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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ~01`LY JPRS L/9514 30 January 1981 Sub-Saharan Af rica Re ort p - FOUO Na. 706 FBIS FOREIGN SROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 NOTF. JPRS publications contain intormation prima.rily from foreign - newspapers, periodicals an~ books, but also from news agEncy transmissicns and broadcasts. riaterials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line ot each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original informa.tion was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was s~.immarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are - enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the bo~?y of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OW~IERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION QF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL,Y~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 = JPRS L/9514 _ 3~ ~anuary 1981 SUB-S~HARAN AFRICA REPORT . FOUO No. 706 CONTENTS INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS - Diplomatic Success~ Financial Dieappointment of SADCC ~ (MA,'tCHES TROPICAUX AT MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Dec 80) 1 ~ Reaulte of SADCC Maputo Conference RevYew~d (Pierre Clary; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 22 Dec 80-4 Jan 81) 4 Sudan Hosts Inter-African Trade Sympoeium ~SUDANOW, Dec 80) 6 Japanese Trade With Africa Detailed (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 19 Dec 80) 8 African Countries Concerned About Libyan Role in Chad (Mohamed Selhami, Abdelaziz Barouhi; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 3 Dec 80) 19 Chadian National Feeling Against Libya Ariaing - _ (Christian Grain; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 3 Dec 80) 23 Revitalization of North-South Dielogue Reported (Jean-Claude Lucae; MARCHES TROPICAUX AT MEDITERRANEENS, - 5 Dec 80) 25 Reportage on Lome I Projects _ (MARCF~ES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Dec 80) 29 International Cocoa Accord Examined (Editorial; MARCHES TROPICAIJX FT MEDITERRANEENS, 28 Nov 80) 31 Briefs Progressive Forces Grouping 34 - a- ~III - NE & A- 120 FOUO] FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 axco~.a West Advieed To Abandon HosCile Attitude (Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 19 Nov 80) 35 New Equip~nent, Improvementa for Benguela Railroad (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS, 5 Dec 80) 37 Briefe USSR Agricultural Cooperation 39 BENIN Unrest Within Labor Groups Examined ~ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Dec 80) 40 CAPE VERDE Country Suited to New Energy Sources Research (Augusta Conchiglia; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 10 Nov 80) 42 ~'ciefs A.gricultural Production Down 44 BADEA Fisheries Development Loan 44 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CCCE Aid to Transporty Infrastructure, Telecoc~unicatione Reported ' (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 Dec 80) 45 Briefs Bokassa Aides Quit ~ 47 Release of Oppoaition Membera 47 CHAD Habre Considered Capable of Continuing Guerrilla War Against Goukouni (Christian Hoche; L'EXPRESS, 22 Nov 80) 48 Briefs New Chad Flighta 50 CONGO Briefs Cabinet Deciaiona 51 French Financis~g ~reement 51 West German Sent~~nced 5! - b - _ FOR OFFICIAL USE QNLk APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE C . EQUATORIAL GUINEA French Economic Aid Noted ~ (JEUNE AFRIQDE~ 26 NoV 80) 52 GABON Data on Current, Projected Statua of Tranagabonese Railroad (MARCHES TROPICAUR ET 1~DITERRANEENS, 5 Dec 80) 53 Brazilian Ambassador Diacusses Future Cooperation (Joao Areias Neto; MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS, 28 Nov 80) 55 GUINEA-BISSAU Briefs Commisaions Formed 56 IVORY COAST Struggle for Succesaion to Presidency Discussed (Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 3 Dec 80)......... 57 Houphouet's Stand on Cocoa Price Assessed (Philippe Simonnot; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 24 Dec 80).......... 60 MAL I Briefs Difficult Economic SituPCion 62 SENEGAL Preaident's Office Defende Treatment of Mamadou Dia (Djibo Ka; JEUNE AFRIQUE~ 3 Dec 80) 63 F'ower Struggle, Poasible Increased Authoritarianiam Expected (Mariam Sysle; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 22 Dec 80-4 Jan 81) 65 ~ Reaction of Opposition to Senghor's Resignation Noted - (Siradious Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQIIE, 17 Dec 80) 68 Oppoaition Attempting Joint Action Against Abdou Diouf (Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQOE, 17 Dec 80) il Briefe Dakar Job Criais 74 " SIERRA LEONE Diacovery of Large Gold Deposi~s Eapected To Aid Aconoury , (Carlos Moore; JEUNE APRIQIIE, 26 Nov 80) 75 ~ - c - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 TANZANIA BADEA Road Conetruction, Realignment Loan (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERItANEENS, 21 Nov 80) 77 Briefe Electric Power Rationing 79 Yugoslav Agricultural Aid 79 Swiea Road Network Aid 79 Afforestation Campaign 79 Additimnal Netherlanda Aid ~ 79 UGANDA Eyewitnesa Accounts of Mini-Invaeion; R.efugee Statistice (SUDANOW, Dec 80) 80 UPPER VOLTA New Leadership's Ability To Rectify Itls Examined (Ginette Cot; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 22 Dec 80) 83 Lamizana'a Downfall Anticlimactic (Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 3 Dec 80) 99 Labor Unrest Preceding Recent Coup Diecuased (Ginette Cot; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 8 Dec 80) 91 - d - ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS, FINANCIAL DISAPPOINZ2~NT OF SADCC Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 5 Dec 80 p 3363 [Article: "Contacts Made at Maputo Conferenee Augur Well for the Future"] [Excerpts] The Southern African Development Coordination Confer~nce (SADCC) did not produce those resulte expected by its member couatries--Angola, Botswana, ~ Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe--who had invited prospective aid donors to meet with them ia the capital of Mozambique on ~6~28 November. Although this meeting was firta~ci811y disappointing, the large number of foreign , delegations present did make it a diplomatic euccess. In fact, 30 couutries and _ 18 international agenciea sent repreaentatives toMaputo in response to invitationa from Botswana which chaired the conference. The conference's final communique revealed that initial pledges of financial assist- ance obtained from internatianal lending agencies amounted to 650 million dollars over the next 5 years. The 97 tranaportation and communicatione project~ submitted � by the nine African co~mtries amounted to nearly 2 billion dollars. But a certain number of governments and development agencies announced they intended to furnish additional funds in the near future. It should be emphasized that the conference did not meet, after all, to establish an organizatian for waging war against the Republic of South Africa. Ztioae SADCC countries bordering on the latter were more reluctant than the other SADCC countries to face the more or less dangerous effects open hostility to the Republic of South Africa could have on Cheir economy. HenGe they sought rather to show that they - were a significantly powerful force and that Southern Africa was not limited just to the Republic of South Africa. From this standpoint, the Maputo conference, as a vast public relatione operation, was a success whose long-range consequences are still difficult to perceive. Dialogu~y~Tith Europe - Noteworthy, however, is the current strengthening of ties between the EEC an~d the ~outhern African "Nine," despite Mozambique's--the conference's host country-- refusal to sign the Lome Convention. 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 Because of this reluctance, Angola and Mozambique cannot benefit directly from moneys allocated to the EDF [European Development Fund) for the Southern African region as a whole: at least 100 million dollars under Lome 2, and actually pro- bably more because Tanzania is not part of the southern region as defined by the EEC. Yet Angola and Mnzambique will derive some indirect advantages from Lome 2 inasmuch as they are the natural outlets to the Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean for the region's six landlocked countries. Cheyason pointed out that the EEC wa~ participating, for example, in the initial phase of [he reconstruc[ion of Angola's Benguela railroad~ the shortest route to the sea for Zaire's Shaba Province and Zambia's copperbelt. Under the terms of this participation, the EEC is to furnish rolling stock and maintenance ser- vices to Zaire and Zambia, members of the ACP community, to which the EEC is linked by the Lome agreements. Cheysson told the AFP that thie rolling atock obviously will not atop at the border. The European co~nissioner slso acknowledged that some difficulties did exist between the Federal Republic of Ger~any and Angola and Mnzambique because of the _ special ties these two African countriea have with the German Democratic Republic. Cheysson called *his a"bilatera2" problem. The AFP reported that despite the few reluctant feelings these difficulties may have aroused on both sides, European diplomatic circles still conaider the dialog opened in Maputo between Europe and Southern Africa as "being a good model" for North-South relations. A Positive Response From France France was represented at the SADCC by Olivier Stirn, its aecretary of state to the minister of foreign affairs. Stirn explained that Paris would respond in positive fashion to the appeal of the Southern African "Nine." The minisCer made no mention of any epecific French financial assistance for the 97 pro~ects submitted. These _ projecta will be assigned to experta for detailed study. He did state~ however, that the cost of programs initiated or planned b~~ France in Southern Africa over the past 18 months totaled nearly 1 billion French francs. It will be recalled that a series of financial protocols were recently signed or are being negotiated with Tanzania, Mozambique~ Malawi, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. The Central Fund for Economic Cooperation is also now authorized to finance opera- tions in Angola and Mozambique. The French secreta.ry of state also noted the initiative taken by France jointly with Belgium, Canada, the United States, the FRG and the United Kingdom to establish a framework for "concerted action in behalf of development in Africa." In fact, an ad hoc committee met in Bonn early thia year to discuss rail tranapor- tation in Southern Africa. In concluding his remarks, Stirn said that France wanted to see this region of the globe "complete its liberation." He mentioned similarities between European and Africana in their collective approach to problems. 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 The Fr~nch secretary of state was received on 26 November by President Samora Machel with whom he discussed Southern Africa's ~rospects. It may be recalled that Mozambique's foreign minister made an official visit to Paria a few months ago. COPYRIGHT: Rene More ux et Cie Paris 1980 8041 CSO: 4400 3 FOR OFPIC~AL USE ONL~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 rvn vrr~~.~r~t, uoe. Vl\Ll INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS RESULTS OF SADCC MAPUTO CONFERENCE REVIEWED _ Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 22 Dec 80-4 Jan 81 p 31 [Article by Pierre Clary: "Ob~ective 90"] [Excerpt] The conference held in Maputo on 27 and 28 November was exceptionally well attencied: indeed, the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) gathered a large spectrum of representatives from various countriea and international organizations. This conference, which was prepared by the 9 coun- tries of Southern Africa, was a reault of the recomm~endationa of the Lusaka con- ference, held last April. These countries were joined by Western countries, the _ EEC, Japan, India, Brazil, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the African Devzlopment Bank, the Arab Bank for the Economic Development of Africa, the COMECON... The SADCC is requesting the establiahment of a regional center for research on soil conservation, s3nce the only existing one is in South Africa. Within the next few mcnths, Zimbabwe will organize a meeting to implement the regional pro- gram for food security. In the industrial field, a conference will be held in Dar es-Salam at the beginning of 1981 to review regional poasibilitiea and to evenCually favor trade agreementa between the varioua countriea; however, it seems certain as of now that the establishment of a free-trade zone will not be retained. Within the first 6 months of 1981, Angola will organize a technical conference on energy. Aa for Zambia, it is scheduled to organize, also in 1981, a regional conference on financing problems, and an institute for the study of regional projects financing might be established as well; it is not likely that an institution such as a development bank may be chosen. Finally, regional training poseibili- ties will be reviewed at a conference organized by Swaziland. What were the immediate reaults of the Maputo conference? Of the 2 billion dollara representing the totality of the pro~ects for the next 5 years, 650 million have been obtained. Another 400 million will be granted by the African Development Bank and 100 million will be provided by the EEC within the frame- work of the Lome II agreement; the OPEC apecial fund and the Scandinavian coun- tries will also make a contribution. ~l FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 The diacussions on financial pledges highlighted the reservations felt by certain countries. Thus, the EEC stipulates that its contribution should not finance investments in Mozambique and Angola since these two countries do not subscribe to the Lome agreement. Nevertheless, the infrastructures defined within a regional framework would mostly benefit the exchanges of landlocked countries which have signed this agreement. At present, this important basic ~ issue has not been solved: it denotes, however, the true nature af the Lome agreement, which is not as disinterested as some hav~ claimed. Other Western countries, such as the United States, have not promised anything: doubtlessly, financial aid from these sources will only be granted if it is aecertained that setting up a regional economic force k~ll not threaten their own investments in South Africa or this country's vital interests. COPYRTGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie CSO: 4400 5 FOR OFFfCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 L~UK Ur'1'1l:lAL U~C UNLY INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS - ~UDAN ROSTS INTER-AFRICAN TRADE SYI~OSNM I~artoum SUDANOW in Engliah Dec 80 pp 13, 14 [Text ] Forterirrg tke developn~ent oJ intm- trade so as to redua the importation Afilcan trode, idPntifying its pnsent &am abroad of goads produced on the undequacies ~ed ncon?mendirrg appra continent. Juan F. Laub, iTC advisor - pr(oK tdW~ions ?+rnr the tha,re: oj the with ECA, empha~ised the necessity of rrctnr lnrnr,AJtican 7tiade symposiwn organising exports on the national level. lxld !n eo+t/unetion wlth the cunent placing particular suess on the creation 71rbr! All-AJNca Fa/i. O?janLted !n co!� in every African natlon of a specialisad - bbo~don wrth the OAU, tht Economic corporadon de~gned to promote export Conuntssfon ojAfsica (ECA/, ti~e lnter- trade. Hashim el Berir, chairman of the ncNr.ncl ?lrndt Centre (/TCJ, Sudarr- Sudanese Exporters Union, spoke about apo, and tlre Sridane,te Ministry oj tt?e wosk of his organiration and Abdel Co~opemtion, Commerce and Supply Rahim Mohamed Abdel Rahim of the _ m~d attended by moro than 60 npre- M~istry of Cooperation, Commerce and senratives oj African nadons, the rym� Supply discusud the government's posba~n wnt grven added impormnce by perspective on the problems of devetop- the active participation of Afiican busi- ing Sudan's export sector. _ nestmen and bankert. ~Vvgi Sdiene Boulis w+as also in attendance and f~led Considerable attention was devoted to dris report. the uses of trade fairs as a stimulus to - ex~.~ort growth and to the issue of ~S HOST, Sudan was elected to chair spreading trade-related information the symoosium, with Seneg~l throughout the continent. Mr Mustafa, occupying the position of vicechairman deputy d'uector of Sudanexpo, and Kenya serving as rapporteur. infortned the audience of thc prepara- Ahmed Salim, Sudane~e State Minister tions for the Thicd All-Africa Fair and ' ofCo-operation, Commerce and Supply, stressed the value of both general and welcomed the rymposium participants specialised fairs. He was followed by and expressed the hope that the R.H.C. Hammad, ITC Trade Fair _ gathering would turn its attenti~n to the Advisor in Sudan. who called for an task of implementing the Lagos Plan of evaluation of the impact of the fair on Action (see Sudanow, lune). His intro- the commercial deals that ue concluded ductory speech was followed by the ~etween busir+essmen in attendance. brief remarks of the Commissioner- Farid H. Nawas, lTC rep~esentative in Cene~~l of the Third Al!�Africa Trade Sudan~ propagated the new, non-tradf- Fair and Director-General of Sudan- tional African exports and urged that expo, Rtd. Brigadier Sayed Omer they be fostered as a means uf earning Mohamed Saeed. the hard currencies that� the continent Symposium discussions concentrated so badly needs. He emphasised the on the problems of development and necesaity of estabiishing jointexpo~t the prospects for expamling intra- marketing groups for these new Af~ican trade. Puticular att~ntion was products. Abdd Gadir Mansour. from paid to the role of the Assc~ciation Sudan Commercial Bank, spoke abcut of Afrkan Tra~le Promotiun Organisa- the financial dit~"~culties entailed in tions (AATk'0), the wcxk� of which intca-African trade, stressing the was describrd by Demeke Gewolde, importance uf seeking practical solu- Felix Mosha, repreyenting the ECA, tions so as to promote Africa's calle~ for the expansion of intr�r-African prosp~cts. Candida David, ITC TraJe 6 FOR OFFYCIAL USE OI~II,Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 = FOS OFtrICIAL IISE ONLY Informatioa adviaor in Sudm, informed African tiade. st well u increasing the audisnce zbout the conditioas and to export credit~guaianta _ roqu~dta fc~r establi~ing succxsiful trade informadon md doc~muntation e) The loag term soturion to t?.ie ' clarfig and payments problem should Recommendstiau aen made in six be tha establishment of an intra-African aress of cancera to the sympo:ium T~~ g~, ~e ahon~term wluaon to - participants. this problem should be the establlsh- Firrtly, t.hat OAU and ECA should ~t of b~lateral rxipra~l accougts im~mediately inldata the axessary betwcea African countrias. - machinery ~med at establlshing a union ~ Effotts to create institutiocu to - of African [nteraatiowl Trade Fairs, coIlect and dissemiaate tiade informa- which should be tesportrible for prog- iion for African countrks should be rammtng, coordinating and enser~ng redoubled. Ia particular, the Reponal - the efficient or~tion of national. T~ada (a{ormation studies, which ECA sub~cegiQnal and All�African Trade ~ reportedly been contemplatiag, - Ftirs. should be spaded up and auiataace ~ Secon~y, that the OAU and ECA, in should be provided to i~dividual Africxn cooperation with ITC aad other specia- c~ut~tr~s in order to enabte them to - liud agencies, should amnudiately carry ~d up national trade iafotmation out the neces~uy studies aimed at ~uld be capable of establishing selxted, specialized ~g regional aad global iaformation aanual A~-Africa Trade Fairs in product ~~~eS. Partici~anu undertook to _ aras ~.fiere Africa's supp~y poaition is malce such requests to the ~ternational ~e~~y. orgpniaa~iona for the aeanuy asais- Thtrdly, the participants recognised tu,ux. major deficier?cies with . cegard to F~~y~ ~~p~d competitiveneas of Africu� exportable that they ue lly awue of the various products both at the intr~�African trade co~v~ational obsticles wh~Ch hamper Ievel and outside the candnent. the expa~sion of Intra�Africaa trade, a) Individwi counMes stiould wc~ aa tiaasport and commumcations, immediately request the services of wppty constraiats, iastitutiom! fiame- ECA, to cdlabonte wlth [1'C ~nd other aorks for trade, andlnadequ ate export- speci~lized agancie~ In undertaldn~ iaframuetunl facili~es. How~ever, the detailed studies of setectsd nadonai pro- cricx~! as~Cts to a61eh the sium ducts with high intn-African trade felt that it should addrds i~were potendal so u to rxommend policy thox whic~ are ca~able of immediate - measures nxes,wry for in~xearieg the imprevement. To rectify i!u diff~culties intra-African uade ot such producu. the partiripaats decided as foiloara: b) Specif;c commodities in whicli a) Exh appticant cauntry should Africa does not uem to bave suppty or astablLh a for,~l export promotnn in- competfcion problen~ ue stIIl not stitution with a stroag legal besis aad substantially t~ded among Afi~f,caa soui?d ~taffing for the purpose of PWIy c~untries relative to the effective expidting the exisdag potential fn demand aad the avv7abk ma~icet in the iatra-Africaa trade. _ region. ECA, in colhboration wtth fTC b) The exista?g export promotinn - and other specializa! ~ageacias, should foal poiats in Afria, u wdl u t}wae immed9ately undertalc4 necestary to be estabibhed, should focge a cloae studies to deterraine the strategies coopecatien dn~mg thanselves including which Afrlraa exporters and impo~ters a periodic exchange of trade should pursue m ordar to max~ise informatioa intn-African trade in theae vital Fifthly, the OAU ~ecretarlat ~hould commod.itias. imraediately call upon thoee member c) ECA, in coU~boratbn with (TC scatas that tnve not joUrod MTFa to and ocher specialhed agancia, should do ao u aoon u poa~ible. ~ immediately undertake studies ~imed at Si~cthly, participauts felt the urgent drtermiNng the f~asibility of ut~lizing aeed to conduct studies on border = airfreight facil~ties for aa iacrra~ed trade betweta :~fiicaa countries, since , number of commodities in intra�Africaa it forms aa esseatial part of iatia- - trade. African trsde. These studies should d) The OAU and ~CA shoutd spad ~ documentation and record� ~ up negotiatioas on payment arraage- m orda to ro~ke it easy to menu for the expansion of the intia- ~ the voiume utd value of thia COPYItZ(~T: All rights reserved SIID~ANOi1 1980 CSO: 4420 7 FOB OFFICIAL USE ONLX r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 ? V~~ VL'L' 1Nli1L NalLi VL\U? ~ INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS - JAPANESE TRADE WITH AFRICA DETAILED Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 pp 3455-3458 - [TextJ In 1978 and 1979, Japan's foreign trade with the rest of the world showed the following characteristics: The overall volume of trade increased 25.5 percent in current value from one year to the next. The distribution of trade by continent is still clearly in favor of Asia. . The direction of the overall balance was modified: + 23-percent cover of imports by exports (in Japan's favor) in 1978; - 7 percent (against Japan) in 1979. This re- versal in trend is of particular interest to a country whose coffi?ercial expansion is often considered excessive and unbalanced. If one closely observes import and export trade, one will note that it is especially in Asia that Japan shows a deficit. This is understandable insofar as its purchases of hydrocarbons are mainly fram Arab countries on the Gulf. ~wr-nfr~ ~ ~ Ripanition du comme~u extMi~ur j~pon~is pe~ contim~ 1) fMlMiodi d~ y~nsl � ~n~ ~rn Eapon ~moon boon imvort Asi~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 E10.6 S 470~! ! 70~.~ 12 94~.9 Europ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ 799.~ 2 064.7 4 3/ S.7 2 684.1 MNripw du Nord a 35a.e 9 9a2,2 0 504,~ 5 012.8 AmMiqu~ du Sud 693,8 466.8 7&7 727.5 Afriaw . . . . . . . . . . .,y 1 34e.a IA4.~ 1 /47.2 ef~.7 Od~nN a diwn ...G~. 7fa.6 1 ~t9,! 7Ea.3 1 467.~ TNY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 fN.s 1~ 727.~ t2 fi1,i 24 24f.1 Key : 1. Distribution of Japanese Foreign Trade by Continent (in billions of yen) 2. South Sea Islands and others 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 . FOR OFFICI . , ~~r-~s-a Quelqua impon~Ms disiquilibra en v~iwr ~bsolue ' (P~ phroliM ~nba exclw) 1) IM/Dl~d~ ar y~ni1 lm 1f7f Ba1M~a B~7~rKv ~ P~ P~ E~on ~mport J~DOn E~at ~mport J~DOn EtatWni~ ..3~ . 6 269 3 10l.7 + 2 160,3 5 772.5 � 48a.9 � 1 316,9 CwM du Sud . 1 206,2 6W.6 ~ 726,7 1 360.7 a31.7 . 628 Honp-Konq 6~6.9 103 . W2.Y e06.E 141,8 . sE0.8 Tstw~n 760.4 306 ~ 3e6.1 967.1 639.4 �?13.7 RFA ~b4.2 421,~ . 342,! 933 5E9.E + 369.4 Ub~ri~ ~6~.7 35.7 . 31e 209,6 90.E ~ 11Y.9 Slnp~pour bB,9 1l2.4 ? 30p,6 6l7,0 326.6 ~ 262.3 P~nartw . 300,1 17.6 a 2e2.E 196.4 ~7.1 + 169 VnrrsM 33E2 a7,4 + 2el,S 3A2,7 90,5 + 2)1.9 URSS 826,a 304,7 a 2Z0.9 636,3 419.1 ? 11E.2 Nlqai~ Q 209A 1.0 + 20Q,3 17e.9 Q,3 .~ea.e Gnnd~-9mpnw ~90,E 2lp2 ? Y0p,4 e74,6 3EE.1 + 306,4 Grlc~ . . . . . . . . . . 197,3 7,2 ? t 90.1 1 d4.Y 10,2 ~ 1 ~8.7 . Indor~w 443.1 1 110.7 - 6a7.0 ~d7,3 1 930.7 - 1 469.4 Awtnli~ SE4,9 1118,3 - 664.4 6E9.4 1378.4 - 909 Gn~d~ ` 396,4 e73 - 277.E 379,6 Q90.7 - 617.2 Sulsw g!. 139,J 207,7 - 69.4 103,Y 226.4 - 81.6 lull~........... 103 13e.7 - 33,7 1~9,0 2~e.~ - e~.t Ghrna e.s Y2.1 - 13.6 7.6 24.e - 17.1 Key : 1. Major Imbalances in Absolute Value (Arab Oil Countries Excluded) (in billions of yen) 2. Balance for Japan 3. United States 4. South Kozea ~ 5. Federal Republic of Germany - 6. Nether~ands 7. USSR 8. Great Britain 9. Switzerland Percentages of cover (for Japan) by cantinent are as follows for 1978 and 1979: 1978 1979 Asia 90.2 67.8 Europe 184.9 160.3 - America 159.6 119.7 Africa 290 164,2 South Sea Islands 54.3 46.1 One can see a very substantial reduction in the rate of cover of imports by exports for the Asian continent, but also a very clear drop in Japanese commercial pressure throughout the world: - 24.6 percent in Europe, - 39.9 percent in America, - 125.8 percent in Africa and - 8.2 percent in the South Sea Islands. 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 Nevertheless, the pressure remains and gives rise to legitimate concern in some European or American nations, especially with reapect to certain categories of gooda (automobiles, optics, photography, cinema, radio and aound equipment, and so on) . . 7'he percentage distribution of Japanese imports and exports by continent in 1978 - and 1979 was as follows: 1978 1979 Import Export Import Export Asia 50.6 37.2 53 38.6 America 26.4 34.3 26.2 33.7 Europe 12.3 18.5 11.1 19.2 Africa 2.8 6.6 2.9 5.1 South Sea Islands 7.9 3.4 6.8 3.4 As previously stated, Asia's enormous predominance with respect to imports (50.6 percent of overall value in 1978; 53 percent in 1979) is essentially due to the _ fact that Japan makes almost all of its oil purchases fram Middle Eastern nations. - Consequently, among the first 15 suppliers, one finds: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq. As one will see belaw, African oil suppliers play a relatively small role. It is normal for Japan's trade to be very active with neighboring countries such as the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, or Korea. In Table JAP-AF-B [preceding page], one can see that with most of these countries, Japan is in the creditor's position and that the surplus of Japanese ~xports to South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan or Singapore, compared with purchases made in those countries, amounts to several hundred billion yen. It is true that the Japanese trade deficit vis-a-vis Indonesia alone was nearly 1,470,000,000,000 yen in 1979. In Table JAP-AF-C [below], one can see the txtraordinary position of the United States as a supplier, but especially as a customer of Japan. The following per- centages for 1979 should make it clearer: As a supplier: 18.4 percent of all Japan's imports. Turnover 1.68 times greater - than that of Japan's second-ranking supplier, Saudi Arabia. As a customer: 25.6 percent over one-fourth of Japan's total sales to other countries. Turnover 4.25 times greater than that of Japan's second-ranking customer, South Korea. The vast majority of Japan's trade with Europe favors Tokyo, except with respect to Switzerland, Italy (see Table JAP-AF-B [preceding page], ~nd sometimes Spain and Denmark. The deficit of Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain vis-a-vis Japan - is still substantial. Africa's participation in Japan's foreign trade is insignificant with regard to imports (2.8/2.9 percent) and very modest with respeet to exports (6.6/5.1 percent). - It is easy to see this in Tab~.e JAP-AF-C [below], for one will not find one African supplier or cuatomer among Japan's top 20 trading partners in the world. 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 TBble JAP-AF-C. _ Principwx p~~ria~irp maNiwx du Jqan ~n 1879 ~ , . ~~awrrd, a~ wn,~ ~ ~.r. ~.~.w..~. r.r+ar.~a. j 1) Euetunls ?a6e.9 11 EutWnM 677x,7 2) Anbl~ Moudla . . . . . . . . 2 6l0,1 t1 CorN du Sud . . . . . . . . . . 1 960,7 31 IMa+Mb . . . 1 Y~0.7 71 Tdw~n . . 963.1 41 AwtrNA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 37~.4 41 IIiA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 ( SI Inn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964.7 61 AnON Ma~u . . . . . . . . 840.7 ~ 91 Kowdt 94t.7 E? Narp~KOep 806.A c.~.e. . . . . . . . . . . . . eae.e n cnw+. oow+iw. . . . . . . . . eoa,e Jt ei EMk.a..w.. . . ~.t e? o~nw.-e~N . e~~.a { 91 Ca~N du Sud . . . . . . . . . 731.e n sww.pww . . . . . . . . . . . . ee~.~ ! 10) CNin~ popubM~ 647.) 10) AuiortlM 569.4 ~ 111 RfA 643.6 ttl u11SS 536.3 ~ 121 T~iw~n . . . . . . 639.4 121 I~MaNW . 467.3 ~ 131 URSS 419.1 1~1 C~n~ 37Y,6 ~ 111 SruMi 4f4.~ 141 ThMlwd~ 373.7 ` 161 IrN 3M,6 ~e~ ~.v.-~.. ~e:.e I ~ ~ei o~.~,o.-e~�.~. s~e.~ 1~1 Ink ]66.4 ' 171 S~Wh IMN ~YW) . . . . . ~6~.Y 171 rMNppie~ . . . . . . . . . . 36~.1 ; t~l ?AUbv~~n ~1E.2 1~1 Rr~ 306.J i ~ 191 SMp~pou� . . . . . . . . . . ~20.0 191 MWyW . . . . . . . . . . . . 2S6 j zo? a+~.~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2~z,~ to? u~oivw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . sa~.e Key: 1. Japan's Main Trading Partners in 1979 (in billions of yen) 2. Suppliers 11. Customers 3. United States 12. United Statea 4. Saudi Arabia 13. South Korea S. United Arab Emirates 14. Federal Republic of Germany 6. South Korea 15. Saudi Arabia _ 7. People's Republic of China 16. People's Republic of China ; 8. Federal Republic of Germany 17. Great Britain 9. USSR 18. IISSR ~ 10. Great Britain 19. Netherlands South Africa, which leads Japan's African trading partnera in imports and exports, is only 22d or 23d when compared with a12 countries in the world. Its sales to Japan are 16 times lower than those to the United States and its purchases are 27 times more modest. Actually, Japan's total purchases fram the entire African continent were nearly comparable to those made by that country from the People's Republic of China, the tenth-ranking supplier to Japan, and 6.5 times lawer than those made from the United States alone. Regarding exports, turnover for all of Africa is a little higher than that for Taiwan and five times less than the figure f or the United States. Japanese Imports From Africa Table JAP-AF-E [below] provides the distribution of African imports by sections ~ using the Brussels nomenclature. Outside of parcel post (00), which represents 11.3 percent of all traffic, the main Japanese purchases involved mineral products, including oil products (26.2 percent), co~on metals and manufactured products (20.43 percent) and unprocessed plant products (11.80 percent). 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 l~ Co~Nrp utlri~~~ JAP_ AF_ 1 Key ' JA?ON ~A 1!1! 1) 1. Japan's Foreign Trade in 1979 (in billions of yen) ( mrlliord~ d~ Y~na 1 2. Imports IM1I~TAT1/Nt 2) 3. South Sea Islands ~ Z4.~45.4 4. Exports ^.,~r~~~~a r ~'ASIE~'x- ;.'~"S~t~~~ ~a' -.~s rE.~URO~PE ~ ~ ~ f AI O U E ; uijy;i` i's";:a: p1.1 lii~i~ i;;ILii~u ,.u~: ~ii !ii`:i;,h' i;;;.~MER10Ut I;;. ~j::~~;~:! ' ~ ~~r~,:! ::5::_~sN.t;;~::~; 3~ ~i~,E^!;::::,::;::~ y :..I�r.::��:: i~r::lr;.;::' '~f~::;..;,:;.~[~~ CAMI Ex11~TATI1Nf 4) ~ tt.s=1,5 - ASiE EuROV~ 4i1~ _ i 1 I~~iL:ji: l~F R 10 U E i~fi: : . {i,,:;N;~~ ~ ~N,,: cu~fill'~~~':~IL!~itj. ~h~j1.,~jC,., ,iii~:'~ M[ A i 0 U E,;;~'; ;:r ;i~~ ; ~ ~ ij:;r~ ~:;~;>>iq.lf~�::-�:;;; :;::;a:. t':a, ,i,::: ~~i,~a;_: '"~~`~t~4i~;k::~~ar~ QCEANIE _;:~ti;:::~ 1N.2 ,.:i~~;'i~ir Y. Imports of mineral products are distributed as follows: Chapter 26, metallic ores (iron, copper, manganese, lead, zinc, chrome): 82,615,900,000 yen. Suppliers: Swaziland: 956,796 tons; Mauritania, 195,792 tona; Liberia, 357,438 tons; Gabon, 124,064 tons; plus 16~832 tons going through the Congo; Zaire, 95,129 tons; Mozambique, 86,609 tons; Madagascar, 62,180 tons (chromite); Ghana, 30,746 tons; Nigeria, 146 tons, and eo on. Chapter 27, energy products (oil, coal): 73,762,300,000 yen. Suppliers: Libya, 19,111.3 million yen (441,651 cubic meters); Algeria, 12,038,700,000 yen (349,693 cubic meters); Angola, 11,837,000,000 yen (257,984 cubic meters); Nigeria, 5,490,000,000 yen (117,245 cubic meters); South Africa, 25,043,700,000 yen (2.4 million tons of coal and coke). 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 ~ JA/-A/A Princip~ux p~rtm~ira afric~int du J~pon m 1978 ~ rMnar.~d, a. w~,~ 1) _ ~ ~ `j ~n~~'r~ e~s�a...3?..... se3a n~i?~+aw6a~a~a...7.)...... z,~.s ~ jj~ z? uw~. oo.e s~ ~e�i. sos.e ~ , ~ 31 Z~m01~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 04~ 3) Nlprh . . 17E.9 41 Zain 26.~ 4) Lbl� 119.7 ' ` SI Gh~n~ 24.0 6) E9YPb e6.3 ' e? u~. . x~.s e? e ~aa ~ 71 EQypn 20.4 7) Cnwlw A~...... 30.9 , ' BI Muoe . . . . . . . . . . ~i . . . 16.3 K�ry~ . . . . . . . . . . . 2l.7 's 91 COt~ d'Ivalti . . . . . ~ . . . . . 14.1 CdM d'iwY~ . . . . ~ . . . . . 1 e.E ~ i01 Mpd~ 13.0 10) Sq~dM~................. tE.4 ~ 111 Alphi~ 12,e 11) T~ner~M 16.7 i i 141 Oup~nda 11.3 12) TwiNb 16.6 ' ; t 31 Soud~n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 13) Cwt~lllA W W . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.7 ~ f u? Hiy.d� ~~1 M.d.o..c� ~~,6 ~ ? t61 Gm~rwn S.4 161 EtliioPb 11 ~ ~ ' lel M~~mbbu~ e.Z tal ZMiOM Y 3 171 MW~qs~ear e.1 17) CMn~o~n S.4 � ~ei N,mro+. e.e ~n M.~oo.........1Q}.... e.~ +e? r.nn~+. e.~ ~ol c~n.n. ~.e ~ io1 E+Moo~. s.~ =01 e.e , Key: ~ 1. Japan's Main African Partners in 6. Customers ' 1979 (in billions of yen) 7. South Africa 2. Suppliers 8. Canary Islands , 3. South Africa 9. Ivory Coast ; 4. Morocco 10. Morocco 5. Ivory Coast ' ~ Chapter 25, nonmetallic, nonoil mineral products: 26,712,600,000 yen (phosphates, ' clays, asbestos, mica, porphyry, coloring earths). Suppliers: South Africa, ' 16,089,700,000 ~en; Morocco, 8,219,600,000 yen;=Senegal, 1,146,200,000 yen (74,566 tons of phosphates); Madagascar, 4$5,700,000 yen; Swaziland, 296,700,000 yen; Namibia, 145,400,000 yen; Kenya, 139,100,000 yen; Mozambique, 64,600,000 yen; i Togo, 35,600,000 yen, and so on. , With regard to common metals, it is Chapter 74 (copper and manufactured products) ~ that is easily in the lead, coming ahead of Chapter 73 (iron, reduced metal, steel) and Chapter 76 (aluminum). ' Chapter 74: 84~586,700,000 yen. Suppliers: Zambia, 63,103,000,000 yen (158,889 ; tons); South Africa, 11,005,600,000 yen (27,936 tons); Namibia, 5,286,100,000 yen , (11,203 tons); Zaire, 5,040,400,OOO~yen (12~848 tons); and so on. ~ Chapter 73: 27,$13,700,000 yen. Suppliers: South Africa, 27,612,500,000 yen; ; Liberia, 181,500,000 yen. . Chapter 76: 18,292,900,000 yen. Suppliers: Ghana, 8,809,900,000 yen; Egypt, 4,515,100,000 yen; South Africa, 3,895,100,000 yen; Cameroon, 956,400,000 yen, and ~ so on. ~ ~ I ~ I 13 I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I ; i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 rvc~ vrri~ieu. vir~.~ _ . - L~s �~fll~~n ~~Mo~~iM: ~ ~fMe~i~s JA~IN e 1l111-~~_ ~F_ ~ ( millia~da d~ Ytna 1 1~ ~rawuc ou suo 2) ~ M 1 T ~ T I 1 N t 3 21~.7 ~ ueEaiA ~e1E . aie~~~ 4) !Li ~ 2 ~r~~,uerearvh - _ :M ~ t1~4 ~.t.itia~~+~c~at~ 1~.~ 5> � I EX ~1 ATAT 11 M t6) 7 =e~n~rAC.rva~ t~ M ~:�ti�: k'-� �i}: � 8 : ~ ~car~rs ) uere ~~3 NieEaw ~ ~~'3 9~ 1~3,4 AFRIOUE DU SUD ue~ 111~! 211,5 21~.5 y. - Key : � 1. Japan's Top-Ranking African Partners in 1979 (in billions of yen) 2. South Africa 3. Imports 4. Others 5. Morocco, Ivory Coast 6. Exports 7. Ivory Coast 8. Canary Islands 9. Others Chapter 75 (nickel): 2,243,000,000 yen. Supplier: South Africa. The unprocessed plant products (for food) most frequently purchased by Japan from Africa are coffee and s~ices (Chapter 9), unprocessed grain (Chapter 10) and oil-yielding seed (Chapter 12). Chapter 9: 39,637,600,000 yen. Coffee suppliers: Uganda, 14,274 tons; Ivory Coast, 13,795 tons; Ethiopia, 6,683 tons; Tanzania, 4,144 tons; Cameroon, 2,636 tons; Angola, 2,337 tons; Madagascar, 2,024 tons; Rwanda, 1,514 tons; Burundi, _ 650 tona; Kenya, ~13 tons; Mozambique, 241 tone; Leaotho, 98 tons, and so on. Chapter 10: 32,256,300,000 yen. Suppliers: South Africa, 961,332 tons; Mozambique, 103,872 tona; Kenya, 65,950 tons. ].1~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY , JAP-AF-E. Japan's African Imports Based on Brusaels Nomenclature (V = billions of yen) v x 00. Parcel post and undetermined items 79 11.31 O1. Animals and animal products 30.6 4.38 02. Unprocessed plant products 82.5 11.80 04. Products from food industries 44.5 6.37 05. Mineral products (including oil) 183.1 26.20 06. Chemical products 16.4 2.35 09. Wood and manufactured items 11.4 1.63 11. Textiles and manufactured items 44.8 6.42 14. Gems and precious metals 44.8 6.42 - 15. Co~on metals and manufactured 142.8 20.43 ; producte 17. Traneport equlpment 10.4 1.49 Other sectiona, each representing less than 1 percent 8.4 1.20 698.7 100.00 Chapter 12: 5,816,500,000 yen. Suppliers of peanuts, sesame seed, cottonseed and so on. Sudan: 11,882 tons; Mali, 10,462 tons; Togo, 5,525 tons; South Africa, - 4,386 tons; Tanzania, 4,357 tons; Ivory Coast, 3,688 tons; Benin, 3,602 tone; Kenya, 2,466 tons; Mozambique, 2,303 tons; Nigeria, 2,070 tona; Upper Volta~ 1,881 tons; Ethfopia, 816 tons, and so on. Imports of animal products mainly included fresh fish (Chapter 3): Chapter 3: 21,778,400,000 yen. Suppliers: Morocco, 9,780 tons; Senegal, 3,365 tons; Libya, 2~414 tons; South Africa, 2,346 tons; Madagascar, 1,791 tons; Mozam- bique, 1,564 tons; Mauritania, 1,020 tone; Canary Islands, 829 tons; Nigeria, 565 tons; Ghana, 456 tons; Namibia, 190 tons; Liberia, 181 tona; Cameroon, 171 tons; Sierra Leone, 43 tons, and ao on. Purchases of augar for 24~616,800,000 yen (484,938 tona) were all made from South Africa. One does not see substantial cacao purchases except from Ghana. Total purchases: 15,499,500,000 yen, including Ghana for 14,352,600,000 yen (16,480 tons); Ivory Coast, 990 tons; Cameroon, 410 tons; and Nigeria, 60 tons. ~ Japan bought 12,343,000,000 yen worth of inorganic chemical products (mainly phos- phoric acid) from South Africa. Wood (11,390,900,000 yen) comes from Cameroon: 51,973 tons; South Africa, 24,966 tons; the Ivory Coast, 13,394 tans; Gabon, 12,358 tons; the Congo, 10,127 tons; Liberia, 7,707 tons; Mozambique, 6,739 tons; Zaire, 2,901 tons; Ghana, 475 tons; Kenya, 465 tons, and so on. 15 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 rva~ vrri~ina. u.,u v.~L. In the textile field, only three chaptera include subatantial imports: Chapter S5, cotton: 34,856,700,000 yen. Suppliers: Egypt, 25,068 tons; Sudan, 16,853 tons; South Africa, 7,220 tons; Chad, 6,823 tons; Cameroon, 4,341 tons; Nigeria, 4,193 tons; Ivory Coast, 3,051 tons; Mali, 2,810 tona; Upper Volta, 2,098 tons; Central African Republic, 1,750 tons; Ethiopia, 999 tons. Chapter 53, wool: 7,615,400,000 yen. Supplier: South Africa, 6,450 tons. Chapter 57, fibers for sack-making, mainly sisal: 1,605,500,000 yen. Suppliers: Kenya, 6,290 tons; Tanzania, 5,145 tons. Gems and precious metals (44,831,000,000 yen) are purchased by Japan from some 15 countries, mainly including South Africa, 43,281,400,000 yen; Ghana, 726,700,000 yen; Zaire, 360,700,000 yen; Zambia, 192,700,000 yen; Kenya, 102,500,000 yen, and so on. Japaneae Exports to Africa .Japan's highly varied exporta to its 20 front-ranking African customere (94.1 per- cen[ of the total) are distributed as shown in Table JAP-AF-F [below]. One will note the considerable position occupied by the section of tranaport equipment, machinery and electrical or other equipment and of common metals and manufactured goods (81.94 percent of total Japanese exporta in value). JAP-AF-F. Japan's Exports to Its 20 Front-Ranking African G~stamera in 1979 (94.1 percent of total exports in value to Africa) Based on the Sections of the Bruasels Nomenclature (V = billions of yen) V % 04. Food industry products 18.6 1.73 06. Chemical products 17.5 1.62 07. Plastic and ruber materials 29.2 2.71 11. Textilea and manufactured items 48.8 4.52 15. Common metals and manufactured products 156 14.45 - 16. Electrical and other machinery and 264.9 24.54 equipment 17. Transport equipment 463.7 42.95 18. Optical equipment, measuring and 46.7 4.32 precision instruments Other sections each representing less 34.1 3.16 than 1 percent 1,079 613.5 100 Table JAP-AF-F shows the amount of purchases in value of the 20 countriea concerned for the other chapters with the highest values, including (in billions of yen): Chapter 87, 238.1; Chapter 89, 211.3; Chapter 85, 154.6; Chapter 73, 143.7; Chapter 84, 110.4. 110,364 [sic] South Africa alone bought over 82 billion yen worth of road transport equipment and Nigeria over 56 billion. Purchases of electrical equipment mainly include 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY radios and television sets. The vast majority of all ships sold go to Liberia (194.7 out of 211.3 billion yen). Other noteworthy chaptere among exporta are the following (over 5 billion yen), from O1 to 99: Chapter 03, freah fish: 5,949,900,000 yen (Canary Islanda, 2,252,300,000 yen; South Africa, 2,034,200,000; Ghana, 1,480,100,000). Chapter 16, canned meat or fish: 18,191,000,000 (Nigeria, 11,984,000,000; Egypt, - 1,536,300,000; Libya, 1,527,000,000; Ghana, 1,019,500,000; South Africa, 777,800,000, and so on). Chapter 29, organic chemical producta: 5,138,200,000 yen (South Africa, 3,718,500,000; Nigeria, 500,700,000; Ivory Coast, 333,700,000). Chapter 39, plastics: 9,409,400,000 yen (South Africa, 4,087,700,000; Nigeria, 3,094,100,000; Algeria, 564,000,000; Egypt, 465,400.000). Chapter 40, rubber: 19,838,300,000 yen (Algeria, 5,125,200,000; Egypt, 3,964,400,000; South Africa, 3,228,100,000; Sudan, 1,796,700,000; Libya, 1,451,900,000). Chapter 51, continuous synthetic textiles: 17,102,800,000 yen (South Africa, 8,040,900,000; Nigerfa, 2,213,300,000; Sudan, 2,171,600,000; Egypt, 1,260,600,000). Chapter 56, s}mthetic or artificial textiles, pieces: 17,904,400,000 yen (South Africa, 8,319,000,000; Nigeria, 3,033,100,000; Alger~.a, 2,363,100,000; Kenya, 1,056,900,000; Egypt, 1,005,300,000). Chapter 82, tools, cutlery: 5,749,500,000 yen South Africa, 2.49 billion; Egypt, 1,025,700,000; Nigeria, 785,600,000; Libya, 620,800,000). Chapter 86, railroad rolling atock: 14,313,200,000 (Egypt, 7,096,600,000; South Africa, 4,430,300,000; Zambia, 2,595,900,000). Chapter 90, optics, measuring and precision instruments: 16,023,900,000 yea (South Africa, 6,480,400,000; Canary Islands, 1,754,100,000; Egypt, 1,605,500,000; Nigeria, 1,491,200,000; Libya, 864,200,000). Chapter 91, clocks and watches: 7,708,900,000 yen (Canary Islands, 2,933,000,000; Egypt, 1,792,600,000; Ceuta and Melilla, 1,111,700,000; South Africa, 1,043,900,000). Chapter 92, music and sound equipment: 22,941,500,000 yen (Libya, 12,822,700,000; South Africa, 3,957,000,000; Canary Islands, 1,641,800,000; Nigeria, 1,622,700,000; Egypt, 1,010,100,000). [Table JAP-AF-G next page] 17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 rvn ~rrl~.lrw uuc VI~LI ~ ~ ~ JAr~+Ai-0 j 1 Cleaaemertt de~ ucportnion: du J~pon wn I'Aftiqw f ~ en 1979 pour qudqua ch~pitra nm~~qu~bla (20 p~~n) (MlMioni d~ wnal ~ ~ 2 5 ~wi 6; j r 3 4 F., u.r ewMn ~ ~ hM~fb Wt~IMI M~e~ W~ M AMIYr { ~ iwer~ weuip~ w~ Me~iww rw+yr w Ilwid : - - - - ~ u,.a awa a~w a~.n a~a ~ - - - - - ~ csunMdlll~ 3~~.7 eos~.e ~oe,e s~,s - ~ ; Gnvies . . ~ . . . . . . S 330,! 9498,1 2 896.3 6E9,2 11,2 ~ f M~~oe 8.. 21d2 1254,2 1022.6 1337 - i AIpMi~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 W 1.E 6 930 22 879.5 2E 471,8 3 970.3 ~ Tunlsl~ a24,3 39E.4 483.8 e~z4.e 7232.8 ; liby~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 60A.0 49 801 3 966.1 10 612.~ 21.5 ~ ~ Egypu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13180.8 22 116.7 9 076,b 12 630,7 1 9~0.1 ~ Soud~n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 064.3 1 266.4 3 tOd.4 3 024,6 - ; Llbsris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 628.9 420.3 199,7 912.1 194 71t,2 ~ CA~~ d'Ivain ...9. 9 2682 2 262.E 1 158.5 1 723.E Y � Gh~n~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 568,2 1 ~47.7 832.8 96I.7 488 . ` N{ps~1~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6E 27E.7 26 401.a 21 644 ~9 066.3 2.3 ~ Cam~roun . . . . . . . . . . . . . S 4~4.8 4+Z.6 63E.9 930.1 - ~ Ethiopi� . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 129.e 1 06e,2 857 2 7E9.1 - K~m~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E 707 2 104.E 3 274.1 11 246.1 - ~ T~ru~nl~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 142.5 3 413.7 3 290.9 3 233,0 - f Anpob . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6d1.7 E46.7 647.E 1 36~.4 _ f 2~mbl~ 2 28e.1 966,2 722 1 037.E Ahiqu~ du Sud ..1.0. e2 26a 17 1 E2.7 32 I~0,3 1 E 876.4 6.6 M~dppesr . . . . . . . . . . . 973.7 2 906,6 644~~ 2 410. t 3 268.2 . Toql . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . 2~ OM,~ 1M R0.7 110 7M /17 Mi,~ 211 ~,1 . Key : 1. Classification of Certain Remarkable Categories of Japanese Exports to Africa in 1979 (20 countries) (in millions of yen) 2. Road transport equipment 3. Electrical equipment 4. Nonelectrical machinery 5. Iron, reduced metal, steel and manufactured items 6. Ocean or river transport equipment 7. Canary Islands 8. Morocco 9. Ivory Coast 10. South Africa COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980 ~~04644400 18 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS ~ AFRICAN COUNTRIES CONCERNID ABOUT LIBYAN ROLE IN CHAD , Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 pp 24-28 ' [Article by Mohamed Selhami and Abdelaziz Barouhi--passages between slantlines originally published in italics] [Text~ With the conquest of Chad, the Libyan leader thinks , the hour has struck for him to realize a gre,st dream, the United States of the Sahel, of whic:h he would be the ruler. ' Monday, 20 October. The Sebha air base (800 km south of Tripoli). Several hundred soldiers are trying to cram themselves into the big tranaport aircraft: two Ilyushin 76, three Antonovs (two of them borrowed from Syria), four Hercules ~ C-130's. Also being loaded aboard are arms (machine-guns and artillery), ~ munitions chests, light armored materiel (Brazilian Cascavels, British Ferret automatic machineguns). i Col Khalifa Mouftah is directing operations. Destination: Faya-Largeau, in Chad, 400 km from the border. /"Responding to the appeal of his brother and counCerpart ~ Goukouni Oueddei,"/ president of the GUNT (Transitional National Union Government), ~ Mu'ammar Zadhdhafi throws himself into the conquest of his neighbor to the south, ; a part of which, the Aouzou Strip (114,000 square kilometers) he has already been occupying for years. The prime ob3ective: to finish off the "dissident" Hissein Habre, leader of the FAN (Northern Armed Forces). And then? _ For several weeks the Libyan leader has had the green light from the Soviets for his military adventure. He is paying for the arms that Syria (which merged with ; the Jamahiriya on 1 September) buys from Moscow. In exchange for his support to the USSR's special partner in the Middle East, he hae obtained carte blanche for his African schemes. And above all--an indispensable technical condition--the cover provided for the Chad offensive by the Soviet and East German advisers present in Libya. Forty-eight hours before D-Day, Qadhdhafi calls together, in the presence of Soviet experts, his principal officers: Maj Abd-al-Salam Jallud, the leader's deputy; Gen Abu-Bakr Jabir Yunis, commander in chief of the armed forces; Lt Col Kharubi, head of the /Moukhabarat/ (secret services) and of the military branch of the Bureau of Arab Liaison; Col Muha~nad (Lamgarif), inspector general of the forces; , 19 - FOR OFP'ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 Ma~ Khuwaylidi al-Hamidi, head of the "People's Resistance" (militia); Col Muhammad Bar~jati, commandant of the Cyrenaica military region; Lt Col Sayf Kaddaf Adam~ head of the bureau for exportation of the revolution; Col Khalifah Muftah. Z~ao members of the People's General Congress (Assembly) are also there. The final details of "Operation Chad" are honed. Col Khalifah Muftah, age 40, trained in the USSR, has been named to lead the operation to "final victory." Before a map of the region he explains how the Libyan Army is going to be deployed. Nearly 4,000 men will be engaged (including 1,500 already stationed in the Aouzou Strip), all heading for Faya-Largeau. From there, 1,600 will disperse into northeast Chad; 400 will head for the Doubou base; the remainder (about 2,000 men) will descend even further south, toward Ndjamena, under the orders of Muhammad Brahim. The road is open. The Jamahiriya cannot fail in Chad. And afterwards, why not Niger, then Mali...Qadhdhafi already has glimpses of the realization of his dream, that United States of the Sahel of which he would be the ruler (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 975). With the help of his over-equipped army, for which he is presently spending about $4 billion per year. Forgotten now are the disappointments of the past! In truth, [this means onlyJ the Ugandan expedition. For, despite the thundering pronouncements of their leader, the Libyans have never engaged their forces in the Middle East theater of operations. In April 1979, shortly before the fall of Kampala, 2,000 men had been sent-- without being previously informed--to the rescue of Marshal Idi Amin Dada. Total defeat: 400 dead or wounded, 600 prisoners taken by the Tanzanians, who drove a hard bargain for their return. Among them, many non-Libyan Arabs, particularly Tunisians, trained in camps in the Jamahiriya and in Lebanon. T'hey were "lacking in fighting spirit, it is said these days in Tripoli to explain the defeat. It is also true that they were far from their bases and on terrain with which they were completely unfamiliar. In any case, the men participating in "Operation Chad" would be much more highly motivated. ~hree-fourths of them are Libyans~ the others being Syrians, South Yemenis, and Palestinians (members of al-Sa'iqah, the pro-Syrian organization). "Revolutionaries" who have opted for Libyan aationality and beerc generously rewarded for it. These shock troops apart, the Libyan army is still far from being equal to the ambitions and objectives of its leader. Overwhelmed by the last word in weaponry, the soldiers still have much to learn about handling these sophisticated arms. Nomads for the most part, often illiterate, the men in the ranks are not battle- hardened veterans. I11-disciplined, fond of parading--carrying themselves jauntily with their Kalashnikovs slung across their backs--through the streets of Tripoli or Benghazi, they are barely able even to march in step. � One understands why the Libyan Army still needs experts and advisers from the "fraternal countries" of the socialist bloc (who are not for all that engaged in Chad) and foreign pilots (North Koreans, Syrians, South Yemenis...) 20 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY , But even so, the "1980 model" is visibly better organized than in past years. A result of the training provided by the foreign advisers. A result also of the growing militarization of the society. For Qadhdhafi has transformed his country into one huge barracks. Up to this point, secondary and colle~ students of course underwent periods of military training in order to serve in aray transport and as "missiliers" [translation unknown] in case of need. Fr~~m now on, they will receive their - training in arms at school. Already, in T�t.ipoli, primary schoolchildren are j accoutered in combat dress and marching in step. The fac[ories too will be transformed to meet the requirements of the army. To tell the truth, Libyan workers already played a small enough part in production. ; Henceforth, they wi.ll report to their work-places in military dress and armed, and will '~e trained on-site. But the finest success is the organizati.on of the womec? into brigades. There are vast numbers of them in the armed forces, and they have the opportunity to achieve officer-grade status. The militar~~ academy has been opened up to them. One sees them in town, in their paramilitary uniforms, elegant, proud, and provocative. - But woe to the "wolf." An over-enterprising young man found biting the dust in the middle of the street in Tripoli following an exhibition of ~udo. Qadhdhafi's revolutionary speeches have more impact on these women than on the men. And for ~ good reason. For them the army acts as a means of emancipation. The barracks and authority (sometimes over the men) rather than confinement within the four walls of the family house and submission to relatives. And after all, since commercial activities were banned (1979), the status of soldier has become a profitable one. Apart from the 3 months of intensive instruction at the sta:t, one reports to the barracks ~ust as another reports to the office. Unless one has guard duty, one goes home every evening when one`s - duties are accomplished. A young recruit's pay is 80 dinars (1,200 French francs) and is the owner of his own house. The soldier, like the officer, benefits from the concessionary pricing on all purchases in army stores (50 percent less expensive than prices in the city). on everything from furniture to electric gadgets, not to mention food products. But this militarization cum social pro~?otion is one thing, while war and its _ consequences are something else. For instance, there are these coffins which, _ since the Chad offensive started, have been deposited at dawn on the doorsteps of homes. When they are not put straight into the ground in the village cemetary. The Libyans will not fail to react to this. But even so, it will not be eventual shifts in public opinion that will stop Qadhdhafi. Especially since, as of 24 November, barely a month after the unleashing of the Chad offensive, victory seemed at hand. After having forced ttieir way along the Ndjamena-Ati-Abeche axix (see report from our special correspondent on page 28), the Libyans built a base at Douguia (60 km north of the capital). From there, they could support a final _ offensive against Habre's FAN, at the time when the FAT southerners of Col Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue were beginning to show their strength against Goukouni Oueddei's ~ men entrenched at Farcha (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1037). - 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 Hissein Habre has good soldiers. But no airplanes or armored vehicles. The balance of forces is overwhelmingly in favor of Qadhdhafi and the GUNT. And the rAN gets no external support comparable to ~hat received by Goukouni. Certainly, the Egyptians have been helping out for several months. But they do not like being committed so far beyond their borders. And will France, which had an understanding with Qadhdhafi on the sharing of influence in Chad (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1037), close its eyes indefinitely? Many African countries, increasingly nervous, are pressing the French. Morocco, which is being pressed by Libya through the POLISARIO: Tunisia, threatened on its bordera by some 10,000 men, two superbly equipped divisions (435 tanks; 10 battalions of infrantry, one of commandos; 40 Mirage F-1 and Mirage 5 aircraft; Tupolev-22 bombers; some 20 helicopters): both are denouncing Libyan expansioniam. ~ Egypt, on which are targeted the Scud-S missiles, is doing the same. Mali and ~ Niger. with limited defensive capabilities, potential victims of Qadhdhafi's Sahara acheme--Qadhdhaif maintains opposition commandos in Libya--take refuge in diacretion. Only Senegal, which has had (in its own "ayayollah", Ahmed I~alifa Nyasse) a foretaste of Qadhdhafian subversion, has spoken out strongly through its president, Leopold Sedar Senghor. But other countries have let Paris know that the "Libyan invasion" was threatenitg the equilibrium of the region. On 24 November, the Quai d'Orsay stated that /"the arrival of sizeable armed elements from the outside gives a new dimension"/ to the civil war. More than a month after the start of Libya's massive intervention, that is certainly an understatement! In fact, without breaking its tacit accord with Tripoli, the government in Paris must have given assurances to its friends in the region. In particular to those most directly threatened (Niger and Mali): Qadhdhafi will not go further than Chad. - France up to now was conceivable betting on a Libyan defeat after the elimination of Hissein Habre. For Qadhdhafi's troops would have a hard time as an occupation army exposed to the hostility of a majority of Chadians and to a guerrilla movement on its own ground. But most Africans think the devil has been too much indulged. 'Thanks to them, there is movement toward creation of a new inter-African force under the banners of the United Nations. Under these conditions, the Soviets woiild have no entry. And Qadhdhafi would be left with no choice but to withdraw. This is how "Operation Chad" could end. But the Qadhdhafi "threat" remains. and his expansionist, revolutionalry, and pan-Islamic ambitions. By throwing his army into the conquest of Chad, he proved that nothing would stop him. Except, perhaps, an "Operation Libya" mounted by some of his adversaries. COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980 951b CSO: 4400 22 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICxAL USE ONLY ; INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS CHADIAN NATIONAL FEELING AGATNST LIBYA ARISING Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 28 [Article by Christian Grain--passages between slantlines originally published iti italacs] [Text] After Faya-Largeau, Dalait, Oum Chalouba and Biltine, Abeche has become the basic ob,jective of Qadhdhafi's cohorts. This traditional and religious town in the east, 100 km from the Sudanese frontier, is in reality the real arsenal of the FAN [Northern Armed ForcesJ. Thls is where Hissein Habre's men store the arms they capture from the enemy. It is through this point that the munitions bought on the international market--whether in Sudan, Egypt, or in one or two other countries that are willing to serve as intermediaries--are channeled. So it is from this point that the goods needed in Ndjamena set out on their 750-km journey over roads and trails. Since 5 November, the Abeche-Ati-Jdjamena trail has been bombarded daily by the 22 Libyan Tupolevs. Hissein Habre told me several days ago: /"If the FAN disappeared, the shock waves would be felt throughout Sahelian and central Africa. Nothing will stop Libya. The French, who are looking at the short term, are deceiving themselves thinking they are duping Libya. You cannot outfox Qadhdhafi."/ _ And Hissein Habre continues to fight. As a guerrilla. He fears he will lose Abeche and be strangled in the capital. But he believes that if the Libyans bombed and took Abeche, it would probably turn.against them and their allies. For Abeche is not his fiefdom. He went there in February 1979 and reorganized the town for the benefit of the population and particularly of the tradesmen. But most of the children of Abeche are fighting in the ranke of Goukouni Oueddei and Acyl Ahmat. If their town were taken by the Libyans and destroyed, they would certainly turn against their ally of today once he became the invader. It remains that Qadhdhafi's new strategy--carrying the struggle to the interior, where he encounters the feeblest resistance--holds more dangers for the country as - a whole than does~the possible taking of Abeche: habituation to the Libyan presence on Chadian territory and on the borders of Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon. T~ao months ago, a three-engine Tupolev-22 began dropping--2 or 3~imes a week, from high altitude, and blindly--some bombs on Pldjamena. 23 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 � V~\ VL L 1~J1LW V VL~ V~\Y~ Today, Chinook helicopters of American design (but manufacture~ll under license in Italy and equipped by the French firm Thomson CSr) as well as small propeller- driven aircraft resembling T-6's send salvos of rockets 4 or 5 times a day. Without their activities being coordinated with a real ground offensive. One has even gotten accustomed to the three Tupolev-22's vio lating Cameroonian airspace every day in an east-west direction, between 1030 and 1200 hours, passing over Kousseri and Ndjamen.a to come back along the Jd~amena-Abeche trail. And to the Libyan helicopter teams playing tourist in Bongor, in southern Chad, where they come to search out Colonel Kamougue's soldiers to bring them back up to Farcha, the rotation of DC-4's from the Libyan squadron no longer sufficing. I have met several members of Goukouni's FAP who are still j ust as opposed to Hissein Habre, but manifestly shaken as to the justice of their fight. It is above all the southerners who are disturbed: their fear and their hatred of Hissein Habre are beginning to yield to their fear of having to learn Qadhdhaf i's green Book by heart. It certainly would seem that, in the face of Libyan ambitions, the birth of a - Chadian national feeling might just be under way. But is it already too late? COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980 9516 CSO: 4400 21~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS REVITALIZATION OF NORTH-SOUTH DIALOG REPORTID Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRArTEII~iS in French 5 Dec 8o pp 3326-3327 ~Article by Jean-Claude Lucass "Seventh Plenary Session of the Club of Dakar Sousse, 24-26 November)i A Contribution to the Revival of the North-South Dialogue"j LText] To cause social and economic antagonisms today xhich are so threatening to the ideal of squaring the '~virtuous circle" of participatory development is cer- tainly very difficult: Yet. hoKever contradictory they may seem among themselves, the often stubbornly held positions taken by the protagonists of the crisis that is to say the industrialized nations~ xhether liberal or socialist~ the oil produ- cing countries, whether or not members of OPDC~ the developing countries taken as an excessively undifferentiated whole xould xell and truly t~ing together the _ logical conditions for a dynamic b~eakthrough if they were to decide that they real]y want to "get out of it." It was precisely these conditions xhich the Qub of Dakar~ following the example of others~ planned to reconcile by the end of its seventh plenary session xhich met from 24 to 26 November in Pert EL Ka~ntaoui, near Sousse, with the resolute intention of shoxing hox the fulfilment of the intereats of each of the three components of the world comnunity furthers the peace and dignity of its peoples. It was a matter then of making a contribution to the revival of the North- South dialogue,which fortunately proceeds outside the narrow paths of official insti- tutions in which it has alread.y become fairly well bogged down. But a1 though, stepping back~ the report on deficiencies and potentials becomes easier to draw up and virtually banal, although the analyses of the causes, taking into account elements of passion~ laings out a nonetheless complex explanation of the crisis and enriches the theory of the exchanges of nex concepts (interdependence~ compensated balance, f1oK of factors~ national preferences for structures...~~ the egoism and awkwardness of human groups put a b~ake, for the, on the imple- mentation of international economic relations finally committed to justice, equality and "greater welfare," relations inspired by a real joint responsibility xhich people to a large degree~ with an excess of paralyzing meanings~ still perceive as being alxays quicker t4 give in to the seduction of deceptive myths. This is the summary of the approach determined from the outset* and Kh~ch~ for lack of.really original conclusive proposals~ has opened the way toward study and thought perspectives which are encouraging. Rather than the somewhat vain and * An approach introduced in the opening statements of Messrs Diaxara~ I~loncef Bel _ Hadj Amor~ minister attached to the prime minister for Civil Service and Adminis- trative Reform, of ~nisia~ and Alfred Sauvy~ grofessor at the College of F~ance. 25 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 ?Va\ Vl'L'lVl[1L V~1L vL\L~ especially unnecessarily polished statements in diplomatic language which ia far too cautious, what will bexetnembered of the activities of this last plenary aession is that part ma.ybe the best xhere the thoughts of the participants shared - aloud were to be found~ that part wher~ they dare to go further and deeper, which nourishes the "tune of the times" with its ideas~ in short that part which deserves more from the Club of Dakar than the excessive formality of the procedures a,~~d the scholasticism which one might have feared it Hould succwnb to~ a victim of the am- biguities and paradoxes of its formula or of its size, if not of its success. ~ Here then, distributed among the six fa.milies of adopted proposals~ is an overview of the debatea. I. Investment of Surplus Capital - For the oil producing countries with a balance of payments surplus, the incitement to invest is largely a function of the guarantees of security and return likely to protect their financial assets~ specifically from monetary erosion. Hence, the . idea of an indexing of the value of capital. Such an arrangement would~ in prin- ciple, be compensated by an agreement to moderate the development of the price of oil and~ on the other hand~ be accompanied~ xith regasd to the borrowers~ by condi- tions strictly adapted to their needs and ca,p&,bilities. Several ideas were brought forwaxd during the deba.te, which would improve by being considered during possible exploratoryr studies at a later date. For example, the recommendation picked up from the Brandt Comiaission aimed at modifying the statutes of the World Bank in order to authorize it to agree to loans representing doul~le its social capital. This measure alone would free an added capacity of 80 billion dollars. Moreover} the precedent created by the IMF of selling gold reserves at auction of whi~h t.hA fixst agreement, comrlAtely imnlemented, d3d _ ~ not lead to a renewal could inspire countries which dispose of reseives to trans- form a part (10 percent, for exa.mple~ at the current commercial market price, but it is not possible to make even an approximate evaluation of the effects of this system. II. Increased Free Financial ~ansfers Tn its general form, public aid no longer seems separate from energy prohlems, and - it is unfortunate that during the sixtles the industrialized countries missed the opportunity to earmark part of the oil returns they xere enjoying at the time, for the developing countries. The worrisome case of Mauritania illustrates this remark: it is experiencing a shortage of drinking water because it can no longer distill sea water in the quantities it needs due to the prohibitive technical costs. On this subject, the Club of Dakar pursued the thought it ha.d started developing during its meeting in Abidjan ~n 1976. It involved moving towards basing aid on a tax on the order of a"world solidarity tax." Three possitile bases for this assess- ment are being considered: a) an automatic contribution by the rich countries based on their national income; b) on the trade of energy products; c~ on the trade of military material s. _ The working hypothesis of the establishment of a preferential price for petroleum, granted by the exporting oil producing countries to the nonexporting oil producing countries, was abandoned because it raised nwnerous objections concerning 26 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . difficulties of implementation. Its formulation in itself was already an obstacle to a preliminary study. All the this arrangement should not be completely ruled out from consideration. As a raatter of fact, the examples of Venezuela and Mexico have been cited to back it up. These countries have committed themselves to supply 9 member countries of the Andean Community xith 160~000 barrels of crude a day in return for the following payment agreement: 70 percent of the price is subject to a normal agreement and 30 percent to yment spread over 5 yeass. This 30 percent ma.y be subject to long term (25 years~transformation according to normal loan conditions. This point undoubtedly feeds numerous controversies, particularly among those who see it as an additional incitement to the consumption of this non- renewable raw ma.terial~ the maaiagement of which it rrould be desirable to organize: hydrocarbons are indispensable to the production of 23,800 products, and these pro- ducts should be given priority in the use of hydrocarbons. It is well known that public aid constitutes an imperfect and quantitatively insuf- ficient instrument (overall~ 0.3tI~ percent of the affected GNP for the member coun- tries of the OECD~ as against a rate initially set at 1 percentj. Ftizrthermore, the aid resulting f~om bilateral cooperation between countries generally takes the form of a relationship of dependence~ which erodes its effects, if it does not invalidate them. Finally, the critical situation of endebtedness of the developing countries the analysis of which shows an extreme diversity of structures requires a renegotiation which would not simply be an extension of credits over time, while the industri~.7. countries of the OECD no longer dispose of surplusses which would a11ow them to respond to the financial needs of the developing countries, surplusses which ase virtually a11 in the hands of the petroleum producing countries with po- sitive balances of payment. This point touches on one of the aspects of the inter- dependence of situ.ations which necessitate the definition of a financial and mone- _ taxy economic order reconstructed on thoroughly modified hases. This observation introduces one of the most urgent proposals to be implemen~ed, specifically a just payment for raw ma.terials for which it should be possihle to guaxantee export receipts in real terms. If the principle does not raise any con- troversy~ the compensatory mechanisms assuming tha.t the current conditions of price setting are maintained ca11 for a reform going substantially beyond the usual stopgap measures. This approach leads to a program of local industrial de- velopment of the products, which is the only way to b~ing out the indispensable - added value by which countries have a hold on their oxn future by controlLing an endogenous and self-centered development. Hence, the action is directed towaxds the causes and not the results. The following proposals are divided into these two groups of ineasnres. III. Strategic Development Options Efforts must be made to increase agricultural production by giving the latter the priority role of satisfying food needs. This orienta,tion cannot keep the developing countries from paxticipating in the process of applied research in the new fields which constitute the technological stakes for the 1980's~ such as agrobiology and - nonconventional energy. Access to technology and the obstacles which slow down or virtually prohibit its transfer, constitute a particularly open theme for thought among the relevant parties. 27 + FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 rv~~ Vlr1\.Lt1L u.~c V1~Ll ~ IV. Development of Horizontal Cooperation In the case of Africa~ regional integration in particular and cooperation at the level of technological research should drax on the achievements attained by the economic communities of Latin America (Andean Treaty) and of South-East Asia (Asean~. V. Less Developed Countries In order to contribute its own ideas to the xork of the United Nations Conference on less developed countries~ to be held in Paris in September 1981, the Club of Dakar has set the objective of introducing "concrete groposals" on the subject as early as the first half of 1981. It would involve defining those means which would a11ow the most disadvantaged na.tions (the number of which is 30~ 24 of which are African~ to reach a minimum income level. VI. Start of Global Negotiations A suggestion was made to the effect tha.t participation of the developing countries - in decision making within the IMF, specifically in matters of allocations~ should reflect a real democratization. Fina1 Comments The Club of Dakar is changing its puhlic image. The strategy of development~ it is true, requires an understanding of the phenomena and the imagination to produce so- lutions comparable in their processes to Keynesian theory~ according to which the genera.l interest does not equal the sum of particular interests. In order to take action it will obviously be necessary to understand the direction of the develop- ments which~ in a scattered way~ Kork in depth toward the emergence of new inter- national economic relations which some people, perpetually behind the times~ will a1 ways look upon as '~the world turned upside down." By hreaking through its re- gional framework~ the Club of Dakar gives a symbolic scope to its gesture: Africa, which for a long time was kept behind developments~ is indicating its desire to participate, through its potential xeight, through its originality, in the develop- _ r ment of the contemporary world. By presenting, in the next few weeks, the six proposals xhich have just been adopted, to the secretaxy general of the United Nations~ to the president of the World Ba.nk and to the director general of the IMF, I~ Diawara, president of the Club of Da3car, will confirm the desire to reopen the North-South negotiations on the ba.sis of far-reaching thoughts and not in the spirit of "everyone for himself," which alone leads to catastrophe. The Club of Dakar Wi7.1 shown the xay. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie~ Paris~ 1980 84~63 - CSO: 4400 2$ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 i INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS REPORTAGE ON LOME I PROJECTS Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 5 Dec 80 pp 3328, 29 [Report from Brussels by a special correspondent: "Lome I and ~he Pro~ects of Regional Cooperation"] [Taxt] The Lome I Agreement reserved explicitly for regional cooperation an amount of approximately 10 percent of the credits, or 300 million European currency units (1 ECU = about 5.5 FFr). What is the status of the use of these crediCs? As of 1 December 1980, the situation is the following: nearly 77 percent of the avail- H able credits have been allotted, or more than 230 million ECU's. Of this total, around a third have actually been spent. Africa accounts for the largest part of the allotments, with more than 158 million. Bq large zones, the dfstribution for the pro~ects is the following: West Africa, 80.8 million; East Africa, 40.9 million; Central Africa, 8.1 million; southern Africa, 25 million; to which is added 7.5 million for studies and 6.5 million for technical assiatance and training. The Caribbean has received nearly 20 million . and the Pacific countries 10 million. Finally, operations of general technical cooperation have absorbed more than 32 million: com~ercial promotion, budget of the "Center for Industrial Development," furniehing experts to the secretariat general of the ACP's [African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries], etc. Among the aid projects, the /transportation/ [in boldface] sector is predominant: more than 100 million ECU's, including 40 million allotted in eastern Africa, 26 million in West Africa, 8 million in central Africa, 18 million in southern Africa, more than 6 million in the Caribbean and more than 5 million in the Pacific. The number of pro~ects is quite high, and mostly concern works of a very significant financial amount: 10 million ECU's for the Abid~an-Accra axis, 20 million for the Lusahunga-Bukumbe highway, more than 12 million for the Butare-Kayenza highway, 10 million for the Botswana-Zambia highway, etc. The second sector is perhaps more surprising: it concerns /training institutions/ [in boldface] such as the "Veterinary Institute of Dakar" (4.5 million ECU's), the "University of the South Pacific" (3.2 million), for a total of nearly 28 million which concerns mostly West Africa and southern Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Next comes the domain of /large dams/ [in boldface] which with only two pro~ects totals 20 million ECU's, in West Africa: "Senegal River Development Organization" 29 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 (OMVS) and "Mano River Union," not to mention the studies. Finally, the fourth sector in order of financial importance is that of /industry/ [in boldface] which _ with the "Cimao" pro,ject [West African Cement Company] already accounts for 18 million ECU's, not counting the "Center for Induatrial Development," etc. These four sectors total nearly 200 million ECU's, or 87 percent of the all~:tments. This diatribution clearly shows the need, felt by the different States involved, to put regional integration in a priority position on an organized, modern network of lines of communfcation between them. It might perhaps be tempting to regret the absence, among the important sectors, of regional research (agricultural ~ research, solar or wind energy, etc.), which should have made a better showing, but perhaps the Sth EDF [European Development Fund] will balance the 4th on this point. The European Commission has just decided upon a apecial aid package of one million ECU's in favor of the following countries: Benin, Ghana, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Togo. Thie aid responds to the call directed to the EEC by the "International Office of Epizooties" (OIE) and by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for the institution of an emergency program intended to combat cattle disease of which several outbreaks have recently reappeared in five countries of the region with danger of propagation. The total cost of this program is eatimated at 5.142 million ECU's. The Commission also decided upon a special aid package of 150 thousand ECU's in favor of the Central African Republic for the purchase of essential goode intended for the populations of the Northeast affected by the famine. /Next Seminar at Lome on the Center for Industrial Development/ [in boldface] "The Center for Industrial Development (ACP-EEC Agreement of Lome) is organizing on 9, 10 and 11 December 1980 at Lome, a seminar to attract the attention of the - countries of West Africa on the functions of the CID and in particular the new aspects as defined in the new Lome Agreement. This seminar will bring together three participants from each country chosea from ministries of industry or planning, from development organizations, from banks or private industry, from technical ministries, agencies or institutions. Also present will be representaCives of the Commission of European Communities, of the European Investment Bank, of the Council of Ministers, of the ACP secretariat, of the ACP-EEC Committee for Industrial Cooperation, of the local branches of the CID, of regional organizations of the ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African StaCes] and of the European Office of Patents. The seminar will be presided over by Mr Peter A. Afolabi, co-president of the ACP-EEC Committee for Industrial Cooperation. - The agenda will allow for, among others, sessions of dialogue in the course of which the two following points will be discussed: promotion of the CID for the establishment of new industrial enterprises in the countries of West Africa with the intervention of EEC industry; potential assistance of the CID in the adaptation of technology and assistance to the existing industries. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980 9508 CSO: 4400 3~ . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS ~ INTERNATIONAL COCOA ACCORD EXAMINID Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3133 - [Editorial: "Economic or Political Priorities"] , [TextJ We must no doubt rejoice that it was possible to arrive at an international agreement on cocoa in Geneva. Naturally, dialog between producers and consumers is always preferable to absence of negotiations, no matter how difficult the latter. Nevertheless, in spite of the conclusion of the talks which were staggered over 2 yearg, questions remain. Without discussing in detail the technical provisions it is significant that two of the countries most directly concerned have refused to sign. One, the Ivory Coast is the chief cocoa producer, the other, - the United States, the chief consumer. Their principles are simple and typical of the misunderstanding prevailing between ; the rich countries of the industrialized world and the poor countries producing the - basic products or raw materials. The Ivory Coast states that its present marketing prices do not permit the suitable � remuneration of the planters, and that the totally erratic fluctuations of the rates on the world market are to be explained not by economic considerations, but by the interplay of unbridled international speculation which precludes any - reasonable planning of its development. Such a situation can only lead to the land being abandoned by discouraged farmers, who come and increase the population of the suburbs of the large cities and the number of unemployed, with all the risks ~ of internal "destabilization" resulting in the country. The Ivory Coast is therefore attempting to obtain the guarantee for the regular and negotiated increase of the sale prices for export, in the same way exactly as the consumers, the industrialized nations, wish to obtain from the oil producing countries an engagement on progressive price increases fixed by common agreement. The Geneva accord did not seem to the Ivory Coast to be accomplishing this objective, so it refused to be associated therewith, and it is extremely probable, as it asserts, that its evaluation of the agreement is ahared by other producers. On the contrary, - the United States, and to a lesser degree, the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain maintain that price fluctuatione are caused by the phenomenon of the ad~ustment of s~xpply and demand according to the laws of a liberal economy. The * The broad lines of the contract may be found in MARCHES TROPICAUX of 21 November i 1980, p 3116 I i ~ ~ . , 31 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 world stocks now amount to about 450,000 tons, and the cocoa crop is abundant for the fourth consecutive year. It is therefore not surprising that the market is on a downward trend. Being faithful to the principles of liberalism, the iJnited States who have nevertheless ~ust ratified the accord on the Funds of Stabilization of Raw Materials, are hardly favorably inclined towards agreements which distort the market interplay. By the way, they had signed neither of the two previous international accords on cocoa, of 1972 and 1975. On the other hand, the United States point out that cocoa is not an indispensable product and that the democratic governments have no means of c~mpelling their industrialista to give up the use of the synthetic products which may be taken as cocoa substitutes. What can the producers do then? Try to change the volume of the production offered on the market? It is impossible for them to reduce the production, unlike the oil producers, whose resources are maintained intact in their subsoil, in this case lack of maintenance of cocoa plantations leads to their premature aging and has an adverse effect on their future production capacity. Should they store some of their crop? Storage costs are high, since the proper preservation of cocoa requires costly solutions. Should they establish a cartel and use the regulating funds created in the execution of the two previous agreements, and which amounts today to about $230 million? At present rates, the fund would permit the purchase of about 100,000 tons, that is an amount insufficient by far to affect the rates. After the expiry of the second international agreement in March 1980, the producing countries had agreed, in a spirit of conciliation, not to demand, as they were entitled, the dissolution of this fund and the reimbursement to the producing countries of the 90 percent to which they were entitled, desiring thus to leave the chance of arriving at another international agreement. The Ivory Coast now considers that it has been very poorly paid for its good faith. Actually, to be able to affect effectively the rates, the cartel of producers should have at its disposal a mass of financial resources which they do not possess today. Unless they request the countries which have an eccess of available capital, such as certain OPEC countries, or the cocoa producing countries should discover oil deposits on their own territories--that is the case of the Ivory Coast--and should use their oi1 resources to maintain the cocoa rates... Since a~t the present time, cocoa is not a strategic product, the producers are practically disarmed, and after a rear guard struggle for the sake of their honor, have no solution other than to bow to the law of the mighty. Therein lies precisely the core of the problems of development. In all the international forums, the representatives of the governments of the industrialized countries proclaim loudly their solidarity with the 'I'hird World countries, and acknowledge the imperious need to raise the standard of living of their populations, if only to facilitate the creation of a market for their manufactured products. These same industrialized countries are prepared to accomplish non negligible efforts to help the Third World countries to restore the equilibrium in their balance of - payments, and to achieve progress in the setting up of infrastructures, the improvement of the productivity of agriculture, basic education and professional training. But the industrial world does not seem capable of understanding that " the most rational means of permitting the Third World to achieve these objectives is to guarantee it the receipt of stable export income, especially when these revenues come from a single product, such as is the case for many developing countries. It is quite apparent that the simple interplay of the laws of the market 32 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY between unequal partners, even if it is not distorted by purely spectulative i maneuvers, cannot assure this stability of resources. It is therefore the prerogatives of the governments to choose between the immediate interests of their industrialists, in this case, the chocolate manufacturers-- but cocoa is only taken as an example here--and their long term interest, that is, their economic and political relations with the whole of the developing world, which holds a considerable part of the basic products and raw materials, not to mention oil, indispensable to the industries of the developed countries of the world. It is essentially a political choice which represents a heavy future commitment. A real desire to help the development is manifested at least as much in the positions adopted in the secret negotiations in Geneva or elsewhere, in connection with any agreement on products as in the declarations naturally impregnated with the greatest understanding aad deepest generosity at the tribune of the United Nations, but which have hardly any other merit than that of being _ non-binding. It is inconsistent to denounce the risks of destabilization of the Third World in Africa in particular, and at the same tir~e to contribute to this very destabilization by removing from the local governments the means of fighting against it by improving the lot of their people. The example of the international accord on _ cocoa is a timely reminder for us of this fact. Not all the governments of the Nine Nations of the EEC have as yet become aware of this. On the other hand, it should be mentioned that the officials of the Brussels Coa�nission, whom it is fashionable in certain circles to refer to as "technocrats" prove to be more far-seeing politicians in the area of this type of problems. COPURIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980 9018 CSO: 4400 i i� I i' 33 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ i I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS BRIEFS PROGRESSIVE FORCES GROUPING--The creation of a"grouping of African progressive , forces" was central to Soviet-Ethiopisn discussions from the beginning of the off i- c ial visit by Lt Col Mengistu Haile Mariam to Moscow (where he arrived 27 October). Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Liberia would be membera. But not Guinea or Guinea-Bissau. (Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE ia FYench 19 Nov 80 p 41] 9693 CSO: 4400 34 FOR OFFICI~IL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OF . _ ANGOLA " WEST ADVISED TO ABANDON HOSTILE 4TTITUDE Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in F`rench 19 Nov 80 p 36 [Article by Francois Soudan: "The Time of the Co~issioners"] � [TextJ Independence saas achieved 5 years ago on 11 November, but the ann~vereary was not a euphoric one. The Angolan file, the reaults of 5 yeara of independence, reads a bit like a court case. With the indictment, the defense, and the extenuating circumstances. Those who see Angola as a state on probation stress that, or almost nothing, has changed there since 1975, and that 5 years later, this state still does not control its territory: 20,000 Cuban soldiera are permanently stat ioned between Cabinda and Benguela, and insecurity continues to reign in the four southern pro- - v inces (Moxico, Bie, Cuando-Cuhango, f~nene) where UNITA's (the rebellion move- - ment's) forces continue to operate with varying results. - Their chief, Jonas Savimbi, who benefits from the discreet support of Ga~~n, the Ivory Coast, and particularly of Senegal (he claims to support "b~ack socialism"), has established hia general's tieadquarters in the north of Namibia. His troops are armed by South Africa, but also--Savimbi recently repeated this--by the People's Republic of China. ' Ir:dictment ~ To the north, the enclave of Cabinda is atso agitated by autonomist rumblings, while the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclav~i has been deprived of ita leadership by the death of its "historic leader" N'Zita Henriques Tiago at the be- ginn ing of September, no doubt the victim of a settling of accounts. Reconciliation policies seem to be excluded, since during the month of August, again, 25 antagonists were executed. Others, the "advocates", note, however, the successes in the areas of education and of health, ae well as the "spirit of democracy" which rQigns at the time of the iimninent replacement of the Council of the Revolution by a popularly elected as- sembly. Above all, they feel that the true source of all the probleme is the con- stant intervention of the South African Army. These many territorial violations, ~ i i i 35 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE 0!JLY . t I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 which culm3nated at the beginning of June with the "operation Smokeshell" (J.A. No 1016) have obliged the Angolan government to devote almoet half of its budget to national defense. Nothing is untrue in this indictment, or in the defense, except that to the list _ of handicaps must be added the death of Agostinho Neto, a little more than a year - ago, on 11 September 1979. The cautious attempts at internal and extemal political openness, 3nitiated during the last m~onths of his life by the one that was affec- tionately called "Netinho" have since been blocked. Only Neto, no doubt, had suf- - ficient authority and charisma to criticize his own errors. His successor, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, is primarily a puppet, around whom men like the minister of security, Kundi Payama, the head of defense, Pedro Maria Tonha (who replaced Iko Carreira in this post) , and the head of the party organization, Iucio Lara, p~ay an all-powerful role. This is without counting the 17 provincial commiseioners who, with ministerial rank, practically constitute a parallel government. On the Cond it ion This tendency towards extreme militarization and "sovietization" of the country _ will only be reinforced if the West continues to adopt its frankly hostile at- titude towards Angola. Recall that, in 1978, returning from a visit to Luanda, - the European development commissioner, Claude Cheysson, strongly recommended large- scale economic assietance. Nothing, or little, since has come from the West. The ihiited States, who still have not recognized Angola, even risk turning their hostility into open de�iance. At the end of June, in fact, the senate in ~ash- ingtoa decided to aanul the "Clark ammea.dment" which, since 1976, has prohibited the CIA from intervening with the FNLA, and particularly with ZJNITA. T'he pro- Savimbi "lobby" (which includes such prestigious names as Henry Kissinger, Henry Jacksan, Thomas 0'Neill, and Stansfield Terner) thus hopes--and they are not hiding it--to make the Soviets pay for the invasion of Afghanistan. On the condition, of course, that they will have an attentive ear in the White House. Ronald Reagan's, for example. COPYRIGHT : Jeune Afrique GRUPJLA 1980 _ 9693 CSO; k400 . 36 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ! i ANGOLA i i NEW EQUIPMENT, IMPROVEAiENTS FOR BENGUELA RAILROAD Par is MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French S Dec 80 p 3258 ~ [Te xt] The question of whether the Benguela Railroad did or did not provide domes- ! tic seYVice, even sporadically, during the period 1976-1978 can be argued ad infinitum. One thing is certain, however, na.mely that the railroad was closed to international traffic during that period. Furthermore, this denial of access ' to the port of Lobito was financially detrimental to Zaire and Zambia. This situation has now--November 1978--returned to normal, but the feeling of insecurity persists all along that section~of the railroad in areas still controlled by UNITA [Natianal Union for the Total Independence of AngolaJ. Nevertheless, the ~ shipping of copper has resumed via this line which~ all things considered, governa the future development of regional railroad projects. Fears expressed about inevitable competition from the TAZARA [Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority] railroad once that liae became o~erational, have proved to be ' highly exaggerated, inasmuch as Zambian copper contin.~s to be exported mainly via ' Atlantic ports. Moreover, there is apparently no reas~~n to believe such fears would revive if a new railway line connecting Kinshasa to Ilebo were to become a ~ real ity . ~ . ; Consequently investment funds are once again being granted the Bengue3a railroad for the purpose of enhancing its operating efficiency. The EEC, for example, recently approved financial aid designed to further dieselize the railroad's locomotive fleet (18 diesel locomotives) and increase its freight carrying capacity (900 freight cars). This EEC assistance amounts to 8 million dollars. In addi- tion, an agreement recently signed with the Arab Bank for African Economic . - Development will enable Angola to have 10 million dollars for capital expenditures. The railroad unquestionably has major requirements both for infrastructure facili- ties and equipment. The infrastructure requirements are topped only by the priority ; need to replace and qualitatively improve equipment. These requirements are expres- sed in financial terms in the 1980 equipment budget's goals. This budget totals _ some 45 million pounds sterling, including 9.2 million for the purchase of locomo- tives (17 road diesel-elactric locomotives and 12 diesel-hydraulic switch engines), 28 million for railroad cars (52 passenger cars and 900 freight cars), and 3.7 million for track repairs and improvements. I i ~ I 37 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ i ~ ~ i I I ~ I ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 Angola's three main railroada all nationalized, are not connected one to the other. This disadvantage is a recurrent major topic of discussion. Interconnecting these three lines would, among other advantages, provide better distribution of the traffic load among each of the ports whose current capacitiea are not flexible enough to handle variations in the volume and rate of traffic. A north-south line --Luanda-Benguela/Lobito-Mocamedes--will probably be the sub~ect of very detailed and rather long-range study. If funding for this long-awaited pro~ect can be ob tained, it will undoubtedly become a reality. Mining of Zambia's rich uranium depoaita would condition, at least in party, any development of the western rail line of that country's Atlantic outlet. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980 8041 CSO: 4400 _a . 38 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 ANGOLA BRIEFS USSR AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION--USSR specialists recently visited Angola to make a profitability study co.ncerning the establishment of agricultural companies for cotton and wheat cultivation. Regardictg cotton, the area under consideration measures about 30,000 hectares for the production of approximately 80,000 tons. The cultivation of cotton ia on an upswing in Angola and should become very important in an economic and social context during the next 5 years. Established � in 1978-1979 ~n a modest scale, cotton plantations reach ed 9,000 hectares in 1979-1980 and 13,000 hectares for the 1980-1981 season, with an estimated produc- tion of 13,000 tons. Increased production will thus satisfy the needs of the domestic textile industry. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3179] CSO: 4G00 , 39 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 BENIN UNRF�.ST IVITIIIN LABOR GR~UpS EXAMINED Paris PIARCHES TROPICAUX TiT TICDITERRANEfiNS in French 5 Dec 80 p 3346 [Text] The labor world o.f Benin is undergoing a crisis due to conflicts of in- fluences and interests and to partisan clashes. All these conflicts make it difficult to viea~ with con~idence and serenity the situation that prevails at the present time. Nevertheless, it is possible to recall certain lines of fc~rce of the union movement since th~ accession of President Kerekou's r~qime 8 years a,v,o. - The advent of President Kerekou's r~gime was not a union move, but the unions c~uickly gave him their support and cooperation. Nevertheless, in 1975 the National Federation of Unions succeeded in removing from its secretariat P1r (;h~zo, who had been a member of that secretariat for many years. IVhen P~r (fiezo was ex- pelled, an open~crisis arose in the union movement. The faction led by D1r ~h~zo remained loyal to him, and P1r Ghezo found himself secretary general o~ the manag- ing office of the National Federation of Workers Unions of Benin (UNSTB). That orqanization became one of the basic organizations of the party. But certain local cells called in vain for the summoning of a clarification congress which never took place. On the contrary, these cells were centered around elements ~ favorable to the so-called "oPportunist" line. As these groupings made possible a strict control, it was decided to hold a congress in December 1980, whereas it was suPposed to have been held after at least 4 years. That explains the excite- ment that has been observed; for the last 3 or 4 months local cells of. the ~h~zo faction of the UNSTB have been holdino mini-congresses every week end. But, con- trary to what might have been hoped, unanimity has not been achieved. For after having eliminated, in 1975, the purist unionist faction, which might be called Leftists in European terms, the UNSTB has been encountering within the Revolutionary Party of Benin itself, of which the UNSTB forr?s a part, resistance by - opposition groups which do not recognize the present managing office run by Mr Gh~zo. These oppositions have led to the formation of ou�law unions, of paral~el unions. F.xpulsions have already been announced and arrests made. It is useless to say that yesterday's "leftist" faction should be rubbing their hands today. The situation is such that President Mathieu Kerekou's arbitration will be f.ound necessary. And if in addition to the economic problems due to improvisations and to chaotic and irrational management of the state corporations, he must confront union agitation and turmoil among the members of his own party, he runs the risk of not bein~; master o~ the situation for long. Tl~e shortcomings of the UNSTB arise from the erosion of its leadership, from their continual compromisin; with all the regimes that have replaced each other in the L~0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 country, which has led to a lack of credibility among the rank and file, who judge somewhat severely the concentration of roles and the plurality of of~ices that they observe in union o~ficials. Thus one may be both cabinet minister and secretary general of. a union; one may be retired and resume office in a field that is not his own; one may remain secretary general in his sector, in which he has been allowed to take advantage of his retirement rights; or still better, one may be vice president of the Revolutionary Ceneral Assembly, director general of the Benin Social Security Office, and secretary general of the union... Mother tragedy of the UhST6 is not having provided itself with any known nroQrar~, having bound itself to international union institutions when its everyday concern should be the training of its members and staff. This lack has been remarked upon several times by the chief of state in the course of his visits to the corpora- tions, when he observed that when the workers do not even know their rip,hts, it is useless to demand that they meet their obli~ations. The ?,�orker in Benin holds industry congresses because it is demanded of him. He also looks on impassively at the leaders' squabbles. He certainly considers that he has not yet been given the floor. And the unanimity that is observed at these _ cong~:esses conceals much too much resentment in a country where the labor world - is �raditionally undisciplined and rebellious. It is said at Cotonou that criti- ci~m should be voiced at all stages. It might be use�ul, by way of suiting the action to the word and in order to get in out of the storm, to allow the real worker to speak, as the higher echelons were allowed to do in October 1979... ACEC: RePresentative at Cotonou for !Vest Africa The Charleroi Electrical Engineering Shops (ACEC) have just installed a represent- ative at Cotonou for the countries of Plest Africa. He is Mr Francis T~onin, and . may be contacted at BP 1881, Cotonou 1 or by Telex N� 5085. COPYRIGHT: Ren~ riorPux et Cie, Paris 1980 $$15 CSO: 4400 ~1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 CAPE VERDE COUNTRY SUITED TO NEW ENERGY SOURCES RESEARCA Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 10 Nov 80 p 36 [Article by Augusta Conchiglia] [Text] Diversification and augmeatatioa of foreign assist- - ance have become a vital necessity. ThQ visit which Pedro Pires, prime minister of the Republic of Cape Verde, made to Paris at the end of October--where he met his French counterpart, Raymond Barre, as well as the ministers of foreign affairs and of cooperation, Jean Francois-Poncet and Robert Galley, respectively--was concluded by the guarantee on France's part of an increase in the sid supplied to the archipelago. New Energy Sources France is also involved in projects of national interest, such as the installa- tion of an inland station for radio coverage of the whole archipelago, and establish- ment of~a center for applied research iato new energy sources. The latter project, which would be f inanced and implemented within the framework of the Inter-State Com- mittee to Fight the Drought in the Sahel, should eaable eacploration of new tech- nologies for the use of solar and wind energy. Cape Verde, exposed throughout the year to the sun and to violent winds, in fact constitutes an ideal location for experiments ia the f ield of research of "energies of the future". Petroleum bills are becaming iasupportable for this small country which is deprived of signif icant natural reaources. Thus, we muat profit from scientific progress in this area," remarked the Cape Verdian prime minister during a preas conference in Paris. Tn this regard, he indicated, there are proapects for development of economic relations with Nigeria, which is interested in 3mport- ing salt--of which Cape Verde is a large producer--and in cooperation in the area of f ishing. On the other hand, Lagos could supply oil. While awaittng or, better, while looking at, the future, Cape Verde wants to be a pilot country for nonconventional energies. As the archipelago is of volcanic origin, the applied research could also bring results in tne area of geothermal energy. Sweden and Belgium, moreover, have undertaken. studies in this area. � . - 1~2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 To counteract the effects and also, in part, the causes of drought, Cape Verde, since ite independence, has launched a spectacular campaign to retimber and to work on the "protection and restoration of soils" on all the ielands. In 1979, 1 mi111on treea were planted, and hundrede of dikes and miles of terracea were built to "anchor" the mountains and protect the fertile lands which the rains, as rare as they are violent, have carried towards the sea for decades. Absorption of Unemployment The results of this work are already visible in the increase in agricultural pro- duction over the past few years. Progress in collecting undergroimd water as, for example, on the island of San Nicolau, which will soon have large water reserves for both consumption and irrigation, is encouraging and assures, at the very least, a better existence for the people. Let us also note that +the work for soil pro- - tection and the rearrangement of the agriculture, also achieved by means of funds from foreign food aid, have enabled maximum employment, with Praia thus absorbing _ the chronic une~ployment which, for almost half a century, has compelled mass mi- gration of Cape Verdians. However, Cape Verde is still far from being able to depend on its own resources, and it must go abroad to cover its essential needs. COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie ' 9693 CSO: 4400 43 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ CAPE VERDE BRIEFS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION DOWN--The total volume of Cape Verde's agricultural production for the present year will only be 14 percent of an average year (with 7,164 tons (because of the drought which has again affected the country, - the Cape Verdian Ministry of Rural Development indicated on 19 December. A team from donor countries and organizations has just visited Cape Verde and has reco~ended that emergency foodstuffs assistance be granted, as well as assistance aimed at the regiona under irrigated cultivation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Dec 80 p 3533] BADEA FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT LOAN--The Arab Bank for African Economic Devel- opment (BADEA) has granted Cape Verde a 2.4 million dollar loan to finance ~ a pro~ect aimed at the development of the fishing sector. According to the terms of an agreement signed on 21 December in Khartoum between the ambassa- dor of Cape Vetde in Senegal and the deputy director general of the BADEA, this loan is reimbLYSable in 12 years following a grade period of 3 years, at an annual interest rate of 4 percent. The total assistance granted Cape Verde by the BADEA amounts to 11,464 million dollars in the form of emergency ai~. (Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Dec 80 p 3533] CSO: 4400 ~ FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CCCE AID TO TRANSPORT, INFRASTRUCTURE, TELECOP4tiJNICATIONS REPORTED Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3416 [Text] Following the official visit to CAR [Central African Republic] by Robert Galley, French minister of cooperation, from 27 November to 2 December, France granted a loan of 1 billion CFA [African Financial Conmaunity] francs (20 million French francs) to CAR. This loan was made by the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) for the purchase of an oil fleet made up of barges and tugboats for the transport of hydrocarbons from Kinshasa and Brazzaville. In addition, an agreement in principle was reached for the granting of financial aid of 450 million CFA francs for the purchase of materials and the operation of a light piece of machinery for the maintenance of the Berberat~-Carnot-Baoro road (202 kilometers). In the rural development sector, an agreement in principle was also reached for continuation of research and development of cotton cultivation, as the current _ program is about to expire. As regards infrastructures, a credit of 25 million CFA francs was granted for a modernization study of the Bangui-Mpoko Airport with a view to the accommodation of heavy cargo planes. Also, two negotiations involving 580 million CFA francs are in progress for the supplying of equipment and the renovating of river trans- port facilities. The present status of renovation of the Bangui urban telephone network, with the cooperation of the BDEAC (Development Bank of the Central African States) (240 million CFA francs) and the FAC (Aid and Cooperation Fund) (100 million CFA francs) was the sub3ect of long discussion as was the project to expand the Bangui tele- phone network which was studied by SOFRECOM [?French Communications Company]. Agreement was reached on the need for postponing the implementation of this impor- tant telecommunications program, provisionally estimated at 3.5 billion CFA francs, until the Central African Office of Posts and Teleco~nunications has been restored to operation. = Finally, an agreement was reached on the need for periodically sending technical - aesistance to all sectors, concomitant with the growth of needs and the trair~ing of Central African cadres. 45 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 Additionally, shortly after Galley's visit, the director for economic development of the French Ministry of Cooperation, Mr Joudiou, was received by President Dacko with whom he discussed the technical financial assistance given by France to Central Africa and also studied the resources needed for the economic recovery ~f Central _ Africa. Finally, it was learned on 8 December that France would supply the Central African Republic with a shipment of repair kits for the 100 kilowatt short-wave receiver installed in Bimbo and spare parts for the Bangui production center. The agree- ment amounting to 60 million CFA francs also covers the supplying of supplementary repair kits for the equipment and maintenance of low and high frequency radio gear. French aid will also be used for equipping a low frequency recording studio. The two countries also signed an agreement covering a share by France in studies on the Central African section of the Mombasa-Lagos Trans-African road. French _ aid, which totals 29 million CFA francs, will be available in the form of FAC grants. This aid from France will permit in particular the building of the Sibut/Kaga- Bandoro/Sido roads and the access roads to Mbres and Batangafo in the firat 6 months of 1981. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980 8143 CSO: 4400 1~6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC BRIEFS BOKASSA AIDES QUIT--1tao of ex-Emporor Bokassa's companions in exile have recently left him. And not the least araong them, since they were the former chief of protocol, Eugene Makouta, and former aide-de-camp, Colonel Bongo. The former - sovereign also suspects one of them to have carried off some papers bearing his - personal s ignature. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 37] 9516 RELEASE OF OPPOSITION r~ERS--Several political activists of the Central African People's Liberation Movement (MLPC) of Ange Patasse, the Ubangi Patriotic Front (FRO) of Abel Goumga and the Ubangi Liberation Front (FLO) of Sylvestre Bangui, who were arrested or confined to their residence for the crime of dissidence, have been released. [Text) ~Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3416] 8143 CSO: 4400 47 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CHAD HABRE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF CONTINUING GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST GOUKOUNI Paris L'EXPRESS in French 22 Nov 80 p 116 [Article by Christian Hoche: "Chad: A Trap for Qadhdhafi? Libya� Co~nits Its Commandoes to Chad. Danger for Africa or a Trap for the Overweening Colonel?"] - [Text] "In the old days the Arabs sold the Blacks. Today, they buy them..." Must one see only impertinence in the declarations of this dip- lomat who is evoking the recent participation of Libyan units in the fighting ravaging the north and central regions of Chad? - Of course, not. It was in mid-Oc~ober when the head of state, Goukouni Oueddei, who only had shreds of suthority left, appealed for Libya's mili- tary aid. This was in application of an aid agreement signed in June with Tripoli. The opportunity was j ust too beautiful for Colonel Mu`a~aar Qadh- dhafi, who dreams of a Saharian republic stretching all the way from the Atlantic Ocean to the frontiers o� Egypt. The military situation, at the end of October, wae clearly in favor of the Defense Minister Hiasein Habre~s FAN [Northern . Armed Forc2sl� They repelled to the north of Ndjamena the sol- diers of the President, the so-called FAP [Peoples Armed Forces], and for months had been holding Faya-Largeau, a key town of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti area. On 3 November, in a joint co~unique published in Tripoli, Goukouni Oueddei thanked Qadhdhafi for his "unconditional sup- port." The following day, the two men made a whole inspectio~n tour to Faya-Largesu, which fell into the hands of the FAP and of the Libyan units, which came overrunning from the Aouzou band. There is no longer any doubt: in the central part of the country Libyan "Islamic legionnaires," brought to Nd~amena by plane, fight by the side of Goukouni's men. In the north, they "aweep out" the last FAN pockets of resistance. Aow many are they, theae "Islamic brigades" accompanied by their artillerq and antiaircraft defense force? According to different calculations, one thousaad mea are at work in the Chad capital aad almoet three thousand are operating at 600 kilometers to the north. Their ~b~ective? It is to chase Hissein _ Habre and his partisans from their defense positions aad put an end to !~8 = FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the "duality of power." Up to now, the ancient jailer af Francoibe Claustre is resisting. But his forcea, weakened, dispersed and ~aspecially not having any heavy equipment, are risking very much being chased out of the capital. At once people are getting nervous in the neighboring countriea of Chad. From the Mali to Niger, from the Cameroon to Central Africa, and also - from Tunisia to Egypt, people demand the respect of the Lagos armistice agreements while condemning the "foreign interference." Some heads of state, not only among the less important ones, apparently have asked that France intervene in order to stop the Islamic crusade of Qadhdhafi. For the moment, Paris keeps to a most prudent course. Not without after- - thoughts. At6months away from the presidential elections it is incon- ceivable that one would go trap oneself again in Chad: let Qadhdhafi trap himaelf in there," declares one expert at the Quai d'Orsay with a com- plice's smile, Alone against everybody, it is thought Hissein Habre would still be capable of leading a harassment war against the occupying force. Moreover, he can also benefit from the acti~�e support of several African states which considered him, only yesterday, a"Marxist adven- turer." ~a Thus, one will have to follow attentively the meeting of the Niger River Commission which takes place, since 20~November, in Conak.ry. Thirteen heads of state are expected, among whom Nigeria's, whom his peers repor- tedly have asked for an energetic condeIImation of the "Libyan coup." It's - a voice which Che colonel should not ignore if he recalls his sad venture in Uganda. After Kampala, will it be Ndjamena? - COPYRIGHT: 1980 S.A. Groupe Express 1751 CSO: 4400 ~ - 49 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CHAD - BRIEFS NEW CHAD FLIGHTS--Air Afrique may soon once again be serving Chad. At least in partnership with a small airline that would assure connections between the cities of Moundou and Sarh, in the south, the only region that is relatively stable. [TextJ [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 37] 9516 CSO: 4400 ~ ~ 50 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . CONGO BRIEFS CABINET DECISIONS--The Congolese Council of Ministers which met in Brazzaville on 3 December made the following decisions: It decided to continue cooperation with Cuba in the sectors of rural economy, public works, national education, health and social affairs, labor and justice. The Council also examined the mining research dossier and on this score Minist~r of Mines Rodolphe Adaga was instructed to continue negotiations with a view to intensification of exploration - and mining exploitation. Finally, the Council approved a project authorizing the ~ state to grant a credit of 900 million CFA [African Financial Communit~] francs for the realinement of the Congo-Ocean Railway. [Text~ [Paris MAR'''iES TROPICAUX ET MEDIT~RRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3417] 8143 FRENCH FINANCING AGREEMENT--On 1 December, Congo and France signed a financing - agreement in Brazzaville amounting to 185 million CFA francs for construction of the port of Oyo, in the northern part of the People's Republic of the Congo. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3417] 8143 - WEST GERMAN SENTENCED--A West German, citizen, accused of economic and indus- trial espionage, has just been given a 2-year suspended sentence and a fine of ~ 2.4 million CFA francs by the Congolese courts. Gunter Runge, an engineer of , the Austrian Voest Alpine company and Pointe No ire, had ta set up an inventory of the repair work to be done on the Congolese national petroleum refinery built by that company. According to the indictu~~ent, he is said to have gathered in- formation on this refinery which he communicated to his company despite the can- - cellation of its contract with the Congolese Government. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3105] 6108 CSO: 4400 51 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ i' EQUATORIAL GUINEA FRENCH ECONOMIC AID NOT~D Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Nov 80 p 35 [Text] After visiting Spain, Morocco and its neighbors Cameroon and Gabon, Lt. Col Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo was in France from 13-17 November. The new man, very much Equatorial Guinean, met with Vale~-y Giscard d'Estaing and various French ministers. Besides the projects that are in progress since the November 1979 cooperation agreement (a total of 11 million francs for fishing, mine prospecting and improvements of the Malabo harbor), there was discussion concerning France's financing of a hydro-electric power station of 8 billion watts and cooperation in the oil industry. France is taking its place in this country that has for a long time been reserved - for the Spanish, then the Soviets. Which will no doubt suit Elf Aquitaine and , the Bureau of Geological and Mining Exploration (BGME). The assets of the French: an ambiguous attitude at the time of the Macias dictatorship (maintaining a diplomatic representation helped preserve the ties): the large number of Equatoriol Guineans who today speak Moliere's language, after being forced to go to neighboring _ French-speaking countries in search of work that the dictatorship was refusing them in their own country. This return of refugees, political and economical, remains in fact the weak point in the new regime: many still do not trust the leaders who collaborated with ' Macias before overthrowing him and who are in no hurry to initiate democratic institutions. COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980 9592 CSO: 4400 52 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 GABON ~ . DATA ON CURRENT, PROJECTED STATUS OF TRANSGABONESE RAILROAD Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITEFcRANEENS in F~ench S Dec 80 pp 3254-3255 I' [E~ccerpt] The Transgabonese Railroad was inaugurated on 27 December 1978. It ~ :?as been open to traffic since May 1979, but anly on its 182-kilometer Owendo- Ndjole section. This section is obviously the first stage in a much larger pro~ect ~ that is still under construction. ~ The line is to be extended to the rail junction of Booue, PR325 [325 kilometers from start of lineJ, and will then continue on to its terminus in Franceville, , PK680. At Booue, the line will split into two branch lines, conetruction of which is scheduled to begin simultaneously: a 320-kilometer branch line to Franceville and a 240-kilometer branch line to Belinga. The Booue-Belinga section justified the original pro~ect by providing rail service , to the mineral resources of the Mekambo region with ita estimated iron ore reserves ; of 1.2 million tons of hematite combined with magnetite and goethite~ incluaing , 600 million tons assaying at 65 percents When these rich deposits are mined, their output is to be hauled by rail to the future ore port of Santa Clara--pro- cessing capacity of more than 10 million tons per year; estimated cost of construc- ~ tion and equipment: 68 million CFA francs--via a 35-kilometer spur line star:ing ~ from the timber port of Owendo. Definitive studies of these railroad pro~ects have now been completed. Construction of the Booue-Franceville branch line is justified by the magnitude of the mining operations at Moanda. The Moanda mine ranks as the world's third largest producer of manganese. Promoters of the Transgabonese ~ailroad believe this new branch line will stimulate production which could, as a result, increase to 4 million tons per year--estimated reserves of 90 million tons-compared with the current 2.4 million tons per year, the maximum carrying capacity of the Congo-Ocean Railroad (CFCO). The terminus of this section ie situat~d in a uranium-bearing region--the Mounana deposit--whose annual production is close to 1,000 tons from an eatimated reserve of 20,000 tons. The Franceville branch line nay also increase thia mine's annual output. Work on the Ndjole-Booue sectian is continuing. The stretch from Nd~ole to Ayem (PK257), half-way between Ndjole and Booue, will probably be completed in 1981 and ~ _ the stretch from Ayem to Booue in 1982. Deforestation and grading work is practi- cally finished between Ndjole and Ayem. At the project's current rate of progress, track-laying operations could resume in June 1981, unless construction is deliberate- ly slowed for financial reasons, as was the case this year. Roadbed construction work which started in Franceville has advanced approximately 30 kilomeCers and all 53 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 . work which atarted in Franceville has adv~nced approximately 30 kilometers and all grading was completed on that atretch last September. When the Transgabonese Railroad is completed, ocean-bound traffic on the railroad as s whole is expected to consiat mainly of timber~ manganeae ore, ferromanganese ore, manufactured goods (batteries), foodstuffs, and sugar. Inland-bound traffic is expected to consist mainly of staple commodities, supplies necessary to the min- ing industry and forest products industry, hydrocarbons, cement, building materials, and capital goods. _ Operating res ults on the section now open to traffic have not yet confirmed these - expectations. It will not be possible to really assess this railroad's importance _ until it is fully operational. In 1979, however, the line carried an average of 5,000 passengers per month, but freight traffic remained at its initial very low level despite the decision granting the railroad the monopoly on transporting tim- ber, a decision which timber firms claim is designed to forcibly make the railroad show a profit at their expense. ~ - On the other hand, the railroad's positive aspect as an instrument of regional ~ development and economic expansion has already been confirmed by the establishmsnt of industrial firms along its route: the cement plant in Ntoum, the crossties manufacturing plant in Essara, and the gravel quarry in Makora. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1980 8041 CSO: 4400 51~ - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY GABON BRAZILZAN AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES FUTURE COOPERATION Paris MARCHE~ TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3170 [Report on statement by Joao Areias Neto, Brazilian ambassador to Gabon, made in Libreville--date not specified] [Text] Mr Joao Areias Neto, Brazilian ambassador to Gabon, confirming that Brazil will henceforth import 46,000 barrels of oil per day (2,300,000 metric tons per year) from Gabon, expressed the opinion in Libreville that the imbalance in trade exchange between the two countries (Brazil currently sells Gabon $30 million worth of goods ' a year) w~ll be soon corrected by the arrival of Brazilian company of the "Engexco" group, charged with increasing trade exchange with Gabon. Such will be the case with the "Enplanta" company which, by building sheds and houses for the presidential guard, will use up part of the $25-million line of credit granted to Gabon by Brazil; this credit has allowed the Gabonese Government to purchase from Brazil four "Bandeirante"-type planes and public transport buses. The Brazilian Government has also granted to Gabon another line for $10 billion. This has been used by the Gabonese Government and semigovernmental enter- � prises such as CODEV (Commercial and Development) to purchase electric appliances, furniture, vehicles, buses, and recently vedette boats, which were presented to the _ public during the parade held last 17 August. Another line of Brazilian credit worth $140 million, granted in 1978, has n~t been used as a result of the austerity policy decreed in 1977. Technological cooperation will enter a new phase with the approaching arrival of Brazilian technicians in Libreville to evaluate Gabon's possibilities to produce alcohol from cassava and sugar cane. The ambassador also announced the imm~inent opening in Libreville of a branch of the "Banco Real," a private Brazilian bank, which should be foZlowed sometime in 1981 by a branch of the "Agencia do Brasil," a publicly owned Brazilian bank. According to Mr Joao Areias Neto, Gabon and Brazil also intend to develop their trade exchange and to create a joint commission for cooperation. ~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980 9627 CSO: 4400 55 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY GUINEA-BISSAU BRIEFS COMMISSIONS FORMED--Five commissions have been created on 16 December by the Council of the Revolution in power ia Guinea-Bissau since 1~: November; they will be responsible for supezvising the activities of the government. nao of them, the defense and security camm~ission and the economy and finance coffinis- eion will be under Gen Joao Bernardo Vieira, chairman of the Council of the _ Revolution. The commission for interior, information and culture will be under Victor Saude Maria, deputy chairman of the Council of the Revolution and state commissioner for foreign affairs. The commission for education, health and social affairs is headed by Samba Lamine Mane, state commissioner for natural resources. Finally, the coa~ission for justice and administration is presided by Manuel Saturnino da Costa, state co~nissioner for interior. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Dec 80 _ pp 3532-3533] CSO: 4400 . 56 FOF OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IVORY COAST STRUGGLE FOR SUCCESSION TO PRESIDENCY DISCUSSED Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 pp 32-34 ~ [Article by special correspondent Sennen Andriamirado: "New Successor Sought--after the elections, a struggle is going on to rule the roost; but the assembly president will no longer be the chief of state's constitutional successor"] [Text] During nearly one month's time oniy once did I see the forces of law and order get edgy. It was on 23 November, at t'~e time of the second round of ballotting for the legislative elections, in the Gbagba polling station courtyard in Bingerville. A soldier, machinegun slung across his shoulder and a black beret sitting awry on ; his head, was laying into a band of young people who were trying to cut in line: - "They have to get in line," he explained to me, "I am going to hit them. There is more than enough chaos like that." The chaos in Abidja~ as well as other places early that morning made you think tha~t , voter participation was going to be greater than at the time of the first ballot on 9 November. All the people running polling stations I ran into that Sunday, 23 November, were optimistic about that. ~ That was because the candidates, just like the government, had spared no expense. ~ ~ At Bouna, for ~xample, journalist Jean Kambire, wha was in second place coming out , of the first ballot, got himself elected because he was the best organized: sup- porCers had rented buses or borrowed trucks to set up a ahuttle service between the voters' villages and the voting centers. ~ Between the time of the two ballots, cand~dates everywhere outdid each other in , passion to ~onvince their voters to get their identity cards, which are required for voting, issued to them by election day. But the statistics were to show that the participation level barely exceeded SO per- cent. Of ccurse in certain districts greater political consciousness improved the ' percentage. Thus, at Aboisso, 47.63 percent of those registered voted (as against 44.19 percent ' on the first ballot). At Abobo, on the outskirts of Abidjan, the level went from 19.22 percent to 21.29 percent. But these slight improvements did little to compen- sate for spectacular reverses such as that at Adzope where, compared to 46.07 per- i cent at the time of the first ballot, only 33.35 percent of the registered voters voted on 23 November. I 57 ~OR OFFICIAL USE t~NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 rvK urr~~.~At, u,G vivt,Y Some polling places were still closed during a good part of the morning because the ballots had not arrived on time, the voter lists had disappeared, or the polling place officiale had gotten lost in town. Some people were pt~t off because their names had mysteriously disappeared from the � . voting registera between the first and second ballots. At Treichville some young voters were challenged because, according to the polling place officials, "a student card is not proof of identity." And students definitely wanted to vote. Y.J., who had abstained in 1975 and who this time was turned back from a Treichville polling place, cried out to me: "Voting or not voting in 1975 amounted to the same thing. Today there is a chance to come and choose a candidate. Even if he's no good." Lecause '4ae enjoy seeing all these people coming nowadays bowing and scraping before us in ord~er to have our petty little votes. It is our revenge." Revenge? Yes. Voters' revenge. The second ballot con- . firmed that incumben~s with expiring terms were being re~ected. The turnover in the assembly was 81.63 percent. Out of 147 deputies, 120 aYe new. Of the 80 with ex- piring terms who stood for election, only 27 were brought back. So the veterans literally bit the dust. Thus Mrs Gladys Anoma (50 years old), secretary-general of the Association of Ivorian Women (AFI) for 15 years and vice president of the National Assembly, lost in Cocody. In her defeat she joins - another assembly vice president, Maurice Oulate, and questeur Tiebla Ouattara. = When choosing among several veterans the voters sometimes preferred the one who smacked the least of the establishment. At Dimbokro the battle among three members whose terms were expiring ended in victory for the young~st, Amon Leon. But it was a tough one since the patriarchal Samba Ambroise Kone lost by a margin of only 427 votes. And only one minister (out of the six who stood as candidates) remained in the running: Etienne Ahin (Soc~al Affairs) in Bingerville. He was defeated. Democratic Process The verdict was final: Ivorians wanted to replace their politicians. Now comes _ waiting for the new assembly's leadership to be inatalled, which cannot be done un- til the day after 19 December, The date on which the present chamber's mandate ex- pires. But, fed by changing rumors; s~:ife among political followings, which is the functional equivalent of ideological debate here, has been heating up the political contest. And the "Old Man" had certainly kept up the suspense. Before the second round of balloting, he had allowed the stakes to rise among the pretenders to the thro~ne. A friend of Philippe Yace's--Yace being the outgoing president of the Natj.onal Assembly--was still saying to me 2 weeks ago: "It is the party's Political BurEau which is as usual going to designate candidates for the assembly leadership. ~ And since there is only one party, there will be no surprises. Democracy is all very weli but it has to stop at so~e point." "It" has not stopped. On 24 November, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the party's sole _ boss, held a meeting of the Political Bureau in order to make his recommendations. He had told me 2 days beforehand at Yamoussoukro: "I do not want to interfere. The democratic process must be fully played out. From now on, the parliamentarians will elect their leadership. Without party interference." 58 FOR OFFICIA~L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY As I was asking him if he were not afraid of a proliferation of candidates among the 147 deputies wanting to rule the roost, he answered me with a smile: "Don't worry. They know each other. There will be two or three candidates. No more." ; Ztao possible candidates are in any case already well known. First, Philippe Yace, , 60 years old, assembly president for 20 years, reelected in Jacqueville on the first round of balloting and who hia friends contend is "too much of a fighter" to ' be content with ~ust being a deputy like the rest. Then there is Henri Konan Bedie, 46 years old, ("I am actually a couple years older," he confided to me), former minister of economy (1965-1977), elected at Daoukro as of 9 November, and of whom it is said that he "didn't resign from the World Bank (1918- 1980) ~ust to have a minor role in the National Assembly." The two of them, Philippe Yace and Henri Konan Bedie, embody the atrife among political ~ followings and the quarrel between oldtimers and newcomers. Except that a third or a fourth may emerge who can keep the new assembly from aplitting into two implacably opposed camps. Besides which any and all candidates for chamber president may back out, faced with the prospect of not being the chief of state's official successor. Elected Vice President For President Houphouet is definite on this point: for a long time he has been - thinking about eliminating Article 11 of the constitution which entrusts the pr.eai- dency of the republic, in case that office is vacated, to the president of the National Assembly on an interim basis. - In a display of consu~ate political skill, Felix Houphouet-Boigny on 25 November gave the outgoing assembly the responsibilitS of changing the constitutiun. At the end ~ of a turbulent night session, the outgoing deputies passed a bill introduced by the , government, that is to say by the president, providing that the interim period, in ~ case of death, resignatiou or total impairment would be handled by a vice president elected at the same time as the chief of state and designated to replace him auto- matically. Only here we are: the president of the republic was reelected for 5 years on 12 October, and only the president, without any vice president. We would bet that before long the "Old Man" will find a way to fill the position before the 1985 presidential election. Above all, let us bear in mind for the moment that the National Assembly president no longer is or will be the constitu- tional "dauphin." But from now on the withdrawal of anyone in contention to rule that roost would be disgraceful. A Philippe Yace would be revealing that the assembly - presidency only interested him to the extent that it would make him the "dauphin," _ a Henry Konan Bedie that he only aspired to the position in order to become the "dauphin." COPYRI~HT: Jeune Af rique GRUPJIA 1980 9631 ~ CSO: 4400 i~ I ~ I I 59 ~ i FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY I I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IVORY COAST HOUPHOUET'S STAND ON COCOA PRICE ASSESSED Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Dec 80 p 43 [Article by Philippe Simonnot: "Cocoa: Houphouet's Aardheadedness"] [Text] Has the o~l gone up to his head? That is the question being asked � a little all over in the international economic and financial world when it comes to the case of President Houphouet-Boigny. T'he Ivory Coast is atill not decided to sign the new international agreement on cocoa which has been concluded by the other producers since the end of November in Ganeva (JEUNR AFRIQUE No 1040), aad the instigator, the strategist of this - irritating and disQuieting hardheaded stand is no doubt Houphouet himself. As the Ivory Coast stands a good chance to become a net exporter of oil in a few years, it is giving itself the luxury, it seems, tD upaet the cocoa agreement a little bit. To ~ustify its attitude, the Ivory Coast invokes one stipulation of the agreement signed in Geneva which foresees the situation where, in certain conditions, the key prices on the international market could be revised downward as a function of the situation. The Ivory Coast repreaentatives see this clause as unacceptable insofar as it forcea the producer countries - to run an unbearable risk. Compromise . Now all the other great producers of cocoa, notably Brazil, Nigeria and Ghana, have accepted this clause as a compromise solution. It is true that the prospects of the market are not looking good. The =ormidable price rises of the last few years (27 cents in American doilar terms in 1970-71; 66 cents in 1973-74; 165 cents in 1976-77; 159 cents in 1978-79) have led the producer countries, and in the first place the Ivory Coast, to increase considerably their plantation acreage, whereas during the same time, the consumption of cocoa has ceased to increase due precisely to the same price climb. Bold Game The result--a classical one for the economist--of this contradictory move- ment of the supply and demand is the appearance of more and more enourmous 60 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ment of the supply and demand is the appearance of more and more enormous aurpluaea and... a drop in the price: the price of cocoa today is a little und~r 100 cents per kilogram . In an attempt to contravent the fall in price, the Ivory~Coast has decided to store at great cost (for the conservation of this product is costly) ~ large quantities of cocoa, using up the finances of the Stabilization Fund which is now in the red. This is an operation made all the more costly by the fact that the production cost of the Ivorian cocoa, given the im- prudences that had gone in the investments, is on the average higher than that of the other producers. - In playing this bold game, the Ivory Coast has, it is remarked by the above-mentioned sources, it seems lost "tens of million of dollars." It seems very doubtful that the Ivorians would in this manner succeed in making the price of cocoa go up, the very existence of the stocks in their warehouses weighing heavily on the market. "One oL these days," it is further remarked, "they will have to put these stocks on the market." The other producers are not the only ones irritated by the hardheadedness of the Ivorians. Claude Cheysson, member of the European Common Market Commission in charge of Cooperation ar.d Development, whose mandate has just been renewed, has recently written to Houphouet-Boigny to make known his concern. It is better to have a not altogether satisfactory agreement than not to have any, he has said in effect. At the European Co~ission people are even more surprised by the attitude of the Ivorian President since in the past he was the one to attach a great deal of importance to the conclusion of a cocoa agreement; for according to him, what was at stake was the stability of this whole part of Africa where the fate of the ~ peasantry is strategic politically speaking. French Aid " On the other hand it is remembered also that the Ivory Coast has negotiated _ with the French Treasury a f inancial aid. The French Treasury has sent the request to the banks. The Ivorians who began by noting their unhappi- neas and disappointment (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1033) hgd in the end accepted the loan proposed to them at market condition: 600 million francs, aimed at consolidating their external debt. In fact, the French banks are not taking a great risk here aince they have in hand a"letter of intention" from the Treasury equivalent to a government warranty. COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980 1751 CSO: 4400 61 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 MALI BRIEFS DIFFICULT EC~NOMIC SITUATION--Mali must import 50,000 tons of cereals (10 billion Malian francs) to face a food deficit in the country estimated at more than 12d,000 tons," the Ministry�of Finance and Co~erce announced in - Bamako on 20 December. Because of this aerious economic aituation, Malian leaders met on 21 December eo review the 1980-81 budget. Despite official determination to restore economic and financial health, receipts for the 1980 budget (77.8 billion Malian francs) did not reach expected levels and the bud- get is being implemented in a climate of auster3.ty and tension. The Ministry - of Finance announces that this fs due to the fact that the country is land- locked and is affected by drought, world inf lation and by the rise in oil prices. The Ministry specified that Mali's oil bill will amount to 48 billion - Malian francs in 1981, compared to 33 billion for the preaent year. [Text] - (Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Dec 80 p 3533) CSO; 4400 62 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040340070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY S ENEGAL - PRESIDENT'S OFFICE DEFENDS TREATMENT OF MAMADOU DIA Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 21 - [Letter to the Editors from Mr Djibo Ka, director of the cabinet in the office of the president of the Republic of Senegal--passages b etween slantlines originally published in italics] [Text] The weekly JEUNE AFRIQUE published in its 12 November 1980 edition (No 1036) an article Siradiou Diallo cited Mamadou Dia, ex-president of the Council of Senegal, in his enumeration of /"personalities in Africa who have been victims of arbitrary actions."/ _ Because of Senegal's regard for JEUNE AFRIQUE and because of our concern always to remain faithful to the facts, I would like to bring to your attention the following facts with regard to the statement by Siradiou Diallo. 1. Mamadou Dia was not the victim of arbitrary action_ In fact, as you know, he tried, on 12 December 1962, to overthrow by force the instiCutions of the Republic of Senegal. - 2. Mr Dia was tried before the High Court of Justice o f Senegal, in accordance with the Senegalese constitution. 3. Mr Mamadou Dia had the right to a defense. 4. He was convicted, at the conclusion of the trial, which /"unfolded without restraints"/ according to LE MONDE of 14 May 1963. At the conclusion of the trial, which took four days, Mr Philippe Decraene, the - LE MdNNJE r.orr.espondent, concluded: /"Harsh justice, but justice all the same."/ . Moreover, Mr Dia was given a reprieve, and later amnes ty, by the president of the Republic of Senegal. Such are the facts. ~ Irom the preceding it is clear that Mr Mamadou Dia was not the victim of arbitrary action. Senc~gal is a country of law, of freed~m, and its political regime is foun~ied on democratir_ principles. 63 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 In thanking you for your willingness to publish my letter in your next edition of JEUNE AFRIQUE, I beg you to accept, Mr Editor, the assurance of my highest consideration. /Answer:/ If JEUNE AFRIQUE militated for the release of Mr Mamadou Dia, I nevertheless recognize that, of all the personalities cited in the article in question, the ex-president of the Council of Senegal is the only one who may have had the right (in 1962) to a regular trial. And, above all, that ~he Senegalese regime is not founded on arbitrary [or despotic] action. S.D: ~ COPYRIGHT: Jeune A~e'ique. GRUPJIA 1980 9516 CSO: 4400 64 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENEGAL POWER STRUGG~E, POSSIBLE INCREASED AUTF~ORITARIANISM EXPEGTED Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 22 Dec 80-4~Jan 81 pp 24-25 [Article by Mariam Sysle: "Senghor's 'Exit ~Text] True or false, it is the signal for a power strug- glc~ witli, at the end, a potential strengthening of the re- gime's authoritarianism--unless the opposition is able to - express the aspirations of the popular n?asses. So the Senegalese president, Leopold Sedar Senghor, has decided to leave the govern- ment, or at least his official duties as chief of state. But when such an all-pow- erful monarch designates a successor to his tl-.rone, it is so he can install in his - place in the presidency his heir and prime minister for 10 years, Abdou Diouf. That is to say, it is also so in the same stroke he can assure the continuation of his policy, which for 20 years has been dragging the country into a total economic - and social paralysis and leading it into a political impasse, while also making it one of the principal strongholds of French rneocolonialism in Africa. Finally, as is well known, the Senegalese were not the first to hear the news, which was of major importance to them above all others. Those who got wind of the affair, at the same time as the whole world, were a minority of Dakarians who are able to buy and read the foreign press--the French daily LE MONDE of 2 December--or those who can catch the international Radio-France. Confirmation was not given them un- til four days later, through the governmental newspaper LE SOLEIL and the national radio. It will still be necessary to wait until the end of the year to hear what explanations Leopold Senghor himself will want to give to all of his fellow citizens. It goes without saying that this way of proceeding was resented by everyone in Sen- egal as a bitter humiliation, which underlines at a crucial time the profound dis- trust in which the exalter of "negritude" and "universal civilization," whose gaze - has always remained fixed on the West, holds his people. The Senegalese president will even have managed that tour de force of alienating the powerful religious brotherhoods, whose support in the past had enabled him to surmount several grave crises, but whose leaders, this time, were not even consulted and learned the news of the chief of state's resignation in the same circumstances as all the rest of the ~ country. Irritation and malaise are so profound and widespread that the government newspaper has really tried to repair the damage, but it could do nothing, other than to sink 65 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 deeper into increasing contradictions. In this way, in its 4 December edition, an- nouncing "President Senghor is Leaving," it attributed the news that appeared in the _ newspaper LE MONDE (30 October and 2 December) to "indiscretions deliberately re- ported so that their author (the correspondent of the French daily in Dakar) could - derive some advantage from them." And LE SOLEIL saw fit to state that the president - had nevertheless warned his prime minister, his closest associates and the principal leaders and dignitaries of the regime. But on 6 December, in a commentary signed by Abdou Salam hane, the editor in chief of L�UNITE AFRICAINE, the organ of the Senghorian Socialist Party, LE SOLEIL asserted: "It was not by chance or out of in- nocence that the president, as part of a conversation, confirmed his approaching re- tirement to LE MONDE's correspondent." But that in this way "the shock of the news to Senegalese public opinion was considerably diminished." In reality it can be said here and now that Leopold Sedar Senghor, who, if his eulogists can be believed was dreaming of a departure worthy of an ancient tragedy, missed his exit, pretended or real, and brought to nothing the efforts of those who praised his regime, who were trying to demonstrate that the Senegalese president's initiative was exemplary. in addition, everyone--or nearly everyone--remains skeptical about President - Senghor's real intentions, and is wondering whether not again a question of - the final role-playing of a chief of state whose extreme manipulative cleverness is no longer to be demonstrated. Be that as it may, it appears that the resigned chief of state in the shadow of the government, after the enthronement of his successor-- which should occur in January 1981. According to his own statement, he will return after a brief vacation, not only to occupy himself with setting up the African So- cialist Internationale, but he will carry on his task as secretary general of his _ party, the Socialist Party. Thus a two-headed government is in danger of being cre- ated, unless, as is more likely, Leopold Senghor, whether he is in Dakar or in - France, continues to pull the strings in the game and to be the initiator of the most important decisions. Finally, one can no longer completely rule out the hypo- thesis according to which, despite his great age (74), the Senegalese president may be preparing, in case the situation of crisis, upheavals and fights that are al- - ready raging in his country should come to reach a critical threshold, to return as the nation's indispensable savior. ~ A Scenario For now, one cannot help but see, too, that by organizing his departure--three years before *_he end of his term--in such a way that the presidency falls upon his consti- - tutional successor, Abdou Diouf, Senghor dealt the last thrust to the democratic image he had wanted or had been forced to give to his regime. In fact, this scenar- io is known to have founded on the constitutional modifications adopted in 1976, when the governmental party alone was represented in Parliament, without the people hav- ~ ing been consulted in une way or another, and against the unanimous opinion of the opposition. � Geals and Maneuvers By acting like an absolute monarch, in defiance of the most ele,nentary principles of democracy, which would require at the very minimum organizing an advance election free of any constraint and any discrimination, Leopold Senghor precipitated his country into a situation of acute crisis. Whatever the real intentions of the 66 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 departing president may be, the lines are in fact broken. In the Socialist Party, which is in complete collapse and leaking like a sieve, the deals and maneuvers have already begun, and it is predictable that the struggle for position will be pit- iless. While the old removed "barons" are in danger of emerging from their "exile," one expects with Abdou Diouf and his entourage (the men being gresented for the post of prime minister are, like him, technocrats of the party's right wing) a marked accentuation of the regime's authoritarian character. As for the unrecognized legal opposition forces, whose commentaries and positions upon the announcement of Senghor's resignation support each other, today they are faced with their responsibilities. On their capacity to surmount their differences, to express the aspiraticns of the popular masses and to come to an understanding around a common political platform and strategy, the evolution of the situation in large measure depends. But this is a delicate period, and any false step could be fatal. In this complete- ly unsettled economic situation, Giscardian Fr.ance seems for the moment to be rest- ing in a state of uncertainty, as if it were waiting for the puzzle to become more clearly apparent before making its choice or choices. In the coming weeks and months anything, even the most unpredictable, can happen. COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie. 8946 CSO: 4400 67 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 SENEGAL REACTION OF OPPOSITION TO SENGHOR'S RESIGNATION NOTED Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Dec 80 pp 18-19, 20, 21 - [Article by Siradious Diallo: "Senegal--What Does the Opposition Do When An African President Goes?"] [Text] Senghor has surprised everybody, starting with his ad- versaries, who did not always react as one might have expected them to do in their capacity as convinced democrats. The announcement of the early retirement of President Senghor caused a ver itable armed uprising in the opposition. Oddly enough, those who had kept shouting "Seng- hor, resign!" or who had sworn that they would bring him down, suddenly seem to be quite ill at ease. To be sure, the dream which they had been cherishing f or a long time, that is to say, a Senegal without Senghor, is about to come true--but without them and, even more seriously, against them. The paradox in Senegal is that the president-poet's partisans and enemies never, until the very last moment, believed rumors regarding his resignation. In spite of his repeated allusions, the calculated leaks, and the little confidences drop- ped here and there, the political class remained strangely skeptical. Accustomed to all kinds of maneuvering, trickery, and other acrobatics connected with this man who has been dominating the national political scene for about 30 years, it could not imagine him in any other role--especially through simple retirement. _ The fact is, even though it may not have said so, the opposition did need Senghor-- as much by habit as by convenience! What as a matter of fact would be easier than to denounce that "troubador of negritude," that "Christian who is a challenge to the Muslim majority of Senegal," that "black-skinned fellow with the white mask," "that man married to a French woman," who "each year spends his vacation in France" and "all of whose actions and moves express a profound complex with respect to the white man." On the topic of the cultural identity and of the political loyalty toward the for- mer colonial power, the chief of state was a favorite target which the opp osition would fire on constantly and permanently. But now this easy target has d isappeared. That quite suddenly deprives his adversaries of their usual propaganda themes, their sweeping slogans, and their most caustic caricatures. 68 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 ~ ~1 With Abdou Diouf, the current prime minister, it will be necessary to find some- thing else because, on the topic of Africanism and nationalism, the future chief . of stzte will not be vulnerable to attack, no more so than the team he will build around Moustapha Niasse, Daouda Saw, Ousmane Seck, Sheikb Iiamidou Kane, Ousu~ane Camara, etc. - These are cadres in whose eyes French education and training constitute not so much a source of cultural assimilation but rather a technique and a prescription for developing their country. Although they remained in power for a long time, one cannot accuse them of having enriched themselves. Apart from some well known cases in Dakar, the political pillars of the edifice, upon which "Abdou" is expected to rest, carefully made sure that they would not be compromised in any kind of affair or business. They undoubtedly benefitted from their ,jobs in govern~ent but they did so to broaden and strengthen their political base, rather than to make money. The fact remains that the team is made up of inen who have the kind of record and who hold the kind of convictions that tie them to a very specific model of society, the model of democratic socialism. That might be expressed by a society based on free enterprise but guided and controlled by the state. In other words, while retaining his own personality and style, the future Senegalese ch3ef of state, loyal to his predecessor's philosophy, will resolutely continue to face toward the West. The opposition is perfectly justified in challenging these choices. As in any demo- cratic regime, with many parties and freedom of speech, the administration's ad- versaries have the right and even the duty to criticize. It is certain that the Senegalese opposition will not refrain from dning just that. But, for the time being, it reacted in a rather unexpected fashion, feeling trapped and still shocked by the announcement of Senghor's resigaation. It called for elec- tions under the control of the army, as did, for example, the PDS (Senegalese Demo- cratic Party)--practically by demanding that the army intervene. How can the convinced partisans of deffiocracy seek the intervention of the army in the nation's political affairs? That might be understood in the case of a country with u single party where any posaibility of expresaion and, a fortiori, a turn- over in tt~e government ~are impossible. But in a country such as Senegal today, where all legal and clandestine political formations with impun:Cty publicize their fighting platforms, would not the appeal to the army be a mistake? That makes one think that the egperi2nce of democracy in Africa is far from perfec~. As we saw in Upper Volta, where the opposition recentlq did not hesitate to turn to the Praetorian Guard, politicians do not aeem to be in favor of this type of govern- ment, except when it is good for them. But the moment it does not permit them to come to power, they do not hesitate to - overturn it. Better (or worse) to throw the constitution out the window, if not to trample it underfoot. 69 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 A dangerous proceduxe indeed. Not only does it inevi.tahly in the mi.litary but it rarely benefi~ts the opposition, Even when, as in the case o~ Senegal, it includes personalities of talent, culture, and eloquence. And that includes Abdou- laye Wade, whose PDS is represented in the National Assembly by 17 deputies; Bou- bacar Gueye, the famous lawyer of the Dakar bar, gresident of the Senegalese Repub- . lican Movement; or the secretary-general of the PAI (African Independence Party), Mahjmout Diop, a pharmacist--all of whom are perfectly fami'liary with the possi- bilities and implicatians of democracy. The same goes for former prime minister Mamadou Dia, the man behind the journal ANDE SOPI, and the eminent Egyptologist, Sheikh Anta Diop, leader of the RND - (National Democratic Rally}. Both of them represent political currents which are not off icially recognized but which are active just the same. It is clear that if these different formations were to overcome their rivalries, - the opp osition could constitute a serious threat to the team of Abdou Diouf. Also, benef itting from the current situation, they would go into action in order to arrive at a minimum understanding, After having unanimously condemned the announce- ment of the chief of state's retirement through a foreign newspaper (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1040), their various leaders consulted with each other-to organize protest demonstrations and, if pcssible, to hammer out a joint fighting platform. The big unknown obviously remains the attitude of the religious leaders. Their in- fluence in rural areas is so great that nobody could aspire to national off~ce with- out seeking their blessing. In part icular, that of the pawerful khalif of the Mourides, Abdoul Lakhat Mbacke. This is why all political leaders, both those in power and those in the oppoaition, have f or several days been trooping to the holy city of Touba where he lives. Here we have seen Master Abdoulaye Wade, Prime Minister Abdou Diouf, as well as President Senghor, not to mention those who had to go there furtively. However, the grand khalif is entirely too aware of his spiritual responsibilities to comp romise his authority with one or the other political leader. While trying to get his support, the pilgrims, on their return from Touba, really do not know whether they should laugh or cry. In other words, the troubles of the opposition are not over. Although the decision of President Senghor does give the opposition the unique opportunity for getting together, shoulder to shoulder, it knows that it cannot count on anything except its own f orces . Under these conditions, everything will depend on Abdou Diouf. Will he manage to maneuver with sufficient firmness so as not to allow himself to be overwhelmed while d isplaying the necessary skill in order to assemble all aces in his hand? In this delicate phase of his career, the advice of the old wolves of the PS (the 6ocialist Party, the party in power) will not be superfluous. They have fought more difficult battles and they went through periods that were just as stormy, so that they certair?ly have something to say at this crucial moment in Senegal's history. COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1980 5058 ~ CSO: 4400 - 70 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8 FOR OFFICIAL U; . SENEGAL OPPOSITION ATTEMPTING JOINT ACTION AGAINST ABDOU DIOUF Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Dec 80 pp 20, 21 [Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "Wade: 'Democracy is Finished."'] [Text] One cannot detect any feverish atmosphere or any excitement in Dakar upon the approach of president Leopold Sedar Senghor's resignation. The only perceptible tension involves the presence of armed police officers in front of some government buildings. At no time was there any call for violence - from certain opposition leaders. "We wanted to maintain free access to these buildings by way of pr~vention. We have to protect government property." ~ For the moment, violence remains verbal and it suff ices to read the opposition newspapers to realize that freedom of expression is still a fact in reality. Some new magazines have come out in recent months, such as VERITE, the organ of ChP pro- Soviet Marxists, or JAAY DOOLE BI, the organ of the Maoists. This violence however can be found among the Socialist Party (the party in power). i TEius, CAAXAN FAAXEE responded with the same kind of aggressiveness but mostly tur- ned against TAXAW, the journal of Sheikh Anta Diop, and ANDE SOPI, the mouthpiece of Mamadou Dia. The last one to get involved certainly was Master Abdoulaye Wade, the leader of the main opposition party, the PDS (Senegalese Democratic Party). Upon the announcement of the imminent resignation of the president on 2 December, Wade published a com- munique comparing "this hasty departure by Senghor to the flight of Louis XVI to Varennes or the departure of Reza Pahlavi to Morocco." , Wade above all went after Abdou Diouf who "wants to play Shahpur Bakhtiar"; a man of good will, of course, but he has "no new ideas" nor any "popular support." He urges Diouf as qutckly as possible to run in the presidentia~ elections under ' the surveillance of the army. Otherwise, "that army might someday be f orced to intervene." These statements created a certain i11 feeling even among the members of the PDS. Wade took it upon himself to sign this declaration by himself alone. Many people saw this as a form of spite for not having been called upou or consulted. 71 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL~' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 I went to see the PDS leader in his law office where about 30 men and women, held in check by three secretaries, were waiting patiently. I asked: "Do you not think that you went too far in comparing Senghor to the Shah of Iran?" He replied without hesitation: "An opposition party lives on the hope of someday coming to power. It believes in turnover in government. But the current adminis- _ tration has demonstrated the opposite. Democracy is finished--hence the appeal to t :e army." This was a strategic response to conceal a certain degree of worry. Then he said: "The Senegalese military have no political appetite. There are some very high- ranking officers in our army who have a high concept of neutrality. I do not think for a single moment that they would be attracted by power. Unless of course the crisis gets worse. I will call them in as arbiters." At Dakar, people have the fceling that the change in government will trigger a new and big wave of wrath. So far, we have had here the eternal debate between two intellectuals, Senghor and Sheikh Anta Diop, who hated each other cordially, They are now going to be replaced by the team of Abdou Diouf and Abdoulaye Wade and the damages might well be much more serious. ' How is Abdou Diouf preparing himself? "This is going to be very tough but the game can be played and it can certainly be won," he told me in his prime minister's office on the ninth and tenth floors of the Administration Building. After 10 years ir_ training, this big government official has acquired assurance in . his gestures and proposals. For the moment he seemed to be doing rather well in resisting the attacks from his adversaries and he seemed mainly concerned with ~ what will happen within his party, the PS, the moment "the Old Man" relinquishes the helm. This is especially true since Abdou Diouf will inherit the full confidence of President Senghor. As a matter of fact, and contrary to many rumoars, Sengiior will no longer remain at the head of the Senegalese Socialist Party either. He would not want to have a two-headed administration: that of the party and that ~f the government. He must thus entrust the office of secretary-general of the PS to Abdou Diouf. For the moment, he is rather hobbled. To begin with, by the round-table of all of - the opposition groups summoned to Dakar on Saturday, 13 December. Objective: to get together on joint action with a view to fighting the accession of Abdou Diouf to the presidency. That of course involves all opposition groups, the three legal parties, other than the PS, that is, the PDS of Master Wade; the PAI (African Independence Party) of Mahjmout Diop; and the MRS (Senegalese Republican Movement) of Boubacar Gueye; and the parties that are not legal, especially the RND (Nat- ional Democratic Rally) of Sheikh Anta Diop; the MSA (Socialist Self-Management Movement) of former prime minister Mamadou Dia; the ODP (Proletarian Democratic Organization) of Abdoulaye Ly; the underground PAI; the (pro-Soviet) Democratic League; and the Maoist current. 72 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY For the record, there was a question of excluding the MRS because of its right- wing leanings. Finally, the movement was accepted after the declaration by Mr Gueye, accusing Senghor of behaving like a monarch who hands his succession to his heir. Mamadou Dia wanted to be considered as the principal leader of COSU (Coo~din- ation of the United Senegalese Opposition). The others turned him down. After these issues of procedure and hierarchy had been settled, it was necessary to determine how to talk a common language and what political platform to start from. At the point where they are now, the obstacle represented by that coalition is net yet very serious as far as the future chief of state is concerned. _ COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980 5058 CSO: 4400 ~ ; I ~ ~ 73 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 SENEGAL BRIEFS DAKAR JOB CRISIS--In Dakar, 40 percent of the employees of ONCAD jNational Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development] whose positions were eliminated in August, could not be resettled in the three companies that replace the former state company (responsible for marketing of ground-nuts and grains). Those still without poaitions continue to stay on the work-site, but as the Senegalese government has decided to freeze hiring in the public sector, as an economy measure, their future is bleak. [TextJ [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 3] 9516 CSO: 4400 74 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ SIERRA LEONE DISCOVERY OF LARGE GOLD DEPOSITS EXPECTID TO AID ECONOMY Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Nov 80 p 43 [Article by Carlos Moore: "Gold! Gold!") [Text] The discovery of a large gold deposit could help in pulling Sierra Leone-- which is undergoing a severe economic crisis~-0ut of the "cluster of the twenty-fo~ar" poorest countries on this planet. Discovered in an abandoned diamond-yielding mine in the southern forest region, the Baomahun deposit might even be "superior (in grade by ton of ore) to that of the best mines in South Africa", if one is to believe the Sierra Leonean experts. They have nut forth the fact that the great exploitation of Black Mountains in South Africa-put inCo operation in 1980-has a product~on capacity of 1.1 million tons of gold ore. In 1979, Pretoria extracted 83,529 million tons of ore with an average grade of 8.19 grams per ton. Baomahun in itself would have the capacity for approximately 20 million tons of gold ore with an average grade sometimes exceeding 8.78 grams. This would en~ure an annual production of 1.5 million tons of gold ore for 15 years, according to the most conservative estimates. In a way, it is like manna fallen from the sky for a country whose economy is on its last leg. The economy of Sierra Leone--70 percent of which depends on its subsoil--is based on the exportation of mining products of which the reserves and the production are rapidly decreasing. The diamond mines, which produce 60 percent of its foreign currency ($97.1 million per year) will run dry before 1990 and, already, production has decreased from 732,000 carats in 1975 to only 316,000 carats in 1979. The production of bauxite--second product exported--is constantly on the decline: from 727,000 tons in 1975, it has decreased to 673,000 tons in 1979. Until the closing of r.he Marampa mine in 1975 (considered at the time unprofitable by the American company Delco), Sierra Leone was one of the major world producers of iron ore. The exploitation of this mine was resumed only in Noveml~er 1979 with the modest goal of 100,000 tons per year. To this decrease in production has been add~d a budgetary def icit of $126 million, woraened aince July 1980 by the invoice thnt Freetown received from the summit 75 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 i LVl\ VL'1'1VlAL VNL VL\V? meeting of the Organization of Af rican Unity (OAU): an investment of nearly $200 million (ref. JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1027). And this in spite of a reconmmendation b~ the International Monetary Fund (IMF) not to exceed a ceiling of $100 million i.~ this - prestigious operation. Already in 1979, IMF had strongly recommended a 20 percent devaluation of the - leone (national currency equivalent to the dollar). The government turned down this recommendation, fearing that the increase in prices--at least on the surface-- might create a social unrest similar to the one that swept through William Tolbert's regime in Liberia in April 1979. The discovery of the Baomahun gold-bearing deposit thus came just at the right - moment. According to the estimates, its exploitation will make a profit of $100 million per year, of which the state will no doubt get half. "The situation could not be better: it is a golden opportunity", said good humoured Adolph Lundin, president of Eurocan Ventures, a small Swiss-Canadian mining enterprise that discovered the deposit and is considering its exploitation. However, Freetown is not readily persuaded and has not yet granted the exploitation license. But the American giant, Diamond Distributors--which already markets diamonds from Sierra Leone and exploits those of Guinea--seems to be in a good position to , receive the license. It has already signed an agreement with Eurocan whereby it a~~propriates 40 perc~nt of the shares of the company that will exploit r_he deposit as soon as the State grants the go-ahead. The heavy equipment is already on site and a camp to house the workers is under construction. The rush has already begun. COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980 9592 CSO: 4400 ~ _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TANZANIA BADEA ROAD CONSTRUCTION, REALIGNMENT LOAN Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 8 0 p 3180 [Text] At the close of its 18th meeting, held on 28 and 29 October 1980 at Khartoum, tt~e board of directors of the BADEA [Arab Bank for African Economic Development] approved the financing of a loan to Tanzania of $8 million (or 21.8 percent of the total cost) reimbursable in 20 years, with 4 years grace period and bearing an annual interest rate of S percent, for the realignment and construction of the Bukombe-Isaka Road. Tt~e EDF [European Development Fund] and USAID will aid the financing with con- tributions $14 million (of which $2.27 million will be in lo cal currency) and $5 million, resoectively. The Tanzanian Government will assume the local cur- - rency financing needs, or $9.65 million. The total cost is estimated at $36.65 - million. This project consists of asphalting the 3d sectio~ of the regional Rusumo-Isaka Road axis connecting Rawanda and Tanzania, thereby opening the Isaka railhead not only to local rraffic but also to trade movements with Rwanda and Burundi. "I'he f irst section of the axis connecting Rusumo with Lusahunga is at present ~,i~er construction, and the second, c~nnecting Lusahunga with Bukombe, is about to be pu*_ under construction. The object of the BADEA contribution is the co- financing of the realignment and construction of the 3d section (112.5 kilo- meters) connecting Bukombe with Isaka and the services of the consulting en~ineers who have to supervise the work. The road, which wilJ. have a surface width of 9.5 meters, will be covered with asphalz for a width of 6.5 meters. - Th{s project aims at assuring Rwanda and Burundi access to the port of Dar-es- Salaam. It is obviously of regional importance. At the present time 85 and 26 _ percent of the impurts of Rwanda and Burundi, respectively, transit through the Kenyan port of Mombasa and are trucked through the whole of the territory of Kenya and URanda. With the opening of the new road axis between Rusumo and Isaka, Rwanda and Burundi will be able to uGe a transport route about 385 kilometers � shorter and thus achieve considerable economies in transport and maintenance costs. tn addition the pro~ect will make it possible to link to the Isaka railheaci (itself connected in the center af the country) the economic system of vast reKions of western Tanzania, with a population estimated at almost 2.4 million and tr~de evaluated in 1976 at about 300,000 tons of agricultural pro- ducts. The quantifiable economic yields of the project may be summarized as follows, according to BADEA: reduc~ion of the cost of transport for Rwanda; ?7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8 . reduction of the expenses of vehicle operation for Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi; reduction of road maintenance costs; harnessing the potentials of a vast agricultural ar~a. The completion of the project, which will take 30 months starting in August 1981, will be placed under the supervision of the roads administration of the Ministry of Public Works of Tanzania. COPY RIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1980. 6108 ~ CSO: 4400 78 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8 ~ , TANZANIA BR IEFS ELECTRIC POWER RATIONING--Electricity must henceforth be rationed for several large cr.nsumers in the regions of Dar-es-Salaan, Tanga, Arusha, Moshi, and Morogore. Forty-eight plants will be closed for 4 weeks in these sector.s as a consequence of the abnormally large drop in the waterflow at the Kidatu Dam, the Tanzanian DAILY NEWS said on 10 November. According to the paper, the plants affected by the rationing, cert ain of which could be halted provision- ally, were selected on the basis of es~encial needs. Industries of national interest, such as the National Milling Company (NMC) will not be closed. On - 12 November, the daily published a correction announcing that 6 enterprises, out of a total of 48, we re authorized to operate at reduced capacity, instead of stopping all product i on as previously planned. The companies benefiting from this decision are Tanganyika Packers, Tegri Plastics, Simba Plastics, Metal Box and Yuasa Battery at Dar-es-Salaam, and Tanganyika Coffee Curing Compsny at Moshi. These compani es were authorized by TANESCO, the state electricity authority, to continue their activities bp~ause they provided essential serv- ices. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3107] 6108 YUCOSLAV AGRICULTiJRAL AID--Yugoslavia has just offered Tanzania agricultural equipment with a tot a 1 value of 6.7 million Tanzanian shillings. The package includes 10 tractors, 2 harvester threshers, 2 jeeps, and a bulldozer, This ` gift is destined for the 1,000-hectare Morogoro palm oil plantation known as "Project Dakawa II." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ~.T MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3 1 08] 61Q8 SWISS ROAD NET~'ORK AID--The Swiss and Tanzanian governments recently signed at - Dar-es-Salaam an agreement providing for assistance of 42 million shillings from Switzerland for tt?e Tanzanian road netw~rk in the districts of Ulanga and Kilom- bero. [Text] (Pari s MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3108] 6108 AFFORESTATION CAMPAIGN--President Nyerere received rorestry experts in Dar-ea-Salaam on 26 November to prepare a vast affores tation campaign at the national level which will be initiated in mi d 1981. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3421] 8143 ~ ADDITT.OivAL NETHERLANDS AID--Tanzania ar.d Kenya will each receive supplementary aid ' for devel.opment from th e Netherlands amounting to 7 million florins ($3.5 million), according to statements made by the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs at The Hague. ` This sum will be a9ded to the 1Q5 million flor.ins and 58 million florins which the Netherlands has already offered to Tanzania and Kenya, respectively, in 1980. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3421] 8143 CSO: 4k00 79 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UGANDPI EYEWITNESS ACCAUNTS OF MII~1I-INVASION; REFUGEE STATISTICS I~artoum SUUPINOW in English Dec 80 p 20 ~Text~ Regional and worad pness reports ncendy way to the town, which cvas t~ed with an ,suggest~d that supponers ojex-Ug~edan air of expectation. Indeed Amia~s soldiers Pnside?it G~era! !dt Amin had bunched were expected at any moment, 7n t':~ on irrvasion of norrheni Ug~nda aimed at lOth, that aftemoon, about three to four tuppling that country s present provi- youths, a+ho called themselves ~n's sional leoders. In rerrospect, tiuse 9oldiers, started shooting into the air with accounu appear to have conrained co?~si- rifks. I ocdend the few policemen still derabJe exaggerction as regods the a~ towu to disarm them, but they did not rttunber of '~voders ; the degrre ojjtglit- react. The number of Amin's soldiers v~g, and the purpose oJthe mintlrrvation. incnaaed as the day progressed. In the Whct ts cesrab+ though, rs thct thls {ate after~oon they came to my house eprsode has jurrher ~racerbated the and ordered me to give them guns. I told Southem Region ~ nfiugrt probJtm. them that the sotdie~s had talcen all the lxob Akol vi,sited the a~ra and tpoke weapons afien they departed. They ded borh with those caught up in the conjHet Ipy hands be6ind my back and started to over the ba+der in Uganda and with those beat me, aII the time demanding that I on this side oj the border respo~uible for give them guas. They used sticks - any- dealing with the conseqriences of thrs thing they could find, At last they gave bnst d~st~rrbmece� up hope of getting any guns out of ine AT FIRST I thought he was not in and then I knew I was t3nished as the any condition to talk. But Dridci beati~g bec~me intenu. though I could gFmoii, Diatdct Commluioaer of b4oyo~ no tonger feel the pain, I lost conscioua- Uganda, sat up in his Yei hoapiW bed neu. An o(d man woke me up at about desp~'te a broken acm and sa+onen face 3 o�ciock on the momia~t of l lth. I wa~ and lips. 'Is thero tea? I~n very thirsty,~ ai t!�,e buah and the old man told me that he said feebly, trying to focus on me . they had kR me for dead, He told me to After a sip he s~id, now more ckarty: `I come with him to Sudan. On the way, the ' had gone to the E~t Bank of the Nile mob caught up with us late in the aad was expacted back in Moyo, but morniqg. They tied my hands behind my because of the 6-to-6 curfew on the ferry baclc ~gain and beat me as I walked to [ had to spend the night on the Eut K~jokaj~ in Sudan.' Bank. We heard shots durmg the night, A Democratic Parry of~3cia1 on his way but on investigation the foUowing to Nairobi told Sudcnow in Juba: 'What moming we discovered that the cause was happeaed in Moyo district was that the a drunken soldier. Upon leaving for Moyo gover~nent sobiiers made a tactical I discovered that the soldiera post~d at aithdrawal because they thought their the ferry had withdrawn towards Gulu. numbers insufficient to meet any large Further, on my way I mec over 400 fo~ce. When ex-Amin sddias heard of ~ldie~ going south. They tol~i me that the a+ithdrawal they walked into Moyo they a~cpecud Amin's soldien to invade _ facing no opposition. The � fdlowing Moyo town and that they were makiag a day it was nimoured that govrmment cactical ~+ithdrawal. I r~ntinued on my troops were retuming in force and ' , Amin ~ wppoRecs then began pulling out , i - 80 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY , ~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 of the town and the countryside. Then 5~~. ~~y were expect�~g a good pro- was no fig,ht at all. but the government ortion of these refugees to rerurn to _ soldiers were shooting indiscriminate~Y. before the ekctions and many In K~jok~ji we could still see smoke rising of than were in the process of leaving from houses sCt on fire by the soldiars. when the trouble started agam. Now the - The situation as descnbed by those ~d goings ak~ng the vast two eye.aritnesses differed from that u~~~ border has become so in Acua, west ~f Moyo. [n Arua, there confused that even the UNHCR office was a prolonged Sgi~t. Ex�Ugandan f~~ it hard to keep track, ~Nobody Brigadier Hassan Marele, who reportedly ~eems to know exactty how many led the rebe( group in the invasion of ~~gas have gone back and how many Arua, was killed just outside the town. have come,' said Andy Stea?ard of the The involvement of Manle, who, long refugee office, ~ut it iscertairr that more before Amin feQ, had left the country have come ihsn gone, We just cannoi say and had become whac one Sudanese how many yet,~ At least 17,000 more - official called 'a mini-rnillionaire' in Yd n~~ ~ye came through regiutration District, kd many people to believe that points ai Kaya, Kajokaji and Nanule. former General Amin miaht not have Un~e the Tanranian invasion of . been behind the recer?t moves to disrupt U~~ ~ pp~ ~t year, when there was ekctions in Uganda, Sudanese security a iot of sympathy for Amin~s sflldiers in personne( have hinted that the rebels Southern Sudan, there is little sympac~?Y might have had some links with the for what the Regional authoricies have Nairobi-based Ugandan polidcisns, ~alyed `a mad ventun' that will hefp no though this could noc be substanriated. one, Nineteen people, including Amin's Indeed it is doubtful that Genera! Amin focmer Vxe Presdent Hustafa Idrisi and and his badly demoralised men would h~ former Minister of Foreign Affairs have had the organisational ahility to Jiuna Oris, aere promptly arrested an~ attempt an invasion, even one as aimless p~ed under detention by the Regional as it was doomed to failure, government. Furthermore, the Canmis- The resutt of this venrure has been an ap ~~m Equatoria Province, influx of thousands of refugees inro Mr Vapancio Loro has been directed by Sudan, an additionat burden the Southern the President of 'the High Executive Region can iIl afford, By June of this Coune~ Mr Abel Alier to ciear the border year the Southem Region office of the of all nfugees, settled or recentty arrived~ UIYHCR repoRed 40,000 rcfugees in the COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved 3udanow 1980 CSO : 4420 ~ 81-82 FOR OFFICIAL IISE ONLY i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ UPPER VOLTA NEW LEADERSHIP'S ABILITY TO RECTIFY ILLS gXAMINED Pari s AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 22 Dec 80 pp 28-30 [Article by Ginette Cot: "The Dying Country"] [TextJ Will the new Military Committee move on from words to actions and extricate the people of Upper Volta from its neo- colonial troubles? Less than 15 months after it took power, on 25 November of lasti year, at Ouagadou- gou, the CMRPN (Military Committee of recovery for National Progress), formed a 17-member government, presided over by Col Saye Zerbo who in addition also holds the j ob of chief of state, minister of defense and of veterans affairs, and chief of s t aff of the armed forces (see AFRIQUE-ASIE, No 228, 8 December 1980). Among the s even other army leaders who have joined the new government we might mention espe c ially Lt Col Bademble Nezien (interior and security)~ Lt Col Felix Tiemtaraboum (for e ign affairs and cooperation), and the Military Quartermaster Ma.madou Sanio (economy, planning, in.dustry, and mining) . The latter two had been members of the mili t ary government of General Lamizana between 1974 and 1978, the f irst of them an minis ter of youth and sports and the latter as minister of finance. None of the nine civilians who completed the government ever held any ministerial posts under the defunct regime. They are nevertheless known for being sympathizers of the op- pos it ion parties which existed under the Third Republic that emerged from the 1978 elections . Afte r the first President of Upper Volta, Maurice Yameogo, ousted on 3 January 1966 by a popular uprising, for whom the "historic proclamation of 25 November 1980" mar ke d"the end of a nightmare," it is the traditional chiefs--whose control over the c ountry's political, economic, and social life was far from negligible--who saved the coup d'etat of Col Saye Zerbo. In a message to the CMRPN, the "wise men of the imperial court of Moro Naba" expressed the opinion in effect that "the event cons t itutes an unexpected opportunity for the country and the people." Card inal Paul Zoungrana, the archbishop of Ouagadougou, congratulated the president and the other members of the Military Committee for "having been the agents of pro- - vidence of a God who loves Upper Volta." Support committees were established in cer ta in localities and, pending the announcement of the new regime's options, it was n oted that the first initiatives taken by the CMRPN were expressed by gestures of appeasement and conciliation. - i 83 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8 Thus it was decided to release all af the Octobez and November salaries for teachers, whose strike had served to *.rigger the crisis to the downfall of the Lami- zana regime. Moreover, two of the demands of the strikers were met. The resulta of the last competition for the assignment of trainees to the National School Ad- ministration Institute in Paris--which had been challenged--were annulled. And the two teachers who had been transferred because of their union activities, were returned to their original positions. On the other hand, expressing its concern for appeasing the discontent caused by the social injustices and lack of care on the part of the old regime, the CMRPN decided to dispatch emergency aid to the three departments in the north of the country whose harvests had been ravaged by invasions of grasshoppers and where it had not rained since August. Finnlly, the fact that the Military Co~ittee pledged to respecC individual, group, and labor union freedoms and that no obstacles were created for freedom of the press--was taken as an encouraging sign, showing that the new government seems con- cerned with taking into account the specific democratic gains of the people of , Upper Volta. The presence, within the Mi.litary Committee, of enlisted men, in- cluding one state trooper lst class, further strengthens this assumption. Nevertheless, it goes without saying that, after a score of years of having been kicked around, the population of Upper Volta--especially the urban population, which has developed a high degree of political awareness through constant labor union struggles--will remain more vigilant than ever before. It expects, if not miracles, then at least profound changes, first of all, in the management of public affairs and the distribution of the national income. Thus, the CSV (Voltan Trade Union Confederation), the country's most dynamic labor union, as a requirement for its participation in the Military Co~ittee's recovery program, demanded "the very detailed determination of the fortunes that were wrongfully acquire~ by the former leaders and the management of public affairs, before anybody can demand any sacri- fices of the workers." Other disclosures were furthermore expected, concerning the discovery of a big arms traffic operation supposedly involving men connected with the PDV-RDA (Voltan Democratic Union--African Democratic Rally), the former party in power. Under these conditions, the 25 November coup d'etat seems to sound the death knell for the Craditional parties of the generation of independence which, in spite of the popular uprising in 1966, had recovered and definitely made the laws behind the reg~me of General Lamizana whose laxity, recognized today, allowed room for all kinds of manipulations and, finally, the law of the jungle. Of course, nobody entertains any illusions. The leeway of the new leaders, regard- less of what their undertakings are, is rather tight. Categoxized among the world's most deprived countries, stricken by 10 years of drought, further reducing its already limited possibilities and potential, suffering the restrictions de- riving from its landlocked location that multiplies the effects of imported infla- tion, Upper Volta must face a situation whose outcome nobody can visualize--except through miraculous solutions. 8i~ - FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 FOR ( ~ Under these condi.tions~ one cannot see how a xeal nat7~ona1 zecovety e�fort could be undertaken---apart from an expansion and in~depth development of democracy, a ~ really popular democracy this time--without at the same time making a real attempt at gaining control of foreign aid and development projects. The Traditional Chiefdoms The 1978 legislative and presidential elections were significant regarding the first point. The thing that emerged after these elections is the lack of interest on the part of a very large majority of the population--esFecially the people in the rural areas who account for almost 90 percent of the country's population--with regard to - the political game wh~_ch was restricted to the capital and parliament. The heavy abstention rate--which came to 60 percent of the registered voters (the latter Eurthermore represent only two-thirds of the population of voting age) during the legislative elections and 65 percent during the presidential elections (although General Lamizana, already running during the first round of elections, in reality was elected only by less than 20 percent of the citizens)--cannot be explained, as people tried to do at that time, merely by the hard work everybody has to do out in the rural areas but rather by a profound disaffection toward a regime which had failed in doing its job. Besides, the election campaign had also shown the bankruptcy of the existing poli- tical parties whose number (nine, in the beginning) rather poorly concealed the absence of any specific project for the future. With the exception perhaps of the party of professor Ki-Zerbo--the former MNR [National Movement for Renewal] which became the UPV [Voltan Progressive Union] and then the FPV [Voltan Progressive - FrontJ, which talked about a general socialist blueprint but which alienated a large portion of the left because of its participation in a Lamizana administration and above all later on because of its alliance with the return of the old political war horses, such as Joseph Ouedraogo--the existing parties had hardly any slogans other than "return the civilians to power`.'; but that was far from enough to make up a government program. The most politically aware strata of the population likewise had become increasingly aware of the need for a broadening and in-depth development of the democratjc debate ~ by getting especially the peasant masses-which so far are still tightly "controlled" by the traditional chiefdoms--to participate. The LIPAD (Patriotic League for Development) worked especially along those lines but, it goes without say ing, that it was bitterly opposed by the government. And the CSV in turn was fighting for the establishment of a vast anti-imperialist front. Concerning the second point, it is true that the Lamizana regime had made an effort to restore public finances after the dilapidation of government funds which had caused the downfall of its predecessor. But the easy-going attitude, the absence , of any initiative~-which had left the f ield to tl:e upstarts and to shady operators most of all--had characterized all of the administrations which followed each ~ other during the era of General Lamizana. The economic development program of the PDV-RDA--the party in power under the Third Republic--consisted, all in all, of these three words: government-controlled liberal capitalism. ~ ! ! 85 i ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8 In fact, "governAent control" ~tas tqtally absent. yi,tal pzojects for the country remained dormant in the drawers for many years; they i.ncluded the WoXk~ng of the manganese depost at Tambao or the reopening of the Poura gold mine, while foreign investors had hand in pushing through programs designed bq them and for them amid the most complete anarchy. Tfiis got so bad that irritation began to take hold of the Voltan cadres and technicians who were aware of the waste and the growing alienation pro~~ted by such practices. ~oreign control is expressed for example by such an ambitious project as the AW (Development of the Valleys of the Three Voltas). This vast operation, whose start goes back to 1973, initially called for the settlement, within 15 years, of 55,000 peasant families (about 600,000 persons) in an area of 47,400 square kilo- _ meters (about 17 percent of the territory), following the eradicatio~ of onchocer- ciasis, and, by the end of the project, an output of 150,000 tons of cereal crops, 70,000 tons of cotton, 50,000 tons of sugar cane, and 40,000 tons of peanuts. It is today in doubt not only in terms of its ba~ic guidelines but also in terms of its objectives. Ita implementation as a matter of fact is running into difficulties of all kinds, inherent in the pro~ect itself, and the money suppliers think that the cost of settling a migrant is too high. As a matter of fact, as the LIPAD underscored in a study of the situation of rural areas in Upper Volta, this experiment is indica- tive of the orientation of the regime's development policy. Depending almost exclu- sively on foreign financing, in other words, the goodwill of money suppliers, "the - AW essentially is aimed at the promotion of income-producing crops." The Voltan "Sharpshooters" In the meantime, the rural areas as a whole seem to have been abandoned. To visua- lize the vast misery of the Voltan peasant masses, we might look at the following two figures. While the average life expectancy, already generally reduced, is 41 years in the urban ar~as, it drops to 32 years in the rural areas. And while, of- ficially, the monthly minimum earnings of a wage worker come to less than 15,000 francs CFA [African Financial Community] (F300), the income of a peasant family is 18,200 francs CFA (F364) per year. In spite of the fact that the Voltan peasant consumes a portion of hi~ output him- self, he must--in order to meet his family's food needs (at least half a score of personsj--spend almost 50 percent of that small money income for food. "In spite of everything," according to the bulletin LE PATRIOTE, put out by LIPAD, "the Voltan peasant, especially in the country's central region, cannot afford more than a single meal per day, essentially based on millet and surghum. During years with little rainfall, where annual cereal crop requirements are estimated at 250 kilograms per person. ~n the average, the harvests in certair,. regions yield only 60 kilograms _ per person and sometimes even much less." How should one then be astonished, under these conditions, that the ancient "tradi- tions" persist? As during colonial times, wtzen the country was treated as a reser- _ voir of civilian and military manpower (the 200,000 "Senegalese Sharpshooters," re- cruited during World War I, for the most part came from Upper Volta), the Voltans, 86 FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY famous for the great value of thei.r work, axe ~orced by the hundreds o~ thousands to go seek a pittance in neighboring countries, such as Ghana, but above all in Ivory Coast, where they are employ~ed in the plantations, the fa ctories, and in domestic service. Nor is it astonishing tfiat the poung people flee from the rural areas in vast numbers, prefering to take their chances in the capital and in urban areas where however they do not find anything to do and only serve to awell the ranks of the unemployed. We can imagine how this situation creates problems of delinquency and potential revolts. Of course, these are common tendencies in many countries but the crying shortages in social terms, as demonstrated by all of the administrations that suc- ceeded each other since independence at Ouagadougou, even more dangerously accen- tuate the imbalances and seriously threaten the verq future of the country. Two examples will suffice to illustrate this observation. While no serious educa- tion reform has ever been undertaken and while 90 percent of the population are illiterates, the school attendance rate of children of school age is barely more than 10 percent. Out of 1,127,300 children of school age in 1975, only 133,660 were actually in school; just 3 years later, progress was ins ignificant since the number of childreii attending school had risen only to 160,528, out of a total num- ber of school-age children of 1,187,600. We must also note that the expenditures of Che parents of these students are very high since they come to 60,000 and even 70,OQ0 francs CFA (F1,200-1,300) per year. As for high schools, not a single one has been put up since 1966. At the start of the 6th year, in 1979, there were only 1,820 places for 17,000 applicants. The country has 37 high schools, only 14 of which are public while the remaining 23 are private, in other words, they require tuition. Doctors and Midwives In terms of health, it suffices to realize that, in 1977 (and there have hardly been any major changes since then), the country had a grand total of 51 doctors (in other words one doctor f or every 118,000 inhabitants, wher eas the proportion _ considered necessary by the WHO is one doctor for every 10,000). Besides, out of those 51 Voltan doctors, 41 were practicing at Ouagadougou or Bobo-Dioulasso; only thx�ee of them were wnrking in the regional centers. There were also 120 midwives, in other words, one for every 50,000 inhabitants (as against on.e for every 5,000 according to the figures accepted by the W[i0), plus 355 government male nurses (one for ~very 17,000 inhabitants) and 946 r~agistered male nurses (one for every 6,350). ThA remark made concerning the territorial distribution of doctors also applies to the other health workers, especially midwives, two-thirds of whom are stationed in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. The very thin medical supFort structure and the prohibitive costs of inedical care given there explain why the vast majority of the population (75 percent) and more particularly the peasant mass es are getting no modern medical care at all. Now, when one realizes that no promotion and dEVelop- ment effort is being made in support of traditional medicine, when one realizes also that scour.ges such as malaria and po].io are particularly virulent, chen one can understand that it is the very survival of a people which is at stake here. - i I- i 87 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ i ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 ~ Finally, concerning inte~rnati.onal relat~.ons, nothing ox' a].ioost has changed since the first years after independence. Regardless o� athether we look at rela~ tions with Ivory Coast, whicfi seem sometimes to consist mostly of relations between the father-state and the dependent-state, rather than a situation of cooperation between equal states; or witether we look at relations with France which, through ity subsidies, its "aid~" its investments, and trade, etc., maintaine almost com- plete control over the country-everything has remained what it always was. Of course, the policy of going along with all of this, pursued by the Lamizana regime, caused more and more rumblings and discontent. At the beginning of the year, prime minister Conombo said that the revision of the cooperation agreements with France was necessary. But all of this of course remained on the level of the vagueness so characteristic of the PVD-RDA politicians. In view of this situation, the first condition for a real recovery involves a fight against the dilapidation of public funds, embezzlement, mismanagement, and ill- considered expenditures. The decision announced on 10 December by Col Saye Zerbo, ~o create a special investigating commaission, "charged with casting light on the management of public affairs under the Third Republic," does respond to the demand of the CSV and leads us to hope for a real change in the practice and orientation of the new regime. While the options of the Q~tPN have not yet been clearly ex- plained, this impression is strengthened by the other intention~ that have been proclaimed. "The moment has come to build a real dem4cracy," the new chief of - state declared and on the other hand he also announced "the necessary reorRaniza- tion of the aciministration" and he asserted that priority would be given in econo- mic terms to rural development and protection of cattle in order to guarantee food self-sufficiency. Of course, this is an objective that has been proclaimed everywhere. But the thing that particularly attracts our attention is that the CMRPN has declared that it is determined to review the policy of iadustrial crops in order to make room for food crops. And it also wants to step up mining prospecting (which so far has been neg~ected, although the Voltan subsoil is not devoid of potential) in order to pro- mote industrial development. While a minimum of caution is necessary in waiting for the promises to turn into real efforts, one may nevertheless hope that a new day is about to dawn over this country which so long has been left to itself. COPYRIGHT: 1980 Af rique-Asie 5058 CSO: 4400 88 � FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 UPPER VOLTA LAMIZANA'S DOWNFALL ANTICLIMACTIC Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 31 [Article by Siradiou Diallo: "A Putsch That Was Almost Dull--General Lamizana Overtaken by Events; A Military Recovery Comm'_ttee Puts an End To Democratic EMperlence"] [Te~:tJ Africa has just recorded its Sth military coup in 11 months. Af ter , Ma~tiritania (4 January) , Liberia (12 April) , Uganda (13 May) , and Guinea-Bissau (14 November), Upper Voltan power is changing hands. At dawn on 25 November Ouagadougou was the scene of a putsch that was almost dull. Gen Sangoule Lamizana, in power for nearly 16 years, was overthrown--painlessly, and, above all, without bloodshed. A"Military Recovery Committee For National Progress seized power, dissolved the National Assembly and thP government, and suspended the constitution and political activity. Calm and Authoritarian This did not prevent that committee from proclaiming its intention to set up a "real democracy," bringing together all the nat ion's active forces and insuring individual and collective freedoms "other than political ones." The new strong man in Ouagadougou is not quite an unknown in the corridors of power. Saye Zerbo, the colonel who chairs the Military Committee, was in fact General Lamizana's minister of foreign affairs between February 1974 and February 1976. That was in the "national renewal" government set up following the political crisis which :~a~ ~roken ouc ~n 22 January 1974 setting Gerard Kango Ouedraogo, the prime minister, 3gainst Joseph Ouedraogo, president of the National Assembly. A~!~eteran of the Indochina and Algeria wars, Col Saye Zerbo comes from Tougan, in western U~per Volta. From the Samo tribe like Gen Sangoule Lamizana, he took the Frejus (France) officer training school course in 1958 before attending staff school and staff college in Paris. Most recently he held the jobs of commander of the Ouagadougou combined service xegiment and head of the studies office at staff _ headquarters. Calm and authoritarian, he is 48 years old. Why this coup in a country envied by the rest of Africa for its democratic experience and which prided itself on respecting individual and collective liberties, while gradually getting used to tolerar.'_ng things like a free country , 89 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 does? Because life for Upper Voltans was getting worse and because of political confusion, the new leaders maintain. To be sure, since the start of the new school year, the unions, in collaboration with the opposition parties, kept things increasingly tense (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1038). _ But can democracy live without clashes and struggles? A Man Who Was Finished In truth, the Upper Voltans were fed up with Lamizana. Worn out by 16 years of power, the general (as he is commonly called in Ouagadougou) seemed to be increasingly overtaken by events. Faced with unrest among some and the intrigues of others, he took refuge in a wait-and-see approach which bordered on resignation. "Lamizana is finished," one of his colleagues confided to us recently, indignant at the inability of the Upper Voltan chief of state to resolve the crisis brought on by the openended strike activity of the unions. "I cannot conceive," added the person we were talking to, "of a president of the Republic who, having met with the union members, would let them go at it again without having made a decision." In the same way, opposition leaders like Joseph Ki-Zerbo, secretary-general of the FPV (Upper Voltan Progres- sive Front), were constantly denouncing the paralysis and i.action of the officials in charge. "Lamizana," they would say, "is like a corpse at the summit of power. He does not act or react, whatever you do." in the face of their chief's ineffectiveness and good-naturedness, the Upper Voltans clearly needed a change and particularly to be ruled by a self-confident head and a f irm hand, provided that their new strongman does not carry that too far. The Upper Voltans, spoiled rotten by Lamizana's laissez-faire approach, might before long become disillusioned and, who knows, react in turn. COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980 9631 CSO: 4400 9~ _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 UPPER VOLTA l LABOR UNREST PRECEDING RECENT COUP DISCUSSED - Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French S Dec 80 pp 37-39 [Article by Ginette Cot: "The End of a Myth"] [Text] The 25 November coup d'etat put an end to the reign of General Sangoule Lamizar~a and his entourage, a regime that had retained but the outward trappings o f democ racy . What for months had appeared to be an increasxngly definite probability became an actual fact on 25 November 1980 in Quagadougou where a bloodless coup led by Colonel Sayo Zerbo overth rew General Sangoule L~mizana's regime which had governed Upper 4olta since January 1966. The coup was englneered b~ the Inter-Service and Support Regiment (RIA) commanded by Colonel Zerbo and the Par atrooper-Commando ~ Regiment (RPC) normally stationed in Dedegou some 230 kilometers northeast of Oua- gadougou. The coup was followed by the arrest of several of the former regime's leaders. These included: President Lamizana; Gerard Kango Ouedraogo, president of the National Assembly and secretary general of the Voltan Democratic Party- African Demoeratic Rally (PDV-RDA), the new version of the old tJDV-RDA [Voltan Democratic Union-African Democratic Party], approved by the March 1980 party congress; Casimir Tapsoba, leader of the PDV-RDA in the capital; General Baba Sy, former army chief of staff, and General Jean Bila, former armed forces chief of stafE. .A11 peryons arrested were taken to the new military camp in the western section of - the capital. A 31-member Military Committee of Recovery for National Pro~ress (CMRPN) was established with Colonel Saye Zerbo a~ chairman. A nine-member steering committee has been formed within the CMRPN and some 10 civil servants have been appointed to handle current business in the various ministries pending formation of a new govern- tnent. The new leaders said their actioxi~aas 3ustified by the country's political and economic situation "marked by the deterioration of the social cli~;ate and all s ectors of national life." In what is now a standard procedure, the new leader- ship~s first decision was to dissolve all of the country's institutions, suapend the present constitution ar?d a11 political parties. � The CMRPN asserted it would abide by all of the ousted regime's international obligations. It also gave assurance that "individual and collective freedoms o ther than political will bE guaranteed." It announced that its objective was " to establish a real democracy in which all of the nation's vital elements are partners." This statement is much too broad and too ambiguous to allow us to speculate in any way, at this early date, about the new government's real intentions. - 91 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 There are, however, two facts that must be noted, even though they shed no r~ore , light on what the future holds than the above statement does. The first fact is that the military coup ~ccurred 5 days after the National Union of African Teachers ~ of Upper Volta (SNEAHV) and the Sole Voltan Union of Teachers of Secondary and - Higher Education (SUVESS), meeting in extraordinary session, had decided to suspend their effort to force a shawdown with the government of Prime Minister Joseph Conombo who is also the assistant secretary general of the PDV-RDA. This attempted showdown had resulted in a strike of indefinite durati~on by elementary school teachers. This - strike, begun on 1 October, the first day of the new school year, was in support of several demands, one of which--revision of the administrative status af teachers-- had previously triggered a 5-day work stoppage in February 1980. The other demands t~ad to do with ~icreased housing allowances for teachers, and with two special cases: reinstatement of two union members transferred because of their involvement in strike action, and the recall to Upper Volta of several trainees sent to the National Insti- = tute of School Administration in Paris under conditions the SNEAHV considers irregu- lar. With every passing day the con~lict had expanded and stiffened as the SUVESS and other labor federatior~sjoined the dispute. For instance~ on 14 October, the Voltan Trade Union Confederation ',CSV), the country's most militant union, staged a 72- hour "sympathy and protest" strike which paralyzed sir traffic, banks, and the cus- toms service. On 4 November, another 48-hour general strike was called, this time by the Eour Upper Voltan 1�^bor federations: the National Confederation of Voltan Workers (CNTV), Voltan Organization of Free Trade Unions (OVSL), Voltan Workers Trade Union Federation (USTB), and the CSV. Motion of No-Confidence While later the CSV was threatening to call for a general strike of indefinite duration to protest the arrest of several union membera, the "illegal freezing of wages, and all forms of ir.justice perpetrated by the regime," a motion of no-con- fidence in the government--the first such motion since the country became independent in 1960--was filed on 11 November by 24 of the National Assembly's 57 member.s. Those members supporting the motion were from the following opposition parties: the National Union for the Defense of Democracy (UNDD) headed by Professor Ammanuel Zoma and former presider~t Maurice Yameogo, ousted in 1966, and the Voltan Progres- sive Fron[ (FPV) headed by Professor Joseph Ki-Zerbo and Joseph Ouedraogo. Under rlte terms of this motion, event~ally defeated by 33 votes to 24, the opposition accused the government of not respecting the Cflnstitution and mismanaging public ~ f~cnds. It blamed the government for the deterioration of the political, economic, and social clLmate, for the insecurity of citizens, and for the country's inade- quate food supplies, particularly in the drought-stricken regions. The motion con- cluded by calling for the constitution of a government of national unity. ;he government had become panic-stricken and its Iast statements and actions reflected its inabili~y to quell the crisis and find solutions. On 12 November, for example, it promulgated a decree prohibiting demonstrations in public places and, strangely enough, the wearing of military uniforms by persons not belonging to the Upper Voltan Armed Forces and paramilitary organizations. To jvstify this measure, General Lamizana explained that "a small group, under a labor union cover, had oroanized a veritable armed militia with wea~ons and ~miforn~s furnished by the 92 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8 . real directors of the operation." He added that the elementary school teachers' strike had been "largely taken over and diverted by disparate coalitiona whoae sole common objective was to foment disorder and confusion." While Gerard Kango Ouedraogo, president of the National Assei~.,ly and secretary gene ral of the PDV-RL'A~ was accusing his lifelong foe: and rival, his "brother" Joseph Ouedraogo--former leader of the UDV-RDA, founder of the RDA Denial Front durin g the 1978 election campaign, and recently affiliated with Professor Ki-Zerbo's movement--of being the chief instigator of thecrisi.s, Prime Minister Joseph Conombo pers onally went so far as to hold "a foreign power" responsible, a power he claimed hed financially backed some tradQ union leaders. With L'tmoa t Calm It was under these conditions of total deadlock, and at a time when the PDV-RDA pres idential ma~ority was preparing to throw off its democratic masks once and for all, that, on 21 November, the two tea~hers' unions decided to suspend their strike ackion while stating that they intended to continue their struggle, coordinate their demands ar.d submit them to the government. The second notewor[hy fact is that the people received the news of Colonel Saye Zerh o's coup d'etnt with utmoet calm, without any agitation. There was even no recorded reaction from officials of the trade union opposition or polltical oppo sition inside or outside the country. This wany perhaps have been an indica- ~ tiozt of necessary caution, but also perhaps the expression oi a wait-and-see atti- tude. The only reactions noted were the almoat unanimous lamentations of the French - pres s and pro-Western African newspapers who viewed the overthrow of General Sangoule Lami zana's regime as the end of an experiment "unique in Africa." The French and pro-Western African media had always depicted Lamizana as a good-natured and concili- aCory person, and had eomewhat prematurely hailed him ae the father of the French- , aCyle democracy ~rhi~h reigned in Ouagadougou. It is true that everyone in the Upper Voltan capital could apparently freely voice the ir opinions, and ti~at a foreign observer ran no risk whenever he sought to inter- vie w any member of the opposition. There was no lack of oratorical jousts and rows, but these could serve as an outlet for frust.rations as well as a means of satisfying those persons who Zike to criticize ~d challenge authority. It is also true that rep ressive violence, torture, or political assasaination have been practically unknown in Upper ilolta up to now. This characteristic is, of course, particularly important. Yet upon closer examination, it is quite clear that this relative democracy, so high ly praised outside the country, had to be doggedly defended everyday agaixist the regime's supporters, and that it owed its existence primarily to the bitter struggle waged by workers. The entire history of the past 14 years is groof of this. Md all politicians from Joseph Ouedraogo to Joseph Conombo have been forced to recognize it and by turns ac~ accordingly. Mas s demonstrations organized by labor unions forced Maurice Yameogo, Upper Volta's fir st president, to step down on 3 January 1966. He had been involved in a series of financial scandals. Furthermore, his government had followed a fundamentally 93 FOR OFFZCIAL USE OI~LX I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8 antisocial policy and truckled to the furmer mother country and its satellites. In 1975, the labor federations again had to nip one of~neral Lamizana's plans in the bud. On 29 Uovember, the chief of state had announced his intention to impose a single party loyal to him. namely the National Movement for Renewal. But the very next day, thousands of workers responded to a call from the four labor federa- � tions--CSV, OVSL, C[~ITV, and USTV--and demonstrated their indignation in Labor Exchange Square. A general strike of unprecedented success was staged on 17-18 December in support of four demands: return to normal constitutional life, higher wages, settlement of claims resulting from misappropriation of relief aid destined for drought victims in the Sahel region and also from misappropriation of social securi[y ftmds. A "Cimmick" ~ 1fie chief of state, forced to backtrack, evaded the difficulty by a"gimmick." With the help of all the country's politicians, he formed a special commission entrusted with the task of drafting a constitution. At the same time, this enabled him to dodge demands for an investigation of the aforementioned misappropriation. Con- trary to the enthusiastic foreign reception given the constitution approved by referendum in November 1977, that document actually marked a regression from the prevailing de facto situation in the country where, without waiting for official _ permission, political and labor organizations were already openly working together because the n~w law specified that only the three parties receiving the most votes in the 1978 parliamentary elections would henceforth be considered lawful. In fact, th~s law accounts for the sometimes strange regroupings and alliances made, after the elections, within~the oppositian as well as in the presidential ma~ority. For instance, in late 1979, the Voltan Progressive Front (FPV), an opposition party, was actually a coalition of Frofessor Ki-Zerbo's Voltan Progressive Union (UPV), Joseph Ouedraogo's RDA Denial Front, the Independents, and elements of the Af:ican Republi- can Party (PRA). ~f the parties having cast their votes for General Lamizana as president, only the UDV-RDA emerged as a lawful party. At its Ma.rch 1980 congress, the UDV-RDA incor- porated elements of other s~uall organizations and on ~hat occasion changed its desig- nation to PDV-RDA. This move strengthened the precarious presidential majority in the National Assembly--33 of the 57 members--and restored respect for constitutional principles (several members of one of those small parties favorable to Lamizana, but defeated in the elections, were already members of the Conombo government). And ttie proceedings of the PDV-RDA Congress consisted almost entirely of behind-the-~ sceneG wheeling and dealing for a share of appointments and honorary positions (the party of the presidential majoriCy has no less than 100 members in its political buremu) . Corruption~ Lure of Easy Money Though General Lamizana's Upper Volta could pride itself on having no person impri~ soned for political or labor union related offenses, it also owed this record to the ~ vigilance of Upper Voltan workers. The many labor protests throughout 1979 confirm this fact. On 22 May, three OVSL officials were confined in the civilian prison at Gnoko for having denounced, at a union rally, the expansian of regionalism since 196G and the misappropriation of public funds with which tile entire capital was 91~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8 charging n~neruus key government leaders. As soon as news of this incarceration = became known, the four labor federations staged a general strike without waiting foi the 15--day cooling-off period prescribed by law. The strike lasted 7 da~ys, from 24 :4xy to 31 ?~[ay, and despite all kinds of intimidation--including the arrest of. ' aeveral leaders of the merchants union, and the occupatirm of the Workers Education Center and the Labor Exchange by repressive forces--the strike movement attained its goal: on 31 May, all arrested tmian members and officials were releseed and all charges against them were dropped. Again the lab~r unions were behind the sudden cuncern expressed on 21 February 1980 by General Lamizana about "::he countless disorders plaguing the IIpper Voltan civil seruice." In addressing a meeting of key govemment staffers, he told them: _ "Corruption, the lure of easy money, disrespect for public service, and the ten- dency of cer[ain officials to allow business to intrude into politics are apparently _ becoming a way of life." He then announced the imminent impletr,entation "of a set of ineasures designed to successfully carry out indispensable reforms." As for this "set of ineasures," it would appear that they consisted of nothing more than the decision to create, as recom~ended by the national administzative reform cotmnittee established in February 1979, a single government inspector general's office for the entire country in place of rhe present "plethoric and anarchic" series of general inspectorates operating in each ministerfal departments. But the labor federations--CNTV, CSV, and OVSL--which. in an open letter to the President of the Republic on 5 Septzmber 1979, had drawn the chief'of state's a:ention to various irregularities noted in the management of public affairs, were hardly prepared to let this matter be forgotten. Especially since each time uni.ons submitted demands, they were accused of warking towards selfish goals and trying, as it were, to bring about the downfall of a country whose destitution is still exacerbated by 10 years of drought. Actually, such accusations were an attempt to set Che city workers ~nions against the immense peasant ma~ority stagnating on the edge of destitution. This situation prompted Prime Minister Conombo to say quite tactlessly one day, in an outburst of demagogic f..eeling, that whenever he was faced with wage earners' demands, he personally considered him- self to be the leader of a peasant trade imion with 7 million members: Leeches But in their letter, the three labor federations not only reiterated their wage demands but also let it be clearly understood that funds could be found wilh which to improve the living conditians of wage earners without hurting anyone, provided, however, the corridors of powera were not filled with so many leeches absorbing public funds. Glith supporting evidence, the three federations denounced the following instanr_es of the waste in the management of public affairs: numerous missiona with inflated delegations; modernizat3ron at government expense of the private homea of cabinet members and other officials; misappropriations and malfeasance by government pereonnel; manipulation of public funds for dishonest purposes; opening of special government-funded accounts and programs for the National Assembly, the ministries, and other public institutions, while keeping the actual use of these funds secret; corruption of ministers and other national officials; systematized favoritism and nepotism resulting i.n favors granted citizens supgortive of the presi- dential majority, such as, for example, the awarding of government contracts to 95 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8 friends and relatives of natianal officials; incliision in the national budget of more than 100 agents and civil servants for whom no derinite functions are specified; the e~iormity of the salaries paid managers af ~emip.ubl.~~:comFanies, etc. . Lastly, workers must also be given credit for the surreptitious but specta~ular wiChdrawal from the National Assembly's agenda ot a bill limiting the right to st�cike. As soon as newe of th~s bill leaked out, the CSV organized a day of protest on 17 January 1980. The bill also promised to create quite a stir in the ranks of the opposition. Consequently no further mention was ever made of it. The special session of the National Assembly called to consider the bill was cancelled withouC any explanation. And ever since then, no government official ;zas dared � even to ~;cknowledge that such a bill ever existed. NeverCheless, the governmental crisis had b~come more pronounced these past few months despite the advent of the Third Republic, the "democratic" ~lections of 1978 and the "patched-up" peace that followed. The deadlock resulted from two traits which have characteriaed the economic and social policy of President Lami- ~ zana's successive gove~nments for nearly 15 years, namely Iaissez-faire and an - excessive tendency to concj.liate. Unable to find solutions, supporters of the presi- dential majority became more and more arrogant. EveryChing was happening as i�, "having neither learned nor forgotten anything," they expected, despi'te all contraindicationS, to bring ;mions and opposition parties to heei, so as Co impase a noncumbersome made-to-order "democracy." In any event, the seizures of newspapers, instances of haraGSment, and Lransfers of civil ser- vants belonging to oppoeition parties continued to :Increase. These roeasures faited, however, to halt the process of the regime's disintegration. And people waited in vain for the municipal electiona prescribed by the Constitution. But these elections were clearly postponed sine die. A CSV oLficial told us a few months ago: "In reallty, President Lamizana and his PDV-RDA majority are trapped in an inextricab].e contradiction. Our leaders take great pride in saying: 'Look at our country, here we have democracy.' For them, in facr, denocracy bo ils down ta a public relattons campaign aimed at the outside world. I'or inside the country, our leaders speak an altogether di~ferent language znd deny full expression to all of the components of that democracy~ and organiZed - labor is one such component. These leaders pose as champions of democracy as ~f tti~~y had invented it. It is essential, however, that it be fu11y understood on the inte rnational level that the men of the present presidential majority--those very same men who were already grouped together as members of the single official party of Maurice Yameogo's First Republic--certainly have no hand in the relative freedom we enjoy. It must be realized that when the general wanted to eatablish his own single party in 1979, these men did not even react. 'Good Family Man' "Our democrntic attainments; which we have to defend in a daily unremitting struggle, were actually achieved by the Upper Voltan people and workers. Moreover, we believe that there will be no real der,iocracy as long as a n~inority can continue to monopo- lize the fruits of collective labor, as long as we have not succeeded in establishing economic and social democracy. Outsiders tell us: you have Africa's most generous 96 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8 general. a good family man who has presented you with democracy. This is a perni- - cious line of reasoning that further juatifies the possibility of repreasion the uament it is felt we are exaggerating, because the number of strikes will increase and that, it seems, is not possible in ~ poor country. Therein lies the danger that threatena us and is liable to jQOpardize our progress toward democracy. Because if our leaders manage to deceive international public opinion, one morning they will be able to reprees us with the blesaing or silent complicity of part of - that opinion...." COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie 8041 - CSO: 4400 ~D - 97 t FOR OFFICIAL USE ~NLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8