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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/9572 25 February 1981 Near East North Africa Re ort p CFOUO 8/81) F~~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 _ ) NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from forPign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- - mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- - t;.on mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in con~ext. Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an - item originate with the source. Times within i.tems are as given by source. - The conrents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. COPYRIGHT I.,AWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODL'CED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATIUN BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ODTLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY , JPRS L/9572 25 February 1981 , NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT (FOUO 8/81) _ CONTENTS INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS - Briefa Algerian-Moroccan Contact 1 AFGHANISTAN Afghan Robberies, Banditry, Fighting Reported - (PeCer Niesewand; THE GUARDIAN, 6 Feb 81) 2 _ LIBYA Briefs 'Italian Terrorists' in Deaert Camps 4 PERSIAN GULF AREA _ Saudis Propose Link-Up With Other Gulf States (Patrick Seale; THE OBSERVER, 1 Feb 81) 5 ~ SUDAN Sadiq al-Mahdi Explai~ns Position Among Ansar ~SUDANOW, Jaa 81) 8 Reconcilxation irn SSU Shows Progress ~SUDANOW, Feb 81) 9 Inlormation Minister Addresses Current Issues (Iamail Haj Musa Interview; SUDANOW, Feb 81) 12 , Head of Southern Industr~ r!inistry InCerviewed (Bona Malwal Interview; SUDANOW, Jan 81) 15 Japaneae Make Large Contribution to Economy ~SUDANOW, Jan 81) 18 Oil Sector Development Reass~esaed (SUDANOW, Jan 8a) 20 - a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO] APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300084455-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Labor Shortage Plaguea Oil Induatry Development (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 2-8 Jan 81) 23 Concentzated Efforts Attack Cat~tle Diseases (SUDANOW, Jan 81) 26 SULTANATE OF OMAN Strait of Hormuz Could Be First Spark o� World War III (Ahmad Hafiz; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 2 Jan 81) 28 TUNISIA ~ 'JEUNE AFRIQUE' Article Analyzes Status of Army (Souhayr Belhassen; .TEUNE AFRIQUE, 31 Dec 80) 34 Gradual Liberalization Program Analyzed (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITF.RRl~NEENS, 26 Dec 80) 42 UNITED AR.AB EMIRATES Details of Establishment of Central Bank ('Abd al-Malik al-Mahar Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 13 Jan 81) 45 ~ , - b - ' OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 ' FOIlt OFiFICIAL USE ONLY INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS BRIEFS ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN CONTACT--The wnrld press reported that Morocco's King Hassan II and AlgQria's president Chadli Bend3edid met briefly with one another insid~ the sanctuary at Mecca. Such a high level contact between Algeria and Morocco, un- ' precedented since 1975, led some papers to infer a likely apgroximation of views vi~s-a-vis the Saharan issue. Large numbers of the pvhlic in Algeria and Morocco feel certain that there were corridor talks between Algeria and Morocco on the Saharan issue. Significance was readilp attached to th.e handshake and embrace ex- changed b etween monarch and president. Over the course of several months semi- , official information and propaganda whisperings in Morocco have actua.lly kept alive a feeling that relations between Rabat and Algiers would soon normalize and that the Saharan issue would soon be resolved in line with Moroccan views. In - Algeria the situation was just the apposite. ~'oreign minister Mohammed Benyahia said it was regrettable that there were "all those rumors tending to denigrate ~ the SDAR's brilliant dinlomatic gains and the increasinglq strong solidarity of world opinion on t~e side of the Polisario Front." Consequently, Algiers has quickly disavowed that the polit~ gesture made by the two heads of state as re- quired by Islamic tradition had a~c.~.y political significance. The fact is that, whether on pilgrimage or otherwise, when visiting the Kaaba all Muslims are obliged to free their minds of all earthly concerns and direct them solely to- wards God. There is no way the sanctuary precinct could be the site of a suutmit dialog. All the same, many North African Muslims will be uf the opinion that it could be the site of a gesture of reconciliation between ~ao believers. In - the process of banishing such "~peculations," EL MOUDJAHID (28 January) contrib- ' utes one of its own: "It must be borne in mind that Algeria and Morocco have no quarrel except for the issue of the decolonialization of Western Sahara, a topic about which each country has a different view." [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES ~'ROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Feb 81 p 288] ' CSO: 4400 1 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 ' FOR OFFI~IAL USE ONLY AFGHANISTAN AFGHAN ROBBERIES, BANDITRY, FIGHTING REPORTED LD061235 Lond~n THE GUARDIAN iz English 6 Feb 81 p 8 ' [Dispatch by Peter Niesewand: "Bandits Boost Toll of Afghan Fighting"] [Text] New Delhi--There has been a marked increase in the number of f unerals in th e Af ghan capital, Kabul, as the toll in continuing fighting again~t Islamic guerrillas vies with fatalities from a dramatic increase in armed robberies, diplomats said here yesterday. Une diploma.t said he had been told that in some areas of the city, ~ Mojahadin (Islamic rebels) had formed n3.ght patrol units which extorted - money from shopkeepers, while at the same time Soviet troops looted houses, stores and businesses. . Ano~her diplomat said that intruders also included "thugs" from th e ruling ~ communist party, and common criminals. Althnugh curfew does no t begin until 10 p.m. few Afghans were now seen on the streets after 7 p.m. , The sources said: "The intruders are always armed, and a major factor in the deterioration seems to be the wide and indiscriminate issue of submachine- guns and automatic rifles. If resistance is encountered--and many Afghan householders are armed--shots are fired and people are killed." Banditry and robbery in the countryside was also widespread now, the source added, with the main dif�erence being that outside the city there were more cases of extortion by Mojahadin. "Resistance forces send demand notes to businessmen and other householders, and set fire to premises if they get no response," he said. The closest the small foreign community has come recently to the latest troub les was on Thursday of last week, when five Afghans, dressed in Western clothes and armed with machine-guns and pistols, raided the iJnited Nations club in Kab ul. Th ey held five UN officers and several Afghans at gunpoint before locking them in a room. The robUers stole electronic equipment, a television set, a film projector, and cash from the club till, and loaded them into three taxis waiting outside. They made their escape unchallenged. Although there were no casuaifiies in th is incident, there frequently are ! woundings and fatalities when people attempt to resist. 2 FOk OFF7CIAL USE 4NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OrFICIAL USE ONLY Political assa~sainations are reportedly continuing in Kab ul, particularly of thase believed to be members of the Parcham (flag) faction of the Afghan Communist Party led by Babrak Karmal, the man installed as president by the Russians after their invasion more than a year ago. Despite the heaviest snows of winter in many parts of the country, there are also persistent reports of continued fighting in many areas. One diplomat, quoting a"good source," said that the Afghan 4th and 15th armoured divis~ons--which for months have been confined to their cantonments ~ and guarded by the Soviet army because of their "unreliab ility"--have now been ordered into the field. Separate reports pin-pointed the 4th and 15th armoured divisions as being sent to Gt~orband and Parwan provinces, along the road to Bamian, and to Taqab in the newly-formed Kapise Province. Taqab is understood to be an area of particular unrest at the moment. Diplomats said they had been told that 47 wounded Afghan soldiers from the 444th Commando Brigade had been brought to the military hospital in the capital after fighting in Taqab and its surrounding valley. Afghan officers in Kabul are also reported to h ave been talking about "a serious defeat" for the 444th Commando Brigade, and saying that an armoured - division had been sent to help thPm. Funer~ls of dozens of military and civil officers in the capital--many announced by the off icial Afghan ~nedia--h~ve been noted by diplomats. Joint Afghan-Sovie~~ for=es have been reported fighting Mojahadin, or being seen on manoeuvres in the provinces of Loghar, Wardak and Zabul, over the - pas t week . A diplomatic source reported that clashes took place around Istalif, about - 30 m:iles north of Kabul, with Soviet helicopters and jets brought in to - relieve pressure on Afghan �orces theie. Military vehicles have been ambushed along the main supply road north through the Salang Pass to the Soviet Union, and some of these attacks have taken place less than 12 miles from the capital. Diplomats said that Kab ul itself has recently been shaken by several heavy explosions. "We have not been ab le to determine the cau~c of these," a source said, but the timing--for inst3nce on Friday (the Muslim holiday) after dark-- - fits oddly with the official explanation of rock b lasting for road construc- tion." COPYRIGHT: Guardian Newspapers Limited [1981J CSO: 4920 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300084455-4 _ . FOR OFFICI_AL USE ONLY LIBYA BRIEFS 'ITALIAN TERRORISTS' IN DESERT CANiPS--Algiars--The chorus of rumors, suspicions and pointers circulating in Italy on terrorism and its international connections is aug- mented dramatically today with information gathered in Algiers. Very authoritative Algerian circles have apparently discovered that Italian terrorists are being trained in three paramilitary camps in the Libyan desert. Basques from Basque Homeland and Freedom and West Germans are apparently keeping our fellow countrymen company there. Ac~ording to the Algerians, the discovery was made by the bedouins who, as we know, know no frontiers in their wandaring across the Sahara. A much more _ realistic hypothesis, however, is that the efficient Algerian security services, which have eyes and ears even in the vastness of the Sahara, are involved. A mes- sage has apparently already been sent to Rome, as a sign of friendship and solidar- ity. Relations between Algeria and Italy are good and Pertini's visit last year helped a great deal. [Excerpt] [LD041423 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SEARA in Italian 2 Feb $1 p 1 ] CSO: 4004 ; 4 I Fnu n~~Trr nr TTC~' nrrr v APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300084455-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PERSIAN GULF AREA SAUDIS PROPOSE LINK-UP WITH OTHER GULF STATES LD021255 London THE OBSERVER in English 1 Feb 81 p 7 [Report by Patrick Seale~ [Text] At-Ta'if, Saudi Arabia--In a ma~or development which could change the political map of Arabia, the Saudi Kingdom and five lesser neighbours are con- _ siderir~g joining together in a confederation of Gulf states, according to senior Arab delegates at last week's Islamic au~it. Under cover of the summit, leader~c from Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab E~irates , Oman and Saudi Ar~bia held an unpublicised meeting here to discuss their plans. Their foreign ministers are to meet in Riyadh on 4 February to study con- stitutional proposals which have already been circulated in great secret. ~ These proposals are understood to go considerably beyond the shared security con- ; cerns which first drew these countries together in the wake of the Iranian revolu- ~ tion and the Gulf war. What is under discussion is nothing less than a sort of political marriage on the model of the Malaysian Federation, where the federal head of state is elected in rotation for a five-year term from among the members. If iC comes off, such a Gulf confederation, which Saudi Arabia would be bound to dominate, would greatly boost Saudi power and prestige and be a major blow to the ambitions of Iraq in the Gulf. Iraq has been informed of the plan and, in a diplomatic trade-off, is believed to have reluctantly acquiesced in it in exchange for Saudi and Gulf backing for its ; war agains t I ran . ; This war is a prime reason prompting the Gulf states to move closer together. ; They fear that, even if a ceasefire is arranged soon, the antagonisms aroused ~ between Arab and Persian, and between Sunni and Shia, could take a generaCion to appease with a constant threat of renewed flare-up. Their greatest desire is not to be sucked in--a desire ardently shared by their Western fri~nds and oil clients. But if the Iraq-Iran war. is the spur to the Gulf get-together, it has also pro- vided Saudi Arabia with the opportunity to make a bid for regional leadership. In the private words of a senior Saudi prince: 'The war has won us 10 years.' ~ 5 ~ FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIQ L ~iJS~. ONLY By this he meant that Iraq and Iran, the kingdom's two principal rivals, had each sui'fer~ed such a setback as to give the kingdom its chance. df all the cou~ lex inter-Arab relations, the Saudi-Iraqi one is now among the most interesting and ambiguous. Saudi Arabia needed--and still needs--the muscle of Iraq to roll back the subversive tide of Shia revolution emanating from Ayatollah Khomeyni in Iran. In other words, Iraq is a necessary buffer between Saudi Arabia, with its s mall population, and Iran's much larger 36 million whose revanchiste nationalism has now been so alarmingly aroused. But, although the Saudis have supported Iraq's war effort, the two countries are really adversary partners. Ideologically and geopoliticaliy they are at odds, and, beneath the surface cordiality of relations between Crown Prince Fahd and President Saddam runs a current of caution and competition. Last week's summit showed that, for the moment at any rate, Saudi Arabia can have its cake and eat it. Iraq is doing the dirty work in the muddy plains of Khuzestan, while Saudi Arabia reaps the political glory of hosting the greatest gathering of Islamic leaders the modern wor.ld has ev~r seen. Undoubtedly, the at-Ta' if summtt has done the Saudi image nothing but good. Brother Arabs were highly impressed uirh the Western efficiency of the arrange- - ments, the meticul.ous staff work, the fastidious finish of the buildings and - highways, the smart, alert bearing of the Saudi security forces. But there was no loss of Bedouin hospitality or Islamic piety. It was as if the kingdom had - managed that most difficult of exercises--squaring the circie between the best of East and West. The picture the Saudis were trying, not unsuccessfully, to puC over was of a strong, stable regime which had fully recovered from the security hiccup of - November 1979 when insurgents stormed th e Great Mosque in Mecca. In hard political xerms, the significant aspect of this, assembling a quarter of the world's nations, was that it signalled Saudi determination to play _ a more assertive role in the world. The instrument for this new role is the - Islamic Conference Organization, founded in 1969 but now for the first time under Saudi chairmanship. The aim of Saudi diplomacy is to demonstrate that this M1s1im forum can be the most effective of all Third World bodies--better. able to shape events than the now dormant Arab League, the gravely sp13L- non-allgn~nent movement, or the powerless Organisation for African Unity, Saddam of Zraq, whc is iooking fozward to hosting the non-aligned conference in Baghdad next year, finds himself upstaged. United in Is1am and exceedingly we11 funded, the Islami.c Conference is being pushed by the Saudis as the place where Third World disputes can best be resolved; where Khomeyni's Shia mischief can best be countered; where the cause of an independent ~ Palestine can best be promoted, and where the encroaching superpowers can best be kept at arm's length. 6 FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY With these ambitions and backed by G~lf money, conference must be judged an important new player in internatinnal affairs. Can Saudi Arabia pull it off? It is easentially a cheque-book state, it has an anachronistic social system, remains heavily dependent on foreigners, and is unused to pro~ecting its power abroad. Now it has manoeuvred itself to the centre of two new power groupings--the pro- p~osed Gulf confederation and the Islamic Conference Organization, whose multiple agencies range from high finance to sport, from Islamic education to the promo- tion of trade, and half a dozen other activities besides. Saudi skills and nerves are going to be stretched iri the years ahead. COPYRIGHT: The Observer Ltd 1981 CSO: 4820 - ~ i ; ~ ~ 7 - , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040340080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SUDAN SADIQ AL-MAHDI EXPLAINS POSITION AMONG ANSAR Khartoum SUDANOW in English Jan 81 p 5 [TextJ In discussing the history of the Ansar since the May Revolution, Sadig el-Niahdi referred in a recent interview, to tfie close identification between the Mah di family, th e Da'irat el Mahdi--the Mahdi company--the Ansar and the Umma Party as reflecting an 'historic phase.' In this light, he asserted that 'the role of the fonner Unmma Party will be inherited by the political organi- sation that all of us want to form for the nation." 'The Ansar,' he said 'will evolve along lines that will contribute to the - mode~�z social and religious culture of the country.' He said, too, that the Da'irat el Mahdi, once restored to its owners, would exist 'in smaller units for people for their livelihood; and not in the previous form as a kind of patronising company.' E1 Mahdi referred to the Mahdi family as a'grouping tied by blood relations-- simple relatives.' In this context, he said, Ahmed el Mahdi, as the eldest living son of Abdel Rahman el Mahdi, would be viewed as the head of the Mahdi family. When asked in a recent interview how political differences between himself and his uncle had affected the Ansar movement, E1 Mahdi answered: 'Throughout - the period of this regime, Ahmed has played a different role from mine.' But, he asserted, their political differences had not impeded the development of the Ansar. 'There isn't any explicit organisation to say this or that is the leadership,' co~nented Sadig el Mahdi. 'But, I think,' he continued, 'that it is quite clear in the minds of the b ulk of the Ansar where they get their political direction; although there are people among the Ansar who may have a different attitude, 'I am saying,' he stressed, 'that throughout the whole period, there has been no confusion about where decisions were made and who made them.' COPYRIGHT: All righ ts reserved, Sudanow 1981 CSO: 4820 8 ~ FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040340080055-0 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SUDAN RECONCILIATION IN SSU ~HOWS PROGRESS Khartoum S UDANOW in &iglish Feb 81 pp 15-16 [Text] The National �Reconciliation was ugreed strongest opposition forces, has bcen upon in 1977. Since that time, jvrmer busy building an organisational hierarchy vpposition groups have slo~oly begun to into the Ansar since his return to Sudan merge with the SSU, ajte~ al! a~reed thot in 1977. Such organisation had previously it w~ould remain the aole polrtical instr- boen absent, and has ~ven the Msar the tution. chance to tackle the ongoing dispute re- Observers have bee?i uw~riting hot ~rding the leadership of the movement. dcl~ates, heated conflict or, in tire Iri a recent inierview, Sadig el Mahdi extreme, ths collapse of the recon- made it quite clear that the dispute had ci(iafion p~ocess Jt seems, hvwever, that been ::ettled, and settled in his favour tirey will be sorely di,sappoin~ed, as with tPrintout,Jan $1). the arrival of the nex+ ycu~ the oppo.ring President Nimeiri's recent book, .'Why - polrtical jactions continie lo ~econcrle the Islamic Metirod ; in praising Sadig, their drjferences Azhari Abdel ~ahman seems a]so to have Iocked the door on repvrts: Sadig's opponent and uncle, Ahmed el Mahdi, who, thrnughout the days of ~LTHOUG~4 observers expected Sadig's opposition to the rc~ime, played major conflici in the late s~;venties, the card of allia~?ce with the regime. it would appear that the political climate Notable is that although Sadig agreed in Sudan has cooled considerably since that the SSU would be the sole political ihe National Reconciliation in ] 9~7. o~gani;ation, he has kept himself and his _ The cssential point to which all parties ibllowers well outside the boundaries of to the reconciliation agreed, according to any political activity. He has also staied Dr Ismail Haj Musa, Minister of Culturc that he rnm~~n~ i~:,i;tent upon the and lnformation and member uf the Poli- originel nilie points that he submitted to _ ticaJ Bureau, was that the SSU should the government upo:: reconciliation, = remain the sale political organisation in points that will, in his opinion, serve to the country. Haj Tdusa considers the re- mak� the SSU more effective, voluntary, conciliation as a step towards national self�financing and rrnnpetitive and a unity but not as attempt to change the generally more a~..ountab'e institution. political line of the SSU. The Musiim Brotherhood has also The question stilf remains as to whether succeeded in maintaining a following, as - or noi the leaders of the various opposi- ~ evidenced by its participation in tion groups are finding it casy to dissolve university pditics, vihere it dominates iheir organisations and merge their the students' unions. A well�known elements with the SSU. lt also remains to leader of the 141Bs and editor ofAlAyam, be seen whether or not this can be done yassin Omer c] Imam,told Srulanow that without compromising the terms of the he considered a single political organisa- ~ opposition groups or contradicting the tion the best system for Sudan because it principles of the SSU. negates conflict and enhances partici- Sadig el Mahdi, leader of one of the pation and dialogue without ideological 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300084455-4 - FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY ' ' commit.nent. Ht went on to add that $rothers were able to increase their there are no Muslim Brothers in the SSU, numbers in the Assembly, and those ~ and that any participation on their part is sympathising with the Mlis hope that of an Islamic rather than political nature. they wiIl use their strengfh to press for The Pinal outcome of the National Re� the passage of tha I~lamic laws prepared - conciliation is one that will be deter- by the Iaws Rovision Committee. mined by history. What is now evident is Sadig el Mahdi, however, boycotted the that secondary conflicts are being tackled elections because he contended that the in ~ngoing debates on the efficiency and National Assembly is without the powers democratisation within the SSU. that it needs to make ii capable of 7'he ineff iciency of the SSU has lotig properly handling iis furction as the legis- been the object of criticism by opposition lative body of the country. Many obser- _ groups, who have claimed that the SSU vers have concluded that Sadig's expected has failed to reach the masses. Dr Ismail mOVe towards the re ' e and the Haj Musa, however claims that there is ~ no criterion by which efficiency or in� appointmeut of Abdel Ma~d as Secntary efficiency can be determined, and General of the SSU are indications that pledged that efficiency will be gained the Assembly will eventually be dissolved. through ex~+eriance. Sadig ei Mahdi This view seems further corroborated by believes that the democratisation of the tlie institution of regional assemblies. SSU must be achieved from bottom to Observers have also been awaiting a hot top, and that the bases of the organisa- debate when the Islamic Laws are tabled tiun should elect the leadership, to which in the Assembly. However, the work of fiaj Musa agrees. The Muslim Brothers do the Laws Revision Committee has been not seem to concern themselves with the frozen due to some dispute over the tech- issue of elections, but tend to criticise the ' nical aspects of some of the laws. popular organisations of the SSU as the 7~e rhyth-n of Islamisatian has in fact cause for inefficiency. According to the been sJowed. I~ws already drafted have MBs, anti-Muslim Brother elements and not yet been tabled. 'Ihe presidency of old cadres of the regime are dominating the committee has been taken from the the Sudan Youth Union and the Sudan Mu~1im Brothers and ~hei.r sympathisers. Women's Union, and have effectively '1'here have been other obstacles to the quashed the influence in decision-making reconciliation, which Dr lsmail Haj Musa of the parties to the reconciliation, vie~vs as a process ~f a large number of Indeed, the social base of the SSU has p~op~e working together under the um- widened since ihe National Reconcilia- brella of natio~?al unity. Yassin Omer el tion and a degree of political stability has Imam argues that the idea of national been achieved. The return of two unity lacks the Islamic depth essential oppos~ng elements from abroad, Abdel to lending unity, and hence reconcilia- Magid Abu Hasabu and Hussein Osman tion, its true meaning. Mansour, indicates that the older powers ~e current plan of regionalisation, in Sudanese politics are slowly coming to adoptei] late last year, has also proven a realise that not so many differences exist bone oi contention among former between the regime and the former opposition e]ements. One MP to]d opposition, and that dialogue may help ~danow that the regional government in achieving the incorporation of the legjslation could have been passed under opposition into the regime and the SSU. Article 6 of the Permanent Constitution, Sadig el Mahdi, in a recent interview, which provides for Sudan~ administra- assessed General Abdel Magid Hamid tion within a decentralised system. Khalil's potential in the latters recent pthers, the M& among them, insisted ' appoir.tment as S~cretary General of the that regulations for regional government SSU: `(1 see his role as) one ot objectively be embodied in the constitution, and this assessing the perfonnance of thc SSU, is what eventually transpired. and that should help to narrow the gep The process of regional governmeni between those of us who, we believe, creates its own ~problems not the least have made such an ass~ssment and those because its opens to criticism and com- who, we believe, have refused to do so.' petition positions and polices which have ` T't~e role of the People's Assembly has hitherto been closed off. Following - been a subject of minor debate compared demonstrations last month in EI Fasher, to the role of the SSU, In elections at the the capital of Darfur region, the Regional begjnning of last year, the Muslim Governor, E1 Tayeb el Mardi, resigned 1Q FnR n~~TrT eT TTC7~ nrn v APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY arid was replaced by Ahmed Ibrahim Dreig. Meanwhile, each of the opposition groups is struggling to promote their own mode of Isla~n as the proper one for the angoing 'Islamisation' of Sudan, The President's book is without conclusion to the debate of which method of Islam is to be followed and how. Dr lsmail Haj Musa is of the opinion that we should Islamise the society before , the state. Sadig el Mahdi, in a recent un- published interview, stated that he is currently seelcing to create a national . Islamic platform comprising all Lslamic - movements, regardtess of political line or religious sect, Under the present conditions, however, it seems doubtful - that such a platform will emerge in the _ nearfuture. Although the issues at stake are major, and the debatas continue, none of the parties to the reconc~7iation has ban forced to rstreat or to make major concessions. Slowly, ii seerns, a political ~ - alliana may, in fact, emerge. COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved, Sudanow 1981 CSO: 4820 11 F4R OFFICIAL US~ ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFl'ICIAL USE ONLY SUDAN INFORMATION MINISTER ADDRESSES CURRENT ISSUES Khartoum SUDANOW in English Feb 81 pp 18-19 [Interview with Dr Ismail Haj Musa, minisCer of culture and information; date and place not given] [Text] Dr /smvi! Haj Musa, Minister of Culture /t /ooks, however, as if rhe conirary and lnjormation, recently sat down is the case. with members of Sudanow's stujf to A: No, We should see with whom the discuss severvl topies of contenrporory reconc~7iation was made; it was made concern: the resulrs of the P~esident's with various groups, some of whose reconciliation initiative; relations wit~ disagreements with the regime had ~ the Muslim Brothers; the President's reached the level of armed conflict. So recently published book, which high- we shouldn't expecf the reconciliation lights the Islamic method; and the to end these differences overnight, and s~a~e of progress of the Islamisation of we canK expect the returnees to remain Laws Committee. Exnacts from this dis- silent. On the contrary we feel that they cussion appear below should contrbute their opinion; so it is ~ natural that at the beginning there were SUDANOW: Whai were ihe effects of some different views expressed and this reconci/iaiion on the genera/ po/i[ica/ ]ed people to wonder about a change in line of ~he SSU7 political direction, Those who worked DR ISI4IAI L: Of course, political change inside through the last ten years was not the aim of the reconc~7iation. disagreed a lot with each other, but On the contrary, the reconc~7iati4n was through dialogue they reached a similar - rrudc in keroina. with the line of the tune; so it is to be expected that the SSU policy, which calls for and concen- views of the newcomers should be ' trates on national unity. The Addis different. I think that with the process Ababa Agreement in 1972, which gave - the South its regional autonomy, was a of the reconcfliation and time the , step towards national unity and in tum opinions of people wiD be unifted, and ' it gave a forward push to national they will reach the best through politics by fostering stability in the dialogue and debate, South and increasing Southem partici- p; Do you think rhat rhe SSU was more - I pation in the political system. Similarly e~lecrive befor+e or after the reconci/ia- I think reconciliation was anoth~r step tionl ' towards national unity, which wui ~r� q; ~e~ is an essential fact when we ' another push and achieve more stability . Hopefully this will contr~ute to a speak about the efficiency ot' the political orpanisation: this is the topic , better atmosphere for economic of discussion now instead of the rulin development, which is our essential + S role of the SSU. With experience and ~ priority, daily efforts and with the admission of 12 ~ T.AO AL~L~Tl~TAT T7C~L+ /~wRV APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY new elements to leading or base declaration on 25th af MaY, 1969, positions we have a new efi~ciency. which rejected the parties, sects, and However, I think it is certain that the trbalism, because they are d~fferentiat- SSU is not on the 1eve1 which we hape ing factors against national unity. A for, and this }ia5 its objective and his� look at the SSU will show that it now torical reasons. comprises those elements which had . been against each other fae a long S~,~ch asT period, They sit together now and p: I think that any political organisa- discuss with each other. It is the result tion which through its struggle has of the rejection of parties and it is created a revolution will be a very effec- evidence that every day national unity tive organisation,because the struggle to will be consolidated. I ctonK think that change conditions which hamper the there will come a day when we can say - revolution will strengthen it and its that we have achieved national unity, cadres will be really strong. To the because national unity is the largest contrary, any organisation which is ntunber of inen working together and _ created by a regime will be ineffective, ~e ~~gest number of efforts made to- simply because as the organisation of gether, and this can't ever be achieved the regime the recruitment of its completely. The broad line on which we members will not be without all a(~ree now are that: (a) the first opportunist aims. I say frankly that priority should be given to develop- there are SSU membsrs who came not ment (b) that this development should to give but to take, and this is a cause of be along a non-capitalist path (c) the complaint on different levels. We give importance of the Islamic method in all people the chance of inembership, our poliiical cultural life. (d) foreign and throup~ exp~erience we will dis- policy should not be tied to any ally, cover the opporturust elements. There is and should evaluate the problems one important new and useful step in objectively for our national benefit and the SSU, which will lead it to more for the benefit of the Afro-Arab world, - e.{f9ciency whether before or after the Q; yyhai happened so far in the l~ami- reconc~7.iation: the S5~ is moving towards more elections, which is an sation of Laws CommitteeT looks es if important part of the efficiency of the it has slowed down. SSU democracy. Let us take the ~olit� A: No. It is not an easy task, because to bureau. The first two politbureaus after review we have to study all existing laws the establishment of the SSU were and decide which of them don't absolutety nominated by the President; conform to the sh~ia. The committee, the next one was half nominated, half since its inc~ption, was directed by the elected; in the next the President President to work with conscientious brought a list of more than thirty from care. I think the committee is going as which he rieeded more than twenty. The planned. We know that the fourth existing 20 member politbureau was People's Assembly has to debate laws in elected by about 100 people. So a day the coming days. Sorne of these will come where the politbureau will be revisions have already been discussed elected d'uecdy from the central com� in the newspapers, for example the Bi11 mittee, and this is definitely a step ofPublic?.!�~~s. towards more efficiency. 0; There have been days when [here Q: You said that naiional ~econciliation was con~mniation between ihe old SSU is a step towards narinna! unity, can we cadres and the Muslim Broihers. Whai conclude that you view nationa/ unity was the MBs aim ar~d whai do [hey hope as a po/itical unityl t.~r /iom ihe Presideni's book7 A� No, what I said about the efficiency A: In fact I have not been confronting of ihe SSU can be said about national the MBs. I understand the reconcilia- unity. National unity is not an aim for tion: that this country can`t develop - which we can set. It is a tune w}uch we unless the means of political activity is will continue te. play - reconciliation, unified and this means a unified the Addis Agreement and the efforts pulitical or~nisation. Sadig El Mahdi, we made an transportation and commu� for example, when he returned agreed nication ace aU steps towards national upon a unified political org~n, indeed unity. 1 have said that the first step t?e has been calling For such a thing since towards national unity was the first the days of the multi-party system. Dr 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300084455-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY liassan E! Turabi in aii intervie~~ w~ith I:T initiativc he put it openly to all who Ayvm also agreed with us. All those upposed ihe regime - not necessarily to who came with the reconciliati~~n agreed ~hose who are abroad, there are some on this point. So whoever works with people inside who didn~t oppose the the regime, I don't deal with him as regime to the extent of anned conflict representing a certain faction, because or even speakingagainst it, but who just all of them are within the sole political kcpl tl~emselves in the sltadow - and org~nisation, and if they have different tlie invitation still stends. So 1 can opinions they express them within the see that the responses will likely organisation, continue. Concerning the Islamic method Q~ Do you think thai therP is an over- referred to in the Presidert's book and P~aying of the tune ihat all things the Constitutional Laws Revision staried wiih the SSU and it will end , CommiUee, it may be shown that 1 with ii - a tune which was higihly disagreed with somc people on this P~ayed aft~r the aborted communist subject. Indeed in my speech at the end coup d etat. of the Third Cultural Festival 1 said that A: Yau seem to be saying that after the th~ lslamic; society v~hich we are coup a concentration was made on the looking for should be built throu~l~ SSU. lt is true that the CSU was estab- preaching and not enfor,:ement. Wfien lished after the cuup d'etat, but the we say that we want to apply (slam, planning for it began earlier. Indeed one that means to get it back to its glory of tlie reasons for the divorce between and great days. This can't be done the regime and the cummunists was. except by a method waich preaches prccisely the SSU because the � communists had been calling for the . and doesn't enforce. This is a hurden to establislunent of front, so as to keep be carried by the mass media, educati~in their oart~. Tl~ey went back to the institutes, and the family. There ~re experienre in Egypt - from their own some people who are dogmatic in their point of view - where the communists opinicin of Islam. I remember thal at the decided to dissolve their party and fuse dialogiie in /~7 ~ vam, attended by Saelig in the ESU. T7iey thou~,ht that was a E1 (vlahdi and Yassin Omer el lmam, we mistake; so to preserve their party with . ccmcentrated on 1'i~htinR the all its or~tnisational and ideological dognatism, becauseit may bring neg,~tive foundations they called for a front as an results. This may be the difference umbrella under wluch all parties will between me and some ~co~le which work. '1'he regime had been thinking thc :nay be su.nmarised as foll~ws: opposite: that the essential priority is That it is not a dialoguc between ~iic or developinent, which can't be achieved any group and another group, but it is a within a front because the conflict dialogue within tlie unified organisation will continue, After the October revo- on c>ne of the controversial issues. lution in ]9C4, two fronts were cxperienced. ih~ Front of Professional Abdel Magid Abu Hassabu and ~)rgenisations - wiiich e:omprised the Hussein Osman Mansur returned to the Nrofcssional and trade uni~~ist organisa- country lasr December. Do you think tions - and the 1Jational Front, which it was just a reacrron to /amily pressure, con:prised the political parties. Both or are there poliiical reasons? proved a failure. I think that those wlio A: I have no idea, I didn't meet them, I played this tune were the communists. ltave just read about it on one of the 1969 may be a turn in a long road, and newspapers. But 1 can imagine that tl~ey 1 tliink thal not only in politics but also disagreed with the opposition with in the cultural and scx;iological fields, which they l~ad been working, People May benefited what c:ame before. tend to say that there is an initiative Before the revolution there were good , from Sherif E1 fiindi, and forget that and e~;ii things, end tl~e revolution when the Presidcnt decided to take this benefited from the good. COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved, Sudanow 1981 CSO: 482Q 1Lt FOR OFFTCTAT, TTSF ~NT,Y � APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 - FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY SUDAN HEAD OF SOUTHERN INDUSTRY MINISTRY INTERVTEWED Khartoum SUDANOW in English Jan 81 pp 18-19 [Interview with Bona Malwal, head of S~~uthern Region's Ministry of Industry, by Jacob Akol--date and place not given] [Text] Fvrmer Minister of Culture and lnfor Q; The siting of the refinery af Kosii is matron, and a longstanding member ~f thoughr by many Southerners to be the ~�olitical Bureau, Bona M~:wal is unfai~ ro the Region. ~l:yai do you now head of the South~;n Region's~ think? newly-independent Ministry oj A: Since most of the oil which will Industry. Jacvb Ako! was first to i~rter- eventually reach Kosti will most pro- view him rn this new post: bably come from the South, one can understand why Southerners complain. - SUDANOW: 'Too soon ro say' has Other regions would also complain. a/ways been the phrase emp/oyed by yowever, there are certain sound Souihern poliricians who wish ro avoid economic reasons for placing the speaking publicly about oi/ dis~coveries refinery at Kosti: railway and river tranj ~ in the South - a matter c%se to the sport does not pose a problem there, for hearts of many Southerners. But is it example. And there are other reasons: really too soon to say? oil by-products can be better utilised and manufactured at Kosti than at BONA MALWAL: tt all depends what Mugiad or Bentiu, the suggested more we mean when wE talk about oil. If we Southern-placed alte~natives. are talking about the fact that we have a Perhaps people feel the way they do natural resource which will hopefully be because there ha~ h^en ~ery little in- found in enough quantities to give some formation coming out of those state optimism and hope for the future of institutions responsible for oil industry Sudan, then there should be no reason decisions. I think it would have been a to shy away from it. good idea if these bodies had enligh- tened the public on the rAasons behind Q: Have you any information as ro how the choice of Kosti, before the Pre- much oi/ rhere rea!/y isl sident's announcement. A: I think there are enough reasonable findings to encourage us to start Bui how informed is the Regiona/ building a refinery; thP refinery which Government on rhese matters? the President has announced will be built at Kosti. Figures quoted by people A: The Regional Government has access perhaps more informed than myself to at least the same information I am range from anything between 40,000 sharing with you. But if they are not and 50,000 barrels a day. sufficiently informed they only have themseives to blame... if they want information they should go out and get it. 15 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Q: What role does the Regional Govern- A: We have ~o revive stagnant agro- meni play in dec,'sions such as ihe industries such as the one in Nzara, /ocation of the refinery, administration canning and brewing factories like those and so on? in Wau, Kenaf and Tonj, the Melut sugar refinery, Mongala textile and sugar A: As regards the location of the factories. refinery, that decision was taken by the We have already achieved some Head of State; and so, as a Regional measure of success. We now have funds Government, there was no room for for both the canning factory and the us to make our own decision. r1s far as I brewery in Wau. A team from the Arab see it, as regards admir~istration, there Fund have promised, during their visit is simply nuthing to administ~r at the to the 5outh in September, to assist us momrnt. In January last year, the with the development projects planned President de:,reed that administrative for Melut and Tonj. problems arising between prospecting Hydru-electric power is an irnportant _ factor in any industrial development of companies and the government will be ~e ~uth, and we have commissioned _ dealt with in future by the Energy ~ Italian company to wriie a study on Department of the region concerned, in potential sources of electric power co-ocdination with central government. throughout the Region. The repe~rt - But really, we are still at a formative should appear in the next few munths. stage and i feel that it is part of my re- We are still pressing ahead wi'h the sponsibility at the moment to try and Kapoeta cement project. create this kind of co-ordination with the central government. , Q: Did you bring back any money ~-rith you from your last tour of Arab staiP~T Q: The wells in the South'em Region A: I came back very optimistic re� are named 'Unity One, Unity Two' and sponses from the Gulf were very r:o- so on, while ihose nonh of ihe Region mising. We have just formalised a pro- are given the names of rheh /ocality, gramme of health, educational and This obvious/y has po/iiica/ overtones, social services aid, costing some $l60 Sourherners camplain. So, who is re- million, to be completed over the next sponsrble for naming the w+e//s, and why two to three years. The United Arab were they so namedl Emirates and Kuwait were particularly A: The first `Unity' well was so-named, generous. Our social services should I believe, by Abel Aliei himself; start to feel the effect of the agreement naturally enough, I think, given our over the next few months. attachment to unity throughout the country. It then followed that `Unity' Q: How important do you think it is became a catch-word... 1 think that thar rhe South is now able to go and `Unity' is just as good a name as p/~ad its case to the ourside world? `Bentiu'; if you like, take it that 'Unity' A: After nine years of peace in ihe is in the South, and che others are in South, all of ~~s in the Regional Govern- the north. ment thought it was about time to go Q: Now for someihing rarher diffe~ent: out and do something about social what is rhe srate of industry in ihe services and industrial development pro- South at the moment? jects in the Region. We realised we A: There are no industries in the South. could nut accomplish much simply with Before independence there was no the resources of Sudan, so we are grate- _ industry there, and then [oUowed the fut that the President of the Republic civil war... some industria] development was able to allow us to seek out our has taken place in the north. brothers and friends in the Arab world, But we hope to move from a situa- whose means are far greater thar. our - tion of stagnation to one of activity. own, and present our case to taem. : ~ ' Q: As mrnister of an industry thai does think this is an important turning-point nor exisr, where do you begin? in the history of development in the South. - 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Q: /r is now eighi years srnce rhe Addis Q: ln rhe recenr debate on the Re- Ababa Agreemenr, yei parts of rhe gionalisarion BiII in rhe Nationa! As- �South are stil! administered from rhe embly, a map which the Souihem North. Why is it taking so long ro bring Region members of ihe Assembly claim ihese areas under ihe Southern Region's was incorrectly marked and wirich, they AdministraiionT clarm, took land away from the Souih A: I would like to hope that the de)ay end gave to the Norih, was attached to a in bringing those areas under the bil/ with the intention of legali~ing the - South's administrative umbrella is r~ot boundaries without ihe backing of ihe caused by any one person being c.if- Southern Region members. Whar is your ficult. It would be un~ierstandable if the reacrron to rhis? - reason for this detay was caused by the A: I think all this should not have Regianal Governmen!'s being bogged happened. It was indeed untortunate down with administrative ~roblems - that this took place at a[ime when the indeed, if you had witnessed the pro� emphasis was on the Regional Guvern- blems the Southern Administration has ment Act, which came before the As- had to tackle over the last eight years, I sembly as a unifying factor rather than am sure you would feel you had enough a dividing one. problems on your hands without adding It must be said honestly that the a few more square miles to them. [ leadership of the Assembly was insensi- believe the delay is jusi another admini- tive to the issue of the borders on the ' strative bottleneck, for the law is very map, and I think that particularly the clear on this issue of administrative Attorney General, the Speaker, the jurisdiction. Chairman of the Legal Ai'fairs Com- mittee - and indeed the whole As- Q: Bur ;s not the land under dispute sembly - should have been much more more than jusf a few square miles' - sensitive to the issue. indeed, does it nor conrarn the copper- 1 do not think rhis matter should be ricl~ Kafia-Kingi disrricr.? settled by sheer weight of numbers A: Agairi, l feel it is very easy to over� W?thin the Assembly. However, this is play this business ut minerals. Tf~e a11 behind us now es the President - who keeps watch over these sensitive matter of the minerals is not relevant to areas - followed the dehate and was the question; we do not claim admini- very concerned by the w~y in which the strative rights to a place simpiy because issue divided the Assembly, on an issue it contains minerals. By law, the central where no division had been expected. government has the right to develop any ~ party to the legislature in the mineral deposits it discovers jointly wi[h country, the President will make sure the region concerned. The rest uf the that this matter is corrected, and I have country }~as to benefit From those no doubt in my mind that he will solve _ minerals if they are found in any exploi- the problem. table quantity. No, the borders were there before we knew there was any copper in Katia- Kingi, just as Bentiu was in the Suuth before we knew tliere was any oil beneath it. We will administer those areas on basic political, not economic - considerations. 1 think it would be wrong of us to su~gest that economic benefits shuuld come to us in the South ro the exclusion of any other part of the country. COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved, Sudanow 1.981 CSO: 482J ~ ' 17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300084455-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SUDAN JAPANESE MAKF. LARGF CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMY Khartoum SUDANOW in En~lish Jan 81 pp 27-28 [Text] Sudan's relations with the nations of'Asia understanding uf the philosophy behind are oJ' fairly recent origin. Although still develupment aid and the need for in their injancy, coope~ative endeavours concrete measures to attack the problem are becoming more extensive. Since the lying at the very core uf the Nurth�Suuth Ramadan War of 1973 Japan, in parti� question,' observed ~tr Hidehiro Yoshu, cular, has played an increasingiy Third Secretary of Japan's embassy here empvrtant rvle in assisting Sudan's in Khartoum. development efforts Nagi Saliem Boulis (t is this understanding that underlies reports be%w: the hisrory of Japanese ,economic ~ assistance [o Sudan. ~Ir Ashaqar Abdalla T HE JAPANESE government has Matur, an Economic Assistant at the recently donated a grant-aid of : Japanese embassy in Kl~artoum, 800m Yen (about $4m) to assist Sudan's commenred upon Japan's grant~aids to efforts to increase domestic food produc~ Sudan: 'The Japanese guvernment realises tion. Notes to this effect were exchanged that a devetoping country such as Sudan last November between H.E. Mr Fumio is more in need of ~rant�aids than of loans Hirano, Japan's ambassador to Sudan, (See Business, December). Japan's grant- and 4Ir Hashim Osman Ahmed, under- aid to Sudan is in accordance with the secretary of Sudan's M~nistry of Forei~ United Nations resolution calling upon Affairs. `The grant will be used for the the developed industrial nations of the purchase of products and services,' Northern hemisphere to allocate 0.7 Sucianvw was informed. Fertilisers, agri� per cent of their gross national products cultural chemicals and agricultural as official aid to the Third World.' machinery will be purchased, as will the lapanese grants to Sudan started in services required to transport them. September 1976, when 154m Yen (about This is but the latest in a series of 50.Sm) was donated for purchases of cooperative efforts between Japan and agriculcural machinPry. In August 1977 a Sudan, and reflects Japan's deepening SOOm Yen (S 1.9m) grant was given to the commitment to Third World develop- government for the establishment of an ~ ment. `The prolonged st~gnation of the experimental farm fur rice cultivation in world economy tnggered by the 1973 the Gasaba area. A year later 300m Yen oil crisis brought about increasing recog- ~~,lm) was rant~d to the Sudanese nition in Japan that the world has never ( g before been so interdependent. This govemment as emergency relief aid for recognition has been accumpanied, the purchase of food, medicine, tents, ~amongst other things, by the awareness and clothes. In October 1978, under the that both the North and the South (the Nutrition Improvement Project, 400m developed and the developing nations) Yen (~?.'lm) was granted to the govern- should be developed in harmony. [t has ment for the purchase of powdered milk also become widely accepted that the and canned fish. 'Cwo months later pur- developed nations should take concerted chases of agricultural machinery, ferti- actiun tu help eradicate poverty in the lisers, and insecticides were made possible developinR countries. As a result, the Japanese public has deepened its ' 18 F~IA f1FFTr'TAT. TTCF nur.v APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ON'LY by a Japanese grant uf another 400m great natural potential. So ~ieveloping Yen. in July 197~ I'urtlier Ib Yen the human resources hand in hand with (S4.6ri) was given to the Gasaba rice the natural resources will enhance the cultivation project, Then, in December of process of development in Sudan.' that year, another ;rant of SOOm Yen was psked about the volumc ~~f trade used for the purchase uf more fertiliser between Sudan and Japan as ~n indicator and insecticides. A month later the uf their mutual ecunomic relations, titr Fishery Development Project received Matur replied that he would not consider a sum of ZOOm Yen, while in September this as a usetul criterion of the coopera- of last year the Blue Nile Health Pruje~t tion between ~he two countries, `Most of was ;ranted 400m Yen. the trading between Sudan and Japan is In addition tu grantaids, the govem- done indirectly. Many Sudanese abroad ment of Sudan has so far received two transfer their eaming~ home in the form lung�term Yen loans. The ti:st loan was of Japanese products such as motor concluded in May 1976, wherein Japan vehicles, television sets, cassette extended 3b Yen (about S10.1m) for recorders, and radios.' (According to the road constructiun between Nyala and Bank of Sudan, 7.8% of Sudan's total Zalingei. T'his loan was tu be repaid over exports for 1978/79 went to Japan wt?ile 30 years with a 10 years grace period 8�'0 of that year's imports came from and an interest rate of three per cent per Japan. In 1979/80 Sudan exported goods annum. The second loan was extended in ~+alued at �s16.5m to Japan and imported December 1977 (Sb Yen, ~?3m) ~or the Japanese goods valued at �s31.1m). purchase of spare parts and eyuipment WI?at are the obstacles to direct trade for the Rural Water Corporatiun and between the two countries? According to bears similar terms of repayment. Mr Matur there are two. `The first has to 'The gos-ernment of Sudar~.' noted Mr do with the congestion at Port Sudan Y~shii, 'has ~tsked Japan to extend a third harbour. Japanese businessmen are loan, which is to be used to improve unvrilling to ship their goods to Sudan Sud~n's telecommunications and because unloading operations there transportation networks.' Although the usually talce IS-20 days. Secondly, amount of the loan has not yet been Sudanese merchants are inexperienced in specified, 1~1r Yoshii predicts that it will dealing with the Japanese market.' be in the neiehbourhuod of Sb Yen. The future of JapaneseSudanese In addition to ;rant-aids and Yen loang cooperation, however, lies in a field other the Japanese gcvernment, tiirough th~ ~~n grants or direct trade, The nature of Japanese (ntemational Cooperacion JapaneseSudanese cooperation in the Agency, has extended scholarships to n~r future will take the form of joint- sume 300 Sudanese for training in various venture projects,' assured Mr Yoshii. 6elds, including agriculture, engineering, `Although Japan has only a few joint- _ telecummunicatians, medicine, computer venture projects in Sudan at the moment, - science, electronics, the te~:tIle industry, several Japanese companies have lia.ison offices in Khartoum searching for such - construction, tourism, port and harbour opportunities.' Tn date Japan is involved design and econumic development s~udies. with thre~ ~oint-venture projects: the �Japan is paying much at[ention to Sudanese Sheet Metal Producing Mill, technic~l cuoperation with Sudan', nuted ~artoum Spinning and Weaving Co� and Mr A, A. Matur. Thanks to this cuupera- Kenana Sugar Eactory. The six companies tion a group of Sudanese technicians will ~th liaison offices in Khartoum are: - be available in the near future to assist ~~tsubishi, Mitcui, i,anematsu, Gesho, the process of econom~c development in Marubeni, Nissho Iwai and Tomen Co. Sudan.' Mr Yos}~u drew attention to the Mr Matur briefly outlined the major f~et that the Japanese 'economic miracle' problems identified by ]apanese firms as could nut have been ~~hieved f~ad not regards the Sudanese market: poor infra- Japan cunverted its human resources into structure, the shortage of loc;al raw a highly skilled and disciplined labcwr materials for the construction trade, the force. `Uniike Japan, which has no outflow of sldlled Sudanese to the Gulf nutural resources. Sudan is endowed with re~on, difficulties in the transfer of forei~ eacchange, and, most importantly, the failure of the People's Assembly to enact the New Investment Act. CUPYRIGHT: All rights reserved, Sudanow 1981 CSO: 4820 19 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SUDAN - OIL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT REASSESSED Khartoum SUDANOW in English Jan 81 pp 31, 33-34 [Text] A national conference is to be held in be allowed to bid for all or part of the ~ Khartoum in March to discuss how best project, the total cost of which is to use Sudan's energy resources. The estimated at $200 miilion. attenNon currently focused on oil as Chevron's involvement in the financing ' the potentia! salvation of the economy does not mean that they wiil be given any needs to be reconsidered in the light preference when tender bids are open~d, of escalating domestic consumption and said Ministry officials last month. the spread of ~oad-haulage and its att- However, Chevron is one of a number af endant fuel demands, while opinion companies who `have expressed an has been divided on the siting of the interest' in ~building the project. Clearly, country's second oi! refinery. ?effery Chevron, or one of its subsidiaries, must , Philfips reports: have a good chance of winning the con- tract. ; ~NERGY MINISTER Dr Sherif el Senior ministry officials are optimistic Tuhami confirmed last month that that construction might begin within six ' Sudan,s second oil refinery is to be built months and the whole project completed ; at Kosti. In the fust stage, using crude oil after a further two years. Dr Sherif el from the Unity field in Upper Nile Tuhami said that an effect upon the province, the refinery wil! have a capacity balance of payments was likely to be felt of some 10,000 bazrels per day - about raised to 25,000 bpd - the size of the one-third of the country's current level of refinery at Port Sudan - depending upon demand. The refinery will be linked to the extent of the oil reserve revealed by - Unity by a 550-kilometre, ten-inch pipe- further exploration. With the rate of line. demand for refined products increasing The Unity wells have been the most by about ten per cent per annum, Sudan , productive of the `wildcat' wells sunk so will be refining about 30 per cent of its far by the Chevron Oil Company in its daily requireenents by late 1983. There 500,000 sq. kilometre concession in are no plans at present to build a crude ; southwestern Sudan. Unity Five has been oil pipeline to Port Sudan, which will i reported as producing 3,200 bpd. Hydro- continue to receive foreign crude. carbon shows have been found at Unity Consumption patterns are difficult to i Six, but no public statement as to the forecast accurately. Even s.~, by the end ' flow rate has yet been made. of the 1980s, a refining capacity of even ; Following the feasibility study for the 50,000 bpd - Kosti plus Port Sudan - proposed refinery and pipeline carried wili be woefully inadequate, providing out by Chevron, detailed designs are perhaps only two-thirds of demand. likely to be completed within the next Even this figure may be an overestimate if ' three months, after which tenders will be the expected boom in road haulage, called for. Although the Ministry of following the opening of the Port Sudan Energy and Mining regards refinery and to Khartoum highway and the road pipeline as one project, tenderers will system linked to it, takes off. 20 ; ~ F(1R (1FFT('.TAT, TTSR (1NT,Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The Ministry of National Planning - were opened at Jebel Aulia at the end of having virtually ~iven up any hopes of iast month. In addition, the River Tran- unproving the etficiency levei of Sudan sport Corporation has recently taken Railways in the short term - are en- delivery ~f four oil barges, with a further couraging the establishment and ex- two expected later this munth. - pansion of modern road haulage com- Despit~e strong Southern reservations, - panies. Indeed by the mid-1980s road there are clear advantages to locating the haulage is likely to carry more than 50 refinery at Kosti. The area is well served per cent of all goods transported - by cummunications, being the point - reversing the domination historually en- where the railway to the west and south joyed by Sudan Railways. But it seems ~rosses the White Nile; it is also the _ - that the energy ~ost of suca a poticy has northern port for north-south river not been fully worked out, so that the traffic. And, when the current road�build- demand for petroleum products is likely ing programme has been implemented, to increase over the next few years by Kosti will be linked by modern ruads to = considerably more than the ten per cent the tuwns and areas of productive activity forecast. in the central region, where the demand The energy options facing the govern- for petroleum products is greatest. ment in the last twenty years of the 20th Looking further ahead, there are plans to build an oil-fired power station ad'a century - ~vhether to increase re~ning ~ " capacity; to encourage tlie esploitation of cent to the new retinery to provide elec- other forms of energy, especially hydro- tricity for the proposed agro-industrial power; to raise the price of petrol at the schemes in the broad sweep of fertile land pumps, and so on - are to be discussed at between El Dueim in the north and the a national energy conference at Khar- Nuba Mountains. `A power statiun thrre toum's Friendship Hall in March. Al- could revolutionise agriculture in that though the list of participants is yet to be area,' said the Energy Minister last drawn up, the ministry. expects a number month. of distinguished Third World authorities Witl~ fast-declining yields in nearly all on energy to attend the meeting to work Sudan's major agr~cultural schemes, out the optimal use of Sudan's indigenous up~n which the national economy is resources. The conference is being totally dependent - fhe importance of . planned by the IVational Energy Admini- domestic oil's coming on-stream at this stration (part of the ~linistry ot' ~nergy time can hardly be over-estimated. The _ and Mining) which is being supported by saving to the balance of payments an~] the a~ 1 million grant from USAID to releasing for development investment of develop an energy policy for Sudan to hard currency export earnings is likely to the year 2000. be the saving of the economy until such The choice of Kosti as the site for the time as the decline in a~riculture can be proposea ~efinery has not been without reversed. Certainly, officials at the Bank its critics. Last month, there were of Sudan and the Ministry of Energy and ~ protests from some members of the Mining believe that oil has been one of People's Assembly who represent the major factors in the ease with whicti Southern constituencies about what they the re-s::.....u?,ng of Sudan's external debt saw as attempts by the north to deprive has been negotiated. Of course, from ~he point of view of the South of investment and jobs that propping up the economy, oil is stil] very were rightly theirs'. Since most of the oil mucli an unproved asset. To date, Sudan has been found in the Southern Region, is capable of pro~ ~cine something in the they said, the rei'inery and any ancillary order of 18,U~0 bpd. But by the end of projects should be built there. lt was also ;j~~ ~~~ade, the country's demand for pointed out that locating the refinery in petroleum products is lihely to be in the Suuth would help overcome some of excess of 60,000 bpd. And last month's the distcibution bottlenecks that the ppEC meeting in Indonesia could not but region currently suffers. In an attempt to reinforce expecta~ions that oil prices are overcome some of the distribution pro- likely to continue upwards. blems in the South and West, two 572- - tonne refined products' storage tanks 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040340080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Tlie building of the refinery and the pipeline are significant of the optimism that now characterises those included in the explorations. But equally, one is _ entitled to expect that the govern- _ men+ will use the breathing space it is ~ ~ now being offered to get its handling of the economy into shape. h'rom this point of view. oil is still an uril:nown quantity. There is still, for example, no reason to believe that Sudan will be capable of producing the amount of oil that the economy will require by 1990. Certainly, there is no ~ reason to believe the reports in the Londun magazine 8 Da}~s that Sudan was capable c~f producing 100,000 bpd fur a decade. Last montli, Dr Sherif el Tuhami denied that he had ever given any reason for believing in such a figure. He alsu denied a report in the same map,azine that Cl~evron Oil Company was considering pulling out of Sudan unless it could prove 365,000 bpd upon which tu establish an . oil-export industry. COPYRIGHT: All righ.ts res~erved,Sudanow 1981 I C S0: 4820 ~ 22 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SUDAN LABOR SHOKTAGE PLAGUfiS OIL INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 2-8 Jan 81 p 44 [Text] The emigration of manual labor is considered to be the greatest ailment to afflict the Sudanese economy. While Sudan has a population of 18 million, 80 percent � of them are illiterate. Meanwhile, the number of workers and employees living abroad has reached a millio:~ and most of these are employed in work in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. The drain comprises trained workers beginning with engineers, teachers, journalists, and ending with drivers, cooks, and continuing to ordinary manual laborers, as in the fields of construction and the like. To put a stop to this drain the regime has relied on restricting the freedom to travel, but it has been unable to prevent the travels of pilgrims wanting to go to ~ the holy land. The pilgrimage is the pretext that is used by workers and laborers then to justify their leaving the country, but then they do not return. In fact there is no solution to this prablem in the foreseeable future, especially since Sudan is a bankrupt country with few job opi.ortunities and no high paying jobs. Furthermore the often incapable of paying the salaries of its civil servants and ~ employees in some production sectors. Sudan's foreign debts are estimated at $4 billion. Four foreign banks have begun negotiations with the government on behalf of some 200 banks in order to put off the repayment of some of Sudan's deb ts and to make its repayments spread out in install- ments over the next 7 years. - Poor planning by the government has only added to Sudan's economic woes. The deve- - lopmental plans it wanted have co~t 10 times what the,y we~e initially estimaCed to be. It is possible to ofPer many examples of poor planning, mismanagement, and the - flight of skilled labor. - The costs of the Kinanah sugar project had been estimated to come to $125 million when projer.ted plans were made in 1973. BuC the project's costs to date have run to a billion dollars, and as of now it produces only a minimal amount of sugar. Sudan cansumes sugar ravenously and the government has squandered huge sums of money in sugar price supports. In spit of this there are six other projects to produce , sugar at various stages of completion, and yet despite the pressing demand for sugar, none of them have gone beyond this stage. [ - 23 ISE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - The factory to produce tomato juice is another example of poor planning. It was built in a.n area that produces dates but not tamatoes. Meanwhile a milk processing , plant was built in an area where no livestock are raised. The g.,vernment has come ~ to realize too late the extent of its planning and economic blunders, It is now in- ' tent in its at~empts to rectify the problems and make these failing projects work. It is laying a pipeline to transport oil from the refinery at Port Sudan on the coast to Khartoum in the interior, but it is not working at full capacity. Workers and contractors on this project have not gotten their wages on schedule. Amidst the rise in the price of Sudan's oil bill (put at $450 million in 1980) some optimistic hopes have spread about the discovery of_ oil inside the country. It is said that within a few years Sudan could be transformed into an oil-producing country _ and perhaps even an oil-exporter. There are currently five wells producing oil at a rate of 18,OOU barrels a day, which is half of Sudan's daily consumption of oil. Mr Muhammad Sharif al-Tuhami, ministar of Energy and Mining expects that Sudan will beco:-~ Jelf-sufficient in the next 3 years. However the American oil company, Chevron, and other oil companies that are prospect- ing for oi~. in Sudan have advised the government to moderate their enthusiasm and optimism and to make less extravagant promises. Chevron, the owner of the principal finds, says that there is oil, but that it is , difficult to say if it is in commercially exploitable amounts before Chevron can complete its tests and technical studies that are meant to estimate if what they have found is of commercial amounts. The company announced last May that its studies would be completed after the rainy season. The rainy season is now over in the south and the time is coming when these hopes will be either dashed or confirmed. Up till now this company has already spent in its prospecting for oil along the coast and in the southwestern part of the country nearly $130 million. It now owns four producing wells. It is said that the oil is a high-grade oil with a low sulphur content, and that this facilitates its refining. Sudan has decided to build a refinery plant in the region of the Upper Nile that , will produce 5000 barrels daily starting in 1982. Meanwhile preparations are under way to build another refinery, perhaps in Kosti, which could start production in 1986 with an estimated capacity of 50,000 barrels per day. Currently the refinery in Port Sudan operates at a capacity of 26,000 barrels daily, although it relies on imported oil, thus disregarding the pipeline coming to Port Sudan from the newly di.scovered oi1 wells in the southwest. Out of the confusion of these dilemmas the government has been unable to deliver ' on its promise to increase wages in two stages by 100 percent; a matter that is threatened by the outbreak of political and labor disturbances considering that the rate of inflation (price increases) was also 100 percent last year. 21~ - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300084455-4 FOR UFFICIAL USE ONLY P resident Numeayri has tied wage increases to the discovery and commercial exploita- tion of oil. It is obvious from this Chat the results of the technical tests on - Sudan's newly discovered oil are of crucial {mportance; for these results whether ~ negative or positive, will have material and economic--and perhaps even political-- - repercussi~ns. COPYRIGHT: 1979 "AL-WATAN AL-ARABI" 9587 CSO: 4802 25 FOR OFFICIAT~ USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SUDAN COI~CENTRATED EFFORTS ATTACK CATTLE DISEASES Khartoum SUDANOW in English Jan 81 pp 34-35 [Text] ~ A NEW �s'/. million veterinary labora- At present, the new laboratory has 0 tory was ina4~urated last month in the projected annual output of two millio'n Soutl~ern Reg~onal capital of Juba by doses of CEPP vaccines, though at periods Abel Alier. Vice-President of the of peak demand batches of 100,000 Republic and President of the Regional doses can be produced within a fortnight. _ High Executive Council. The ceremony This level of production will provide was attended by the Regional Minister 40-50% coverage in the region, compared for Agriculture and Animal Resources, to the present 15-30�Io. The ultimate Dr Gama Hassan, the Director�General target, which depends upon improved of the Ministry, Dr David Bassic>uni, and ~ads and transpurt, is for 80-90`~~ tlie llirectur of Veterinary Services, Dr cc~verage. Aggrey A~uen. `Southern Sudan is an endcmic area for The conception uf a veterinary vaccines a number of major cattle diseases, and production laboratory dates from tt~e with an estimated annual herd mortality inception of regional self-rule. Following rate of 13.5%, disease problems are more the 1972 Addis Ababa Accord, priority extensive, serious and intractable than in in regional development was given to the more temperate climates. In the absence rehabilitation of the agricultural sactor, of sufficient information about the with emphasis on the development of incidence and severit of various diseases small-holder farming a.s tne quickest no effective disease control ro ramme method of raising the standard of living can be mounted. Hence a disease surve . of the mass of th~: population. The Y . _ potential for livest~~ck production Wil~ be conducted from within this obviously required an effective animal laboratory as a prelude to the present and - health service so as to reduce the future- disease control programme,' incidenc~ of endemic disease. Therefora, observed Dr Ayuen. the regional government, with the In this effor', the May laboratory in assistance of the Federal Republic nf Juba wil) be aided by branches in Wau Germany, undertook a large-scale vaccina- and Malakal. Simple diagnostic work will tion rogramme, rimaril aimed at be done at the Wau and Malakal labora- ~ P P Y tories, with the more advanced work - rinderpest and contagious bovine pleurop� handled by Juba. The Wau laboratory is neumonia. already operational, directed by the This effort was timely, but various German Veterinary Team, and the factors limited its impact. The vast dis- Malakal laboratory will open shortly. tances between herds, the ' frequently `The May laboratory in Juba will also 'short shelf-life of vaccines {two to three pro:~ide in-service training for local ; weeks for the ~EPP vaccine, for personnel, an exercise which has not yet example), the already heavy demands on existed in the Southern Region, and it - the central laboratory in Khartoum and W~l as well act as a centre for new scien- ' su on made a regional vaccine produ~tion tific techr~ology,' continued Dr Ayuen. _ centre necessary. 26 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY In addi~~on to rinderpest and contagious bovine pleuropneumonia other diseases flourish. New lines in � vaccine production will include haemorr- hagic septicaemia, black quarter and anthrax. Wlth the present scope of the new laboratory, Sudan will continue to . se~?d samples to Kenya f~,~lly hose sophisticated problems, esp in the field of virology. Although Kenya has been very cooperative in this _ endeavour, it is felt that we should be - prepared to h3ndle our own problems. Most of the road still lies ahead and a degree of determination is needed so that the impact of scientific work is felt more effectively at the grass-roots. It is tlte wish of the government that in the not too far future there should be similar veterinary centres in all cattle-populated provinces. - prop Madut COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved, Sudanow 1981 CSO: 5400 27 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300084455-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i SULTANATE OF OMAN STRAIT OF HORMUZ COULD BE FIRST SPARK OF WORLD WAR III Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 2 Jan 81 pp 32-34 [Article by Ahmad Hafiz: "The Game of Nations on the Arab Oil Term3.na1"] [Text] An Omani helicopter took us to the strait on a warm, sunny morning with the breezes playing. Near me sat an Omani officer as a companion and guide. Then there were three members of the Omani armed forces, carrying some provisions, mail and newspapers to the Omani armed forces stationed at the entrance to the strait on the = ~ island of al-Ghunayim, as well as a photographer from the Omani Ministry of Informa- tion. The plane made the trip to the strait in 2.5 hours but it had begun to seem to me as if it were taking 10. I was overtaken with apprehension about the winds playing with the small aircraft that was above the lofty peaks with pointed, rocky sum- mits and above the deep, desolate valleys. However, the vista would at times change and the attractive topography along the On?ani caost would appear, splendid scenery with a m3xture of sea and desert with green cases covered with date and coconut trees and all types of tropical plants while there were scattered villages near the primitive fis~:;~l~ ~~dw and thc ^?rrow deseri: ~.aths. ~ "Here is the island of al-Ghanayim, at Ra's Musandum," said the captain, "We will now leave you and then pick you up at the same place in 5 hours so as to take you back _ to Muscat with us." I looked about me. It was absolutely silent everywhere. The 3.sland looked like a barren, rocky mass with a number of buildings and installations on its forward edge jutting into the water. I asked my companion about them and he said, "They are the installations of a small Omani military base comprising a battalion of 130 per- ; sons, seven coast guard patrol boats, a helicopter and a small transport aircraft." I ask~d whether this small force w�as suff3cient to protect or secure navigation in the strait. _ He responded, tersely, "It is not enough." Alone, We Cannot... I recalled I had been told by Yusuf al-'Alawi, the undersecretary of the Omani Ministry, in his o�fice in Muscat when I was talking with him about the 28 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 ~ F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY responsibilitq of the Sultanate of Oman in the strait as the state within whose territorial waters the international channels were located. I recalled how he had said that his country could not alone bear the responsibility for pro- tecting that iriternational strategic corridor where the most important "material" of modern times passes--oil. Al-'Alaw3 added, explaining his country's policy w~tih regard to this vital issue, For a long time, we have been drawing the attention of the world, or to be more precise, Che producing countries whose oil passes through the strait and the consuming countries, to the issue of protecting navigation there. Given our responsibility as a country in whose territorial waters the stra3t is located, we at the beginning proposed to the s3ster Arab countries who have oil ex- port ports on the Arab Gulf that the strait constituted the only bottleneck for the passage of ships to and from the Gulf. We suggested creating a fund to pay for forming a special Omani force, equipped with various necessary air and naval units, whose main mission would be to protect navigat3on in the strait but the idea got no responsive audience. In an attempt on our part to implement it, we aga3n raised it with the western oil importing countries which had fundamental interests in the safety of navigation but were startled to encounter a vicious attack on us and on Oman3 policy as a whole and how we were striving to establish western military bases in our country, and consequently, in the Arab Gulf area. We made repeated attempts, reexplaining our goals and reaffirming that we did not want foreign armies to pro- tect the strait, as this was to be rejected out of hand; rather, we wanted financial _ assistance or ma.terial assistance in the form of equipment which the Omani armed forces could use to protect freedom of navigation and to guard the international waterways fram any sabotage." "In any case,"--the undersecreta~q of the Omani Foreign Ministry is still speaking-- "The western oil consuming countries themselves were not enthusiastic over the Omani - plan. It is now clear that they preferred to bring their fleets, their battleships and their aircraft carriers, to be stationed in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, nea: to the entrance r~f the strait, to be completely ready to intervene were any interference with navigation to occur. The strange thing is that these countries pre- ferred ta spend hundreds of millions of dollars a month to guard the strait with - their military machinery, the sums representing the costs of the fleets near the strait, rather than pay IO percent of this sum to implement the Omani plan that could - fulfill the objective." War and the Strait - I was recalling what Yusuf al-'A1awi told me about the responsibility of his country toward this strategic waterway when i visualized a terrifying scenar3o: The strait is closed and the industrial west is deprived of 19 million b~arrels of oil a day, 90 percent of Japan's needs, half of what Europe consumes and a quarter of America's imported requirements. I visualized the international and Arab reactions to this. The strait is the vital artery linking Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, the UAE, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain with the sea, although Saudi Arabia could rely on its ports on the Red Sea and the Sul- tanate of Oman on the Gulf of Oman as is the case with the UAE which recently built a port on the Gulf . 29 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300084455-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE O1VLY Obstructing, Not Halting However, can navigation in the strait be halted? This was the question I put to the captain of the Omani naval vessel while we were touring the waters of the strait near the Ra's Musandum peninsula and ge~ting a clear view of a huge oil tanker quietly sailing east, that is, out of the Arab Gulf. The officer said, with his eyes on the distant horizon, "The fact is that you should consider the closing of the strait to be lacking in scientific accuracy for one sim- ple reason, that is, that the word "closing" which is bandied about by some infor- mation media is imprecise with regard to the Strait of Hormus. Scient3fically and practicallq speaking, it would be difficult to completely close the strait. The truth is that it would be possible to obstruct the course of navigation there for a few days or weeks, depending on the s3ze and nature of the obstruction operation. However, I do not want to minimize the gravity of statements about guaranteeing the security of navigation in this important waterway; obs~tructing navigation here for even one or two days would have a direct effect on the world`s oi1 supplies. Suffice it for me to say that before the Iraqi-Iranian war, the number of ships and oil tankers transit3ng the Gulf and passing the Stra3.t of Hormuz used to approach 300 a day, an average of one ship every 3 minutes. Now, with the war still going on between the two countries, the number has fallen to 220 and, at times, to 180, since the loading of oil has stopped at the Iraqi and Iranian terminals, the two largest oil exporting countriss in the area after Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, we can imagine the shortage in oil supplies to the world were navigat3on in the Strait of Hormuz were to come to a halt, if only for a single day, to clear some mines which had been planted to ob- struct the progress of the ships." ' However, I asked, how would it be difficult to close the strait, or what 3s the fallacy in the common expression, closing the strait? He replied, "The strait of Hormuz is a waterway that is different from the Suez Canal, for example, which is also an essential international waterway. The strait varies in width from 400 kilometers at its widest to 40 kilometers at its narrowest point at Ra's Musandum, where we are now. Also the water depth reaches 250 feet. If we assume that the largest tanker of the type transiting the strait has a draft of no more than 20 feet, in order to close the strait, it w~uld then require the sinking of no less than 10 huge tankers one on top of the other, not to mention what I said about the width of the strait at its narrowest point being 40 kilometers; what is the length of the largest ship in the world?" Salamah, Queen of the Islands The man had been speaking excitedly in a loud voice, trying to make himself heard ov~r the roar of the vessel's engines us through the waters of the Arab Gulf in this part called the Strait of Hormuz, while on the horizon appeared a huge rocky mass, growing larger and larger as we drew closer. Our guide pointed to it and said, "That i~ the island of 5alamah which the English used to call "Queenland," that is, the queen of the islands, because of its importance in guiding ships at the entrance to the islands. It is an Omani island but no ~ne lives there except some workers who operate the lighthouse." The man then po3.nted to a group of small isl2nds 30 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 EOR OF'FiC1AL USE ONLY around Salamah Island and said that they were named Banat Salamah [the daughters of Salamah] as an indication of their small size compared with the mother island, Salamah. The vessel took us around Salamah Island so that we could see the lighthouse and, f rom afar, a number of workers who operated the lighthouse were visible. We returned to the coast to al-Ghanayim Island, the site~ of the small Omani military base and found the helicopter waiting for us. The plane took us on a tour of the strait and here began the most impressive part of the trip. No sooner had the plane risen over the calm, deep blue water than one of the most beautiful veiws we had ever seen became evident to us, the Strait of Hormuz. We caere flying over the narrowest part of it and the peaks of a chain of high mountains began to appear clearly and rock islands emerging from the waters.of the strait. The shipping corri- dors which wound around the small islands looked like small streams of clear water. The landmarks of the other side, the Iranian side, appeared distant and the aricraft captaii~ apologized for not taking us closer; we nodded our heads in understanding. The oil tankers stood out clearly in �ront of us, sliding along easily and quietly on the surface of the water. It was a splendid natural panorama. Suddenly our enjoyment of our view and our absorption in the details of ~hat splendid panorama was broken by the voice of the captain saying, "Attention. We have approached a very dangerous and important spy ship stationed in international waters at the en- trance to the strait, the Soviet spy ship." Quickly I stuck my head out the open wincow of the helicopter. The deck of the ship looked lilce a jungle of equipment and w3res running back and forth here and there. The crew in their uniforms stood quietly, watching us coldly with their naked eyes as if they were seeing a paper airplane with - which a sma11 boy was playing. They were right since what could be done by a small helicopter tayed with by the breeze as it wished, a plane whose captain had asked the passengers to wear life jackets throughout the whole flight in readiness to jump at any time. The pilot took us around the Soviet spy ship once, then a second time and then a third to give us more chances to photograph it. I asked the Omani officer, "isn't this dangerous for us; they are watching while we are taking pictures?" The professional officer laughed loud].y at my naivete and said, "Do you think that they are taking any interest in the pictures you ~-~~o taking or even in the fact that we are now here above their heads? They have been here for months monitoring all a.ctivity in the Strait of Hormuz and on both the Arab and Iranian sides of the Arab Gulf_. Everyone knows they are here. Nearby are other American ships and a British ship and a French ship and they are all watchirig each other so that no one will break the rules of the 'game'." Between Iran and Oman The plane began to move away from the Soviet ship squatting on the water while two ships opposite course~ appeared on the near horizon, one heading toward the Gulf ports and the ather moving toward the entry to the strait, and from there to the high seas. I�re~alled what I had been Cold by 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rawwas, the Minister of Information in the Sultanate of Oman, when I had been sitting with him in Muscat. He had been talking about the strait and how Oman had concluded an _ _ 31 FOR OF~'ICIAI, USE ON~,Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY agreement with Iran in 1974 which defined the continental shelf between the two coun- tries, thereby dividing the strait on the basis of the line at the midpoint in the waters between the furthest land promontories between the two countries. As a result of the agreement, the shipping channels in the strait were confined to Omani terri- torial waters since the Iranian portion did not have sufficient depth of water for the passage of large ships. Iran had instructed an international company to reg- ulate shipping through the strait but, after the agreement defining the territorial waters between Iran and Oman, the Omani Government alone assumed the burdensome duty - of regulating the new shipping channels since the navigable channels were confined to Omani territorial waters. Starting in November 1979 the old routes for tankers were changed to new ones that would achieve greater safety for shipping traffic through the strait. These rout2s now comprise three channels, one for tankers heading to- ward the Gulf and the other for those leaving it, with a safety strip in the middle. These routes are 2 nautical miles wide and the water depth reaches 100 meters, the width of the old routes for tankers having not been more than 1 mile. The area divid- ing the routes had been narrow and the huge tankers had been unable to maneuver freely and this had posed a constant threat to shipping in the strait because of the possi- bility of collisions between two tankers headed in opposite directions. Limits of Qmani Resnonsibility When I asked the Omani Minister of Information about the limits to Omani responsibil- ity for the Strait of Hormuz, he replied, "The responsibility of the Sultanate of Oman over the strait, or to be more precise, over the waterways there is total, just _ as is its responsibility over any part of Oman3 soil." I asked him, "llo you receive any tolls from the ships and tankers that transit these waterways as Omani territorial waters?" He replied, "No, we receive no International practice is that tolls are not collected from ships transiting international straits on the basis that they are natural waterways, unlike the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal, fur example, which had been dug by human efforts." I queried him, "So what benefit do you derive from this important international strait?" He replied, "Nothing, except for the problems which we don't need. We have no com- mercial port in the strait or the Gulf as a11 our ports are located on the Gulf of Oman. That might explain the invitation, known as the Omani plan to protect the strait, which we extended more than a year ago and in which we asked the countries that benefit from the strait (the oil exporting and consuming countries) to help us provide the needed guarantees for shipping; we, however, have as yet received no positive reaponse and so we have no choice but to depend on our own abilities to exercise our sovereignty over an important part of the Omani homeland." On the way back, while the winds were buffeting the old helicopter and the captain was reiterating the saf ety instructions and the need to confirm the positioning of the parachutes on our chests as a precaution against danger, I felt a succession ot _ misgivings inside and more than one question flashed through my mind. I wonder how things will develop 3n this sensitive area of the world and whether World War III will start from this strange, wonderful strait which ~he countries of 32 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the world are quarreling about protecting while the country within whose internation- al boundaries it is located has no interests in it, or at least no concern with whgt goes an around it and over it? Another question: Do not the inhabitants of the strait and the Gulf have priority over others in protecting it? Then why ~o others i.mpose themselves as protectors of us and of our territory and our waterways? I~ it because of "our beautiful dark eyes" or for purely their own interests which, in this case, 1ie in ensuring their continued supplies of oil through the ~trait of Hormuz, the one bottleneck through which Arab oil passes to all parts of the world? It is certain that any slight miscalculation by any of the parties who have their _ fleets stationed around the Strait of Hormuz could light the first spark of World War III. If there is any doubt about this, closer scrutiny of contemporary history which moves through the strait each day would be enough to wipe away this doubt and transform it in~o a certainty. COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-�'ARABI 8389 CSO: 4802 33 FOR OFFI~IAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300084455-4 . FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY TUNISIA 'JEUNE AFRIQUE' ARTICLE ANAYLZES STATUS OF ARMY i Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 31 Dec 80 pp 178-184 ~ [Article by Souhayr Belhassen: "The Tunisian Army: An Unknown Qua.ntity"] ' [Text] On 24 June 1956, in the course of a parade through the principal streets ' of Tunis, the Tunisian people were meeting the most spectacular attribute of independence: The army. In fact, the parade involved the first contingent of the Tunisian Army, composed of a combined arms regiment of about 1,500 men, among whom were 26 officers (includ- ing Major Tebib, who was to lead the Tunisian Army for many years) and noncommis- sioned officers, several of whom had served during World War II. ~ Sergent Bechir recalls how, as a teacher and administrator at Sbeitla at the age of 20, he found himself wichout a job and volunteered for the Fourth Regiment of Tunisian light infantry a few months before the Tunisian Army was established. "A list of inen from the First Combined Arms Regiment was to be sent to us from i the Ministry of Defense. It was more than taking an examination, more than getting a diploma. It was a kind of second birth." That is why the military routine did not stop for 3 days at Forjmol barracks in ~ Bab Sassoun (a residential area west of Tunis), where the First Combined Arms Regiment was installed. While the various units were being formed, the Tunisian high command received its armament (MAS rifles, sibmachine guns, 105mm artillery, half-tracks), its vehicles, and its prime moving equipment. Even before the parade took place the Tunisian Government decided to open military schools in Tunisia and to send a certain number of students to France in order to train the permanent cadre of the army. To be a graduate of a senior school and to ' be 20 years old at the time amounted to seeing all doors open before you. Leaving ~ for somewhere was therefore the key word. To go into dentistry, pharmacy, or to ; attend Saint-Cyr came to about the same th3ng. The Dream of Being in Uniform , However, for many young men the army was perfectly integrated into the general patriotic movement. Each one wanted to find his place in the nation which was ~ 34 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FO~R ~OFFICCAL USE ONI,Y being born. 'i'hus, the brother of General Abdelhamid Escheickh, today chief of stafF of the Tunisian Armed Forces, explains that his father and he himself did everything possible to talk the young Abdelhamid out of going into the army. "He was brilliant, always first in his class. He was advised to become a doctor or a lawyer, but he was stubUorn. To us, bec~~ming a member of the military was not a career!" - "My ideal," a reserve captain says, "was to wear the Tunisian uniform!" "It was somethi~.g new, prestigiousy attractive, whir_h responded to my taste for adventure," recalls another young man of the time who had a choice between going into the hotel business or to Saint-Cyro He adds: "Being a soldier, I said to myself, was nevertheless better than being a waiter in a cafe, because at the - time that was the way I loaked at the hotel business So there were 105 young 'I`usisians who entexed the combined arms school a.t Saint-Cyr. But there were also others in Brest to attend the naval school; or at Salons-de- Provence for air force training; at Montpellier for the military administrative s.chool; at Bordeaux of Lyon for the army medical school. The excellent general - training and the iron discipline o.f these great schools made the young second lieutenant into a young wolf in the eyes of the officers who had gone through the campaigns in Italy or Tndochina. This competition between "older and younger sol.diers" clearly led to tensi.ons in the relationships between offjcers, but events would very rapidly lead certain young officers to distinguish themselves. - A New Pyramid The first task of the military officers was to delimit the frontiers of the country; ~ but the army had to fight also, beginning in 1958, at Remada, in the southern area of the country, where sauze noncommissioned officers received their baptism of fire. However, the real test would take place in Bizerte during the summer of 1961. This battle would mark once and for all tihe supremacy of the civil power and would under- l.ine the fact that the army is only an instrument of ~hat civil power. It would also accentuate P1the quarrel between older and younger soldiers." The battle of Bizerte shaped the top of the pyramid of the Tunisian Army and gave birth to a cadxe of rese.rve officers. A certain ~+~m~~-r of officers, in fact, would choose to leave the active army after the shock provoked by the 600 dead left on the battlefield. Some of the officers were turn~d into gover.nment delegates (subprefectsj. Others retired to marry foreign women or quite simply because they were not well adapted to the military life. Finally, the conspiracy of 1962, orga- nized against the regime by a d:i.verse group of oppon^ats, some of whom were mili- tary officers, including two young graduates of Saint-Cyr, broke the morale of the young officers. To3ay, only half of the first class of officers are to be found in the higher command of the armed forces, composed of the three general staffs and the various directorates (of progra~uning, logistical services, planning, health, etc). Parallel to these direct~rates is a General Inspec~orate of the Armed Forces, 1ed by General Molcaddem (the only represeni:ative of the older personnel who came from the French Army). 35 k~R ~FF~CIA~, USE ~Nd.Y ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY Since the reforms introduced in 1979,the minister of defense holds all power in the armed forces after President Bourguiba, supreme leader of the armed f orces, - The chief of staff of the armed forces, Ma~ Gen Iibdelhamid Escheikh, is only an adviser of the ministsr, contrary to the French conception, which invests this position with real powers. Mohamed Salah Mokaddem and Boubaker Balma are the two other major genreals. On - the same date four colanels were promoted to the rank of brigadier general, includ- ing Mohamed Gzara, chief of staff of the army. The chief of staff of the navy is Capt Habib F'Dhila. The only rear admiral of the Tunisian Navy is presently serving at the Tunisian Embassy in Paris. Finally, Col Touhami Machta is the chief of staff of the air force. The Ps eudopeasants Personnel, intelligence, training, and logistics and operations are the four depart- ments of each general staff. The first five or six training classes, or about 300 officers, who today are between 40 and 50 years old, had an essentially technical kind of training at the time of the war in Algeria. An interesting detail is that in the military training exercises at Saint- Cyr they played the role of dissident peasants [fellagas]. For 10 years after independence, and unril 1978, the first officers who received diplomas from the general staff school in Paris --as well as those from schools in the United States and Belgium--were graduated at the rate of three or four a year. Like the officers from the countries where they are trained, they enter the respective schools by means of an examination, as is also the case with the Higher War School in Paris, where one or two places are offered each year to Tunisia. Further, the training programs or the refresher courses in France, the United States, and also in Italy, Greece, and Turkey, operate continuously for specialized personnel, officers, and noncommissioned officers of the three services. The "Eggheads" Courses in management and electronics were added to those involving combat. Today the armed forces are managed like a company. To judge both the level of the per- sonnel as well as the quality of their training in terms of military instruction, technical education, and practical training in posts and units, it is enough to see the results of the training courses abroad. The results show, in fact, th at by their standing in the class~:s the Tunisians have no reason to envy their Western comrades. Aside from the students in postgraduate class es for the army and navy, who are still trained abroad (a naval institute has just opened in T~nisia), the entire army training takes place in Tunisia, with the assistance of G3 foreign advisers, at the military academy of Fondouk Jedid, which accepts only senior school graduates and which tra:ins each year nearly 500 noncommissioned officers; at the combined arms postgraduate school of Bou-Ficha, which trains an equal number each year; and finally at the general staff school at Kassar Said, recently established, which produces about 20 graduates per year. Whereas in the civilian sector there is a tendency to think that the level of in- struction is generally declining, the revexs e is occurring among the Tunisian military. Thus, at the military academy it is dema.nded that the student also 36 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFIC[A1, ~1~;F ~NLY - folloor, at the same eime, a course of study leading to a diploma in the area of his choice. "We were getting eggheads," says a colonel on active service. "From 1974 to 1979 there was a continuous coming and going between the military academy and the u~niversity, to ttie paint that officers were arrlving at postgraduate school. w~th the mentality o� civilians. We had to stop the experiment." A reserve captain, 45 years old, notes that not only are the criteria for admission higher than Chey were when he attended, but aiso thaL ~he stud,y programs are following the evolution of the sciences and the technical areas~ "Among the mil- itary there is something which on~ does not find among Tunisian civilians, that is, a moti.vatl.on to learn. At 40 years of age a soldier, whatever his grade, does not feel it beneatti tiim to return to study. Quire the contrary!" This captain also notes a new educational *_endency founded on cooperation, reflection, and group work, A leader, although always the only one to decide, consults and listens. According to whether. an officer has studied in the United StaCes or in France, the style changes: simple and direct for the first group; reserve and distance are commonly to be �ound when one encounters a soldier trained in a French military school. Concern for Promotion . The emergence oi a businQSS-~riented baur~eoisie in the 1970�s, which has created a gap between civili~s and militaxy personnel, has not involved coJ.lective dis- content among the military but rather i.ndivi.dual frustrations which will be answer- ' ed v$ry quickly by indexation of milita~~~ salaries to the salaries of the civil service, a policy of housing For military personnel, sports and leisure clubs, insurance polic:Les--in short ~~11 ~the advantages which equate higher ranking of fi- cers and ge.nerals te civil personnel. The officers quarters have nothing in common with the sumpt~ious villas in the suburbs of Tunis, but this does not fail - to arouse a cer.tai.n envy on the part of junior of~icers, whose first problem is housing. Pramotion is also a matter of concern to junior officers. One can easily take about ' 8 years to go f.rom second lieutenanL- to Xieutenant and finally receive 'L60 dinars instead of 120 dinars per month (60,000 CFA francs) . The future appears to be ' blocked for the generation of 30--year-olds ~ Whereas in civilian life business act~vj.ty has opened up the prospects for tnis gP� ..u~ion, in the armed forces, as in the government, the best positions are already takeii~ Installed in his home which "loolcs rich"--heavy velvet drapes from Genoa, stucco _ statues, fancy windotashades, many small possess3.ons arat~nd the house--"the colonel" wears sporty clothes which malce a:nan in his 50's who is gett;_ng a little thicker - around the waist, look younger. Only the regulation haircut recalls his function. Owning his own house, he evidently doss not have the advantages he would have had ~ if he had been the comuiander of a place ? ike Sousse or Bixerte, but with a salary of 400 dinars per month, "heavens," he says, "I have nothing much to complain about." Like his opposite ~number in civi? ian "life, a high of ficial or executive in a _ co~~pany, "the colonel" dreams. He speaks of khe plans of others, of those who have come upon "the" good business deal, of those who have been able to put something aside to help make ends meet. Thus, some of his colleagues in the armed forces 37 FC~R O~'1FICIAL USIE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300084455-4 FOR OF~'IC[AI. USE ONLY have a share in "big" or "little" Uusiness transac~rions, some with friends, some _ with relatives (their brothers or ~aives). Th.ese inGlude representing medical firms, - offices, import~-export concerns, restaurants, mountain resorts, banquet ha11s. This is done in order to have some money set aside when the time for retirement comes. If he had wanted to make money like everyone else, "the colonel" would have taken the path of "promot:ion" already followed by many of his colleagues from his "class" and would have left the armed forces. Moreover, all those who leave the armed forces are very much in demand for their efficiency, whether in ba.nks or private or public companies. But the slogan of "the culonel" is "to serve and obey." A Closed Caste The military apparently constitute a separate corps of people. In fact, they are a caste lives in a closed world, a cocoon, but a permeable cocoon. It is permeable above all in terms of daily problems: the high cost of living, housing, the future of their children. Thus, in the mess, in the course of a game of cards, one can have a lively discussion about the latest football game, but not about the latest change in the government. Does this meaza that the Tunisian Army is not politicized? Compared to the armies of the Middle East, it is certainly less politicized and more loyalist. Rejection of Politics For President Bourguiba the place for the soldier is :tn his barracks. Excluded from political relationships, the soldier wi11 not bring politics, and therefore govern- ment ideology, into the barraclcs. Between government leaders in a given region and the local military comma.nder there is a kind of madus vlvendi, a type of peace- fu1 coexistence. "Don't mix things," says a captain, "that`s a good idEa." This commander thus does not hide the little esteem he has for politicians. "They are people who only progress by devious neans. At least, in the armed forces you advance by ranks and by .following a hierarchy, and that's the right way to do itl"~ Another officer says, "The army means: I don't get into politics, but don't play politics with me." Perhaps this is what explains the fact that today there is no attempt made to avoid speaking of the way in which the former minister of defense, Abdallah Farhat, entrusted the organizatton of the last congress of the govern- ment party to the armed forces. One officer says: "So much the better if President Bourguiba keeps his hand in things. That keeps us from being involved in problems which do not concern us. As for us, our job is to defend our territory against an external enemy." - What about 26 January 1978, when the army was called out to put down riots which ~ grew out of conflicts between the trade unions and the government party? In response to all questions the person to whom we spoke became annoyed and aggres- sive: "Go ask those who gave us the orders. As for us, our duty is to defend the country when it is in danger!" - One year later, to the day, the army came out of its barracks once again to en- - counter, in Gafsa, a commando group which came in from Libya. On this subject the 38 FOR OF~ICI~,L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FUR OEFICiAL USE ONLY . speaker was more vocal, and the tmpresaion remains Chat Gafsa, for the army, was not ~ bad thing. It was the alarm ba11 which fina.lly was to draw the attention of the government to the plan for modernization of the army. Created with no military development objective, with essentially the aid from , France, ~ahir.h in ~.956 ~urned over a heterogeneou.s collection of equipment, the armed forces hav~ had :Eor a long time a skimpy budget o� about 10 million dinars annually. When Che Tunisian-LiUyan union of Jerba took place in 1974, the armed forces, long frustrated, did not look unfavorably on "this extraordinary field of experiment" which was opening up before it. The union, which did not develop, convinced the politicians o~ the need for a credible and defensive army. Sweeping aside his prejudices and suspicions, President Bourguiba let himself be convinced, and the armed forces set aside its temporary structures, replaced its equipment, and pleadect for minimal growth in its stock equipment. From 20 million dinars in 1975 the defense budget more than trip'led in Y977. Faced with tiie expansianism of Libya, the Tun3.sian Navy, which up to - the present has been ff� re of a coast ~uax�d r..omposed of 2,500 men, charged with ' conflicts relatad ~o fishing quLs~tions, has been faced with the need to reconvert. 1K.ode~nization of Armament In 1976-1977 Tunisia carried out a p~J.icy of diversification in all directions of its arcuament, of which the weakest point remains the air force. This is not so much in texms of the nuuiber of inen (nearly 3,OOOj but zn terms of i.ts air defense capa.bili~y. Also, tb.e lack of troop transport aircraft was cruelly fe:Lt at the tLme of the I,i.byan connrando attack (Gafsa, January 1980) o This attack carried away the last hesitations of the old pacifist leader. Caught between two neigYibors who a~e not always as calm as he is, the chief of state ordered the general sta.ff to cons~.der again the plan for the renovation of the arm~d for.cES which will be carried aut cluxing the next 5 years, If the objectives as def~ned are clear enough, their achievement js a question of ineans. Members of the ~Crench and American general staffs ~made several visits to Tunisia in 1980 and even before, ir. February and Apri1 1979, in ~ to evaluate the military potential and ideriti:Ey neQds o For ttie caming 5-year period thr~e stages are de~~nede The first phase will be equivalent to 2,5 times the present budget, or 250 mill.~on dinars; the second phase will prov~de 350 mx].lion dinars; and the Iast pnase, whose budget will reach 700 million dinars, shoul.d assure n.inisia of acqui.ring sophisticated equipment for ' surveillance, detection, and telecommunications. About half of this sum w3.11 go to tt~e air force (160 million dii~azs) and an equivalenC sum for the acquisition _ of missiles. A gaod ~art of it goes to the army, which continues to be the tip of the lance. The xest goe~ ~o ~he navy, for logistics and for various auxiliary services. Arab financing~ particu7.arl.y from Saudi Arabia, is being ac~a.vel.y sough~. 39 FOR O~'~~C~AI. USF., ~I~lL'1' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY However, the Army has only played a military role. Outside the cities, and especially ir~ the south, the prPstige of the uniform does not need to be demonstrated. Tn godforsaken places the means of development are to be found in tihe army. Often, local or regional authorities turn out to be incapable of en- couraging the effort necessary for urgent and vital tasks. These situations will convince the skeptics of the need to entrust young national servicemen with carry- ing out projects forming a part of national plans (fight against erosion or floods, construction of roads and rural housing, etc). The Other Side of the Picture: Desertions In the Sahara desert, isolated by sand dunes, situated about 20 km froW the nearest center provided with electricity, the village of E1-Faouar welcomes the young con- scripts in battle dress, armed with picks and shovels, with a spontaneous and un- precedented burst of praise! "Our f riends, you have come to save us.... Finally, the road promised (for the last 20 years). "Long live the army!" This is one example among many others. And the positive side of the balancesheet is often to be found. The professional soldiers are proud of stones dug out of the ridges, of ineals.shared with a native of the locality, underprivileged and unknown, and, above all, of an Army prov?ng without fanfare or speeches its effectiveness along- side a"profit-ma.king" society. The tr.oops, like all troops in the world, iz~arch in disciplined fashion. However, conscription, long considered as a misfortune, is far from having acquired Che title of nobility in the eyes of the people. Nevertheless, since the establish- ment, following the riots of 26 January 1978, of abligatory wor.kshops for y~ung - unemployed workers, tYie annual conscription classes present themselves at the gates of the barracks without even being called. Mahmoud, a black who is 23 years old, tells how, when he was caught in a security sweep in Tunisa, he had a hard time showing the papers proving that the Ministry of Defenss had postponed~his - being called up. It didn't work. He spent 3 days in the hell of the classifica- tion center and then was sent, together with 200 others picked up in various sweeps, to the barracks at Sousse. "That was paradise," says Mahmoud, "with meat every day. I used to think that the army was made up of savages. But I learned more in 3 months than during tha rest of my life. The noncommissioned officers were better than parents to us. They told us that the army is a big family, and that is not false. For the first time I had the impression that someone was concerned about my education. I learned, for example, to give he~p to others, spontaneously, to carry out my joo on time and the best I could." Very quickly, Ma.hmoud lost inter- - est. When his training was over, he was as~igned to "S". That could stand as well for Sfax as for Sousse or Sahara. Now, the Sahara is the worst of calamities for a conscript. If they are not told their destina~tion, this is to avoid deser- tions, but there are some cases on each trip. Assigned to Ksar-Ghilane or Dhib at, in the farthest reaches of the Sahara, like Ali, another s~ldier 20 years old: "One had the impression," he says, "of being turned into a forced laborer. We broke up rock all day long, where we were building houses." Military Service or Civilian Service? When they left Tunis, Ali and Mahmoud considered that overall the balarce was a good one. What had they learned? They had learned to know the country, in the . 1~0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICCAI. USE ONLY first place, and the people. "The people of. t~ie south mistrust the people of the north. They treat us like inferiors." They learned to deal with situations with courage and a sense of responsibility, to work, to discipline themselves. Would they vol.unteer for the army? The categorical answer is, no! However, bath of them are unemployed. Some people are concerned to see military senrice take another path, first by tolerating and then by extending its participation more and more in useful work projects and turning the soldier away from his proper mission: a good defense. "At the time of danger," Deputy Nouri Boudali told the National Assembly, "the value of a planted tree becomes insi~ificant, while the value of a well-trained soldier becomes decisive. It is not a matter of the soldier becoming a citizen bur rather that the citizen become a soldier." Search for Homogeneity B ased on conscription, the Tunisian Army is composed of 1,000 officers, 3,000 non- counnissioned officers, 1,000 officer and noncommissioned officer candidates, some 5,000 corporals and privates, and fxom 15,000 to 16,000 conscripts. About 27,000 ? man in all. Since independence in 1956, nearly 400,000 young men have performed their military service, to the point that, in 1972, there were not enough officers for training the conscripts, and a 6--month training program was set up for soldiers b eing demobilized, in order to train nox~cou~?issioned and commissionec? reserve of.ficers. According to reserve officexs the reserve army is at a good level and has kept its ref].exes in good order. ~Iowever, f.or a regiment to be effectice, it must be compos~d of elements having a minimum of homogeneity. Now, this organiza- tion presupposes that at its base there exist relationships of confidence b etween the civilian and military authorities, so that in each area of a city, locality, or region defense activity can be carried on without a break, without difficulty, and that it wi11 ber_ome natural, simple, and effective. Tunisia is hesi.tating. Aruiing itself to have credible forces capable of deterrence is a legitimate abbition, but can it really be effected in a Tunisia with only - limited resources? To insure "coverage" of this need involves risks. King Hassan II of Morocco h~s said quita correcCly, "one is always a little bit the prisoner of him who helps you." COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980 5170 CS~: 4400 ~ !~1 FOR OFFIC~AL USE ~NL~' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TUNISIA GRADUAL LIBERAL IZATION PROGRAM ANALYZED Paris MARCHES T ROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Dec 80 pp 3513-3514 ~ [Text] Mohamed Mzali's government, following President Bourguiba's directives, is _ prudently carrying its work of political liberalization. In the unions, nearly all of the militants who were condemned after the events of 26 January 1978, on 10 November were pardoned and had their civil rights reinstated; thus they will b e able, depending on the decisions of the future extraordinary con- gress of the Tunisian General Federation of Labor (UGTT) , to aspire to union respon- sibilities again. But seven of the condemned, including Habib Achour, who was re- - leased and put under house arrest, have not had the benefit of these reprieve mea- sures. Some exp ect this to be the case before the meeting of the UGTT Congxess; in fact Mohamed Mz ali clearly stated that the union members who have received the pres- idential ~grace constitute "a first group," and the new president of the National Committee of the UGTT, Noureddine Hached, did not fail to take note of this formula. During an audience he granted on 13 November to Noureddine Hached and the members of the National Committee of the UGTT, President Bourguiba did not fail to formulate his directives aimed at the union group. The latter will have "to have in its r~.nks loyal nationali ~ts who demonstrate a spirit of sincere responsibility." The work- ers' educationu 1 activity will have to be pursued in such a way as to "inculcate in them high patri otic values and make them aware of their rights and duties," and by seeing to it that "any activity likel.~~ to hinder our work of developr~ent is avoided." - The UGTT will, in particular, have to contribute to the success of the Sixth Plan. After the audience the members of the Committee themselves in_dicated that they had assured the pre sident of the Tunisian workers' desire to preserve the dignity and invulnerabilit y of Tunisia, and to support the development ef.f.ort; they confirmed their resolve " t o maintain cohesiveness in the ranks and to be imbued with a sense of responsibility." ' The National Committee of the UGTT is thus giving all the guarantees of good will, indeed of confo rmity, which are desired on its part. For his part, President ; Bourguiba is ret aining his freedom of action as to the measures for reprieve and re- - instatement awaited by the seven union members who were excluded from the first ' series of benevolent measures. No doubt he intends in this way to avoid having the moral authorit y of these militants weigh too heavily on the operations of preparing ~ for the union congress. But detractors of the present Tunisian political line con- clude that, all things considered, Tunisian unionism has still not really been set free. 1~2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Be that as it may, Noureddine Hached is pleased with the changed atmosphere in Tunisian unionism: "The black page has been turned," he declared on 6 December ~t a public cexemony in memory of his father. "The sectoral committees of the UGTT have been formed, 365 basic unions have so fax been renewed in all regions of the country, 4,S$5 candidates have been elected; about 43,000 voters, out of the 63,000 UGTT mem- bers, participated in the voting. We are proud of ~these results." What Noureddine ~lid not indicate at that time is that most of the election results favo.r thz partisans of "the old group," despite attempts to obstruct by the employ- ers or by the local Destourian elements; the reappearance of social conflicts, gen- eralJ.y }iaving to do with wages, also contributed to hindering the activity of the sectoral committees and the National Committce of the UGTT. In these circumstances the UGTT Congress, which should mark the reswnption of normal union actzvity under a new regularly elected Central, will not take place on 20 January as scheduled. A Revealing Ministerial Shuf.fle � On the political level, the ministerial shuffle of 3 December is the first sign, though ve.ry qualified, o� an opening up toward the opposition. In fact it includes - assigning to Tahar Belkhodja the In~ormation portfolio, detached for the occasion from the portfoli.o of Information and Cultuxe, and the appointment of Beji Caid Essebsi as ministerial delegate to the pri~ne minister. Tahar Belkhodja, after being a diplomat for a long time, then National Security di- rectox and a membex of the C~ntral Committee of the party, became minister o� the Tnte.rior in 1973. It was in that post that he strongly advised against the "policy of fixmness" adopted the Tunisian c~vexnment during the last montlis of 1977, coun~er to thc J.eadership of the U+~TT. Believing that he had been too weak with respect to t}ie movements launched by the railwaymen and the miners, President Bour- guiba dismissed him on 23 Decembex 1977, which brought about the resignation for solic~axity reasons of three other ministers and a secretary of state. Among those ivho resigned, while Habib Chatti became secretary general of the Isla~nic Conference, the other two ministers, Mongi Kooli and Moncef bel Hadj Amor, found high political office this year; on the other hand, Tahar Belkhadja had only been xeinstate~. last March in the diplomatic corps and named ambassador to Bonn. Tlie slowness which a ministerial post was given him--a post much ].ess im~ortant than the one he held 3 years ago, are indica~tive of the care with which President Bourguiba is striking a _ balance between the measures of appeasement and conciliati~n; if the 1977 dif�erence of opinion has been pardoned, it is plainly not fc.~~otten. The case of Beji Caid Essebsi, which is very di�ferent, shows similar subtleties. Mr Essebsi, who as a student was active durine t}ae fight ~or independence, had a career that was more administxative than political; he w;.~ secretary of state and then minister of state during just five years; and since 1972, after a brief mission as ambassador to Paris, he has been back at the Tunis bar. In recent years Mr Beji Caid Essebsi has been one of the leaders of ~he "liberal" movement of the Social Democrats, directed by Ahmed Mestiri, but he represented the most moderate group there. Whereas Mr Mestiri clearly took a position in favor of multipartism, Mr Essebsi was not articu.lating as clear a doctrinal demand and seemed to be invis- aging merely a"liberalization" of the regime by granting important offices to per- sons with independen~ leanings; and several months ago he agreed to be reinstated in the party, from which he had been excluded in 1974 for criticizing the regime. L~3 F'OR OFFT.CIAL USE ONI.~Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 ; FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY In such circumstances it is permissible to wonder if his accession to a political post entailing no responsibility in a ministerial department really constitutes a success for the opposition. How Much Freedom of Expression for the Opposition? In fact Beji Caid Essebsi's accession to the government underlines and emphasizes the divergence that exists between the two groups of the Socialist Democratic Move- ment (NIDS), since June 1978 when Ahmed Mestiri expressed his intention of formino a political party and began taking steps to that end, in vain as it happened. The Essebsi group in the i~S, which is the most modexate--or rather the least immed- iately ambitious--, had been authorized for three years to put out the weeklies AR RAI (THE OPINION) and DEMOCRATIE. The Mestiri gxoup has just been authorized to publish AL MOUSTAQBAL (THE FUTURE), whose first issue went on sale on 1 December, and a French-language weekly which should follow shortly. In its first issue AL MOUSTAQBAL publishes an editorial by Anmed Mestiri, recalling the opposition's de- votion "to the rules for the alternation of power" and reveals rhat is favorable, though with numerous reservations, to the more open policy practised by Mohammed Mzali. On the other hand, neither the Tunisian Communist Party nor Ahmed ben Salah's Move- ment for Popular Unity have received the publication authorizations they asked for. And the Muslim publications of fundamentalist leanings, AL MOUFI'AMAA (THE SOCIETY) and AL MAARIFA (KNOWLEDGE) remain suspended. This extremely restrictive and frankly arbitrary measuring out of freedom of expres- sion constitutes, when all is said and done, indirect homage to the critical spirit of the Tunisians and to the strength of a national opinion that the only Destourian channels are not enough to convey. This is undoubtedly a weak point in Mr Mazli's policy; on this subject he is glad to be laconic. "If no other party (than the Neo-Destourian Party) has been able to impose itself upon the Tunisian political ' scene, this is not our fault. However, there is oppasition on the right, and espec- ' ially on the extreme left, that are expressing themselves in one way or another, and no one is preventing them from doing so as long as that expression is not accompanied by anarchy and violence." (Interview in the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 1 December 1980). Actually, this "expression" is realized chiefly through the channel of the foreign press; within the country it takes place only from mouth to ear or through . clandestine pamphlets. Mohammed Mzali, as he confides in the gxeat American daily, is counting on the Sixth Fivp-Year Pian to "assure a more equitable distribution between individuals and re- gions of the fruits of growth, a condition that is necessary for mobilizing energy and strengthening the social peace and national unity." He adds, "We are also con- cerned with all the rebalancing required today by the evolution toward a more just ' society that is better structured and better balances." The reappearance of social ~ movements, which certain symptoms already foreshadow, are in danger of not giving the government the time needed to properly conduct a policy envisaging such ample time for its realization. ~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1980 i 8946 CSO: 4400 ~ FOR OFFICIAT, USF. ~NT.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - UNITED ARAB EMIRATES DETAILS OF ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTRAL BANK Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 23 Jan 81 pp 48, 49 - [Interview with Governor of UAE central bank, 'Abd al-Malik al-Hamar, bq Ahmad Hafiz, date and place not given] ~ [Text] Arab and international political and economic circles are following with deep interest the establishment of a central bank in the UAE. This interest arises from the unique pulitical character of this state which was founded on the basis of a fed- eration among seve.ral emirates each of which had represented a politically, socially and economically independent entity prior to the formation of the UAE in 1971. The establishment of the central bank comes as a step along the road of union and com- plete amalgamation. Prior to issuance of the decree forming the central bank early in January, there had been no specific body with the powers enjoyed by the central bank as a governmental institution to monitor and implement th e state's financial and monetary policy. - There had been a currency council but its powers were limited and each emirate had its owu budget besides the general federat3on budget. 'Abd al-Malik al-Hamar, governor of the central bank, says, "Estalilishment of the bank means that the member emirates have agreed to come to terms with each other about depositing their funds in foreign currencies in it and that this will lead us to a very important fact, that is, that for the first time since th e creation of the UAE, there will be a federal account deposited in a central bank owned by the federation state." _ A1-Hamar added that the emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai had been the first emirates to participate by depositing 50 percent of their oil revenues, that is, of their basic income, in the central bank which, in turn, covers the governmental institu- , tions and the public sector in the state in their financial requirements. 'Abd al-Malak al-Hamar also says that the huge expansion experienced over the past 10 years in the economic and commercial areas made it essential to create or form a central bank to legislate, develop and promote commerical and financial activity , in the state. To prove this, we merely have to recognize that the number of banks operating in thE = UAE has jumped from 12 to 54 in the past 10 qears and the numb er of branches of = _ 1~5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300084455-4 F'OR OFFiC1AL USE ON~Y - international banks in the country is about 420. This huge banking and economic leap made it necessary to create a natipnal inst3tution on the scale of the central bank to go beyond the role of the previous currency council to regulate the prodi- gious financial and banking traffic in .the country. [Questionj However, don't you feel as I do that the appearance of this large number of banks exceeds all anticipated bounds in a small country such as the UAE? [Answer] That's very true. This perhaps stemmed from the tremendous leap exper- ienced by the UAE in its first 10 years, the economic and social growth rates having exceeded all projections, and from the standpoint of the huge construction projects witnessed by each emirate. This was helped by the large monetary fluidity provided . by the oil exports, besides the fact that the state at that time was pursuing an open - door policy with no restrictions on the entry or exit of currency; in fact, it was a completely free market which made it easy for any bank management which wished to form banks or establish banking branches in the UAE. [Question] Up to 1977 which saw a severe financial cxisis as the result of the dis- appearance of controls over the banking and �inancial system in the country? [Answer] Yes, tlaat was what happened. The currency council tried at that time to cope with that crisis, issuing some econ~mic and financial laws defining the condi- tions under which banks or bank branches would operate in the country. As a result _ o� the application of these laws, some foreign banks closed their doors and the num- ber of branches was reduced. That, in: my op3.nion, was an essential step in coping with the financial crisis in one of the wealthiast countries of the world. - I am in full agreement with the statement that there was a verq high ratio of foreign banks operating in the country compared with any other country, even pre-1975 Lebanon. Naturally, all the profits of those banks were remitted abroad and the econ- omy of the country did not benefit in ttie slightest from them. Moreover, those . banks were totally owned by their owners and the emirates had no share of them. The major. role commercial banks pl~y 3.n commercial activity is no secret and it would _ have been better had the number of local banks been greater than the number of foreign - banks and what happened in 1977 would not have taken place. So, it is my opinion, which I have e~~pressed on iuore than one occasion, that it is necessary to ~olster and improve local banks so that they ca.n compete with the huge international banks. What has happened up to now is that we have countered t:it increasing activ3ties of the f oreign banks with laws regu"lating thei.r operation. In 1977, the year of the crisis, a number of decl.sions were issued of which I might mention the freezing of licenses for foreign banks and their branches and not granting licenses to open new banks. In early 1978, we abrogated a number of licenses pending for bank branches ~ that had delayed carrying on full activity, about 70 branches, after a warning period which they did not abide by. [Question] How many local banks ara there compared with foreign ones? [Answer~ lfaelve local banks compared 54 foreign banks. 46 ~'OR O~FIC[AL US~ ~NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Conditions for Establishing Foreign Banks [Question] What are the new terms for opening foreign banks in the UAE? [Answer) National capital must constitute 80 percent of the capitalization of the bank with the remaining 20 percent being foreign capital. [Question] Is this condition laid down on the basis that it is in effect in the other countries of the Arab Gulf? [Answer] No. Each country has its own circumstances. Saudi Arabia, for example, - stipulates that therc be 70 percent local capital participating in the bank with the other 30 percent foreign. [Question] Are all the local banks in the UAE set up on the bas3.s of p urely local capital? - [Answer] Most of the banks are established on the basis of purely local capital, banks such as the National Bank of Abu Dhabi, the Bank of Dubai, the Bank of Oman, the Bank of the Middle East, etc. There are some local banks that were set up with the participation of foreign capital but the proportion of foreign captial in each ~ case 3s not more than 30 percent. Local participation is rare in the other 54 foreign banks operating in the country. The Bank and The Future - [Quest3on] What precisely is the policy laid down for the central bank to pursue in the future? [Answer) Essentially it is that it will have priority in the next few years in in- vestment operations in the state and expenditures on various projects and disburse- ments in the institutions of the state and its governmental sector in the sense that those fundamental activities will, to a large extent, be restricted to the central banle, the operation of which has begun, in coordination with the ministries of plan- ning, trade and petroleum. _ In brief, it will be the state's basic bank to take on the burden of organizing and developing the country's economy, this having been left up to the small local and large foreign banks. It is an extremely important new political and economic phase that has begun in the UAE and will have firemendous future effects on the unification process. - COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI I 8389 CSO: 4802 END ' i , i i L~7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080055-0