JPRS ID: 9706 LATIN AMERICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400010002-4
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORTS

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- JPRS L/9706
1 May 1951
Latin ~merica Re ort
p
(FOUO 10/81)
; -
_ f
FB~$ FOREIGN BRDADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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: NOTE
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transmissions and broadcasts~ Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources '
are transcribed or ~eprinted, with the original phrasing and
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[J are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] '
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the origina~ information was
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- mation was summarized or extracted.
Untamilisr names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Worcls or names preceded by a ques-
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- Other unatt~ibuted parenthetical notes within the body of an
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The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli��
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I
JPRS L/97n6 -
1May1981
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' .
- LATIN ANiERICA RE~ORT
c~ouo io/8i>
CONTENTS '
' COUNTRY SECTION
CUBA -
Reagan-Pinochet Relations Criticized
(Fulvio Fuentes; BOHEMIA, 13 Mar 81) 1
GDR's Gerhard Weiss I7isc~:~ses Long-Term Cooperation
( Gerhard Weiss Interview; BOHEMLA, 13 Feb 81) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ ~ . ~ 4
Cost of Production in Socialist Economy Defined
(Alexis Codi:~a; BOHEMIA, 13 Mar ~1) 6
Relationship Between Productivity, Cane Varieties Noted
(Andres Rodriguez; BOHEMIA, 13 Mar 81)........ ~
-
HONDURAS ~
Capitalistic Development of Agricultural Sector Discussed "
(E. Moncada Valladares; AMERICA LAZ'INA, No 3, 1981) . 9
. PERU
~
~ Briefs
An ti te rro ris m Law Pro tes te d 20
Oil Exploration Urged 21
- a - [III - LA - 144 FOUO]
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COUNTRY SECTION CUBA _
- REAGAN-PINOCHET REI~ATIONS CRITICIZED
Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 13 Mar 81 p 75 _
[Article ny Fulvio Fuentes.: "From the Potomac to the Mapocho")
- [Text] The illustration accompanying this commentary, a cartoor. depicting an event
from the current political scene, captures the moving, emotional moment when His ~
Excellency, Gen Augusto Pinochet, head of the Chilean Military Junta by the grace
of reactionaries snd military men alike, prepares to kiss the oil-rich banker's
~ hand of David Rockefeller, steward of the Chase Manha~tan Bank. The scene takes on
symbolic significance: The Exxun magnate is seen here how irreverent Posada
is! as an old floozy, ;.he made-up go-between for imperialism. The brand-new
Reagan administration has entrusted her with the task ~f going to the distant repub- _
lic on the Pacific to seal with embraces and juicy loans the tender reconcilia-
- tion of the old friends occasiona~ly separated by that nonsense over human rights. -
However, to a certain extent the Chilean-Yankee squabble is import~nt because con- _
cerning the intervention of the Central Intelligence Agency in the overthrow and
_ assasslnation of Allende, the whUle pot got stirred up, there was a scandal in the
news, the ~enate got all worked up and some of the more infamous misdeeds of the
CIA came to light. But for naught. The investigations led nowhere. The Agency -
eu,erged from the test more influentiaJ. than ever, so much so that one of its former
directors, George Bush, kept a letter of optian to the White House in his pocket.
Never~heless, President Carter maintained his reservations about the Mili*_ary Junta
in Santiago and prohibited Eximbank from financing exports to Chile. Likewise,
through diPferent channels, Washington included the Mapocho regime on all its lists
nf human rights violators. It was under these conditions that the murder of Orlando
Letelier, former Chilean ambassador to the United States and former minister in the
Popular Unity Government, took place, blown up by a bomb right in the middle of the
_ Elmerican capital. No one was deceived about the autilors of the crime. Clues,
testimony, confessions and documents point to the responsibility of Pinochet's -
_ po?.itical police, DINA [National Intelligence Department], and specificall.y, its
chief, Gen rianuel Contreras, and two of its officials. Contreras acts as the -
regime's veritable executioner, the boss of the concentration camps and houses of
torture. The very model of the efficient functionary, opsn to all innovations and
experiments, he not only assimilates the most modern torture techniques, but also
creates his own original formulas that bring him the respectful admiration of
- his colleagues on the continent. Based on the fact that the assassination of
Letelier occurred in American territory, Washington demanded the extraditi~n of
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" iLS ~ ~ : ~-f � .4 ~ _ ~ a ntrer.~ti ~ind his cc~horr.:;, The requ~at Appeared to be no mnre than a~.;etiture Lor
public: opinioii. Pinochet naturally refused to turn over his collaborator. The
former head of DINA plunged into a discreet silence. But do not worry about it ,
General, the Chilean people will never forget you.
Once Carter was out of the White House Ia comedia e finita the new chiel~ uf
. state got rid of the problem of human rights which, while it often went no further
than a demagogic fuss, did samet'_.mes mortify many good friends of the United States.
On the other hand, in a system in which every chief executive invents his own
"doctrine" for his personal use, Reagan is listing the fight against terrorism as
- his government''s prime concern. Just as Carter 3id, Reagan now reserves the right
to issue certificates of good conduct. Naturally, Pinochet has to be erased from
the list of "bad guys" and placed quite honorably alongside the good. Between
Pinochet and Reaga:~ and the White House and Diego Portales there is an exchange of
salazms. From the Potomac to Santiago comes the filthy rich Rockefeller riding
a golden calf. At the ~ame time, the American Navy invites the Chilean fleet to
participate in joint maneuvers in the South Pacific. Washington declares war on
terrorism! At its side in the crusade, with sword and banner, is Augusto Pinochet.
Ronald Reagan whitewashes his fascistic background. The slate is now clean.
COPYRIGHT: BOHEMIA 1981
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COUNTRY SECTION CUBA
GDR'S GEItHARD WEISS DISCUSSES LONG-TERM COOPERATION
- Havana BUHEMIA in Spanish 13 Feb 81 pp 51-52
- [Interview with Gerhard Weiss, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the _
GDR and a member of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] Central Committee,
� by Tania Quintero; in Havana in February 1981]
[Text] Eight months after Fidel and Honecker signed the Treaty of Friendship and -
Cooperation the lOth Session of the Joint Cuba-GDR Commission for Ecanomic, ,
Scientific and Technical Cooperation was held in Havana in early February.
BOHEMIA interviewed the chief of the German delegation, Gerhard Weiss, deputy
chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers and a member of the SED CenCral Committee
before he returned ~o his homeland.
AidQd by an efficient interpreter, Weiss responded to the first question: _
[Answ~r] In this session we established certain stipulations in regard to economic, _
scientific and technical cooperation. These stipulations actually are based on
~wnat was agreed upon by Comrad~es Fidel and Honecker at their last meeting, and
they concern such important questions as cooperation in citrus fruits, nickel and
- development of the ceramics industry on the Isle of Youth and long-term cooperation
in the scientific and technical spheres.
- [Question] Between 1975 and 1979 about 30 important conventions and agreements
concerning all areas of social life were concluded. Is it possible that this
figure will increase in the period 1981-1985?
[AnswerJ Well, from the numerical point of view I cannot predict that. However, �
_ from the point of view of importance, more important agreements have been made
- for the 1981-1985 period than in previous years. In this session, for example,
we agreed to prepare a long-term plan, running to 1990, for the principal areas
of coope:ation, and this will be drawn up in the next few months. This is an ,
~ example of the dimensions of our thinking today.
[Question] According to the agreemenC signed by you and the president of Che
Cuban Central Planning Board last year, trade in merchandise will rise 45 percent
in the period 1981-1985. I am particularly interested In knowing by what percen-~
= tage trade in consumer goods will increase.
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_ [Answerj Yes, trade in 1981-1985 is going to increase notably over that in
1976-1980. I cannot tell you by exactly how much, but in our session we concluded
. agreements on the shipment of inerchandise for popular consumption, such as medi-
cines, fabrics, games and toys, musical instruments, leather purses and china,
~ among other items, as we11 as supplies for the manufacture of~ domestic refrigerators
and equipment for the ceramics industry, which will indirectiy benefit the people.
Also, in the next few year.s we will send equipment for the texti.le industry.
In general, howe~ver, a large percentage of Cuba's total imports is in this area.
[Question] In addition to sugar, nickel, citrus fruits, honey, peppers and
liquors, what other Cuban products will be shipped to the GDR in this 5-year
period? .
[Answer] Citrus juices and concentrates, potatoes and r~n are among the most
= important products being added.
- Time is getting short. I glance at my notebrok and ask the last question:
[Question] As a result of the close friendship and cooperation of the German _
_ Democratic Republic, one of the most modern cement factories in Latin America is
being built at this ti.me in Cienfuegos. I should like to know what other large-
scale projects will be constructed in our country in the ~uture within tha frame-
work of this friendstiip?
[Answer] There will not be just a single pro~ect, but several. Among the most
important pro~ects planned through 1985 are: the expansion and finishing of the ~
' Second Congress ceramics factory, begun a short time ago on the Isle of Youth in
accordance with the agreements made by Fidel and Honecker. We are also going to
construct a cement factory, and plans will be submitted for bakeries and c~.eaning
and dyeing establishments. And of course, we will continue to supply industrial
_ equipment and installations in accordance with the agreements signed. _
- If you have no other questions, I should like to tell ,you that I have �visited
Cuba many times and have watched the growth of factories like the one in Cienfuegas.
~ I am very happy to hav~ been with the Cuban people again, because I nave noted
' great progress in many areas. I was in Trinidad, where I admired the architectural
beauty, but where I was also able to learn about the use of sugarcane pulp in the
paper factory being constructed there. However, what impressed me most were the _
meetings with many ol.d acquaintances and with workers in the factories and cultural
establishments. Everywhere I found great affect.ion for the GDR, an affection which
- ~ast year materialized in the treaty. But treaties and conventions are a cold
matter, and it is friendship between nations and people which fil.ls them with life
~ and warmth. In that sense, I have had many experiences which justify :rry conviction
that relations between our two countries will continue to develop successfully. -
And with that good feeling we will undertake to carry out the plans contained ~
in the documents that Comrade Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and I signed.
COPYRIGHT: BOHEMIA 1981
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' COUNTRY SECTION ~BA I
_ ~
COST OF PRODUCTION IN SOCIALIST ECONOMY DEFINEB
Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 13 Mar 81 p 32
[Article by Alexis Codina]
[Text] The cost of production is the sum of all expenditures incurred in the manu-
facture and r_ompletion of a product. It includes the value of raw materials, fuel,
e]ectric power and other msterials used in the process: wear on machinery, equip- -
ment and buildings, payment of the labor farce invoZved in production and in the
- ' administration and management of the workshop and enterprise where the article ~
ir produced.
This indic~~tor is a summary of the quality of work done by all workers in the -
enterprise, the level of productivity achieved, the efficiency with which machinery,
equipment and racilities were used, savings on the consumption of raw materia.ls, _
electric{~ty and other materials, and the rationality af administrative and manage~
ment exF,enditures, making it possible to com~are the efficiency achieved by dif- -
ferent collectives and enterprises.
The cost of praduction is one of the most important indicators of the socialist
econr~my. Its reduction enables society to have more goods and services to meet
its various needs. It is an important instrument in the analysis and evaluation
of :'Lnvestments. In addition, it is the point of departure for the proper deter-
mination of the price of products.
From the standpoint of the socialist enterprise and its group of workers, it is of
_ great significance because it is the fundamental path toward increased earnings,
making it possible to meet one of the basic principles of the economic management
and planning system app roved at the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba.
~ The principle states that enterprises "must cover expenditures with their income -
and produce a profit" f rom which, after meeting budgetary obllgatior.s, the enter-
prise may set up the bonus fund and the fund for sociocultural measures and the
construction of hoiising. "
Ttie main ways to redtice the cost of production are saving on raw materials ar.d
other materials used, without affecting the quality of the product, increasing ~
labor productivity and the efficient operation of machinery and equipment.
COPYRIGHT: BOHEMIA 1981 -
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COUNTRY SECTION ~BA
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRODUCTIVITY, CANE VARIETIES NOTED
Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 13 Mar f31 p 33
[Article by Andres Rodriguez]
[Text) Despite its curious combination of cane varieties, the Orlando Gonzaiez
sugar enterprise in Ciego de Avila always exceeded its production plans during the
1976-1980 period.
It would appear that sugar cane is a much hardier species than one may have ima-
gined~ Orlando Gonzalez could be the enterprise with the worst combination of
varieties of cane in Ciego de Avila Provi~ce and ;~et, it never failed to meet its
preduction plans in any of the years during the 1976-1980 period.
Is it possible to extract more sugar from cane than what it brings from the field,
the real factory? Naturally not. Is there then some grain of truth in the claim
of those who emphasize the regional nature of varieties, their response to the
specific condit ions of every place? Or does the proper application of agricultural
techniques contribute significantly to the concrete manifestation af the potential
the varieties have?
What is certain is that Orlando Gonzalez systematically exceeds its goals, despite
the curious comb ination of cane varieties it uses. What were the main strains
- which that enterprise so accurately labeled the "Avila watch" because of its
efficiency milled during the 1976-1980 period? By order of importance, they
are: Barbados, 4362; Puerto Rico, 980*; Casa GrandeS 12745*; Jaronu, 60-5;
and Mayari, 5465.
We placed an ast erisk beside Puerto Rico 980 and Casa Grande 12745 because both
varie~ties are c onsi.dered to have low sugar potential. ,It is also curious that ~
during this same period, the same Puerto Rico 980 should appear in second place,
above the universal Jaronu 60-5, the country's main cammercial variety.
Another very interesting fact was registered during the 1976 season, the first of
the already comp leted 5-year. period. During that season, the sugar production plan
turned out as fo llows:
Plan Production
- Sugar produ~ed 53,154 58,533
Days in season 139 138
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The following varieties were harvested:
Arrobas Cut (in millions)
[1 arroba = 25 pounds]
Puerto Rico 980 15. (i
' Barbados 4362 10.7 -
Barbados 42231 6 � 9 ~
- Casa Grande 12745 5.4
, Jaronu 60-5 1.3
In thi.rd place is the poor producer (as well as hard and 1Paning) Barbados 42231,
already banned at that time~ _
In cazclusion, there is one final curiosity that must also have its asterisk: the
yield of the five main varieties during the cur.rent 1981 sPason:
Arrobas/Caballeria [1 caballeria =
33.2 acres]
Mayari 5465 57,900 (lst place)
Casa Grande 12745 56,600 (2d place)
Jaronu E~0-5 53,600 (3d place)
Puerto Rico 980 50,700 (4th ~~ace)
_ COPXRIGHT: aOHEMIA 1981
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COUNTRY SECTION HONDURAS ~
_ CAPITALISTIC DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR DISCUSSED
- Moscow AMERICA LATINA in Spanish No 3, 1981 pp 65-78
[Article by E. Monc~~da Valladares] ~
[Text] After World War II, the Honduran economy underwent substantial structural
changes as a result of the increase in the share of the manufacturing industry in
the gross domestic product (GDP), and the simultaneous decline of agriculture's
share. -
_ Despite a certain amount of progress in this aspect, however, Honduras has one of
the lowest levels of industrial development in Latin America. T'he basic obstacles
to industrialization in the country are monopolistic private land ownership, and
Che nation's dependence on forcign banana monopolies.
Agriculture continues to be ~he mainstay of the Honduran economy. It is the -
source of raw materials for national industry and of subsistence for more than
60 percent of the population. Furthermore, the country continues to occupy its
traditional position in the international capitalist division of labor as a
supplier of agricultural raw materials and food for developed c~pitalist coun-
tries. Suffice it to say that the agriculture sect;or in 1976 accounted for 75 per-
cent of export earnings.l This fact alone proves tha~ Honduras continues to be an
export-oriented agricultural nation. It is for that reason that the future
economic and social progress of the country (that is, the development of national
industry and the solution of a series of problems, including food) depends on how
well agriculture does.
Deformed Development of Sector
Thc~ agrarian s~ruci.ure of Honduras teday is distinguished by the high degree of -
concentrarion of land in the hands of large landowners, and the presence of a ~
great number of pc~r~sants with little or no land. This characteristic is revealed
by the data from the narional cadastre of 1974. The2large landowners (4 percent
of the haciendas) who possessed more than 72 manzanas of land controlled a total
- of 2 million manzanas, or 56 percent of arable land. In addition, 187,400
haciendas with parcels ;,f less than 72 manzanas, or 96 percent of the total,
owned only 44 percent of the land. The haciendas ~f less than 7 manzanas (63.9
- percent) controlled only 8.9 pF:cent of arable land.
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The large haciencl;~s, particularly the latifundios, are c:~aracterized by their '
- large holdi.ngs of unused, vacant land. Thus, on property consisting of more than
500 manz:.nas, only 13 percent of thr land is worked, ~nd not more than 7 percent
is devoted to crops; 34 percene is used for pa~ture. On the other hand, on the `
_ small haciendas owned by peasants, cultivated land amounts to 6c3 percent of the
total. If that proportion were extended to the large holdings, those exceeding
50 ma~zanas, the area under cultivation would rise by 519,000 manzanas, or 68 per-
cent. For this reason, even with the low level of agricultural acCivity going on
_ in Honduras today, the distribution of unu:.ed land from tne latifundios among
_ peasants would have a favorable influence on the development of the sector, and
would alleviate, among other things, the nation's food problem. Today, on the -
contrary, a considerable portion of the small hacier.das is located on land that -
would ser.ve better as a grave for its owners t:~an as a means of subsis~ence.
- The Honduran agrarian system is marked by the inconsistent utilization of land.
The parceling of the productive process is one of the factors that preserve '
- old-fashioned rustoms in agriculture. The food-producir.g hacienoas, both small
and medium, typically have low yields. Holdings of less than 49 hecl�a res produce `
90 pcrcen! of basic grains, but the harv~sts are quite low.6 According to 1975
figures, one hectare prod~uced 1?.~ quintals of corn, 4.8 quintals of beans, or
13.3 quintals of snrghum. In the United States, for example, a hectare of land
in the early seven~ies produced 49.8 quintals of corn; the Latin American averag~~
was 14.5 quintals. This proves the need to bolster productivity, a measure Lhat
would meet the objcctive demand for the development of productive forces. But the
application of. such a rneasure would run up against the fundamental roadblock of _
the monopolistic ownership of land by local and foreign latifundists, the unfair
_ terms of land leases, and the yoke of inerchants and usurers.
- In agriculture, especially in rhe export-oriented part of that sector, there is a _
tenden~,y toward the mechana.zation of the productive processes. However, the -
latifundists are not interested in the modern methods of intensivc cultivation.
Their reluc~ance is du~, on the one hand, to the presence of abundant and cheap
- labor and large tracts of unused land on the latifundios; and on the other hand, _
to the fact l~hat l~rge landowners make many unproductive outlays for luxury
= items, tra~~el abroad and other things. The resources they invest directly in the
promotion of produc~ion are miniscule, so it is not surprising tha~ the average
investment by landowners in one hc~ctare of arable land is se~en time s less Lhan
the invesement madc~ by peasants in their low-yield holdings. These facCs, far
from demonstrating the advantages of small holdings c~ver large ones, show how
- parasitic the latifundisrs are.
~ Honduran agriculture has encount~~red serious difEiculties in terms of sales and
the storage of a~;riculCUra1 products. The majority of agricultural products
' produced on smai 1 peasant-owned haciendas end up in the hands of suppliers and
wholesalers, which drives up Che price of food considerably. The study done by
tfle Agency f~r International Development indicates Chat the peasant haciendas
sell 90 percent of their ~alable prod~~cts t~8 middlemen and 10 percent to represen-
tatives of the National Development Bznk. The prevailing price for storage is
fr.equently used to stimulate Che production of exportable crops, to the detriment
c.f those [hat contribute to the national diet.
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The amount ~f agricultural products lost during storage furCher complicates the
i~sue of ineeting the population's needs. The lack of adequate facilities means
losse~iof up to 50 pc~rcent of the gross corn narvest, 25 percent of the bean har-
_ vest. The losses resulting from s!:orage and transNOrtation eat away at the
fureign earnings derived from the exportation of agricultural products. The lack
of transportation means and facilities is another factor that hinders the
commercial development of agriculture.
The above-mentioned problems bc~ar a direct or indirect relationship to the develop-
= ment o� capitalism in the Honduran agrarian sector., with the irrational utiliza- ,
tion of arable land and the pc~rsistent dependence on in~ernational monopolies.
- Process of Capitalist Modernization
After World War II, capitalist relationship~, penetrated the nation's agrarian
sector with greater :~ntensity. This process was clearly maniEested in the
= accelerated displacement of small holdings by large ones, with the resulting
_ failure of the former; the inti�oduction of capitalist methods in eld latifundios;
_ the increase in the number of wage-earning, semi-proletarian wc,rkers in rural
areas; the favoring of large landowners in granting loans; anc the spread of
- modern methods and technology in agriculture.
In areas ~ahere capitalist relationships were rapidly becoming entrenched, land-
owners and the rural bourgeaisie bought the land belonging to the rural peasants. -
Thus began an intensive process of concentration of agricultural land ownership.
From 1952 to 197