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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/9697 29 ApriO 1981 Translation TANKS AND TANK TROOPS Ed. by A,Kh. Baaadzhanyan, et al. FBIS FORElGN BROADiCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFdCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 NOTE 1PRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, pdriodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources arg trans'Lated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and uther charactPristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or ex*racted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are - enclosed in parentheses. Words or name> preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the ' original but have been supplied as appropria*_e in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or at.titudes of th.e U.S. Gavernment. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING aWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ODTLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104460-1 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/9697 29 Apri1 1981 TANKS AND TANK TROOPS Moscow TANKI I TANKOVYE VOYSKA in Russian 2d ed, supplemented 1980 (signed to press 14 Mar 80) pp 1-432 [Book publis.hed under the general editorship of A.Kh. Babadzhanyan, Vayenizdat, 25,000 copies, BBK 68.513 T18 UDC 623.438.32+358.119(001.1)] CONTENTS Annotation Foreword 1 Part O!ie. Armored Vehicles 6 ' Section I. Modern Armored Vehicles and Development Trends Chapter 1. Tanks 6 1. Tanks Principal and Most Important Categery of Armored Fighting Vehicles ( 2. Future Evolution of Tanks and Their Performance Characteristics 19 Chapter 2. Self-Propelled Artillery 23 Chapter 3. Armored Personnel Carriers and Infantry Combat Vehicles 28 . 1. Traciced Armored Personnel Carriers and Infantry Combat Vehicles 28 2. Wheeled Armored Vehicles 35 Seetion II. Combat Performance Characteristics of Tanks 42 Chapter 1. Layout of. Tanks 42 1. Demands on Tank General Layout and Ways to Achieve Them 43 2. Classification and Comparative Evaluation of Tank General Layouts 46 Chapter 2. Tank Firepower 51 1. Armament of Modern Tanks 51 2. Principal Factors Determing Tank Firepower 53 3. Increasing the Force of Projectile Effect on the Target 54 4. Increasing Target Hit Probability 58 5. Increasing Maneuverability of Fire 62 6. Increasing Normal Rate of Applied Fire 63 7. Reducing Weapon Vulnerability and Improving Crew Habitability Conditions 64 8. Arming Tanks With Missile and Combination Weapons 65 - - a - jzz - UssR - Fovo] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY [IIx - USSR - 4 FOUOI APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104460-1 FOR OFFICIAL LTSE ONLY ' Chapter 3. Tank Protection 67 ~ 1. Demands on Tank Armor Protection and P rincipal Ways to Achieve Them ~ 2. C].assification and Comparative Evaluat ion of Hulls and Turrets 71 3. Special Measures to Improve Tank Protection Against Shaped-Charge " Projectiles ry.nd Nuclear Weapons 72 Chapter 4. Tank Mobility 75 1. Tank Powerplant 75 2. Tank Transmission 88 3. Tank Running Gear 92 4. Tank Equipment for Crossing Water Ob st acles 96 Cliapter 5. Armored Vehicle Electrical Equipment and Automatic Control Gear 98 1. Electrical Equipment of Armored Fight ing Vehicles 98 2. Weapon Stabilization System 102 3� G.round Navigation Systems 106 Chapter 6. Communications Gear and Infrared'Equipment 110 - l. Communications Cear 2. Infrared Equipment 114 3. Laser Equipment 117 Section III. Wheeled Armored 123 Chapter 1. Development of Wheeled Armore d Vehicles 123 Chapter 2. Ceneral Layout of Wheeled Armo red Vehicles 129 C;hapter 3. New Wheeled VehiclP Designs 139 Section IV. Servicing and Maintenance of Armored Equipment 141 Chapter 1. Servicing ot Armored Equipmen t 141 1. Principal Points of Care aad Servicing or Armored Equipment 141 2. Reliability of Armored Equipment 144 = 3. Combat Readiness of Armored Equipment 149 Gliapter 2. Repair and Overhaul of Armored Equipment 152 - 1. The Com!,Sat Vetii c1e as Ubj ect Repair 152 � 2. Production Process and Technology of Repairing and Overhauling Armored Fighting Vehicles 155 3. Armored Fighting Vehicle Maintenance Facilities 158 - Chapter 3. Ergonomir..s in Tank Troops 164 - b - FOR OFF ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFNCIAL USE ONLY Part Taa. Combat Employment of Tank Tzoops 174 Section V. Time and Tanks 174 - Chaptk:r 1. Tanks Main Striking Force of Gxound Txoops 174 Chapter 2. Tanks i.n a Future War 180 Chapter 3. Tank Troops Development Prospects 186 Section VI. Combat Operations of Tank Troops 190 Chapter 1. Nuclear Weapons and Tanks 190 1. Nuclear Weapons and Their Casualty-Producing Elemeiits 190 - 2. Pz�otective Properties of Tanks Against the Casualty-Producing Elements - of Nuclear Weapons 192 3. Utilization of Tanks During Employment of Nuclear Weapons 194 Chapter 2. Tanks Against Antitank ti'eapons 197 l. Possible Actior.s Against Tanks 197 ~ - 2. Modern Antitank Guided Missiles (ATGM) and Thei.r Influence on Tank Operations 201 : 3. Methods of TRnk Protection From and Countermeasures Against ATGM 210 Chapter 3. Movement of Tank Troops 217 1. Contemporary Warfar.e and Space 217 _ 'l. Modes of Travel. Long-Distance Marches 219 3. Organization of March and March Support 222 4. Executij-on of a March 230 Chapter 4. Meeting Engagements Admirably Suited for Tank Troops 234 - 1. Essence of the Meeting Engagement 2. Conclitions for the Occurrence of Engagements 236 3. Characteristic Features of the Tank Troops Meeting Engagement 240 4. Conditions of Achieving Success in a Meeting Engagement of Tank Troops 24'~ 5. Fundamentals of Organization of a Meeting Engagement in Tank Troops 253 6. Actions of Tank Troops in a Meeting Engagement 258 ~ Chapter 5. The Ol`fense 266 1. General Considerations 266 , 2. Modes nE Passing to the Offensive 270 3. Conduct of the Attack 273 4. Pursuit 276 5. River-Crossing Operations 283 6. Tank Actions in Radioactive Contamination Zones and Areas of Heavy Destruction 288 - c - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 ~ FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY 7. Features of Tank Operations in Condit3.ons of Mountain-Desext and Desert- Steppe Terrain 289 8. Trends in Development of Methods of Conduct of Offensive Operations by Tanks 292 _ Ctiapter 6. Defense 295 1. Emp'loyment of '1'anks in the Defense 295 2. Conditions of Shifting of Tanks to the Defense 299 3. Orgauization of Defense of Tank Troops 300 4. Conduct of the DefensA by Tank Troops 307 Chapter 7. Control 316 1. Essen::e of Control in Modern Combat 2. Organization of Combat Operations in Tank Troops 317 3. Control Agencies and Command Posts 321 4. Technical Means of Control 325 Section VII. Employment of Mathematical Methods in Tank Troops Utiliza- tion Decision-Making 328 - Chapter 1. Essence of the Process of Decision-Making Cliapter 2. Mathematical Methods Providing Elaboration of Optimal Decisions 334 Chapter 3. Criteria of Effectiveness 336 Chapter. 4. Practical Application of Mathematical Methods and Models 339 1. Application of Methods of Clagsical Mathematics 2. Application of Prabability Theory : 345 3. Application of Linear Programming Method 347 4. Fundamentals of Mathematical Modeling of Tank Combat Operations 349 5. Application of Critical-Path and Control Methods 360 Section VIII. Tank Troops Combat Service Support 363 - Chapter 1. General Considerations 363 Chapter 2. Combat Service Support 367 1. Combat Service Support During a March 367 - 2. Combat Service Support in the Attack 370 3. Combat Services Support in the Defense 374 Conclusion 377 - d - _ FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY ANNOTATION The volume "Tank i tankovyye voyska" was written by a team of professors and in- structors at the Armiired Troops Academy imeni R. Ya. Malinovskiy, officers from the central edifice of the USSR Ministry of Defense and from the Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division, under ttie direction of Doctor of Military Sciences Prof Gol P. G. Skachlco. The group of authors includes Doctor of Technical Sciences Prof Engr-1Kaj Gen L. V. Sergeyev; Prof Engr-Maj Gen A. S. Belonovsiciy; Doctors of Military SciencQS Prof Cols P. G. Skachko, P. Ya. Oreshkln, and N. K. Shi"shkin; Doctors of Technical Sci- ences Profs M. R. Maryutin and V. I. Medvedkov; Candidates of Military Sciences Docents Cols S. V. Vasil'yev, V. M. Derevyanskiy, A. V. Polyakov, and V. S. Chernov; Candidates of Technical Sciences Docents Engr-Co1s A. G. Burlachenko, N. S. Galandin, V. V. Kiselevskiy, V. A. Mangushev, E. D. Prikhod'ko, and A. G. Solyankin; Engr-Col M,. D. Zhurko; Gds Sr Lt V. P. Skachko. The volume was readied for publication by Cols P. G. Sk.achko and N. K. Shishkin and Engr-Col V. V. Kiseievskiy. Chief Mar Armed Trps A. Kh. Babadzhanyan (deceased) served as geaeral editor. - e - N FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040340100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLI' FOREWORD The years which have passed since publication of the first edition of this work have fully confirmed the conclusions and forecasts of the authors pertaining to the place and role of tanks under present-day conditions and in the foreseeable future. The aggression in Vietnam, the India-Pakistan conflict and the Arab-Israeli war demonstrated that the tank continues to be a formidable combat weapon. This is due to the fact that the tank beautifully combines thP excellent qialities requi,red for battle: f irepower, striking power, maneuverability and mobility, as well as protec- tion against the principal weapons. As a result of development of modern means of transportation, the tank has beeome transportable for all modes of transport, including air. This has increased to an even greater extent the tank's potential and significance as a weapon. Predictions by skeptics that appearance on the battlefield of antitank guided mis- siles (ATGM) would bring to an end the tank's domination of the field of battle ` liave not come true. Gonelusions on the role and place of tanks in future wars, made - by Soviet military science even before World War II, would remain valid after that war as well. The .laws and patterns of employment of tank troops, discovered by our science, have not lost their praetical signiticance. The clevelopment of powerful antitank weapons, including ATGM, has not diminished the significanee of tanks. Keseatch and improvement in the military area are opening up new horizons, which are truly boundless. Together with the development of military hardware and knowl- edge of military affairs, new problems arise in the art of wlrfare, problems which form obstacles in the path of efficient utilization of new equipment and employment of new methods of concepts arising on the foundation of new knowledge. In order to move forward it is necessary to resolve these problems in a prompt and timely manner and to proceed now iaith penetrating into the essence of those phenomena and processes which wi11 arise in a future war, if aggressive forces ~ initiate a war: In the course of war there will scarcely be time to correct er- roneous concepts. Commanders of all echelons will have too little time to acquire experience during combat operations. Therefore it is doubly essential to test and verify now, elemerit by element, already existing and newly developed conceFts to as thorough a degree as is possible. Questibns pertaining to the presenr and future of tank troops acquire particular importance in this regard. 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Pract:ical experience and theory become rapidly obsolete in a time of swift advance of technology. Development of weaponry in the postwar years evoked many new ideas in military affairs. We are witnesses to a reassessment of values. Debates on the role and influence of services and arms on the course and outcome of war have con- tinued up to the present day. Nor has this process bypassed ;:ank troops. Today, however, there are no longer any doubts about whether the tank is obsolete it has becorne completely obvious to everybody that the tank is needed. At the present time thEre is a ilebate in progress abroad :~-bout what tank is best under present-day conditions, what its design, lay- out and armament should be, what combat vehicles should be employed for infantry, and whether large operational formations of tank troops are needed under present- r day cor.ditions, when armies have become fully motoriaed. These are the main prob- lems in development of tanlc troops which concern theorists and practical exgerts in military affairs and on which various points of view exist. It is generally -believed today that a11 the capabilities of mode.rn weapons can be fully utilized in mobile warfare and that the tank is the mast po~Terful means of ground att-ack for performing many of the combat missions assigned to ground troops. Frequentl'.~, however, completely opposite points of view are held by experts in dif- ferent countrips as regards the tank itself, the organizational structure and theory oF employmenr of tank troops. This is quite understandable and logical, for the truth is born in struggle by opposing opinions. The task of military science in this regard is to reveal correct?y and yii a timely ranner the objective laws and patterns of war an3 correctly to detertni_ne the trends which should be followed by developmen*_ of armored equipment, organizational forms of development of tank troops, and Lhe principles oi their employment in war. Another aim of the second edition of this work is refinement of these laws, patterns and trends, which are very difficult to see in the streams of new, corctemporary in- _ formation in all areas of military affairs. Therefore they require fuller and more systematized presentation. The authors of this volume have sought to show the general directians and patterns of development of armored equipment and organization of tank troops, as well as the principles of their employment on the battlefield, without going into details. The authors have also of course taken into account the experience of the past, es- pecially that experience which in their opinion is useful for the future, for suc- cess llas always ateended not he who blindly copied the old but rather he who, over- the old, boldly laid new roads forward. In this regard the book can offer - tank troop commanders and military engineers as well as the people in the tank in- rlustry faod Por their innovative quest in design, operation and combat employment of tanks. , It is a well known f.act that the tank was created by the objective conditions of coiubat reality. Its role and significance experienced change, beginning on 15 Sep- tember 1916, when the tank first appeared on the battlefield. Employed initially as an infantry close support weapon, the tank was gradually transformed into a means of in�antry and eavalry tactical exploitation. As technical improvements occurred, the tank earned its right to existence and was ultimately transformed into a factor of operational significance. 2 FOR OFFICIAY. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ V. I. Leniii and the Communist Party, attaching enormous importance to the technica"1 equipment of the Red Armyy, defined the role and place of armored for.ces in war. Analyzing the conditions of waging war in the machine age, V. I. Lenin reached the , conclusion that victory could not be gained without equipment and the ability to utilize it against the adversary in battle. In war, he stated, "victory is won by he who ras the greatest engineering, organizatian, discipline and the best machines..." * The tank trobps established during the first years of Soviet rule became in the hands of the proleta�riat and its army a powerful means of defense of the Soviet _ Republic against thQ imperialist aggressors. Taking account of V. I.'s statements, Soviet art of warfare had high regard for the operational capabilities of tanks. Elaboration of theory of employment of - tanks and establishment of large tank combined units were a result of this. Soviet art of warfare created for the first time in history a theory of the operation in depth, in which tanks were assigned one of the dQcisive roles. World War II fully confirmEd the correctness of thi.s theory. L3rge tank formations, working in coordination with air power, performed operational and strategic missions, _ penetrating deep into the pnemy's dispositions. One can boldly stata, without clenigrating the role and significance of other weapons, that tanks deserve excep- tional credit for achieving victory over the enemy i-a World War II. J The effectiveness of employment of tank troops in World War II was so great that their development after the war proceeded at an accelerated pace in all the armies of the raorld. The development of nuclear weapons, however, with their enormous destructive force, engendered substantial doubts in the minds of certain foreign - theorists and practical experts in military affairs regarding the qualitative com- position ef the tank inventory, which at that time included three principal types of tanks: light, medium, and heavy. Since the principal role in neutralizing and destroying the adversary was assigned to nuclear weapons, and since they viewed the = capture of enemy-held ground as the principal mission,of ground forces, it was con- _ sidered adequate to pos'sess only light tanks and other armored vehicYes adapted for - airlifting and capable of performing these functions. The developmerit of antitank guided missiles, which are capable of piercing tan': armor of practically any thickness, bolstered this view. In France, for example, only light tanks, armored cars and armored personnel carriers were built for an ex- tended period of time after the war. The majority of military experts, however, are of the opinion that the necessity of large-scale combat operations dictates that tank troops be equipped with diversi- Fiecl military hardware, including various types of vehicles: tanks, self-p ropelled guns of various designation, armored cars, armored personnel carriers, and other special vehicles. Advocates of this view are of the opinion that tanks should constitute the founda- tion of tank troops highly mobile trackaicombat vehicles with excellent * V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 36, page 116. 3 FOR OFFICIAL UCE ONLY ! APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFIClAL USE ONLY cross-country perfornance and carrying powerful weapons and srmor protection.. Tanks are designated for performing a broad range of missions, particularly engagement of hostile tanks. They are an offensive weapon which is directly employed to neutralize and destroy the enemy, and therefore they should carry versat-ile main armament ,,d: conduct of redon- capable of performing the combat missions which they are assigno naissance and engagemeiit of hostile armored targets, neutralization and destruction - of hostile antitank,weapons including artillery, destruction of deferisive install.a- tions, and ki?ling of enemy personnel. In order to accomplish missions of this ~ kind, tanks should incorporate an aggregate of design features which provide high ` _ fire maneuverability. - What has been stated above attests to the impossibility of combining in a single - tank model the entire diversity of combat performance characteristics requisite for performing as5igned missions. Therefore foreign experts believe that at the present time and in the foreseeable future tanks of differing designation will continue to be designed and built, differing substantially in combaC performaiice characteristics, specifications, and design features. The existence of several types of combat vehicles, however, results in considerable difficu.Lties both in the area of logistical support and training personnel to ' operate, maintain and repair these vetiicles. These di.fficulties engendered the idea of standardization of combat vehicles, in order that all missions assigned to tanks can be performed by a minimal number of tank types. = At the present time the tank inventories of the majority of the world's armies con- tain a so-called main battle tank, which is capable of performing various missions, par.ticularly such missions as engaging enemy tanks, destroying antitank weapons, destroying defensive installations, and killing enemy personnel. The remaining types of armored fighting vehicles are highly specialized. In addition, development of tanks and tank troops is influenced to a decisive degree by forecasting the character of a future war, the role of tank troops in a future war, and the modes of their empZoyment. In this regard the principal demand imposed on rhe tank boils down to its effective utilization in contemporary wartare both with and without the employment of nuclear weapons. The modern tank is a complex combat vehicle built on the basis of the latest ad- vances in science and technology, while tank troops are highly mobile bodies pos- the greatest capabilities to conduct successful combat actions under various combat situation conditions. Tlle best of the modern tanks are technically more sophisticated than tanks of the postwar period. They reflect the latest advances in electronics, optics, radio engineering, mechanics, chemistry, and power engineering. a In thjs edition, as in-.the previous one, the authors have sought on the basis of unclassified published materials to show the contemporary status of tank troops armored equipment, to discuss problems of adoption of the latest scientific and technical advances, and to examine the future development prospects of armored equipment and tank troops as a whole, without taking an excursion into history. 4 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 . , FOR OFEICIAL USE ONLY Tliis volume presents only general trends in the improvement of tanks and the pat- terns of employment of tank troops. This is the correct approach, because individ- ual points bECOme rapidly obsolete, while the general laws and patterns remain valid for an extended period of time. This volume can become a desktop companion not only for tankers but also for other otficers in our army, since it will help them perceive the role and place of tanks in the ground forces armament system. Chief Marshal of Arm4red Troops A. Babadzhanyan 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLI' - PART ONE. ARMORED VEHICLES SEC'1'TUN I. MODERN ARMORED VEHICLES AND DEVELOPMENT TRENDS Chapter 1. TANKS ~ .l, Tanks Principal and Most Important Category of Armored Fighting Vehicles - '1'lie exnerience of World War II and combat operations in Korea, Vietnam, in the India-Pak.istan conflict, as well as in the Near East, conf3rms that tanks are the most versatile weapon, capable of gerforming a broad range of combat missions. It is precisely this which determines their role in contemporary wars as the main striking force of ground troops. The development of armored equipment is today taking place under conditions characterized by the following: the necassity of effective employment a.[ tanks and other armored vehicles in combat operations both with and without the employment of nuclear weapons; _ a high rate of troop advance with a substantial depth of operations; the fact that armies are armed with large quantities of diversified high firepower antitank weapons, including ATGM, aircraft and, of course, tanks. Ttie United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Great Britain are the leading capitalist nations in the manufacture of tanks and other armored fighting vehicles. In addition to these countries, Sweden, Switzerland, and Japan also build tanks of their own design. The FRG is the leAder among the European capitalist countries in production of armored eq uipment and quantity of armored equipment in its military forces. It has become one of the principal exporters of tanks to countries of the capitalist world. Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, Norway and Italy, which formerly purchased tanks in thc United States and Great Britain, have in recent years adopted the Leopard 1 tank for their armies. Witli devPlopment of the STB-6 tank at the beginning of the 1970's, Japan joined the gro up of nations which produce modern tanks. The versions of this tank, which was adopted by the military in 1974, employ the latest tank engineering advances of the _ leading capitalist countries. In spite of the great variety of modern armored vehicles, tanks retain their primary - importance. At the present time the armies of the capitalist countries have designated as main battle tank one type of tank the combat performance characteristics 6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 F'OR OFFI('IAL l1SE ONLY and tec.linical specifications oE which enable it to be successfully employed to perLorin an extremely broad rauge of combat missions. The Western military press I)egan empl.oying the term "main battle tank" for these tanks. The main battle tank combined, as it were, the performance characteristics of inedium and heavy tanks (ac- cording to the previously employed classification). Therefore when the discussion deals with tanks, their role, comparison and develop- ment, of greatest intdrest are main battle tanks, the total number of which in modern mechanized (motorized infantry) di.visions runs to 200 vehicles, and in tank (armored) divisions 300 vehicles and more. - Thus characteristic ot the evolution of tanks today is a decrease in the number uf types. At the same time one observes aprocess of decrease in the number of dif- ferent base vehicles within the framework of total armored equipment, by develop- ment of a"Family" of vehicles based on one vehicle which is comman to the "family." T111.5 arrangement greatly simplifies problems of manufacture, supplying spare parts, vehicle reconditioning and mai;tenance, mastering of the equipment by personnel, and securement of coordination of subunits and unlts, since as a rule the member vehicles of a"family" possess the same performance as regards mobility and protec- tion. As a consequence of increasing the production of vehicles similar in design, at the same time a decrease in manufacturing costs is achieved. ' From the beginning of the 1960's up i.o the present time,fcreign countries have been continuing to build and furnish the military with postwar second-generation tanks. A fairly complete picture of the achieved level and trends in future tank develop- ment can be obtained from an examination of the major combat performance - characteri_stics of the main battle tanks adopted in the 1960's by the armies of those countries wtiich are leaders in the area of development of armored equipment. These tanks include the following: M60A1 (United States), 48 tons (Figure 1.1.1); ChieftainX (Great Br.itain), 52 tons (Figtire 1.1.2); AMX-30 (Fxance), 36 tons _ (Figure 1.1.3); Leopard 1(FRG), 40 tons (Figure 1.1.4). In spite of a considerable difference in weight, all of them are the main battle tanks for their countries' armies and are designed to perform the same missions. Table 1.1.1 lists the prin- ciPal specifications and perfoimance characteristics of foreign tanks. AI.l Llle listed tank morlels retain the traditional, so-called classic layout. A As regards new innovations, we should note the Chieftain *_ank, in which the driver a5sumes a semi-reclining position. This configiiration is due to an endeavor to reduce overall tank height by shortening hull height, which makes it possible to reduce weight with given armor and to decrease of taking a hit on the . battlefield. Tlic: climensions of today's main battle tanks vary across a fairly broad range. The h160A1 tank, for example, is ttie tallest (2,980 mm), while the AMX-30 is ttie shortest. - Tlie Lormer is almost 700 mm taller than the latter. The Chieftain tank has the gretlLest hiill lengtli (7,650 mm), while the M60A1 tank has the greatest width (3,630 mm). The AMX-30 tank has the smallest dimensions: length 6,380 mm, width --3,1-10 mm. * Elere and henceforth ttese designations shall apply to the principal models of tanks of the designated types, that is, in this instance the Chieftain Mk2. 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR nFFIC1A,L USE ONLY Figure 1.1.2. Chieftain Tank (Great Britain) Figure 1.1.3. AMX-30 Tank (France) _ 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 ~ a ~ i : APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 F'QR OFFI('lAL USi; UNI.Y Figure i.l./+. Leopard I Tank (FRG) Figure 1.1.5. STRV103B Tank (Sweden) 1. The Chieftain tank is the heaviest, while the AMX-30 is the lightest. The difference bt-_tween them is approximately 16 tons, which gives the AMX-30 tank considerable - advantages in cross-country capability and transportability (ground, water and air). - ihe Leopard 1 tank occupies an intermediate position in all these specifications. The design.of the Swedish STRV 103B tank is unique (Figure 1.1.5). It weighs 39 tons, and its 105 mm gun is mounted not in rhe :urret but in the hull. This tank's turretless design is due to an endeavor to obtain a vehicle with thick armor protection at a lighter weight, since the turret accounts for up to 25 percent of the total weight of a tank. Mounting the tank's armament in the hull has made it pos- . si`61'e to reduce the tank crew to three men, by employing automated loading. Foreign experts, while noting the unique design of_the STRV 103B tank, point to a serious defi.ciency of this layout the impossibility of delivering aimed fire 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY m x ro H ~ .r{ N N 0 w C N N 'b z 4-1 0 to C) .r.{ N .r.l ~4 a) 4J U cd H Cd ~ U d U ~ ~ 34 O 44 N PL4 'O ~ cd ~ ~ O ~ ct U .r{ W .r.{ Cj a) a cn r4 r--I 14 a r-I ~ Ei y, ~ ! nl CI '7 y = Lfl 00 Q 2 Rl Lf a C V a o o c': ^j y O ~ ~ ~ ~ u c ^w,. ` t` v O ~ K M~-I N i M ~ c- ` 1 L ~ CC ~ C r v V..:. r ~ J C14 G ~ - ' 00 t'rl G^ 0 Cf1 G~ L: ti ~ ~ ] ^ r, _ ? ~ _ ~ ^ K ' r C h `7 C r . ~ KM p ~ = Ir ~ < ^ ^ c - ~ Q~ C 1+7 G < ' I'D u i u a Xi M t~ t~ = F, M M ^ K:"7 Y O O G ~fj _ u Ci O . a u u ~ ~o ^ E = R Q -r = " I I = o ~ -M �L v , r v F" v N a M l Q u = U tO ~ N cf) 'Ir � LO ~n ~ c% r Q � N ,c ~ a _ F M c~ ` N a m ~ v x ti c- ~ ~ g U N a `,r I I N Z. ~ t- D i :J F ~ f;, O a = s ~ ~ S Q ~ v m n K n ~ u o r CQ u'1 .-I N ~ rl c+1 rl v1 e-1 ~O I~ GO r-I p C' ' ~ c u iv y N r. C' o ~ c ~ y N Y N 0 q O V ~ r4 = r rl k- c r Y O N ` ~ a V ~ ~ N ~ ~ C cY S~ G Y G{ Y 2 = S ~ % c ~fl ~ i N% a u O s " C ic v ' G ~ ~ = v � , = ` et a.".0 v 0 m= u 0 ma A y? O ~ o � s ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ V ~ M L^ LO ;a FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104460-1 " FOR OFFICIAL USE ON1.Y Key to TaUle 1.1.1 on preceding page: 1. 2. 3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Parameters Main battle tanks M60A1 (United States) M60A2 (United 5t3tes) Leopard l (FRG) Chieftain (Great Britain) AMX-30 (France) P68 (Switzerland) STR.V103B (Sweden) STB-6 (74) (Japan) Sheridan iight tank (United States) 25. Fording depth witl: underwater operation equipment, meters 26. Installed during modernization. 27. Optical range finder 28. 46 (including 13 ATGM) 29. Yes 30. Laser range finder 31. 5hellproof 32. Installed beg inning with model AI 33. Laser range finder (beginning with model A4) 34. Yes 35. Laser range f ir.der (beginring with model Mk3) 36. Installed during modernization 37. Laser range finder installed dur- ing modernization 38. Installed during modernization 39. Optical range finder 40. No 41. Laser range f inder (beginning with model 103B) 42. (;as turbine engine) 43. Amphibious 44. Yes 45. Laszr range finder 46. (3ncluding 10 ATGM) 47. Small-arms-proof 48. (5.6 afloat) ~ 12. Combat weight, tons - 13. Crew 14. Tank gun caliber, mm 15. Ammunition load 16. Machinegun - � 17. Coaxial 18. Antiaircraft- 19. Armor protection 20. Weapon stabilizers 21. Means of precision target ranging 22. Maximum engine horsepower ~ 23. Top speed, km/h 24. Tank range (highway), km while rolling, since laying the gun for deflection is done with the tank hull, which ~ greatly limits the effectiveness of utilization of this tank under combat conditions. Let u5 examine the major combat performance characteristics of modern main battle ' Lanks tlieir firepower, armor (and special) protection and mobility, which will give us an idea of the attai.ned level and trends in future tank development. ~ Firepower. Postwar second-generation main battle tanks adopted by the armies of the capitalist countries possess considerably greater firepower in comparison with e H c~ ~ ~ ~ v, n g a%~a ~ o � av ~ ~a u o~ a~H x~ r- id c c c r. ~ . iT ~ ? 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V N I:~~ L'~. ~ O ~ I~~ I � " � I � I � ~ ~ M a c ) u'1 �rl ~ H . v I . ~I '�I . ~I . . .I I . .I . I . ~7' N . . T,I _ _ .I . .I . . ~ - ~ a a ~ M (y j ~e 1" ~ � ' r' A 'P'I Ip GJ J,.~ GJ N ~A 4-4 ~y y 1V q"V O + F~ 0 3~v cd u ~v .C ~ cd G Cf o c~ -H 0 r-I ~ i3 M ~ r-I �rl aJ Sa .C ~I Z H 'd (1) J.1 ~ ~ Gl f~ c0 N r-I ~ co u co Qo ~ C) J.J "b Q~ ~."i U C"+ ~ C) p ~ ~ C1 (.7 V C) V-1 �rl ' CJ (d M-I ~ ~ vi ~d r-I 00 -ri �rl rl �H ~ `rl JJ i-1 cU 'b JJ 'Li $4 4-J Tl �ri 1-1 Jj iJ 11 11 �ri 11 GJ ~ N �rl D c~ O �r~ �r ~ R1 'I R) �r �rl �rl U' GQ ~3 G p ~ W ~ p q ~ v 4 p H H D ~ ~ N Q Gl 41 r-i V �rl co �H a ~ ~ n x ~ 9 ~ Z ~ H ~ d cn A a x x 205 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY At the present time there is observed abroad a trend toward decWhile thehearliest weight of ATGM and toward their miniaturization. For example, - ATGM, such as the Malcara, 55-12 and others weighed between 75 and 100 kg, the weight of modern ATGM in service and under development wi11 be 6-30 kg (Dragon, TOW, ACRA). In connection with a decrease in weight, there has also been a decrease in the size of antitank guided missiles. This has led to the employment of a large number of ATGM on launchers mounted on trucks, armored personnel carriers, tanks, fixpd-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. The foreign press notes a trend toward 3.ncrease in the ATGM basic load of aumnunition in antitank subunits. There is a trend toward increasing the flight speed of ATGM, since it is ob- vious to everybody that the great er a projectile's speed, th(i less time a tank has - to maneuver and take shelter behind terrain irregularities or local features, and therefore the greater its vulnerability. An analysis indicates that while the maj ority of antitank guided missiles presently i.n service ai:d in production travel at a maximum speed of 80-85 m/s (SS-10, ENTAC, Cobra ElOB, Cobra 2000,;MAT, Bantam) or range between 110 and 260 mps (SS-11, Dragon, Vigiiant, Ma.lcara),- second-generation missiZes in production or under develonshould bearXinumind speed of 270-650 mps (Swingfire, HOT, ACRA, Mosquito). 0ne that knowledge of rang tanks for developing tank tactics in - We knaw that two ranges are specif ied with ATGM: minimum and maximum. Minimum range is the distance from the ATGPM launcher to the point where a fired missile becomes guided. Maximum range is the range of missile flight during which it remai.ns guided. For the maj ority of ATGM in service, minimum range varies from 300 to 500 meters, and maxnmuma25e200 mete0rs 4,000 tor6i000ATGM, however, have a minimum ra g of meters (SS-12). - - J m - ~2~~1(ent, ~1~ OcNV in yc udsuxmaHOercAa lymin pimax _ - OTYPC - ,max - Figure 6.2.1. ATGM Minimum and Maximum Range of Fire Key: D - First generation 1. Mobile ATGM launcher DZ Second genera*ion - 2. Target As is evident from Figure 6.2.1, at minimum range a missile is not yet guided and a tank enters a"dead" zone, as it were, in which it cannot be hit. Foreign mili- tary experts believe that this circumstance should be t:aken into consideration in - developing tactics for tanks attacking ATGM positions. Tanks, taking ad- vantage of terrain irregularities and local features, should get into the ATGM "dead" zone as quickly as possib le and from this zone destray the antitank guided missile positions with their fire or tracks. - 206 1'11-TAT iTCL' nmT.y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR ()FFTCIAL IiSJ: ONLY The foreign military press notes that the commencement of a missile's guided Flight depends I.n large measure on the skill and ability of the firer (operator): the lesa we11-trained the Ejlrer (operator), the larger the ATGM "dead" zone will be.* It is also noted that knowledge of the maximum range of ATGM enables one correctly _ to select tank deployment lines beyond the zone of effective ATGM fire. In those cases where terrain is flat and open, according to foreign sources, it is recom- mended that the tank deployment line be specified not closer than the maximum r.ange of ATGM fire. Satur.ation of combat formations with ATGM, as well as their improvement and ~ provision of the capability ot firing ATGM from man-portable and mobile launchers, liave substantially complicated tank actions on the battlefield. We know that ATGM in service with NATO armies are launched from ground or mobile launchers, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry combat vehicles, fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. Missiles are fired either directly from their transport containers or from special launching devices with guides and _ mounted on vehicles. Figure 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 show methods of launching ATGM. 8 Figure 6.2.2. Methods of Launching ATGM from Stationary Ground Launchers: a-- from ground launcher; b-- from transport container; c-- from launch tube T.he majority of new AT(=M presently on the drawing board are to be fired from a tube mounted on a special tripod. A missile can also be fired from a shoulder- held tube (MILAN, liOT, TOW). Foreign military experts believe that knowledge of missile guidar;:e systems i.s acquiring great importance for development of tactics of combating ATGM. Basically there can be many different systems of guiding ATGM to the target. At the present time, however, following are the principal missile guidance systems employed in the armies of capitalist countries**: * See REVUE MILITAI'ZE GENERALE, July 1972. See TRUPPFNDIENST, May-June 1972; REWE MILITAIRE GENERALE, July 1972. 207 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY Figure 6.2.3. Methods of Launching ATGM from Mobile Launchers: a-- from helicopter; b-- from fixed-wing aircraft; c-- from truck; d-- from armored personnel carrier; e-- from tank _ a) manual remote control with commands transmitteu by wire or radio; b) semiautomatic or combination wire guidance plus homing head employ- ing infrared or UHF beams, as well as laser beam; c) self-contained or automatic. It is pointed out that all guidance systems other than an automatic system involve manual guidance and require a controller (operator), who must guide the missile's flight, from launch to target impact. In manual ATGM guidance systems (SS-10, SS-12, Vigilant, Swingfire, Cobra, Malcara), the operator must constantly track the target an~_': the missile in flight and steer it into tha target by means of a control device, with the aid of which commands are transmitted to the missile by wire or radio. The comnands "Right," "Left," "Down," and "Up" are sent to the missile. Superimposing the target and missile onto a single point, thP operator steers the missile to the target. Thus in manual or command guidance systems there are three communication links which can be affected in order to prevent a tank from being hit: the weapon-target line, the misslle trajectory, and communication channels for transmitting commands from operator to missile (wires or radio channels). 208 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY It is noted that in combina*?Ion or semiautomatic guidance systems (MILAN, HQT, Dragon, Shillelagti) the operator tracka only the target. The missile automatically tracks the operator-target line, seeks to go onto this line, and follows it into the target. In these systems there are only two communication links: operator- _ target line, and missile f light trajectory. It,is sufficient to exert effective influence on just one communication link in order to prevent a tank hit. Tankers should utilize precisely this in combating enemy ATGM. In self-contained or automatic guidance systems, such as the Atlas, Mamba, and ~ Hellfire ATGM, the missile guides itself to the target. Therefore these systems contain only one communication link which must be acted upon in order to complicate ! or prevent a target hit. ~ I In order better to understand the mechanism of missile guidance to the target, we shall examine the semiautomatic guidance system employed by the French second- generation SS-11B1 ATGM.* Figure 6.2.4 contains a block diagram of this missile's semiautomatic guidance sys- tem. It operates as follows. The operator spots a mobile armored target with the aid of an optical instrument which is rigidly connected to the infrared guidance system sensor and, holding the target in the instrument's crosshairs, fires the missile. The semiautomatic guidance syatem commences to function as soon as the missile is fired. 4 nryv; U~rntuvecKUU 1 /lpoooila 2 SS-IIBI npu6op 3 noaeina ir~vP . - l/UNU.q qenu 5 /JyCKOBQA ycmarroaKa 6 yzoll anrcnolreNUA mpacKmopuu nonema 7 /ITYPC om nuriuu ycliv 8 Cyeml+o- pewa rou{ee yr.mpnucntoo ~ Tll Figure 6.2.4. Block Diagram of a Semiautomatic ATGM Guidance System Key: 1. instrument 2. Wires *-See REWE MILITAIRE GENERALE, July 1972. 209 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Key to Figure 6.2.4 (cont'd) 3. ATGM trajectory 6. Launcher 4. SS-11B1 ATCM 7. Angle of deviation of ATGM 5. Operator-target line trajectory from operator-target line 8. T11 computer The system's equipment, which detects the infrared radiation of the tracking flare on the missile in flight, automatically holds the missile on the operator-target line. If the missile deviates from the line to target, data on the deviation angie are fed into a computer (T11) hookedtip to the launcher, and the computer generates appropriate commands in the form of electrical pLlses transmitted by wire to the missile. These commands are transformed 3n the missile's onboard equipment into corresponding movement of the missile's controls, as a result of which it returns to the operator-target line. Analysia of existing foreign guidance systems indicates *_hat manual guidance of the missile to the target is essential in the majority of these systems. Many Western military experts note this as a shortcoming of ATGM. General [Zho Marzloff], for example, notes in an article entitled "Combat Against Tanks"* that during firing of an ATGM the controller-operator must the entire time track either the *?=~et and missile simultaneously or just tha target. If he loses sight of the target oi missile for several seconds, the ATGM may go astray. This is a very im- portant foctor for organization of countermeasures against antitank guided missiles and, in tha opinion of foreign military experts,** generates a number of attractive ideas for tank actions upon encountering an ATGM. 3. Methods of Tank Protection From and Countermeasures Against ATGM In view of the combat capabilities of ATGM and a trend toward heavily saturating troop combat formations with them, tnnkers should consider them enemy riumber one _ and possess the skill of combating them effectively. This is possible if one knows their strong and weak points. Foreign military experts consider the following to be the strong points of ATGM (Table 6.2.1): capability to pierce the thickest armor which tanks can carry 400-650 mm; versatile launch capability from ground and mobile launchers, including armored vehicles, fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft; high battlefield maneuverability and simplicity of operation; battlefield utilization capability against all targets; * See REVUE MILITAIRE GENERALE, July 1972. See TRUPPENPRAXIS, February 1977. 210 -rTT/'1TAT TTCF nNT.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY high moving target kill probability: 95 percent at maximum range, and 85 percent at minimum range.* Foreign military experts note the following as weak points of ATGM**: . the necessity of continuously tracking target and missile with-manual (com- mand) guidance systems and only the target with semiautomatic guidance; brief loss of the target from sight, which can result in the missile going - astray; considerable missile flight time to target; increased number of missile guidance failures as the missile proper becomes more concplex; existence of a"dead" zone to a distance of 300-500 meters from the launcher. Proceeding from an evaluation of the strong and weak points of ATGM, three modes of protection of tanks and countermeasures against ATGM are noted: group, in- dividual,, and passive. ~ With the group method of protecting tanks and countermeasures against ATGM, measures providing protection of the tanks of the entire attacking or defending subunit, as well as destroying or neutralizing hoatile ATGM are condlicted in a centralized manner, by orders of the senior commander. One of the most effective group methods of protecting tanks from and counter- _ measures against ATGM is tank employment of tactics which make it difficult for the adversary to employ ATGM. Such tactics include utilization by tank subunits of terrain conditions (ravines, gullies, woods, copses, inhabited localities, standing r.rops, and brush) for closing with the enemy and s3multaneous neutraliza- - tion of ATGM launcher positions with artillery fire or sirstrikes. The longer the time during which tanks remain unseen by enemy ATGM operators during closing ; to contact and assault, the greater the tanks' chances of survival. Utilization by tanks of rough terrain covered by brush, sparse trees or local _ - features can lead to premature detonation of ATGM if the warhead fuzes are set for instantaneous, or to loss of guidance as a consequence of breaking of command transmission wires from control box to missile. Figure 6.2.5 demonstrates the principle of utilization of terrain irregularities and local features for tanks closing with and neutralizing ATGM. Neutralization of ATGM launcher positions with nuclear weapons, massed artillery - fire and airstriices, as well as fire delivered by the attacking tank subunits, as noted in the foreign military press, is also a group method of protecting tanks Pram and countermeasures against ATGM. It was noted above that in order to score a tank hit, ATGM controller-operators must continuously maintain visual contact * ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Moscow, No 9, 1978. See ORDNANCE, September-October 1972. ~ 211 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ -~i~ " � i. _ _ _ � ' � '~R - ~ . _ ~ _ 2- _ . � ~i ' ~ ' ~ e~--4.- 4, 1~� _ r ~ r L/~~ - ~ _ _ - - ~ ~ _ ~ . : , = _ ' ~ ~y;.s ~ _ .r, , _ - = � - - - . . - " ,.r~ - � _ - _ ~ - ` � � � _ _ - Figure 6.2.5. Utilization of Terrain Irregularities and Local Features for il Tanks to Advance to and Attack an ATGM Launcher Position with the target in their guidance instrt:ments. If the tracker turns his head away for a few seconds, he will lose the missile. Nuclear bursts as well as air- strikes, and heavy artillery and mortar fire will force operators to seek brief = shelter, and consequently lose their target (Figure 6.2.6). irx 1 r--.. " ~ . � . . _ . . ,y ~ . . . _ ~1; v' _ 1,~~~~. _ . . ' . . . . � l'r - + t.�' , . . . ~ / ` ~ ~I~. I ' ~ _ r . ,~.~u,. ,~G, . . ~J~ ,~~~~~1~�;~~~~~,�. = \ Figure 6.2.6. Artillery Fire and Airstrike Countermeasures Against ATGM 212 - � - ,,,,n V APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Many foreign theorists believe that laying down smoke screens by aixcraft, with the aid of artillery and the tanks themselves, also constitute a means of gxoup protection of tanks. The appearance of a solid or limited-area smoke screen for- ward of ATGM launcher positions will cause controller-opezators to lose sight af the targets, and consequently lose their missiles as well. Employment of smoke screens on open terrain with sparse vegetation will be one- of the pxincipal means of groun protection of tanks. Figure 6.2.7 shows a method of group protection of tanks by laying smoke screens. Smoke screens can be employed, however, only in conditions where the wind 3s blowing in the direction of enemy ATGM positions or at a certain angle to them. , 4. ,~'''ppp _.,�.y. ~ / ~M` � :t, '4 ~-t.~s"-' ~ - ` ~ � ~ i.r... . I - ~ - � - _ - s _ M . . V t ~ , % _ - '~,~�tiv:''' ~,i~~. r.', � _ 4+4.,~ ~-'Z�-- 4 L : r~'~' �rti~ , ' _ _ - 'ti . �..r_s~'`y+.... . .;,,q~j.. . � :'i'i::... ;r'' �:a...::�... , ~ :::~i:;.e.....~. ~~i~l~~~ii'JY.:r: ~p~ s.r,+.:�:~:a' ~:.u~::~%';:c'�i.^:ii>~' .1i:~��..~v2.kL ~ .L~. Figure 6.2.7. Method of Group Protection of Tanks From ATGM Fire by Laying a Smoke Screen The opinion is expressed in the foreign press that j amming radio command missile guidance systems and employment of decoy targets to fool homing-guidance missiles can be a group method of protecting tanks from and countermeasures against ATGM.* The opinion is also expressed, however, that with properly organized ATGM radio - command guidance, jamming is extremely difficult. For example, the controls of second and third-generation ATGM (TOW, MILAN, HOT, ACRA, Hellfire) can operate in the 1-meter, decimeter, and centimeter bands. Therefore jamming must cover a * See ORDNANCE, September-October 1972. 213 FOR OFFTCIAL USE dNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY broad range of frequencies. And this requires radio and radar jamming transmitters with an output o� not less than 250 kw. Such jammers can be carried on armored vehicles proceeding in the combat formations of tanks, or on board aircraft es-- corting the attacking tanks. It is recommended that false radar targets be generated during a tank attack, which can also perform the role of group protection of tanks. False radar targets, such as corner and other reflectors, metal stxips, etc, can be generated by specially assigned armored vehicles proceeding ahead of the attacking tanks, as well as from the air by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. As regards homing missiles (ACRA, Mystic, Hellfire ATGM), in these instances it is - recommended that one consider the fact that their homing heads commence operating fairly close to the target 100-150 m. And this means that there will be very litr.le time available for jamming such m3.ssiles, and therefore protective measures must :+e undertaken by bounds, in a centralized manner, in the course of the attack. Foreign experts consider passive protection measures to include scattering of napalm flame generators or extended-flight flares by patrol and reconnaissance tanks or with the aid of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft on lines which tanks - will be crossing, as well as utilization of special tanks to generate protective smoke screens forward and on the flanks of attacking tanks. Stated in the foreign military literature is the idea of employing powerful search- lightsto generate infrared screens forward and on the flanks of attacking tanks to protect them against ATGM with infrared heat-seeking heads. It is believed that employment of such searchlights can be very effective. with the individual mode of protection and countermeasures, each tank protects it- ; self and conducts countermeasures against hostile ATGM independently. Each tank crew performs various measures, which foreign experts list as follows: employment of smoke shells, generators and bombs by individual tanks; camouflage and con- ~ - cealment of combat vehicles, utilization of active tank protection by destroying _ - ATGri in the field, as well as increasing tank armor resistance to shaped-charge warheads in order to reduce the effect of ATGM on an armored vehicle. Efforts to incxease armor resistance are being conducted in many countries.* Problems of , resistance of armored hulls have been studied sin ce the appearance of antitank artillery. Armor resistance to shaped-charge warheads, however, did not begin to be examj.ned until the development of shaped charges. Armor resistance to shaped- charge warheads can be achieved, on the MBT 70 tank, for example, by developing composite armor which can withstand high specific pressures and high temperatures. Since a shaped-charge ,jet burns through armor, heat-resisting components are em- ployed in composite armor, and skirting plates are employed to ensure armor resistance to shaped-charge warheads. Skirting pl.ates can vary (thin armor plates and metal screens mounted on the tank hull, etc). In Great Britain and the FRG, for example, armor plates are extensively employed as tank skirting plates.** For example, turret skirting plates, etc can be installed. * See J. Polk, "We Need a New Tank," ARMOR, July-August 1972. - See [B. Dyunets], "Tank Gun or Guided Missile?" ORDNANCE, September-October 1972. 214 - - - ,,.n APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The purpose of employirLg skirting plates is to cause a shaped charge to burst pre- maturely, putting the tank's main armor beyond the �ocal point of the shaped-charge jet, where the pressure and temperature of the jet reach a maximum.* Many foreign military exp erts believe that tank camouflage and concealment promotes their individual protection. Employment of camouflage makes a tank incon- spicuous against the terrain backgrcund and thus makes it more difficult to detect and observe when firing an ATGM. In addition, employment of antiradar coatings on tank armor (M60A1) supposedly makes them little vulnerable to radar-homing mis- siles. This coating, app lied under camouflzge, makes visual and radar detection of tanks difficult. Foreign experts also express the opinion that infrared camouflage is an important individual means of prote cting tanks against missiles with infrared homing guidance. Armored vehicle infrared camouflage measures reduce the quantity of heat given off by an armored vehicle to the environment, and thus reduce the sensitivity of ATGM heat-seeking missiles. This, in the opinion of foreign military experts, makes difficult tank detection by antitank guided missiles, and homing guidance heads capture the target at clase range, as a consequence�of which ATGM will frequently _ overshoot the target. Displacing the thermal center to one side or above a vehicle may be an important means of individual protection of tanks against ATGM.** The displacement point s hould radiate considerab].e heat and offer a target to heat- seeking ATGM. The missile may hit only the heat release point, leaving the tank unharmed. Finally, foreign military engineers believe that individual active protection of tanks by destroying ATGM on approach to the tank may be another significant measure. In past wars shrapnel and canister shot development in artillery was no mere happenstance. If it was necessary to hit enemy infantry and cavalry close to friendly troops, canister shot or grapeshot was employed, while shrapnel was em- - ployed if this was to be accomplished at a distance from artillery positions. It _ is believed that this idea can also be successfully utilized for organizing countermeasures a;ainst antitank guided missiles as they approach tanks. Western experts note that such individual means of active tank protection should include means of protnpt and timely detection of hostile ATGM and should operate as self-contained automatad systems. Without going into cost, but taking accounr of advances in radioelectronics and mechanics, they claim that such active mean:, of individual tank protection can be developed. We have examined above the group and individual modes of protecting tanks and countermeasures against ATGM, which differ in organization and extent of ineasures conducted. Both these modes in turn, however, can be active or passive in protection and countermeasures.*** * See ARMOR, July-August 1972. . See H. Wein, "Antitank Defense at Night," TRUPPENDTENST, May-June 1972. ***See REWE MILITAIRE GENERALE, Ju1y 1972; ARMOR, July-August 1972. 215 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Active mode of protection and countermeasures is defined as neutralization and destrucC.ion of ATGM at pxincipal launcher positions by airstrikes, artillery and tank fire, as well as by nuclear weapons, actively jamming ATGM guidance systems, and destroying ATCM during f light to the target with the aid of tank auxiliary or mnin armament. Passive modes of protection are defined as those which diminish the effectiveness of ATGM. They include thE following, according to data in the foreign press: em- ployment of concealing or obscuring smoke screens, skirting plates and composite armor on tanks, and false targets to confuse homing-guidance missiles. In conclusion we can state that the development of such antipodes as the tank and antitank missile once again confir[ns manifestation of the law of unity of opposites in military affairs. Improvement of modern tanks resulted in the development of antitank guided missiles, which in turn led to a new stage in improvement of tanks and development of new methods of their employment and countermeasures against ATGM. Therefore there are no objective groundj to claim the decline of tank troops and that the Lank has become obsolete on the b attlefield. Extensively employing modes of group and individual protection and countermeasures against ATGM, tank troops can successfully operate on the battlefields and maintain their predominance. As foreign mil3.tary experts believe, the tank will continue operating effectively on the battlefield for a long time to come and will consti- tute one of the principal factors in achieving victory in nuclear war. Therefore one of the princigal tasks of tank officers and combined-arms Wh~hnbatt lefields search for methods of tank operations in the war of today, will be saturated by all types of antitank weapons. 216 - � - ,,.n V APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Chapter 3. MOVEMENT OF TANK TROOPS 1. ConCemporary Warfare and Space The entire history of the art of warfare constitutes a continuous process of evolution of the means and modes of waging war. Weapons and other military equip- ment have changed and improved, and the modes of waging war have correspondingly changed. Development of modes of conduct of combat operations was accompanied by an increase in the spatial scope of the battlefield and war as a whole. If we trace the process of growth of the spatial dimensions of combat operations, we can establish a definite pattern, which consists 3.n the following: the dimen- _ sions of the battlefield and war as a whole have increased proportionately to in- crease in the power and range of weapons and increase in the nianeuver capabi.lities _ of armed forces. In other words, the greater the quantity of manpower and weapons, the better their performance characteristics (range, casualty effects, mobility), fihe larger the territory required far waging combat. The scale of maneuver of troops increases in connection with this, the conditions of their movement become _ more complex, and the character of maneuver changes. - Up to and including the 19th century, wars were restricted to that territory on which combat operations were directly conducted. The area over w'kich a battle took place was easily observable from a single command post. Adoption in the military of mass quantities of new weapons, which provided a sharp increase in voli.ime of fire and troop maneuver capabilities, led to a situation where by World War I the framework of combat operations had greatly expanded, con- tinuous fronts had appeared, and substantial territory adjacent to the battle line was now part of the area of military operations. The spat:ial scale of areas of combat operations increased to an even greater ex- tent in World War II. Battles were fought along gigantic continuous fronts, and the combat zone included substantial areas located deep within the territories of the belligerent nations. 217 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104460-1 a FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The proceas of incxease in the spatial scale of engagements and operations was ac- companied by change in the scale of troop movements. The larger the combat zone became, the more frequently occurred the need to improve tactical and opera- tional maneuvers for the sake of gaining victory over the adversary. Simultaneous- iy with this there occurred an increase in the role and significance of troop move- ments and depth of maneuver. AchievemenC of success in any engagement and opera- tion was Uecoming increasingly dependent on quickness of troop maneuver. Experience indicates that whoever skillfully utilized capability to execute broad maneuver of inen and weapons for the purpose of achieving superiority in manpower and weapons on a decisive axis, invariably secured the conditions for achieving victory. In February 1944, for example, the German-fascist command was attempting to rescue the troops of the encircled Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy force by mounting an attack with substantial forces in the vicinity of Lisyanka, but this attempt proved fruitless. Following a skillfully executed maneuver, the III and XVI Tank Corps and the XI Guards Tank Corps reached the threatened sector in a timely manner and mounted a powerful attack on the enemy. - In the past war tank troops very frequently shifted position both within the - boundaries of a battlefield and outside combat zones. These movements accounted for approximately 60 percent of their total time of combat operations. The role of movements will become even more important in a future war. The highly mobile character of combat operations, the possibility of mass casualties and the necessity of rapidly building up the efforts of farward-echelon troops, increased capabilities of the adversary to disrupt troop movements by rai1, as well as in- creased march capabilities of tank troops all this can result in a l.arge portion of combat activities of tank troops consisting in movement in march formation. It is also claimed that the depth of movement of tank troops by their own transport resources will increase. In the past war, in spite of the fact that combat operations were conducted over vast terxitories, a theater of war could be arbitrarily divided into the area in which combat operations were being conducted and an area which was relatively calm and in which the occurrence of war was indicated only by indirect signs. In these - ~ conditions tank and mechanized troops, when moving large distances, could travel by - rail right up to the zone immediately adjacent to the front. Air power was unable to break up rail traffic deep in the rear. Therefore tank and mechanized troops unloading areas were frequently 150-200 km or even less from the line contact. After unloading from trains, tank units and combined units as a rule had suffi.cient _ - time to become fully combat ready and for thorough organizatiori of movement and : comprehensive preparazion for forthcoming combat operations. It is true that in the course of World War II there were cases where tank and mechan- ized troops were forced to cover great distances as well under their own power. In - July 1943, for example, the IV Guards Tank Corps successfully executed a march from the vicinity of Zeinlyansk to the Oboyan' area, a length of 450 km, while in August 1944 the IV Guards Mechanized Corps traveled a distance of 600 km, from Dorobyantsii to Burgas. 218 .,rl� nTTT V APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 rbI< OFFICIAL USE ONLY Tt is noted in the foreign military press that under conditions of combat opera- tions with employment of nuclear weapons, weapons are capablz of surmounting any obstacles within minutes and of delivering a devastating attack on any target, at any distance. Consequently the most important rail and highway junctions, bridges, dams, as well as airfields and seaports may be subjected to nuclear attack and be put out of commission for an extended period of time. This nature of physical destruction on lines of communication limits possibilities of moving troops by rail or water transport. Therefore under these conditions tank troops will most frequent- ly travel even large distances under their own power. It is believed that the charactex of movement wi.ll also change to a significant degree. In the past troops, when executing a movement, were subjected to hostile countermeasures only in the immediate vicinity of the battle line, as well as on _ the battlefield when they would move for the purpose of taking a more advantageous position or line in relation to the adversary. In most cases conditions of troop movement outside the contact area essentially differed in no way from peacetime con- ditions. In the future, as indicated in the foreign press, conditions of movement will be in- - comparably more complex. Troops and lines of co=nunication at any distance from _ the front may be sub3ected to attack by offensive nuclear weapons, aircraft, air- borne assault troops and reconnaissance-raiding parties, and therefore any march becomes a complex combat mission, even outside the cambat zone and at a great dis- tance from the enemy. Enemy reconnaissance-raiding parties, armed with modern weapons, can inflict heavy casualties on advancing troops and create consi,derable ~ difficulties as they move forward. _ Now, it is claimed in the foreign press, it will be necessary for troops to expend - significant efforts on the march to maintain their combat efficiency, to negotiate obstacles, as well as to combat hostile aircraft, various enemy raiding parties and assault forces. In addition, tank troop movements can be accomplished at any time of the year, day and night, in any weather, and on various terrain, frequently off ' roads. Thus the conclusion is reached that modern conditior.s of combat operations require of tank troops the ability to travel long distances, at high speeds, and to arrive in - the destination area on schedule, at full strength, and maintaining full readiness to engage. 2. Modes of Travel. Long-Distance Marches Under present-day conditions tank troops may travel under their own power (that is, by march), rail and water transport, and combined mode, with simultaneaus or sequential utilization of two or several modes of transport. Selection of mode of troop traiisport is influenced by various factors:, scale, depth of movement, time allocated for its execution, status of lines of communication, availability and capability of ineans of transportation, condition of routes o� movement, and character of enemy activities. - 219 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040340100060-1 FOR QFFICIAL USE ONLY Movement of tank troopa under their own power. As is noted in the foreign press, thia type of movement is of particular significance, since it corresponds to the greatest degree to the demands and conditions of modern warfare. It is believed that travel by tank troops under their own power has a nuatber of advantages in comparison wit'h other modes of travel. First of all, a march ensures achieving a high rate of movement. It is apparent from the following graph (Figure 6.3.1), prepared on the basis of data in the foreign press pertaining to a U.S. Arnry armored division and a FRG Army tank division,that rail transport of troops - provides a time savings in comparison with movement under their own power only when traveling a distance of 2,000 km. Tn their opinion, the advantages of tank troops traveling under their own power are not limited merely to achieving a high rate of movement. Of primary significance under present-day conditions is securement of the organizational integrity of subunits, and their constant readiness to perform com- bat missions at all stages of motrement. Today t}:is requirement ev idently can be met with troopa traveling under their awn power. In addition, when executing a march under their own power,.tank troops have better capability to maneuver for the purpose of crossing or bypassing zones of phyaical destruction and radioactive - contamination, and also possess relative independence of large stationary installa- tions on lines of communication, which can be destroyed by the enemy. 12 flepe603n0 008fitiiM(1) II mpaicnoprnoM ~ 10 ~ 9 ~2~ AcpeooaHa no H,eneanou ~ dopv2e 7 6 4 3 Z IICpCdOUNlCfUB GOULIM X0f30A1 (3) ~ (4) Paccmnanuc o 200 400 600 eoo non zoo iann 1600 ienn zono 2200 aaoo e rrM Figure 6.3.1. Graph of Time Expenditures When an Arnored Division Travels by Various Modes Key: 1. Travel by water transport 3. iravel under own power 2. Travel by rail 4. Distance _ Let us see what march capabilities are possessed by tank troops. The principal indicators characterizing the�march capabilities of troops are average rate of movement, vehicle range on one fueling, motor capacity,,and tracks. March capabilities depend on proficiency of driver personnel, ability of commanders to lead columns, state of equipment, routes, and weather. 220 �..~..t Ar trnr l11,TT V APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104460-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY We know that the average rate of movement of troops depends primarily on the maneuver and operational characteristics of combat and transport vehicles. During the Great Patriotic War tank units and combined units, equipped with T-34 tanks, executed marches at an average speed of 20-25 km/h. Tn September 1944, for example, the V Guards Tank Corps traveled at an average of 20-25 km/h far a distance of more than 300 km. Today's tanks boast better performance, and therefore the average rate of movement of tank troops today can be greater. The rate of movement of columns, and consequently troop march capabilities are sig- nificantly affected by the level of proficiency of driver personnel. For example, top proficiency-rated drivers can drive the same vehicles, under identical condi- tions, at an average speed of 25-30 percent greater than drivers of the lowest proficiency rating. The physical capabilities of personnel are also of great importance. It is believed abroad that 12-14 hours at the controls can be a normal daily work load for drivers. Of the remaining hours in the day, drivers should spend 5-6 hours resting, 1.5-4 hours taking meals, and approximately 3-4 hours servicing their tank. Proceeding from this calculation and allowable average speeds, tank columns, in the opinion of U.S. military experts, can cover a distance of 300 km in a 24-hour period. Tank range on one fueling, by motor capacity and tracks is an important factor which influences troop march capabilities. Range on one fueling for today's principal foreign tanks (M60A1, Leopard 2, AMX-30, Sheridan) can be approximately 500 km on one fueling, 6,500 km or more by motor capacity, and up to 8,000 km for tracks. It follows from the above that modern tank troops possess excellent march capabili- ties and are capable of executing marches of considerable distances at a rapid pace under complex situation conditions, while maintaa.ning a high degree of combat readiness. Tank troope tr3vc1 uy rail. I:. spite of the obvious advautages of u uVeiisig under their own power, in many instances tark troops, when traveling great distances, _ wi.11 employ another mode of travel rravel by rail. This mode of transportation makes it possible quickly and more economically to accomplish the mission of moving large masses of troops. Combat vehicles do not run up mileage, less personnel energy is expended, and troops can travel at high speed in all wPdther. But this mode oE r.ravel also has drawbacks. The most important is the Fact that the or- ganizational integrity of subunits and units is disrupted. In addition, units , stretch out to considerable depth, because of which, after the first trains arrive in the new area, troops require a certain amount of time to reach a battleworthy state. As is noted in the foreign press, another serious drawback is the fact that man-made structures on rail lines are vulnerable to attack by nuclear missile weapons, airstrikes, and attacks by enemy raiding-reconnaissance parties. Capabilities to move tank troops Uy rail transport depend primarily on speed of loading and off-loading, speed of trains, rail line traffic capacity, and availability of loading areas and rolling stock. 221 FUR OFF'9CIAL i.lSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY During World War II1, when moving tank units by rai.l in the European countries, the rate of movement of trains amounted to 300-500 km per day. Tn the summer of 1944, for example, dur ing niovement by rail of units of the German-`ascist 9th and lOth Panzer divisions from Poland to Nancy, trains traveled at a zate of more than 400 km per day. Under present-day conditions, in connection with further development and improve- ment of the rail network, as well as upgrading of rolling stock, including motive power, train speeds have increased. Foreign military experts recommend that these capabilities be utilized in a period of conduct of combat operations without em- ployment of nuclear weapons, and in a number of instances even with employment of nuclear weapons, although the traffi.c capacity of rail lines may sharply decrease. Carrying tank t roops by water txansport. This mode is employed chiefly in transporting troops from one theater to another. Transporting tank troops in coastal sectors will obviously involve considerable difficulties which, according to data in the f oreign press, consist primarily in the following. Under present-day conditions large numbers of ships will be requirrtexamplePomore tank troops by water. According to figures in the foreign press, fo _ than 20 large t ransports are required to move one armored division. It is believed that it will be difficult to assign such a large number of transports, since with the outbreak of hostilities means of txansportation at the disposal of the m. tary wi11 be utilized on a priority basis for amphibious of shipsng forcesIn the As conbat experi.ence indicates, this wi11 require a large the Americans amphibious landing operation in Korea in September 1950, for example, employed a tot al of 250 warships and vessels to land a reinforced Marine division and an infantry division (a total of 40,000 men). Another difficulty lies in the fact that special cargo handling equipment is re- - quired for loading and off-loading tanks and other heavy equipment, which will be in short supp ly with mass shipping of inen and equipment and if port facilities are damaged by attack. As a consequence of this, loading and off-loading of tank troops will require considerable time. In addition, it will be necessary to assign certain naval and air forces to escort a convoy of transports to the destina- t.10115, diversi on of which to perform secondary missions is undesirable. Foreign military Qxperts reach a conclusien from all this that water transport cannot be wide ly employed at the present time for transporting tank troops in coastal sector s. - The situation may change in the future, however. military leaders attach grear importance to construction of large tank landing ships. Such veeshoreke it possible to load and off-load personnel and equipment from an unequipped , = substantially reducingloading noatransport.arenincreasedon with this, capabilities to move tank trooPs by water 3. Organization of March and March Support It is believed that timely and comprehensive preparation for movementi predetermines the success of a march to a significant degree. In order for tank troops to be able to utilize in fu11 measure all their maneuver capabilities, comprehensive - 222 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040340100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY preparation for aud organizat3on of a march are essential, which will require a cer- tain amount of time. At the same time, under present-day conditions it will ob- vioudy often be necessary to organize movement of troops on a tight timetable. Con- trol agencies may be faced with the necessity of accomplishing several tasks simultaneously: making troops combat ready, restoring their battleworthiness, as well as other measures. This wi11 require of commanders and staffs a high degree of organization and work efficiency. Only under this condit3.on will there be created guarantees that all requisite measures pertaining to preparing for move- ment will be accomplished on a tight timetable. A high degree of organization and efficiency in the performance of control agencies in organizing troop movements can be achieved as a result of application of the most expedient, scientifically substantiated methods of decision-making and move- ment planning. Only with correct methods is it possible to guarantee the per- tormance of control agencies and to reduce their work to a specific system, to en- sure efficient sequential and parallel work by several echelons. = The conditions under which preparation for travel takes place can be quite _ diversified, and therefore one must assume that the work methods of control agencies will also be diversified. Certain general principles, however, are characteristic of this work. ' Combat experience has shown that in conditions where there is inadequate time for organizing troop movement, staffs usually employ approximately the following method. Upon receiving a task assignment, the commander studied it together with his closest aides. Parallel with this, the mission was marked on a map. Following mission briefing, those items were determined which had to be handled without delay. First of all the matter of organization of reconnaissance and security was deter- mined, as well as traf.fic control service. Then the main decision items (depth of march, routes, march formation, start point - and start point passage time by heads of coiumns) were determined on the basis of a concise estimate of the principal situation elements and consolidated calcula- tions. In order to reduce decision-making time, reference figures prepared in ad- vance by the staff were utilized, particularly such data as quantity and status of ~ weapons and equipment, quantity of supplies available, and calculations for move- ment in several variants (depending on the march formation, road and other situa- tion COI1C1it10L1S). Warning orders would be issued on the basis of the march plan, indicating length o.ti march, routes, and start point passage time. ACter this the cominander and his aides would calculate the march in detail, deter- mine time_of troop passage of control points and arrival in the destin ation area (if ilot specit-ied by the higher command echelon), would work out matters of march !~:upport, woiild complete preparation of a road movement graph, and would draw up written combat documents. If the necessity arose, the commander would refine his ciecision. 223 POR UFFICIAL [JSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104460-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE OIVLY This mezhod shortens the time xequired to organize a march, since it makes it pos- sible to organize parallel work at several echelons and promotes precise, purpose- ful efforts by all control agencies. A march decision can be correct only when it takes into account the situation attd requirements of forthcoming combat operations andis based on thorough, precise cal- culations. One should bear in mind that movement is not an end in itself; it creates favorable preconditions for accomplishing the principal mission, defeating the adversary in combat. It is noted in the foreign press that under conditions of massive employment of modern weapons and ha.ghly mobile ground and airborne assault troops, the situation may change rapidly and abruptly 3n the course of a march. Therefore traveling subunits and units, even at a considerable distance from the line of contact, may be forced without warning to engage the enemy. On the basis of this, foreign mili- tary experts advance the demand that, when making his march decision, the com- mander should first of all determine a plan of action in case of an encounter with . the enemy and should specify what grouping of forces should be secured in the ; designated area. These questions are abviously of determining significance for elaboration of other decision elements and, in particular, elements such as struc- ture of the march formation, routes, movement support, etc. As is emphasized in the foreign military press, there does not exist a standard march formation. It depends on the presumed actions taken by the adversary, the assigned missic-, existence and state of roads, weather conditions, and troop march capabilities. In determining march formation one usually proceeds from the position that it en- - sure combat independence and stability of march columns against enemy weapons, freedom of maneuver and continuous readiness for rapid deployment into combat for- _ mation, optimal conditions for control, logistical support and maximum utilization of vehicle performance capabilities= preservation of combat equipment and conserva- tion of energy of personnel, etc. Not all these demands, however, are equally important in all circumstances, Depend- ing on concrete conditions, sometimes one demand and at other times another demand is the most important. For example, in executing a march under conditions where direct encounter with the enemy is little probable, means of transport are utilized in the most efficient manner. If tanks are executing a march when there is a threat of encountering hostile ground troops, the interests of conduct of combat against the enemy are paramount. Therefore it is recommended that the march formation ensure xapid dispersion of troops and prompt deployment into combat formations upon encountering the enemy, en- suring swift deployment and engagement without a halt in attack position. Timely and organized movement of tank troops depends in large measure on precise planning. The essence of march planning consists in various calculations and in concrete determination of the sequence of troop actions during the movement, as well as in elaboration of comprehensive support measures. Of all the calcula- tions perFormed by the staff, calculat3on of the march is the most complex and laborious. 224 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFF[CIAI, IiSE ONLY - March calculation fox tank subunits and units executing a max'ch with organic vehicles consists in distributing allocated time among movement, rest, messing, refueling, maintenance and inspecfiion of equipment, as well as in determining the time the column will take to pass a given point, time of passage of the start point ~ and control goints, and time of arrival in the destination area. Fuel consumption is al5o determined in performing march calculations. Tfte principal demand on a troap movement calculation is accuracy, which is achieved by carefully taking account of all the conditions of the movement. Even minor errors in calculations can lead to serious consequences (to delay in reaching _ destination arPas or deployment lines, to creation of traffic jams on roads and in front of obstacles, and to troop casualties at these locations). As is noted in the foreign military press, initial data for march calculation _ usually include composition of troops, routes; number and length of march segments; time allocated for accomplishing the march; march formation; rate of movement of march columns on individual route segments; start point and traffic contxol points; areas and duration of halt (day's halt, night halts). - In order to reduce the time required to perform march calculations, such data as number of vehicles in subunits, march formation variants, column length, composition . of reconnaissance agencies, march security, traffic control manpower and facilities obviously will be prepared by the 3taff in advance and be detailed when the mission is assigned. Various slide rules, tables, graphs, nomograms and other automation devices can be used to speed up calculations. Figure 6.3.2 contains a nomogram (set up with logarithm scales) for determination of column length based on number of vehicles and vehicle lead, as well as time dis- tance on the basis oE road distance and rate of march. It is convenient to utilize a scale rule to perform rough operational-tactical cal- culations (Figure 6.3.3). _ The march plan is drawn up as a result of performed calculations, indicating all principal measures pertaining to troop movement. It is one of the principal planuing documents. Organization of movement under present-day conditions is not limited to reaching the conimander's decision, formulation of missions, and planning the n..,vement. Of importance for successful execution of a march are measures pertaining to combat, tipecial and rear ser.vices support of the march, the purpose of which is to provide the troops with conditions for successful accomplishment of the assigned tasks, to protect tliem from surprise air and ground attack, to maintain their fighting effi.ciency and to give them the opportunity promptly to execute dispersion or maneuver in order to bypass dangerous areas, successfully to accomplish a move- uient under any and all situation conditions, and to provide the troops with every- Llling Lhey need. '1'tie inevitability of an abrupt situation change in the course of a march, increased capability to hit troops in movement, the great length of marches arld high rate of march intr.oduce, as is indicated in the foreign press, a number of specific 225 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY KunoMempbl (1) gpew (3) - rliorocnb (2) r 3oz~o - (40)- 40 MUft (q) 250 220 100 (50) SUMUii 0 170 IGD (GU) 1 vac - 150 140 (6) (70) 1410MUt 13U I7.0 cw7nucale rtepr,c~~u- (eo) 14 20MUH (12 ) (7) III~ N,i ff H(CNUA z (yO) - II UMB NfZ I430MUI1 K nUVCC t 3) "'auru~~~ _ puMep ~ ~u Paccmos~HUd S M eo wuM (rou) . 1114 oMUi ~ 90~9J ~s , H'~ Ao(A) (10 'On~y l ucnruf+uuu Me~rrB yM_am. 1,iSOMU~" 7vacu (5) !'nGuiia(9) s ~ zv roMUll KO tUlll161 7o(7) i ~ OM 6- (15U) 2 4 T.OMUN r ~14~ 2, 4 30MUli [jCMp \ Z 4 4OM(IH nepeBoweHUA ~ ~ 2 430M1111 y 3 4l]C(7 i10 5(10) ) ISnM/ - 25M (200)1' 3tr lOn+uic - S 4 2Omiiir ~3 4 3O M 1l ll 110(4). ~qK (ZJO) 4 4l]GO _ A 7 (300) 51401coo . (i I(IOM 30(J) 5 6 vacoo 4 (^00) 7 4oCOo ,S 5UM 20(2 (,500) 8 vacoo Z 9 vacoa (600) Io yacoo 15(1,5 25M 11 yacoo - (700) 12 fracao Aucma~uuu (soo) ' (11) (900) 15 yacoa Kon, MU(UUH (13) 1)iy6ur+a Konoi+H (9 ) Figure 6.3.2. Nomogram for Determining Column Length and Time Distance Key: 1. Kilometers 3. Road distance _ 2. Speed 9. Column length _ 3. Time 10. km/h 4. Minutes 11. Lead - 5. Iiours 12. Example 2 6. Rate of march 13. Number of vehicle 7. Example 1 14. Time distance 226 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104460-1 FOR OFFICIAL [1SE ONLY .Macwma6r+aQ tunana c yvemon, (2) u3ounucmocmu 80po2 (1) (30M)OrCMAHOOC1110HOQHy Nue naccmouHUUe e ~aoucuMOCmu / ~3~ om cHO ecmu 60KM SOKM 40NM 30KM/ ZOKM IOKM J430M+(J0) 3450M 3410M 24+(,30M) 1y20M 0440M 3430M 34 2w+(JOM) 1430M 24 0430M 24+(30M) 1440M 14201w ly 0440M 0420M SOHM 40 KM 3016M ZOKM IOHM (5) WKana paccmoArruu 6e3 yvemo u30unucmocmri 8opoz Figure 6.3.3. Rule for March Calculation K D Key: l. Halt time 3. Time distance in relation to 2. Scale taking into account speed road twisting 4. Speed 5. Scale of distances, without taking road tiaisting account features into the form and content of support. For example, at a considerable dis- tance from hostile ground troops main efforts in the area of troop march support are focused on providing columns with cover against air attack, on providing security to roads, bridges, river crossings and the entire marc.h formati_on against surprise attacks by various partisan forces. As a column approaches the front, march com- bat support is subordinated to the interests of engagement of the troops and creation of the most favorable conditions for deployment. Due ro the great number of ineasures pertaining to support as well as their com- plexity, they caniiot be fully examined in this volume. Therefore we shall discuss below anly certain aspects of security and traffic control. Reconnaissance. Tn the opinion of foreign military experts, organization of recon- - naissance during long-distance movements involves certain difficulties. This is due to the iack of situation clarity to the entire distance of the march and in- crease iti r.he extent of missions performed by reconnaissance. In addition to normal missions of spotting the enemy, reconnaissance is assigned missions pertaining to determination of routes, degree of terrain trafficability off roads, and collection of information on the radiation and bacteriological (biological) situation along the route and in the troop concentration area. The capabilities of troops en route to conduct reconnaissance are limited. This can be compensated to a certain degree by obtaining requisite information from higher headquarters and directly from air reconnaissance, and as the troops ap- proach the front from units operating out ahead. T.t is noted that intelligence obtained from these sources cannot fully satisfy the command when making the march decision, as a consequence of which it may become 227 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104460-1 = FOR OFFICIAL USE ON1.Y necessary to supp�lement or refine the information obtained from higher head- quarters. Reconnaissance subunits of the moving troops will pe-rform these mis- sLons, concentrating their attention on obtaining information on those vehicles - aud installations which are of the greatest interest at this time. It is quite obvious that this will affect the composition of reconnaissance agencies, t'_:eir place in the march and distance from the main forces. Therefore when the mission is recei.ved, each route is reconnoitered, with a - detailed study of the terrain (the state not only of the roads as a whole, but also individual stretches, condition of bridges, river crossing sites, etc), determination of potential areas of dropping (landing) airborne assault forces along the route of movement, spotting of obstacles and detection of contaminated areas, scouting out bypass routes around these areas, and detailed information on the radiation and biological situation. As is noted in the foreign press, during execution of a march under conriitions of absence of threat of encountering the enemy, reconnaissance teams on board heli- copters are sent out in advance to reconnoiter routes, halt and rest areas, and to select control facility sites, as well as engineer reconnaissance patrols and trafEic control subunits. Sending out reconnaissance teams does not exclude detailing reconnaissance sub- - units for conducting ground reconnaissance, detailing the condition of individual sections of road, detour roufies, marking them, determining the boundaries of con- taminated areas, areas of physical destruction, etc. If a march is being executed in anticipation of engagement, main efforts are focused on reconnoitering the enemy. Strong reconnaissance patrols are es- tablished for this purpose. Foreign military experts believe that the pace of conduct of reconnaissance is = somewhat slower than the potential rate of movement of troop columns. Therefore helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft are employed in some armies to speed up the pace of conduct of reconnaissance. In the U.S. Army, for example, air reconnais- sance at the division level is conducted by and rotary-wing aircraft of the aerial reconnaissance company of a reconnaissance battalion and army aviation bat- talion to a depth of 150 km. Of course these agencies conduct reconnaissance in close coordination with ground reconnaissance agencies, devoting particular at- tention to route reconnaissance and, if a meeting engagement occurs, they observe _ combat actions and adjust artillery f ire. Foreign military experts emphasize that reconnaissance missions can be successfully _ performed if not only reconnaissance but also march security subunits are assigned to tliis mission, as well as manpower and equipment from the main force columns. Security. Modern conditions of movement of tank troops require organization of march security capable of ensuring unhinciered movement of main force columns, of . warning the protected troops of a surprise enemy attack, providing conditions for engagement and preventing penetration of hostile ground reconnaissance to the route of movement of the protected troops. - 228 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040340100060-1 FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY At the same time, forea,gn militaxy experts be].ieve that the si.tuation and condi- tions of movement will demand great efforts in organizing such security. Increase in the effective range of offensive weapons and a rapid rate of closing of opposing forces require that security agencies be at a substantial distance from the main forces. In addition, an excessively large gap between forward subunits and the main forces impedes engagement of the main forces, does not help in seizing the initiative, and deprives a force of advantages in building up efforts upon en- countering the enemy. Therefore at the present time it is believed in the armies of the NATO countries that troop security missions can be accomplished by coordi- nated effo rts of reconnaissance, covering force and march security subunits, per- sonnel and weapons assigned to security and defense of vehicles and facilities en route, as well as constanti readines on the part of all subunits to perform par- ticular combat missions pertaining to supporting the movement of t'he main forces. In the abs ence of a stable front and threat of ineeting engagements, many foreign _ armies follow the practice of sending out covering units. These units beat the adversary in seizing important positions, and support deployment and engagement of - ttie main forces. They are also assigned the mission of conducting reconnaissance along the route of movement of friendly forces. In contrast to an advan ce guard, Eorward fo rces operate at a greater distance from the main forces, reach the destination earlier, and therefore encounter the enemy sooner. As a rule security su:units are sent out a short distance ahead of the main forces. In the U.S. Army, for exsmple, the advance guard of each division main force column includes up to a reinforced battalion. Depending on the situation, the advance - guard should be far enough ahead to ensure gaining time and deployment of the main force column beyond the range of aimed artillery fire. According to information in the foreign prass, however, advance guards can be even further ahead, such as in those instances where more than 30 minutes is required for deploying and readying to fire those weapons moving up under the cover of the advance guard. In executir:g a march deep to the rear of friendly forces, columns can be provided cover solely by immediate security. In the opinion of foreign military experts, uiider pres ent-day conditions tank troops will experience great difficulties in organizing flank security, since it is capable of covering only a portion of the ~ main force column of protected troops. The little effectiveness of flank security is complicated in many instances by a lack of suitable roads. As a rule forced to travel on ill-suited, difficult roads or cross-country, ilank guards have inevitably fallen behind their guarded columns. Missions of covering the main forces in NATO armies are assigned to a subunit which moves as an element of the column on the threatened flank. At the same time the _ main force column is continuously air-patrolled. The column commander, upon receiving intelligence, immediately moves the designated subunit to the threatened secror. S tarionary f.lank guards are set out where the threat of enemy advance and attack is most proUable. 229 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 41)P. OFIFiCIAL USE ONLY , Under present-day conditions, traffic control and regulating have assumed excep- tional importance. To the normal tasks assigned the traff3.c control service _ (regulating movement, monitoring and inspection to ensure that troops observe the estat>l.ished procedure of movement, camouflage and concealment measures), in con- nection with the threat of employment o'L nuclear weapons, are added such tasks as route security, conduct of radiological and chemical reconnaissar.ce, engagement of enemy reconnaissance-raI'cling parties, assistance to control agencies in troop control, as well as securement of the organized movement of the local civilian population. = The increased volume of tasks evokes the necessity of increasing expenditure of manpower and equipment. Personnel and equipment requirements will be especially , large during execution of a long-distance march. It is claimed abioad that under these conditions it will be necessary to assign to each route two traffic control ~ details, which can perform thei.r tasks sequentially by leapfrogging, at day's - march intervals. Some foreign military experts believe that one way to reduce expenditure of per- sonnel and equipment on orgunization of traffic control and regulating is exten- sive adoption of the method of escorting columns by traffic control subunits. Such a method of regulating traffic is successfully employed, for example, in the armies of the NATO countries. Mobile regulating posts proceed at the head of the column in automobiles (motorcycles), halting oncoming vehicles by signals, and setting up stationary rPgulation posts where necessary. Another mobile post proceeds at the tail of the column, preventing the column from being overtaken and ren.oving traffic controllers set out by the column-head mobile post. Such a method of traffic control is also advantageous because it enables commanders to move columns confidently at maximum possible speed. This is due to the fact ttiat commanders reconnoiter the route thoroughly and in advance, are thoroughly briefed not only on route con3ition, but also on alternate routes, detours, detours around built-up areas, obstacles, alternate river crossings, etc. Escorting columns with a mobile traffic control detail, however, does not meau elimination of the system of stationary traffic control and regulating posts. There remains the need to set out stationary posts at railroad crossings, at river- crossing sites, and in large built-up areas, but tneir number is greatly reduced with the above traffic control variant. 4. Lxecution of a Depending on the situation of the troops, a march may be preceded by forming up marcli columns and moving them out past the start point, which requires a consider- able time expenditure. In addition, reconnaissance entities, traffic control sub- units, sectirity and other combat support subunits are usually sent out atiead before the main Eorces proceed to move. All this, under conditions of an acute shortage _ of time, demands particular flexibility and efficiency in the performance of com- manders and staffs. The march begins at the moment when the start point is passed by the heads of the main force columns. The success of the march movement will depend to a certain 230 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY degree on how promptly troops pass this poirt and their degree of or.ganization. I.t is therePore not surprising that in the past war troop passage of the start polnL- would usually be monitored by staff officers. These officers, possessing in- formation on the composition of the columns, their structure, and the precise schedule o.f departure of units and subunits, could when necessary take measures on the spot to impose order and ensured organized commencement of a march. Movement of march columns in the course of a march is usually controlled with intermediate passage points. At the commencement of a march, in addition to control to ensure on-schedule troop passage of the start puint and intermediate control points, commanders and staffs devote particular attention to ensuring that troops observe the specified march order and discipline, and ensure that columns move at the specified speed and in the specified direction. For this purpose, specially designated officers at con- troa_ points monitor the state of the passing troops, collect situation data and report this data to headqu3rters. We should note that the command experiences considerable difficulties in exercising continuous troop control, especially when particular tasks arise (crossing rivers, contamination zcnes, restoring battleworthiness, destro.irg a`rborne assault forces, etc). The main difficulty lies in the fact that control should be exercised in the course of movement of control agencies and troops with major restrictions in utilization of radio communication gear. _ In order to overcome these difficulties, it is recommended in the foreign military press that command posts set up on helic.opters be extensively utilized for troop control under these conditions. riaintaining organization and discipline on a march ensures its successful execution. Columns and individual vehicles drive only on the right side of the road. Each vehicle proceeds in its assigned position in the column, maintaining the specified speed and gap. Vehicles which fall behind retake their places at the next halt. Ttie necessity may arise for one column to pass another. This is permitted, however, only with the authorization of the senior counnander and with observance of measures preventing accidents between vehicles and mixing up of subunits. When such a passing is required, the column being passed halts on the right shoulder or off the road to the right. lt is very importaitt to ensure unimpeded passage of large built-up areas. In Lhe past war tank troops as a rule slowed down considerably in towns and cities. - Under present-day r.onditions, with a greater probability of tormation of all kinds oP obstacles in built-up areas, it is essential to endeavor to bypass them. If no bypass routes are available, traffic control is set up in built-up areas. Columns p ass tlirough built-up areas in the specified order, without halt, with increased gaps, and at the greatest possible speed. [';ink subunits and units may execute marches at night for purposes of concealment, aC 'Ar(iicli time a complete blackout is particularly important. In this case drivers em- pluy night vision devices. During daylight hours troops are dispersed along the r outes bar;: from tfie main road, observing camouflage and concealment procedures. During daylight hours personnel inspect and maintain equipment, take meals and rest. 231 FOR UFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OF'FICIAL [ISE ONLY Urillzat.'ton only of the liours of daxknesa for executing movements, however, has the drlwback that the pace of a night march is slower than that of a daylight march. Therefore, as !.s indicated by the foreign military press, troops may also move during the day, but in sma11, compact g,roups. In the course oF a march, when there occurs the threat of enemy employment of nuclear weapons, upon receivingrui appropriate warning signal, the troops take re- quisite protective measures and continue moving. At the same time surveillance, radiological and chemical reconnaissance are stepped up, and appropriate instru- ments are switched on more frequently than usual. jdhen the enemy delivers nuclear strikes, those subunits which have maintained their battleworthitiess shall continue moving in order to leave as quickly as pos- sible the areas of physical destruction and heavy radioactive contamination. The commander and his staff shall estimate the situation, determine the status of the subunits which have been hit by enemy attack, and shall take measures to restore their combat efficiency. Neutralization of the consequences of nuclear strikes should not del,ay the movement of battleworthy troops. The roadway shall be rapidly clear of burned-out and damaged vehicles. - In the course of a march it may become necessary for tanks to negotiate a contami- n ated zone or to get out of such a zone as quickly as possible. Obviously the method of crossing a contaminated zone will be determined on the basis of levels of radiation in the zone, length of routes and possible speed of movement along them, as well as the demands of the operational-tactical situation. Contaminated zones - shall be crossed at the maximum allowable speed in a direction ensuring the least degree of irradiation of personnel. These directions, as is noted in the foreign press, can be indicated by radiological reconnaissance by helicopter. In the con- taminated zone gaps between vehicles shall be increased sufficiently so that dust f xom the vehicle ahead does not strike the f411owing vehicle. Contamination zones can also be bypassed, but usually with the permission of or on orders by the seni.or commander. This is due to the fact that bypassing always re- quir_es a route change, while an independent change of direction of movement with- out taking into account the missions of adjacent units can lead to crossing of routes and formation of traffic jams on roads. Zones with radiation levels, detouring around which is impossible or inad- visable, will evidently be crossed after high radiation levels drop off, by decision of the senior commander. After leaving a contamination zone, parti al decontamina- tion will be performed at the first opportunity (usually on halts and day's halts), casualties will be determined, as well as the degree of radioactive contamination of personnel. lluring a march under present-day conditions, troops may be subjected to air attack at practically any distance from the line of contact. Therefoze a high degree of preparedness to repel hostile aircraft and to diminish the ef.fectiveness of air- strikes is maintained cluring the entire marc.h and during halts. Troop actiorLs on the appearance of enemy airplanes and helicopters can vary, depending on the situation. When natural screens are available along a road, a column shall halt 232 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY along a route segment sheltered from aerial observation. If movement is occurring on open terrain, subunits shall continue movement, increasing gaps between vehicles, and sometimes assuming a dispersed formation as well. All weapons which can engage hoatile aircraft shall open fire. Protection of moving troops against actions by partisan forces and enemy airborne assault forces assumes great importance under present-day conditions. Foreign military experts believe that in order successfully to handle airborne as- - sault forces and partisans, it is essential that all necessary measures be = spec3fied in advance, while the commander is formulating his decision and during preparation for the march. It is pointed out that in the course of a march, with acquisition of intelligence on areas of partisan activities and enemy airborne assault forces, troops shall take measures to beef up reconnaissance, security of bridges and other bottlenecks on the immediately protected route. Colums are patrolYed by helicopter gunships. = It is believed that only minimal forces must be enlisted for aggressive actioris against partisan forces and enemy airborne assaults, primarily reconnaissance sub- units, march security, traffic control service, as well as subunits specially as- signed to these missions. The main body of troops should continue moving in order to reach the destination on schedule, maintaining a high 1eve1 of combat efficiency. There may also oc- cur departures from this principle, however. Tt is possible that tank subunits in the march formation will be called onto destroy airborne assault forces and raiding-reconnaissance detachments. Thus the success of a march depends on thQrough organization 2.nd comprehensive support, firm cons:rol and observance of discipline. 233 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Chapter 4. MEETING ENGAGEMENTS ADMIRABLY SUITED FOR TANK TROOPS l. Essence of the Meeting Engagement Characteristic of modern combat operations are a large scale, rapid pace, swift and abrupt situation changes. In connection with the extensive adoption of tanks in the armies of all major countries, combat operations have become swift and mobile. In the course of these operations, conditions for the occurrence of ineeting engage- ments and encounter battles become particularly frequent, in which the principal advantages of tank troops are manifested most fully great striking power and f irepower, high mobility and survivability. Considerable attention has always been devoted to elaboration of theory of the meeting engagement in Soviet art of warfare. Analysis of Red Army combat opera- tions in the civil war and subsequently in the Great Patriotic War were the basis for this. Classic examples of the conduct of successful meeting engagements with large, high- ly mobile enemy forces were provided by the Red Army cavalry in the civil war at Orel, Kromy, Voronezh, and Kastornaya. Its swift and surprise attacks on the enemy from the flanks ar.d rear swiftly broke up superior enemy forces and made it pos- - sible subsequently to crush them piecemeal in short order. In the majority of en- _ gagemenC' s the Red Army cavalry in the civil war achieved victory by virtue of swiftnef;s of actions and concealed maneuver, while not possessing superiority of forces over the enemy. ' Taking into account the experience of combat employment of cavalry, as well as correctly evaluating the capabilities of a new combat arm tanks Soviet mili- tary theorists noted in the first years after the civil war that massed employment - of large tank combined units, in coordination with other forces and weapons, sub- stantially expands the offensive capabilities of troops and dictates the occur- r.ence of ineeting engagements. The essenee of the meeting engagement as a mobile , cype of off ensive action in which both sides seek to accomplish their missions by attack was quite clearly defined. It was belzeved that meeting engagements will most Lrequently begin directly from the march (Provisional Field Service Regula- tions ot the Workers and Peasants RPd Army, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1936, page 140). During the Great Patriotic War theory of the meeting engagement experienced further development. In particular, practical experience indicated that meeting engagements 234 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 14 can occur not only from the march but also in the course of an attack or in the defense (during the conduct of counterattacks against an advancing adversary). For example, the Fa.eld rianual of Red Army Armored and i�techanized Troops (Part II, page 297), published in 1944, stated that "the meeting engagement of armored and mechanized troops is usually conducted deep in the enemy's dispositioris during ex- _ ploitation of success or during mounting of counterthrusts against an advancing ad- versary." The definition of the essence of the meeting engagement as given in the prewar years was conf irmed. During the Great Patriotic War many tank brigades, corps and armies successfully - conducted meeting engagements and encounter battles during penetration of the _ defense and exploitation in depth of offensive success, during pursuit, in crushing counterattacking and counterthrusting enemy forces, as well as in the course of actions in mounting counterattacks and counterthrusts. It is noted in the foreign military press that under conditions of nuclear missile warfare, due to the specific charactex of development of weaponry and mass equip- ping of ground forces with tanks and other highL'y mobile, high firepower armored vehicles, there will evidently be even greater preconditions for the occurrence of meeting engagements and encounter battles. Famous military theorist Liddell Hart claims, for example, that in future wars top-echelon commanders, in contrast to their predecessors, wi11 seek to achieve decisive results primarily by movement rather than ba.'ctles. He believes that in a nuclear missile war maneuver and movement will essentially constitute the principal content of troop actions. In an article entitled "Tanks and Their Future," Liddell Hart emphasizes that there may be not only small tank units possessing maximum flexibility of action on the battlefield and therefore capable of quickly shifting from one action to another, but entire divisions as well, capable of swiftly maneuvering from one area to another and hitting the enemy with counterthrusts. Foreign experts have also noted in their statements that under present-day conditions meeting engagements may occur both during offensive and defensive operations, as well as during redeploy- ments directly from march formation. During the conduct of offensive operations, a swift breakthrough by tanks deep in- to the enemy's defenses will naturally evoke corresponding countermeasures in the form of counterattacks and counterthrusts. Because of the decisiveness of ob- jectives pursued by counterattacking or counterthrusting enemy forces, combat against such forces will most frequently assume the form of ineeting engagements and encounter battles. ' During the Great Patriotic War, in January 1945, in the course of the Vistula-Oder ~ Operation, the enemy mounted a counterthrust with the forces of the XXIV Panzer Corps (three divisions in strength) against the troops of the advancing 4th Tank Army. As a result a large meeting engagement took place near Kielce, in which combined units of the 4th Tank Army, utilizing maneuver, surprise and mounting attacks on the enemy from the flanks and rear, totally crushed a powerful enemy force. The enemy lost 180 tanks and assault guns in this battle. It is believed abroad that in the course of defensive operations by friendly Farces in combat against an adversary who is exploiting offens4ve success, talk troops wd be most frequently employed for counterattacks and caunterthrusts, which will also lead to meeting engagements and encounter battles. The 5th Guards Tank Army 235 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY was utilized in this manner in the past war during the Battle of Kursk. By mounting a powerful encounter attack with the tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army against the main panzer force of the German-fascist army, the German offensi_ve was halted. As a result of a savage encounter battle and heroic actions by the tank crews of the :,rh Guards Tank Arniy, hundreds of German tanks were destroyed, and destroyed along with them were the hopes of the fascist command for achieving decisive suc- cess in the summer campaign of 1943. Thus meeting engagements have been and remain the foundation of the conduct of com- bat actions Uy tank troops. Considerable striking power and firepower as well as high mobility enable tank troops to attack the enemy not only with a superiority in forces but also with equal and even inferior forces. 2. Conditions for the Occurrence of Meeting Eugagements The experience of past wars indicates that meeting engagements have occurred and can occur in the attack, defense, and directly from march formation. �jt:: i . - f Figure 6.4.1. Occurrence of a Meeting Engagement with Counterattacking Enemy Reserves in the I-ourse of an Attack According to the views of foreign military experts, a meeting engagement for tanks in tlie attack may occur during penetration of the enemy's defense and exploitation in depth, when the adversary seeks to break up the advance with counterattacks by support echelons and immediate reserves (Figure 6.4.1). In this cas^ character- i.stic of the advancing force in the forward echelon of tanks is the fact that their forces are usually already deployed into combat formation, while all or part of the weapons are in position. In addition, control, communications and co- ordination of these forces are already organized,ard a system of comprehensive sup- port is functioning. All. tiiis makes it possible, as is noted in the foreign press, to hit the adversary with already deployed forces and weapons more swiftly than if this were to be ac- complished following preliminary deployment from columns, and alsb makes it 236 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY possible in the shortest possible time to organize or refine coordination, control and comprehensive support. Upon entering a meeting engagement in the course of an advance, forward-echelon troops are helped by the presence of adjacent units in successfully accomplisliing their missions. Foreign military experts believe that adjacent units can secure _ the flank and prevent a surprise enemy attack. The preseme of adjacent units makes it possible to concentrate maximum forces on a decisive axis, although, on the other hand, it still somewhat restricts maneuver capability to attack the - flanks of the advancing enemy. In addition, with a combat formation set up for fighting a directly defending adversary, under conditions of limited time it is very difficult to establish the combat formation which is necessary and more ad- - vantageous in a meeting engagement. The stronger the resistance of the opposing enemy force, the greater is this complexity. Therefore subunits, units or com- bined units advancing in the attack echelon cannot always conduct a meeting engage- ment with a counterattacking adversary with utilization of the requisite quantity of available forces and weapons. It is also noted that the advancing troops may have sustained considerable casual- ties by the time of engagement. This also complicates combat against a strong counterattacking adversary, since under these conditions it is not always possible to utilize such factors as beating the enemy to the attack, the element of sur- prise, and attack into the flank and rear. Under the above co:iditions, prior to entering a meeting engagement with an enemy force advancing for a counterattack, there may occur the necessity of first seizing and holding an advantageous position and carrying out a number of ineasures to thwart the organized advance and deployment of the approaching enemy. And all this will take place under fire delivered by the opposing enemy force. Consequent- ly, entry into a meeting engagement in the course of an advance by attack-echelon forces is one of the most complex conditions of occurrence of a meeting erigagement. During the Great Patriotic War entry into meeting engagements between advancing _ troops and counterattacking enemy reserves occurred both on the scale of units - and combined units and on the scale of tank armies. A typical example was the en- counter battle between the 4th Tank Army and theenemyis XXIV Panzer Corps on 13-14 January 1945 in an area south oi Kielce. Army combined units entered into an en- counter battle directly from march formation, essentially at the commencement of _ the operation (on the second day). The foreign press notes that entry into a meeting engagement is less complex for units and comrined units which prior to this were in the support echelon (reserve). In this ca;e the attack-echelon troops localize aggressive actions by defending enemy forces and create favorable conditions for deployment and establishment of a combat formation required by the situation by the forces of the support echelon which are advancing to engage. Under these conditions support-echelon troops can - establish a combat formation which is fully in conformity with the general plan of action of tlie meeting engagement and which is not burdened by the mission of . mopping up the defending enemy force. Troops committed to battle from the sup- = port echelon are able more freely to select the main axis of advance, and sometimes can execute a maneuver to hit the flank of the advancing adversary. 237 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A certain amount of time is needed, however, to prepare support-echelon forces to engage and fight, time which will be limited by the actions of the advancing ad- versary. Therefore, as a consequence of limited time, some matters pertaining to support, and particularly coordination, may be settled in insufficient detail under these conditions, since it is not possible to specify all situation features prior = to engagement. For this reason all matters not decided in advance are usually sub- sequently worked up and detailed as additional information is obtained. It is noted in the foreign press that most frequently meeting engagements will oc- cur during exploitation in depth, when armored units and combined units will fight meeting engagements with enemy reserves from depth or from other sectors of the front. Under these conditions units and combined units usually operate by axes with substantial gaps between adjacent units, and sometimes separated from them. It is believed that, possessing reconnaissance operating in depth and a high degree' of mobility, tank units and combined units, when fighting actions in depth are able swiftly to drive forward to the avenues of advance of enemy reserves, to beat them in seizing advantageous positions and to attack enemy reserves from the tlanks and rear. Considerable freedom of maneuver and the capability to achieve tlte element of surprise enable tank units and combined units operating at depth to deliver the most powerful attacks on advancing enemy reserves, attacks corresponding to a maximum degree to their combat capabilities. In the Lublin-Brest Operation in July 1944, brigades of the III Tank Corps, pursuing the retreating enemy, reached the avenues of withdrawal of his Brest force. The enemy mounted a counterattack in order to clear the routes of withdrawal for his troops. In the vicinity of Jakubow a meeting engagement was fought between part of the forces of ttie 5th Goering Panzer Division and the corps 103d Tank Brigade (see Figure 6.4.4). When the brigade encountered the enemy, it was deployed on a broad front and had exposed flanks. The success of the engagement was determined by swiftness of at- tack on the enemy through gaps in his combat formations and a drive into his rear, as well as precise coordination with the SOth Tank Brigade, which attacked units of the enemy's Sth Panzer Division on the f.lank in the vicinity of Jakubow. The experience of tank troops combat operations during the Great Patriotic War in- clicated that upon advancing deep, tank units and combined units as a rule would attack only the enemy's flank and rear, executing concealed turning movements and bolcl raids for this purpose. Such, for example, were actions by the tank corps and Urigades of the 2d Guards Tank Army in January-February 1944 in meeting engage- ments with Gernan-fascist troops at Uman', Zhitomir, and Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy. In tlie above-mentioned encounter battle of the 4tli Tank Army in January 1945, the X Tank Corps and VI Mechanized Corps hit the enemy's 17th Panzer Division on two flanks and crushed it. Based on the experience of the past war, during actions at depth tank troops as a rule would enter meeting engagements (encounter battles) independently, in the absence of adjacent units, which demanded the conduct of all-round reconnaissance and assignment of a portion of forces to repel possible attacks by a flanking ad- versary prior to eftcountering his main forces. 238 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 - FOR OFFIC'iAL l1SE ONLY Typical of conditions for the occurrence of ineeting engagements is limited time for organization, sometimes a substantial separation from other forces, and ex- posed flanks and rear. The circumstances of occurrence of ineeting engagements during actions in depth may also be unclear. In this connection one can expect sur- prise attacks by the enemy and his unexpected appearance from different directions. Of course under these conditions commanders may not possess sufficient information for making a decision to engage. The vagueness of the situation, however, does not exempt them from prompt decision-making. Under these conditions, during the war years troops aggressively acquired new intelligence and conducted continuous recon- naissance on a broad front and to considerable depth. Iz the conduct of defensive operations during the war years, meeting engagements took place with an adversary exploiting offensive success with his attack- echelon units which had been able to advance swiftly deep, or with support- ~ echelon (reserve) units committed to battle to exploit offensive success. -i ~ Specific features of situation conditions during the conduct of counterattacks or ! counterthrusts in the course of defense included a substantial enemy superiority in personnel and weapons, the enemy's seizure of the initiative, and t[ia possibili- ty of changing the course of combat operations at any moment by mounting additional attacks and shifting efforts. Of importance in this connection was skillful utilization of the advantages of the defending troops concealed preparation for a counterattack and its surprise execution, fullest utilization of advantageous terrain conditions and advance preparation of deployment lines. A meeting engagement of counterattacking units in the support echelon (reserve) of defending troops would usually be executed in coordination with the forward-echelon troops. Consequently, in thes-_ conditions rhey usually would have adjacent units, the enemy would be known, routes of advance, deployment lines and lines of shift to counterattack would have been reconnoitered and sometimes prepared, matters per- taining to mutual support would have been in principle determined in advance, and control, communications and support would be organized. At the same time one shou]d bear in mind that in the course of combat forward-echelon subunits may sustain con- siderable casualties, and therefore their stability will not be identical on all axes. In this connection prior specified coordination with them may frequently be disrupted, while directions of counterattacks will require re---inement. ' A characteristic feature of the conditions of occurrence of a meeting engagement in thc course of a defensive battle, that is, with the conduct of counterattack, is = a continuous and abrupt situation change. This can require considerable flexibility and efficiency in the work performed by commanders in organizing for combat. In a number of instances it may also be necessary to alter the general plan of action. Modes of action in a meeting engagement in the course of counterattacks can natural- ly be varied, depending on the opposing force forward-echelon units or fresh reserves. DifferUnt variants are examined in the foreign press. In one instance, For example, a counterattack should be swift, prepared as quiclcly as possible and executed at that moment when the enemy is halted and has not yet had time to dig in. 239 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY In order to gain time, a counterattack may be mounted immediately following an ar- tillery strike on the enemy and along the shortest axis. If a meeting engagement is fought with subunits and units exploiting offensive success, the countering force will obviously need close mutual support with the forward-echelon units, and joint delivery both of fire for effect and execution of attack on the adversary. In another case, when the adversary commits his support echelon or reserves to intensify a successful offensive drive, counterattacking forces may also fight a meeting engagement independently. They can execute a concealed maneuver in order to attack the enemy 3n the flank. It is belie^ved that under conditions of conduct of high-mobility actions, various redeployments wi11 be carried out on a large scale. Under conditions of absence of continuous fronts, with abrupt sltuation changes in the course of such re- deployments, armored troops may enter meeting engagements directly from march formation. Initiation of a meeting engagement directly from march formation occurred extensive- ly in the Great Patriotic War. Large redeployments of troops, especially tank troops, were typical i.n this period. In June 1941, for example, the 23d Tank Divisicn, 22d Mechanized Division, and the VIII Mechanized Corps entered a meeting engagement from march format3on. Engagement from march formation is also pos- sible when advancing toward a boundary, to points of engagement to exploit offen- sive success, and to repulse attacks by an advancing adversary. In all cases of engagsment from march formation, experience has shown that suc- - cess was achieved by thorough organization and comprehensive march support. Thus meeting engagements can commence from an attack, during the conduct of defensive actions, and from march formation. They can occur both at the beginning of an operation (battle), in the course of the exploitation phase, and at the con- , cluding stages. The experience of the past war demonstrated and the character of present-day con- - ditions confirms that meeting engagements can be fought both night and day, on any terrain and in any weather. The high mobility and maneuverability of tank troops enable them to fight meeting engagements in any situation condition, even the most complex. 3. Characteristic reatures of the Tank Troops Meeting Engagement Meeting engagements are characterized by a number of typical traits dictated by ttie specific features of the situation during their initiation and conduct. In a meeting engagement both sides seek to achieve their objectives by means of swift offensive actions. Characteristic of this type of engagement is closing of the opposing forces and consequently rapid engagement even with a relatively large initial distance between them. In this connection the fact of limited time for organization for combat is both a condition for and one of the principal typical , traits of a mPeting engagement. 240 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The fact of lim3ted time in a meeting engagement requixes that all calculations for delivering fire for effect on the enemy, for deployment of troops and other - actions be performed as quickly as possible. The duration of time for organiza- tion for actions in a meeting engagement in each concrete instance usually has certain limits, which must be observed in order not to end up in a less advantageoua position than the opposing side. The point here is that when there occurs a combat situation in which a meeting engagement is possible, the opposing forces are at a certain specified distance from each other and, traveling at a speed possible for the given concrete conditions, may encounter Ane another after a quite specific time interval. Consequently, in order to engage in an organized manner and to be well prepared - and thoroughly prepared for combat, troops should within the time available execute all requisite actions and measures ensuring success in combat. In addition, in - order to place the adversary in less favorable conditions, it is essential to execute all actions and measures swiftly, in order to beat the adversary in ~ delivery of effective fire, in deployment and shift to the assault. _ In practical terms, in the modern meeting engagement the time count breaks down literally into hours and minutes. As regards delivery of fire between ta.zks and - tanks or tanks and antitank weapons directly on the battlefield, time is counted - in seconds here, just as in other types of engagement. Because of limited time, and as a consequence of the maneuver character of actions in the initial stages of a meeting engagement, as mentioned above, the situation - can frequently be vague. This feature of the meeting engagement is dictated by the fact that in the endeavor by the opposing sides to keep their troops from being hit by the enemy, they take all steps to conceal their movement, to delude the enemy and thus to ensure the element of surprise in mounting their attack both in time and place. The experience of the past war demonstrated that although the fact that opposing sides have at their disposal highly effective intelligence gathering means helps positively resolve the question of spotting the enemy in advance, it does not totally eliminate the problem. In contrast to the conditions of an attack on a defending adversary, when his forces, although camouflaged and concealed, can be determined fairly completely, since they remain for an extended period of time practically in a location, in a meeting engagement the enemy's personnel and weapons are in movement, and therefore they may again become "lost" following detection. Because of this specific feature, the missions of reconnaissance in a ` meeting engagement have always been more complex than in other types of engagement. I As a consequence of the fact that troops have exposed flanks, characteristic of a _ meeting engagement are actions on a broad front with the execution of maneuver to reach the enemy's flanks and rear. Execution of such a maneuver is usually con- " - nected with the appearance of a sometimes considerable gap between the forces executing it and the troops operating frontally. As a result thE overall fighting frontage in a meeting engagement increases substantially in comparison with an ~ attack on a defending adversary. For example, during the Great Patriotic War - brigades attacked on a frontage of from 1 to 2 k;u, and divisi -ons usually in a - zone of from 2 to 4 km, while in meeting engagements the fighting frontage of tank 241 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY brigades amounted to 4-6 km, with 10-12 km and more for tank divisions (early in the war) and tank corg,s (in the middle and at the end of the war). In connection with an increase in frontage and enhancement of the role of in- dependent actions by subunits aud untts in a meeting engagement, a specific feature in the combat formation ar3ses the necessity of having the buik of personnel and weapons available for mounting the main attack. Subunits and units fighting on the flank and driving to the enemy's rear should have a high degree of - independence. As a consequence of swifC closing of the opposing forces and abrupt situation changes, maneuvering to the adversary's flanks and uneven advance by troops in a meeting engagement, the so-called battle line or line of contact can have a siiarply irregular configuratiun, and there can occur frequent and deep penetration by the opposing forces. Since in a meeting engagement both sides seek to accomplish their missions by attack, different missions may arise for individual elements of the combat formation. According to the views of foreign military experts, in these conditions it is advisable fur the bulk of one's forces to advance on one axis, with a limited number of troops on another axis. Characteristic of the meeting engagement during the Great Patriotic War was a specific division of forward- echelon forces into two parts a blocking farce, with the mission of halting the enemy's main forces, and a main force, with the mission of mounting the main at- tack on the enemy and crushing him. J Another characteristic feature oF a meeting engagement is the fact that as a rule the mutual position of the combat formation elements changes very rapidly due to swift and abrupt situation changes in such an engagement. This dictates especially high demands on efficiency in the performance of commanders and staffs both in collecting situation data and prompt detailing of missions to Subordinate forces and weapons. Meeting engagements of tank troops are usually very brief. In the opinion of foreign experts, a surprise, resolute assaul.t following brief but heavy delivery of fire on the enemy can quickly lead to victory not only over an ad- versary with equal but even superior forces. The zerm short duration of a meeting engagement is relative, however. The fact is that in many instances one of the . opposing sides, following a clash betw2en the main forces, and sometimes only the forward subunits (units), having determined the adversary's superiority, may im- mzdiately break off ofFensive actians.* Under these conditions it is coiisidered that a meeting engagemer.t is of short duzation only in the sense that it essential- - 1y encompasses only the brief initial period of clash between the opposing forces. Theretore although combat will continue, it will essentially possess different forms, contrasting to an engagement where both sides seek to achieve their objectives by attack. During the war meeting engagements were conducted by both sides with employment of aggressive offensive actions until one of the forces was victorious. In this case * See "Sukhoputnyye voyska kapitalisticheskikh gosudarstv" [Ground Farces of Capitalist Nati.ons Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1974, page 197. 242 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY they naturally were of considerable duration. Tank battalions and brigades, for - - exanple, would achieve success in a meeting engagement in 1-3 hours, while tank ` :iorps sometimes required from 10 to 30 hours of intensive fighting to defeat the adversary (the XXIX Tank Corps in battle with the German-fascist 3d Panzer Division in January 1944; the X Guards Tank Corps and the enemy's 17th Panzer Division in - January 1944; etc). The short duration of a meeting engagement as one of its typical features is grounded in the very foundation of this type of combat action by tank troops. Not being connected. with r.olding any line or position, and offering considerable - f reedom for execution of concealed maneuver, selection of time and advantageous place of action and ut3.lizing the element of surprise, tank subunits and units can - execute maneuver in order to crush the adversary with an initial powerful attack. One distinctive feature of ineeting engagements, dictated by the decisiveness of _ objectives, mounting of surprise attacks, and short duration, is their exceptional- ly intensive character. Any acti.on of one of the sides aimed at gaining a cer- i tain advantage requires immediate execution of appropriate countermeasures by the opposing side. Otherwise more favorable conditions are created for the first side to continue combar whieh, with equal forces, enables that side to hold the initia- tive and rapidly achieve decisive success. In connection with the above, in thc endeavor to secure an advantage 1y maneuver and attacking f irst, each of the opposing forces will cont~nuously undertake the most persistent measures to create a favorable position in respect to the _ adversary. Since this process is mutual, rhe initiative in a meeting engagement can frequently and rapidly shift f rom one side to the other, which malces a meeting etigagement exceptionally intense. As a consequence of the high degree of intensity - in a meeting engagement, there will occur deep penetration into the enemy's dis- - positions by a partion of one's forces, with simultaneous repelling of attacks by superior enemy forces by another portion of one's forces on a different axis. The attack in a meeting engagement is only the focus of combat actions, common in objective and content. As a consequence of frequent and abrupt situation changes and a rapid shift ot initiative from one side to the other, some subunits - (units) may attack while others may counteratt ack, mount ambushes, redeploy, and then once again engage with the most diversified missions. Such a dynamic develop- ment of combat actiens is the most important distinctive feature of the mPeting engagement of tank subunits and units. Ljepending on the scale of a meeting engagement, its characteristic features are not always manifested.identically. In a meeting engagement of small siibunits, - for exarnple, it is more difficult to pin down the enemy with a portion of one's forces on one axis and at the same time to attack from the flank or rear with superior forces. Sma11 tactical subunits operate on a relatively narrow frontage and usually in view of one annther, and therefore in a meeting engagement of such _ subunits all available forees entex battle almost immediately after shifting to the assault phase; they operate in close contact, and the fighting is of short - duration. 243 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFIC'IAL USE ONLY - Meeting engagements of larg- tank forces, as took place, for example, in January - 1945 at Kielce (4th Tank Army), in November 1943 near Fastov (3d Guards Tank Army), and in June 1944 on the Bobr River (Sth Guards Tank Army), commenced and developed :in the initial phase according to the classic scheme of engagement. Initially the advance guards engaged, followed by the main forces: one part of the forces pinned down a certain enemy force, while the remainder attacked the enemy force in the flank or rear. The main forces attacked the enemy on one and sometimes on two axes, that is, with envelopment of the enemy on both flanks. In contrast to a meeting engagement of small subunits, when large tank forces clash actions develop with a great diversity of forms. It very often hagpens that - combat actions shortly assun,e the form of a great many individual engagements of - subunits and units dispersed laterally and in depth. In many instances these engagements assume a fo cal character. Ubviously these actions cannot be viewed as a simple sum of isolated engagements, since their overall content is substantially broader, for it constitutes an ag- _ gregate of engagements subordinated to a common objective and f ollowing a unified general plan for all forces. Just as in the last war, meeting engagements of large forces may also be typical in present-day conditions. It is believed that in all probability the clashes will be of the nature of encounter battles.* According to the figures af foreign experts, hundreds of tanks toolc part on both - sides during the events in October 1973 in the I3ear East. ~ It is believed that the character of eilcounter battles in the war of today may - be analogous under certain conditions to the encounter battles of World War II.** Encounter battles of tank armies during the Great Patriotic War were fought on a frontage ranging from 20 to 40 km. Tank corps and armies took part in these battles, and they lasted up to 72 hours. Actions by tank combined units of the 5th Guards Tank Army at Prokhorovka in July 1943 and on the Bobr River in June 1944 during the rout of the enemy's Sth Panzer Division can serve to a certain degree as an example of such encounter battles. Taday's meeting engagement, which is offensive in content, at the same time en- compasses an aggregate of various actioris united by a single obj ective to crush the enemy with swift attacks. This makes it one of the most complex versions of an offensive operation, distinguished by exceptional a.ntensity and determination. 4. Conditions of Achieving Success in a Meeting Engagement of Tank Troops A meeting engdgement is usually fought by equal forces in personnel and defensive weapons. As we know, however, it is almost impossible to achieve victory in a f rontal engagement with equal forces. Such an engagement usually leads to mutual * See Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976, Volume 2, page 406. See ibid., pag.: 407. - 244 FOR OFFICIAL USE 01'dLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FUR OFFICIAL USE: ONLY destrucrion or personnel and equipment on an approximately equal basis. It is ther.efore believed that essential for success in a meeting engagement are a number of specific conditions, correct utilization of which can guarantee victory n.ot only over ::ln adversary who is weaker or equal in numerical strength but also over a superior adversary. In the last war major conditions for achieving victory in a meeting engagement in- cluded prompt detection of the enemy and continuous surveillance of him, reaching a decision for actions by friendly forces in the shortest possible time and prompt assignment of combat missions, and beating the adversary in seizing favorable posi- tions and delivering airstrikes and artillery fire, as well as in deployment and shift to the assault. Of great significance for success in a meetin,; engagement were the element of sur- prise and skillful utilization of terrain anc'. weather., which makes it possible to execute actions which take the adversary by surprise, a. powerful initial attack, execution of maneuver to attack the enemy's flank or rear, rapid splitting up ^f the enemy force and its piecemeal annihilation. Victory over the enemy in a meeting engagement was also secured by seizing and holding the initiative, by bold troop actions, and by maintaining precise and con- tinuous coordination of all forces and weapons participating in the engagement. An important role in achieving victory over the adversary in a meeting engagement " was played by firm and continuous control and precise coordination of reliable protection of exposed flanks and rear. Each of these conditions is manifested differently, depending on the concrete situation. In a meeting engagement, for example, one cannot averemphasize the importance of reconnaissance activities, since the results of reconnaissance ac.- tivities essentially determine the manifestation of such factors of achievemerit ~ of victory over the adversary as utilization of the element of surprise and beating the adversary in mounting attacks, swift seizure of advantageous positions, and prompt execution of maneuver into the enemy's flank or rear. As is noted in the field manuals of a number of the world's armies, an increase in troop readiness and their increased combat and naneuver capabilities make especially important promptness and quickness of decision-making for a meeting engagement and seizure of the initiative. For successful accom- I plishment of these tasks, reconnaissance in a menting engagemen* a.s conducted ~ continuously, to considerable depth and along a broad frontage. In the last ~ war cumbat and reconnaissance subunits and agencies conducted reconnaissan.ce in ~ subunits, units and combined units. In addition, air reconnaissance was also con- ducted on an operational scale, performing missions simultaneously in the in- - terests of tank troop units and combined units. Air reconnaissance will also be conducted extensively under present-day conditions.* In a number of armies ground and air reconnaissance is conducted to a depth of up to 100 and 300 km respectively.** * See Soviet riilitary Encyclopedia, Vol 2, pp 228-283. See "Sukhoputnyye voyska kapitalisticheskikh gosudarstv," page 197. 245 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFF(CIAL USE ONLY ~ (?n the basis of tlie experience ot the war, speed of decision-making for a meeting _ engagement as a factor in achieving success dictated the possibility of promptly executing a maneuver to sei�r.e an advantageous position, advance into the enemy's f.lRnk or rear, and to beat the adversary in delivering fire and going into the assault phase. As a result this helped gain an advantage over the adversary even under conditions where the overall situation was not developing to the advantage = of friendly forces. During the action south of Bogodukhov, for example, units of the VI Tank Corps were pursuing a retreating enemy during the night of 11 August 1943. At 0400 the corps commander learned that enemy columns were moving out of Kovyaga; the corps was able to engage this enemy force at 0600, that is, only two hours later. Successful corps actions were achieved in these conditions because the corps had established in advance an advantageous force grouping for initiating _ combat from march formation and therefore was able to beat the enemy in deploying. Beating the adversary in detection, delivery of fire, deployment and attack was decidedly a most important conditlon for achieving success in a meeting engagement. That side which beat the adversary in deploying and mounting an attack would ~ ac'.deve victory even over a numerically superior adversary. The 181st Tank Brigade, for example, during the battle of Kursk in July 1943, encountered an enemy column of approximately 40 tanks near Mikhaylovka. The enemy was routed by a swift and surprise attack by only two battalions one (the lead batttalion) frontally and the other from the flank although these battalions totaled fewer tanks. It is noted in the foreign press that essential in order to beat the adversary in delivering fire, deployment and initiation of the attack are swiftness and accuracy of calculation of nlanned measures in time and space, taking account of the capahil- ities both of friendly and snemy troops. It is important to take into account in these calculations that the adversary will camouflage and conceal his actions and alter t.hem abruptly in order to deceive the adversary.* Therefore when performing calculations it is considered essential to foresee the most realistic uariants of possib le actions by the adversary and to determine the requisite time and sequence of delivering artillery strikes, deploying and attacking with one's forces, beating the adversary in these moves. At the beginning of the last war, in spite of the fact that the treacherously attacking enemy had the initiative for the most part, tank and mechanized corps endcavored to attack the enemy with the element of surprise and to beat him to the punch. For example, in a meeting engagement fought by the VIII Mechanized Corps near Lutsk on 26 June 1941, the 12th Tank Division succeeded in attacking L-irst, hitting thc flank of the enemy's 16th Panzer Division and advancing 15 km - by Chat evening. The enemy sustained appreciable losses. In that same battle unirs of the 34th Tank Division attacked the llth Infantry Division, routed a regiment of motorized infantry, destroying SO tanks and armored cars, and ad- vanced 30-40 km by the evening of 27 June. - As was noted above, beating the enemy in delivering artillery strikes, deployment and initiation of attack by the main forces is a most important condition for _ success in a meeting engagement. The experience of the Great Patriotic War * See "Sukhoputnyye voyska kapitalisticheskikh gosudarstv," pp 198-199. 246 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY v showed the important role of beating the adversary to the punch. Let us examine what it involved and how it was achieved. - Beating the adversary in delivering an artillery strike consisted in the follawing: by the time troops were ready to initiate an attack, the enemy was in effective range of artillery fire but was himself not ready to delivery artillery fire. Beating the enemy in deploying tank units and combined units in a meeting engage- ment was usually accomplished by achieving a high rate of march, by conducting special measures to delay the enemy's advance, and concealment of actions. It was taken into account that in order to beat the adversary to r_he punch it was es- sential not only to cover the distance to the probable point of encounter faster than the enemy but also to hit the adversary's flank, that is, to cover an addi- tional distance. Tn this connection, the rate of advance of troops for the purpose of beating the adversary in taking an advantageous positi.on should substantially exceed the adversaryb rate of movement. In cases where achievement of high speeds proved impossible for various reasons, measures were taken to delay the enemy with artillery strikes, airstrikes, and actions by advance guards. In the opinion of foreign experts, remote min3ng of terrain is sometimes expedient for this purpose. At the same time, beating the adversary in deploying and a combat formation for establishing an advantageous grouping of forces in a meeting engagement also had their own specific features. On the one hand, they should be rapid enough so that the adversary is unable to take effective countermeasures, and they should end with a swift attack of the enemy immediately following air and artillery strikes. On the other hand, premature deployment of main forces could not be permitted, since in this case the adversary would be able to discover the plan of action and take appropriate measures to avoid a surprise attack. Hi.tting the enemy with a strong initial attack when large forces came into contact was achieved by concentrating a maximum quantity of personnel and weapons on a decisive axis and employment of tanks in mass on this axis. This would be based on correct calculation of relative strengths and the character of actions of both sides in the prevailing situation condi.tions. Maximum quantity of inen and weapons utilized for the attack was defined not as the maximum quantity which could be assigned to any given axis but that which would ensure a decisive superiority over the adversary on the main axis of advance and would make it possible successfully to repulse the enemy's attacks on the blocking axis. When determining the optimal composition of forces and weapons on the main and blocking axes, one took into consideration the high probability of unexpected at- tacks by the enemy, which required placement of an adequate quantity of inen and weapons in a combined-arms reserve. Attaching particu].ar importance to the requirement that the initial attack be _ powerful, the point was that in a meeting engagement this question should be determined in each individual instance taking account of the concrete situation features, and first and foremost proceeding from the possibility of beating the enemy to the attack and achieving the element of surprise. It was believed that - superiority in forces on the main, decisive axis creates only the preconditions fur achieving success, for there occurs simultaneously with this a weakening of ~ 247 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ friendly foxces on other axes, which the adversary can exploit. Therefore in a ~ meeting engagement it was important not only to establish superiority in men and weapons on the decisive axis but also quickly to exploit that superiority. Yn urder to achieve muximum power of an initial tank attack, in addition to massing tanks on the decisive axis it was also necessary to hit the enemy effectively on the far app roaches to the point of probable encounter with airstrikes, and sub- sequently with artillery. The force and power of delivery of f ire on the adver- sary would be boosted to a maximum level just prior to initiation of the tank assault phase. In this instance the adversary would sustain considerable losses even prior to initiation of the attack.and would be significantly weakened. Under ' such conditions the force of the initial attack on the enemy would increase sub- stantially. - The dependence of the success and power of the initial attack in a meeting engage- ment on the element of surprise in its delivery was manifested in this case in achievement of victory even against a stronger adversary. The element of surprise in a meeting engagement and encounter battle in the last war was achieved by concealed forward movement, swift execution of maneuver and beatiiRg the adversary :in deploying for battle, by careful camouflage and conceal- ment of combat formation elements, by selection of modes of action which the adversary was not expecting, by artillery strikes in secondary areas or on second- - ary axes for the purpose of diverting the adversary's attention from the imminent attack by the forces on the decisive axis, And by a differing time of attacks _ in different areas, especially feinting attacks. = During the Great Patriotic War the element of surprise in mounting attacks by tank - troops was usually achieved prirsarily due to their high degree of mobility anfl their capability of operating on practically any terrain. The actions of the XXIV Tank Corps were indicative from the standpoint of utilizing the element of surrrise. During the battle of Stalingrad, in the severe winter of 1942, within a few days time the corps had advanced more than 200 km deep into the enemy's dispositions and captured Tatsinskaya Station directly from march - formation an the morning of 24 December. The appearance of tanks so far behind enemy lines and under adverse weather conditions took the fascists so much by surprise that even aircraft were unable to scramble from the airfield located near Tatsinskaya Station. As a result of this lightning strike, the tankers of this corps destroyed approximately 350 aircraft, SO artillery pieces and 15 tanks. Frequently tank suhunits and units in the last war took advantage of adverse weather and road conditions to mount sudden attacks on the enemy, which took the latter - by surprise and led to success. For example, in meeting engagements of tank and mechanized corPs of the 3d Cuards Tank Army at Proskurov in March 1944, the troops executed a maneuver under conditions of muddy terrain and a heavy snowfall; during hours of darkness combined units of the 3d Guards Tank Army conducted meeting engagements near Fastov; in the summer of 1944 troops of the 5th Guards Tank :1rmy conducted night meeting engagements on the Bobr River, and in the - vicinity of Vormdit in winter, in deep snow. In order to take up an advantageous _ position in respect to the adversary, corps forward detachments and their main 248 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104460-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY forces wauld take advantage of terrain enabling them to advance undetected to points at which they would shitt to the attack, as well as to axes on which the adversary could not expect Soviet tanks to appear. The element of surprise in a meeting engagement is manifested in differing ways, depending on the numerical strength of the forces involved. For small subunits, - for example, the result of an attack with the element of suprise may prove decisive in tiie very first minutes of battle, since the element of surprise in actions of this scale usually develops quickly. At the level of combiAed units and Iarge strategic formations, the element of surprise would be in eff ect for an extended period of time. Surprise actions by the XXIV Tank Corps, for examp].e, enabled it successfully to batter the enemy for a period of f ive days. In this connection, counting on utilizing the element of suprise, the potential duration of the ef- fect;ive surprise would be taken into consideration, since there could come into effect after this such determining factors as relative strengths and the firepower _ and striking power of subunits and units of both sides. The high mobility of tank troops enables them to execute swif t maneuver which takes the enemy by surprise, essentially on any terrain and at any time, day or night. Yrecisely such swift mobile actions brought success to Soviet tank - brigades and corps during the Great Patriotic War in meeting engagements with German-fascist units. In a meeting engagement fought in January 1945, for example, the X Tank Corps first defeated the enemy's 17th Panzer Division and then, in - coordination with units of the VI Mechanized Corps, also defeated the enemy's 16th Panzer Division, which was advancing from another direction. � During the conduct of mobile actions, tank troops employ in order to achieve suc- cess in a meeting engagement such forms of maneuver as close envelopments and wide Envelopments of the enemy on one or two flanks (Figure 6.4.2). Such a form of - maneuver as the f rontal (splitting) attack (FigLre 6.4.3) was also frequently employed in tank corps and army battles in the last war. Frontal attacks were mounted by the lst Tank Army at Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka, by the 3d Guards Tank Army at Fastov, etc. Selection af a given form of maneuver in a meeting engage- - ment depends on the quantitative composition of troops and their mobiliCy, available time and terrain conditions, the adversary's position and actions. : ~ -~Wid P, en''velopment _ y - /~~�f~~n i. :aaw ~ JilH:3 ~ yY~l7Dr. Close envelopment - Figure 6.4.2. Wide and Close Envelopment 249 FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104460-1 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY _ - _ _J - i~ AAA~ ~ . S ~;~`~s _ ~ ,.~r~~.,':, ~k ~ . _ � _ . . Figure 6.4.3. Frontal (Splitting) Attack In the last war many tank brigades and corps achieved decisive success precisely because of a bold maneuver into the enemy's flanks and rear. In the meeting engage- ment of the 3d Tank Corps which took place on 28 July 1944 during pursuit of the retreating enemy in the vicinity of Jakubow, the 103d Tank Brigade pinned down the enemy frontally with one tank battalion, while two battalions (a tank and motorized rifle battalion) executed a wide envelopment on the enemy's flank. - Simultaneously the corps attacked units of the enemy's 5th Panzer Division or. the left flank with the forces of the 50th Tank Brigade. Thus the 103d Tank Brigade, in order to achieve success, executed a wide envelopment of the enemy on one of his flanks, while the corps executed a close envelopment of tlie enemy on both flanks (Fi.gure 6.4.4) with the objective of destroying his personnel an3 weapons. Tank subunits in a meeting engagement more frequently employ a close or wide en- velopment only on one flank. This is due to the fact that subunits usually have insufficient forces to executE a close or wide envelopment maneuver on the enemy on two flanks. In addition, during the initial stages of a subunit-scale meeting en- gagement, both sides retain the capability aggressively to hit envelopingforces with available weapons without shifting them significantly, and therefore it is difficult to execute such a maneuver undetected, and yet without concealment of this maneuver, success may be placed in doubt. In cases where execution of maneuver by part oE the forces of a subunit appears possible, however, it is usually employed without delay and produces the most appreciable results. Employment of a concealed wide envelopment maneuver into the flank or a drive into the enemy's rear by even a small part of one's forces cdn compel the adversary to execute a sometimes substantial redeployment of forces and thus weaken certain axes. In February 1944, for example, in the fighting at Leningrad, a tank bat- talion of one of our combined units, operating in the forwa.rd detachment near the Berezhki Sovkhoz and Gorki, encountered an advancing enemy column of 20 tanks and IS trucks carrying infantry. Frontally bl ocki.n g the enemy advance party, the battalion main forces attacked it on the flank (Fi.gure 6.4.5). The tank attack 250 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY b rna O'N 0 I 0 6na3N~~a I - ',~D \ ~�N~~ V`~AN,yf ye h AR N ,�~~11", 103m6p ( ~ ~ ~V - ~OJ `lO~~ ' KanywHH 3 j; MH11C11-A1;1300P1AIlN 1 r ~ 50n6p 3me ~ ~IIP.~49HNH ~ / 21j 4 an 1107con (pe3epe 311111) ] 3mK 0 uefnra 5 ~ Figure 6.4.4. Meeting Engagement of the III Tank Corps on 28 July 1944 at Jakubow Kay: 1. riinsk-Mazowiecki 7. Reserve 2. Jakubow md. Panzer divzsion 3. Kaluszyn mbp. Tank brigade 4. Pielczanka an. Artillery regiment 5. Ceglow can. Self-propelled artillery regiment 6. Laziska mk. Tank corps took the enemy by surprise to such an extent that the enemy force was totally crushed in short order. The battalion destroyed 13 tanks and killed 100 fascist soldiers. When executing a maneuver in a meeting engagement, one should beur in mind that its execution is not an end in itself but a means of achieving success, making it pos- sible to inflict tlie greatest damage on the adversary in the shortest period of time and witti minimal fr.iendly casualties. Therefore it is advisable only in those cases where troops will occupy a more favorable position as a result of its execution and a decisive superiority i.n men and weapons will be established on the axis of advance or the element of surprise will be achieved. If, as was ttie case in the war years, these advantages were not secured in a wide envelopment maneuver, it was more advantageous to mount a strong attack, swiftly and with the element of surprise, frontally at the enemy's weak point, splitting the force in two and then destroying it piecemeal. Such actions were especially successful if they were executed following massive delivery of f.ire on the enemy with employment oF all artillery and available tactical air. 251 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104460-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1 fopitx ~ 2 EnNa~poeo Qy 60ANA 3 ?n q~~fNN~N � O ~ ~ uuno,wniuuN 5 C neronioii / ` / V ` n6 7 ~ c0x. 6e,,4 iiw ~5.,.~ ~ 1 Figure 6.4.5. Maneuver in a Tank Brigade Meet:Lng Engagement in February 1944 Near the Berezhki Sovkhoz , Key: 1. Gorki 2. Yelizarovo 3. Dubovka 4. Berezhki Sovkhoz 5. Approximately 20 tanks and 15 trucks carrying infantry 6. Tank company 7. Tank battalion 8. Rif le company fAoeNwe 1 cuAW 2 /'Aaexwe nponfun~nKa~ ' ~ ~~lloaoaxo~ 17ozo2NO1 4 culoer ~~,oxpamexue nponrueffuea oxPaNemui ~r.~�.L.~ ~ 1 �ca ) ~--~O--O- .00�-,~'~ / ~--O-o- Figure 6.4.6. Interrelationship Between Form of Maneuver and Main Axis of Advance in a Meeting Engagement Kzy: , 1. Enemy main forces 2. Main forces 3. Enemy march security 4. March security Experience indicated that the employment of maneuver in a meeting engagement depended in large measure on coordination among the forces attacking frontally and enveloping the enemy on the flanks. The main thing was not to execute premature or poorly concealed actions, as a result of which the enemy could discover the purpose of the maneuver and have time to take measures to counter the main force by executing his own maneuver. 252 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY One important condition for achieving success in a meeting engagement and encounter battle in the past war was correct determination of the main axis of advance against the adversary. The sEquence of actions by .forces and weapons employed in the past war in a meeting engagement can be schematically represented as depicted in - Figure 6.4.6. For example, if in the course of a or close envelopment maneuver on the enemy's flanks it was possible to bring sufficient forces to one of the flanks for a powerful initial attack ensuring the enemy's defeat, as a rule units would mount the main attack on this axis. At the same time, as a rule the main attack would be directed at the weakest paint of the enemy force, where tanks could operate in mass and at high speeds, and consequently most fully and effective- ly exploit the results of preliminary airstrikes and artillery fire. Mounting, in the course of a meeting engagement of tank subunits, an attack with ~ one's mai.n forces at the enemy's weak point, into the gaps and intervals in his combat formation leads as a rule to rapid splitting of the enemy force. Rapid splitting of the enemy and his subsequent piecemeal destruction constitute the j principal condition for achieving decisive success in a meeting engagement. I If the enemy force is separated even prior to engagement, it is advisable to prevent him from linking up his forces, to isolate them from one another ~nd to smash them sequentially. For tank subunits possessing a high degree of mobility, destroying the enemy piecemeal has been and remains one of the principal methods of achieving victory. One of the factors which ensure successful accomplishment of the mission of routing the enemy in a meeting engagement is seizing and holding the initiative. In con- trast to an attack on a defending adversary, when the initiative is in the hands of the attacking force from the very outset of battle, in a meeting engagement both sides simultaneously endeavor to secure for themselves the advantage of maneuver with the element of surprise, execution of an attack which beats the adversary to the punch, and seizure of an advantageous position in respect to the enemy. Under these conditions that side which has most iully and swiftly ex- ploited favorable circumstances will also possess much greater chances of success. thus, as indicated by the experience of the war, constant and comprehensive figuring by commanders of tank subunits of the continuously changing situation con- ditions and facts affecting achievement of success in a meeting engagement, con- - tinuous conduct of reconnaissance, maintaining continuous readiness to engage and advance establishment of a force capable of entering battle from *narch formation ~ without significant change of formation, as well as prompt and full utilization ~ of the capabilities of available personnel and weapons create a solid foundation for defe3ting the adversary in short order. iJnder conditions oE high-mobility actions, rapid and abrupt situation changes, suc- cess attends that side which devotes more attention to securing its flanks and rear, to reliable protection of its dispositions against air attack, and maintenance of firm and continuous control of forces in the course of combat. 5. Fundamentals of Organization of a Meeting Engagement in Tank Troops Thorough organization of troop actions and their comprehensive support in a meeting - en-:+f;ement canstitutes the fnundation for successful accomplishment of all missions 253 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY arising in a clash with the Qnemy. Organization of a meeting engagement is affected by limiteci available time, situation vagueness, and the sper_ific pos�- ttire of the opposing sides as a ru1e, both advancing toward each other. = In the past war battal'Lozs, brigades, and sometimes corps frequently had from one - to three hours to organize for action in a meeting engagement. Under these con- ditions, as a cflnsequence of highly mobile actions by the apposing sides, decisions pertaining to the meeting engagement would be made extremely rapidly, and missions would be assigned literally in minutes. Fast deterr.:ination of these questions is particularly important in order to beat the adversary in delivering artillery fire, deployment and initiation of the assault. r - With limited time available, all questions pertaining to organization for a meeting engagement can be successfully settled only with advance and comprehensively - planned preparation of troops for the forthcoming action. For example, when or- ganizing for a march or during pursuit under conditions where the enemy may be eri- countered, as measures executed in advance the commander of a tank subunit - specifies organization of reconnaissance and secur3ty, arrangement of his men and weapons considering possible engagement directly from march formation and the requirement of rapid deployment into combat formation, organization of control and - communications in conformity with demands imposed,on them in combat, and provision of supply to the troops, figuring on combat with a powerful adversary. _ One important preparatory measure for entering a meeting engagement is, under these conditions, advance determination of the sequence of actions in case of an en- counter, and establishment of an expedient force. When organizing for an attack on a defending adve.rsary, the commander of a tank subunit may include among measures to prepare for a meeting engagement with counter- attacking enemy reserves specification of reconnaissance missions to ensure prompt spotting of approaching reserves, expedient structuring of the combat forma- tion and distribution of personnel and weapons figured not only for defeating the defending enemy force but also fighting a meeting engagement with the enemy's reserves, and de*_ermination of matters of mutual support. Under these conditions the procedure and sequence of delivering fire on counterattacking reserves by supporting artillery and other sources of fire may be planned in advance. Ad- vance accomplishment of these measures wi11 make it possible to engage with the least loss of time and, most important, to beat the adversary in carrying out re- quisite actions. During the Great Patriotic War, due to a lack of adequate intelligence on the enemy when organizing for actions in anticipation of a meeting engagement, a force grotiPing would be established so that any combat formation required by the situa- tion could be adopted in short order with minimal displacement of force elements. Such a force grouping is made sufficiently flexible and versatile, convenient fQr - rapid formation changes. In order to maintain a high degree of readiness to enter battle from march formation, during closing with the enemy, as additional intel- ligence is obtained on him, appropriate adjustments would be promptly made in the ' formation of friendly troops. The commander alone makes the combat decision. At battalion level and higher, the commander is assisted by his staff. Distribution of funGtions at these echelons 254 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and working method depend on the degree of coordination between commander and staff. The main requirement is to reach a decision on al.l matters as quickly as possible and ensuring that the greatest possible amount of'time is directly made available to subordin3tes. In this connection, the para11e1 method is adopted as the basis for work on organization for a meeting engagement. With this method,* the required information and missions are communicated to subordinates as soon as they are determined, prior to completion of all work pertaining to organization for combat at the higher echelon.* This method enables one to organize for comb at ac- tions in a comparatively short period of, due to which troops wi11 have more time for immediate preparation to execute the assigned mission. In connection with the fluid nature of actions by the opposing sides and the limited time available, the meeting engagement decision should be made quickly, while marching. It is based on an endeavor to beat the adversary to the pun ch in delivering effective fire, in deploying and initiating the assault. Therefore when the mission is received, the subunit c:ommander shall as quirkly as possible figure the time and pl.ace of encounter with the adversary, specify the general plan of action and determine the most advantageous forms of maneuver. The decision shall be made on the basis of a thorough situation estimate and con- sideration of the enemy's tactics and specific capabil.ities of friendly foress.** During the Great Patriotic War, when a decision was being made for a meeting en- - gagement or encounter battle, the following would be determined: an advantageous main axis of advance, sequence and procedure of delivering fire on the adversary, - the force grouping required for the engagement, time of the attack, modes of ac- - tions, missions of the troops, and procedure of mutual support and control. A cor- rect estimate of the enemy was an important factor in determining the composition and time of deployment of one's main forces. The task consisted in more accurately determining tlie adversary's plan, the possible time of his establishment of a - force grouping for combat, its composition and formation at the commencement of battle. Due to a lack of sufficient intelligence on the enemy, a r:ajor role in an estimate was the ability of commanders to predict the possible course of the ad- versary's actions. Missions of fire delivery on the enemy were determined with the aim not only of inflicting maximum possible damage but also of delaving his advance. This wi11 mrike it possible on the one hand to improve the correlation of forces and on the other to gain time to deploy and attack the enemy from the most advantageous posi- - tion. In the past war, beating the adversayy in establishing an expedient force grouping and its deployment f.or battle was precisely calculated in relation to the ad- versary's potential actions and readiness time. The enemy's rate of advance would - be determined with this objective, and on this basis, taking account of the dis- - tance separating the opposing forces and the rate of advance of friendly troops, the specific time of encounter would be determined. * See D. A. Ivanov et a1, "Osnovy upravleniya voyskami" [Fundamentals of Troop Control], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1971, page 232. See ibid., pp 195-196. 255 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY In order to ensure that the calculated encounter time and measures to beat the ad- versary to the punch proceeding .from this calculation remain valid, there would subsequently be maintained continuous sur7eillance of the Pnemy, with all changes in his actions noted. With this objective, immediately atrer completion of tirae and encounter calculations, cor.responding orders would be issued *o detail recon- naissance missions. In determining force composition and its time of deployment, a commander would take into consideration that under some situation conditions beating the enemy to the attack and the element of surprise could be decisive, whi1P in other conditions _ the strength aiid force of the initial attack would be determining. The concrete situation would indicate what was more important. Everything depended on what factor was decisive in a giveri situation and what condit3.ons were favorable for one side or the other. The experience of the Great Patriotic War indicated that in a meeting engagement the combat forcnation of tank brigades and corps was usually set up in a single echelon with designation of a reserve. Establishment of a reserve but not a sup- port echelon was due to the facC that because of situation vagueness, rapid and abrupt situation changes, 3.t was impossible to assign a concrete mission to a sup- port echelon. As a rule a large part of available men and weapons would be designated to the attack echelon in brigades and corps, in order to deliver a powerful initial at- tack: two battalions out of three in the brigade, and two to three brigades out of three to four in the corps. Such a distribution of forces between attack echelon and combined-arms reserve, however, is not mandatory. If it was determined that enemy attacks from the flanks were possible in the situation, and Gihen the opposing enemy force was not highly battleworthy but had strong reserves in a deep position, the forward echelon could contain fewer forces than indicated above, with more forces in the combined-arms reserve. When mounting counterattacks and counterthrusts, that is, during the occurrence of a meeting engagement in the course of defensive operations, the order of ~ battle would also be i.n two echelons. In the fighting at Prokhorovka on 12 ,Tuly 1943, for example, the forward echelon of the XVIII Tank Corps ccntained the 18ist _ and 170th Tank brigades, while the support echelon contained the 110th Tank Brigade and 32d Motorized Ri _fle Brigade. 'Lhis was due to the fact that the corps counter- tlirust was canducted in a precisely defined area and missions were assigned con- cretely both to the forward and support echelon. _ Forward detachments would be designated �rom units and combined units in case of a possible encounter with the adversary in the course of executing marches and during - pursuit. During tlie past war these would be reinforced battalions in brigades and brigades in corps. Forward detachments seek to seize advantageous positionson the routes of advance of the enemy's main forces and to Ulock them, tlius en- suring Eavorable conditions for the brigade (corps) main forces to deploy quickly and unhindered and to initiate a decisive attack. In addition, the order of battle of brigades (corps) included an artillery group, an antitank reserve, a mobile - obstacle detachment, and antiaircraft weapons. 256 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFiCiAL USE ONLY Under present-day conditions, in connect3.on with a constantly growing quantity of the n:ost diversified weaponry, an increasingly important role is being played by coordinated employment of these weapons in a unified combat formatian, where they, 5upplemer.ting one another, are able to display their specif ic combat performance c characteristics with the greatest effectiveness. Therefore, as is noted in r.he foreign press, a combat formation of tanks should also contain motorized infantry, - antirank weapons, artillery, and air defense weapons. The engagement plan is refined as the opposing forces advance to contact. Also refined is the plan for delivery of fire for effect on the enemy and, consequently, also the previously specified general plan of actior. and forms of maneuver. Frequently, as combat experience indicates, the plan of action is even refined upon engagement of the covering forces. In determining the content of combat missions, the Gommander proceeds f rom the position of priority being assigned to crushing the enemy's main forces. There- fore in the past war brigades and corps in a meeting engagement assigned an immediate mission of crushing the opposing adversary to the depth of his main forces, that is, the fnrward echelon. In defining the mission, troops ware told the line which should be reached anil taken and the time to reach it. For sub- sequent actions only the direction was specified, due to the higlily mobile - character of these actions. Eviden* the content of combat missions will be - similar under present-day conditions. Meeting engagement missions in tank subunits and un.its are communicated by radio, by specif ied signals, and by brief operational instructions. In order to save time, gain bearings quickly and to give suborciinates more time to prepare for combat, in the past war they were initially given only that informatioii which was essential for immediate inifiiation of specific actions. Subsequently the mission would be detailed and supple-iented by other essential information. In order to achieve a high degree of efficiency of troop actions, missions were initially assigned to those forces which were to commence given activit ies earlier than others to reconnaissance agencies, covering forces, advance guards, and artillery. In order to speed up conmunication of missions, they would usually be transmitted with utilization of various communication channels, and in addition would be repeated on a redundant basis. Simultaneously with assignment of missions, instructions on mutual support are also communicated to commanders af subordi.nate subunits. Due to iimited time availabili- ty, it is difficult to organize on the terrain mutual support in a meeting engage- ment. In the past war the first items to be determined were troop advance, execu- tion of maneuver and deployment, and then, as concrete inf ormation on the enemy was received, matters pertaining to delivery of fire would be determ:i.ned. ~ Upon approaching deployment lines, when the direction of actions of the enemy's maiu Eorces and his force grouping became known, matterz of mutual support when _ initiating the assault phase and exploitation at depth could also be cuucretely determined. - Mutual support of forces in a meeting engagement would be organized first and foremost on the axis of the advance of the main forces, af ter which mutual support 257 FOR OFFICIAL U: E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFiCIAl. USE ONLY instructions would be communicated on that axij where the enemy was being blocked, and efforts would be coordinated as regards missions (positions the troops were to capture in the course of defeating the adversary), as well as objectives and time. Matters oE mutual support in a meeting engagement require constant refining, due to rapid and abrupt situation changes, as new int elligence is obtained on the enemy, especially on maneuver of his forces to the f 1 anks and rear. In organizing mutual support, it is important Lhoroughly to brief s ubordinate commanders on their - assigned missions and those of adj acent units, as well as the missions and sequence of acr.ians of attached and supporting forces and weapons. In order to ensure - maximum coordination in troop zetions, commanders of a.?1 echelons must possess firm knowledge of the time and sequence of deli.very of fire on the enemy by the forces and weapons of the higher commander, adjacent units, as well as their own actions durYng this time and immediately following art illery hombardment. - Securement of firm anc; continuous control occupies an important place in organizing for a meeting engagement. When moving forward, during advance to contact, the com- mander and his staff usually accompany the main forces (with their command post). - When a subunit engages, its commander is pos itioned in the combat formatJon, proceeding on his tank at a distance from the assaulting tanks which provides good - obser�vation of the entire subunit. 1n units and subunits, during deployment and engagement the commander is at his _ command post on the axis of advance of the main forces and displaces in order to observe the actions of tanks on this axis. In the past war precise briefing, an expedien t procedure of communicating missions, and continuously operating communications would be organized in advanr_e in order to - ensure reliable cor..:-.rol in subuni"_s and units (at all echelons, with adjacent units, supporting forces and weapons). Commanders and staffs were required to respond promptly to situation changes by ref ining plans and missions. In view of the fact that during preparation f or combat matters of support have already been settled, in anticipating a possible clash with the enemy they are usually only detailed in conformi.=y with the actual conditions of the developing - situation. 6. Actions of Tank Troops in a Meeting Enga gement As was indicated by the experience of the Great Patriotic War, success in meeting engagemenu-3 and encounter battles was achi_eved with a high degree of aggressive- ness of actions by tank units and combined un its. As we know, aggressive t roop actions in a meeting engagement usually would begin after reconnaissance spotted an acivancing enemy force a-nd its approach to a distance at which it could be hit by air and artillery. Even prior to these strikes, however, covering forces (if designated) and main forces would begin to advance to axes and lines ensuring occupation of an advantageous position in respect to the enemy and enabling one to attack with the element of surprise and b eating the enemy to the punch. Security subunits (advance guards) or the covering force, upon encountering an inferior or equal enemy force, would attack it from march formation and seize 258 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONL1' positions advantageous for subsequent actions by the friendly main forces. During a meeting engagement with such an enemy force, security subunits would employ wide envelopments, clos e envelopments, and would frontallv artack the enemy with a small part of their forces and hit the flanks with the remaining forces. They would endeavor to at tack at a moment when the enemy was in coltinul formatiun. Yn order to beat the enemy in delivering fire, artillery would r'cr.loy from march formation, without considering convenience of position, and woiild open fire as . rapidly as possible. It was believe prise tank fir one axis with security or in superior enemy these subunits Thanks to such =i an advantageous , in a situation _i d that frontal attacks and an unexpected attack from the flank, sur- e f rom ambush, as well as delivery of stationary fire for effect on a simultaneous assault on anoth`r could enable subunits operating as the covering force to destroy in short order not only an equal but fo rce as well. In a number of instances the aggressive actions of (units) forced thE adversary to deploy his main forces as well. actions by covering forces, the main forces were able to execute mane uver unhindered and to deliver a powerful attack on the enemy which was- disadvantageous to the latter. When covering force subunits encoLntered a superior enemy force, they would detail a small part of their forces for frontal actions, while the remaining forces would execute a conceale d maneuver to deliver a surprise attack on the enemy from the flank or rear. In order to ensure the element of surprise in this attack, they would move along te rrain irregularities, ravines, small woodlands, and areas where the er.emy was not expecting troops to appear. ~ ~ r~ ~_=J i~ AW ~ 1 ~ / ~ i i ~ ~ ~L~,rj = _ . - . ~ , _ ~ _ `_'~'�'ii' ~ . Figure 6.4.1. llelivering Fire on the Enemy in a Meeting Engagement While the Ad- versary Ts Advancing and Deploying (according to the vieoTS of armies of capitalist countries) 259 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY In a mceting engagement of tank subunits under present-day conditions, an imporiant role Ls played by stizure of an advantageous position by a portion of one's forces au d a suprise attack by the main forces in the flank or rear. The lead subunits seize a position which is advantageous f or holding in the path of the advancing _ enemy force, secretly deploy in this position, and hold the enemy with surprise _ tank and ATGM fire. ~ If a subunit is supported by artillery, the latter delivers fire on the enemy taking into account the specified plan of action. Based on the experience of the past wax, surprise artillery fire in combination with intensive tank fire is especially ef fective when, because of terrain conditions, it is difficult for the enemy to maneuver or to deploy rapidly. An exceptionally important role was played by tank ~ ambtish actions. By delivering fire from the flank and rear from ambush, they could not only inflict heavy losses on the enemy but also canfuse and disorganize him, which should immediately be exploitpd by the main forces to accomplish his complete defeat. ~Ihen seizing positions the terrain ahead of which impedes the actions of enemy fo rces, efforts were made to ensure that terrain behind friendly forces permitted � deployment of the main forces rapidly and without being observed by the enemy. Ttie experience of combat operations of tank units and combined units in the Gr eat Patriotic Way demonstrated the high degree of effectiveness of hitting the erLemy continuously, from the moment of detection on. The main forces would initiate the assault, utilizing the actions of the covering fo rce, usually frorn. behind their flank. They would attack after hitting the enemy with artillery and supporting airstrikes. The enemp wov.ld initially be hit witli fi res as he approached the contact area, calculated not only to hit the enemy but also to hinder his maneuver and delay his advance. The enemy would usually be hit as his columns were crossing defiles, rivers, wooded areas, and passes. As a result of such strikes, the enemy's advance would be considerably delayed. Under present-day conditions, according to existing views in a number of armies of capitalist countries, the delivery of nuclear and conventional fires looks approx- imately as is schematicall.y presented in Figure 6.4.7. ~ From the experience of *he war, the greatest density of fire for effect on the enemy occurred at the moment the main forces were commencing the assault. There, d epending on the time during which the enemy was delayed, the main force tanks - would advance onto those axes where, they could take up the most advantageous - p ositions for an assault in mass and attack the enemy before he could bring his - t roops into a state of combat readiness. The pace and sequence of advance of f riendly troops would be adapted to the time and capabilit.ies of delivery of d ecisively effective fire on the enemy by air and artillery. According to the views of foreign military experts, main forces can hit the enemy in a meeting engagement either simultaneously or sequentially. It is believed that in a situation requiring considerable force of initial attack, asimultaneous attack by tlie majority of available troops is employed. This is a chieved by moving up the required quantity of forces to the assault initiation 1 iric, timing things so that they are ready to attack on their axes by a specified 260 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ time. In a situation where the element of surprise can be achieved by concealing the advance and deployment of troops, and where time for organizing troop actions is limited, the attack can be executed sequentially as troops comprising the attack echelon arrive. Such actions are considered particularly advantageous in conditions where the adversary is advancing in a noncompact force, is delayed in moving up his forces, while his weapons have not yet deployed for combat. According to views existing in the U.S. Army, in a meeting engagement a division's leading brigades move out onto their axes, sequentially deploying from march into combat formation. When a brigade is proceeding along a single route, lines of - deploymenfi into battalion, company, and platoon columns can be designated. When friendly forces are engaging upon arrival, the division or brigade attacks with its forward units without initially halting. With this version, march groups (tank or motorized infant,ry battalions) proceeding at the heads of columns attack in the forward echelon. The remaining forces are engaged as they arrive. This version is specified in cases where superiority over the enemy will be achieved by artillery and airstrikes. In the past war various actions were employed upon encountering an enemy force which was superior in men and weapons. If, for example, the enemy force was tem- porarily demoralized by artillery and airstrikes, the troops would engage this enemy force from march formation and commence the assault immediately. If this did not appear possible, an advantageous position would be selected, from which the enemy would be delivered fire from position, after which the troops would commence the assault. These actions were especially successful when opening f ire on the enemy with the element of surprise. According to views ex3.sting in the U.S. Army, when conducting a meeting eiigagement when large enemy forces are encountered, division main forces initiate the attack following a brief halt, and not unit by unit, but simultaneously by the entire main f orces. U.S. military leaders believe that with this version, division main forces will engage 2-3 hours following initiation of a meeting engagement by ad- vance guards, while ttie employment of nuclear weapons is unquestionably the decisive factor in achieving victory in a meeting engagemento* In the opinion of fareigxZ experts, nuclear weapons will be employed in a meeting engagement in combination with maneuver of troops and with conventional weapons. The principal targets of nuclear strikes in a meeting engagement include offensive nuclear weapons, attack-echelon tanks, support echelon, and command posts.** It is emptasized that in all cases tank subunits and units move swiftly in a meet- ing engagement. Tanks proceed at maximum speed during deployment and in the assault. They choose the shortest routes when advancing. They utilize all ad- _ vantageous topographic features 3uring movement terrain irregularities, hills, " brush, and ravines. No pauses or halts are permitted. Tanks deliver the greatest intensity of fire during the assault. Artillery does likewise, hitting tanks and ofiher enemy targets, ard especially antitank weapons. Air defense weapons cover See "Sukhoputnyye voyska kapitalisticheskikh gosudarstv," page 205. See ibid., pp 205-206. ~ 261 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the attacking tanks, x'epulsing hostile air attacks arme d helicopter gunships. Tank subunits achieve init i al attack by swift penetration of the enemy's flanks and rear. 'rhe forces operating during this enemy is mounting the main attack block him and the axis of advance of the main forces. and destroying the enemy's ATGM the greatest succcess in the battle order and by hitting the time on the axis on which the prevent him from maneuvering to Based on the experience of the past war, in a meeting engagement the main forces usually would not hold back to complete mopping up individual pockets of resistance; they would swiftly bypass them and advance to depth without a halt, in order to split up the enemy as quickly as possible and destroy him piecemeal. The minimum requisite forces would be assigned the mission of repelling attacks by sma11 enemy forces under these conditions. ' By v i rtue of the fact that a meeting engagement of tank subunits and units, with botti sides persistently endeavoring to achieve superiority and to force the ad- vers a ry to give up continuation of assaults,is distinguished by exceptional in- tens ity, all personnel in the course of a meeting engagement must display genuine boldness, daring and ingenuity. As an example of such actions, one can cite the engagement of the XVIII Tank Corps in the Battle of Kursk at Prokhorovka in July 1943. Approximately 400 tanks clashed on a two-kilometer fr.ontage in the zonP of ad- van ce of the 181st and 170th Tank brigades, following a 15-minute Soviet artillery bomb ardment. The fighting continued all day on 12 July, with variable success. Toward evening about 60 German tanks frontally counterattacked subunits of the 181s t Tank Brigade and the 32d Motorized Rifle Brigade, and up to 20 tanks, sup- port ed by selF-propelled guns, attacked them from the rearo The 181st Tank Brigade and the 32d Motorized Rifle Brigade were forced to repulse the enemy attack with stat ionary fire. Receiving intensive resistance, the enemy was halted, and then pushed back to his initial position. Durin g the day of fighting the corps destroyed 63 enemy tanks and self-propelled gun s, 28 antitank guns, killed more than 1000 officers and men, shot down five , airc raft, and smashed 29 trucks carrying supplies and motorized infantry. The corp s lost approximately 25-30 percent of yts tanks. The XVIII Tank Corps fully ret aiacithe initiative in the course of the engagement. Successful actions by the unit s of the corps were promoted by close and continuous coordination on the part of a 11 personnel and weapons. I'or example, when enemy tanks counterattacked units of t he corps forward echelon from the rear, they were hit by the 110th Tank Brigade of t he support echelon. - In a number of instances the adversary can offer the most stubborn resistance and, redeploying its forces, delay the advance of tanks. In order to prevent slowing of t he rate of advance in a meeting engagement, foreign military experts recommend - that pressure on the enemy be built up by engaging reserves, as well as by - mane uvering men and weapons from one axis to another. It is noted that on the one hand promptness of engaging reserves was of particular importance for achieving the greatest result, while on the other hand it was important to take aggressive meas ures to thwart engagement of the enemy's reserves, such as by cutting them off from the main forces with airstrikes, artillery fire and resolute assaults. 262 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY Promptness of engaging xeserves was defined as that iuoment in combat when forward- echelon f orces were clearly insufficient to alter substantially the status of the opposing sides and to exploit offensive success (or hold occupied positions). Delay in engaging reserves under these conditions could lead to loss of initiative. In a number of instances reseryes were committed to repel a sudden threat of enemy attack from the flank or rear. As we know, premature utilization of reserves in combat is potentially dangerous. When maximum intensity in combat has not yet been reached, and the opposing sides retain the capability to fight successfully not only by committing reserves but also effective actions byforward-echelon forces, retaining their reserves, there is a possibility of obtaining substantial advantages for subsequent exploita- tion. According to views in the foreign military press, reserves in a meeting engagement are moved secretly and engaged with the element of surprise, on that axis where the greatest success can be achieved. Reserves are usually engaged on the flanks or tn gaps in the forward-echelon forces. It is considered inadvisable for reserves to be engaged by leapfrogging past the forward-echelon dispositions, since this leads to excessively dense packing of forces and the threat of mixing troops. es- pecially advantageous conditions were created when reserves were engaged on an enveloping flank to attack the enemy from the rear. At the same time, in a situa- tion where the enemy was already split up by efforts of the attack echelon, reserves would be engaged along the shortest path, in order to complete crushing the enemy piecemeal as quickly as possible, swiftly attacking that force grouping designated to be destroyed fa.rst. Engagement of reserves is supported by artillery fire and airstrikes on the opposing enemy force both forward of the line of contact and on the flanks of the forces being committed to battle. At the same time the forward-echelon troops operating on the axis of engagement of the reserves also deliver fire on the enemy and execute a swift assault. Success achieved by engaging reserves would immediately be exploited by the attack- echelon forces. At the same time, in all cases a portion of forces of the forward- echelon troops would replace expended reserves in order to restore them to strength. As noted above, meeting engagements and encounter battles usually take place between equal forces. However, in connection with the specific situation features, and particularly its vagueness, they may also occur in the absence of equality of forces, that is, with a superior adversary. For example, on 11 August 1943 the lst Tank Army, with 260 tanks, encountered south of Bogodukhov counterattacking t roops of the enemy's III Panzer Corps, with approximately 360 tanks. Savage figliting continued throughout the day. Part of the forces of the corps (forward brigades) advanced deep to the vicinity of Kovyagi. As a result of the en- counter battle, the main forces of the corps, although unable to exploit the success of the covering forces and to soundly defeat the superior enemy, neverthe- less clid succeed in delaying him. ~ 263 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY In the course af this battle the army's VI Tank Corps attacked the flank of the enemy's 2d Panzer Division in the vicinity of Vysakopol'ye and Aleksandrovka. The corps' 112th Tank Brigade succeeded, with a bold maneuver, exploiting a gap in the enemy's dispositions, in reaching an advantageous position ahead of the adversary, in attacking the latter with the element of surprise, from march formation, and - inflicting heavy losses. With favorable situation condit i ons, especially when the element of surprise can be achieved in attack on the enemy's main forces, greater success can also be achieved in a meeting engagement against a superior enemy force. In addition to the element of offensive surpri s e, lt is based on beating the adversary in deliver- ing fire, deployment and commen cing the assault, and splitting up the enemy force. The excellent maneuver capabilit ies and considerable striking power of tanks enable them to split up an oppo sing enemy force in short order and quickly concen- trate principal efforts on crushing the enemy piecemeal. Such, for example, were - ~ the actions of the 4th Tank Army south of Kielce in January 1943. Provided frontal cover by two brigades, the amy's troops executed a close envelopment from two sides on the enemy's 17th P anzer Division which had driven forward, and at- tacked it on two flanks. As a result, by the evening of 13 January the enemy division was routed. Subsequen tly the enemy's 16th Panzer Division reached the Uattle area, and was blocked f r ontally by the 49th Mechanized Brigade, while the main forces of the 4th Tank Army attacked the enemy division in the flank and surrounded and destroyed it on 15 January. Abrupt and rapid situation chan ges in a meeting engagement and a swift drive by tanks to the enemy's flanks and rear frequently can leacl to a situation where part of the forces may be separated from the remaining troops, and sometimes end up surrounded. In such a situati on a decisive role is played by bold, resol.ute ac- tions by the personnel of isol a ted units and subunits. In the past war, for ~ example, the 61st Guards Tank Brigade, in combat as an element of the X Tank Corps against the German-fascist 17 th Panzer Division in January 1943, found itself cut off from the rest of the corps forces behind enemy lines. It continued fighting heroically, however, and when the corps main forces initiated the assault phase, ~ it attacked ttie enemy from the rear and thus helped complete the rout of the ~ enemy. Modern combat operations are conducted continuously, including at night. r:eeting engagements are no exception. In particular, it is especially stressed in the f oreign press that under condi tions of increased power and capabilities of weapons _ and improved tank performance characteristics, their operations will be most ag- gressive precisely at night. The specifi.c conditions of the hours of darkness make it possible to operate con- cealed and to achieve the element of offensive surprise. Foreign experts believe ttat in a number of instances it is possible at night successfully to perform com- _ plex missions even with less f o rces than during the day. It is believed that since ir is more difficult at nig'tIt to determine the actual quantity of personnel and - weapuns of the opposing side, mounting of surprise attacks at night may sometimes produce gr.eater results than during the day. 264 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - At night it is more difficult to gain bearzngs, to conduct abservation, and to adjust the time and place of execution of actions. Therefore night vision devices _ are employed in conducting night actions. Night movements are executed following the shortest route. A complex maneuver re- quires extensive employment of navigation gear, enabling the troops accurately and rapidly to reach the required axes and positions even in the absence of clearly visible landmarks. An especially important role in night operations is assigned to precisely organized mutual recognition and marking of friendly troops. Essential in the course of tank night cambat is continuous and more frequent information on situation changes than during day operations. In the course of a meeting engagement, primary importance is attached to combating helicopter gunships, including those armed with ATGM. Success of these efforts in the course of a meeting engagement depends on thorough organization of air defense and skillful employment of air defense weapons, as well as prompt detection of helicopters before and during combat. For combating helicopters in the course of a meeting engagement, it is recommended that air defense weapons be maintained continuously in the tank dispositions. weapons capable of quickly downing enemy helicopter gunships and fixed-wing aircraf t as rapidly as possible. Tr,is is due to the fact that the short time required by a helicopter to accomplish its mission, amounting to only 40-50 seconds, for example, operating f rom ambush, unquestionably makes it more difficult to detect and destroy a helicopter, because a helicopter should be destroyed or measures taken to diminish its effectiveness precisely during this short period of time. Thus tank meeting engagements are distinguished by a high degree of complexity and _ intensity. It is precisely in these engagements, however, that the tank's principal performance char.acteristic is revealed to the greatest degree con- = siderable striking power, a result of the tank's grear firepower and mobility. 265 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Chapter 5. THE OFFENSE 1. General Considerations Every tank commander should know that war is conducted according to objective laws characteristic of war, which are defined as the most general, essential and per- sistent relations which recur in the phenomena of war. The general laws of war- fare include those which express the relationship between the course and outcome of war on the one hand and the correlation of economic, scientific, moral-political and military torces proper of the warring nations and coalitions on the other, as well as the character of their political aims. Alongside general laws, there are laws which operate in the course of war which apply to the specifics proper of war armed combat. These are laws which reflect the all-encompassing, objective, intrinsic, necessarily stable relations which characterize the specific processes of armed combat, which is the principal con- tent ot war. Many centuries of combat experience teaches us Lhat victory is achieved through attack. Only by advancing foxward, by destroying and capturing the opposing ad- versary is it possible to achieve decisive objectives and to force the enemy to surrender. Therefore in all the armies of the world the offense is considered the principal type of combat actions. Under present-day conditions troops, including tank troops, can also conduct other types of combat actions which are variants of the offense and defense: meeting en- gagements, pursuit of a retreating enemy, rivp:-crossing operations, repelling counterthrusts and counterattacks, etc. The offense and defense, however, con- stitute the Foundation on which all troop comb at activities are grounded. This proceeds from the fact that the attack and repelling the attack, or offense and defense are two dialectically interlinked processes of armed combat. They can- not exist in isolarion, one without the other. In addition, elements both of the oFfense and of the defense are always present in each of these types of action. It is believed that the enemy can be totally routed only with a resolute offensive, employing all the power of available forces and weapons. Offensive actions most of all promote retention of tank battleworthiness, under conditions of employment - of modern weaponry and successful combat against enemy nuclear weapons. 266 FOR OFFICIAL USE QNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICAL USE ONLY The following principal and most characteristic modes of tank actions in a modern offensive battle are examined abroad: delivery of fire and forward movement, with the delivery of fire the principal mode of action, the basis of the offensive, for only with the employment of all types of weapons can heavy losses be inf licted on the adversary, taking away his capability to employ his weapons. Foreign military experts believe that modern offensive operations of tank troops are character3.zed by even more decisiveness of objectives than in the p ast, and a sharp increase in the spatial scope; by employment of nuclear weapons as the deci- sive and principal means of hitting the enemy in order to achieve the stated ob- jective; by unification of efforts with motorized infantry, air, airborne assault forces, other forces and weapons participating in battle; by the high mobility and maneuverability of the tanks waging combat; by the intensity and short duration of ; combat, by the diversity of inethods of hitting the enemy employed by tanks and rapid stiifts from one method of action to another; by abrupt and rapid situation changes; by the element of surprise in combat actions and constant effort to seize the initiative; by heavy expenditure of materiel and the possibility of massive casualties and combat equipment losses; a continuous high state of tank combat readiness to perform any missions may arise on the basis of the situation. Foreign experts comment on the points enumerated above as follows. The decisiveness of objectives and large spatial scope of the offense are based on the possibility of swiftly crushing the adversary with massed employment of nuclear weapons, on fullest utilization of the increased range of weapuns, mobility and - maneuverability of tank subunits, anu on the driving skill and excellent combat proficiency of t3nk crews. Failure to observe these demands is fraught with serious consequences. Employment of nuclear weapons as a decisive and principal means of hitting the - enemy is new and determining in successful accomplishment of missions by armored troops and rapid achievement of their objectives. Nuclear weapons and the prin- cipal means of delivering them to the target missiles, which combine enormous power and great range on the battlefield, enable tank subunits under present-day conditions rapidly to accomplish missions which are the most diversified in character and scale. Mutual support between tank subunits and motorized infantry, air, airborne assault ~ forces, as well as other forces and weapons participating in combdt ensures the i success of an offensive. In spite of the fact that a decisive role in combat operations will be played by nuclear weapons, victory can be achieved only by the ' joint efforts of a11 combat arms and aviation, in uniting efforts with other _ services working in cooperation with tanks. Tlounting of deep and swift attacks by tank subunits to the entire depth of enemy dispositions, based on employment of nuclear weapons and high mobility actions of tanks working in coordination with other troops participating in combat, is one of the conditions for rapidly achieving decisive objectives and a large spatial scope of ttie offensive operation. 267 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040340100060-1 FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Hitting the enemy's principal forces to the entire depth of his dispositions with missile and airstrikes, in the opinion of foreign military experts, opens up con- siderable possibilities for successful actions by motorized infantry subunits, - deep, swift tank a*tacks and landing of airborne assault forces with the aim of swift completion of defeat of the enemy and capture of his most important areas and installations. The element of surprise is of decisive significance for offensive success. Surprise = is achieved by deception, by deluding the adversarq, and by concealment and camouflage. Military leaders of old pointed to the necessity of utilizing the element of sur- _ prise; they stated that in war it is necessary to outwit the enemy. - Aggressiveness and persistence in pursuing objectives constitute one of the features of offensive tank operations. Aggressiveness is closely linked with ini- _ tiative. he who holds the initiative is the master of the offensive situation. Continuous conduct of combat actions is one of the most important conditions for _ achieving offensiva success. Initiated actions should be conducted aggressively and continuously, day and night, at any time of the year, in any weather, until - the enemy is totally def eated. Of importance for offensive success is selectian of the main axis of advance, which comprises an aggregate of nuclear strikes and swift advance by tanks and other ground troops subunits in coordination with these nuclear strikes. According to the experience of the past war, main axis of advance is defined as that direction of combat actions in which the main efforts of the attacking force are concentrated in order to accomplish the principal offensive missions. In the opinion of foreign military exnerts, main axis Qf advance presupposes the most expedient employment of nuclear and other weapons and exploitation of the - - results of delivered fire by advancing tanks in order to achieve rapid defeat of _ the main enemy force; swift advance by attacking troops to considerable depth; ' their rapid advance into areas subjected to nuclear strikes, in order to complete the rout of the enemy or seize important areas and installations. The success of - an attack is ensured by establishing and r_ontinuously maintaining on the main axis of advance a superiority in men and weapons, especially nuclear weapons. This is achieved by concentrating the principal efforts of missile subunits and air to destroy the enemy's offensive nuclear weapons and principal force groupings; by establishing a battle group consisting primarily of the most battleworthy tank - subunits, with strict observance of the demands of dispersed disposition of per- sonnel and weapons in order to protect them against enemy nuclear weapons; by prompt build-up of troop efforts by executing extensive maneuver by tanks and other weapons in the course of offensive actions. It is believed that the axis of advance of tanks under present-day conditions should ensure maximum utilization of their maneuver capabilities, as wel1 as gaps in ttie enemy's dispositions, areas covered by negligible forces, for rapid penetra- tion deep into the enemy's dispositions. 268 FOR ^FFICfAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Conduct of offensive operations in the absence of continuous battle fronts, on separate axes and simultaneously at differing depth, it is believed abroad, con- _ stitutes one of the specific features of a tank subunit attack under present-day coriditions. The character of such tank actions is dictated by considerable _ capabilities to inflict damage on the enemy with nuclear weapons, which make it possible to put out of commission not only individual units but also large f orce groupingg as well as by the high degree of mobility and maneuverability of tanks. Concentration of tanks on decisive axes assumes even greater i.mportance for today's - offensive actions than in past wars. The coriditions and procedure of massing tanks, however, differ substantially today from similar actions in the past. It is believed that under the new conditions there is no need to maintain a compact for- i mation, since decisive significance for achieving success in combat actions is as- sumed primarily by massed employment of nuclear weapons and other weapons on the main axes for hitting the enemy's main force groupings and most important targets, as well as maneuver and swift actions by tanks following these attacks, with maximum concentration of large battle groups. Dense formations and massing of troops are inadmissible today. Personnel and weapons must be dispersed to the greatest possible extent for the successful conduct of combat actions, and partic- ularly in order to create facorable conditions for their rapid utilization on decisive axes, against the principal enemy targets and at an appropriate time. The high mobility of tank actions is a characteristic feature of today's offense. It is believed that highly mobile actions, which ensure continuity and a high rate of advance, are most fully manifested in tank actions from march foi-mation. Such actions consist in the fact that preparation of tank subunits to perform a forth- coming mission is accomplished during performance of preceeding missions without any halts or pauses in combat operations. Highly mobile tank actions are grounded on prompt and full utilization of the en- tire power and range of nuclear missile weapons and conventional weapons, as well as the higti mobility of missile subunits and aviation, air defense forces, other forces and weapons invo'Lved in an offensive operation. Therefore organization and execution of nuclear strikes in the shortest allowable time for accomplishing the p rincipal missions, conduct of an attack by tank subunits following these strikes at the greatest possible speed, prompt advance and displacement of all other forces and weapons with utilization, when necessary, of the maximum march capabilities of all troops, as well as their rapid deployment and shift to other formations in con- f ormity with the developing situation will constitute the content of high-mobility actions under present-day con.iitions. Proceeding from the above,it is believed that tank combat operations snould be con- _ ducted continuously, day and night, and should be characterized by a high degree of - mobility ancJ a highly dynamic character. Tank subunits, swiftly advancing following nuclear strikes, exploit without delay tlie results of these strikes. They should be able rapidly to organize and deliver Fires with their own weapons, without halting the advance, and they should be capable of rapidly deploying on command (signal) from columns into approach march or combat Formations, of swiftly attacking the enemy and, when the enemy has been c:rushed, of rapidly deploying into columns. 269 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104460-1 FOR OFFICIAL l1SE ONLY The short duration of battles is predetermined by the capability of modern weapons, and chiefly nuclear weapons, of almost instantaneously delivering massive effective fire on the enemy and knocking out entire elements and important t argets, and also by the capability.both of ground troops as a whole and their striking power tanks of rapidly exploiting the results of nuclear strikes and completing the rout of opposing enemy forces. Modern tank offensive operations will also be characterized by an increased element of surpise and a fight to seize the initiative in all types of combat actions. - Successful accomplishment of offensive missions depends on correct selection of mode of passing to tYie offensive. 2. Modes of Passing to the Offensive - An analysis of foreign mi?.itary literature indicates that with modern means of delivering nuclear warheads to the target, it is possible to neutralize and clestroy entire force groupings as well as to destroy important enemy installations to their entire depth of disposition in a theater of military operations. All this significantly affects not only the modes of passing to the offensive but also the course and outcome of combat actions. The term mode of passing to the offensive is defined under present-day conditions as the procedure of delivering powerful air and artillery strikes on the enemy and the character of actions of the troops proper which follow these strikes. Modes of passing to the offensive by tank subunits, in the opinion of foreign authors, depend on the situation conditions and will be determined ~n each concrete instance by the degree of neutralization of the enemy, and particularly his of- fensive nuclear weapons, as well as by the character of actions of his troops, the state, position and combat capabilities of the tank subunits of the attacking force at the moment of passing to the offensive. It is believed that there can be several methods of ground troops, and especially tank forces, passing to the offensive. In the opinion of foreign experts, however, the greatest preference should be given to a method whereby surprise, massive fire delivered on the opposing enemy force is secured, with prompt exploitation of the results of this fire by tanks in order to penetrate swiftly deep into the enemy's dispositions. _ Under present-day conditions, attack of a defending enemy force may be executed directly from march formation as well as from close contact with the enemy. Under conditions of employment of nuclear weapons, the attack directly f rom march forma- tion is considered the principal offensive mode. Tanks and tank subunits will pass to the offensive primarily on those axes on which the enemy has been most heavily damaged by nuclear strikes and delivery of conventional f ires. Passing ot tanks to the off ensive directly f rom march formation ensures their rapid ad- vance into the areas where the principal offensive nuclear weapons are located and a swift advance deep into the enemy's rear. 270 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL USC ONLY _ lleep in the enemy's defense, an attack without a halt in attack position may begin directly from the aiarch and even in coluBms. For passing to the offensive ; by tanks in columns without deploying into comb at formations under present-day con- ditions, intervals and gaps between the enemy's operating troops can be extensive- ly utilized. At the same tim2 it is stipulated that if for various reasons it is impossible on certain axes to deliver reliable, effective fire on opposing enemy forces, tank , subunits will pass to the offensive with deployment of tanks into combat formation without a halt in attack position. Such a procedure enables tank subunits quickly to seize and hald the initiative at the very outset of action, to thwart an enemy ! advance on a given axis, to destroy or capture the enemy's principal missile I weapons, and to disrupt the operations of his rear services. Operating in coordina- ' tion with missile subunits, air, motorfzed infantry and airborne assault forces, the tanks should adyance swiftly in columns, smash the enemy's reserves, thwart deployment of fresh enemy forces, and thus ensure that all attacking troops achieve their objectives as quickly as possible. In those cases where the enemy, although fairly well neutralized, can offer resistance and threaten delay of the advancing troops, in order to avert this threat it is recommended that a portion of the attack-echelon forces of the ad- vancing tank troops be deployed into combat formation, while maintaining support echelons in columns or lines. But if the opposing enemy force is not neutralized and offers substantial resistance, the advancing tank subunits will be compelled to deploy into combat formation and attack the enemy with artillery and~air support. Thus under present-day conditions, according to the views of foreign experts, pass- ing of tanks to the offensive without a halt in attack position is possible in the following in%,tances (Figure 6. 5.1) : following nuclear strikes in columns or approach march formation without deploying the main force grouping into combat f ormation; following nuclear strikes, in a combined mode, where a portion of the tanks passes to the offensive ?.n columns or approach march formation, while the remainder deploy into combat formacion for passing to the offensive; following nuclear strikes, with deployment of the main tank force into com- bat formation and preliminary bombardment by conventional weapons. It is believed that with tanks passing to the offensive in columns or approach march formation, tanks are able promptly and most fully to exploit the results of nuclear strikes by advancing swiftly along the shortest routes to depth, with tanks and infantry combat vehicles delivering fire directly from columns, and only when necessary assuming combat Eormations to knock out individual pockets of resistance. Passing of tanks to the ofFensive with deployment of the main forces into combat formation without a hait in attack position can be a forced mode of action with in- adequate damage inflicted on the opposing enemy force (Figure 6.5.2). Under these canditions lines of deployment into combat formation beyond minefields are designated. 271 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 % ti. FUR OFFIC'lAL USE ONL.Y I. B H040NNOX u nped6ooeaix /lOPAdHOX ~ ~ ~ J}~ O ~/fl..~ t\ g~::��' B ~ fa m ~ `~^.~5: ~s P~6e~.Gsaonatxoto 4 ra(,.a�U. m4 I ~ c~ 7~ i>� -T 2. HOMGUNI/p0BOHfIMM cqCo6o.w, e HpAOHNQX U RPQaGABBbIX dnpnBxn r c~age mni~~~ue,w vacmu cu,+'e 6ooenre nopAamu y~\ -f' ~ o ~4' ~ z"' ~ - ~haw~ ~ c.. . ~ . / - V J- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ �nNU. p~6e+~ ~ua~ep~neisnNU ` e 6onsae ~ ponrne~eixo~oNHa � l~ � Py6ew 5e3onucb0r0 t~,~rr7n4rwun 4 ~r~~l , ._,C-S~ ~ I 4's-1 3. C pujaepmweaNUe.u e 60coele nopnanu 4 ~ O(/ : ~ ~ !o J~ O",~�,' -~~p~ ~1 ~ �`%>Pr6s~ Pr6exr pajsep- p 6ew noaeepmueaMUs ~ paj#epme'q~KU Rl6/sOHUl1 e L r � jRRi0.I60NNNI 7 � fioe� pamNele ~ KoxoNMa � ~ , ~ ~0~1111~N~ b110.10NNN ~ C,`~~,~r"'.~(~ 4 � ~ ~0 ~ ~ 110, h'iiznre 6.5.1. Possible Modes of Tanks Passing to the Offensive : 1. Iti culumns and approach march tiormation 1. Combined mode, in colutms and approach uiarch fozmation with deployment of part of the forces into combat formations 3. With deployment into combat formations 272 y 4. Risk distance line 5. Line of deployment into com- bat formations 6. Line of deployment into com- pany columns 7. Line of deployment into battalion columns FOR OFFICiAL LJSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FOR OFFICIAL U~'E ONLY - - _ 4~~' ~ .c %lpoxodw ~ r- e y - ,~4 W& e ~ ~...o ar� - 3 ~ _ ~ PezynupoeusuH- . � 0 0 0 \ ` I ~ G o ~ i ' _ - - MuHnoe 2_ _-~`----P` noAe t. - r - - � ` L} PyoeNr pusUepmbteaHUs a npedooeeou nopaoon Figure 6.5.2. Tanks Passing to the Offensive With Deployment of the Main Forces Into Combat Formation Without a Halt in Attaclc Position, Beyond Enemy Minefields (variant) Key: 1. Lanes 2. Minefield 3. Traffic controller 4. Line of deployment into appproach march formation Tanks operate in combat formations when attacking a defending enemy force from close contact with that force. 3. Conduct of the Attack It is noted in the foreign press that attack of a defending adversary begins with , penetration of his defense, with del`ivery of �ires with employment of all available weapons, and a subsequent resolute assault by tank and motorized infantry units. With conduct of an attack without a halt in attack position, reconnaissance and ~ engineer subunits, advancing to the enemy's defenses ahead of the main forces, im- inediately proceed to reconnoiter the enemy's defenszve fortifications and to deter- mine the cliaracter of his obstacles, particularly minefields. Lanes are cleared _ tlirough obstacles (minefields) and are clearly marked for tank passage. Tank platoons cross minefields by these lanes and then deploy for the assault. After artillery fire and airstrikes are shifted from the forward edge of the battle _ area, tanks with motorized infantry penetrate the first position and exploit the advance deep into the enemy's defenses and toward the flanks. Tanlc troops which have passed to the offensive continue advancing in those forma- t:ions in wtiich they commenoed the attack: in columns, approach marcn or combat f:)r- 273 FuR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 FnR OFFICIAL USE ONLY formation, Uut in the course of advancing to depth and toward the flanks, combat formations change in conformity with actions taken by the enemy. , In conditions where there lie in the path of tank subunits areas of terrain with substantial radiation levels, and where detouring around these areas will be im- possible for any reasons, it is recommiended that commanders at all echelons replace the subunitJ which have been operating in these zones. Figure 6.5.3 shows the sequence of actions of a tank c.ompany in crossing terrain with substantial levels of radioactive contamination. 2 3 4 5 B03NO1NNOQ 1'poeeu paeuauuu a ma NOX ~ Mera~K'�d0a iVeraNUx=eoBumeea QH b' ~HON4HdflP XUMf/3UPOBaNN020 U9NENON(IQ I NOtyM 6MR76 d0 HOpN6/ { id1Q.Ib C.IfaUl713Q' yOemPeM/I72EMOME?!fl JJHU/1ONlQ .7BpuO49U4BClf(I pocnoAo+weHUR I NONONaUP I71QN/fQ (i7BOclG) Il10XO3aNUnNY I pOC/I10mNM0 I flPOBEPoem NOftl4U0 3QPQ' gaeoBoe no I 8o1(,qaaaeaarrr Ko.vaNBupr 1pewmteNOrempa I iAxeNHwx pacmHOe peuieNUro pamu KoraHBupo pomw - in - O~Lu'r?tm~'~"`' ~ - :��.l.i:::�.�;. _ . ~~.....~MwM ~~�l~'.,ul"3s~~~. = ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ _ 4X _ " ~ I.,. >~:~`i'.~.'.'` .j~i'.::'':'�.-= _ _ =P 6e~r ac6 e� . - - : Y P . :'�~cry......,...,....,...~. - T ecNQNUN POT61 B '~npea6oeeeie 'i;�. ~.,M,~�~":::::,,-= - 5 ~nopaBHU I / ~ - ~ ; ...~.v A, - TaNxoeax poma s .+uNUu -7 _ _ ~ 'V � ~ 8.190d NWX NOAONN nepea / pr6ewo.w pa3sepmeieaHUa Py6ed`pa3aepmnleaNUx ~ , maNxoaoJ pomeI $ ~ YcnoeNae 0603naveHNn ~ TaHK HOMBNANPa P~Td lO t ~ Y4aCTNN B MB '.l! 3TOMHW 7f 12 83pW808 C03Hb4NT. p8j4N81{M8i1 TaNH KowaHpwPa 11 ~ TdHH KoMaNpNpalsjeopa C%NMN3NPOB8H' I ~ , . ~ �~:1 `~i` . % _M~'.~.~=~ _ ~~~i.:~;. ~ n~t./�.~~,, ` , _ ~-'^r'~i~J_~. ~ lJU~+uA- ~ � _~~,~_~l~~~ Vf. s j{ r' ioMrrunacnedyacuux ~ , i ~ 1'+~~' - ~.z ~ `\i~.'~- ~ - .~y~J. ~'euro~a^�~em,ad~ Ta~NU oveAedHO 1J - 2o . iIli' Y ,y ! Feucuoacvem� _ 14 ~ y C/1 U B N o! B 0 b 0 3 N3 y� y J A 5 1 ~CN:![% ~ocm 2 - ~ CDC3lj(OD/Cll3,) rFZav c mpacanr $ y aCZ ` Poe"PG00P:41"N C OOBUCCMO'-'(('.'PU, V/1006{OA- ~ mp .p rPHf/ 'gf/ N p1 ti ' : ^ 'OOCf! yK03Hl! 6 Saj,;~O, .40d0no3,.o-cn9c0menaH0A =a1ai+141.'a 9 1 n 'OlLlu;; h : P. 0 c, : 3 4 t C.r aopNaR aexo 317P Na,7p~Oene.~uA oBUxreNUa moMNC 0 B 60 ~ d a~ 3a ~ ep~ p ~ maA i+uu C ea o Cbe3doa I 4 Figure 6.5.4. Tank Subunit Crossing River Under Its Own Power Submerged (var. i ant) Key: 1. Legend 2. Crossing area command post 3. Traffic controller with radio set, controlling tank move- ment submerged 4. Lanes through minefields 5. Water entry (exit) 6. Markers 285 7. Marker stakP for guiding a tank 8. Frime mover with cable 9. Diver-rescue station 10. Combat engineer detail for maintain- ing entry and exit ramps in working order 11. Tanks crossing under water 12. Tank of comnnander supervising cross- ing FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104460-1 , E'OR OFFtC1AL USE ONLY (Key to Figure 6.5.4, cont'd from preceding page) 13. Tanks of following wave 15. Tanks of subsequent waves 14. Line of departure 16. Traffic regulating line nHn. Traffic post mNuxHCnopm u apmun u 12 ~r.~repuA G C~ O z~ 4 r:`-" C tp K /IuHU~ H1111 13 YMpoucrnao annapeneu _ o a 15 3eninANaa annapenv17 TpaHCnopmHb1e cpedcmea Ha cKamax 6epeza - C~' ~ u 6oeeaa mexHUKa oveped- - c;~o0 ~r+oeopeucgottc4ema A p~U NCXOdNdR qUNUA 16 - ~18 iiaz 3r,amex- Hu ud u~e~i N Po3zpy3xa paNeHSIx u mpaHC- Hp Po~~ \ nopma,udy~uuxambrn 19 ~G ~ ~ /IUHUA noz yaxu20 ~ ~ O O _ - ~ . - - JlepesnnHas annapenb 21 22=_~j~- t /1nZfly3NLtP(XNPHb1.YU 23 Pas2p 3Ha~-~---Cpknmexr+uKU,iranpaenne- nexooiu MbIx a mvfn '~-~Q mexHUxu, NCXUdHQA AUHUA 24 ' _ ud y~uaL i.~ p Na Ppo+m i ' ~Luj-,C_~ yClfCBHbIP 0 03HA'YPHIlA 1 ~ HonreHdaNm nepenpaabr 2 a Aemo,modunv 7 - Q IIDMOii,(NUK HOMeNdQH/I7Q' 3 tl, subunit I will possess numerical superi.ority over subunit II. A co*nputer can quickly furnish the results of a large number of combat variants in table and graphic forms, which can be analyzed and practically utilized. With variable Al and,/1,2 (which in practice will almost always occur), equations (7.4.14) are not solved i .n elementary expressions; they must be solved numerically, on a comp uter, for example. Obviously these equa*ions are also a mathematical model of combat between two groups of any similar weapons. With constantA 1 and A2, equations (7.4.14) are solved in elementary functions. A simpie analytica]_ model is obtained. To solve the equations, in this case it is _ convenient to proceed from nl and n2 to relative quantities ti 1=n1;P,;w2=n2 : N2. Ob- _ viously tA 1 and f'2 can change within limits from 1 to 0. We shall also introduce quantities d and t: N, A, (7.4.15) a= Nr A,' I (7.4.16) ~ . Quantity called superiority indicator and determines the relative strength of the oppos ing forces taking into account quant::ty and quality of tanks. _ Tf d> 1, the capabilities of adversary I to del:.ver effective fire exceed the capabilities of adversary TI, while when d,C1 on the contrary, and when et =1, the capabilities of the opposing forces are practics.lly identical. Solving equations (7.4.14) with constants Jtl, a,. 2, we obtain: I (a 1) I)e-il. (7.4.17) -a)e'+ + Where e-2.73 base of a system of natural logarithms. CompuL-ations according to the formula are performed with utilization of function tables y=eY, Y-e-X� Performing calculations with formulas (7.4.15-7.4.17), one can obtain for any moment in time from commencement of combat, what percentages of tanks p,l and N.2 - will remain in the opposing-force subunits. Knowing r 1 and J~t2, we obtain _ n1= '+1N1, n2= 1`2N2 and losses r.1=Nl-nl, r2=N2-n2. 354 _ FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104460-1 FOR OFFI(.'IAI. IiSF. ONLY One can demonstratu ttiat if dt > l, then for any moment in time nl> w 2 will occur, thaL is, the adv:intages of the stronger adversary will be maintained throughout the eu[ire engabement. For practical utiJ.ization of expressions (7.4.17), one plots in advance graphs for t.1 and J%2 in a. function of c witli various d(Figure 7.4.7). inn 90 BO %U 5/1 i +n !0 !0 0 _ -i - - - - _ - \ �l,3 \`I _ . . - ~ _ - - - t ' - - - \ \ - - - - ~ - ~ _ - - - - a.=! - ` \ - - - - _ - - .114 �i,3 d�i l00 VD 90 70 f0 50 411 10 20 fG 0,1 Q2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0.6 17.7 6,8 0,9 1,0 1,1 1,2 1,3 1,4 1,5 t-VWj_A2-t Figure 7.4.7. Graph of Simple Engagement Model To utilize graphs K1 and w 2 it is necessary to determine according to quantity et tiie stronger opponent and to assign him the number 1. We find two curves on the graph for quantity a. The upper curve (solid) determines change in relative num- ber of still surviving tanks of the stronger subunit, and the lower curve (dashed) of the weaker subunit. The curves show that the superiority of the stronger subunit over its adversary in- creases with time (the distance between the corresponding curves increases). Example 8. Compare the combat capabilities of a tank subunit containing 25 tanks with the tank subunits of an adversary possessing 20 tanks, utilizing a mathemati- cal model. The effective rates of fire of the tanks are constant and are equal to 0.30 and 0.25 effective rounds per minute respectively. Solution. We shall utilize expressions (7.4.15 and 7.4.17) and the graph in Figure 7.4.7. Accerding to the condition N1=25; N2=20;A1=0.30; A2=0.25 there is a numerical superiority in favor of the first subunit: N1:N2=25:20=1.25:1. Taking into con- sideration the quality of the tanks, the superiority of the first subunit is even greater: Q= 25 5 5W) = 20 0,2 1,25 Y 1,6 = 1,4, �r. e. 1.4 ; 1. 355 FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104460-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY We find curves �,ahere ol =1.4 on the graph in Fi_gure 7.4.7. The upper (solid) curve will deterniine change in the relative number of tanks of the first subunit in the course of combat, and the lower (dashed) curve of its adversary (second subunit). For any moment in time t one can find I.,1 and r. 2 wzth these curves. At that moment when the secon3 subunit will still have 40 percent of its tanks, the first subunit will have approximately 75 percent. In constructing a model one can eliminate a number of assuniptions which were ini- tially made. One can assume, for example, that one of the adversaries opens fire before the other, that the adversaries commit reserves at certain moments in time, etc. A11 this natura'Lly will affect the indices which determine the course and outcome cf combat. For example, if subunit T, having Qxecuted a maneuver, mounts a spoiling attack on subunit II in the course of time t=ty, we can show, utilizing equation (7.4.14), that NZ tanks will remain in subunit II: N!, = N,, - A, N,tY. (7.4.18) From the moment of mutual delivery of eff ective fire, one employs fo r calculations expressions (7.4.15 and 7.4.17) or the graph in Figure 7.4.6, where quantity NZ is taken in place of N2, etc. Example 9. A tank subunit, having execut ed a maneuver, attacked the flank of an ~ enemy tank subunit and mounted a spoiling attack for ty=2 minutes. Determine the ratio of fire capabilities of the subunit s before and after the spoiling attack. Initial data: N1=25 tanks,A1=0.25 for the first subunit; N2=30 tanks, A 2=0.20 for the second. Solution. The coefficient of commensurab iiity prior to attack, according to fox- mula (7.4.15) is 25 0,9 < 1 a~ - .i0 0:10 - _ Tlie fire capabilities of the second subunit are greater than those of the first, - with a ratio of 1.1:1 in its favor. MA Following the spoiling attack, the adversary will retain the following, according to formula (7.4.18) : N2=30-25�0.25�2= 18 tanks. The coefficiQnt of_ commensurability will be: YFi 1~ 0,'1,5 1,6 t , a= - 18 i' 0:'U - - The fire capabilities of the Eirst subunit have become signil'icantly greater ttian those of its opponent 1.6:1 in favor of the former. 356 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104460-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A mathematical model determined by expressions (7.4.15-7.4.17) is an example of a simple model. It enables one to elucidate influence on the course of combat cle*_crmined by the magnitudes of losses, the ratio of tanks and their principal } erFormance characteristics ./1.1 and-42. Quantities �,t 1 and .A. 2, as stated above, are dependent on tank performance characteristics, type of engagement, methods of fire, etc. Consequently, with these quantities one c�.an more thoroughly estimate the influence of a number of basic factors on the course of combat. rtathematical models of more complex variants of combat operations (various weapons, consideration of terrain, displacement of the opposing forces, control, etc) are constructed similarly to the model examined above. One obtains more complex mathematical expressions, and in larger quantity. More complex and laborious calculations are performed for their utilization. Statistical Model Considered rando:n Factors are played out (simulated) in statistical models, after which the influence of their concrete values on the course of the process of combat operations is detej�mined by conventional methods. After one process realization on such a model, the values of the sought quantities will be random; general con- clusions cannot be drawn from them on the course and outcome of the target process. Therefore the process is played out repeatedly on the model, as a result of which one obtains statistical data on its progress. The requisite synthesized - characteristi.cs are obtained after processing the statistical data. Let certain random event A, with a probability of p be considered. We shall designate as a model of this event a certain other event A*, the probability of wtiich is also p, Bep (A) = Bep (A*). Usually an easily reproducible event is taken as event A*. :It is demonstrated in probability theory that event A* constitutes a model of any random event A with prcb-::i.lity p; a number less than p is selected in one trial from a table of random numbers or a random-number generator. The latter is - easily accomplished. For example, we examine a random event a kill scored on an enemy tank with one ruund fired. Let the probability of this event be p=0.$. To play out this event on a model, we must take number ~ from a table of random uumbers and check inequality l,c 0.8. Tf 4,d 0.8 occurs, the event of tank kill has taken place on the model. If 4 > 0.8, the tank has not been killed. In like manner a random event is played out on a computer with the aid of a random-number generator. litilizing a table of random numbers or random-number generator, one can also play out many random phenomena determined by one or several random quantities. But for ttiis it is necessary to determine in advance the distributions of these random quantities. Therefore construction of statistical models of combat operations is preceded by investigation of random factors influencing them, with the aid of the edif_ice of statistics and probability theory. 357 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100060-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104460-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Example 10. Construct a statisticai model of a duel between tanks. This engage- .ient is represented as follows. The crew of the first tank spots the enemy tank _ and is the first to fire off a round. If rhe enemy tank is not destroyed, it fires a response round at the first tank. If the first tank is not destroyed by the first response round, a second round is fired at the enemy tank, etc. The outcome of this engagement is of course random, and it can be estimated by probability of v:ictory pl of the first tank over the second tank, which is equal to the probability of killing the enemy tank. A statistical model can be constructed to determine the probability of victory. It is necessary in advance to be able to compute the probabilities of killing the - enemy and the first tank with the first, second, etc rounds fired. As we know from gunnery theory, this problem is fairly simple to solve with the aid of appropriate tables. Ranges to targets and adjustments are of course also considered. Let enemy tank kill probabilities be pi(1=1, 2, n), where i is the serial number of the round fired. Yrobabiliti:es of killing the first tank are qJ, where j is tlle serial number of the eaemy's response round (j=1, 2, n). Figure 7.4.8 contains a statistical model variant algorithm. !lodaomoeKa K eamonyeHriro onnlm4 1 BelvuCnumb aepoAmNOCma P r nopa.weHUp maHka npomu61tuka npu oveper3NOM eb1cmpe,7e 2 nONeMy (r=1,2,.,.,n) 4 Qa 17opo.kceH f u maNK n17vm11e1iukn npu 011epr.(?110,v snicm- pene? ~-usQCy ~4 p(c) 3 Hem 7 BalvucAumb eeponmi+ocmb qWnopn.rceNaA nepeozo _ moNKa npu ovepeo'HOtf ome2mHOM ea1cmpene npo- mueNUKn (j a 1, 2, n) 5 6ni~0 Au nopo.areNVe nepeozo moN,ru npu oveped- - 111 NoH oinqemNOH eaicmpene? 6 , 4 -u3,QCJ, ~