Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 1, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2.pdf1.9 MB
APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/9612 16 March 1981 e USSR Re ort p POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAI AFFAIRS CFOUO 7/81) , FBeS F~OREIGN BROADCAS~" INFORM~?TION SERVICE - FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign - newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and - other characteristics r~tained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text) or [Excerpt) in the first line oF each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the origina? informa*_ion was processed. WherP no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfar;iiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated enclosed in parentheses. Glords or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. ~ Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an ~ item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli.- cies, views or attitudes of the tT.S. Government. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIQNS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI.Y. , APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 I FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY ~ JPRS L/9 612 - 16 March 1981 USSR REPORT = POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS - (FOUO 7/81) CONTENTS INTERNATIONAL Western Imperialism Blamed for Muslim Insurgency (A.I. Zevelev; VOPROSY ISTORII, Dec 80) i - Soviet Policy to Jews Defended, Zianism Attacked _ (M.A. Gol'denbP�rg; IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK MOLDAVSKOY SSR. ~ SERIYA OBSHCHESTVENNYKH NAUK, No 3, 19$0~ 16 - a - [III - USSR - 35 FOUO] _ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300094434-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ? INTERNATIONAL WESTERN IMPERIALISM BLAMED FOR MUSLIM INSURGENCY Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian No 12, Dec 80 pp 82-91 [Article by A. I. Zevelev: "International Imperialism - the Instigator of the Basmak Movement"] [Text] International imperialism has focused its "attention" on rhe Soviet ~ East for many decades. The policy of the Western powers has been deter- mined by their hatred of the socialist revolution, which had ar~ enormous influence on the entire world, including the peoples of the non-Soviet East. The imperialist plans to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat and split Central Asia away from the Soviet Union assigned an important role to the Basmak bands.l International imperialism played an instigatory, organizing, and directing role in the formation and support of the Basmak movement as a form of anti-Soviet struggle by the local bourgeoi~ie, - feudal lords, bais~ mullahs, and kulaks. The movement's ideological founda- tion was reactionary religious (pan-Islam), chauvinistic (pan-Turkism), and nationalistic. The actual organizers of the Basmak movement were the counter- revolutionary Shura-i-Islam and Shura-i-Ulema organizations in Turkestan. Their direct allies were the White Guards and Turkish~ Afghan, and Chinese _ reactionaries. Reactionary circles in England and the United States had shown an inrerest in the Central Asian region durin~ the preceding century, Central Asia attracted particular attention from American colonialists at tfie turn of - the century.2 This region interested them for its wealth in minerals, cotton, and cheap labor and its strategicallq important position. - The Yankee penetration of Turkestan followed the classic plan of colonialism. _ The first to appear there were "specialists" in the study of "native" culture, ways~ and mores, instructors in cotton processing and development of animal husbandry, leaders of g2ological and railroad surveying parties, arcfieolo- gists, journalists, and tourists. They collected and processed economic, political, and military data and their "cover" activities in the spheres of cultural education and philanthropy were generously financed. According to incomplete figures, 25 American representatfves of different types died in Turkestan in 1903-1913.3 Alongside these "cultural emissaries" diplomatic - and military officials appeared~ desiring to establish contact with local authorities and the owners of cotton p:.antations, cotton gins~ coal mines, and oil wells. They actively sought out possibilities of receiving ' 1 FOR O~FICIAL USE 4NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300094434-2 : FOR iDFF[CiAL (J~E ONL's concessiona, opening divisions of their banks and trade offices~ making con- - tracts f~railroad construction~ and performance of irrigation wark. The first American offices, storehouses, concessiona, and commercial and in- dustrial firms appeared in Central Asia. In Tashkent, for example~ the Brown Company opened a cotton gin and creamery equipment plant, Stucken and ~ Company opened an enterprise that supplied Central Asia and the Caucasus with machines from the American Limmus Plant~ and the Anglo-American J. Block company opened affices represenrcing plants producing hoisting macliines~ bi- cycle~, typewriters, and the like.4 In 1909 Jackson, a representative of American Tianking circles~ formed a company to build a railroad from tTie Siberian Railroad to Tashkent. H. Hoover, who was backed by tIie Morgan fi- . nancial group~ was particularly active in "opaning up" Central Asia. The Russian-Asian Society was formed at this same time. It ovned 2.5 million = acres of land, including forests and sources of hydro energy. The society's lands had deposits of gold, copper, silver, and zinc with 12 operating mines, two copper smelting plants, 20 sawmills~ and 250 miles of railroad track, It owned steamships, barges, blast furnaces, rolling mills, chemical plants, and dredges.s The Russian-Asian Society had property worth a total of more than 1 billion dollars. The Morgan group also sent the Hammond mission to Turkestan to take control of the development of ixrigation pro~ects in the K,arakumy. American and British capitalists worked persistently to establish themselves - in the Fergana valley, which later became the center of the Basmak movement. The stock of many companies that exploited the riches of the Fergana region were held by Americans and Englishmen. In 1909~ for example, the oil com- panies of H. Hoover and L. Urquart, after buying the Maylisayskoye petroleum deposits from Russian entrepreneurs~ formed the Fergana Oil Industry Society. It also took in the Pamir Gold Industry Societq of the Fergana entrepreneur Nazarov, an agent of American capitalists and one of the future leaders of � the counterrevolutionarq Turkestan Military Organization.6 In 1912 W. May. an American who became a member of the Turkestan Trade and Industrial Society, settled in Andizhan. At his initiative the society established contacts with U. S. industrialists,~ and the American Vacuum Oil Company . opened a storage facility in Kokand. The Central Asian Oil Industry and Trade Association~ abbreviated "Santo~" and formed in the ~ergana region in ' 1898, was financed by the Russian General Petroleum Corporation, estab- lished in London and functioning on the basis of British law.8 The Chimion petroleum and mining society formed in 1905 was also linked to English capital.9 Two-thirds of the fixed capital of the Kzql-Kiy Central Asian Hard Coal Society belonged to the St. Petersburg International Com- mercial Bank, which was connected to English, French, and German capi~ talists.l~ Shortly before World War I the American corporation Singer _ Company with stock capital of 5~ million rubles opened a division in Russia. It had representatives~ warehouses~ and stores in virtually all cities and large populated points in the Turkestan region, There is evidence that "the entire vast network of Singer Company agents in Turkestan spent leas time selling sewing machines than engaged in espionage; agents of the firm collected information on the occupations of the population, the condi:tiil of roads, the sizes of fields and herds~ and about industry ard trade. 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300094434-2 FOR QFFICIAL USE ON~.Y Bank capital occupied a spectal place in U. S. economic expansion, The Russian-Asian Bank (formed in 191t` on the basis of the former Russian- n Cfiinese bank~ which was founded in 1896) was one of the largest in Central Asia. It had close ties American financial capital~ particularly with " W. Vanderlip and Hoover. The bank had divisions in Tashkent~ Samarkand, Kokand, Andizhan, Mergalan, Namangan~ Bukhara, Novyy Urgench~ Askhabad~ ` Merv , and Kerki. These dj.visions controlled the activities of almost all the local cotton industrialists and purchased a ma~ority of tfie shares in _ the Kokand-Namangan and Tokmak railroads, the Russian Neft' [011] Society, the Kokand Electrical Society, and the Central Asian Petroleum Industrq Society.12 The bank granted credit to locai cotton entrepreneurs and buyers and owned shares of stock in construction of the Andizhan-Oah railroad, American capital also subsidized th~ conatx~uction of the Fergana railroad~ in large part. U. S. imperialism strengthened its position in Central Asia markedly during _ _ World War I. It partially financed construction of the railroad from - Bukhara xo Termez, carried on irrigati~n pro~ects in the Goladnaya Steppe _ and on the Chu River, and extracted petroleum on the Cheleken peninsula. A division of the Russian-Amprican Chamber of Commerce opened in Tashkent and promoted the penetration of American capital into Central Asia. Tfie Marshall Produce Company acquired the enterprises of the German Duerschmidt _ firm, which had occupied a monopoly position in the food industry of the - ~ Turkestan region.13 British capital was entering Central Asig at an inten- sive rate at the same time. One of the London organizations that worked - solving "geographic problems" there in the early 20th century was tfie H, MacMahon mission, which directed British exploratory w~ork in southwestern = Afgfianistan and the adjacent areas of Iran.14 _ The Great October Socialist Revolution crushed the hopes o� the Anglo- ~ American imperialists to turn Central Asia into a colony quickly and rela- = tively cheaply. But they did not give up their former plan. U. S. president W. Wilson's "14 Points" and the commentarq accompanying them spok~ of Central Asia as a future U. S. poasession. Point VI reads: "There is no available informatfon whicfi would permit us to form an opi:nion on a correct - policy in relation to Muslim Russia~ in short, Central Asia. It is en- tirely possible that it will be necessary to give aome state a limited man- date to govern on the basis of a protectorate."15 This point was also " found in tbe expanded version of the document ratified by Wilson as tfie official American program for the Paris peace conference.16 Speaking at the conference, Wilson mentioned that the system of mandates would spread to "German colonies~ the territories of the Turkish Empire, and otfier terri- tories." Wfien asked what he meant by "other territoriee," tiie American President responded: "The forTner Ru~sian empire~" tfiat is~ the C~ucasus, - Central Asia, and other regiona,l~ The map compiled by the U, S. State _ Department for the U. S. delegation showed the regions that were to be taken away from Russia; Central Asia was indicated as a zone of U~ S. influence~l8 The bourgeois-bai elements and nationalists immediately called on Wilson for help in the "struggle against the Bolsheviks in Turkestan."19 One of tfie Transcaspian White Guards newspapers at that time wrote tFie following about _ ; the plans for intervention along the Karsnavodsk Samara and Samara Vladivostok railroad lines: "Theae two great lines are destined to play a 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 I FOR OFF'I~IAL USE Oi~i,'_~ - great role in history. They will liak the Americans with the mose inportant new fronts today. In the near future we will see detachments of Americans passing through our regions~i20 - ~tepresentatives of English ruling circles, for their pr~rt~ openly expressed g desire to make Turl~estan a British colony~21 Speaking in the House o~ Co~nons ~ on 4 March g918 English Secretary of FoXeign A~fairs A. J~ Ealfour stated that the government was devoting a great deal of attention to Asian Russia.22 _ British agex~ts were working hard to put together from bourgeois nationalist _ elements and the reactionary part of the Muslim clergy a delegati~n to travel = to Paris and put before the peace conference a demand for "liberation of Turkestan from tfie Balshevik yoke." London was already working out a program ~ for this appearance.23 If this plan fell through the im~periaZists had a plan - to aet up a kingdom in Ceatrat Asia. Nzgotiations on this subject had been conducted earYier with Seid-Alim Kahn~ the Emir of Bukhara~ Preparations ~or open intervent~on were also made. "English soldiers," a British said, "will h~ve to stand guard in the oases of Merv and Samark nd.~~24 But the U. S. assigned its work to R. Treadwell, American general consul in ' Tashkent. Upon officially presenting himself to the government of the Turkestan Republic in May 1.918 he demanded the right to unrestricted travel throughout Turkestan~25 Using his diplomatic immunity, this diplomat coordi- ~ nated the work of the missians and delegations carrying on espionage and sub- version in Tashkent and other cities.26 The representative of the Soviet People's Commissars of the Turkestan Republic F. I. Kolesov observed, in a telegram to the RSFSR Soviet of People's Commissars in the summer of 191~: ~ "Ambassadors and consuls of different countries are flooding Turkestan."z7 - In the fall of the eame year A. F. Sol'kin, representative of the Central _ Executive Commi.ttee of the Turkestan RepubYic, noting Anglo-Amertcan rivalry in Central Asia, said that to the United States Turkestan repre~ sented an "especially savory morsel.r2~ London sent a military-diplomatic mission to Tashkent consisting of Major - (according to other information Coloz~el) F. M, Bailey and Captain (according to otfier information Major) Blacker. D. McCartney~ former English consul in Kashgar, joined them later. J. Castagne wrote of their objectives: "They were given a special mission in relation to local authorities."29 I. M. Zaytsev, a White Guardsman associated witfi the Britisli emissaries~ - spoke more openly: "The ob~ective and intentions of the mission were to prepare for and organize an armed uprising against Soviet power in Turkes*_an and to provide the rebel detachments witfi ~money and weapons from EnglisP~ bases closest to Turkestan (Meshkhed~ Kashgar~ and Afghanistan30 Tfie mission liad broad powers and authority to carry out these ob~ectives. And fiere is the admission of Bailey fiimself:31 "Soon after my arrival I made contact rwi2h ~ those I believed to be the heads of several anti-Bolshevik organizations. The activities of the mission immedi~tely attracted the attention of Soviet governmental agencies. Kolesov reported to Moscow: "The mission is behaving very suspiciously.i33 It made contact with Treadwell and carried on subver- sive work under his direction. In a lecture in Hong Kong in 1928~ Treadwell indicated tfiat "in 1918 I was in contact witii the English Colonel Bailey~ wfin was sent from India through Kashgar to Tasfikent for deep reconnais- sance.i34 In his book "Mission to Tashkent," Bailey writes of Treadwell's ' 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300094434-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY role in anti-Soviet work: "T cooperated closely with the general consul of the United States. Treadwell maintained constant communicationa witfi me~ and his support and approval were very precious and valuable Lo me."35 Us- ing the ideas of pan-Islam and gan-Turkism~ Treadwell and Bailey Began spreading propaganda for the creation of an "independent Turkestan~" un- associated wit~i Soviet Russia~ The agent of the Peonle~s Com~aissariat of Internal Affairs in Turkestan observed ~hat this was a"~oint Anglo-American project, "36 England estaTilished several strongpoints in Iran~ Afghanistan~ and North- western China and from them directed counterrevolutionary activities in Turkestan. The posts at Meshkhed and Kashgar wer.e especially active. The imperialists were relying most heavilq in Turkestan on the Rasmak monement, " which expressed the class interest~ of ti~e feudal lords~ bais, incipient local bourgeoisie, and reactionary Muslim clergy~ Some of the working people _ occasionally made temporary alliance~ wi th the Basmaks for various reasons. But the workers and a large ma~ority of the peasants [dekhkany~ of Central Asia fought tfie puppets of imperialism and the enemies of tTie popular masses witfi gun in hand. All the prominent leaders of the Basmaks were hired agents of American and Englisfi intelligence. M. V. Frunze poi~:.ted out that tfie Basmak movement, "without strong support among the locQl population~" foun3 its support abroad in English "gold and guns.i37 In November 1917 a decision was made to form an autonomous bourgeots govern~ ment in Kokand, one of the commercial and industrial centers of Turkestan and an important point for pan-Islam and pan-Turkish propaganda. Leaders of the local counterrevolutionary forces had gal�hered in this city after Grest October. The formation of the "Kokand Autonomous Government" was the Beginning of secret English intervention in Central Asia,38 Ctiurchill re' marked later ~hat the anti-Bolshevik governments that arose on the frontiers - of Soviet Russia were defended and supported by troops of the Entente.39 On 15 (28) April 1918 the English Government sent a memorandum to Washington concerning the necessity of intervention in Soviet Russia and support for the White Guard organizations and the "governments in the south and soutFieast og - . Russia."40 Colonel E. House~ advisor to President Wilson~ wrote that the occupation of the Siberian Railroad was carried out at this time for the pur- pose of supporting the "autonomous governments in the southeastern part of Russia."41 W~en the Red Guard detachments of Turkes tan smashed the "Kokand Autonomous ~ Government" in Fetiruary 1918, ita defenders, among wfiom was the former criminal Irgash, became t~ie first Basmak "kurbashi" (leaders of criminal bands}. Madamin-Bek, a convicted robber who had later worked fiis way into the position of chief of the local milit ia division, also became a leader of a band. As the command of the Fergana Front observed~ "all organ~zed international imperialism" stood behind him.42 By the summer of 1918 a network of Basmak gangs had formed in the Fergana valley, They raided _ villages, robbed and killed the inhabitants, first of all communists~ workers, and rural activists~ took hostages, destroyed fields and livestock~ ruined irrigation systems, and burned the cotton~ They frequently imposed . taxes on tfie peaceful population in the form of grain~ rice, and fiorses; these taxes were 25 times as great as the prerevolutionary tributes, They . 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300094434-2 F06t OFFICIAL USE ONI.Y ~ _ took women away for their harems and blockaded industrial centers and cities~ causing problems with food and water supplq.43 The Basmaks tried with special fury to disrupt tlie work of railroad transportation, Hunger and poverty Yaged in t~ie fertile Fergana valley and the population lived in constant fear. It was no accident that Fergana was the main center of the Basmak movetnent. It was close to ~hina and Bukhara. From Chinese territorq the imperialists supplied the Basmaks with guns and, in case of need, sheltered them ttiere. 1Tie imperialists also used the exploiter strata of Bukhara, especially the reactionary part of the clergy, for their purposes. The struggle by Soviet autr~orities against the Basmaks came to be called the Fergana Front. It wa:~ not a solid line. Fighting would break out unexpectedly at different points and not last long. The dense population of tfie Fergana valley and the ex- tremely rugged terrain made it easier for the Basmaks to wage war by bandit metfiods and at tfie same time complicated the operations of regular units of the Red Army. - By the summer of 1918 Turkestan was like a fortress under seige. V. I. Lenin, analyzing the situation in the country in the middle of 1918~ wrote: "Yesterday the report came in that some of the cities of Central Asia have been seized by the counterrevolutionary uprising with open participation by tT~e English~ who have for~ified themaelves in India~ made Afgfianistan com- pletely subordinate, and long ago eatablished a base of operations for tfie~- selves to expand their colonial possessions, strangle nations~ and attack Soviet Russia."44 The first fighting between tfie Red Army and tfie Basmaks showed that it was not a question of sporadic or scattered actions by tndi- vidual leaders of bands. It became increasingly clear tfiat the Central - Asian counterrevolution was coordinated by a~killed and experienced ~iand. The Basmak movement ~ecame especially strong in late 1918 in connection witfi - attempts by the enemies of Soviet power to ~oin all the counterrevolutionarp~ forces of Turkestan. It was about in September or early October tTiat Col P. G. Kornilov (tiie brother of Gen L, G. Kornilov) secretly arrived in ' Fergana. He carried on negotiations ~rith the leaders of tiie bands un befialf of the English and assured ttiem of complet~ support from London. Tfie Bailey _ mission, which apenly traveled around Turkestan, on behalf of Fiis government promised to supply the Basmaks with o~eapons: "a) from Chitlar~Gilgit - through Sustag Pass to Kashgar~ and from ~re through Irkeshtem and ~sh; _ b) from PesTievar through the Ktryber Pass~ then on through Afghanistan an3 Bukhara. There were no limitations wfiatso~ever on any types of supplies~or _ on money�, tfie English representatives promised to provide wfiat the rebels needed "in adequate quantities when tfiey need it."'+5 Colonel Zaytaev was also sent to Fergana, iie and Kornilov were gi~?en tlie mission of reorganizing the Basmak bands into a cavalry corps consisting of two divisions or eight regiments 4rith two mountain cavalry batteries, a total of about 10,000 man. The formation of infantry rifle nnits was also contemplated. The entire army was to cons~st of roughly 25~000 men and was to be organized and trained following tfie model of ~ossack units,46 Tfiese units were supposed to participate in carrying out the plan to overthro~,r ~ Soviet power by breaking through toward Tashkent across the Kender-Davan pass in the Turkestan Range~ crossing the Murza Rabatskaya Steppe around tfie range to reach Chinaz, and crossing the Syr-~arrya~47 6 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300094434-2 . FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY Open Englisfi intervention in Turkestan began on 12 August 1918. British - troops were expected to act as a kind of nucleus around whicfi local counter- ~ revolutionary forces would gather. TEiis idea was expressed by D. Lloyd Oeorge at the interallied conference of Entente ceuntries in London as early as Marcfi 1918.48 Preparation for the intruaion lasted many months. - The territory of Iran was used as the apringboard. English troops were t~rougfit there from India and Mesopotamia. They had alrPady reacfied the - border of the Transcaspian Oblast in March.49 T'i~p `ormation of a military misaion was begun in Meshkhed under the direction af the Britiah general consul in Khorasan~ Gray~ In the summer of 1918 Genera~ Malleson took com- mand of the mission.s~ At the same time General Densterville was forming a - similar mission in Khamadan in western Irsn. Intensive work was done to ' establisfi lines of communication to the borders of Turkestan and the Trans- _ - caucasus. Afte~- the fall of the Baku commune in late July 1918 the ring of - interventionists surrounding the Soviet Republic on the south was broken only in Turkestan, When the English penetrated the Transcaspian region the _ ring was connected there too. At the 13 November 1918 meeting of tfie wem- 6era of tfie cabinet in London Lord Milner~ representing the raar department, stated that it was necessary to eliminate Bolehieism "in the regions of *_he Black Sea~" and specified that he meant "the Caucasus, the Don region, and Turkestan.i51 The White Guard newspaper observed that the "Allies" had "broader assigrtments~ unquestionably. Our ca~on task is to wipe out the Tashkent outpost and liberate the road between Samara and Krasnovodsk from any oFistaeles~ TIie strategic importance of this great road is enor~us. - It connects the English Baghdad front with the Volga~ Czechoslovakian~ and Ural fronts.i52 The colonialists and White Guards suffered a ma~or defeat in the very first en~ounters with the Red Army near Bayram-Ali on 13 August and near t'lerv on � 16 August. On 19 August General Malleson signed a treaty with the SR-- Menshevik government of the Transcaspian according to which England received the "rigfit" to take Soviet Turkestan and turn it into a colony~ The proto- col envisioned British aid to the WEiite Guards and Basmaks in the form of troops, military instructors~ field guns~ machine guns, airplanes~ rifles~ cartridges, and explosives.5' In Western historiography this treaty is treated as aimed at "suppression of Bolshevism in Turkestan.'r54 The plan of struggle against Soviet power contemplated a series of successive strikes ' from outside and the organization of uprisings by local nationalists and , White Guards at the most important points in the Turkestan Republicr Re- bellions were to be instigated in Tashkent~ Samarkand~ and the cities of ' ~ the Fergana valley, The Basmaks were assigned to take Tashkent~ and tfie Bukhara Emirate was to support the ~ffensive of the counterrevolutionary ~ forces.55 The American and English agents led by Treadwell were at the _ ' same time giving supplementary training to a detachment of Austrian and - German prisoners of war who were also expected to fight in Turkestan. Malleson later recalled that tne British High Command int~nded to make every effort tc~ take control of the Central Asian Railroad and~ if possible~ - all shipping on the Capian Sea.56 Tfie Basmaks received broad financing. In Fehruary 1919 the English consul _ in Kashgar gave the former Tsarist consul 100~000 rubles to pass on~to the _ leaders of the bands. Russian mercfiants and White Guards wfio had fled from Turkestan and were living in Kashgar appropriated 155,000 rubles.57 _ ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE nNY.Y ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - Intensive propaganda was carried on among the Basmaks. This propaganda was carried on by the "Indian-Tu~:kish miasion" organized in January 1919. Bq early 1919 Basmak gangs wer_e openly attacking Fergana~ Namangan~ and other Cities. The situation that had developed in the Fergana region was described as follows by ~the representative of the Turkestan Central Executive Com- mittee: "The nu~erous and highlq mobile bandits have in fact talien control _ of the entire region except for certain fortif ied points in the Russian parts of the cities.i5~ Basmak centers existed in othei pZaces as well: the Matcha Begstvo near Tashkent (Ablyk) and later the Bukhara and Khorezm xe- pu~lics. There too the bands were organized under foreign leadersfiip. England, af ter approving formation of the Matcha Begstvo on the headwaters of the Zeravshan River beyond Oburdon Pass, staged an election tbere to choose - a delegatioa ta travel to London for "advice" an~ "aid." The delegation re- turned to Matcha in the summer of 1919 with a promise of all possiBle sup- port.60 Soviet authoritiea took effective steps to organize the struggle against the Basmaks and their instigators. Revealing the true roles of Treadwell and Bailey was significant. Wfien the Turkestan Cheka jExtraordinary Committee] received substantiated information that these men were the leaders of the - anti-Soviet actions and Basmak bands~ Treadwell was put under house arrest bq autfiorization,of the RSFS~ Peop1E's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.61 In March 1919 the U, S. Government recalled him.62 Bailey went underground.63 He discussed this step wiLh Treadwell, focusing apecial attention on estab- lishing direct contacts with the Basmaks.64 The anti-Soviet reBellion in Tashkent in January 1919 failed~ The arrival of General Corey, chief of staff to the Entente coamnander of troops in the Balkans and Caucasus, in . _ uccupied Ashkahabad in March 1919 for the purpose of inspiring the White - Guards and Basmaks to greater activity came to nothing. Malleson's attempt to distri~iute a pet~tion au~ong the Turkmens with a"request" to the English - to remain in Turkestan for a long time was also unsuccessful. The situation that had developed in Af.ghanistan liy the start of 1919 also played a certain par~ in the failure of the English intervention. On 20 February 1919 the English puppet Emir Khabibulla-Khan was killed. The new Emir, Amanulla-Khan, declared Afghanistan an independent state and sent an a ambassador to Soviet Russia in April 1919~65 After tfiis tFie British imperi- alists, witfidrawing their fcrces from Turkestan~ focused special attention - on supporting the Basmaks. New subunits of English troops appeared in KasTigar, near Tashkurgan. They began building fortifications near Yangi - Shark and Karamgalyk.~6 Kolchak sent a special mission to Fergana composed _ of two of his generals and two English officers.67 They awarded Madamin- Bek tfie rank of colonei.68 The objectives of the mission were revealed in a letter by the chief of Kolchak's general staff to the former Tsarist counsuls in Kul'dzhe and Chugachak dated 8 October 1919~ which read: "The military mission has been assigned to strike up relation~ and establisli close communication with representatives of the powers that are friendly to us so that~ with logistic support from them~ part~san detacliments can be organized from zhe inhabitants of certain parts of Turkestan to figlit tfie local Bolsheviks."69 The mission subsequently fulfilled the functions . of intermediary between the Basmaks and Anglo-American agents and also helped unify the Basmaks with detachments of local Russian kulaks. 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300094434-2 y FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY ?0(adamin-Bek tiad already been promised permanent aid in the form of gune and gold By this time.~~ _ In late August 1919 tfie fa*_e of the Turkestan Repu~ilic was being decided on _ the Orenburg-Akty~sbinsk front. This was wfiere the Soviet authorities con- centrated their primary attention, and during those same weeks the un~ted forces of the Basmaks, kulaks (a whole large unit of kulaks co~anded by K. Monstrov had been armed in Southern Kirghizia), White Guards, and local bais reached agreem~nt to isolate Fergana from the rest of Turkestan and destroy rail~ telepl:one, and telegraph lines, They adopted a plan for a camb ined offensive against the city.71 Intensive distribution of anti-Soviet flyers~ proclamations, and appeals was begun. One of them contained an appeal to call a Constituent Assembly at which half of the places would be given to Muslims.72 Zn September fighting against the Basmaks broke out near Andizhan. - The bandits were dispersed and Og and Dzhelal-Abad were ~iberated from tfiem. T[ze Red Army's breakthrough into Turkestan and connecting the central zone of the country with the Turkestan Republic played a large part in the _ Bamak movement. In October 1919 the Commission on Turkestan Affairs - (Turkkomissiya) of the All-Ru~sian Central Exscutive Committee and RSFSR ~ Soviet of Pe~ple's Commissars was formed; it later became tfie Cormniss3on of tfie Turkestan Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist - Party (Bolshevik)~ The of the commission were Frunze~ V. V. Kuybyshev, Ya. E. Rudzutak, F. I. Goloshchekin, and Sh. Z, Eliava. The Commission on Turkestan Affairs and the Coffinunist Party of Turkestan were guided in their act~.vities by Lenin's letter entitled "To the Communist Comrades of Turkestan. In it Lenin emphasized the great importance of establishing correct relations with the indigenous population.73 During a short time in April and May of 1920 two ~etached caval.ry Tirigades were formed from volunteer working people in Fergana~ plus a detached cavalry lirigade in Senirech'ye and the Turkmen Cavalry Brigade, Following an appeal 30,000 Uzbeks, Ta~iks, Kirghizes, Kazakhs, and Turkmens enlisteZ - in the Red Army and became defenders of the Soviet Fatherland. Tfie Com- mission for Turkestan Affairs and the Turkestan Front worked out a more clear-cut line for the struggle against the Bamkak movement.74 "The diffi--- ~ ' culty is not in defeating the enemy militarily~" Frunze wrote. "Tfie d~ffi-- culty lies in making the millions of ,~orking Muslims understand tfiat tfie Basmak movement is their enemy and that fighting it is the sacred mis5ion of the working people.i75 Political work among the working population of the local nationalities. correct food policy, and material aid to the pea- sants were emphasized. Additional volunteer detachments of coam?unists and Komsomol members were formed in the native villages. A comprehensive program of political, economic, and military measures cre- ated favorable conditions far greatly weakening the Basmak movement. To revive it the imperialists called a meeting of the bandit leaders on the - Soviet-Chinese border on 22 October 1919. Representatives of the reac- _ tionary part of the Muslim clergy and local bourgeoiaie also participated. _ The mesting was directed by Uspenskiy, an English agent and former Tsarist consul in Kashgar. It was decided to organize a"Provisional Fergana Government" headed by Madamin-Bek. Uspenskiy promised to intensify aid to ' the Basmaks and gave them boxes of guns and shells as an "advance~" After 9 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ~NLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040340090034-2 FOR OFFICIAL USF. ONI.Y - f~rmation of the puppet "government~" imperialism's ties with the Ba3mak movement became even stronger, The Eaglish consul was a member of Madamin- Bek's lieadquarters and in fact directed his activities.76 Tfie "Provisional Fergana Government attempted to bring all the Zeaders of the bands under its ~ontrol by eliffiinating differences amon~ them and working out a general plan ~f action. The 1.50 Fergana bands were organized into four large detachments. _ Intensive fighting began in early 1920. The Tatar Brigade, which consisted _ of Red Army soldiers who spoke the local languages, and the Muslim Battalion - imeni 3 Internatsional were sent to Fergana to participate, Several bandit - leaders ioined the Red Army side and Muslim cavalry regiments were formed from their su5ordinates. In March 1920 Madamin-Bek surrendered and virtually - the entire Fergana region was cleared of bandits. In the summer, nowever, a new wave of the Basmak movement developed. This rebirth was the result of . efforts by imperialist ~ccomplices who placed their hopes on Kurshirmat, an out-and-out criminal and privateer, The reactionary mullahs declared him the "true fighter for Islam." Fergana again became the scene of mtlitary ~ operations. Frunze arrived. In his appeal entitled "To the Muslim Popula-~ tion of tfie Fergana Region" he emphasized that the local population itself~ "as one person," should "come to the aid of the authorities in rooting out tfie Basmak movement."~~ Local working young people, in particular tfie - - Komsomol organization of Fergana and A. Naviyev~ one of its leaders who - later died in battle with the enem~~~ took an active part in the struggle. International detachments under the command of E, F, Ku~helo also partici- - p ated in the operations. Tfiere were several thousand Basmaks in Fergana, Khiva~ and Bukhara in the spring of 1921. Then in October 1921 Enver-Pasfia~ th~ former Turkish mi~ister of war and one of the leaders of pan-Islam and pan-Turkism~ moved to Central Asia. His platform, as English General G. Macmun observed~ was to establish = an"empire" consisting of Persia, Bukhara, Khiva, Afghanistan, and Turkey.78 Anti-Soviet propaganda ir.tensified under the call for a holy war. The Basmaks were depicted as "true defenders of Islam." In this situation it was enorm~usl.y important to carry out Lenin's instructions: "Win the trust - of th~ natives; win it three times and four times over; prove that we are not imperialists, that we tolerate no inclination in that direction, This - is an issue of world impoitance, without exaggeration~ In this we must be absolutely strict."79 Neither caravans with weapons and ammunition nor tfie whining of the imperialist press about the "inevitable death" of Soviet power in Central Asia was able to save the "commander of the armies of Kliiva, Bukhara, and Turkestan," as Enver r_alled himself, from defeat. He was finished off in the summer of 1922. Basmak centers lasted longest in _ Khorezm where the Dzhunaid-Khan band was eliminated in 1924~ and in Bukhara~ Where Ibragim-Bek's bar.d was wiped out in 1926. The actions of Dzhunaid- Kfian were directed by English agent Shukinbayev. Ibragim-Bek spoke of this later at tria1.80 The elimination of the Basmak movement was one of the indicators of success- ful transformation of the Bukhara and Khorezm people's republics into socialist republics and implementation of national boundaries and formation of Uzbek and Turkmen SSR's, the Tajik ASSR, and the Karakirgiz and _ Karakalpak autonomous oblasts in Central Asia. Peaceful building and recon- - struction of the economy, especially implementation af land water and other _ reforms~ drew many people who for various reasons had been linked to Basmal 10 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY leaders or were simply confused away from the Basmak camp. The leaders of the bands did not lay down their arm3 immediately. As long as the exploiter ~ strata lasted in Central Asia there was a class base for the Basmak mocament. - Now and again new "emir-lyash kurbashi" ("supreme commanders") wonld appear, for example the Turkish officer Salim-Pasha and Fayzula Maksum. The center of Basmak leadership finally moved out of the country. Reinforcements were sent from tfiere, sometimes directly from England.81 The last wave of the Basmak movement, caused by the general upsurge of anti-Soviet activity by - international imperialism at that time and its development of nesa interven- tionist plans against the USSR, came in the late 1920's and early 1930~s. On this occasion the Basmaks un~uccessfully tried to stop large-scale col~ - _ lectivization of agriculture. ~ The principal factor in defeating the Basmak movement was consistent tmple- mentation of the Leninist principles of nationality policy by Soviet authori~ ties in Central Asia and the measures taken by the Communist Party to improve present agriculture, which offered the bulk of the local population the hope for a new and better life. Consolidation of the international status of tfie Soviet State was very important. The collapse of tfie Basmak movement repre- sented a compl~ta iailure of the plans of international imperialism to break Central Asia ..way from the USSR and subjugate its population. _ ~ FOOTNOTES 1. The Turkish verb "basmak" means to attack, suppres3, and pressure. 2. For more detail on this~ see A, Babakhodzhayev~ L~ Landa~ A~. S'tanishevkiy~ and N. Khalfin, "The Failure of the Aggressive Plans o� tfie Anglo-~nerican Imperialists in Central Asia~" ZVEZDA VOSTKA~ 1951~ No 8; L~ M~ Landa, "American Imperialism Active Organizer of the Anti-Soviet Intervention in Central Asia (1918-�1920)~ "TRUDY MUZEYA ISTORIT UZBEKSKDY SSR, Tashkent, 1954~ Vol II, 3. Landa, op, cit., p. 24~ 4. See S. R. Konopka, ~'Turkestanskiy Kray, Putevoditel~'~ [The Turkestan Region. Guidebook]~ Tashkent, 1910~ 5. Seyers, N., and Kan~ A., "Taynaya Voyna Protiv Sovetskoy Rossii'~ jTFie Ser_ret War Against Soviet RussiaJ, Moscoar, 1947, p 117. 6, Malyshev~ K. I., "The Defeat of Anti--Soviet Tnterve~ntion in ~outhern ` Kirghizia," Candidate~s Dissertation~ Moscow, 1956' pp 19-20~ - 7. ZVEZDA VOSTOKA, 1953~ No 5~ p 103. , 8. Eventov~ L. Ya.~ "Inostrannyy Kapital v Neftyanoy P~omysfielnnost~ Ro$sii:" [Foreign Capi~al in the Russian Petroleum Industry]~Moscow-Leningrad~ 1925, pp 62, 85, 89. " 9. Ibid., pp 44-62, 10. Gindin, I. F., "Russkiye Kommercheskiy Banki" [Russian Commercial Banks], Moscow, 1948, p 362. 11 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 F FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 11. Landa, op. cit., p 25. 12. ~"Otchet Russko-Azitskogo Banka za 1910 g," [Report of the Russian- Asian Bank for 1910j~ St. Petersburg. 1911, p 2. 13. Landa, op. cit., p 25: 14. Babakhodzha,yev~ op. cit,, p 135. 15. "Arkhiv Polkovnika Khauza" [The Archives of Colonel House], Vol 4, ~ Moscow~ 1944, pp 152-153, - 16. Kunina, A. Ye.~ "Proval Amerikanskikh Planov Zavoyevaniya Mirovogo - Gospodstva v 1917-1920 gg." [The Failure of American P1ans To Gain World Domination in 1917-1920]~ Moscow, 1954~ p 95. - 17. Girshfel'd, A.~ "The Role of the United States in Organizing the Anti- Soviet Intervention in Siberia and the Far East~" VOPROSY TSTORIi~ ~ 1948, No 8, p 20. - 18. Miller, D., "My Diary of the Conference of Paris," Vol IV~ New York, 1926, pp 219-220. - 19. ISHTRAKIYUN. Tashkent, 21 March 1918. 20. GOLOS SREDNEY AZII~ Ashkhabad~ 17 August 1918. - 21. Densterville, L., "Britanskiy Imperializm v Baku i Persii. 1917'1918 gg." [British Imperialism in Baku and Persia. 1917-1918]~ Moscow~ 1925, pp 122-123. 22. DIE POST, 6*iarch 1919. 23. TsGAOR SSSR [Central State Archives of the October Revolution, High State Government Sodies and State Administrative Bodies, USSR]~ Fund 1318~ .Inventory l~ File 627, STieet 78. - 24. TsGAOR UzbSSR, Fund R-17~ Inventory 1, File 317A~ Sheet 80. 25. Landa~ op. cit.~ p 29. 26. Among those in Tashkent in 1918 were the French attaches Castagne and Capdeville, the Czechoslovakian "representative" Gotfried, tfie Romanian charge d' aFfaires" Baltariu, Swedish representatives Hall, Von Schulman, and Studen the Danish "delegate" Braun, Belgian consul - de Sterc, the Germans Zimmerman and Wohlbrueck~ J. Davis and J, - Brennig, representatives of the American Young Men~s Christian Asso- ciation, and others. 27. TsGAOR UzbSSR, Fund R-25~ Inventory 1~ File 27A, Sheet 2~(back), 2F. TRUDY MUZEYA ISTORII UZBEKSKOY SSR~ File II~ p 36. 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 29. Castagne, J.~ "Les Basmatshis" [The.Basmaks], Paris. 1925~ p 20. 30. SOLOV E~KIYE OSTROVA, 1926 ~ No 4, p 62. - 31. His report on his activities in Turl~estan was discovered in the natiori~]. - - archives of India, in the secret fund of the " gu~eau of Special~Infor- mation" (K. A. Gafurova~ "The Documezts Exposed," VOPROSY ISTORII, ~ 1970, No 8), ~ee also F, M. Bailey, "Mission to Tashkent~" London~ - 1946. ~ 32. "Report of the Kashgar Mibsion, 1918-1920~" foreign and political _ department. Special bureau of information, 1920~ No 22(6)~ p 3, . 33. TsGAOR SSSR~ Fund 130, Inventory 2, Fi12 762, Sheet 230. 34. Niallo. A., "Ocherki Istorii Revolyutsii i Grazhdanskoy Voyny v - Kirgizii i Sredney Azii" ~Essays on the Historq of Revolution and ~ Civil War in Kirghizia and Central Asia]~ Frunze~ 1941~ p f~4. 35. Bailey, op. cit., p 156. _ 36. Zevelev, A. I., "Iz Istorii Grazhdanskoy Voyny v Uzbekistane" jFrom the History of Civil War in Uzbekistan]~ Tashkent, 1959~ p 89. . 37. Frunze, M. V., "Izbranyye Proizvedeniya"[Selected Works]~ Vol I~ _ Moscoar, 1957~ p 314. 38. Timoshkov~ S. P., "Bor'ba s Interventami~ B~logvardeytsami i Basmacfiestvom v Sredney Azii" [The Struggle Against Tn~erventionists~ White Guards~ and the Basuak Movement in Central Asia]~ l~ioscow-~ 1941; _ Timoshkov, S. P., "Bor'ba s Angliyskimi Interventami v Turkestane" _ [The Struggle Against English Interventionists in Turkestan], Moscow~, 1941. ~ 39. Churchill, W.~ "Mirovy Krizis" [The World Crisis]~ Moscow~ 1932~ p 105. - - 40. "Dokumenty po Istorii Grazhdanskoy Voyny v SSSR" [Documents on the History of the Civil War in the USSR], Vol I~ Moscow~ 1940, p 492. 41. "Arkhiv Polkovnika Khauza~" op. cit.~ Vol TII~ Moscow, 1939, p 275; _ Vol IV, pp 152-~153, 42. TsGASA [Central State Archivea of the Soviet Army]~ Fund 149~ File 51, Sheet 90. 43. Ibid.~ Fund 110, Inventory 2~ File 409~ Sheets 35-38, - 44. Lenin~ V. I., "PSS" (Complete Works], Vol 37, p 7. 45. SOLOVETSKIYE OSTROVA~ 1926, No 4~ p 63. 46. Ibid., 1926, Nus 5-6, p 37. 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 47. Gafurova. op. cit.~ p 37. ' 48. Layrov, S. V. ~"The Struggle in Britisii ~o]~itical C3Jrcles Cot~cernil~g tfie An~1o-Soviet Negotiations of 1920~1921~~~ ~10PROSY T&TORIT~ 1977~ No 6, p 61. 49. TsGAOR UzbSSR~ Fund R-25, Inventorp 1~ 'File 118~ Sfiset 7Q. 50. The Malleson mis'sion was aLso referred to by the acronym "Malmis." 51. Ullman, R. H., "Anglo-Soviet Relationa~ 1917-1921~" Vol II, Princeton-~ Oxford~ 1968, p 14. - 52. GOLOS SREDNEY AZII, Askhabad~ 17 August 1918. 53. "Kto Dolzhnik" [Who is the Debtor] , Moscow, 1926, pp 396--394. , 54, Ullman, op. cit.~ Vol I~ 1961, p 319~ 55. SOLOVETSRIYE OSTROVA, 1926, No 4~ p 68-69. 56. Malleson, V., "The 26 Commissars~" Russian translation in the manu-- _ scrtpt fund of the Institute of Party History of tTie Central Com~ mittee of the Uzbek Communist Party~ Fund R-2~55. Sheet 6. 57. Zevelev, op. cit., p 117, - _ 58. TsGASA, Fu~d 110, Inventory 4, File 275~ Sheet 26. 59. It~id.~ Fund 149~ File 69~ Sheet 79. 60. Polyakov~ Yu. A~~ and Chugunov, A. I~, "Konets BasmacTiestva" jTiie End of the Basmak Movement], Moscow, 1976. p 51. 61. The report of the Government of the Turkestan Republic said tfiat the = instigators of the anti'Soviet conspiracy were tfie imperialtsts and "foreign capital" (NASHA ~AZETA~ Tashkent~ 9 Octob er 1918), 62~ TsGAOR UzbSSR~ Fund R-25~ Inventory 1, File 31, Sheet 14; File 120, Slteet 34. 63. THE TIMES, confirming that Bailey went underground, wrote that he oper- ated "in Turkestan for more than a year without lieing discovered," whicfi included his time in Bukhara (Zevelev. op. cit.. p 246)~ 64. Gafurova~ op, cit., p 38. - 65. For more details see M. A~ Khalfin~ "Afghanistan Wins Independence," VOPRO5Y ISTORII~ 1980, No 6. 66. TsGASA~ selection of items~ Invent~ry 2, File 835~ Sheet 188. ; 14 ~ FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - 67. According to other information, three officers~ an interpreter~ and _ escorts (TRUDY MUZEYA ISTORII AN UZBSSR~ Vol II, p 37). - 68. ZHIZN' NATSIONAL'NOSTEY, Moacow~ 1923, No 1~ p 89. 69. TRUDY MUZEYA ISTORII AN UZ~SSR, Vol II, p 38. _ 70. Party Archives of the Central Com~ittee of t~e�Uabelt~Communist Party, Fund of Party History~ 1919~ Sheet 16 (back). 71. TsGASA~ Fund 25859~ Inventory 1, File 44, Sheet 97. ~ 72. Ibid.~ Inventory 6~ File 47~ Sheets 231-232. 73, Lenin~ op. cit.~ Vol 39~ p 304. 74. Nikolapeva, V. P., "Tfie Commission for Turkestan Affairs as a Fully Empowered Organ of the Central Committee of. the Russian Party (Bolshevik), VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, 1958. No. 2. 75. Frunze, op. cit., Vol 1, p 314. 76. TsGASA, Fund 110~ Inventory 4~ File 36, Sheets 271-273. - 77. "M. V. Frunze na Frontakh Grazhanskoy Voyny" [M. V. Frunze at the Fronts of the Civil War]~ collection of documents~ Mosco~r~ 1941~ pp 309-311. _ 78. Macmun, G., "Afghanistan from Darius to Ammanullah," Londono 1923, - p 288. = 79. Lenin~ op. cit., Vol 53, p 190. 80. Polyakov, op. cit., pp 107-111. 81. BaTiakhodzhayev~ A. Kh,, "Proval Angliyskoy P~litiki v Sredney Azii i na Srednem Vostoke v Period Prtznaniya Sovetskogo Gosudarstve De Fakto t De-Yure" [The Failure of English Policy in Central Asia and tfie Middle East during the Period of De Facto and De Jure Recognition of the Soviet State], Tashkent, 1957, p 175. - COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Voprosy istorii", 1980 11,176 CS0:1807 ~ ; i _ 15 - FOR OFFICIA~, USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 FOR QFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ INTERNATIONAL - _ SOVIET POLICY TO JEWS DEFENDED, ZIONISM ATTACKED Kishinev IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK MOLDAVSKOY SSR. SERIYA OBSHCHESTVENNYKH NAUK in Russian No 3, 1980 sigaed to press 11 Nov 80 pp 32-4U [Article by M.A. Gol'denberg: "The Anti-Sovietism of ~ontemporary Zionism"] [Text] A sharp galvanization of massed Zionist propaganda, which is distinguished bq a clearly expressed anCicommunist and anti-Soviet diversionary thrust, can be ob- - served in the camp of our class adversaries. For this reason it is necessary in evaluating the role of Zionism in the current ideological atrug~le and in determin- ing our attitude to-ward it to proceed from a most important proposition formulated by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev in the CPSU Central Com~i.ttee Report to the 25th party con- gress: "There can be no room for neutralism and compromise in the struggle of the two outlooks. What is needed here is high political vigilance, active, prompt and convincing propaganda and the timely repudiation of hostile ideological diversions."1 Let us examine certain facets of ~ust one, but extraordinary important aspect of Zionist ideology and policy--its intrinsic anti-Sovietism. The ungovernable hatred of the apologists of Zionism for the world's first socialist state appeared not today nor yesterday--the Zionists began to engage strenuously in the kindling of anti-Soviet passions im~ediately following the victory of the Great _ October Socialist Revolution. The facts testify that the Zionist leaders of old Bessarabia cooperated closely with the royal administration and local nationalists on a counterrevolutionary, anti-Soviet platform. For example, at a celebration in - honor of M. Slutskiy, chairman of Kishinev's Jewish community- and a ringleader of local Zionist organizations, in 1931 the "hero of the day" was gr.eeted not only by the Zionist-clerical "elite" headed by Chief Rabbi of Bessarabia, L. Tsirel'son, but _ also by representatives of the municipal authorities and also P. Khalip and G. Pynt',2 the regrettably well-known gleaders of the "Sfatul tseriy" Moldavian bourgeois- nationalist organization. And in our day imper~alist propaganda assigns international Zionism an increasingly marked role in line with the exacerbation of the ideological confrontation in the world arena, and its apologiats "specialize," moreover, in "illustrating" the non- existent "Jewish question" in the USSR. This "problem" determines the basic content - of all their exertiona in the field of "Sovietology," corresponding to the principles of the "division of labor" accepted in the imperialiat camp. 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 - FOR ~FFICIAL USE ONLY As Comrade M. Wilner, general sE+cretary of the Iaraeli Communist Party, observea, the same Zionist ruling circles which are pursuing a policy of harsh oppression of the Palestin~ans on the occupied territo~ries "are, without batting an ~yelid, organizing propaganda campaigns in connection G~ith a failure to observe human rights and na- tional discrimination in...the Soviet Union. Anti-Sovietism is a most dreadful poi- son in our country, more dreadful than the poison of anti-Arab chauvinism and tarism."3 The incessant moaning about the "oppression" of Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality, who are allegedly the target of anti-Semitic persecution, resounds from day to day in the camp of the Zionist faultfinders. And inasmuch as the mass information media ~ in the West are more often than not controlled directly or in di~guised form by Z~anist'_ organizations o= sugport the Zionists by virtue of community of reactionary class interests such calumny receives the most extensive dissemination by no means only in the milieu of Philistines af Jewish extraction. In addition, what is re- vealed here is a gamble not only on the excitement of anti-Sovietism--a most import- ~ ant primordial postulate of Zionist doctrine, which is that anti-Semitism is inera- dicable, makes itself felt. In the Zionist interpretation anti-Semitism is a time- less phenomenon and is always the parallel condition of every non-Jew in any sooial ~ situation. Zionist "theoreticians" expunge from anti-Semitism ob~ective causality and psychologize it, shifting it from the sphere of social activity to the sphere of ~ the mind. And insofar as they substitute mental for class-economic factors, anti- Semitism is divorced from the objective course of social development, as a conse- _ quence of which the antiscientific conclusion of the impossiblity of its elimination is born. _ The defenders of Zionism essentially absolve the bourgeois world order of responsi- - bility for the constant reproduction of anti-Semitism since in their interpretation hatred of Jews is the attribute of the "invariable nature" of any person of non- Jewish national origin, whom they portray as the receptacle of ineradicable dark and destructive instincts. But man's true nature is not an invariable and predetermined = - substance; it i~s a specifically social essence. The content of inter-nation relations ensues not from some a pri~ri enmity but from the mode of production which has become established in a given specific society and from its social structure and political institutions. According to Zionist views, however, anti-Semitism and type of society are noncontiguous concepts. This approach leads to the illegal extrapolation to socialist states of conclusions which are true of exploiter relations. An analysis of contemporary Zionist sou~ces malces it poseible to highlight some of the principal invectives of the anti-Soviet attribute: 1. The main artery chosen by Zionist propaganda consists of an attempt to ascribe to the Soviet Union a"state anti-Semitism being implanted in planned fashion" inasmuch as "Jewish national culture" is allegedly being suppressed here. This "suppression" amounts, among other things, to the fact that "a ban has been imposed" on its alleged- ly indispensable form of embodiment--the ancient Jewish language (Hebrew). For the mythical "world Jewish nation," to which, in Zionist concepts, Soviet Jews also belong, Hebrew is the native tongue, without which "Jewish cultural values" cannot exist. - 17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300094434-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I~ow~ver,~~egarslin~Hebrew as the native tongue in respect of Soviet Jews is, at the very least, strange for they have never known it. There is, therefore, no need to ban what practically no one uses (if we do not count synagogue services, at which - the believers, elderly people, as a rule, mechanically say in this langua$e greyers - whose meaning is virtually incomprehensible to them). The dead "holy" language of Hebrew was artifieig111,8 revived by Jewish nationalists at the end of the laat century. They see it--and do not hide this fact--as a means of realizing Zionist goals. "Revival of the ancient Jewish language as a secular language is connected with Zionism," the "Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel" candid- ly writes. And if the connection of Hebrew with Zionism is openly proclaimed by our enemies, then in this rarest of instances we have to agree with them. _ Language is merely the form by means of which a certain content is presented. And in the dialectical interaction of the twin philosophical category of "form and content" - it is precisely content which is the leading aspect. What content would the inter- national Zionist concern like to impose on 5oviet Jews with the aid~of Hebrew? A purely Zionist content, of course. It is an endeavor to suggest to them a sense of belonging t~~ a"world Jewish nation," iti which, incidentally, were the Zionists to succeed in accomplishing the plans for its "Hebrewization," there would appear at least one of filie.:genuine characteristics of a nation which it lacks entirely. It is an attempt to incline them in the direction of emigration and prepare them "in the best way" for "absorption in the land of their forefathers:" It is a vain attem~t to impose Zionist "spiritual values" on them. It is a brake block capable, in the calculations of Zionist circles, of halting the objective process of assimilation. - All these plans, however, are built on sand. They cannot be crowned with success not only in respect of Soviet Jews but also the Jews of the Western capitalist atates. 2. In the USSR, the Zionist disinformers repeat again and again, the Jewish collo- - quial language (Yiddish) is also being eradicated by administrative methods. This language is indeed losing its positions in our country, but for entirely different reasons. In the process of the voluntary, natural process of the Soviet Jews' ra- pprocheutent with the Russian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Moldavian and other peoples of the USSR they long since well assimilated the languages of thse peoples, primarily Russian. Under these conditions increasingly leas and increasin~.}t.~~ use is made of Yiddish. After all, analogous phenomena can be observed all over the world, particularly in the industrially developed states, and Zionist authors simply cannot fail to notice them. One of the works says: The sphere of use of the Yiddish language is similar in our day to that of shagreen leather. Evidence of this is the continuous decline in the Yiddish press, which was once very powerful, but which today runs to ~nly a few names. This decline is 3ust as severe in the United States as in Israel and in France as in Britain."5 But a little laCer on (p 213) in this "work" philippics resound against the USSR, which "prevents" its citizens of Jewish natienality having either newspapers or books in Yiddish. It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand why, for example, the fact that in the United 9tates, where the Jewish population is three times that of Soviet Jews and where only one newspaper in Yiddish, and artifically supported at that (of the - 18 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300094434-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 10 in existence in the first postwar years),6 has survived appears to the Zionists as a"misfortune," albeit inevitable, but that in the USSR, where, as is known, the - journal SOVETISH GEYI~AND (Moscow) and the newspaper BIROBIDZHANER SHTERN (Yevrey- skaya Autonomous Oblast) are published in the Jewish language, the "malicious sup- preasion" of Jewish culture iar-.~ddfsh~ia under way. _ But even if, contrary to actual requirements, the publication of various literature in the Jewish language were to increase many times over in the Soviet Union, this would not change the anti-Soviet course of the foreign Zionist organizations in the _ least. For the content of this literature would be democratic, progressive and ~ socialist. And this corresponds least of all to what the Zionists wish to achieve. If all the Jewish schools, for which there has been absolutely no need, were to be - restored in our coimtry today, the anti-Soviet campaigns organized by the Zionist _ centers would not cease but would, perhaps, intensify even. For the same reason the content of the tuition and education would by~ no means be that "needed" by the Zionists zealots. 3. Directly related to the fabrications concerning the "persecution of the Jews and their national culture," which are aimed at inciting anti-Sovietism, are inventions _ concerning the "eradication of the Judaic religion," which is regarded by Zionists and Judaic clericalists as the fo~mdatlion of this "culture." Special attention should be paid here to the malicious mixing and confusion of concepts with the aid of which - any criticism of Judaism can be portrayed as an anti-Jewish attack. " It is necessary in this connection to reveal one feature which is not reflected in our special literature. In a number of West European languages (English, French, Span- ish and so forth) the term "Judaism" has a dual meaning, signifying, depending on the context, bc~th the corresponding faith and "Jewry." And inasmuch as it is in precisely these languages, and not Hebrew or Yiddish, that the lion's share of Zionist literature is published, this semantic singularity to some extent contains the premise for identifyiag denominational and ethnic indications so needed by our ideological enemies. , In Russian Judaism means, as is known, merely a certain religion, and nothing more. If, however, it is pretended that the Russian seman*ic scope of this concept coin- cides with, for example, the French, then inasmuch as Soviet authors regard Judaism on a par with any other faith as a brake on the path of social progress, the Zion- ist interpreter "translates" this proposition such as for it to appear that "Jewry - is a barrier on the path of man's progreas." Anti-Semitism is easily "exposed" with the help of such terminological machination. The expanded interpretation of the "Judaism" concept, which allegedly also incor- _ gorates Jewish culture, language and history and the Jews themselves in addition to religion, has long been established in Zionist and clerical literature. Given this antiscientific approach to the phenomenon in question, any publication on Judaism which appears in the Soviet Union "proves to be" aimed against Jews per se. The fundamentally important fact that Marxist experts distinguish precisely between the concepts "Jew," "Judaism" and "Zionism" ar~dim,dern,ocirctm~stances permit their identi- fication is, of course, glossed over. 19 FUR UFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 C� ~'GR OFt~ICIt~,L tJSE ~PCi.~~ This ancient Zionist aim is undergoing certain modifications among various foreign authors, buC its essence remains the same. Thua the bourgeois expert on the history of anti-SPmitism, L. Polyakov, whose pro-Zionist and anti-Soviet orientation is not in doubt, writes: "The more anti-Jewish propaganda is devel~ped in the East for foreign and domestic political considerations, the more necessary semantic precau-- tions become, and for this reason the Bible and the state of Israel serve as a tar- get, as is the practice in the Soviet Union...."~ However absurd it ~:ay be to attempt to pass off conde~ation of the ruling circles of the state of Israel as an anti-Jewish act, the endeavor to portray scientific criticism of the Bible as a euphemism cunnir.gly employed to conceal "anti-Semitic - agitation" appears even more inane. Following this flawed logic, we would have to put Spinoza, Heine and Einstein, who, despite their Jewieh origins, did not conceal their negative attit~sde toward Judaism and its "holy" books, among the anti-Semites. Complaints that Judaism "is being suppressed in planned fashion" in the USSR wi11 be seen in the true light if it is considered that this faith is experiencing Frcfo=.Y:~' crisis in the West also. The Zionist authors of the book mentioned earlier, "Judaisia," dolefully state that the said religion "is retreating step by step under the blows nf. - industrial civilization, preserving on~y a few islets where loyalty to God remains the primary truth" (p 196). The "de-Judaization" of the indigenous Israelis, who are not confining themse3:ves to a position of indifference with respect to the "Faith of the fathers " but often openly expressing "seditious" antireligious opinions,8 has become a matter of deep anxiety for the Zionist leaders and the Rabbinate in Israel itself . A report which appeared in the Western press is highly significant: American rabbi.s are extremely depressed by the fact that the ma~ority of former Soviet Jews who emigrated to the United States avoid attending the synagogue.9 It appears that while these "formers" lived in the USSR, the road to the synagogue was "forcibly" barred to them, but in the United States they cannot be lured there anyhow~. If even such people--for it is mainly the Jews whose minds have been clouded by every con- ceivab le survival who take the path of emigration--are reluctant to attend the synago gue, despite all the benefits which bourgeois society promises them for piety, albeit affected, this confirms from an tmexpected quarter the effectiveness of our atheistic propaganda. And, of course, this is convincing proof that the Zionist concept of the "suppression and devastation of Judaism" in the USSR is no more than a malicious myth. If, for example, in the period 1978-1980 the Kishinev synagogue was attended on the ' most important Judaic holidays byr 700-800 peopl~e, which is approximately 3 percent _ _ of the city`s adult Jewish population, the perfectly natural questions is: why should it be considered that the "remaining" 97 percent do not visit the synagogue - for the reason that the way to it is allegedly barred to them by some administrative obstacles? On what groimds is it to be expected that the longing for the synagogue is stronger in Soviet Jews, who have assimilated, as a rule, the scientific-material- ist world outlook which prevails in country and who, as a whole, have no thought of leaving their true motherland, than in those whom the Zionist recruiters have suc- ceeded in catching in their nets? 20 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The testimony of [Ya. TsurJ, former Israeli ambassador to Paris, serves as yet fur- ther proof of Zionist hypocrisy: "Many leaders of France's Jewish community are married to non-Jews, irrespective of whet~er the latter have been converted to Juda- iem or not."10 Consequently, the Zionist and clerical leaders are "exposing" in vur country the same objective assimilative regularities which they not only obaerve all around them .;:~ery day in the West but in whose power they themselves are. ~ The enormous significance which Zionist prrpaganda attaches to Judaism as the basis of the Jewish culture which is allegedly being destroyed in the USSR de~ands a clear idea of what~the Zionists understand by it. The "cultural values" they need are based on glorification of the "god of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob," "His chosen people" ~ and the "Holy Land given to this people from above." Whereas for this, as also for - any other bourgeois-clerical culture, there is no place on Soviet soil, all the neces- sary conditions have been created in our country for the development of progressive, - democratic national cultures, the Jewish culture not excluded. 4. The criticism of Zionism on the part of Soviet authors is an indicator of flour- ~ ishing anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, the Zionist malevolents would have us be- - lieve. Someone has only to comment critically on Zionism for him to i~ediately be labeled, an anti-Semite. If this person is a non-Jew, of course. If he is a Jew, he is just as unceremoniously declared a traitor and renegade. According to the Israeli "dove" M. Peled, in whose opinions it is sometimes possible to detect ele- _ ments of coamwnsense, "persons of non-Judaic faith could be characterized as anti- 5emites merely for attempting to suggest that Israel could have done more to show _ how far it is willing to go along the path leading to pe,ace."11 - Such attacks are frequently also directed agains t bourgeois figures, far from Marx- , ism, who have dared even in highly cautious form to entertain doubts about some aspects of the Zionist circles' practical activity. But insofar as the Soviet Union's position has nothing in common with the timid attempts to chide international Zion- ism and Israel's ruling circles for "partial erro rs" and "certain extremes" but consists of the resolute re~ection of the totality of Zionist ideology and policy, to t??at extent false accusations of anti-Semitism resound with particular importun- ity agains t the Soviet Union. They are j ust as absurd as the attempts to declare the struggle against Ukr.ainian nationalism and pan-Turkism an insult to the Ukrain- ians, Uzbeks, Tatars and so forth or the e:.�posure of the Moldavian bourgeois nation- alists of "Sfatul tser.'~y" a violation of the Moldavians' national dignity. Unscrupulousness and, in particular, the already mentioned terminological lack of principle enable the Zionist falsifiers to equate the far from identical concepts of "anti-Zionism" and "anti-Semitism" and to declare them interchangeable or, at least, to draw them right up next to one another. It is not necessary to prove that the _ criticism of Zionism, like any bourgeois nationalism, i.s conducted here from strict- ly class positions. And it is not directed agains t Soviet Jews and not against the , Jewish working people of the capitalist world, including Israel, but corresponds to the true, correctly understood interests of workers of Jewish extraction, wherever _ they may reside. � V.I. Lenin,. an ardent fighter against any variety of national oppression, ad3ured that Soviet people be equally intolerant of both Zionism and anti-Semitism. Having 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY dPfined Zionism as an ideology "utter~ly false and reactionary in essence," the founder of the Communist Party and the Soviet state together with this categorized - ant i-Semitism as "the vile fanning of racial detachment and national enmity on the _ part of the exploiter classes. "I2 It is fitting to mentian that at times th~ Zionists th~mselves have actually admitte~ - that the straggle primordially waged against Zionism by the followers of Marx and Lenin is determined by class factors. A document drawn up at a secret Zionist gathering in Moscow immediately after the Great October Socialist Revolution which said "Socialism is in the way of Zionism" became widely known here. Consequently, in documents not intended for "mass consumption" the ideologists of Zionism reveal their understanding of the fact that socialism and Zionism are anti- podes. And this proves, their will notwithstanding, that an irreconcilable strug- gle between them is an inevitable consequence of their class incompatibility and their political opposition and not the result of national enmity. _ We should not exaggerate the significance of the apologists of Zionism doing more than taking liberties with the conceptual apparatus on which they rely. This would - le ad to the conversion of fundamental social-class problems into purely semantic - ones, which would correspond to the sub~ectivist philosophy of semantism and engen- _ der fallacies explaining class conflicts by an imperfection of speech and the in- co rrect use of individual words. But we cannot fai7_ to see that the dishonest jug- gling with certain terms and the establishment of artificial intercrossing connec- tions between them help the Zionists confuse credulous people and influence them - in favor of the wave of anti-Sovietism. And for this reason it is essential to expose the semantic anarchy which has become firmly established in the Zionist lexicon~ The strictly scientific delineation of th~ concepts which the Zionists arb itrarily identify is an important task. Cer tain scholars and commentators, including those of Jewish extraction, have long been opposing Zionist terminological arbirrariness in the capitalist countries also. "Can you really not defend your cause," the public figure M. Liebmann tasks, addres- _ sing Zionists via the French newspaper LE MONDE, "without resorting to such dema- go gic reasoning as the crude and illegal confusion of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism? Wha t are your beliefs worth if you endeavor by means of such a lie to blackmail peo- - ple and play on their fee lings in order to prevent any discussion and any comparison - of different viewpoints?"13 The "arguments" examined auove, which are intended to "prove" that Soviet Jews are - sub ~ect to discrimination, pursue two main goals: disparaging Lenin's nationality - po licg~ in the eyes of the world public and pushing as many people as possible onto the path of emigration, which is declared by the Zionists the sole means of "rescuing" Jewish citizens of the USSR from imaginary persecution. There is no need to adduce here data on the .1.rreparably hobbled fate of those who have fallen victim to Zion- is t propaganda, irrespective of whether they have ended up in Israel or in the We stern capitalist cotmtr ies. We would draw attention merely to th~ indecent spe- culation of the Zionist and pro-Zionist press around the parameters of emigration sen timent. What is the value, for example, of a report in a reactionary French ~ournal that 200,000 persona ii~ the USSR...have been rtfused visas for Israel!14 22 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300094434-2 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ . Meanwhile, as B.T. Shumilin, deputy USSR minister of internal affairs, reported, as ~ of September 1978 some 2,249 pe~sons had provisionally been refused such visas, _ on groux3s provided for by the law, which constitutes only 1.6 percent of the total number of persons of Jewish nationality ~ho haWe left the USSR.15 We have her~ a concrete "falsification index": the true number of "refuseniks" is almost 100 ti~~ less than the fabricated figure. - Lamentations over the "hard lot" which has allegedly become the fate of Soviet Jews - are an. important component of the noisy anti-Soviet campaign unleashed by hostile ~ _ propaganda under the cover of a fraudulent concern for human rig~ts. But the Zion- _ ist disinformers cannot conceal the fact that all USSR citizens, including those of Jewish extraction, enjoy in full the totality of rights guaranteed by the USSR Con- - stitution. As Comrade L.I. Brezhnev pointed o~t, it "records more extensively, clearly and f ully than anywhere else at any time the citizens' socioeconomic and political rights and specific guarantees of the exercise of these rights."16 Ou~~ press has repeatedly adduced the true facts tes tifying that Soviet Jews are not restricted in anything in any sphere, be it political or economic life, labor rela- tions, science or any other sp~tere, and that they are not deprived in the least of - either government awards or honorific titles. We would refer here to certain most recent data published in the weekly LE NOUVELLE DE MOSCOU (8 April 1979), which - appears in French. In 1977 Jews constituted less than 1 percent of the USSR's population. But they represented 5.7 percent of scientific assistants, 5.2 percent of cultural workers, 6.5 pe rcent of writers and journalists and 6.7 percent of law- yers. Jews constitute 10.8 percent and 12.5 percen t respectively of Lenin and State prize winners in the sphere of science and technology and 9.7 percent and 11.8 percent in the sphere of literature and art. All this is graphic confirmation of the irrefutable truth that Jews in the USSR are an organic part of the new histori- cal community of people--the Soviet people--and the internationalism embodied in the profound convictions and standards of behavior of Soviet people rules out any var- iety of national discrimination. - Further exposure of Zionist anti-Sovietism will remain in the foreseaable future one of our urgent tasks. It has to be admitted, we believe, that although our authors have devoted much effort to revealing the anti-Soviet essence af international Zion- ism, not enough has yet been done in this sphere. In particular, there has long been a need for a special monographic study which would thoroughly analyze the latest factual material, expose the flawed methodological basis of Zionist subversive anti- _ Soviet acts, classify them appropriately and study the motivational singularities and - mechanisms of their action. The inclusion of Zionis t anticommunism and anti-Soviet- - ism i.n the broad context of global tasks set the "psychological warfare" service by _ monopoly capital and revelation of the general and particular in the activity of the international Zionist centers and their interaction with other detachments of bour- geois reaction, including those whose anti-Semitism is no secret, seem obligatory - here. At the same time it is necessary to investigate in detail the as yet insuf- ficiently developed, but fundamentally important problem of allies (both clearly self-determined and potential) in the struggle against Zionism, remembering ~hat the criteria are to be found in the class and not the ethnic plane for there are both supporters (and direct membership of a Zionist party is by no means obligatory for a _ supporter) thereof and opponents both among Jews and among non-Jews. 23 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ The further elaboration of theae questiona will aerve to accomplish a very urgent task of Soviet aocial ecientists who are purposefully counteracting the ideologi- cal intrigues of imperialist circles. _ FOOTNOTES 1. "Material of the 25th CPSU Congress," Moscow, 1976, p 74. r 2. See Moldavian SSR Central State Archives, coll. 679~ invent. 1, d. 5664, sheet 52. _ 3. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA No 4, 1979, pp 3-4. 4. "Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel," New York,. 1971, p 47. 5. R. Aron, V. Malka, A. Neher, "Le judaisme," Paris, 1977, p 206. - 6. VIATA NOASTRA, Tel Aviv, 11 January 19 7 7. 7. ETUDES, June 1979, Paris, p 764. S. N.W. Cohen, "American Jews and the Zionist Idea," New York, 1975, p 149. 9. ISRAEL AND PALESTINE No 76, Paris, 1976, p 4. 10. Quoted from "Le ~udaisme," p 206. 11. PROBLEMES POLITIQUES ET SOCIAUX No 271, Paris, 1975, p 29. ` - 12. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Works], vol 8, p 72; vol 7, p 245. 13. LE MONDE 28 March 1970. ' 14. INFORMATIONS CATHOLIQUES INTERNATIONALES No 529, Paris, 1978, p 14. 15. See "Belaya kniga" [White BookJ, Moscow, 1979, p 143. 16. L.I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [Lenin's Way], vol VI, Moscow, 1978, p 531. COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo '`Shtiintsa", 1980 8850 CSO: 1807 END 24 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090034-2