JPRS ID: 9811 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020050-0
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• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 50
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9811
25 June 1981
Nec~r East North Africa Re ort
p
CFOUt~ ~ 1 /81)
FQ~S ~OREIGN gROi4DCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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JPRS 7~/9811
25 June 1981
_ . NEAR EP,ST/NORTH AFRICA REPQRT
= cFOUO 2i/sl)
CONTENTS
Ii~TER-ARAB AFFAIR5
Act,ivities of German Rocket F`irm in Zibya, Saudi Arabia Outlined
(Guenther Barth; STERN~ 11 Jun 81) 1
AFGHANISTAN
USSR Gradually Absorbing Afghan Econo~y
(Jamal Rasheed; 8 DAYS, 11 Apr 81) 5
ALG ~RIA
Algiers Hesitant About Support of POLISARIO
(Abdelaziz DaYlman~ ; JEITI~IE AFRIQUE, 6 May 81) 7
1r~.arr
War Seen Bankrupting Country
(Tim McGirk; 8 DAYS, 11 Apr 81) 9
TSRAEL
ERRATUM: In JPRS L/9762 of 1 June 1981, FOUO 19~81 of this
~ series~ at the end of the axticles entitled "Peace Movement
To Seek Rapprochement With PLO" and "Arab Land Qwnership
- Disputed in Galilee," which begin on pages 10 and 1L~,
- respectively, please correct, the copyright citations to
read: COP'YRIGHT: 1981 by NEW OUTLOOK.
MAURITANIA
Qadhdhafi Efforts To Gain Influence ViEwed as Failure '
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUPfE AFRIQUE, 6 May 81) 11
SAUDI AF~.A.BIA
Electronic, Traditional Methods Used for Internal Security
(Jerome Dumoulin; L~EXPRESS, 28 Apr 81) 13
J - a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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~ INT~',R-AR'AB AFFAIRS
ACTIVITIES OF GERMAN ROCKET FIRM IN LIBYA, SAUDI ARABIA OUTLINID
DK121,11? Hamburg STERN in German 11 Jun 81 pp 206-209
[Article by Guenther Barth: "German Rockets for A1-Qadhdhafi"]
[Text] Secret agreements prove: the Munich company "OT$6iG" is build3ng missiles
for the delivery of nuclear warheads in Libya. More customers from the ThS:rd World
have already been baited.
The "rhing" was nearly 12 meters tali and had a diameter of 90 plus centimeters. It
shone silvery in *he morning sun. "F~y," murmured Dr Walter Ziegler. Then the
engineer from Munich pressed a red button in the safe concrete bunker. A gigantic
blast flame erupted from the bottom part of the glittering object. To begin with
it lifted off very slowly, then it gained ~relocity, and a few minutes later it was
just a tiny dot in the brilliantly blue sky.
,
This happened in the morning of 1 March 1~81. The scene was a small Sahara oasis,
just about 800 kilometers south of the Libyan capital, 1'ripoli. The "thing" was a
rocket of the Munich "Orbital Transport:~and Rocket Joint Stock Company" (OTRAG).
The Bavarian company has always claimed to build rnckets which would orbit satel-
lites for peacerul purposes.
To the rederal Government, however�;� the activities of the Munich rocket builders
are "c~use of particularly deep concern"--as government spokesu�an Lothar Ruehl put
it.
For after the liftoff in the desert this is clear for experts: OTRAG is construct-
ing military missiles for Libya. The test missile covered a distance of just about
300~~kilometers.
Bu Libya's fanatic chief of state Nuammar al-Qadhdhafi wants more: medium-range
and long-range missiles which will be a~le to carry bombloads weighing tons over
distances of up to 7,OQ0 kilometers--mi,ssiles of domestic production, built in thQ
~ deaert country rich in oil, conceived by German scientists.
To achieve this end the "madman of Z'ripoli" (a~ the London OBSERVER r_alls Qadhdhafi)
intends to pay heavily. For a 5-year prr~gram he has earmarked $1.5 billion. Libya
and OTRAG came to terms on thia in a secret agreement concluded in Zurich in January
1980. The desert state has already shelled out $100 million for initial test series
part of which also was the rocket launching of 1 March.
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The ultimate ob~ective is a gruesame plan. For al-Qadhdhafi,.who dreams of an
Islamic empire ancl the destruction of Israel, concluded the pact with the German
depreciation company only under one condition. A high-ranking Libyan Government
official explained it to STERN thusly: "OTRAG promised us to deliver rockets which
can also transport nuclear warheada."
~verything had started in Suly 1978. At the time rocket designer Lutz T. Kayser,
~ 43, still experi~u~ed~~ in the African Zaire with rockets designed to carry Cicilian
satellites to space at low cost. He had leased from dictator Mobuto a highland
- plateau in the copper province of Shaba as a rocket-launcing site, an area as big
as the GDR. But the rocket launches scared neighbor countries such as Angola. There
were international protests. The charge: the Federal Republic is carrying out il-
legal missile tests in Africa. Bonn promised Mobuto more developffient aid if he would
kick OTRAG out. Thereupon Mobuto terminated the agreement in 1979. For this reason
it was very expedient that the Libyans had paid Kayser a visit in Zaire shortly
bef~re.
A three-member delegation disembarked from tha plane from Tripoli, headed by 'Abd
al-Ma~jid al-Qa'ud, intima.te friend of Libyan chief of state al-Qadhdhafi and now
his minister for nuclear affairs.
The OTRAG people set up a special rocket for the Libyans. They had to scr~pe their
, last pennies together. For in view of the interna.tional protests the money sources
of the Kayser empire no longer welled as abundantly as before. The investors in the
depreciation company--tax-fatigued FRG citizens--had become suspicious. Besides,
the boss himself had reached deeply into the company's coffers: he had sold his
patents to his company for a total of DM150 million and cashed DM20 million right
away.
Prior to the visit by t?~e Libyans OTRAG boss Lutz T. Kayser had been restlessly
fl.ying around the world--always in search of suitable launching sites for his rockets.
He negotiated with Brazil on launching bases, he lobbied in Indonesia. But he had
to reali.ze that nobody in the world was seriously interested in his satellite plans.
At tha~ time, a former intimate friend of Kayser said, the missile designer worked
himself up to the decision to step into the big arms business. The first nation was
Syria.
He suggested to Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad to suppl_y for a total of. $714 million
--according to a contract offer--production places for the construction of 15 mis-
siles annually. They were supposed to have a range between 300 and 2,000 kilometers,
and they should be able to carry half ton of explosives each to tY~eir target. The
Syrians were interested, but they had rio money.
Al-Qadhdhafi's envoys had no financial problems. They were deeply impressed by the
Kayser demonstration on the occasion oi' their visit in mid-1975. Further negotia-
tiunF followed sometimes in Zurich and sometimes in Munich. In early 1979 al-
Qad}~dhafi gave a check of $1.5 million to permit OTRAG to move from Zaire to Libya
and to buy new material.
K.ayser still continued to look for other potent sponsors in the rich oil states.
But the Saudi princes first did not take the missile constructor very ser3ously.
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`1'hat changed when Kayser followed the mediation of his bank, Merck, Finck and Company,
involving *_he Frankfurt businesaman Klaus-Dietrich Nick~l, who was experienced in
Mideastern businese. On 26 March 1979 Nickel and Kayser agreed on "absolute secrecy"
and concluded an option contract on the sale of misaile technology to Saudi Arabia,
In ordzr to dodge German law prohibiting not licenaed exports of arms, missiles and
armament know-how, Kayser signed as the boss of an "OTRAG holding" located in Zurich.
Nickel said to STERN tihat he was supposed to get "5 percent of the total volume" as
a provision once a contract was successfully concluded with the Saudis.
On 22 May 1979 Kayser and Nickel concluded ano~her "option contract" on the sale of
_ missile technology and the setup of missile factories in Pakistan. This time Kayser
signed as president of the "OTRAG Holding International" loca.ted in Panama.
Pakistani President Ziaul Haq was most interested in obtaining carrier missiles for
his nuclear explosives which were under construction. But he did not have any money
because of. the expensive nuclear program.
Nickel was ~ust the right man for the OTRAG business. The 56-~ear-old man had built
up an ar.tistic setup of firms in the main river metropolis, with Nickel holding the
position of either chief representative or chairman of the board of directors. There
were such firms as "MEAPLAN," "INTERTAEC" and "MIDEA." The owners of the ~apital
are either his tt?ird wife Ursula or his fourth wife Lieselotte, or men of most noble
families--such as Meinrad von Hohenzollern, a businessman specialized in the Mideast,
or the Saudi Prince Abdul Aziz Nawaf, who holds 25 percent of MEAPLAN.
Through liis mediation Nickel achieved access to the highest authorities in Saudi
Arabia. But because the Saudis did not consider the OTRAG as too serious a deprec-
iation firm, experts and German firms of world renown had to be involved.
Again the bank, Merck, Finck and Company knew the right agent. Nickel told STERN
that director Rolf Huhn of the F`rankfurt branch established "contacts witrr General
Wust." He had ~ust quit as Bundeswehr inspector general after a quarrel with De-
fense Minister Apel. The first meeting in summer 1979 was most conspiratorial, as
_ usual if one is involved in prohibited arms deals. "We met on half the way at the
Montabaur Autobahn Inn," reports Nickel. Both agreed quickly on the deal.
The general "straightened up the shop," as a r:EAPLAN employee remembers. And he
brought along serious partners. "I lmow old man Diehl quite well," said Wust,
thus involving one of Germany's greatest arms firms in the business, the Nuremberg
armament and compu~er combine Diehl Ltd and Company. Then the firms AEG-Telefunken,
whose radar equipment is in worldwide demand, beca.me involved, as well as the Frank-
furt firm Polensky and Zoellner. The latter does not ~ ust build the subway in
Dusseldur.f, but also higk?ways and public buildings in Libya.
Because the missile installations are s~upposed to be built in enormous subterranean
bomb-proof halls in Tihamah mountains at the Red Sea, the Swiss engineering firms
Godeplanning (Zurich) and Blanchut and Bertrand (Geneva) were also involved. They
had experience in building subterranean ammunition depots in the Swiss Alps.
The partners in this project worth billions met nearly weekly in the winter of 1979/80
--sometimes in Zurich, sometimes at Dieh1's in Nuremburg or in Frankfurt.
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~n 8 February 1980 the MEAPLAN board of directors approved DM100,000 for the further
pr.eparations. The money was used, among other things, for paying for an expensive
presentation album with which the missile pro~ect--code name "Delta"--was to be
presented to the Saudis. A magnificent book, bound in green leather, gilt-edged,
8 centimeters thick, size 40 x 30 centimeters and weighing nearly 4 pounds, produced
i.n 'Lurich f.or a price of exactly 37,243.55 Swisa franca. Quite unlike a man of the
world the Nuremberg arms forge later sought to dodge payment of its share of
4,656.82 Swiss francs. An internal note for Diehl director Dr Gerd Gassner, chief
of the company division for arms technology, laments the fact that not even "one
copy is in the possession of the Diehl Company."
Well, this was impossible, for only three copies were printed. One was given to
Prince Nawaf, another remained with the MEAPLAN company, the third having been car-
rLed to Riyadh by ex-General Harald Wust on 5 June 1.980 who negotiated on the Delta
pro~ect there with the Saudi defense minister. While in the capital of Riyadh Wust
stayed at the Intercontinental Hotel, room number 503, the room Y.aving been booked
by the Saudi Government.
Upon his return from the desert Wust dictated to his MEAPLAN secretary that his
impreasion of the negotiations with Defense Minister Prince Sultan and deputy chief
of the general staff Habbam was "positive on the wh~le." STERN is in possession of
the travel report of the general who denies his military involvement in Arabia--as is
a copy of the minutes of the meeting of the Deltia consortium in Frankfurt on 20 June
at which the general reported on his desert trip once again.
Wuat said in his travel report that it was the presentation album, abo*~e all, which
impressed the Saudis. This album contains, for example, a"military study" which
specifies which missiles should be stationed and where, where subterranean conffiand
staffs should be set up, and how the missile brig3des should be organized militarily.
All rold the companies participating in the Delta project were supposed to produce
in Saudi Arabia 1,943 missiles "for the fields of short, medium, and long-range
deterrence" as well as for air derense. Of this total, 1,346 should be distributed
over mobile or subterranean bases and 597 held in reserve in mountain shafts.
The deal came to r.aught, at any rate for the time being. According to Nickel the
Saudis cut off the negotiations in the fall of 1980. The discreet o3.1 princes had
found out that the "strictly confidential" Delta scheme had ended up with the
Israeli intelligence service Mossad. Meetings of the consortium had been photo-
graphed by Mossad. Nickel also caught his driver copying teletype messages after
duty, and he found out that one of his secretaries had just married an Israeli.
Nickel and his friends, howe�ver, did not have trouble with Mossad alone. The Munich
prosecutor's office is investigating them, the Delta partners and General Wust
"on suspicion of violation of the war-arms control act."
The interest of the Saudis has awakened again af te r the successful test launching in
Libya, Kayser's friend Frederick Weyma:r confirms. Weymar is a money broker with head-
quarters in Monte Carlo and had already negotiated the Zaire agreement for OTRAG. Now
the Saudis, too, believe in the mil.ita~,-y usability of the OTRAG roclcets again. Ac-
cording to ar OTRAG spokesman the next test phase in Libya will be rocket launch
"under military conditions." This mea�;is: liftoff out of a silo, with the launching
preparations having to be wound up "in iess than half a day."
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AFGI~iANISTAN
USSI: GRADUALLY ABSORBING AFGHAN ECONOMY
London 8 DAYS in English 11 Apr 81 pp 24-25
(Article by Jamal Rasheed: "Russia and the Kabul Pay-off"]
[Text] AFGHANIST.4N'S e~:onomy, battered by Tarraki's murder by Amin, Amin's own
rivil w�ar and already one of the poorest in death at the hands of the Parcham facticm of
the world - with a per capita income of a Babrak Karmal and the subsequent
merc 5160 - is having to struggle to intensification of the civil war. F~rcien
xurvive, in ~pitc of Soviet cash and aid. Now trade declined drasticalh~. The salc of fruit
therc are indications that a complete and nuts via Jalalahad and Peshawar in
restructuring c~f the economy is taking Pakistan was curtailed bccause ~i rebel
rlace, Feared tc~wardc mineral exploitation ambushes. there was a drop in the numher
and industry. The obvious question is who of karakul skins sold abraad, and foreign
~tands to bencfit from tficse developments. exchange rescrves fell. Onl~� natur:~l ~;i~
Thc Afghan economy depended upon sales to the Soviet Uni~~n rcm;~incd
Se~viet aid even before the April 1978 constant. An estimated 2.6bn cubic mctrc,
rcvnlution. 7'he subsequent Five Year Plan of natural gas goes to the Soviet Uni~m from
cirawn up by Soviet economists under the Afghan gas ~elds at Sherberghan, cl~~~e
f~rmer Presidcnt Tarraki in 1979 aimed to to the Soviet border. Rescrves are put at
allc~cate more than 40 per cent of total 120bn cu m. According to the i:ahul
invcstment to mineral extraction and government, the Soviets arc payinF ~100
industry, in order to raise industrial output for every 1,000 cubic metres. In 1976 ihe
hy 65 per cent aver the period 1979-R4, price was $l6.
Coal production was to be doubled from Abdul Latif Aurah, a senior official at the
223,~OQ tonnes to S23,U00 tonnes, cement ministry of mines end industr~~ W~ho recently
production tripled and natural gas }1Pd to Pakistan, told a press conference
production raised by one third. there that ihe Soviets were taking 3.Sbn
The proposed extraction of other cubic metres to meet energy needs in Soviet
minerals was not specified, but a secret Central Asia, at a80 per 1,(100 cu m.
World Aank report published in 1978, However, verification of this allegaticm is
hefore thc re~~olution, stated that difficult to come by.
Afghani~tan was rich in iron ore, eopper, Afghanistan has always recerved all its
- uranium, ccial, gac a�d oil. 'The only petrol by road from the S~viet Uni~~n.
a,mPrehensive mineral surveys had been Prices have been kept low, (20 cent~ a litre)
~i~~ne hv tfic Soviecs, and undcr this plan the but Afghanistan is anyway one of the
precic~minantly~ agrjcultural basis of the world's lowest energy consumers. The
economy wa~ to he neglected, ensuring USSR announced recently that it is to
Afghanistan's dependence on the Soviet provide a$106.4m credit, to build an oil
Union for all hasic f~odstuffs. Pre~~iously it refinery at Kabul which a~ill makr the
had imported thcse from Pakistan, 1ndi:a country self-sufficient in oil, and t~ devclop
and Canada. two small oil fields. Afghariistan has oil
The plan went into aheyance after retierve~ ~f lOm tonnes accordinF to the
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~1'~,rld B;inl., hui ?hrrc err reports from to douhlc coal production mean that most
K~+hul cif hu~;c new oil find. in the nonh, of it will br cxported to Suviet Central Asia.
:~d~;iccnt U, thc g;~s field,. I~uwevcr, a number of coal minrs outsidr
Il~,wrvcr il i. Afgh,inist;~n'~ minrral thr maj�r pupulation ccntrc~ havn c~cn
~1cr~sits which are :+ttracting mos~ closed sinee the war, and renrening them
,incntiun. Thc Wcst knew abo~! them will be hazardous.
� during }'residcnt'~ Daoud'~ time but failed The government has announced a
develop them because of the inaccessihle development budget of Afghanis 14.Sbn
tcrrain, the lack of a railti�a}� system and the ($329m) for 1981-compared to Afghanis
nl~ticnce of a coastline - problems w�hich Jo 17.Sbn (S397m) the previous ycar - and a
nnt limit the Soviets to anything like the total budget of Atghanis 33.1bn (S766m).
~:imc cxtcnt. This will include Afghanis 8.Sbn ;$193m),
Copper re~erves at Ainak, south of worth of loans and grants from the Soviet
Kabui, ~re dcscribed as colossal. An Union and Afghanis 700m ($16m) worth of
estimatcd $]bn is being sunk into aid from the Comecon countries. Recent
~lcveloping these mines over the next five export figures show a rise due to increased
vcars, in order to pn~ducc 95,000 tonnes of exports of natural gas, but all other exports
c~mccntratcd curper a year by 1988. Iron are down. Government revenue has also
urr drposits in Bamiyan province in central declined due to the complete halt in
Afghunisten, inhahited by the Hazara e~urism, which in 1977 brought in $15m.
~cc~ple, total 1.7bn tonnes eccording to Remittances from Afghan workers in Iran,
Latif A~tr~h, but they are situated in a the Gulf and Pakistan ha~~c also ceased,
hi~hly underdevcloped region torn by civi] resulting in a shortfall of a20Um a year.
war due to the Hazaras' fierce resistance. The fuod supply system has broken down
1'w~c~ governors of Bamiyan province have completely except for the major cities,
alrc~dy heen killed. However, the Soviets which are dependent upon Soviet handouts.
arc invcsting in mines at Hajigak, closer to The Sovicts recently provided ] O,U(l0
K;~hul. tonnes of grain and 20,000 tonnes of rice
The World Bank report stated that free of charge.
- AfFhanistan had 100m tonnes in proven Afgh~nistan is slowlv being drawn into
roal reserves, with another 40Om tonnes the Srn�iet economic orbic. Its mineral and
probable. Domestic ~emand for coal is less industrial development is geared towards
th~~n ?00,000 tonnes a year. Soviet efforts turning the country into a storehouse of raw
materials for the USSR.
COPYRIGHT: Falcon~rood Publication Ltd. ISSN-0144-1841
CSU: 4920
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ALGERIA
ALGIERS HESITANT ABOUT SUPPORT OF POLISARIO
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 May 81 p 21 ~
LArticle by Abdelaziz Dahmani/
LR'ext7 How to temper Qadhdhafi's ambitions in the Sahara without harming the interests
of POLISARIO is the question being asked in Algiers. So the failure of the union
between Mauritania and the SDAR ~aharan Democratic Arab Republi) proposed by
Qadhdhafi is not regrettEd in the Algerian capital. But any strict neutrality by
Mauritania would also diminish POLISARIO's opportunity to take action against Morocco.
_ Fiow to get out of this vicious circle?
POLISARIO understood the dilemma the Algerians were confronting, and reacted by inten-
sifying its most recent attacks. These were targeted on Guelta Zemmour and were
launched from Mauritania; Sidi Ambara, F_rom Algeria; Squem and Douay in the Smara
region, from the Haouza base which POLI:7ARI0 continued to control aft;er the building
of the famous "wall" by the Moroccan army.
7'hose very hard battles were primarily fought for diplomatic ~bjectives, with the
18th OAU ~rganization of African Unity7 Summit scheduled just a few weeks ahead
(Nairobi, June 1981). In reality, the SDAR has received no additional recognition
- since the last summit (Monrovia, July 1980)--recognition that would reinforce the
clique of those who want to see "the Saharan Republic" take its place in the pan-
African organization.
What has happened is that Qadhdhafi's ambitions have excited intense concern in
t~lack Africa since he put Chad under his guardianship. Concern which could be
damaging to the POLISARIO cause. Chadl:. Bendjedid, Algeria's president, during his
recent trip (J.A. No. 1058} therefore taok pains to distance himself from the Libyan
leader.
~nother curious incident: the mid-April attack of an Algerian food convoy by a
~ (pro-Libyan) POLISARIO unit. The skirmi.sh, though denied by the Algerian authorities,
left fatalities on both sides. The engagement was followed by an attack in undisputed
- Moroccan territory north of the former Western Sahara. And Morocco reportedly
exercised the right of hot pursuit into Algeria to go after the POLISARIO combatants.
This serious incident was revealed by Algerian sources, while the Moroccans categorically
denied...It puts an end to the truce negotiated more than 7 months ago which had
obliged the POLISARIO not to utilize Algerian territory to launch attacks against
"undisputed Morocco."
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I' Ui\ Uf f 11.1NL UJr, U1VL 2
'Phis rupture was reportedly due to the failure of A1