JPRS ID: 9344 JAPAN REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100024-1
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• Document Page Count: 52
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L19661
- 14 April 1981
- (rl ea r E ast I~l o rth Af '
r~ca Re ort _
p
CFOUO 13/81)
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FOK dFF[CIAL USF_ ~h~.Y
, JPRS L/9661
14 April. 1981
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT ~ ~
(k'OUO ~3/81)
CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Analysis c~f Hassan II's 'SPIEGEL' Interview
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JETJNE AFRIQLTE, 18 Feb 81) 1
~ Status of Moroccan-Algerian Talks on Western Sahara
(Mohamed Selhami; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 18 Feb 81) 3
Briefs -
Algeria-Morocco Agreement 5
=v IRAN
Internal Strife, War With Iraq Reviewed
(AL-WtiTAN AL-'ARABI, 13-19 Feb 81) 6
LEBANON
Violence, Assassinations in Politics Discussed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 20-26 Feb 81) 11
Controversy Over Extension of Sarkis's ~erm Discussed
� (AL-IdATAN AL- ARABI 27 Feb-5 Mar 81) 18
' ,
LIBYA
Italy Seen as Fea.rful of Qadhdhafi's 'Increasing Influence'
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 27 Feb-5 Mar 81) 25
- A1-Qadhdhafi's Economic, Political Interests in Italy
(Cesare Puruzzi; IL MONDO, 30 Jan 81) 27
Briefs
Weapons From Britain 3.4
SUnAN
Abel Alier Addresses Southern Issues
(Abel Alier Interview; STJDANOW, Mar 81) 35
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
.........e . .
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS~
.~d
ANALYSIS OF HASSAN II'S 'SPTEGEL' INTER~IIEW
_ Paris JEUNE AFRTQUE i.n French 18 Feb 81 pp 20-21
IArtfcle by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "Sahara: Is the War Over?"]
[Text] At the beginning of last January King Hassan II gave a surprising interview
to tfie German magazine DER SPIEGEL. In it he asserted with an air of supreme
authority that the war is over in the Sahara! His remakrs seemed so astonishing
' to us that we needed the confirmation provided by their publication in the
Moroccan press in order to start pondering their real significance.
Was he making an effort to mount a psychological operation? Or was i~e expressing
a premature hope? It looks like the explanation is to be found out in the field.
At first the Moroccans attempted to ma.intain the security of the uncontested
~ southern part of the country (Tantan, Tata, Akka and Assa) and the so-called
"useful" part of Western Sahara where the population is concentrated (El Aiun,
Smara, and Bujdur) and where there are important economic interests, such as
at Bou Craa.
- In order to achieve this objective, they concentrated on "cleaning up" the Warkziz
range which runs south to Wadi Draa and on creating an impressive sand barrier
surrounding the "useful" Sahara.
~ According to what headquarters promised, this barrier was supposed to be completed
at the end of 1980. Iiowever, the POLISARIO, who understood what the Moroccans
were driving at, started concentra~ing all its effort on stopping this encircle-
ment and fought fiercely at Abatih, Ras-El-Khanfra, E1-Kreibichet, Ras-El-Hmiret,
etc. ,
The POLISARIO's sutbborn resistance was not ineffective: in mid-February 30 km
we.re sti.ll not sealed off and there was continued fighting. With that section
- completed, thQ Moroccans would be in a position to say that the war had virtually
ended, since the area considered to be "useless" is less hilly terrain where the
Royal Army thinks it can more easily overcome its enemies.
Anyway it is in precisely this area where the POLISARIO regularly takes its guests
araund, following a route that has became standard: from Tindouf (in Algeria) to
Mahbes to Jdiria to Haouza; and it is there that on 28 February the POLISARIO
. wi11 be celebrating the sixth anniversary of the SDAR (Saharan Arab Democratic
_ Republic) being proclaimed.
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To say~ that the war is over is undoubtedly premature, but the PULISARIO itself,
realizing the import of this maneuver, has started to withdraw a sizable portion
~ of its forces from Mauritan~.~~ This is sa it will not find itself pinned in
Tiiidouf in a situation which w~~ild cause problems with Algeria.
At the moment the king's interview represents an event which deserves attention,
and contacts between Algerians and Moroccans represent the first steps of a
tortuous progress toFrard normalizing relations between those two neighboring
- countries.
COPYRIGIiT: :leune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
9631
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INTER-ARAH AFFAIRS
STt~TUS'QF MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN TALKS ON WESTERN SAHARA ~
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Feb 81 pp 23-24
[Excerpted article by Mohamed Selhami: "Negotiation, But With Whom?"]
[Excerp ts] So wha.t has happened to suddenly make the word "peace" the current
state of M~oroccan-Aloerian relations?
Hpwever, the two countries have never stopped collahorating, particulary in the
security area. The intelligence services of Rabat and Algiers have traded "what
they have by wry of pieces of information" even in the military area. In addition,
the horder, which had been 3eclared closed, was never really tightened up. The
comings and goings of businessmen never stopped, and neither did those of people
visiting who had family on both sides.
Ne.ither Algeria nor Morocco lilces to admit these tacit relations. Similarly they
have kept quiet about the respective punishments inflicted in 1980 on several
soldiers from both sides who were caught playing cards together near the Figuig
barracks.
One month after the E1 Asnam disaster the border between the two countries became
even more porous. Airports started receiving visitors on one side and the other.
On the diplomatic level, an Algerian charge d'affaires was named for Rabat, and
similarly a Moroccan consul general was assigned to Algiers (JEUNE AFRIQUE Number
_ 1044). In parallel fashion Algiers and Rabat are outdoing each other in friendly
declarations. In boLi~ capitals people are starting to think that 1981 might
bring peace.
And Algeria has given up its place as the Front's top weapons supplier to Libya,
not without considering the consequences, particularly in the wake of the Chad
events.
In Rabat as well there seems to be a gradual change in the direction of coming to
an understanding. Thus a referendum in the Sahara is no longer an impossible
event. By the same token a meeting between the POLISARIO and Moroccan policital
parties can be envisaged. Ther~ are as well democratic developments in Morocco. �
Hassan II does not ha.ve his "absolute monarch" complex any more. This is one more
- point in his in the steps he is taking vis-a-vis Algiers.
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_ Th.ere is a new situation 'here whose further develornent is feared by the
Saharans . TEiey are trying, no t witiwut dif ficulty, to adap t themselves ,
_ particularly by seeking the good offices of Paris. But will France still be
able to play that role, now that Algeria.ns and M~oroccans seem to be on the
~ road which will lead them to harmony?
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981 ~
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
ALGERIA-MOROCCO AGRFEMENT--Algeria is said to be ready to give up its support for
the Polisario and, in return, Morocco would guarantee Algeria access to the Atlantic
Ocean. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 20 Mar 81 p 80]
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I RADi
INT~RNAL STRIFE, WAR WiTH IRAQ REVIEWED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 13-19 Feb 81 pp 38-39
[Article: "Th e War on the Domestic Iranian Front after the Drama of the
Hostages; The Wing of Clerica.l Cloaks Is Preparing Itself for the
Destruction of the Laymen's Wing"]
[TextJ What will happen after the hostages? How far has the struggle
between the laymen and the men with the clerical cloaks gone? What is
the true situation on the battle fronts? AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI publishes
today a literal translation of a dispatch on this subject it received
from a Europe an correspondent who is visiting Iran at the present time.
The drama oE the hostages has not yet come to an end. It has become an
inseparable part of the violent struggle for power between the wing of
_ the men with the clerical cloaks and the wing of laymen.
The laymen's wing, whi.ch is led by President Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr,
thought that the opportunity was suitable for discrediting the wing of
the men with the clerical cloaks which had undertaken the process of
~ reaching a settlement with the United States regarding the hostages.
In doi.ng so Bani-Sadr is relying on the "meager gains" Iran reaped from
the agreement. He thinks that insisting on this idea would be extremely
~ embarrassin~ to the men with the clerical cloaks and would cover up the
devastating Cailure that befell the Iranian counterattack early last
January. Bani-S~~cir holds himself personally responsible for ordering
that attack.
While Bani-Sa dr is calling for an official investigation into the cir-
cumstances ~nd the condi.ti.ons surrounding the "ludicrous agreement,"
the wing oE t}ie men in clerical cloaks thinks that no other agreement
could have t~een better. Prime Minister Mohammed 'Ali Raja'i, who is con-
sidered one ~f the men of the clerical cloaksf says that nothing more
' could have been taken away From the "Great Satan." Here, the "Great
Satan" in Ir.an's political jargon is the United States.
The Cact oE the matter is that the difEicult, decisive days for the wing
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_ of t}ie men in the clerical cloaks, represented by the Islamic Republican
parCy, had begun the moment the hostages were released.
The internal struggle will focus or, the question cf the war and the
deteriorating economy. There are many Iranians, and among them a~e sup-
porters oL- the party, who consider the settlement that was achieved with
Washington to be unfair. They think it constitutes a setback for the
party after it had turned the question of the hostages into a slogan for
its struggle.
The Islamic Republi.can party is not exactly a political organization
- as much as it is a broad platform on which the religious establishment
sits. It utilizES the mosques of Husayn as its headquarters. Its autho-
rity is also curiously interwoven with that of the government so that
no one knows where the party's authority ends and where the state's
authori.ty begins.
~ [dhat adds to the mystery of the struggle is the fact that there are no
democratic traditions and no strong political and consti.tutional orga-
ni~ations. It ma} be that one of the most important r.easons for
Bani.-Sadr's f.ailure to tighten his control over government is the
inabi.lity of his supporters to turn his overwhelming victory in the
pr.esidential elections to a unified political party organization.
Day after day, the struRgle becomes more tense and more sharp. Ayatollah
Mohammed Aeheshti i.s the leader of the wing of the men in the clerical
cloaks. He is a gloomy and mysterious religi.ous fi~ure whose deep,
hoarse voice suggests melancholy. Beheshti is a tricky politician who is
- skillful in contriving political intrigues against his opponents.
~ Bani-Sadr is experiencing great hardships from him just as [other] lay-
men had expcrienced them previou5ly, from Bakhtiar to Mehdi Bazargan,
, and including Karim Sanjabi.
Beheshti is the leader of the Republican party, and he presides over
the revolutionary courts. During the administration of tne Siiah he was
a civil servant in the Ministry of Education. Then he wa~ sent to the
Iranian Embassy in Bonn to look after the religious affairs of the
Iranian students abroad. He returned suddenly to become Khomeyni's autho-
rizea representative in Tehran..tte was the one who supervised Khomeyni's
ret~i .rn to T ran abotit 2 years ago.
roremost among i3eh~shti's aides and supporters come Hashemi Rafsanjani,
the speaker oC the parliament; Musavi Kho'ini, Khomeyni's representative
in klic Supreme Defense Council; Mohammed 'Ali Raja'i, the prime
rr~ini.ster.; and Behzad N~ibavi, the minister of state who undertook to
negoti.ate witli the Americans [matters] relating to all the hostages. ~
Tl~e party cic>es not have a clear policy on the internal front or on the
foreign front. There are no ideas about development, about dealing with
the economic crisis, about directing the oil policy or about dealing
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wi.th the outside world. Full coordination is also lacking among the
clerical members of the party. However, what does bring those leaders
together is the fear that the army may be reorganized and the authorit~ _
' of the laymen expanded. They are using the almost absolute control they
have in their areas on all the Iranians to exert pressure on their poli-
ti.cat opponents or to overthrow them. They may even lead their opponents
to the execution fields.
Bani-Sadr benefits from the errors of the men in the clerical cloaks
and from the Lact that they lack an integrated view of the situation
[now] or in the future. Rani-Sadr has many suprorters, but they in turn
are not organized, and they fear the tyranny and the demagoguery of -
- Beheshti's supporters.
Ban i-Sadr is nevertheless daring in ttis attacks on his political oppo-
nents, but he attaclcs them without naming them. To do so, he uses his
new spaper, iNQILAB-E ISLAM [The Islamic Revolutionj for this purpose.
The re i.s also the newspaper, AL-MAYZAN, which is close to Mehdi
I3azar~;an, the former prime minister.
Bani-Sadr is tr.y~ng to protray himself as the hero of the Islamic Revolu-
tion, rising to sacrifice his life on the battlefield or in an assassina- -
tio n attempt, to which, he insists, he is always subject. The most -
rece nt statement i.n this regard was that which he made about a plan to
fire missiles at his car in Khuzistan while he was reviewing the armed
forces. In an attempt to motivate and stimulate the army in order to
dri_ve i.t into the heat of the internal struggle, Bani-Sadr says that it
was military intelligence that revealed the "conspiracy" to assassinate
him. However, when hz is asked about the details, he resorts to silence -
under the pretext that the circumstances of the war require secrecy now.
The struggle i.s approachi.ng its inevitable explosive climax, and the
indication~ Eor thi.s are numerous. Other than the media campaigns, there
are armed clashes that develop unexpectedly between the supporters of
Ban i-Sadr and those of the Islamic Republican party. Any visiting obser-
ver who sees the situation from nearby would expect negative results for
the struggle whi_ch may threaten disaster for Iran's political future and
Cor the un i ty of its peoples. -
The C;~rulit ions Surroundin~ the Negotiations with Washingt_on
Much infoi-rnation h.is become available here about the conditions sur-
- rounding t},e compli.cated and lengthy negotiations between Iran and the
United Srates re~arding the hostages. When the war between Iraq and Iran
I~roke out l:ist September, Iran unexpectedly sought a quick solution to
the questi.on of the hostages. It may be that the motive for that was to
get weapons, ammunition and spare parts.
In this context it was found out that Sadiq Tabataba'i, one of
Khom eyni's close relatives, had met secretly in Bonn with Warren
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- Christopher, the ~ssistant U.S. secretary of state who later became
closely associated with the entire negotiations process. Tabataba'i is
married to a German woman, and he used to be press attache at Iran's
- embassy in Bonn during the administration of the Shah. '~abataba'i speaks
German fluently. -
_ Then there were other rapid meetings through Algeria whose mediation
_ the United States had asked for i.nstead oP Bonn's. Those wlio partici-
pated i.n the mysteri.ous, secret negotiations in Europe and in New York
were Cyrus Vance, the former secretary of state; Hamilton Jordan, White
House counsel to former president Carter; and Harold Saunders, assistant
secretary of state. Tt~e latter two made several secret visits to several
Eur.opean c~pitals for that purpose.
Bani-Sadr became extremely an~ry when Khomeyni prevented him from going
to New York to hold a secret meeting with Vance. At tha!_ time Bani-Sadr
offered his resignatic~n from h~s position as minister o;: foreign affairs
in protest.
As time went by, t�Tashington wzs able to per.suade the Iranians,
especially through Algeria, to give up most of their co~~~ditions. These
included the formal U.S. apology and the monetary ransom that was
of.fered in Exchange Eor the hostages. Washington also changed the
- Irani.ans' minds about returning the Shah's wealth, and they were satis-
fied with a symbolic U.S. promise in that regard.
Informed Ir.lnian sources state that Algeria played a ma jor role in the
process of inducing Raja'i.'s "compliance" and preparing him as well as
the wi.ng of inen in clerical cloaks to enter into a process of serious
negotiations with Washington. Raja'i yielded to a"brainwashing" process
in Algeri.a wlien he stopped there on his return from New York to Tehran.
in the military area the Iranian side is satisfied with the statements
it makes m~~;nif.ying the losses oE the Iraqis. However, Iranian
_ officials, ~specially Rani.-Sadr's wing, have resorted to absolute
silence since the Cailure oE the counrerattack.
'i'here are ciistorted Iranian admissions that the Iraqi.s have regained the
land they li;id lost i.n the beginning of the attack in addition to the new
land they had captured. 13ut the leadership of the Iranian military staff -
}ias formall~ acknoc,rledged that it had opposed the counterattack which
Bani-Sadr had ordered because the armed forces had not been prepared for
it. The lranian mi.li.tar.y command i.s complaining about the interference
- of civi.lian elements in directing its military operations. It is the men -
in the clerical cloaks and the leaders of the Revolutionary Guard who
are intended here.
'I'he situation on the battle fronts may be summarized as follows: -
The Iraqi si.e~e of Abadan continues and so does the continuous artillery
sllelling of the town.
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The concentrated arti.llery shelling on Ahvaz, the capital of lChuzestan
(Ar.l6istan.: province [continues~.
The situation is critical for the Iranians in the Susangerd section,
wtiich was the scene of the Iranian counterattack that failed.
There is concentrated shelling of the oil installations and oil pipes in
the Dezful section.
The Iraqis are maintaining full control of the situation in the section
of Qasr-e Shirin, [located] on the principal road between Baghdad and
Tehran.
The Kurds, supported by the Iraqis, are launching concentrated attacks
on the northern front. The Iraqis there have taken over strategic moun-
tain passes that would make their thrust into the interior [of Iran]
easier if they wanted that.
T.n general, the war. on the long battle lines is assuming the character
of an zr.tillery duel. We are waiting for the weather to improve in the
spr.ing; then, the si.tuation wi.ll depend on the circumstances.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-[~TATAN AL-ARABI
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LEBANON
.
VIOLENCE, AS~ASSINATIONS IN POLITICS DISCUSSED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 20-26 Feb 81 pp 16-18
[Article: "The Diplomacy of Liquidations in the Lebanese Jungle"]
['I'ext] The kidnapping of al-Muhaysan Brings Syrian-
~ Jordanian relations back to the boiling point.
- There is pol.itical and popular turmoil in Beirut just as there is in
Amman. Disregard for the Lebanese state has reached such limits that it
has become inconceivable to keep quiet about [that situation]. The break-
down of diplomatic immunity through the use of weapons is an open attempt
to force Arab and foreign diplomatic missions to leave the country. Is the
- outbreak of a new kind of war with Jordan--a war of diplomatic liquida-
tions--what some people have in mind, or is the kidnapping of the
Jor.danian charge d'affaires in Beirut the inauguration of a new stage in
the Lebanese war in which Lebanon will become the testing field?
The kidnapping oC Jordanian charge d'affaires, Mr Hisham al-Muhaysan -
crowns a gr.oup of successi.ve events witnessed by the Lebanese capital
in recent months. These events had targeted Arab and foreign diplomats.
In September and October of 1980 the U.S. embassy came under rocket
attack, and the embassies of Iraq, Iran and the Kin~dom of Saudi Arabia
came under similar attaclcs. In the nPxt 2 months armed elements attacked
a Delgian Jiplomat in ttie western section of Beirut, and the Iraqi Cul-
tural Centcr caas subjected to a new attack. Late in December a French
- diplomatic vel~icle was blown up with dynamite, and several missiles were
fired on the garden of the French embassy. Demonstrators also attacked the
offices oF the lJnited Nations.
- Aut the new incident is different from the previous ones because it con-
stituted an armed, dir.ect Eorci.ble break into the sanctity of an Arab
diplomat's I~ome after having its entrances, its exits and all the hallways
leading to i~ surrounded in an organized and well-considered operation in
_ which scores o� armed men participated. In this sense the incident is
considered more than a mere attack against a building, a car or

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facilities. It was an obvious military dete:~rent [intended] for a rep-
resentative of an Arab state on Lebanese territory.
Diplomatic Discharge
From this perspective we can understand the wave of fear that prevailed in
Arab and foreign diplomatic circles in the heart of Beirut. Diplomats
rushed to seek help from armed a~;encies to guard their homes, their embas-
sies and their families while awaiting the "security ring" which the
Lebanese government had promised after the incident. Some diplomats went
to the PLO, and others went to the Syrian deterrent forces themselves.
It's been said that Mr Yasir 'Arafat responded to more than appeals in
other than Arab embassies and that the Palestinian organizations volun-
teered to protect a number of embassies in accordance with standards that
are well-known in Lebanon. These have to do with the affiliation of this
or the other groiap with this or the other state.
Although the Lebanese government had in the past permitted a number of
foreifin emb:issies to procure guards from abroad because the ar.ea where
the embassies are located does not fall under its dir.ect protecti.on,
- Lebanese oEfi.cials are apprehensive that in a justifiable preventive
measure, more than one Arab and foreign agency may reduce the size of
their dipl.omati.c representation in Beirut within certain limits.
Because Lebanese officials realize the magnitude of the danger that would
resulr from taking the diplomatir_ delegations away from Lebanon, they
rushed to iook for a reassuring way out [of this dilemma] before matters
should get out of control. The formula that was achieved in the absence
of the Lebanese army from ~dest Beirut was that of charging the police
- force with the task of providing security for the diplomats; summoning the
reserves for service; and distributing them over scores of diplomatic
centers in the capital.
Lebanese officials are being helped in carrying out these measures in the
regions of the deterrent forces by the fact that the Arab and foreign
diplomatic corps does not trust the Syrian protection of the embassy
- district. That protection had led to more than one attack. The Arab and
~ inter.national uproar condemning the recent kidnapping constitutes pressure
on the Syr.i.an deterrent forces to force them to accept any Lebanese
secur.ity decision.
It is evide~il- that the nature and the consequences of al-Muhaysan's kicl-
nappin~ provicle indisputable evidence of Lebanon's official impotence
on the one h;~nd and oE the fact that Lebanon is subject to intra-Arab dis-
putes which practice the most offensive crimes over Lebanese territory.
The Incident and the Stories
How did thc incident happen?
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At 1:30 a.m. on Friday, February 6 aboiat 20 or 25 armed men forced them-
selves into the home of the Jordanian diplomat which is located on the
second Eloor of Mul~ammad Ita'd's Building in the quarter of Bi'r Hasan west
of Beirut. They had stopped four cars near the entrance [to the building]
_ and on the road leading to it. A number of the men wore masks; they broke
into the glass entrance to the building and shot two Jordanian soldiers
and a Lebanese gendarme who were guarding the house. The attackers and the
guards exchanged fire, and Jordanian soldier 'Abd-al-Salam Salim Arshid
(30 years old) was killed. The sergeant in the Jordanian army, Muhammad
Salim Karim (29 years old) and the Lebanese gendarme, Bahjat As'ad Sharif
were wounded. While a team of the armed men set up a roadblock, another
team went to the second floor of the building. They fired shots at the
door of Mr al-Muhaysan's apartment, removed the door and entered the
living room. They began searching the rooms [of the apartment], and they
Lound his maid, Zakiyyah Khuri and detained her. Then they entered the
_ bathroom wher.e al-Muhaysan had sought refuge, and they detained him too.
Before leaving the apartment they emptied the bullets in their automatic
weapons in the rooms, and they broke some of the contents [of the apart-
- ment]. They took a few safes and odds and ends. Then they forced
al-Muhaysan to put on his clothes quickly, and they transported him and
- his maid to one of the four cars that were waiting near the building.
Then they rushed to an unknown destination. A few witnesses indicated
that the armed men continued to fire shots to cover their retreat until
they were able to cover some distance on the road.
After the armed men left, the neighbors of the charge d'affaires rushed
to notify the police. The police came and found near the building a
Pontiac vehicle, [license] number 128557, that was sprayed with bullets.
Inside the vehicle was the body of a man called Adib Khalil Khalifah (38
years o1d) who was shot by accident during the melee as he was passing in
the quarter. He was the owner of a sea-food store in al-'Uza'i.
The police searched the place, and they found that the contents of
al-Muhaysan's apartment had been thrown into disorder and the effects of
the bullets jthat had been fired] were still evident everywhere, including
- the entrance to the building and the sides of the elevator. They also
found the Jordani.an sergeant and the Lebanese gendarme wounded and
_ bleeding. They had them transported to American University Hospital where
_ they underwent emergency surgery and were placed in the intensive care
unit. However, the Lebanese gendarme died of his wounds soon afterwards.
Although the immediate legal investigation which was quickly undertaken
by the competent authorities yielded no result to speak of, the publica- ,
_ tions that were found in the reception rooms of al-Muhaysan's home which
bore the signature of the Leftist Arab National Organization--the Van-
guards of Revolutionary Violence--the Lebanese Region, increased the mys-
tery surrounding the kidnapping inci_dent. It was the first time the name
oE r.his organization had been heard of. It is an organization whose pub-
lications advocate the overthrow of King Husayn's regime; it attacks his
. positions and criticizes the Jordanian media campaign that is directed
_ against Syria.
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This mystery was accompanied by an expression of official displeasure.
President Sarkis, the prime minister, Mr Shafiq al-Wazzan and the minister
of foreign affairs, Mr Fu'ad Butrus denounced the incident and expressed
their regret over what happened, calling upon the palice to clear up tH~
conditions that have a bearing on the incident and to work with all the
' capabilities that are available to them to ensure the safe return of the
charge d'affaires.
~ However, the conFusion and the complexity of the situation were increased
by the announcement that was broadcast by the Voice of the Phalangists
Radio that a spokesman for The Palestinian Revoluti.on's Eagles Organi-
zation had contacted [the radio station] and informed it that the organi-
zation was r.esponsible for kidnapping the Jordanian diplomat and that it
was threatening to execute him if Jordan did not turn over the two Syrian
pilots who are members of the Muslim Brothers and who had sought asylum in
Amman. This announcement caused political circles to wait in order to
determine the credibility of the report and the 'identity oE the agency
' behind this opcration.
Ttie second and the third days after the kidnapping operation went by,
anci the fate of the Jordanian charge d'affaires was still clouded in
mystery. The investigation was going around in circles, and determining
the i.dentity of the kidnappers continued to be a question that needed
to be answered. But the wave of rumors and mysterious statements returned.
The French Press Agency and the Voice of the Phalangists received another
statement from the representative of the kidnappers outlining the con-
ditions for al-Muhaysan's release. The most notable of these conditions
was that negotiations were to be conducted through the embassy of North
Yemen in Beirut. This was later changed to [the embassy of] South Yemen.
The two escaped Syrian pilots were to be released, and the PLO was not to
interf.ere in the negotiations. The statement announced that the time limit
Eor carryin~ out the conditions of al-Muhaysan's release would end at 5
p.m. on Monday--that was 2 weeks ago. Otherwise al-Muhaysan would be
executed. Half an hour after that the location of the body would be
announced. The spokesman indicated that the Jordanian charge d'affaires '
w,is sufEerin~~ frorn a nervous breakdown, and he claimed again that he was a
member of Tl~e Arab Revolution's Lagles Organization even though Chat
organization haci deni.ed responsibility for the kidnapping. The spokesman
also claimed that al-Muhaysan had been returned to Beirut from Syria
beEore dawn the preceding day and that the condition oE his health con-
tinued to decline. He added that his organization followed "the instruc-
tions" of t1~e leadership of the ruling party i.n Syria. A few rumors had
mentioned that al-Muhaysan was in a secret hideout in Syria. Other rumors
mentioned th~t he was in the town of al-Labwah in the area of Ba'labakk.
Meanwhile son~e sources rumored that he was in the forest of 'Armun where
the body of. journalist Salim al-Lawzi had been found. A1-Lawzi had been
' ki.dnapped under circumstances that were almost similar [to those of
: eil-Muhaysan's lcidnapping].
In tlle midst oE t}iese compli.cated climates the heads of the accredited
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Arab diplomatic delegations in Lebanon held a meeting in the home of their
chief, the ambassador of Kuwait. They reviewed the circumstances that
had a bearing on the kidnapping of their Jordanian colleague, and they
formed a tripartite committee which included the ambassadors of Kuwait,
Tunisia and Algeria. This committee went immediately to the home of Min~S-
ter of Foreign Affairs Fu'ad Butrus and delivered to him a memorandum
asking him that the utmost efforts be made to save al-Muhaysan. The memo-
randum focused on honoring the immunity for the diplomatic corps.
The action of t~e Arab diplomatic corps was followed by another action
undertaken by the foreign diplomatic corps. In a memorandum delivered on
their behalf to the minister of foreign affairs, Mr Fu'ad Butrus by the
Pope's ambassador, the foreign diplomats denounced the kidnapping and
expressed the anxiety of the diplomatic community in Lebanon. The memoran- -
dum requested that practical measures be taken to prevent the recurrence
of such action and also to allow the embassies to take their own security
measures.
Lebanon: the Jungle -
In a memorancium submitted to the Arab League the Jordanian Ministry of -
Foreign Affairs emphasized that such an action endangered the lives of
diplomats in Beirut and threatened stability in Lebanon. The memorandum
asked the secretariat of the league to ask the Arab countries to carry out -
- the necessary communications with the Lebanese and Syrian governments for
the release of the kidnapped diplomat as soon as possible.
The Jordanian prime minister [indicated that he] was holding the Lebanese
authorities responsible for ensuring the satety of al-Muhaysan. He said, -
"If Lebanon is incapable of protecting diplomats, we will call upon all _
the countries to wi.thdraw their embassies from Lebanon until peace there
is established." Ha added that Syria had taken over the authorities of
the Lebanese government and had turned Lebanon into a jungle where outlaws
roamed freely.
After this round oE details about the kidnapping incident which shed some
li.ghL on the a~ency that committed the kidnapping as well as the Arab and
world reactions that accompanied it, the major question that is still
being asked, despite the battle of accusations between Syria and Jordan
- and despite the mutual vengeful measures and the elimination of the common
border stations that resulted from the incident, is this: What is the fate
of Hisham al-Muhaysan?
Reference must be made here to the iact that an action oF this kind is
= only ~ndertaken by organizarions that are affiliated with organized agen-
cies. The importance of the incident lies in the fact that the accusing
finger which the Jordanian government used to point to the kidnappers was
pointing in the right direction. Reference must also be made to the fact
that the claims made by the Revolution's Eagles Organization were chal-
lenged by a l,ebanese security official, who described its statements as -
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very curious indeed. This is because secret groups contact pr.ess agencies
only once and thei.r telephone conversations do not last more than 2
minutes so they can prevent their call Lrom being traced by the police.
But this organization called again and indicated in a recent telephone
- conversation, which the Voice of the Phalangists did not broadcast, that
it had carried out i.ts decision to execute the Jordanian charge d'affaires.
What adds to the conviction of observers that the Jordanian government
was not wrong in its expectations is the fact that it had some kind of
premonition about what was going to happen. This was expressed by an offi-
cial. spokesman f.or the Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The spokes-
man said, "The Lebanese authorities had been told previously that such
dishonorable actions that are planned by agencies which have been accus-
tomed to act under the cover of darkr~ess and in the absence of reason were
possible." This made [t.hese agencies] engage haphazardly in irresponsible
conduct to hide their identity which is no longer hi.dden from anyone. ,
Is He Alive or Not?
What is the F~ite of. al-Muhaysan?
7'he Jordanian authori.ties are still hopi.ng that al-Muhaysan will be
returned alive, but the stories about his fate are conflicting. There is a
story that he was killed 24 hours after he was kidnapped. There is another
story that [his] kidnappers are determined to do away with him after "
taking away from him information they think he has. It is the opinion of
one i,ebanese ofEicial that assuming that al-Muhaysan has not yet been
killed, in addition to the statement made by Syrian minister of foreign
affairs, Mr 'Abd-al-1{alir, Khaddam thar his country had nothing to do with
the incident, the mutual accusations and condemnations that followed his ~
kidnapping signify that his kidnappers have washed their hands of his
blood if he is still alive. _
The prevailing bel.ieE in Bcirut is that the kidnapping inci.dent could
- not t~ave talcen place in the region of the Syrian deterrent Eorces without
the knowledKe or the approval of these forces. All the assumptions indi- _
c~tc that, whether al.-Mtihaysan is alive or not, it is not in the interests
ot~those who committed Che incident to reveal their identities.
Some obsservers tiE~ the kidnapping incident to three concurrent incidents.
7'hese are:
l. The atterr~pt to ~~ssassinate the Jordanian prime minister, Madar Badran
by a group oC Syrians caho were arrested in Jordan sometime before last
week. They were lPd by a colonel in the Syrian army.
2. Obstructi.nK the way of the Iraqi diplomatic mail car on the way to
Reirut Airport.
3. The fact that the Jordanian charge d'affaires had been in Jordan 3
days before he was ki.dnapped.
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It is known that ~il-~luhaysan was kidnapped no more than 3 days after his
; return from Amman. News oE the attempted assassination of Jordanian Prime
Minister Madar Badran had not yet subsided. This triggers the belief that
this incident, in addition to t~~e Iraqi diplomatic pouch incident, could
have been in response to what had hap~ened in J~~rdan to reveal or to
obscure information. Those observers think it unlikely that coincidence is
a factor in these three inciden~s. It may be that t~is was what led
Minister Butrus to ask the Arab ambassadors when he met with them after
al-Muhaysan was kidnapped to work for the suspension of the intelligence
war that was being fought b~~tween them. It were as though he were indica-
ting indirectly s~me of th~s circumstances that had a bearing on the kidnap-
p ing .
The Special Deterrent
G1hat irritates Lebanese officials most is the fact that they are being
called upon to bear their responsibiliti.es at a time when the Lebanese
authority can exercise no influence on much of its territory. In response
to Jordan's hulding Lebanon responsible for what happened, one of the
politicians said that Lebanon must first be able to protect itself before
it can protect others. All the Arabs are being called upon to become aware
ot what conditions have come to [in Lebanon]. It is hoped that they will
take notice of the nature of the functions which the forces that are found
o~~~ Lebanese land are assuming. Even though the Arah deterrent forces did
_ enter Lebanon by means of an Arab resolution, all the Arabs have to assume
their responsibilities towards what is happening. Together, they have to
decide to rescue Lebanon from what it has come to by means of an Arab -
resolution also. Instead of having a sense of reassurance and safety that
would be spread by what is called the deterrent forces, all the Lebanese
people are livine ir a cli.mate of. a~xiety and fear because these forces
are concerned chiefly with their private interests instead of the public
interests of the Lebanese people.
What i.s causi.ng the Lebanese people to worry more than they did in the
past is the f~ct that the kidnapping of al-Muhaysan is a new symptom of
new poli.tic