wfiicfi was tryt.ng to "participate" in
power, and restst tfie Palestinians who had 6een transformed since the 1961 de~eat
into an armed revolutton. Tfie Phalange Party f~astened to impose a kind of political
guard~ansE~~ip over this army, exploiting the weakness of the central authorities.
Everyone rememfiers the demonstration ~wf~icb tfie pf~alange s6amefully called for to
support the milita~~y organ~zatinn, whicb resem6led a political group in a domestic
- struggle.
The first confrontation in the domestic context was w~en the Le~anese army skirmished
with some Palestinian parties in t6e southern region, t~en in the area around the
sports vill~ge in Beirut. 4ltth these clashes, the tatlitias started to prepare for
a histortc role, and w~ereas they fiad just heen token fiands in calnouflage gar6~, they
6ecame groups trained in street fig~it~Tng witFi aid from afiroad and the ~Interferen~e
of a large nwnber of regional and international tntell.~igence.agenc~es.
Laugha6.ly Sorro~cful Experiioents
- It ts no secret to anyone today that t6e source of the pfLalange's heavy ~teaponry is
Isreal; at the heginning lig6t r~eapons were proxided ~y the~Phalange war council
through party financial sources and 6y figfiti.ng men the~oselves betr~een 1973 and
1975, while the most important portion of t6e~o came oy er tfie Syrian 6orders at
various times in installments. It ~s also certa~tn, tfi~t t6e or~gins of the weapons
of the Nat~ional 19oyernent ~nil itia and t6e otfier ~~1 ittas ~[ere Ara[z ones wE~ic~ varted
as t~e all tances of yarious groups witfi one Arafi reg~ne or~ another shtfted in
spectptc stages . ~
Foreign intelligence serves played a basic role tn farloing the forces of all the
confltcting parties and t~eir military ~nstrwnents, tEw t ts, their mil~tias. Arms
and aimnun~tion are tr~o 6asic elements in wartime, and proof of that in the Le6anese
war was the notorious 6attle of Tall al-Za'tar: the attac[c of Christian mtlitias
on Tall a1wZa'~ar almost stopped after a short period 6ecause ammunition ran out,
then went on ~ecause Syr~ta at tE~at time bastened to supply its "allies" with the
suff~cient aid.
The Wli] itias and the Intel l~igence Services
'fhe miittias' experience tvit[~.t6e ~ntelligence s~rvices was not always happy. ~n
the spr~ng of 1476, the "Za~lab group" (.figf~ting men from Zaf~laE~ in the Christian
militia~ fell ~nto the trap of Amer.ican intelligence. Tf~e in6abttants collected
a sum of abflu~ 1 mtll ton pounds to buy anns and aromuniti:art~to fight "the Arab army
of Lebanon." They assigned tn~ ~asic to an Armenian merc6ant of American nationality
~ . 38
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who had previousiy brought weapons to Lebanon; however, the p~aple of Zahlah, who
were waiting for their arms to arriv~, did not know that the Armenian merchant was
just an American intelligence agent providing arms fo~r a given group whenever the
CIA agency decided that it needed the group to protect certain positions or decided
to advance along the political and military map with calculated steps carefuliy
studied in advance. After a lengthy wait ancl pro~r3ses, 9~ became apparent to the
Zahlah group that "Sar[cisian" had devoured tF~e funds the inhabitants had collected
- and tt~at peaca had not come and woul d not come :
What happened to tl~e peopl e of Zahl ah al so hapened to a mil itary organization al l ied
along with tbe phalange ~xith A~nerican inte1ligence ~tbrougb one o~ the latter's agents,
disguised as a"fiwaane do~tor." This doctor� prr~rnised tf?e Christian organizat~ion l.igh~
arms wE~ose purc~iase he would facili~tate from 5outh Yietnam and Spain, with the ob-
jective of keeping the organization from looRtng for ot6er sources of armament for
- a specific time. The "doctor" toofc his Lefianese clients and traveled around with
them for 45 days at sea r~itbout letup, searcFiing for the promised ship which would
unload its cargo ~t sea; tfie tour continue~ until orders came to return the clients
to the coast at Juniyab without t6eir buying a singl e round.
The Phalange itsel f had an experience with its Syrian all ies in the ~attle of 'A1 jya~i
in tbe fall of 1976. At t[~at tt'~ve, t~e P6.alange-~yrian alliance was in a honeytnoon,
_ hut t6e Phal angtsts had not 1 earnt ~r6at tfi.e 1 imits of thetr "provisions" from Syrta
~ere and had not understoud tf~at tfiey were in all iance ~?ith Damascus and that Damas-
cus ~r~as not in al l iance ~cit~ t[zeero and that ~hey were in its serv~ce, not the other
~tay around. In the battle of 'Aliyat, tfie Pbalangists tried, as Isreal tried in
the Octo6er ~ 478 figC~ting, to transcend the advice of "al l ies" and invade the town;
there was a real massacre in one day of t6e fighting when Syrian joint forces artil-
lery fired on tC1e. advanr.,e procession of t6e PE~alange in t6e Tal'at al-Kahhalah (.t6e
eastern suSurEi of Heirut~.
Undecl ared Coord~nat1on
The exPerience of t~ 1 ate Kawal Jum~1 att and the Natlonal ,'~oyement rvith Daroascus
was no different fr~no t~at of t~ P~alange. This is fiecause two wtlls were and
still are tu.gging back and forth in tf?e Lebanese war: tfue first is tbe will of
Syria, the second is tE~e w{11 is Isreal. Each has the decisive say in the circles
. of the group it 6elongs to. It is Damascas wicb set off the Le6anese army "war
- of the 6arracks," providing the parties to it witf~ support and weapons. Then i~
allied with tf~e P6alange and partlcipated witfi it in strikir~g down the national
movement and the palestinian organizattons in ~eirut, Sufar and Syda: then it
advanced and bro.ugbt t[ie natlonal ~oovement out of i:ne mountains to return and
strike at tbe P6alange in al-Ka6halah, tf~en in t6e otF~,;r arnas the Christian mili-
_ tja dominate: Is there an undeclared Syr1an-Isrea3i coord~nation in the Lebanese
war?
The Isrealis admit such coordination, although t6is ac6nission does not constitute
proof. Gen Af?aron Yariv, head o~ the Isrea1i Center of Strategic StudYes, in a
report pu6.1 ished by the Isreal i newspaper YEDIOT AHARONOT on 13 Octo~er 1980, re-
veal ed the fol lo~?ing, in t6ese words: "Understanding f~as been reached on a, group
of implicit ayreements 6etween Isreal and Syria since tfte latter occupied Le6anon.
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- These agreements are founded on the basis that neither party will go beyond specific
lines. Experience has proved that 6otE~ part~ies F~ave imposed the maximum degree of
control over t6e group tE~ey ;~rotect. Tf~erefore we conside~^ tf~at the Lebanese ex-
periment in Syrian-Isreali relations underlines the fact that possibilities for
dialogue and understanding between the two countries always exist." It is well
known that Gen Yariv was comnander of Isreali military intell.igence for 10 years.
While Syria has exercised specific infl uence on the various armed militias in Leba-
non in one form or an~ther, Isreal has trained and armed more than one: the volume _
of Isreali arms to the PE~alange was enougt~ to supply an entire division (11,000
fighting men~, with its various land, sea and air corps, with all the arms it re-
quired. It is natural that Isreal sbould retain a numfier of "friends" in the ranks
of persons it has trained and should maintain sound, clear relations with them for
_ specif~c purposes inside t~e Phalange organization itself. T~.er~e are people in
the Phalange political ~ureau ~r6o accuse Isreal of using t6e party's for its in-
terests and w~o say "If Isreal 6as wanted us to triumpFi it wou]d have enabled us to
to do so oz numerous occasions. However, it intervened only to maintain the 6a1-
ance and preserve the situatio~ of no winners and no losers - or, more clearly,
to inundate everyone in a war dawaging to everyone?"
In any event it is not strange, in accordance w'ith Kisstnger's thinking, that Syrian
and Isreali strateg~es s6ould coincide in Le6anon and that the t~ro declared enemies
shouid form an al7iance to ta[ce possession of Le6anese territory which is easily
avail abl e, retain t~e power of tfie mil it~as, destroy tfie army and smash lts po~cer
everytime it ~nanages to emerge. To under.line that, there is proof in additton to
the clashes whicb bave occured and are occuring fi.etween tfie Lefianese arroy and the
Syrian deterrent forces on the one fiand and fietween this arroy and tf~e Christian
mtlltias on tfie otiier. On 7 Fehruary 1 q78 Syri~n army attac(ced tE~e al -Fayyad~yah
barracks of t~e Lebanese army and Lebanese off~cers, C~?risttans and Moslems, jotned
- together in tfie 6arrac[cs against t5is attack. Su6sequently no actual coordination
of any kind ~ccured on t5e ground b.etr~ceen the 1 egit~ ~mate Le6anese army and t`~e
Syrian forces ~rhic6 ~tere t6e patrons of legitimacg, because these forces did not
i n any event ~rant tf?e resurgence of a Lebanese army w~icf~ woul d put an end to its
"servlces" in Le[lanon. As long as t~e army is a6sent from tfie t,e6anese stage and
as long as t~e milttias exist and are ready for corobat, t6e Syrian role will not
end and Syria will have adequate justification to reraain:~ TEws, the stronger t~e
mil itias are and the wea[cer tf~e state, Syria wil l 6e guaranteed t~e ~hErer~itf~al
for staying in Lebanon and will win a new card in a new garoe.
It i s cl ear� that the real en~roy of Isreal a,s a strong Lehanese state and a strong
coherent unified Le6anon, and Isreal's direct or indirect fr~end is anyone offer- ~
ing it a pretext to intervent, pav~~ng tfie way for it to reach Juniyah and al-~�~
Ashrafiya6, and indeed go beyond t6an. It is as if everytfiing tbat 6as been going
on in Le~anon for 10 years does not amount to more than an "internal war" rvhich
the commanders of Syrian and Isreali intelligence mainly stay up late at night carry-
ing out. ~
The Ostrich Policy
- However, it is also clear that the Lebanese army, ~~i.~h~its comroand, structure and
` form, has not 6.een prepared, froro independence to t~iis day, to survive in the sea
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of struggles the region is witnessing. It is as if this a?^rrrtY, in spite of the
great hop~s the Lebanese attach to it, 6elongs to a mil9tary institution only by
vi rtue of the salaries it troops receive and the provisions the mi?itary coopera-
tive offers them. It has happened that tF~e current commander of the arnty, Gen Victor
Khuri ,~has more than or?ce turned f~i s gaze away ~rom transgressions and conduct i n-
- fringing directly on tf~e yood repute of tf~e corma~d and on tf~e good repute of the
organization itsel�f. In this regard, Dean Rayroond Iddab, who is in Paris says, "If
anyone in the desert corrr~~nits an aggression against the horse or camel of a bedouin,
he .perpetrates a major crime fiy ~is 6are Fands. i~ow can the co~nander of any army
be content to bave 4is parents' 6oroe fiiown up and ~is horses [cilled without showing
the sligE~test reaction? Haw can he fie content to have one of fiis officers killed
in a1-Ashrafiyah or the south, or in an armed am6ush of the road, and not take the
measures military honor dictate~ against the kiilers?
Pe rhaps the recent events in '~yn al-Rumnanah and the charges one could 6ring against
the comroanders on tneir account are further proo~ of t6e ineffectiveness of the Le-
ba nese roilitary 'institution. Tb.e commanders were silent a6ou~ the existence of a
R~ilitary poc[cet, the al-Hanas~ poc[cet of the Libe?^a1 Nationaltsts' Party in the army
' area, for 3 mont~s, then let anot~er competing pocket, t~e dl-Hanash pocket, the
j P halange pocket, grow in exc6ange. The result was t~at the army iet the two parties
fi ght and piayed t6e role of an o6server, unti7 one of tFiem managed to expel it from
the region!
I f they army cororoand ?ail ed to ilnpose t~e state` s au~ho~^i~:y over an area of 5 square
kl7ometers lyfng in the y1C1t11t,y of t6e repu[~7 ican palace co~mioand harracks, how could
it E~e hoped to e~ctend tfue scope of ~~.is awtfiari't,,y i~~ tC1e fiutur~e over all Lebanon?
Now could the (iehanese dream tt~at tbe autEwri~t''~s colild r~gain tfie 6order strip
lying und~r actlial Tsr~al~ ~~ni~ance?
The latest disruption in the mili~:ary organization may 6~ attrihuted to the structure
it was 6uila or~; rooder~ experience in tE~e building af armies has proved that that has
be come inappropriate. ~~~ever, t~e military and political co~omanders are intentional-
ly or unintentionall~ exercising t~e p4licy of the ostrich in this regard, specifical-
ly, and on a matter whlch tvill not admft of bargaining. Tn 1977, in accordance with
a request hy the minister of def~nse at tfiat time, Fu'ad Butrus, the command ~ormed
a five-man cor~otttee whicb was assigned to set out a study ~^elated to the future of
th~ arroy. This cor~oitte~. incl uded officers w~th the rank of i ieutenant col onel and
colonel who Ewd ta(cen part ~in t~e fig~ting on 6otfi stdes, and its recomnendations
were not acopted 6.y the corr~and. Tfie defense law wh~cFi Fu'ad 8utrus refused to sign
( thus resigning from the ministry~, divides the 3rmy into tive armies and the com-
ma:nds. Gen K~uri decided to sign it for American and other "Maronite" considera-
t ions rel ated to the post-1982 stage. One sf~oul d bear i s~ m~.n.d that a del egation of
Nb slem officers went to tl~e office of t6e commander, who was a minister of defense,
a nd info rmed him tbat tbe interest of Le6anon, Christians and Moslems, required that ~
- t he la~r not be passed in the formula in w6icfi it had 6een set out. The commander's
answer was "I aln confident tE~at ~6e larv will not work, ~ut I am al so confident that
it will not pass tf?e Cham6er of Deputies."
41
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Need for One
After~the army's ideology and cause, the army first and foremost requires weapons
which enable it to confront its domestic and foreign adversaries. Here it is neces-
sary to establish two facts. First, t[~e former prime minister, Dr Salim al-Huss,
more than once abstained from signing any contract whatever for the purchase of
heavy arms for the army, 6ecause he was not convinced of the structural soundness
of the military institution. One should 6ear in mind that the government approved
3 billion pounds for rear~nament in 1978. He also refvsed repairs for the French-
manufactured I~irage aircraft, w~ich one s6ould 6ear in mind was rising 30 percent
in cost annually. T6e second fact is t6at tbe Lefianese aut6orities "put all their
eggs" in the United States 5as[cet; it 6appened tfiat Giashington donated very modest
suros for the purcf~ase of ~eeps, rifles, truc~s and ptstols for officers, while the
militias and organizations bave four tiroes tFie fieavy weapons that the Lebanese army
- is armed with.
For example, the militias have Soviet tan[cs ~vtt~ long-ra.nge artillery C122 and 130
millimeter~ and roisile launc~ers ~Grads and Katyus~asl. They also possess heavy
British tan[cs (~hic~ t6e PE~alange used in tfie 6attle of Qanat against the Syrian
arroy~ and heavy and l.tght macfiinery. In every encounter between the army and the
- militias, the victorf goes to tfie stronger party, above and beyond supremacy in the
type and quantity o-i arms. Tfien t~e internal composit~on of tGe army is weak. An-
_ other ~natter is t~at the com~at conduct of t[~e army is military conduct, whiie the
militas permit themselves conduct wfiic[~ no milftary tradition or law whatever would
approye, which is related to guerrilla war. ~I~.ile t6~e po~cer of the state is con-
nected dtrectly to t~e po~cer of t~e. arlay, any "state" can arise 4n the midst of
the nuroer�o.us "states" of the mil ittas: ~
_ If to all these consideratjons we add t~e point t8at Isreal is standing watching
every movement the Le6anese army taa[ces, we can understand 't6E difficul ty of this
ar~oy's tas(cs. It is no secret tfwt Isreali artil~ery struc[c at the army heading
south via al-Biqa' on 1 August 1478 and struc[c at it ag~in on t~ie coastal road in
early swomer 1479.
Strategies
It is natural that confiicting strategies s6nuld coincide on one issue in Lebanon, -
in spite of tfueir differences, and t6at is the rejection of t6e arrpy. It is the
interests of the United States, or tbe "Kissinger game," that a peace should be set
out in the Middle East wbich will 5e suitable for Isreal.
Isreal's interest lies in having the Palestinians a6andon their identity and their
demands in Palestine and assume an alternate country and alternate identity in
Lebanon, where the factional atmospf~ere wfiic6 tbe intell.igence services created
before 1~75 encourages the growth of what is 6y cf~ance called "Palestinian author-
ity" in sout6ern Le6anon.
Returning to the American position, one can wonder: how can Washington arm the
Lebanese army ~vhile it is trying to apply the Camp David agreements, which state
that the Palesttnians should fie left where tf~ey are? Is it reasona6le that the
United States give t6~ Le~anese army weapons wit[~ wfiicE~ it can defend the unity
of Le6anon?
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Isreali strategy is not based on the establtstwent of the Lebanese army; rather, it
is antithetical to t~e Le6anese military institution. Isreal's interest lie in
keeping tf~e Lebanese state weak so tf~at tbe Palestinians will seem like a"state"
in Lebanon. On tE~e pretext of removing tbe "Palestinian danger" and "protecting''
the Christians of Lebanon, Isreal advanced to the l~nes it reached in 197a - that
is, to the al-Lttani River, to esta6]isE~ a new buffer zone on its borders. The
Christian militias have benefited from Kissinger's sc6eroe, and, in the absence of
the state and t~e arroy, fror~ t6e course ofi tE~e ~illigerent parties allied against
Lebanon, in o~^der to expand the scope of tf~eir dominance over an area which has come _
to constitute a firoad 6ase for tF~e Pbalange "statelet." Wf~en the chapters of the
conspiricy are completed if t6ey are destined to 6e completed the Le6anese
~ state, tn its c.urrent form, will E~ave reacf~ed the state of nonP.xistence.
W~11 the Lehanese Arlay survive? -
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
11887
CSO: 4802
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~ -
LEBANON
,
CHRISTIAN LEADER CALLS FOR NATIONAI UNION, PEACE
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Ara6ic 5-11 Dec 80 pp 21-2g .
/Article by Fl orence Ra'd: "Bashir al-Jumayyil Talks to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI: The
Arabs Must Not Brtng Us To a State of Apostasy"~
~ /Tex~ I met with Shaykh Pierre al -Jwoayyil, comoander of the Le~anese Forces, at
the hal ange ~car council , I toet [~tm ~6en .I ~tent into t6e council., and f~e al so ar-
_ rived at once, 6~y huosel f, driytng fiis green ~lerce~ies car, approaching with a smil e
~ and shorten~ng tf~e procedure for enter~ng ~.~s "castl.e."
Shaykh Pterre's conyersation was less yiolent and ~pore conciltatory to the Le6anese
' Mosle~ns tban hts preyious ones.
Shaykh Pterre was arixious that tEue comrersat~ton he in ~r~tt.ng,, gtv~ng a lack of ttroe
' as a reason, but I talked ~[~tfi.fiitD a little alongstde t~e ~rrftten canversat~on ~hile
he ~as contemplating tELe cedars engrayed on copper ~cfi tt~e Phalange Party was pre-
paring to place on tfie platform to cele5rate tfue 44t~.anntyev~sary of t6e P~alange.
~ Tbe r~rttten questions I presented to fii~ ~ctended from f~tstoric docuroent, the army
; and taxes to t[ie. fifth. 6asin in tfie port of Hetrut and t~,e il l igal har6ors w~tc~.
' said fie f?ad closed to Isfeal i occnpat~on in tfie sovth. S6ayKfi Pierre chose the
: questtons ~e preferred to answer and left niaoerous otfiers unanswered. Among the
: fonoer questtons, for ~nstancey was one w6icb asked:
i
~ ~"In your statements you have always put emp6asis on the Palestinian and Syrian occu-
pattons and have not 6een content to ~a1k, even tndirectly, a~out the Isreali occu-
patton ~n t~e soutf~, an occupat~on ~rhtc~ has ta[~en over sources of water on Lebanese
territory and some day will ntb6le away at Lebanese territory, ~~t 6y b~t. I am re-
peating t6~s question 6ecause you say tbat y~ou are ext~nding tf~e hand of dialogue to
; the Le6anese Moslems: 6ow can t6ey reach out to sbake your hand if you do not con- -
demn tf~e Isrealt occupatton?'
i
Shaykh Pierre answered by wondering,
i
~ "Daes that mean tbat you consider it an occupatton?"
;
~ When I told h~m:
; "Of course I consider it an occupation."
~
,
I
I
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He replied,
"I consider that I would have done what Sa'd Haddad has done in the south had I been
crammed down t6ere. Now I say, wf~en Sa'd Haddad can send E~is son or his wife to a
medical clinic tn Beirut, w6en the pupils on t~ie 6order strip can go to the Lebanese
University in Beirut, when they 'tear the Palestinians away from our skies,' then w~:
will see!"
Those Who Tal k~ritE~ Us Wil l Kil i Us
When I asked him ahout t~tw among tf~e ~1osl e~ps r~oul d tal k, he repl ied, _
"I cannot venture into t~ese details nov~, b.ecause t6e f~estern section is under occu-
pation. Wf~en t~ey pr esent the people w~o will talk witb us, t6ey will describe them
as they have descri~ed otfiers [~esides t~ero."
I went on to tell ~im,
"In a previous staternent, you offered an invitatton to a dialogue. At that time,
the al -Murab.~itun radio repl ied t6at tfiey ~toul d not reacfi out to shake the hand of
anyone cooperating ~fth Isreal
Here Shaykh Pierre hecauoe excited and said,
"Who asked them to extend their hand or not extend? F~ve years have gone by, the
country is on fire, a nd we are still playing with words."
When I reviewed the "~[ritten conyersation," I folind t6at Sfwykh Pterre al-Jwoayyil
answered one c}uestion i~y sayi,ng, "Nauoe me tfie parties ~tfiic~. 6ave been l~quidated."
I tol d ~11a :
"In the sixties, the tripartite alliance emerged, consisting of Camille Chamoun, -
Raymond Iddab and Pierre al-Juma,.yyi1. However, it 6roke up after the president~al
elect~ons. In the Le6anese war t~e Le6anese Front was formed by Sulayman Franjiyah,
Camiile Chanaun and Pterre al-Jumayyil, in addltion to some small organizations such
as the Cedars Guard, the organization and young people of al-Bash Marun, and we heard
the Brtgade of Offerers, the Brfgade of al-Maradah and so forth. Today, we find that
t6e first party rvFiich 6as 6een liquidated or paralyzed is the Natinnal Bloc Party;
then a d~vorce and estrangement 6as occured between you and President Franjiyah,
the people from Zagbarta 6ave witbdrawn and liquidations have taken place; then
fighting has started 6etween tbe P~ialange ar~d th~ Li6erals in numerous areas.
Shaykh Pierre replied,
"Are you trying to say that all these parties were liquldated? The National Block
Party still exists, president Franjiyah's party still exists, and the saroe with the
Nat~onal Li~eral Party."
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i
~ 50 Gangs Have Become the Lehanese Resistance
i I asked him:
"What has happened to pluralism, as a result of the unification of the rifle?"
i He answered,
"There use to ~e 50 million gangs and today we fuave a single force, the Lehanese
resistance."
In the course of talking a~out tfie Phalange and tf~e position of Arab officials re-
garding tfiat ~e said,
~ "They are all competing over the pt~alange. Prestdent Mwar al-Sadat, wtw at the be-
gtnning of the r~ar said 'Tatce your 6ands off Le6anon and ma[ce an understanding with
- the Phalange,' today is accusing Pierre al-Jwoayy~tl of trying to esta~lish a Christian
state and suppo rting t6e Copts of Egypt. President Hafiz al-Asad, who emerged as an
exceptional P6alange ally after the 2-years' war, iaunc~ed a war of extermination
against tf~e p~alange 2 years ago and accused it of fielping tfie Moslem Brothers. Col
Mu'aminar al -Qadfidfiafi, ~rfi.o bas perpetrated the ugl iest pol tttcal and mi 1 itary crimes
against t[~e P6alange and t~e Cfiristians in Le6anon, did not f~esitate recently to
acknowledge ~~s cri~nes and call for a dialogue, alt6ougfi 6e accompanies the appeal
- for a djalogue witfi anotfuer appeal, to a6andon CE~ristianity and embrace Islam. Their
s~tuatjon ~ts ~rierd, TE~ey excha.nge roles of pratse and condemnatton, ~n stag~s."
S6ayk~. pierre al-Jwaayyil refused to express ~is opinion on the llth Ara6 summtt c~n-
ference. He also did not r~ant to ela6orate on dtscussion afiout the Lebanese army,
' beyond ~chat he fwd repl ied in tfie wrttten dtal ogue. He al so tnsisted ~in denyi,ng the
r~unors brlitted a6~ut concerning tf~e p~alange's readtness to declare a Maronfte state
or create alte~rnatiye condittons to tfie LeSanese state, saying,
i "There is ~o ~istoric document. For tf?ree montF~s they 6ave 6een tal ki.ng a6nut such
; a document, fwt t[~ere is nothing of t6e kind."
; L~ebonon Where?
~ After that, the oral conversation moyed on to the written one. The ftrst question
was on h~s appraisal of the future of Le6anon 5 years after t6e Le~anese events. He
rep'ied,
"The future of Lehanon is contingent on ~he form tfie Le6anese aspire to. If they can
negotiate over t~e 6est solutions and formats which are in keeping with their socie-
ties and give every one of t6eir 6odies t6e freedom and security they aspire to,
; they wi~il have tfie Le6anon tfiey want. However, ~if the Palesttnian-Syrian dominance
; continues to bloc[c tE~e will of ~6e Le6anese l~loslems, o6struct them and prevent a con-
' cord ~rith tf~e Le6anese Christians, t6is future will be uncertajn. However, I am con-
~ fident that the Le6anese must meet in a wholly free atroospf~ere to choose the future
- ; tE~ey want."
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lQuestiof Rwnors are proliferating about a single-party dictatorship and the uni-
fication of the rifle. To what extent are these rumors valid, especially following
the successive liquidation of t he parties?
Second
LAnswe~ First, name me the pa rties that have been successively liquidated. t _
we icnow the source of everyt6ing tE~at f~as been said in tf~is regard and its purposes.
Everything that President Chaunoun has declared, and everything happening on the
ground, prove that we are in the vanguard of Le6anese who reject any f~rm of dicta- _
torshtp whatever. Democracy can 6e remedied only 6y more deroocracy that is what
we are striving for.
As for the other measures r~hich have ~een aimed at organtzing t he ranks of the com-
batants in the Le~anese resistan~e, purging t6em and unifying t~em, they are neces-
- sary and understood. Our proof of tbat is t6e psycf~log~cal and security relaxation
~n our areas, total support for everyt6ing that bas happened, and the termination e`
the cr~s~s following the final agreement wbich was made in the Lebanese Front on 19
Noverober 1980.
/~uestio~ T~e events of 3' July took place under t6e slogan of an end to smuggling -
Fave you put an end to these activities? Have your groups 6een successful in com-
bating gambl tng? Is t~iere proof?
/AnsweJ As I~oted in the previous answer, tbe 7 July movement is going far beyond
what is contained in tbis question. However, as regards sruuggl~ng, gamhling and the
- like, you have only to visit our areas and see for yourself what the real state of
1 ife there is.
/QuestioJ What is your opinion about the new cahinet?
LAnswer/ Before, during and after t~e format~on of t[1e ca~inet, I explicitly stated
more tFwn once that ~te, as a Lebanese a^esistance, are not concerned with this su6ject,
As for tE?e future, olir yie~t of th{s governtoent, 1 ik~ otfie~^s 1 ike ~it, 6efore and stnce,
r~ i l l d e p e n d o n i t s p o s i t i o n s a n d its frank actions to 1~6erate tf~e country from the
two occupattons, the Syrian and t6e Palestinian ones, and participation in sett ing o~�.
the rules on t~htch tE~e future Lebanese politica1 comnunity will be based.
A D~alogue with Mosco~
L~uestioJ What is the goal in the meettngs you held wit~ the Russian amhassador in
Be~rut? Some people say tf~at you tr~ed to dispel t6e cold, or at least open an addi-
tional line to Moscow.
_ LAnswe~ .I have a cause. I am striving to achieve it with all the determination
and capabllity I possess. I am seeki.ng support for it from every horizon ~vhich can
provide this support. My Anly condition is that there ~e no restrictions or con-
d~tions whatever tnfrtnging an my cause.
In this spirit, far from any interiority complex ~xhatever, I~roeet with the Russian
am6assador, as T meet wit6 otf?ers, and I present my cause to the whole worl.d.
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~Question% What is your appraisal of Arab-Phalange relations?
i LAnsweJ If the Arah world wants to continue violating the spirit of the Charter
of the League of Arab States, and if it continues its very serious ulterior motives
which are working to Islamize Le6anon under slogans w61ch are on the surface national
and democrattc 6ut r~fiose tnner spirit are not f~idden to us at a11, Ara6-Phalange
relations, and consequently Ara6-Le6anese relations, will remain tense and the peo- -
. ple bear~ng the 6.anner of extremism in t~e Ara6 world wtll increase tf~eir enmity
toward us and Lebanon. We have told tf~e Ara6 world, and repeated t~is statement
hundreds of times: respect our identity and our independence, respect our dis-
tinct~ve features and our ri~~t to freedom and security, and respect our exist-
ence ttwt will he 6est for us and for you. ~inarever~, t~ey are s~�il~ prac~eding
with their erroneous conceptions.
Above and 6eyond that, Lebanon so far has relled on Ara[~ solutions to its crisis.
What has the reslil t~een? T[ie resul t fias 6een an ~ncrease in the. complexity of the
crisis and fatl~re to approacE~ a solution. qe despair of Ara~ solut~ions and the~
Ara6s must not 6ring ,~s to tbe state of aposta~y. ~
Who Arros? W[w Ftnances?
- LQuestio~ W4at are the Lebanese Front's sources of arroaments and sources of ft-
nancing?
LAnswe~ They 1~ie tn the sr~e.at, hlood, acttvtty dnd itrxn rttl l of th+e LeG~anese to
confront the chal l enge~ and oyea^come ~(t. ~
, LQuestio~ I met you a full year ago. Could you eval.uate the work the LeBanese
forces ~iaye done do~nestical l y and afiroad during t~e year?~
~nsweJ Domestical ly, and in t[~e national -pol ~tical context, the Lebanese forces
- ~ve real ~(zed t[~e un~ty of tbe. rtfle in tfie ran[cs of tfie Le6anese resistance, have
pu.rged it of sotpe of the ~tiltfi tEwt bad becoloe stuck to it, and f~ave rev~aled in the
consc~ence of tE~e reststers t6e me.aning of tE~e resistance and the vision it is seek-
ing to realize.
In the security-economi~-development context, our area has been doroinated hy security,
rela~cation and confidence. Numerous matters in the context of.transportation and ~
vttal streets and the provision of ma~or 6asic goods for t6e citizens and~factories
fiave 6een dea~ t wi th.
' In the foreign context, the Lehanese forces have conveyed the viewpoint of the Le- -
banese resistance to tfue internationa] circles t6ey haYe loanaged to get i~ contact
; and have a dialogue witf~, fill ing tfie~n in on tfie true picture of tFip two occupations,
; the Syrian and palestinian ones, wfiicf~ Le6anon, and especially tf~e Moslem group, are
suffering from. Tfie Lefianese forces fiave taCcen large steps in tfiis context, and
these circles twve begun to understand tfie Le6anese cause clearly and deeply. -
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LQuestioJ What are your views on tfie future of Lebanon, in the light of inter-
national variables?
LA~nsweJ Our experience with international varfahles has proved that no solution
can be ~mposed on us from a6road. EverytFiing that internattonal politics have im-.~ :
posed as regards Lebanon has failed because it has been opposed to what tbe Lebanese
resistance had made up its mind to do. In 1975 and 1976 tf~e variables were aimed
at having the Palestinians take tF~e place of tf~e Christians in Lebanon, and the
scheme failed. In 1977 and 1978 the variables were aimed at having Syrian decision-
makinq take the place of intrinsic Lebanese decis~onma[ctng, and tf~ey failed too.
Today, as time has ~egun to sf~o~c, ft appears tfwt the aim of th~e variahles is to
partition Lefianon. This tendency also arili fatl, 6ecause ~e want Le6anon to re~
main in its ltmits as specified in its const~itution and as internationally recog -
nized, as a country for all its ~eople w~ittwut exception.
~ LQuestio~ W~at is the goal in t6e Maronite conference hold recently in Ner~ York?
LAnswe~ The conference had no o bjectives except these which r~ere expl~icttly de-
_ clared.
- It is na tural that Lehanon should 6,e devoting importance to this conference and
that ~he conference should devote its ent~re attention to the ~natter and tltie desttna~
- of Le6anon. T[~e Maronites' relations~ip to Lebanon ts not~an ordtnary one Le6anon
has em6raced lqaronis~o and given tEie Maronites tbroug~ h.~tstory an ~invtol dbl e~ sanctu-
ar y which has allowed tfiero to su rviye, has saved tfieir freedom and dign~ty, and has
caused the Maron~tes to em6race Cfiristianity in all its depth and 6ecome t~e hope o f
Eastern Christians.
An organ~c relationship of t[iis type must prompt everyone concerned ~t~th the suhject
of the 4rtent ai~d the Middl e East to deepen h~is understandtng of tf~e real ity of what .
has, gone on there and is, going on there and its fiistory, so that it wfll ~e poss~Ib~e ,
for thein to deterroine tf~e truth and recornnend the proper solut~Ions.
A United Army and a Divided Peo ple:. �
LQuest~o~ In a speech in Kasrawan, you said "The grievous error was in permi~ttng
tbe Le6anese arloy to enter the 'Ayn a'WRw~mana~ area. How did you manage to draw
the army out and occupy its pos~tions? Wfiat are the reasons for tfie repeated clashes
wtth tbe Lebanese arroy?
J �
~The port, al -Hadath, ' l~yn al -Rur~uanah and so on . Z
_ LAnswe~ The enero~tes keep giv~ng out tendentious explanations and ~nterpretations
regard~ng our so-called en~nfity toward tbe Le6anese a rnDy. Is tt at al~ reasonable
that we should reject tfie national army?
The fact ~s:
First, the co~nders of tfLe Le6anese ar~oy tried, in a certain period, to mobtl~~ze
this army against ~illusory dangers, in~t6e Ew pe of using it for purposes w~~ich dtd
not greatly honor these comnander.s.
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Second, these co.romanders did not ~oove, hut ~aye stayed still, and so far have not set
out any plan whatever, to liberate t6e country from Syrian and Palestinian occupations.
Third, knowingly or not (.in either case ~t is a great disaster~, these commanders have
striven to achieve t~e Syrlan-Palestinian desire of dominating the free and liberated
areas under a very t6in veil of concern for legitimacy and the need to extend domi=
nance over the liberated areas, It is as i� L~tianese sovereignty is lacking among us
but is dazzling in tf~e occupied areas.
Fourth, no concern whateyer has been shown by arn~y commanders for the need to extend
the~r presence in the occupied areas and stand as an o6stacle to the terrorization,
a pantc king and mUrdering ~f Le6ar~ese ~here. ,
Fifth, the hasic weak point which t~ese commanders are still Zgnoring is t6at an army
which is united frnm the structural standpoint in not necessarily united from the
standpotnt of reality. The army, in terms of officers and soldiers, who are among
the scjons of t6is people, is suffering from wfiat it is suffering fro~n how can a -
united army emerge from a divided peopl e?
Therefore, since tE~e start of tfie crisis in 1 g75, the Lebanese anoy has shown an
o~.vious Znafiility to perfor~n tts duties. Tfiis is not 6ecause of a lack of people,
nur~b.ers, ~nateriel or mil itary expertise. Ratf~er, the reason in the verttcal
part jtion t~t~ich ~fs yiol ating its conscience. Tfierefore, it h~:.s not been abl e to
defend any area of Lebanon wfiateyer, '~yn al-Rur~ manah, western Betrut, al-Damur,
Sur, Bayt J~allat or Tripoli. Last 6~t not least, I can assert to you that we have
not fougfit the Le6anese army and do not bave tf~e intentton of doi~g so, for how can
someone figf~t ~irosel f? ~le 6ave fieen and will rema~In opposed to al l deviations in
behavior and goals, ~thatever tbey are and wfierever they ~re, over the length and
- hreadth of the country.
LQuestio~ Is tfiere a LeUanese-Lebanese dialogue? dave ycu arrived at a formli1a tn
t6is regard?
_ LAnswe~ We for our part are most prepared to enter ~nto any dialogue whatever with -
any Le6anese group whatever. We absolutely refuse to bold a dialogue with any stran-
ger w~oever who wants to appoint himself as a spokesman for any Lebanese group what- -
soever. _
pn this basis, there is a Lehanese-Le6anese dialogue. It js proceeding on an expli-~ ~
cit lin~ ~ct~icfi is entirely in agree~oent with our goals of preserving a free indepen-
dent sovereign Le6anon.
Liberation from Dominance
/QuestioJ Hor~ do you vie~t Ronald Reagan's ~ictory ~in the qinertcan presidential cam-
paign? Are you h~etting tf~at the new Aroerican a~qinistration Will bring Lebanon out
~ of its trails? Do you expect an Amertcan tnttiative ~n the Middle East as an exten-
sion of Camp David or outside of Camp David in 1981 ?
LAnswe~ I generally vie~t tfiings 6~? two criteria: f~rst, t~,e principles of the In-
ternat~onal Declaratinn of tiwnan Rigfits, and second, tbe triumpE~ of the Le6anese cause
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(whjch is at the heart of these. pr~nciplesl. ~'hen ~ al~solute1y do not l~ke to rush
to judgroent . T6e vtews wfiich t[te Leb~nese forces are concentrated on expl tctt facts
and positions.
In anot~er area, I firmly hel ieve that firinging LeSanon out of its or~deal firstly
and before all e~ se depends on the ~till of tE~e Le6anese, and nothing ls the equiva-
, lent of that, except elements ~thtcb are of raaximuro iroportance i~ causing solutions
to fail or helping speed tE~e~o up. TE~e Lebanese wi11 6e comp1emented ~n their power
~ only i f the Mosl em Lebanese take the 6istoric decision we are waiting for fror~ them,
which is tE~e will for l~b.eratton from Pal~stinian and Syrian dominance.
LQuestio~ There are peopl e rvho tal k of the "united [cingdom" plan regarding a sol u-
tion to the ~al estinian cause. Do you fiel ieve that a sol ution of the cause at the
expense of Lehanon is no longer at Zssue?
/Answe~r I consider that the Lebanese resistance is ~hat has ~ade the solution of
the paTestinian cause at trte expense of Lebanon fai.l. The resistance's continued
perseryerance and the concentration of resources for tE~is perseverance, through
the Mosl ems' support of it, wil l permanently el fminate any thought of any sol ution
at the expense of Lebanon .
- ~Questjo~ Is it trlie that the Lehanese forces have decided to open new offices
in the United States? Is tfterQ an understand1ng ~ritf~ the ne.~ Aroertcan admintstra-
~ion on opening these offices?
LAnswerT Jf the Yictory of the Lebanese cause reqLires ~pare offices for the Lehanese
forces, in the Untted States or tn otfier countr~es, t~e are ready for that, wh~ile re-
specting tfie 1 aats of tE~e country +~fiere we v~or[c and confining oursel ves to them en-
tirely.
LQuestio~ I~hen will Lehanese forces television start hroadcasting?
LAnsweJ ~lhen ~re consider that we bave co~pe to need ~it. The stattons will he the
most power~Pul tbere are, and t~e programs will 5e the ~est in terms of national
gutdance.
An Answer to Dean Iddah
/_Question% What is your vier~ abnut Dean Rayroond Iddah's statement to AL-WATAN
~CL-' ARAB~ that "A Maronite state cannot ex~st pol it~cal~~ y or econoroicall y in Le-
banon and if the Syrian forceS pull out of Le6anon suddenly ~6e alternative must be
j nternational forces , or el se tbe fjghting am~e~g Lebar,::se wil l be terri 61 e?"
~Answe~ Mr. Iddah, 1 ike so~ne peopl e, is ta[cen in ~,y tf~e fial se rumors propagated hy
enemies of the Lebanese cause. Perbaps ~de (~aye ~condered a~out the extent to which
Mr. IddaF~ ~as particfpated in spreadfng rumors of t6is [ctnd t~rough mocking posit~tons
- and statements w6ich have 6ecome unconnected to the Le6anese situation, from which
thc dean has b.een cut off for a long period. As reqards the sudden withdrawal of
the Syrian ar~oy and terriC~le fighttng among Lebanese, t6.e Le~anese wjll never frght
one anotEter tf the Syrian army really and~ truly wit~draws and if the Palestinians ,
~ ~ ~
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go back to their camps. I say that hecause the Syrians can really withdraw and wash
their hands of any intervention whatsoever in our domestic affairs, or +'.~y can
wit hdraw on the surface hut remain in practice in the gutse of al-Sa';~ah ~r the
Palestine Liberation Army.
However, if the withdrawal is illusory, and if t6e Palestinians continue to occupy
. the Lebanese territory th~y occupy, then ~t will 6e the duty of the Leba~ese resist-
ance to do r~hat its national c~onscience dictates.
/Questio~ What statement wo~Id you like to conciude your talk to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABZ
with? -
LAnswe~ Man ~ s the enerqy of ~that be does not know.
I am not amazed that the Arabs, or soroe of tliero at lea~t, are t�ktng a hostile stand
toward the Lebanese cause, e~pecially since tEie leftist-Syrian-palestinian medta,
mass~ve in resources, have to a yery large extent contri6~ted ~o forming a wayward
Ara~ pu6.1 ~c opinion. ~
I am aski.ng eyeryone, especially people responsifile for o6~ective roedia, to try to
understand our reality not throug~i enemies and conspirators ~ut through sources
, which have the por~er to proyide them wit~. tEie naked facts.
Everyone has tf~e right to arrive at t~e trut6 and Zt is the true right of everyone
not to 6e vexed in reac~.ing it.
11887
CSO: 4802
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MOROCCO
- ANALYSIS OF SAHARAN CQNFLICT' S Il~.'ACT ON COUNTRY
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MFDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 pp 33$9-3390
[Article: "The Saharan Affair Still Dominates Diplomacy and Domestic Policy"]
[Text] After tZ?e Decolonization Conmmission, the United Nations General Assembly -
on 12 November reaff irmed, by 88 votes against 8 and 43 abstentions, "the inaliena-
b].e right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence...as well
as the legitimacy of the struggle that it is carrying out to exercise this right."
Inviting the United Nations "to cooperate fully w~i.~h the OAU with a view to making
it possible for the Saharan people to exercise their right to seYf-determination -
and independence," it urgently requests Morocco "to undertake the dynamics of
peace and to put an end to the accupation of the territorq of West Sahara," as
well as to ~oin with the POLISARIO, "representative of the ;~op1e of West Sahara... ~
in undertak~?ng direct negotiations leading to ~ definitive ~~tt~a smen* of this
matter.
_I The Moroccan authorities do not conceal their disappointment; but their information
' agencies, while affirming that the New York docwnent will be ineffective and that
; the fatherland cannot again be divided, sharply criticize the countries that
rejected the Moroccan thesis. According to AL ALAM, a daily that is very close
~ to the position of the minister of foreign affairs, "most of the countries that
' supported the Algerian plan disl so as a result of tribal concepts and of borders _
imposed by colonialism. They are coimtries where the wi11 of the people is ignored,
and where a single person governs and believes he can decide the destiny of a
country and the ~ity of a people..." As for the countries that abstained, the
sa~c or~an. remarks that for the most part they have "an important stake in inter-
national policy and relations with both Morocco and Algeria. Theq are afraid to
depart from their neutrality and to impair their relaCions with one of the two par-
ties."
' Moroccan pub~ic opin ion moreover appears unsympathetic to this vote, foreseeable
since the �ailure of the Moroccan-Senegalese proposal before the Decolonization _
Camm~.ttee. It appears much more attentive to "news from the front," which during
the entire duration of the New York debates featured the heightened activity of _
; the royal armed forces and emphasized the results that they attained. The reference
in the army dispatch of the Ohoud division, which carried the heaviest weight in
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the offensive operations of that period, ends by giving the impression of a decisi~~
campaiga. Also, in various Moroccan circles, it is hoped that the mil:Itary matter
will be definitively settled in a few months, and that a political solution can
_ then take place.
After its failure in the United Nations General Assem~bly, Moroccan diplomacy shoul~i -
Iogically turn to the Organization of African Unity, which is qualified to settle
what Rabatre~,ards as a conflict between two member states, Morocco and Algeria. In
fact in Freetown it renounced the nolicy of the "~mpty chair," which had been
harmful to it; it can count on the active support of Senegal and Zaire; and, given
the progressive orientation of the partisans of the POLISARIO, any reaction of an
African country against the revolutionary dangers experienced in Africa, anq govern-�
mental change involving a more conservative orientation may be worth an additional
vote for Morocco. But experience seems to prove that it would be useless to expect
an effective action from the OAU, one way or another.
- But, according to Moroccan diplomacy, the Saharan affair depends completely on -
Algeria. In spite of the denials that have been made, everyone in Morocco is con-
vinced that cantacts have t,een made with this country, and that they have proved
to be useful. Of c~~urse one was disappointed to ascertain that the approaches did
not have ~ny effect on the debates of the 4th Commission and of the United Nati~ns
General Assembly. And, contrary to the impression that was gained as a result of
some indications in the month of October, one no longer thinks that the attitude
- of Algeria has now changed. But there is a conviction that it will, when the
military successes of the Moroccan forces make it clear to the Algerian military
- 3taff that the struggle of the POLISARIO is at an impasse. Then the Algerian
government will favor a negotiation that will make it possible to settle the Saha-
ran matter in a few weeks.
Difficulties and Party Grievances
This optimism, however, is accompanied by a fear, already frequently expressed:
namely, that the sacred union, created by thp royal desire for recovery of the
Sahara and manifested by the famous "Green March," no longer from then on having
any reason to exist, will disappear and will give way to party rivalries.
The system of democratic representation, which Morocco is very proud of, seems to
have experienced some wear and tear and manif~sts operational difficulties. The
ISTIQLAL, inheritor of the great ALLAL AL FA�SI t~~dition, an important political
factor that makes it possible for the palace to avoid *_i~e twofold outbidding of
- intransigent nationalism and of militant Islam, was allocated a number of port-
folios. This fact caused jealousy and criticism. In particular, one imputes to
it the inatiility up to now of Moroccan diplr ~acy to gain acceptance of its
point of view in the Saharan matter. In fact, Madame M~hamed Boucetta, who is
minister of foreign affairs, is also the secretary general, that is the chief
animator, of the ISTIQLAL. ~
~
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It is thus a"contradictory and shaky dip7.omacy" that the leftiat rival of the
ISTIQLA,L, the Socialiat Union of Popular Forces, denounces with vigor; this
"exaggerated pacifism would have ended by diverting even the traditional friends"
- of Morocco. A similar attitude would explain that neither at the time of the
meetings of the OAU, nor within the United Nations, did Morocco find effectizJe
support. The ISTIQLAL organs up to now have responded only with nuances, and
indirectly, because it would be difficult for them to be clearer without alluding
to directives from the palace.
The ISTIQLAL, as Madame M'hamed Boucetta confirmed when interviewed at the beginning
of November in a CARREFOUR (crossroadsJ radio broadcast, is all the same satisfied
with having agreed to participate in the democratic experience launched in
1974-1975, in spite of the imperfections of the latter. It considers that it is
a question of an "important step toward a totally democratic system." In fact,
one must not separate oneself from the govemment too long...one must be informed,
~ one must make his contribution, even a modest one..."
In the opposition, the disappointment of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces is -
now expressed openly. Its decision to participate in the municipal elections had -
won for its leaders the reproaches of many of the rank and file militants, who
doubted the possibility of~cooperating with the government, even at this modest
- echelon and in this nonpolitical sphere. Well, its weekly, LIBERATION, now
repeats the difficulties in fact encountered in the exercise of their functions by
_ the numerous municipal councils that the USFP directs totally or in part; and it
indeed appears that the situation is 3udged in an analogous manner by the locally
elected persons of the ISTIQLAL.
Contrary to the expectation of a ntmmber of these elected persons, the responsibili-
ties with which they were invested were not matched with the resources, means, and
- powers that would have made it possible for them to correctly face the situation.
In spite of the maneuvers that the USFP once again retroactively denounces wi.th
- great vigor, the opposition was sble to carry off a majority of the seats in
several important cities: Fes, Agadir, Rabat, Sale, and certain Casablanca
communities; but, either because of the enactment of new legislative or regula-
tory texts, or because of the behaviour of representatives of aut'nority, the real
_ scope o� the councils has been greatly reduced with respect to the budget and in
various other important spheres, such as the issuance of permits to build, civil
defense, and public health. Moreover, the municipal councils did not have the
personnel and the technical means needed for normal administration. Finally, since
1977, the administrators have been empowered to supervise all of the existing -
services in the provinces, which makes it possible for them to engage in unlimited
local interventions. ~
The functioning of institutions is beginning to be contested also at the parlia-
mentary level. The USFP deputies were not the only ones to protest against the
manner in which the chairman of the chamber, Dey Ould Stdi Baba, interpreted th~ -
new measures, approved in May by referendwn, which established the term of service -
- at 3 years, as being applied retroactively and with exemption fram having to comply
with re-election.
SS
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As for the great governmental party on which the government counted to balance the
political system, that is, the National Gruup of Independents, it no longer seema
- to offer all of the stability that was hoped for a short while ago; the ~uxtapo-
sition of those elected in the campaiga, who expect a more social policy, and of tt~;~
elected Uourgeois who desire a return to investments, is revealed as artificial. _
Moreover, the "bourgeois" wing of this group, which still seems to be in the
ma~ority, for financial and economic reasons desires a quick end to the costly
Saharan campaign. The independents nevertheless a short time ago had unanimously
encouraged the king to launch the expedition; but at rhat time everyone thought
that it would soon be over.
Moroccan public opi.nion in fact does not contest the principle of the "reunifi-
cation" of the Saharan provinces; but the burden of the operation appears heavy to
some, an.d if the army is the object of unanimous praise, the diplomatic conduct of
the operation seems to be contested more and more.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Mareux et Cie, Paris 1980 ~
8255
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MOROCCO
BRIEFS~
OIL SHALE--Fairies for Moroccan shale. The pro~ect for the e.xploitation of the
bitianinous shale of the Moroccan bed in Timahdit (see our most recent "I Have
_ Leazned") is arousing the enthusiasm of Arab financial institutions. "We will
: all be t.here," one of their directors confided in me. "We waat to share in this
' great 'first' for the Third World." Ths.aniticipated financial budget for the first
factory being on the order of $3 billion, alI cooperation will be welcvme. The
World Bank and OPEC fi,mds will doubtless also be creditors. So many fairies around
a cradle, even before the child is bbrn. It's a good omen for Morocco. [Text]
[Paris JEUNE AFRIQLE in French 17 Dec 80 p 35] 8255 . � . ~
MOROCCAN TROOPS IN UAE--Ttao thousand Moroccan soldiers have left for the United
; Arab Emirates under orders of Col E1 Angri. Mission: to assure the security of
, the royal family. [Text1 ['Paris JEUNE AFRIQiTE in French 17 Dec 80 p 51] 8255
CSO: 4400
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SUDAN
~
COUNTRY SAID USING U.S. INFLUENCE TO OBTAIN LOANS
~ Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARA~I in Arabic 7-13 Nov SO p 43
. /Article: "The Sudan Mediates with the White House To Obtain New Loans"/
/Text/ The Sudan is facing a stifling fiscal and economic crisis because it has
no foreign currency at the present time. International and foreign commerci~l
banks have refrained from lending to it when it began to fail to pay its debts at
� the end of 1978.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that President Ja'far Numayri talked at length with
' America's President Carter on this subject when he visited the United States last
July.
The Sudanese president asked the American president peraonally to mediate with
. American banks to reachedule the debta and give international banks, which the.
United States dominates, an incentive to offer new loans to the Sudan. -
, The American president responded to the Sudanese president's request for several ~
reasona, among them the fact that the Sudan is of great importance to Washington,
- which cannot leave the present regime there to face its destiny in a social and
economic upheaval. It also does not want the Sudan to turn to the Kremlin again
or rely totally on Arab Gulf sid, especially if the price is permanently to abandon
the Sudan's uncertain position between the proponents and opponents of Cam~ David.
The White House's silent mediation with the American banka concerned was A success. _
- They, in addition to West German banks and the Federation of Arab-French Banks,
; agreed to r~schedule Sudanese loans worth $600 million over 7 years. The transac-
. tion aleo included the offer of new loans to provide liquidity in foreign currency.
i
r
Britai~n is playing a rolesimilar to America's, since ~t is exerting pressure on
~ about 200 other creditozs to reschedule their debts through the Morgan Grenville
~ financial organization which the Sudan has suthorized financial agent. Japan and
~ the European Common Ma.rket countries agreed to reschedule Sudanese debts worth
~ $497 million last year.
i Sudanese Central Bank experts say that the Sudan must pay at least the interest on
, ita loans in order to retain a minimum of confi3ence of international banks;
~ -
~
~
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- otherwise, it will receive no new loans, including a$600-million one which the
International Monetary Fund has agreed in principle to offer it over the next
3 years.
The Sudan had paid just $1 million of itF basi.c $6Q0 million in debts Co American
and European ca~nmercial banks in ~979, and refrained from paying the inCeresic on G
these debts, which totalled $100 million last yeaY and will double this year.
The Sudan is linked to the United States by solid political bonds. It comes dire~r~
ly after Egypt in terms of the value of the aid received from Washington. Last
fiscal year, ending September, that totalled $125 million, and it is expected that
' it will reach $130 million thia year.
In American strategy, the Sudan constitutes an immense wall in the way of increas-
ing Soviet ambitions from Ethiopia north along the waters of the Nile. ~
The Sudan's importance to America increased ~fter Standard Oi1 Company of California
discovered an oilfield producing 12,000 to 18,000 barrels a day in the southwest
St~dan close to the borders of Chad. .
The causes of the current financial crisis may be attributed to the ambitious de-
velopment programs set out in the sev~nties, which were accompanied by poor agri-
cultural planning, waste, extravagance, the flight o~' manpower, neglect of cottor~
- cultivation and the problem o� the Sritrean refugees. _
The Sudanese government was cmupelled to accept the risks of an ascetic program im-
posed by the International Monetary Fund in exchange for the latest loan offered;
thia includes a program of belt tightening, reduction of the budget deficit, a halt
to luxury imports, a drop in government subsidies of the prices of son?e basic com-
modities and incentiyes for cotton growing.
The basic challenge facing President Numayri's regime is exemplified by the avoid-
ance of social and political disturbances reaulting from the pursuit of an ascetic
fiscal policy which does not enjoy popular support.
Sudanese Central Bank experts expect that the Sudan's current c~isis will continue
for a number of years, since its annual deficit ranges from $S00 to $700 million
and it needs $400 million i.n foreign aid a year.
COpYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
11887
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, TUNISIA
: .
STATE CONTROL CONTINUES TO HAMPER ECONOMY
~Paxis JEUNE AFRIQUE in ~^rench 24 Dec 80 PP 22-24
[Article by Philippe Simonnot: "Tunisia.: State Control of the Econon~y Is Not
Dea,d"]
[Text] Tunisia does not have the economic leadership it deserves.. It cannot
use its adva,ntages xisely unless thexe is extensive reform geared to economic
~ groxth. Accelerated ecanomic groxth is essential to prevent increased uriemploy-
' ment~ but it remains out of the question until governmental aims and the very
, structures of the sta,te achieve a ne~ coherence.
` 'de reached these conclusions after talking on the scerie to many Tunisiana-- -
! ministers, bvsinessmen, specialists, ba,nkers, trade union officials and
' average citizens.
With its 6 million inhabitants, ~nisia has no other choice. The Maghreb does
ttot exist economically= although Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali's recent Algerian
visit xas very timely and successflxl~ it did not cha.nge this long-st,a,nding
situation.
i
~ Tunisia must opt for a larger arena, seeking international trade and foreign
~ capital~ with a11 the res~raints that implies.
Mohamed Mza11's predecessor~ Hedi Nouira, carried out such a policy for 10 years.
= Csrtainly, it can always be said that the tax and other incentives given to
foreign investors (~'rench, mainly) to locate in Ttiinisia were too generous.
~ It can be noted that some ~irms thus attracted had problems in their own country, -
more because of their management than theix xages--considered too high--which
~ they brough~ along.
~
~ven if all this is true, there xere resultss 400,000 new ~obs created between
i 1970 and 19~0, as compared xith 132~00 during the preceding decade. In the
~ most negative assessment, these new 3obs had no more impact than if they had
~ been created in Europe for emigrants.
. .
i'
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Excessively Geiierous T'ax Incentives
This extreme assessment remains to be proven, and it nonetheless true that
. _ -
these fir~ relocated. on T~nisian soil and enabled Tunieia to learri about
induestria.li.zation. '
This induatrial.ization is ~enre durable tha~ in ~eany other comparable countries -
(Algeria, '~:~r example) becawse it ia more modeat~ more realistic aad better
- suited both to the abilities of Ttmisian ~rorkers and the intexnational economic
situa.tion. The Tunisian choice today has proven to be a].1 the more 3udi.cious
because xealthy European countries hurried, after the crisis, to shut their
doors to immigra.tion.
Tunisia's problem is tha.t this rema,rkable effort, together xith high grorrth
rates and a ~.~a,te of imrestraent close to the tolerable maXi~um, has not been
able to keep up completely xith de~ographic pressvres.
Thus~ the "Nouira decada" (1970--1980) ended, accordirig to official esti~ateso
~ith a deficit of 130~000 ,jobs. Unemployaent has risen substaatially and is
nox~ sti21 according to official sourcea, 1~.4 percent of tha ooorking population
(of.f the record., high~r p~rcentages are mention~d.)
The fliture looks even more worrisorae. Authorities predict that, during th~
_ 1980-2990 decade~ 65d,0~}0 or 65,000 people a year o~ill enter the 3ob maxket.
To p~event rising unemplayme~nt fro~ crosaing dangerous sxial and political
thresholds~ the Tunisians aust make greater efforts but at the same ti~e they
- are tired of the austerity Mr Nouira imposed for 10 y~ars. i~ioha,med Mzali 3s
exploiting this feeling perhaps ~ore than mei^e prudance xould dictate.
- ~he present talented pri~e minister, of coura~~ is not an economist and maqy
observers in Tunis fear he does no~ give economic ae,ttera the proper attention.
Decigions have been made sloxly or not at all sinoe he has been in office.
The indi~sper~usable a~ceelerat3on of eeonomie gro~th can be achieved only by
increased foxeign capital. FSrom this viexpoint, tha team of Mansour Moalla
and Abdelaziz Issr~--respective],y ainister of finaace and plan an8. ninister
of the econor~}r--is better p7.aced. than the technxrats of Hedi Nouira's time.
'bacawse they have establi.shed relationa xith the rich Arab countriee af the
Gulf .
Adainistration Is the Dead. Weight in This Country
In retrosp~ct, the Nouira tea,a has been criticized fo~ ~eing too pro-iiestern
and not sufficiently pro-Arab. Ir~deed, contarcts, talks and syaposiuma as~e
increasing betxeen ~niaians and Arab mnneylend.era, but parAdoxicaZ]y, the
present Tunisiari govern~ent still clepends more than ever on French aid.
The increase in forei.~ capital--~?hether Arab~ E`uropean or American (the latter
is very rare)__raiees a fundaeental question ~hich, if it is not forthrightly
addreased, ~ay endanger the final outcose of the efforts and sac~ificess
the Tunisian econo~yr is atill largely under the atate's eont~rol and high ranking
ofPiciala say priv~tely that "the admini.stration is the dead xeight in this
b1
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;
_ countryi" it is oamipresent and supercentralized, aieddleeome and ineffectivei
that it is high. time the atate shift responaibility for econom~c kasks to
real coap~aniea so it ma~y concentrate more on its apprnpriate sectoz~ (security~
' health and educa,tion.) If T~nisia takes the liberaZ option, for reasons
- mentiohed abov~e, then it must go all the xay in ordex not to lose acroas the
boanis .
They Are Neither Gods Nor Saints
That is the sore point. After 20 years, Z1~nisian sxislism has created
unrealistic prices f~om the viexpoint.of aarket laxs,they handicap the ~roxth
- of Tunisian f.irms. These unrealistic prices affect three areas vital to
; Tunisia's development.
The first is foo~; basic foodstuffs are sold belox cost because of costly
_ sta,te subsidies. In fact. the entire agricultural issue must be thorough ly
reviexed.
~ Tunisia has su~'fered xhat has been finally recognizeci as a common occurrence
, in developing and socialist countries--the univeraal disaster of the so-called
- . agrarian refor~s. Thus~ it is astonishing that the Orientation Rep~rt fnr
the Third Decade of Development (1980-1990)~ ~11 of very ~udicious remarks,
and put out by the Ministry of Finance and Plan in October 1980, on~y devotes
5 Pa6es to agriculture out of a total of 218 pages.
;
' Moreover, agriaulture~ Which still employs al.~ost half of the xorking population~
is onl allocated 1 .6
Y 3 percent of the investments iri the Sixth Pla,n estimates.
~
~ It is even more disappointing sirice the first pa~t of the report clearly
' criticizea the draxbacks of "cooperative dea,d x~ight xhich deals a sev~ere blotr ~
to socialism and democracy."
We can even read: "The traditional, classic concept of coopera,tion is based
on genernus, but incorrect, ineffective ideas as long as men are men and not
gais or sainf:s:"
. The second area is energy: consumer prices hav~e lagg~ed far behind the ~
internationa]. evolution. This explains the Kild gro~th in consumption and in
energy-inefficient industrial installations. Stagna~ing petroleum production
; may cause Tunisia to becom,e an importer of hydrocarbons by 1985. This reversal -
' xould be very difficult to take. It can be clearly seen ttaat until now, the
~ Tunisian econonqr ha,s been favored and propelled by the successive increases in
; the price of black gold, since it Kas a net exporter of petroleum. Unless
; there are nex, sizable discoveries~ the hi
; gh price of petroleum irill soon xork
` against Tunisia~ Hhich really does not need this additional handicap.
Tunis Could Repla,ce Beirut. But... -
; -
Finally, money is the third area Mhere prices are unrealistic: interest ra~es
~ are relatively lox because the money market is cut off from the outsid.e xorld
~ ~
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by exch~nge controls and the nonconvertibility of the dinar. This causes
several inconveniences: savin~ is inadequately re~rarded, xaste is enca~uraged
because profits on investmen~s cannot be calculated aa3 Tunisian capital
leaves the country ~raudulently because of exchA.nge controls while foreign
capital is not encouraged to come in, Khich is the direct opposite of
governmental policy. -
The authorities are aKare of this con~r~.ciiction. Rowever, they h~,ve not
decided to resolve it (See the remarks ~f Minister Moa,l7..~, in "Jeune Afrique,"
issue 10'~5.) According to a high-ranking official of the Ministry of the
Econon~yr~ they feel that ending exchange contmis mould result ir: a run on
foreign curr~ncy which.in a sin~le stroke xould deplete the reserves of the
central baxik. "We do not I~ow hox much capital the French have here." ~ae
explained to us, "and Ne fear they xould take thfs opportunity to send large
amounts of money back to F~ance." Nevertheless, as long as Tunisia with its
nonconvertible dinar seems like a snare for capital, it cannot expect the
- indispensable fina.ncial contributions f~om abzroad.
After 20 years of state-controlled econo~r~ it ie not easy to refor~ the money .
and other unrealistic prices~ even for man who cla,i.m to make the 1980-1990
- decade the "decade of reforms." Z'he au~horities feel the Tunis~an econon~y is
"like a child" xho ntust be protected until he reaches maturity. This overly
paternalistic governing style may not truly correspond to the country's stage
- o.f development. It is possible that valuable oppo~tunities are passed up.
We xill give only one example: an international fiziancial p].~ce is needed to
replace Beirut; Tunis could re~,sona,bly be a contender if the dinar Kaa
convertible.
To mak~e true reforms~ the governmental team mus~ be bolder and have more
authority. It is not so much the ~embers of Mzali's cabinet who ate called
into question but the current Tunisian political structure and ita obvious
archaism. _
COPYRIGHT: Jeune A_~'riqus GRUPJIA 1980
9,~+79
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