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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104449-4 F~JR OFFI('IAL U~E ONLY JPRS L/9686 23 April 1981 = E ast E u ro e R e o rt p p POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS CFOUO 5/81) - FBI~ FOREIGN BROA~CAS~ INFORMAT'ION SERVICE FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100049-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104449-4 NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign _ newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed ar reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. ~ Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indica~ors such as [Text] or [Excerpt] i_n the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- - mation was summarized or e.xtracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are - enclosed in parentheses. Words or names precE3ed by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. - Other unattributed parenthe~i.:al notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within ~items are as given by source. The contents of this publicaiion in no way repre::ent the poli- cies, views or at.titudzs of the U.S. Government. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERI,ALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI.Y. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100049-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104449-4 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY _ JPRS L/9686 23 April 1981 ~AST EUROPE REPORT POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS (FOUO 5/81) CONTENTS GERMAN DEMOCftATIC REPUBLIC West German Writer Analyzes Changes in GDR's Germany Policy ~ (Peter Jochen Winters; EUROPA-ARCHIV, 10 Jan 81) 1 POLAN D Havana MagazinA I:ztsrviews Emil Wojtaszek on Local Situation (Elnil Wojtaszek Interview; BOHEMIA, 9 Jan 81) 9 - a- IIZI - EE - 63 Ft~UO] i+ F(1R (1FTT~"T A T' i TCF I11vT V . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100049-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104449-4 I } FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC L?EST GERMAN WRITER ANALYZES CHANGES Ih GDR'S GE&MANY POLICY ~onn EUROPA-ARCHIV in German Vol 36 No 1, 10 Jan 81 pp 31-38 [rlrticle by Dr Peter Jochen Winters, memt+er, FRANKFURTER ALLGEI~EINE editorial staff since 1968; political cori�espondent in k~est Berlin since 1972; permanent correspond- ent in East Berlin since 1977: "East Aerlin's Change of Course Toward Bonn--On the Condition of Inner-German Relations"] [Text] In the fall of 1980, there occurred an abrupt ch~ng~ in the relations between the two German states : Cooperat9.o~n turn~ed into confrontation. To be sure, the network of agreements that had been b~lt in the last few years has proved--for the time being--to be stable (all contractual arrangements remain in ~ force anci the scheduled talks and contacts did take place); however, by raising _ the minimum exchange rates for visitors from the West and affirming the categorical demands vis-a-vis the Federal Government that Party leader and State Council Chair- _ man Erich Honecker had raised in Geray the GDR placed itself outside the opera- tional framework of the inner-German trea.ty policy. The Operational Framework of Inner-German Relations _ Through the drastic increase--decreed on 9 October l~y the GDR Ministry of Finance-- of the minimum exchange rates for GDR visitors from "nonsocialist states and West Berlin,"1 the GDR effected--no doubt intentionally--a considerable reduction in the tourist and visitor traffic. This move affected the substance of the Federal _ Governments's inner-German policy that had been initiated in 1969 and that aims "through negotiations on practical proble~s to work out arrangements that could _ help to improve the living conditions c~ tYie people in divided Germany"2 so as to "prevent a further driftirtg apart of the Germans, mitigate the consequences of the ` division, overcome the tensions and make the overall atmosphere between the two = states more tole rable."3 The level of the conversicn rates was not contractually specified, but the Federal Government could justly assume that the GDR would not - change th ese rates without prior consultation; after all, there existed a--hitherto unpublished--letter by Honecker, in which Honecker advised the Federal G'hancellor of the partial revocation of the minimum conversion rates which had been doubled in November 1973--which revocation was effected as of 15 November 1974. dn 13 October 1980, Honecker stated in hi~ Gera speech that in regard to the rela- tions between the GDR and the Federal Republic "progress could be made only on the - basis of the unqualified assumption of the existence of two sovereign, mutually - independent states with dif.ferent social systems."~* In particular, Honecker i 1 I~OR OFFICIA~, USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100049-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104449-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY d~manded recognition by the FRG of GDR citizenship, conversion of the permanent - missious in Bonn and East Berlin in to embassies, conclusion of an agreement fixing - the border on the ~lbe in the middle o~f that ri~,rer and abolition of the Salzgitter Central Registration Center of the state ministries (which is concerned with regis- tration of human rights violations in the GDR). In raising these demands, fulfill- ment of which was to be a precondition for the noriealization of inner-German rela- tions, Honecker pZaced himself outside the operational framework of the Basic Agreement between the two German states that had been signed on 21 December 1972. _ For in the preamble of this agreement, bath sides expressly stated that they con- clude d the agreeme nt "on the basis of the historical realities, irrespective of the differences of regard to basic prob lems, including the national question, and guided by the wish to create�--for the benefit of the people in both states--the conditions necessary for cocperation hetween the Federal Republic of Germany and the Ge rman Democratic Republic,"S Honecker's conditions concerning the further course of the policy of detente in connection with inner-German relations actually were a demand for revision of the Basic Agreement. _ A revision of the Basic Agreement '_s unacceptable to the Federal Republic. The demands raised by Honecker concern crucial elements of the FRG's Germany ~policy. In regard to the issues of GDR citizenship and conversion of the permancnt missions into embassies--which would be equivalent to officisl, internationally b inding recognition of the GDR as a foreign country--the FRG cannot comply with the GDR's _ wishes. The statement made by Federal Chancellor Wil'~ Brandt in the goverrunent communique of 28 October 1969 is as valid now as it was then: "Official, inter- nationally binding recognition of the GDR by the Federal Government is out of the question. Even though there exist two states in Germany, they do not deal with each other as foreign nations; their mutual relations must of necessity be of a special nature."6 Part of this special nature is the fact that so far the consequences of - World War II and of the German partition have not been definitively settled. The German question remains undecided--a state of affairs illustrated bq the continu- ance of the rights and responsibilities of the four victor powez:. In the "Letter - Concerning German Unity," which is addressed to the GAR Governmei~t and which is part of the Basic Agreement complex, the Federal Government pointed this out. - In the Basic Agreement, the FRG does not a.ccord to the GDR any official, inter- nationally binding recognitian. The Basic Agreement cannot be interpreted as validation of the demand for recognition of GDR citizenship--this is brought out by the "proviso regarding citizenship problems"~--or of the demand for conversion of the permanent missions (whose status was determined in the Protocol of 14 March 19748) into embassi~es or of the demand for the fixing of the border on the Elbe River by the two Cerman governments. As regards the Elbe border, the Supplementary Protocol of the Basic Agreement merely allows the two governments to mark the divid- ing line between the Western zones and the Soviet zone of occupation that was establislied by the allied powers during the war and in the postwar period.9 As for areas where the course of the border is unclear or in dispute--e.g. along the stretch of the Elbe River betwe~n Schnackenb urg and Lauenb urg--it is only the Four Powers, whose rights and responsib ilities for Germany as a whole are not affected by the Basic Agreement, that can pass a binding ruling. As regards the problem of undivide d German citizenship--which the Federal Republic must uphold by virtue of the stipulations of its coi~stitution and the ruling o� the Federal Constitutional Court on the Basic Agreement this issue also involves the 2 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100049-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104449-4 I _ - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI.Y - $tatus of the residents of West Berlin. German citizenship--as defined by the ~t$11 valid German Nstionality and Citizenship Law of 1913--is a uniting all fec~~ral citizens, West Berlin resi3ents and GDR citizens. The demand for recogni- t~.on of GDR citizenship by th2 Federal Republic actually is a demand f:sr the establishment of a special FRG citizenship, but on account of provisos of the allied powers this citizensl-~ip could not be extended to West Berlin residents; they would then have to be accorded their own citizenship and such an arrangement wo uld - make West Berlin an independent political entity, a third German state as it were. j The Inner-German Relations in a Deteriorating East-West Climate The Federal Government was taken unawares by the GDR's change of course. But the events of October 1980, the GDR's abrupt switch from detente to delimitation, had ~ been expecte d- by those who ncw were taken unawares--as early as the 1979/1980 turn of the year. In October 1980, there ende3 a state of affairs that had been called a~ inner-German idyll of detente in the midst of global confrontation. If the GDR's action is to be met with an appropriate response zhat makes allowance for the ERG.'$ objectives in regard to its Germany policy, one must examine why the GDR changed its course only now instead of 9 months earlier. Qn 12 December 1979, the NATO Council in Brussels had decided on building new American medi~-range missiles and stationing them in Western Europe so as to res.tore the equilibri~ that had heen upset by the deplo-,~ment of Soviet SS-20 mis- siles. On 26 December, the Soviet Union had latm ched its military intervention in Afghanistan. These two events resulted in a hardening of Soviet-American relations. Observers spoke of the end of the policy of detente. The Federal Republic sup- ported the boycott taken by the American president, Jim~ay Carter, against the 5QViet Union, even though other EC countries did not ~oin this boycott. In spite � of or precisely because of this attitude of the FItG, the Soviet Union permitted the - inner-German policy o.f detente to develop further--almost nnaffected by the - increasingly acerbic confrontation of the two superpowers. On 25 January 1980, Honecker. addressed the first secretaries of the SED kreis [GDR administrative tmit] ac~ministrations; in this speech, he accused the Unite d States of pushing its European allies into a confrontation with tfie Soviet Union. The 5ED organ NEUES DE.UTSCHLAND commented on the most interesting point of Honecker's speech: "In p~actice, this results in the TJnited States exporting the Cold War to Europe and ~ thWarting de tente--a fact that can only have a negative effect on the promising relations ~+etween the ,.GDR and the FRG. "11 The concept became apparent: The GDR h.eld out the promise-~th the approval and probab Iy at the request of the Soviet - ti~i~.on--of con~inuation of the policy of inner-Gex~man detente. In doing ~o, the GDR hap~d that the Federal Republic would in return advocate in Washington resumption " oi the dialog with Moscow, ratitication of SALT T.I and above all modification or even suspens ion of NATO's Brussels resolution concerning supplementation of arma- ments. At the end of Januaryy after the Moscow visit of SED Politburo member Hermann Axen, - the rneeting between Federal Chancellor Schmidt and'. State Coim cil Chairman Honecker, which was suppose.d to take place in the GDR at the end of February, was postponed on account of the tense international situation, but both sides issued a communique con~ernit~g the postponement, affirming their intention to hold the conference and l~ter on to set a date agreeable to i~oth sides.12 In February, the GDR tried to intxoduce in the inner-German negotiations new projects that would have cost the 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100049-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104449-4 FOR OFFtCIAL USE ONLY Federa2 Republic millions. In a kind of last-minute panic, the GDR offered to ' electrify all railroad lines between Berlin and the FRG and to add a second track to all single-track lines and to let West German fi~ns build near Leipzig a brown coal power plant, in return for which the FRG--including ti'est Berlin--would receive electric power. State Secretary Guenter Gaus, the FRG's permanent repre- sentative in East Berlin, who conducted the negotiations, appears to have urged the Federal Government to accept these offers so as to bring as much as possible to " completion before worldwide confrontation would put an end to the downright uncanny inner-German harmony in regard to detente. However, the Federal Chancellor declined, referring to the budgetary restrictions. In spite of this rejection, SED Politb uro member Guenter Mittag, the Central Com- _ mittee secretary in charge of econo~ics, visited the FRG in April. In Bonn, Mittag met with the Federal Chancellor for talks. Although the Federal Government had urged the German athletes to boycott the Moscow Olympics, on 30 April the GDR and the Federal Republic signed in East Berlin the new agreements that picked up the threads of the traffic agreements of 16 November 1978 and that like the traffic agreements could be considered "a step on the road toward normalization."13 The new agreements were concerned with a) the establishment of an Autobahn connection between Berlin and the Wartha/Herleshausen boxder-crossing point through construc- tion and expansion of Autobahn segments in the CDR; b) the widening of a 27-kilo- meter-long segment of the Mittelland Cana1 in the GDR; c) the establishment of dual-track railruad operation between West Berlin and Helmstedt by means of eXpan- sion of two smaller track segments and modif.ication of the DR's jGDR railroad] Berlin-Rummelsburg cleaning installation for transit trains. In regard to these agreements, the most interesting result in regard to inner- German rel ations are the statements made by the two parties "in regard to the solution of certain water-related problems." The Basic Agreement had stipulated that negotiations be conducted in preparation for an environmental protection agreement; shortly after their co~encement in 1973, these talks had reached a deadlock--not least owing to the establishment of the Federal Office for Environ- mental Protection in West Berlin. Now the two parties wanted "to try to solve individual problems already at this stage." Since September, experts of the Fed- eral Government and of the GDR Government have been discussing measures intended to reduce the dangerously high salt level of the Werra River, which is caused by the GDR's potash mining operations. The agenda also includes ~measures aimed at curtailing the potash lye drainage in FRG areas close to the border and improving mine safety; the experts wi11 also discuss problems concerning border-crossing potash mining ope rations. As early as May, experts of the West Berlin Senate and o� the GDR Government had met in Berlin for discussions concerning Berlin water protection problems. The agreement of 30 April 1980 not only paved the way for talks with the GDR on environmental protection; it also established a so-called federal iunbrella for the Berlin water protection ta'lks.14 On 30 June and 1 July, the Federal Chancellor and the FRG Foreign Minister visited Moscow. During these talks, Brezhnev and the other Soviet leaders must have gained the impression there was no hope of getting the Federal Republic to play an independent role in the Atlantic Alliance and above all vis-a-vis the United States. Brezhnev realized that the Federal Chancellor would not be able to persuade the Americans to ratify SALT II and th at he was not even willing to suggest to the American president to modify the NATO resolutions of December 1979. The Soviet ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100049-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300144449-4 i FOR OFFICIAL USF ONLY leadership saw tt?.at its attempt to drive a wedge between the IJnited States and the _ Federal Republic had failed. The chancellor was useful to the Soviet leadership - only in that he helped to resume--at least in regard. to mediiun-range missiles--the - talks with the United States that had been broken off on account of the interven- titm in Afg~~anistan. _ ~ On 11 August, upon conclusion of the Moscow Olympics, Honecker met with Brezhnev on the Crimea. According to the commimique issued after the talks, Brezhnev and Honecker regarded as extremely important a conscientious attitude regarding the international agreements that had become milestones in the process of detente and in the shaping of the legal foundations of detente. In this connection, they - _ emphasized "the necessitq of strict regard fnr the legitimate interests of the socialist German Democratic Republic and of all other sovereign states."15 ~hey had set the tone that 2 months later recurred in Honecker's ~~era speech. Even before the Crimea Conference, Bonn and East Berlin had started the preparations for _ the Chancellor's visit to the GDR. On 11 August, the Federal Chancellor received Honecker's official invitation to a working vi5it on 28 and 29 August at Werbellin- $ee [Lake WerbellinJ; this came as a s~rprise to Bonn, since in the preliminary talks a 3-day visit at a Baltic Sea resort had been suggested. T[~?e preparatory talks, which were conducted by the Federal Chancellor's Office, likewise gave rise to mistmderstandings, difficulties and irritation on both sides. However, in the process of drafting a communique, the FRG intimated to the GDR that the Federal Governwent was now prepared to discuss the large-scale projects the GDR had pro- posed in February. On 21 August, the SED organ NEiTES DEUTSCHI.AND p~blished an article hy Colonel- General Fritz Streletz, chief of the general staff of the National People's Army, deputy defense minister and secretary of the GDR National Defense Council headed by Honecker. The article contained--the first instance in a long time--sharp criticism of the Federal Republic, which--it claimed- had become the main NATO base in Central Europe and a champion of ar+++a+++~nt. 1'~e article also accused the FRG of upholding its "doctrine of the so-called inner-German relations" and fomenting expansion-oriented and revanchist propaganda. On the following day, 22 August, the Federal Chancellor--talking to Honecker over the telephone--canceled his GDR visit "on account of the recent developments in Europe" (i.e. the events in Poland). At this time, the Polish strikes, which had been continuing for weeks, were nearing - .*_he critical stage; at the same time, the threat of Soviet intervention was growing.l6 The GDR did not i~nediately com~ent on the Federal Chancellor's cancellation. On - 31 August, Honecker--visiting the exhibit of the Hoechst AG [Hoechst, Inc.] at the - Leipzig Fair--actually took a fairly positive view of the inner-German relations: He stated that the GDR desired further normalization of its relations with the ` - Federal Repub lic; this would help to "promote the process of detente in Europe and thus open up new perspectives regarding the cooperation between the two German states."17 However, on 5 September--in Poland the Party meanwhile had accepted the _ 21 demands of the strikers in Gdansk and Szczeczyn and was about to replai;~ Party boss Ectward Gierek--the GDR news agency ADN circulated the announcement that "after ~chmidt's sudden cancel].ation of the working visit" Honecker felt it was tmlikely-- if only be cause of his own busy schedule--"that a new date would be set soon."18 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100049-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104449-4 FOR aFFIC1AL USE ONLY Motives Underlying the Change of Policy ~ One can safely assinne that the abrupt change in inner-German relations that was - marked by the events of 9 and 13 October was caused by more than just one factor. The change of policy vis-a-vis Bonn surely was not based exclusively on a GDR deci- sion prompted by Honecker`s real or simulated irritation about the cancellation of the chancellor's visit and the form of its announcement. Nor is therP much to b~ said for the assumption that the raising of the minimum exchange rates--like that of 1973/74--was no more than an attempt at blackmaiiing the FRG and that by partially revoking that raise the GDR waneed to strike a favorable foreign exchange bargain. - To obtain the consent of the Federal Goveniment in regard to fixing also for .the ; coming years the interest-free overdraft credit in inner-German trade (swing) at the established level of DM 850 million per year--an issue to be discussed in 1981-- the GDR need not resort to blackmail, for Bonn, too, is 3nterested in maintaining the swing at this level. Nor di.d the two large-scale projects desired by the ~DR call for blackmail, for the GDR had practically been assured of their implementa- tion. = More plausible than the above theories is the argument t~iat it was on accounc of ~ the events in Poland that tb e GDR effected the switch in its Germany policy. It is a~act that the GDR--not least owing to Soviet pressure--has sealed itself off toward the East by restricing tourist traffic to and from Poland and that vis-a-vis the Polish Communist Party it is pos ing as the guardian of the p ure doctrine of - Marxism-Leninism. But the Polish events alone are not sufficient to account for the change of course in the Germany policy. At best, these events accelerated and - intensified the process of delimitati~n vis-a�-vis Bonn. Rather, the key factor. in the abrupt policy change vis-a-vis the Federal Republic appears to have been the resolve of the Soviet Union not to allow the GDR to engage in.special detente maneuvers vis-a-vis the Fe de ral Republic, after it had become apparent that the ~ FRG was imlikely to dissociate itself from the United States. The GDR and Honecker himself were forced to discontinue their special policy of detente in Germany and _ to fall back into the ranks of the socialist catap, because the Soviet Union is not willing--in view of the change of 1 eadership in the United States and the domestic difficulties resulting from the even ts in Poland--to take any risks in conn~ction ~ w3th special inner-German conditions. Now as before, there is great distress in Moscow in regard to all inner-German agreements and there is the fear that any _ - community of interests between the two German states could undermine the Marxist- Leninist SED's loyalty toward Moscow. In his Gera speech, Honecker made clear how matters stand and what Mosco~ ar~d East Berlin expect of Bonn: _ "As far as we are concerned, it goes without saying that our treaty policy with the FRG is an integral part of the coordinated policy of our alliance with the Warsaw Pact states--a policy oriented toward safeguarding peace. In view of the require- ments of our time, it is necessary to point this out anew. No one can seriously ' believe that one can actively supp~rt the policy of the Western allf.ance, out of solidarity with the United States boycott the Moscow Olympics, pose as originator and champion of the Brussels missile resolution and at the same time convey the impression that one need do no more than talk with the GDR about relaxation of the regulations concerning tourism."19 _ 6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100049-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100049-4 FOR ONFICIAL USE ON1.Y , In this situation in which further measures against normalization in Germany can- not be ruled out, the Federal Government should stand firm and adhere to its principles. It is not the Federal Republic, but the GDR that must return to the common basis, if the normalization policy in Germany is to make further headway. _ ~~i this regard, it should be noted that the inner-German relations are still part and parcel of the ovPrall framework of East-West relations. It is only in close collaboration with the United States and the other partners in the Atlantic Alliance and in the European Commimity that the Federal Republic can pursue its national interests, and that ineans it cannot go against the given world-political trends. The GDR's change of course in its Germany policy does not signify the end of the treaty policy in Gerniany, but it does signal a pause. It is now impera- tive to show patience and at the same time t~ make every effort to safeguard the results that have so far been achie~red, FOOTNOTES 1. Decree of 9 October 1980 con cerning implementation of an obligatory minimum exchange of currency, NEUES DEUTSCHI.AND, 10 Oct 80. 2. Letter of 22 January 1970 by Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt to the chairman of the GDR Cotmcil of Ministe rs, Willi Stoph, reprinted in: EUROPA-ARCHIV, Na 9, 197~, p D205. 3. Governrnent Declaration of Federal Chancellor Schmidt, 17 June 1977, reprinted in: Federal Ministry for Inner-German Affairs, ed., "Zehn Jahre Deutschland- politik--Bericht und Dokumentation" jTen Years of Germany Policy--Report and Docum~ntation], p. 317. 4� NEUES DEUTSC~iLAND, 14 Oct 8Q . 5. EUROPA-ARCHIV, No 1, 1973, pp D13 ff. 6. Ibid., No 21, 1969, p DS00. 7. Ibid., No 1, 1973, p D17. 8. Ibid., No 24, 1974, p D573. 9. Ibid., No 1, 1973, p D15. 10. Ulrich Scheimer, "Undivided German Citizenship: A Continuing Problem of the Division of Germany," EUKOPA-ARCHIV, No 12, 1979, pp 345 ff. 11. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 26/27 Jan 80. 12. Ibid., 31 Jan $0. 13. See Winters, "A Step on the Ro ad Toward Normalization," EUROPA-ARCHIV, No 9, ' 1979, pp 269 ff. - 14. See FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Z May 80. 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100049-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300144449-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ' 15. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 12 Aug 80. 16. Christoph Royen, "The 'P'olish Sz~mnner' of 1980," EIJROPA-ARCHIV, No 24, 1980, pp 735 f f . 17. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 1 Sep 80. 18. Ibid. , 6/7 Sep 80. ~9. Ibid., 14 Oct 80. COPYRIGHT: 1981 Verlag fuer Internationale Politik GmbH, Bonn 8760 - CSO: 2300 . $ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100049-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 20Q7/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R04Q34Q10Q049-4 FOR UFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ _ P OLAND HAVANA MAGAZINE INTERVIEWS EMIL WOJTASZEK ON LOCAL SITUATION ~ Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 9 Jan 81 pp 72-73 - [Interview with Emil Wojtaszek, candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR]~by Teresa Mederos - Diaz; date and place not given] [Text] "Poland was, is and will continue to be a socialist coun- try, a firm link in the socialist community, the friend an.~3 ally of the Soviet Union, of all socialist countries, of all nati~nal liberation movements and of all the revolutionary and progressive forces in the world. "This has been a protest by the working masses, not against social- ism, but against the breakdown of its principles; not against the - people's government, but against its poor. administrative methods; not against the p arty, but against errors in its policy. "Neither enemy force nor the most refined methods can divert the Polish working class from the socialist path of development chosen ` _ by our country 36 years ago; nor can they weaken our fraternal ties with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist couunun- i ty . Still fresh in our minds were the words spoken to the plenary session of the Second [Cuban Communist PartyJ Congress by Emil Wojtaszek, chief of the Polish delegation, as we approached.the place appointed for BOHEMIA's interview with the leader of that brothex country. Also alive were memories of several visits to Poland, of conver- sations with workers and laborers in various fields, with veterans of the World War II and with men and women who had shed their own blood and fought agains t the German fascists. For that reason, our first questions concerned the current situation and the attempts by Western news media to distort the events which have taken place in Poland in the last few months. - [Question] Comrade Wojtas zek, the Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the Polish Untted i~orkers Party will take place in 1981. We would like to know how preparations for that congress are coming along. [Answer] The Sixth Plenary Session of the PZPR CC [Central Committee] decided to call ~ the Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the PZPR, and the Seventh Plenary Session of the 9 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100049-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100049-4 i ~'OR OFFICiAL USE ONLY CC resolved to set Chs ~ate between the end of the first quarter and beginning of the second quarter of 1981. _ 7'he ninth congress wi11 a detailed e~aluation of the situation, determine the ~ gaals to be achieved by the party and take a position with regard to the experiences and the character of the restoration which is taking place. The determination of that p~ocess, sincP it is a restoration process, implies a return to the basic values ot socialism, as well as a restoration of the ideological values of Leninist prin- : ciples in the life of our party. Why have we called the extraordinary party congress? This decision and the resolution were influenced bq events occurring in Poland to- ~ ward the end of last year. The first secretary of our party, Comrade Stanislaw Ka.nia, = evaluated them as follows in his speech to the Sixth Plenary Session of the PZPR Cen- , tral Coimnittee: "This has been a protest by the working masses, not against socialism, but against the breakdown of its principles; not against the people's government, but _ against its poor administrative methods; not against the party, but against errors _ in its policy." To begin the work of the congr.ess we have established a preparator~ committee repre- l - senting the basic social ana professional groups of workers. The committee has a:lready begun to work toward drawing up, by January, the proposed documents for the - ninth congress and partici:iarly the theme of rhe program, as well as plans for changes _ in the laws . The comani.� *_~~e will use in ,~ts work all proposals presented by the party . organizations and requc:s*~s from party memiaers at all levels and from workers in _ general in all sectors,. The work of the conbress committee will be to draw up the _ political and ideologicdl platform which will permit a stepped-up campaign of ideological and educational activity, as we1~1 as reinforce cohesion in the party - rank and file. In the party congrass we want to present, among utner things, some guidelines for socialist democracy, internal strengthening of the party and improvement of the methods 'by which the government functions and of all the links in the state apparatus, for now and for the future. The most important problem, basically, is to strengthen - the governing role of the p~~rty in our society. - [Question] Let us touch upon another subject. The Western news media have insisted on distorting the internal situation in your country in the last few months. What can you tell us ahout this? - [AnswerJ It is true that Western propaganda recently has given great notoriety to - the events in Poland. The voices of alarm or of open catastrophe in the bourgeois mass communications media have caused us some concern. They distort the picture and - inspire our enemies. Behind the smokescreen of "the Polish problem't and of the alleged "Soviet threat" the spokesmen for the cold war and the interests of the ' military industrial co~plex are seeking an opportunity to achieve their objectives, . the realization of which, up to now, has encounter~d serious obstacles as a result of the position of detente taken by most of the countries of Western Europe. I am thinking in particular of the aspiraticns of those forces to stall the tallcs on disarmament, postpone definitiyely the possible ratification of the SALT IT Treaty, to obtain an inc:rease in armaments budgets in the NATO member countries and to install new types of nuclear weapons and missiles in Western Eurape, as well as to bring about greater sub ordination to NATO. 10 FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100049-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104449-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Thus, then, the campaign unleashed in the West around "the Polish problem". must be ' treateri as an attempt to distract intern.ational public attention f.rom the real causes of the present antisocialist and anti-Soviet escalation in Europe as well as in ~he - rest of the world. Part of the WE~tern press is trying ta pres~ent tre events in Poland as a movement against socialism. Actually, with its many mass d.monstrations, our working class is expressing its unbreakable union with socialism a:~d its support for our alliances within the framework of the socialist community. Neither enemy force, nor even the most refined methods are able to d3vert the Polish working class from the socialist ' path of development chosen by our country 36 years ago, nor can they weaken our fra- - ternal ties with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist co~nunity. [Question] The Polish United Workers Party and the government have adop ted several ~ dec~.sions to solve the difficult internal problems of the country. What has resulted from those decisions? [Answex], During the Sixth Plenary Sessfon, the Central Committee made a very neces- . sary study and formulated decisions to allow the counxry to emerge from the crisis in accordance with the hopes and sentiments of most of the party members and of the participants. The Central Committee adop ted the political line needed to emerge from the crisis and begin the res~toration process. As I said earlier, we adopted very energetic actians to strengthen the party, to step up its campaign and to improve its political and organizational capabilities and the efficiency of its ideological and educational work. The party consultations which have been held at various levels throughout the country give you an idea of the way the party has mobi]:ized to achieve those objectives. Also, as a result of party recommendations, the government has adopted a series of measures in the social and economic sphere. The work on basic economic reform is - proceeding very rapidly. The government is establishing a 3-year plan for stabili- zation, and in January the economic reform plan will be submitted to a general dis- cussion among the people, after which it will be debated in the Se~m (parliament). In addition, some chan~es have been introduced in the 1981 plan and in the 5-year plan which begins this year--changes which are consistent in view of the new situation, with a more just distribution of resources. On this basis the investment program has been limited, particularly in the area of big investments which require large auioun~s of capital and long periods in which to get unler way. Priority has been given to production for agricultural development, food and housing construction. In addition, we have agreed to improve the effectiveness and the role of the Sejm in accordance with its constitutional rights. Other important changes concern the work of the local representative organs. Once again we want to emphasize and repeat what we said at your Second Congress: "Poland was, is and will continue to be a socialist country, a firm link in the socialist community, the friend and ally of the Soviet Union, of all socialist _ countries, of national liberation movements and of all the revolutionary and pro- gressive forces of the world. 11 FOR O~FICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100049-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104449-4 COR OFFiC1AL USE ONLY Emil Wojtaszek spoke briefly about his country's toreign policy, reaffirming its full support of the agreements of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty, which met in Warsaw last Ma.y, as well as of the results of the meeting between Che higft-ranking leaders of tha s~gnatory members of the Warsaw Pact held in Aioscow at ~ the beginning of December. Emil Wojtaszek w1s minister of foreign affairs when he came to Cuba a few years ago. Today, by decision of the Central Committee, he is a candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the PZPR Central Committee. We recall his impressions of our country as he expressed them to BOHEMIA on that last visit, and we repeat them here: . - . . _ _ _ "I am very happy to have had the honor of participating in the Second Congress of the ' fraternal Cuban Communist Party. It is not only an important event in the life of y ouur party and of the Cuban pe~ple, but also it has great importance for the entire communist and international c~~orkers movement and for all the progressive forces of the world, "The Second Congress has demonscr~;:ed the political and ideological force and the ~ organizational capabilities of the vanguard of the Cuban working ,class, the Cuban Communist Party. It has proved also that your country is a strong and steady de- - tachment of thP international communist movement; it is an exaiuple of dedication to the cause of international solidarity. "I take this opportunity to transmit, on behalf of our delegation, our thanks for the cordial welcome and hospitality we have found at every turn. Our visit to the Casablanca shipyard, where we met directly with our [as published] self-sacrificing working class, made an unforgettab le impression on us. "In closing, I should like, on behalf of the leadership of the Polish United Workers Party, to extend to our brother party, the Cuban Communist Party, and to the Cuban people our best wishes for new success in the work of strengthening the building ~ of socialism in your beautiful and heroic country." , COPYRIGHT: BOHEI~IIA 1981 8735 CSO: 3010 ~D ~ 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100049-4