JPRS ID: 9716 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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~ 4pRS ~is71 s
7 May 1981
~l1/est E u ro e R e o rt
p p _
- CFOUO 25/81)
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NOTE
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~ ~ JPRS L/9716
7 May 1981
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-I WEST EUROPE REPORT
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(FOUO 25/81)
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' CONTENTS
I MILITARY
;
~ FEDERAL REPIIBLIC OF GERNiANY
_'i
Controversial Aid to Third t~orld Miiitary, F'olice
(Atario R. Dederichs; STERN, 19 Mar 81) 1
GREECE
. Reportage of Aviation Industry, Mirage F-1 Planes Published
; (Jean de Galard; AIR & COSriOS, 14 Mar~81) 4
GENERAL
FRANCE
Computerized Demographic Study of Electorate
(Herve Le Bras, Emmanuel Todd; L'EXPRESS, 21-27 Mar 81)........ 10
~ Briefs
- Joining Space Agency 26 ~
- - a - [III - WE - 15~ FOUO]
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MILITARY FIDEREIL REPUBLIC OF GERM.~~NY
CONTROVERSIAL AID TO THIRD WORLD MILITARY, POLICE
i~iamburg STERN in G~rman 19 Mar 81 pp 238, 242
-I .
[Article by Mario R. Deder3chs: "A Double Moral Standard: Bonn's Controversial
Training and D~velopment Aid to Third World Countries' Military and Police Forces�1] -
[Text] In the course of a Bundestag questions-and-answers session, State Secretary _
Wilfried Penner of the Ministry of Defense found himself in a quandary. CDU
_ deputy ~Lans-Juergen Stutzer had wanted ta know whether not sending any weapons _
into areas of tension and to dictatars and putsch leaders while at the same ti~ne -
p~ovidi~g Bundesraehr training for soldiers from those very countries does not con-
stitute "a double moral standard." Penner conceded that there a,re "some diffi- ~
culties as regards consistencq with res~aect to existing standards." Then he
added the follawing: "A sensibly conceived foreign policy must also let itself
be guideci by what appears us~ful for the FRG."
The princinle of "whatever serves Bonn�s inter~sts will be done" has for years
been app~.ied to the r~endering of as~istance to military and police forceQ in
Africa, Asia, and South America by pro~3ding them with equipment and training, in
- which endeavor the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior are ~
- ~ointly collaborating uader the overall control of ~Ii~ister of Foreigr~ ~.f.fairs
Hans-Dietrich Genscher.
~ Thus for instance the Bundeswehr is
pree~ntlq ins~.ructing 219 soldiers fraan 39
predom~nantly Third world countries in mili*arp comm~and functions and weapons '
technology. Included are mili~ary personnel frouu such dictatorships as Guinea and
~ Zaire. Two officers of the South Korean potentate Chun Doo Hwan are participating -
in a course of study at ~he Hamburg aff ice~ academy. Dating back to the time of
the shah, 31 Iranian cadets have been getti:ig naval training. In thEir country, _
, torture and persecution were already prevalent at that time and today Iran, in~ _
_ volve~ in a war w~th Iraq, is one of the hottest tension areas of the wozld.
Ac~cording to a confidential government pape~, Bonn nonetheless believes that its
training assistanc~ is "as suita3le as scarcely any other means for conveying our
cancepts of ~ustice, freedom, and of the de~ocratic form of government and way of
- life."
The Federal Government is also making a staL+nchly positive assessment of its equip-
ment aid for the military and polic,e forces which it is presently xendering to 31 _
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underdeveloped countries. During the past year, this item in the budget of the
_ Ministry of Foreign Affairs devoured DM 9 million. An "iuformational annotation"
states tha.t, "due to its special political effect and, last but not least, its
speedy iu.plementation, simplicity, and precision, the equipment aid has proved to
be eminently worthwhile as a dependable.means for use in our foreign-policy re1a~
tions with thA concerned recipient countries."
To be sure, Bonn would much prefer to en~oy such gratificativn in silence. Accord-
ing to the Ministry of ~'oreign Affairs, confi.dentiality has been agreed upon with
- all recip ient countries, and this was allegedly done in accordance with their
wishe~. Equipment aid made headlines only in this one instance: Accordj.n.g to
= Bonn's version, Somalia would never have given its consent to the GSG-9 liberation
= action ~t Mogadishu without this aid. In the 3-year program preceding the free-
_ ing of the hostages, Somalia received military and police equipment amounting to
DM 8.9 million. Afterwards, the aid was escalated to ~M 15 million. Today this
East African country is the second biggest recipient country after Tunisia.
- Additional ma~or recipient covntries are the Sudan and Niger, Morocco, Mali,
Ruanda, Cameroon and Upper Volta.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that the delivered material--trucks,
aircraft, engi_neering equipment, unifoYms and criminal investigation laboratories--
' are or~ly of a defensive nature and must not "be used for peace-endangering pur-
poses." Rather, it is pointed out, this is "a measure which flanks our development
aid." However, Uwe Holtz, the SPD's Third World expert, countered with the
following statement: "We must oppose the militarization of the underdeveloped
countries." His fellow party member Peter Wuertz, a member of the Bundestag bud-
- get co~3.ttee, vigorously demands that the next 3-year equipment aid program not
be permitted to grow as szrongly as in 1979. At that time it had been doubled
from DM 76 million to DM 153 million.
For in the politically unstable countries of the Third World there is always the
risk that German equipment aid may be used for purposes other than originally
intended. For instance, in the civil war, the military ~unta of EL Salvador is
using 20 Rheinstahl armored police cars. Morocco, which is fighting against the
Polisario guerrillas in the western Sahara, supp'lies its army for the most part
- with field kitchens, medical equ~pment, and field rations from the FRG. In
Tunisia, where members of the opposftion and unionists are rigorously persecuted,
German officials are training the police.
The military and police aid activities f~netion as a"bri~ge" to future arms
exports. For conflict research specialist Peter Lock of Hamburg Univ~rsity there
exists "no doubt at all~that this amounts to an aid for opening up markets.~'
Firms which get involved via official aid projects subsequently keep on doing
business such as, for instance, the Dornier aircraft man.ufacturing firm in Niger,
which received the Do 27 and Noratlas aircraft plus military advisers fx^,m Boun.
- And Malaya i~a Southeast Asia is no Ionger satisfied with only the Ger~man planning
~ aid rendered to it ~n connection with the construction of the new Lumut naval base.
Now, this country waats to buy 500 "Marder" infantry tank~ and special~purpnse
"Con~or" police vehicles frrnn Thysseri-Henschel. �
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An az-maments study prepared by forwer tank General Eixe Middeldorf for the MinisCry
of Defense accommodates such ambiticns: It recommaends that old Bundeswehr
weapons not be scrapped, but that airpla.nes, tanks, gims, aad infantry weapons
be passed out to underdeveloped countries--but, of course, only for "defensive
. purposes,"
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Gruner & Jahr AG & Co. ~
8272
CSO: 3103/227 ~
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MILITARY GREECE -
REPORTAGE OH AVIATION INnUSTRY, MIRAGE F-1 PLANES PUBLISHED
Paris AIR & COSM+OS in French 14 Mar 81 pp 35-37, 39, 52
i [Article by Jean de Galard: "Greek Mirage F-ls Have Flown More 'I'han 40,000
Hours"]
i
[Text] Situated ~ome 60 km northeast of Athens, near the shore of the
Aegean Sea, the Tanagra Base,~today under the co~nand of Colonel Plevrakis,
~ houses the 114th Combat Wing of the Hellenic Air Force, rahose two squadrons
Nos 334 and 342 are equipped with Mirage F1CGs which have SNECMA Atar 9KS0
engines and Thomson-CSF Cyrano 4 radar.
~ The 114th All-Weather Fighter Wing is a unit a~ the Greek Tactical 9ir Force
~ Whose principal mission is air defense and whose secondary mission is '
ground attack.
I The Hellenic Air Force was one of the first foreign air forces (after
South Africa, Spain and Kuwait) to place an order with the French Government -
for Mirage F-ls--the sreek designation is Mirage F1CG--and it received
delivery of the first 40 of this type of aircraft ordered in June 1974
at about the same time that the Fourth Air Defense Squadron of the French
Air Force, equipped with Mirage F-ls, was becoming operational.
Let us mention again in fact that the f irst F-ls of the 30th Fighter Wing
arrived in Reims in December 1973-January 1974 (cf AIR ET COSMQS No 515 of
2 February 1974). The two Mira~e F1C~s flown from France by Greek pilots--
from Mont-de-Marsan ~o Tanagra via Orange, G~t+_�h reserve fuel tarks--landed
at the Tanagra Base on 5 August 1y75. 9nly several a~onths time, ~herefore,
separated the entry into service of~the Mirage F-ls in the air forces of the .
! two countries. And as the squipping of the Hell.~nic Air Force (HAF) was
~ caxried out at an accelerated rate--the two squadrons of 20 planes each were
constituted in 1976 and 1977 respectively--and as the increase in strength,
on tY~e ~~perational level, of tfie two Greek squadrons was carried out just as
rapidl;, j.* can be said that the French Air Force and the Hellenic Air Force ~
enc~unte�red and lived through the same problems together, those which aw.a3t
everv air force which places in service a new combat plane, especially when
thc technology, o~peration a;1d maintenance of this aircraft incorporate new
concepts--which was the case �,qit;-i the Mirage 1.
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The pilots and mechanics of the French Air Force certainly still remember,
even if the situation has radically changed, the growing pains the F-1
experienced in the early part of its entry into service and the modifica-
- tion--not to mention the supply problems--which had to be effected on its
frame, its engine, its equipment.
: The Greeks also experienced this difficult period, doubtless rendere3 more
. difficult yet for three reasons:
--the distance separating the place o~ use from the supply source;
--the language, even comprehension, problems of a technical doeumentation
preliminarily translated into a second foreign language;
--the novelty and shortcrnnings of French log~;stic support in the process
of being created, compared to the experience and ampl3tude of the NATO
logistic system to which the HAF had long been accustomed.
The initial weakness of logistic support was also felt at tha same time in
the French Air Force. It usually accompanies the placing in service of a
new airplane because experience is lacking to order in time the spa~re parts
which will be necessary on a priority basis. It was felt all the moxe
strongly in Greece in ~hat it occurre4 at the same time that a national
- aeronautical industry, called the Hellenic Aerospace Industry, was being
created, entrusted both with building up tfie first stock of spare parts
ea.rmarked for maintaining a gocd aperational level of the two squadrons
- equipped with F1CGs, and progressively, without exterior aid, assuri~g the
complete maintenance of the plane: frame, eng3ne, mechanical and electronic
equipment.
It was also important, as the increase in strength of the Mirage F-ls in the
air defense squadro ns of th e French Air Force made apparent the necessity
- of certain technical modif ications, to have the same modif ications also
applied to the Greek Mirage F-ls. The politico military situation in Greece
required in fact of tfie Hellenic Air Force that its operational availability
be very h igh.
- The undertaking, as might b e expected, was not simple. Five years after the
arrival at Tanagra of the f irst F1CGs flown by Greek pilots trained in
France, a little over 3 years after delivery of the last of the 40 Mirage F-ls
ordered by Greece, difficulties still remain. These concern essentially today,
as we sha ll show in the follow~ng lines and in an article we will devote
later to the Hellenic Aerospace Industry, spare parts and supplies, the
difficulties relative to maintenance having been almost completelq overcome.
The customer, in this case the Hellenic Aerospace Industry, is inclined
to judge severely its suppliers' delays, while the latter, for their part,
consider that the spare parts ordgrs from the aforementioned customer are
often received much too close to the desired delivery date.
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The problem ie obviously all the more serious for the Hellenic Aerospace
Industry in that they must both be able to demonstrate their aptitude at
carrying out their twofold mission of supply and maintenar~ce center and
give instantaaeous satisfaction tio an exacting customer, the Hellenic Air
Force.
~ A Well Prntected Base
The Tanagra Base has a NATO regulation-size, that is to say 2,400 m,runway.
It is flanked on either side by two taxi runways which can if ne~d arises
be used for take-off. At the alert, the Mirage F1CGs can take off
simultaneously in groups of three.
It is equipped with an ILS, and an approach radar constitutes for pilot~
; a second aid in landing.
i
' The base includes, like all NATO bases, many shelter hangars (let us recall
that this will soon be the case with all French Air Force fighter plane bases).
These hangars constitute for tfie Mirage F1CGs excellent protection but also
very good camouflage, for to ~he visitor who walks around the base no parked
airships are visible. The only thing he sees are hangars and planes taking
off, in flight, or landing.
Each of the two squadrons has available ~n the base its own geographic zone
and its own runway service. Maintenance service, shared by both squadrons,
assures the ugkeep of tfie various elements of the aircraft: mechanical and
hydraulic units, radar, enginas and accessories. The ma~ority of the testing
and monitoring benches in service on the base are identical, as the photos
which illustrate these pages show, with those found at French Air Force bases.
The arrival at Tanagra of the F1CGs necessitated the construction of several
new technical buildings and especially the transformation and modernization
of already existing buildings to adapt tIiem, notably in respect to maintenance,
to required specifications.
Pilot Instruction and Training
The first 16 Greek Mirage F-1 pilots were instructed and trained in France,
principally at Mont-de Marsan and at Reims. From among them, the most highly
qualified were selected as instructors to assure in their turn i_. Greece
the conversion of student-pilots for the F1Cvs.
= For their part, ground mechanics in charge of upkeep and readying p lanes have
. also taken in France a reconversion course in 1974-1975. Today, on the
spot, the senior students are instructing the juniors.
Since 1978, the two squadrons 334 and 342 have had available an LMT simulator,
whose operation and periodic upkeep have been entirely assured since 1979
by the qualified personnel of the base. It is in operation auout 8 hours a
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day (it is doubtless appropriate to point out here that in peacetime on a
Greek airbase normal activity begins at 6730 and continues witb.;,ut a break
until 1500) and has three uses: to instruct very young pilots; to coerfect
to the F1CG pilots who hav%� experience on other types of planes; to p
the pilots who are already qualified on the F1CG.
The pilots chosen to fly Mirage F1CGs have a minimum of 150 to 200 flight
hours on fighter planes. They take a training course on the ground at
Tanagra which lasts about a month; this course is followed by a week of
simulator work (10 hours on the average), during which the pilot in training
flies about 5 hours on a T-33, especially in order to familiarize himself
with procedures and, on the visual level, with the base surroundings.
Next comes, for the future Greek Mirage F-1 pilot, soloing in his plane,
the first ground taxiing. Then it is his first real 'solo' flight, in -
which he is of course accompanied by a patrol leader instructor. The f irst
training flights last all total a little under 10 hours. These are followed _
by an operations training period which is spread over a littie more than
40 hours. The pilot is then qualified as op~rational if he passes a series
of tests. His tra ining is continued under the watchful eye of an experienced i
pilot who aims to make of him both a patrol leader, capable of bringing a
disorientated crew member back to base, and a pilot capable of uadronileaders, Ir
in aerial combat. In this respect and in the opinion of two sq ,
the 2-seat version of the Mirage F-1 would constitute a valuable aid. But
the GrQek defense budget does not authorize the corresponding expenditure.
- In the two squadrons we have visited, experienced pilots who already have a
good number of Y:ours to their crec?it on Mirage F1CGs are mixed in w3th very
, young pilots, who graduated just a f~w years earlier from the Air Academy. _
In the squadrons, the pilots f ly an average of 15 hours a month (180 hours a
year); in this total are included the 3 to 5 hours in the T33 but not, of
course, the 3 to 4 hours of simulator training they put in in order to
pexfect themselves.
A Good Level of Availability
The 114th Fighter Wing (which has, in addition to its Mirage F1CGs, several
T33s), has had to deplore, up to now, two F1CG accidents wYiich cost the life
of their pilots. The 38 Mirage F1CGs presently in operation have totaled
40,000 flight hours and the one which has the largest number has around _
1,300. All upkeep is assured today by Greek mechanicians who had the
advantage, until last year, within the framework of contractual agreement~,
of the presence of French technicians sent by Dassault, SNECMA and Thomsan-CSF.
- For the last year, there has been only one.
- The level of operational availability, according to squadron-leaders, is on the
order of 80 percent, wh ich appears remarkable if one thinks of the amount of
= uplteep problems to be solved (those ~veked in the beginning of this article). _
7
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_ The Greek F1CG pilots~ whom we questioned declaxed themselves we~.l satisfied ~
with the plane's intrinsic qualities (remarks on its SFENA automatic pilot ~
were always very laudatory), its easy handling at high and low speeds, its
- mgnoeuvrability, its performance. The colonel in command of the Tanagra Base,
who has flown around 250 hours in Mirage F-ls (out of a total of 6,250 hours),
cons iders it the plane the best adapted to the mission of air def ense as
this latter 3s defined by the Greek general staff. Like all fighter pilots, -
he would unquestionably wish that "the motor would p�ash a little harder
and that the radar would work better."
In any event the pilots expect a lot from the improvements whicYi the add:~.tion
of comhat flaps will add to their planes; the transformation of the planes
is going to be assured shortly and will be staggered so that the Wing's
operational level will never fall beneath a certain fixed threshold.
~ The F1CGs of the 114th Wing took part several months ago in NATO manoeuvres
~ along with F4s, F-5s and F-15s. The results were 3udged to be very -
satisfactory.
_ For reasons of "national defense," the people we spoke with were keen not
~ to reveal any details on F1CG weaponry; doubttless the interface modifica-
- tions required by the use of the Sidewinder inste~d of the Magic missile
were not without causing some probcle~s. It is intentional that the planes
photographed here have been shown on the ground in ?inear configuration.
"For air-to-air firing they are armed with 30 milimeter canon~ and missiles;
on tactical support missions, they ch iefly carry bombs, of 250 and 450 kilo-
- grams among others."
Supply Time Must Be Reduced
If the pilots of the 114th Wing freely admit that the placing in service
of the Mi~age F-1 has finall;i set fewer operaCional problems for them .
than of the F-104 20 years ago, the Maintenance Squadron':s mechanics, on the
- other hand, lament that supply time of spare parts is pract3cally twice as
loag as th~t to which NATO logistics had accustomed them. Fort~unately, the
breakdown rate of the plane's various components is qualified as rather low.
The setting up of the various testing benches has ~'oubtless required more
I .
ti~e than planned; it is practically finished today and the complete upkeep
of the F-ls is assured by ~reek mechanics. The latter carry out in
~ particular the 200, 400 and 600 hour check up of the Atar 91~50, e~ch check up "
requiring around 80 working hours. The 800 hour check up and beyond is `
assured by th e Hellenic Aerospace Industry, with resources whose amplitude
will be made known in the article we will write soon oa the HAI. ~
Periodically, Greek Mirage F-1 pilots vis3t with some of their aircraf t air
defense units of the French Air Force. Last year the 12th Fighter Wing of
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Cambrai received the visit of Greek pilots. Next June, in principle, the
lOth Fighter Wing based at Crei? will receive the v3sit of the ~reek
Mirage F1CG pilots . Let us bet that, meanwhile, the remaining difficulties
~ will have been substantially smoothed over. And, in any event, in the
meantime a Greek delegation, composed of high-ranlting representatives of
' official departments, will have been received on of~icial visit in France, ~
~rt?ile Greek pilots were supposed to come this week to France to comp?_ete
and terminate in Istres the first evaluation of the Mirage 2000 carried out
last year.
COPYRIGHT: A& C Paris 1981
S"s3~
CSO: 4900/24
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GEIV~RAL ' FRANCE
- -
- COMPUTERIZED DEMOGRAPHIC STUDY QF ELECTURATE
- Paris L'EXPRESS in French 21-27 Mar 81 pp 140-143, 145-I48
_ [Article by Herve Le Bras (director of studies at 1'Ecole cies hautes etudes en
sciences sociales and director of research at 1'Institut national d'etudes
demographiques) and Emmanuel Todd (author of "La chute finale" and "Fou et le
proletaire" and columnist for LE MONDE) based on their book by the same title:
"L' Invention de la Fra~?c ~"j
[Excerpts] The Computer, the Map and Sociology ~
- The map complex was prepared by a computer. The most r,ecent materials are flexible
and accurate enough to make the result favorably comparable to a traditional cartog-
_ rapher's work. The maps appear on a cathode screen the size of a large television -
screen. They are made up of minuscule luminous dots linked together to form contours
_ or scattered to fill in surfaces. In less than 2 minutes, almost 20,OQ0 of these
_ dots appear on the screen to create a remarkably detailed image. A(hard capy)
= photocopying machine then sweeps the screen to record the map. This speed of execu-
tioY~ has revolutionized cartographic practice, in which the designer had to reflect
carefully before choosing his colors, and tracing took several hours. Henceforth
one can obtain more than 20 different maps in an hour, choosing that which aupplies
the best illustration. The convenience of the computer is not limited to.speedy
drafting, but is also evidenced in the almost infinite possibilities for manupula-
tion. In the present case, instan~ access to a bank of departmental data comprising
almost 1,500 different series makes a wide variety af cbmparisons, cross references
and superpositions of economic, social and anthropological phenomena possible.
J
In less than a minute, any departmental series whatsoever can be compared to the
series under study. To prepare two close phenomena, such as the intensity of
religious practice and the frequency of right-wing voCing, the computer calculates
the existing range between its reading for religious practice and its reading for
right-wing voting. The smaller the gap, the greater the agr~ement between two
pheuomen~a. The greater it is, the greater the difference between them. The map of
, these differences instantly obtained reveals the existence of some regions of dif-
ference in France in which the right wing is not vPry Christian or the left wing is
very little dechristianized.
- No one to date has been able to expl.ain why certain regions~in France seem naturally
leftist and others rightist. Economist so;.iology, whether Marxist and fanatic on the
concept of social class, or liberal and supporting the idea of socioprofessional
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categories, has nothing to say on these opposing attiti~es. Certain right-wing
" regions are rich and others poor. Certain leFt-wing regions are heavily worker
populated, but the majority are rural or tertiary. Ecotiomics does not guide French
poiitical life. However, the left and the right, which divided up the national
territory between 1789 and 1885 (between the taking of the Bastille and the buildit?g
of the Eiffel Tower), did not choose their respective provinces by chance or for the
quality of their cheese or their folklore. The politic~i~division or France followed
very precise anthropologicati lines of force. 1'Eie major ideologies---radicalism, con-
servatism, socialism, Catholicism and couuaunism--are each situated in a system of
- particular relationships. Political sensitivity is closely linkea in fact with the _
dominant mode of family affectivity.
More generally and basically, a study of French anthropnlogical diversity leads to a
new interpretation of a central myth in national history, a myth which is useful and
generous: universal man, identical in any p].ace, any cultures the revolui:ionary
dream which did not die with the First Republic.
Could this radical attitude have been born elsewhere than in France, an anthropo-
logically diverse nation, where the citizenry is not the mere juridical ref lection of
a system of particular mores, but the product of a will on the part of individuals
and provinces to "live together," of a desire to dominate, to annihilate anthro-
pological determinism? _
The invention of France is this process of fabricating a nation from diverse and con-
trad ictory elements.
Nature and Development of the French Political System
- Since its origins, thP French political system has been only superficiall.y natior?al. -
The bal~nced opposition of the left and the right hardly exists except on the floor
_ of the Chamber of Deputies at the Bourbon Palace. The majcr~.~y of the provinces and
the regions have in reality been politically homogeneous and stable since the -
_ beginnin~ of the century. The right wing traditionally carries the West, a good part
- of the East and the southern pait of tne Massif Central. The left dominates in the
Midi, the Center-Limousin and the North. The electoral battle is only uncertain on
the fringes of these inert blocs, in which voting, whether it be heavily for the left
or the right, is not a subject on which individuals reflect, but an element of local r
culture.
Statistically, this characteristic of the political system is expressed by the _
extreme disparity in the results obtained by each party in the various regions of
France. In the 1919 elections, for example, just prior to the Tours split, the old _
Socialist Party, still united, won 42 percent of the votes cast in Allier, but only
_ 2 percent in Vendee; 40 percent in Bouches-du-Rhone, but 7 percent on Orne; 22 per-
cent in Correze, but 5 percent in Meuse. A traditional statistical index with an
evocative name, "variance," ena~bles us to synthesize these disparities for the
departments as a whole, to measure the average degree of disparity in the results -
obtained by this or that party in a given election. Variance, which summarizes here -
the geographic variability of electoral performance, is traditionall.y very strong =
fer all the French political parties. The more a party tends toward uniform distri-
bution of its voters over the whole of a territory, the smaller the variance. On the
contrary, the more its voters are concentrated in certain strongholds, and sparse in
other regions, the greater the variance is.
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From this point of view, the PS and the PCF still appeared in 1973 as two parties of _
the old type. These two brothers, not twins but both the offspring of the old Jaures
Socialist Party, produced, like their common ancestor, a strong variance in their
electoral results: 46 for the PS, 46 for the PCF. This symmetrical system broke up ~
in 1978: the electoral variance of the PCF did not change, while that of the p5
drupped to 23.
This declinP shows that the PS is suddenly spreading to the whole of French territory.
It is advancing above all in the traditional zones of force of the right wing, the
East and the West. It is losxng ground in the old regians of leftist influence, the
Midi in particular.
The socialist penetration in the East, ~ccounting for a gain of percent of the
- votes in Alsace, is basically a natural phenomenon. The very conservative direction
' of this region is recent, the effect of the 20th-century traumas, the constant
transfers of sovereignty suffered by Als~ce and Lorraine since 1870. In the middle
of the 19th century, Alsace was regarded as a republican and leftist region. It was
the anticlerical policy of the Third R~public between the two wars which led the
recovered province to reject these traditions. Thus the socialist push ia not a
- novelty, but a reconciliation.
~
~ It is the conquest of the West by the PS which began in 1978 which is the spectacular
and basic phenomenon. Here~socialism is penetrating a region which had rejected the
left w~th a certain fanaticism since 1789. Andre Siegfried clearly showed, in his
"Political Chart of the West of France" around 1913, to what point Brittany and above
all Anjou, Maine and Vendee were still living in the era of the Old Regime, as if they
i were outside republican France. The 1978 election thus completed an historical cycle.
; Ir. meant that the French Revolution, with its specific ideological conflicts, its
-i loves and its hates, was ended.
- The PS is not alone in profiting from this calming of passions and this national
homogenization movement. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, less popular in the country as a
i whole than General de Gaulle, nonetheless has had greater acceptance in the heart of
Languedoc, which extends from Montpellier to Toulouse. In 1974, the liberal right
' wing penetrated the red Midi at the very moment the liberal left wing was penetr,ating
the reactionary West. A process of fusion is currently in progress and is likely to
' continue in the years to come. The French political system is in the procesa of
-i abandoning its old geographic and anthropological segmentation.
i
As opposed to these movements of national breadth, the French Communist Party is the
embodiment of fidelity to regional traditions. It remains solialy established, or
so?idly z~educed, depending on the point of view, in its stronghold in the North, the
Center-Limousin and Midi. It has been absolutely unable to expand in the Eastern
and Western parts of the country. On the contrary, its most serious provincial
setbacks in 1978 occurred in the regions in which it was already traditionall.y weak. -
It lost more than 4 percent of the votes cast in Finistere, Calvados and Cantal, aIl
departments belonging to the bloc of old conservative regions. With its three strong
goints being the North, Center and Midi, the electoral map af the PCF, showing violent
contrasts, still some~ahat resembled that of French socialism in 1919. The PCF was -
not able, as the PS was, to reach beyond the framework and the fidelity defined by
_ our very ancient revol.ution.
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The only region in which it is still advancing in perceptible fashion is, typically,
the Sou~h-West (Hautes-Pyrenees, Ariege, Tarn-et-Garonne, Haute-Garonne), where it
continues to chip away tirelessly at the bastions of the olrt SFIO [French Section of
- the Workers International (French Socialist Party)] and the Radical Farty. Thus
Fr~nch communism is confirzning that it is less a leftist force than a necrosis of the
left, plagued with impotence when it comes to forcing the retreat in conservative
influence.
There is one region of France, of capi~al importance one can accurately say, in which
the PCF is fainting--the Parisian concentration in the broad sense. In the depart-
ments of the "little crown" as a whole (Seine-Saint-Denis, Va1 d'Oise, Hauts-de Seine),
the PCF showed a decline between 1973 and 1978 from 29.5 percent to 24.9 percent of
the votes cast--a drop of 4.6 percent in ~ years.
Since its origins, the power of Paris cocmmunism has concealed the unequal influence of
the party in French territory as a whole. In the grea?`. Jacobin tradition, a strong
PCF in the capiCal sufficed for it to be considered as a great natiorcal party. This
central collapse, if it continues, is lik~ly to bring brutally to the fore the
regional ethnographic characteristics of the PCF.
Communism and the Workers Class: A Sociological Fantasy
The PCF defines itself as the party of the w~arkers class. This claim is widely
accepted. It ~.s believed, on the right as on the left, that communism is a prole-
_ tarian phenomenon. This representation is a veritable sociological fantasy. There
is no visible relation in France between the geographic distribution of the workers
class and the regional influence of the PCF. The coefficient of c~rrelation between;
the relative importance of the industrial sector and the percentage of votes won by
the PCF in the legislative elections is practically nil, to be exact 0.08 (1978
legislative elections, active population employed in the secondary sector in 1968).
~ The maps showing the location o~ industry and the "party of the workers cZass" are
- absolutely disparate. Communism and the proletariat Goincide only in the Northern
part of France (departments of Pas-de-Calais, Nord, Aisne and Ardennes). Of the 21
most heavily industrialized departments, only 4 show a percentage of communist votes
equal or superior to 25 percent. Two of the three co~nunist bastions, Center-Limousin
and the Mediterranean coast, are in na way regions remarkable for their industrial
development.
The East, on the contrary, from Moselle to Isere, which is heavily industrial, has
- been penetrated by communism to a very weak extent. There is a mystery here and a
mystification. How could political science and public opinion in g~neral have
- accepted the idea that there is a firm and basic relationship between communism and
the proletariat?
The illusion is based on an inversion of the mechanism of perception of economic
reality. The regions which vote communist are perceived as industrial and workers'
regions. It is not widely known in France that Isere, Haute-Savoie, .Tura, Doubs, Eure
_ and Aube are heavily industrial departments with concentrations of workers, because
these regions do not vote couununist. In the collective awareness, economic perception
derives from political perception, and not the reverse.
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The economy is a world of social half-awareness. It is regarded as important and
_ even basic by the majority of current sociologists, whether Marxist or not, but
these sociologists lack a precise knowl~dge of the specific economy. Economics is
a mythical reference. On the theoretical level, it dominates the field of the
humanities. In practice, its image is entirely determined by the political super-
structure and the ideological superstitians which prevail today. Only the conser-
vative deputies electec; in the heavily proletarian regions know basically that
communism is not a bypr~iduct cf industrializatior.,
This lack of coincidence between communism and industry on :he level of France can
be observed on the international scale. The Russia of 1917 and t`;he China of 1949
. were not indust~ial countries: thE~~ are presently communist. England was very much
a country of the workers: it ia sx�.ill not coffinunist. .
Giacard d'Estaing, de Gaulle and Languedoc
i Valery Giscard d'Estaing was r~garded at the tiime of his e~ection to the presidency
_I of the republic as a con5ervative of a more classic nature than General de Gaulle.
~ There was emphasis then on a popular base of support for Gaullism which the new
president lost. Electoral geography brings out another image, a ra~ically different
one .
In 1974, as a whole, Giscard rallied a much smal'ler percentage of votes than did
de Gaulle in 1965: 50.7 percent as opposed to 55 percent. But if he lost voters in
the greater portion of the country, he surpassed the general's figures in the mo~t
. traditioral leftist regions, in the heart of Languedoc. With Giscard d'Eetaing, the
so-called classic right wing penetrated the most solid bastions of t~ie soc.ialist and
~ radical left. This movement can b~e compared with the ayQ~aetrical push of the new PS
in the conservative East and West. Valery Giscard d'Estaing and the PS are the
simultaneous incarnations of a process of geographical homogenization of the Fre~ch
political system. From the point of view of electoral so~ciology, they are comple-
mentary ana are contributing to the development of a new political system.
This development also points up the extent to which the purest essence of the Midi
rejected de Gaulle. Rarely in the political history of the country has the contrast
between the North and South been so striking. With the appearance of national unity
- and rising above parties, the general pushed the antagonism between North and South,
one of the structural elements in the old French political system, to its li.mit of
tolerance. It would be interesting to know why the heart of Languedoc raas so
resistant to the charms of the personal and plebicite system. One thing is certain:
this region does not like the father image in politics. Thus in the subjugated France
uf the years 1958-1969, Languedoc was a veritable refuge for liberal ideas. This
role as a political "redoubt" is not without its similarities to the place occupied
- by the reactionary Wesr. in the republican and secular France of the Third Republic.
The Rocard Ph~nomenon
A candidate in the 1969 presidential election, Michel Rocard achieved but a limited
- triumph. The big winner on the left then (that is to say the least defeated) was
Jacques Duclos, the representative of the PCF, who won 21 percent of the votes d~espite
predictions to the contrary. Rocard had to content himself with 3.6 percent. These
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are overall results. A detailed geographic analysis reveals the meaning of the Rocard
phenomenon, the profound reason for national popularity and fascination unrelated c~
the minority, not to say insignificant, electoral base of a candid~te. Compared with
the total number of leftist votes, the strength of Kocard's electorate traces with
diabolicai precision the map of religious practice around 1950. The deeper one pen~~ ~
traCes into a Catholic region, the heavier Michel Rocard's weight on the left was.
What he represented was quite simply the breakdown of the old clerical-anticlerical
cleavage inherited from the French Revolution. His minuscule electorate then repre-
sented a union of the two Frances, or rather a third France, indifferent to the ideo-
' logical conflicts of the past. But the PCF was not at all wrong in speaking of a
"R.ocard d'Estaing." The electoral maps of the support of the two graduates of the _
National School of Administration are strangely similar. Both are dic~ated heavily
- by the map of Catholicism, which in itself is a marvelous negative image of the map
of communism.
The Right Wing and Religion
The French left wing has a mythical adversary, fascism (it will not succeed) and a
real opponent, Catholicism (but it extends a hand to it). One could marvel at the
_ consisten~y with which our leftist parties wage the battle against an absolutely non-
existent fascist menace. No party of the Mussolini, Nazi or more modestly Franco i
- type has ever had the slightest electoral importance in France, even in 1936. Today, ,
the extx�eme right wing, a11 factions merged, commands about one half of one~percent ;
of the votes (1978). "
The hard and serious nucleus of the Frencii right wing is Catholicism, an ideological
system which may under certain circumstances encourage anti-Semitism, but which never
favors a generalized xenophobia of the Nazi type. The Roman Catholic church is after
all, like communism, a supranational phenomenon.
The map reflecting the voting support for Giscard d'Estaing in 1974 and that showing
religious practice around 1960 are remarkably similar.
Paradoxically, the French Revolution, by decapitating Catholicism in Paris and the
Paris basin, enabled it to sink deep roots in the peripheral peasant society. In
Rouergue, in the Basque country, in Alsace or in Leon (in Finistere-Nord), Catholicism
prevails in local co~nunities where the temperament is democratic. It provides the
conservative right wing with a veritable mass base. _
The Left Wing: A Family Affair
The economic variables are powerless to explain the unwavering leftist inclination
of certain regions of France and the reactionary obstinacy of some others. The map
showing Mitterrand's voting support in no way resembles that reflecting industry or
poverty. Nor does that reflecting Giscard d'Estaing's voting support coincide with
that showing wealth or the peasantry.
Family structure, a basic anthropological parameter, does on the other hand, and with -
remarkable precision, coincide with the map of the leftist vote. The regions in which
the traditional family is both extensive (that is to say frequently associating a
number of married couples in a single domestic unit) and flexible in its mechanism for
the takeover of the generations (reflected in early marriage by young adults) voted _
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~ for Francois Mitterrand in 1974. The typical values of this communizy typ~e o�
family organization are close to those of the left. The coa~unity family envelops -
the individual in its warmth and its protection.
When this traditional family structure is solid and intact, it is a true social
force, a guarantee against encroachments by state or aristocratic powers. This is -
- the reason for the leftist inciination in the regions where it is found. When this
' family structure breaks down and is replaced by simple conjugal households, it leaves
individuals with a sense of emptiness and yearning for the community. Consequently
the individual is predisposed toward an acceptance of the communist idea.l, a par-
ticularly clear ghenomenon in two regions, the Center-Limousin and the Mediterranean
coast, while the collapse of tha Languedoc family structures in the 19th century -
created fertile g~ound for the communist movement.
I Authority
A cartographic contour recurs unceasingly in this geography of French mentality.
Twenty times, 100 times, like a leitmotiv, a complex has appeared made up of S peri- _
~ pheral poles: Brittany, the Basque country, the Southeast frontier--from the Jura
to Alsace. A large number of variable factors find their way into this repetitive
I form, such as the proportion of households including collateral relatives of the head
I of the family or children over 25 years of age and the frequency of the birth of twin~. _
If we add to these five poles the interior of the West--from Perche to Anjou--we
obtain a map of religious practice, or the hard right wing, that is to say the depart-
ments which voted most enthusiastically for Valery Giscard d'Estaing in 1974 or for
Charles de Gaulle in 1965, and attended mass most assiduously around 1960.
I There is a veritable key whic;h organizes this seemingly heterogeneous grouping:
; average age at marriage. Couples marry more or less young in tihe various provinces
' in France: the level of youthful marriage is a good indicator of the type of control
i exercised over these young adults by their aocial system, buC this social system is
' not uniform throughout France. Age at marriage, recorded on the departmental level,
measures the local strength of the authority principle. Marriage at an older age
~ defines a family structure of the authoritarian type. It produces numerous unmarried .
~ men and women who sometimes remain for the whole of their lives in the families of
i their married brothers or sisters, as aging children or eternal uncles.
Politics and the Birth Rate
i
I' Toward the middle of the 6th decade of the 20th century, one could still find in France
a rather remarkable coincidence between leftist political votes and a low ~eproduction
rate for couples. . The map reflecting the vote for Mitterrand in 1965 and that showing
the lowest reproduction indices in 1975 ~re very similar. The old republican and =
~ anti-de Gaulle regions have a conservative attitude toward procreation.
; In 1974, however, this clear image liecame clouded: Mitterrand won back for the left _
wing, after the departure of General de Gaulle, the old socia~ist regions in the North,
between Amiens and Lille. Now this part of the country has a high birth rate, close -
- to that of the vast conservative zorie which surrounds it. The relationship between
the left wing and low reproduction is weakening, but it has not disappeared on the
level of France overall.
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There is no direct and immutable relationship between the number of births and
political attitudes. The coincidences, frequent but in~ermittent, derive from tha
fact that politics and the reproduction rate are both determined by an anthropological
subetratum. But if the co~unity family in the South always produces leftist votes,
Chis does not inevitably lead to a low birth rate. _
Political Agnosticism and Life Expectancy
1'he t~ao main ideologies underlying the traditional national political conflict--the
revolutionary concept and Catholicism--are metaphysical systems. ~eligion bPlieves
in paradise after death. The revolu~ionary ideal involves belief in paradise on
earth.
Communism, the current representative of the revolutionary atheism and materialism of
the 18th century, affirms m~reover that the spirit dies when the body does.
Communism and Catholicism have in common the idea that a relationship must necessarily
exist between the view of death and the concept of politics. True happiness, according
_ to both doctrines, can only lie in the future of an individual, on earth or in heaven.
Th~e majority of the regions of France have accepted this coincidence of political
ideas and metaphysical concepts. One is leftist and atheist, or rightist and a
believer. Only a few provinces have rejected this alignment of faith and the vote.
_ They are then rightist, without being particularly Christian, or leftist, without
_ being entirely dech.ristianized. ~ao main and opposing blocs are particularly `
remarkable.
One extends from the Seine to the Atlantic, and is right wing without excessive
belief in god.
The other extends from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean and is viscerally leftist
without being hostile to religion.
. Curi~usly, these two compact blocs are seen with equal clarity on the maps of life
expectancy. `
Death comes particularly late in the xegions of political agnosticism, where meta- _
physics is not concerned with earthly conflicts. Lives are long in the regions
in which there is belief neither in paradise on earth nar a paradise after death.
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Comm~unism in the Wor~ers Class--departments with both a strong communist vote
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