JPRS ID: 9820 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030001-3
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9820
2 Juiy 1981
West Euro e Re ort
p ~
cFOUO 3~1ia~~
Fgt$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION S~RVICE
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JPRS L/9820
2 July 1981
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 31/81)
CONTENTS
ENERGY ECONOMICS
f'I ~LY
Co11.-l~ired, Nnclear Plants Planned for Lombardy
(M~;rco Car.zonio; CORRIERr DELI,A S~RA, 2 Jun 81) 1
ECONOMIC
U~ f'Cf:1) KT.~I(,n~ri
Hea~f~ i~utlines Tasks of UK-Japanese Cooperation
(Ed~vard Heath; THE TIMES, 16 Jun $1) 4
T'OLITICAT
Iid'I'i:lzNA'('fON~L nrrniizs
I;ric~f 1,~._~. Span Seen Eor Italy-Atalta Neutrality Accord
_ (Lucizrto Corsini; IL SOLE 24-ORE, 23 May 81) 7
1'I?i)1~;~;~AI_, Ri?PURI, fC (1F GERM~INY
~I~D`s (:~Lo~z oil I,oss i.n 13erlin, Leadership Pr.oblems
(Peter Glotz Interview; DER STERN, 21 May 81) 10
' I 'I' ~1 I
I't:l':, Lngrao Calls for Dialog With European Socialists
(Pi.etro Ingrao Interview; PA~iOltAP1A, 1 ,Tun 81) . . . . . . . . . . 14
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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Survey of PCI Opinion on Government Formulas
(Paolo Passarini; IL MONDO, 1 May 81) 19
Review of Craxi-Berlinguer Conflicts
(Paolo Passarini; IL MONDO, 8 May 81) 24
, MILITARY
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Spanish, Portuguese Military Industry, Weapons Production Firms ~
(LA PENINSITLE LUSO-IBERIQLTE, 1980) 28
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ENERGY ECONOMICS ZTALY
COAL-FIRED, NUCLEAR PLANTS PLANNED FO'. '~'`SBARDY
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 2 Jun 81 p 20
~Article by Marco Garzonio~
~Text~ "Unless we start ianmediately, industry will come to a halt in 3 years."
When we hear speak of a candlelight future and of a gradual blackout capable of
bringing in8ustrial activity to a halt, our impression is that someone is trying
to paint the.~~tuation "darker" than it really is, perhaps to press for~decisions.
Yet, listening yesterday morning at the "Pirellone" to the figures cited by the
top officials of ENEL ~National Electric Power Agency~ was enough to dispel any
thoughts of pleasant dreams. Acc~rding to those figures, if the output of the
electrical network remains thQ same as it is today, Lombardy's energy deficit
within 10 years will rise from its current 26 percent to 36 percent. If the�two
plants now planned (a coal-fired one at B,~s.tida Pancarana and a nuclear one in the
Mantova Region) are built by then, ~he gap will of course be reduced, but only by
s~me 6 percent. This is like saying that within 10 years Lombardy will in any case
be "in the red" by about one-third af its energy requirement. Or that, unless new
plants are planned quic.kly or alternative solutions are brought into being, the
risk of our fallir.g behind the productive evolution of our other European partners
will become a material reality. This assumes that our aim is not directed toward
"zero growth," which in reality means, in plain trerms: a retragression.
With the chilling precision made possible by the figures compiled through the most
sophisticated survey and forecasting techniques, the experts have pinpointed the
"black period" for energy in our region: the years between 1984 and 1987. To
quote a comment--which to say the least was a bitter one--by an ENEL eMgineer
ye~terday morning in the corridors of the "Pirellone": "Let us hope another boom
does not erupt over the next 3 to 4 years." In sum, faced by an eventual indus-
trial "recovery," we would be unable to cope with it.
Virtually "everyon~" was present in the Regional Council Hall, in the Piazza Duca
d'Aosta skyscraper, yesterday morning, to apply the first bit of patchwork--
5 years late--to the Lombard deficit. The solemn tone that marked the occasion
even pushed into the background the polemic between the politiEally minded admin-
istration officials (who throughout the.~ears have sacrificed our energy problems
to equilibristic formulas) and the engineers (who throughout the same years have
been content to play the role of "voices crying in the wilderness"). Sealing the new
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- ~ - - - - ~a~o or
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~
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7 /
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.---1~jA EMONA ~~cAR ~
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(1) CENTRALE A CARBONE W uNA D~LtE DuE zGP~i INDICA'~'E
- Above map by Dario Mellone shaws the location of the future
coal-fired electric power plant at Bastida Pancarana and
the two locations being discussed for the nuclear one in
the Mantova Region: Viadana and Sai~ Benedetto Po.
Key:
1. Coal-fired plant.
2. Depuration plant.
3. `Phe nuclear plant will be built in one of these two
zones. ~
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course, Francesco Corbellini, president of ENEL (flanked by Directors Bitetto,
Faletti and Lizzeri and by General Manager iN4retti) said: "Wlaat we are doing here
is betting on direct dealings with the Region and the local Aqencies, but we feel
- certain of winning our bet."
It is a creditw~orthj opening to which the Reqion neQd respond in one way only, but
an essential way: by maintaining its undertakings as to agreed deadlines. Because,
since yesterday morning, it is all now in black and white: The statements of
intent and the "programs" have actually been transcribed into a"protovol." And
to this document, which will lead to a full ar.d genuine "agreement" as well as a
"Lombard energy plan," were a��ixed yesterday morning the signatures of Giuseppe
Guzzetti (for the Regional Administration) and of Francesao Corbellini (for ENEL).
in the presence of the journalists, the president of the Regional Administration
undertook (with him were also Regional Vice President Lodigiani, Speaker of the
Assembly Marvelii, and Councillor Semenza) to give ENEL the go-ahead by ~he end of
July for the construction o� the coal-fired plant at Bastida Pancarana, in the
province of Pavia. Engineer Corbellini, who in addition to being an engineer is
also a person who has learned to deal with politicians, gave a poir~ted reply to
one who asked him when the new plant would be going into operation: "It will take
between 5 and 6 y~ars: obviously, from the moment we actually receive the OK."
The scenario for the other plant--the nuclear one on the Po--is not unlike the one
for the coal-fired one. Objectively, however, the situatian in this case is
different: Here it will not be enough to provide for depollution and elimination
of waste, as at Bastida, to satisfy the population; the nuclear plant poses more
complex problems of satety and more difticult relations with the citizenry. The
evocative power of the term "nuclear" penetrates the boundaries of the deepest
emotive layers, to the limits of irrationality. It is a taboo that will take
years of of "informative campaigning" to dispel. Putting it to an odd new test,
Guzzetti guaranteed that by the end of this year the Region and local Agencies
will give a definitive answer as to their choice between the two locations cur-
rently being discussed. And Corbellini, with his usual pruder~ce, added that
within 9 to 10 years from that moment the plant will be put into operation. But
the fact that the two potential nuclear locations being discussed "of~icially" are
Viadana and San Benedetto Po was not brought out.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
9399
CSO: 3104/297
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ECONOMIC UNTTED KINGDOM
HEATH OUTLINES TASKS OF UK-JAl'ANESE COOPERATION
LD161129 London THE 'TIMES in English 16 .~un 81 p 12
[Article by Edward Heati~: "'i'he Message We Mtist C;ive Air Suzuki" ~
['fext] 'fhc: visit Co London of the Japanese prime minister, rlr G~nlco Suzulci,
which beg:ins to:iay, t~a:.; received far less attention than last week's state visit
_ nf hing Khal.id of Saud.i Arabia. Unfortunately, ~he increasing cunl'ribution which
C:)C7~)E'.ration between Lurope and .Tapan can make towards the maintenance of the
w~~rlclwic(e interesrs bol-h have in eommon is often ign~red in Lhe (~~�e~i~y of bilater~~l
~rncl~ clispu~es which have come to dominate the relationship. '1'his i.;; L-o be
re~;retted for several reasons.
I~i.rSt, iL bilateral trade issues remain the centrepiece of the relat:i.onship, it
wil.l bc~come so demoralizin~ Eor. both sides that the prospects for constructive
parlnership will be progressively eroded. ~
Second, much could be done to correct Japan's lopsided trade balance with Europe
if ~~r.eater emphasis were placed on other, more promising, aspects of their economic
re.l:ltionsliip, notably direct investment by ,Japan in ~urope. This would help
to reconcile .Tapan's understandable desire to preserve a reasonable share of the
Gur.opean market with our need to increase employment, boost exports and keep
~_tbreast of the newest techniques of management, production and marketing.
- (:xperience has shown i~ow successful Japanese direct investment in the United
Kingdom can be. For example, the television factory set up by Sony at Bridgend
.in ~dales now produces one quarter of all British television exports. In addition,
it supplies to the United Kingdom market almost half as many television sets as
we import directly from .Tapan, a fact which ensures for this country a considerable
number oF jobs and saves it a great deal of foreign exchange.
'Phat this is a logical way ::o deal ti~ith ma~or trade imbalances has already been
demonstrated by the Americans back in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, it was only
~ by massive United States investment in European subsidiaries--whose sales in 1968
totalled nearly four times the value of direct American exports of manufacturers
to the EEC--that the growth of an unmanageable trade gap between the United
States and the EEC was avoided.
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Thirdly, the failure to develop other areas of the Japanese-European relationship,
apart from bilateral trade, is wasting opportunities for cooperation which could
be of major importance to the political, econamic, and strategic interests of both
sides.
At the broadest level, a deeper partnership between Japan and Europe could take
much of the strain off their respective relationships with the United States.
If successful it wouZd both increase their confidence and status vis-a-vis
Washington and take some of the spotlight off their continuing dependence on its
security guarantees.
Specifically, there are four main areas in which we need to seek closer cooperation
with Japan: in the development of advanced technology; in the management of world
monetary affairs; in diplomacy; and in the sphere of military strategy.
Cooperation in the development of advanced technology is particularly important
. where the United States is overwhelmingly dominant in the world market. Aerospace,
computers and the creation of new ana more efficient methods of generating energy
are three areas where a vast amount of money, skill and time could be saved if
only Europe and Japan would work together as partners rather than face each other
as competitors.
Such cooperation would also demonstrate to public opinion the practical benefits
of this partnership, just as the successful Airbus project has done inside the
European community.
The management of the international mone*_ary dystem~ increasingly ~2quires close
cooperation between Japan and Europe, which are together responsible for over
40 percent of world trade. Although cooperation between central bankers is already
well advanced, this cannot be said for governments. It must be a prime task for
them to coordinate the policies of the European monetary system with those of
Japan and her South-East Asian partners. The joint management of the world's
monetary arrangements by the majcr economic regions--Europe, the Far East and the
U.S.--has become essential to the stability of the international currencies, which
our investors and industrial managers so badYy need.
_ Diplomatically, there is a great deal that Japan and Europe can do to help each
other reduce the conspicuousness of their economic and political involvement in
sensitive developing countries. For example, greater European cooperation with
Japanese economic enterprise in Indonesia, Malaysia and other members of the
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), could help to reduce the visibility
of the Japanese presence in these countries, and thereby enhance its acceptability
in the eyes of local public opinion.
In the long term, this would be economically beneficial to both Europe and Japan;
and it would help to cement their political ties with the ASEAN countries, none
of which wants to be conspicuously identified with just one in particular of the
advanced industrialized nations.
In the sphere of defence, it is becoming ever more important for Japan and Europe
quietly to coordinate their views in the fields of military strategy and arms
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control within their own regions. Although they do not have any farmal responsi-
bility for each other's defence, the security of the Pacific and European theatres
is increasingly linked; and the possible need for the United States to shift
military equipment between Europe and the Far Eaet in the event of a conflict
in one of these regions makes it essential for Japan and Europe to agree on when
and how this would need to be done. Any absence of agreement in the event of a
crisis could profoundly endanger the long-term cohesion and security of the West
- as a whole.
However, it will not pay to put pressure on Japan substantially to increase her
defence expenditure or to expand her military effort beyond her im~ediate perimeter.
There is a deeply-rooted consensus against such policies across almost the entire
political spectriun in Japan. To ignore it will bring only irritation to Japanese
leaders and frustration to the Europeans.
It would make far more sense for us to press Japan to assume a more audacious
diplomatic and economic role in the world, and particularly in South East Asia.
Japan's discreet efforts to maintain communication between Peking and Hanoi at
the time of China's "punishment" of Vietnam in 1979 showed how important she could
be in helping to arrest a military conflict which was in danger of serious
escalation.
For all their rhetoric about the interests and values, which they share, the
leaders of Japan and Europe have so far done little to develop these avenues for
constructive partnership. One reason for this is that they tend to see their
respective relationships with the United States as an adequate basis on which to
construct their foreign policies. New attitudes will not be easy to forge.
It would be a tragedy if they were only to follow upon a series of rude shocks
to our expectations of America's ability and willingness to uphnld our interests;
or if they have to await a major crisis in the Japanese-European relationship,
due to unbearable frictions in bilateral trade. They will certainly require many
more high-level contacts, such as today's visit of the Japanese prime minister;
_ for a growing network of coffinunications at all levels is vital to the development
of ar~ effective political partnership between Europe and Japan.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1981
CSO: 3120/61
~
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POLITICAL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
BRIEF LIFE SPAN SEEN FOR ITALY-N;ALTA NEUTRALITY ACCORD
Milan IL SOLE 24-ORE in Italiar. 23 May 81 p 15
~Article by Luciano Corsini~
~Text~ Ita1y has made known the document that guarantees Malta's neutrality.
Prime i~iinister Mintoff seems satisfied. But what the Maltese majority actually
thinks has not yet been revealecl. Two things are known however: First, the atti-
tude of the Nationalist Party, that is, the opposition, toward l.?ic ai:cord is one
of strong reservations, if no'c of outright hostility, and secondly, because of
this, it may be taken as a certainty that a big question mark remains in the
middle of the Mediterranean.
"Mintoff," the nationalists warn, "is chaotically confusing the juridical meaning
of the neutrality decision that has been agreed with Italy with the political ~
meaning of 'nonalignment�.' The first of these seriously compromises Maltese
sovereignty."
In all of his statements, the prime minister constantly reiterates that he has now
guaranteed Malta against attacks from either of the two major military blocs, when
the fact is that the neutrality decision has a purel:y continqent function: The
minority party's adversaries stigmatize it as "a defense against improbable Libyan
attacks."
- Why improbable attacks, when what we are witnessing on the part o� Tripoli is an
expansionist aim that renders Qadhafi a real. and true imperia3ist? Is it possible
that the Rais can be considered hars~less by none other than Fenech Adami himself,
and his followers, who for decades have courted Western civilization, sharing in
its concerns and decisions?
Recent history is too well known to warrant going back over it again, as is also
the friendship with Qadhafi's Libya which Mintoff elevated to the status of
brotherliness--a choice that Mintoff had to clamorously repudiate in search of
a safe shelter in the arms of the Western powers. A oontroversy over oil (which
also involved the ENI ~National Hydrocarbons Agency~) even evoked thoughts of the
imminence of planned aggressions in the archipelago by the bellicose North ~lfrican
- country. Actually nothing of the kind occurred, thanks largely to Italian
diplomacy.
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The waltz step dan~ed by Mintoff in Maltese foreign policy seemed destined to
totally efface his domestic adversaties. The latter, however, far from letting
themselves be eliminated frnm play, imanediately occupiec] the positions that had
been abandoned by the "qovernment forces." Weaving a tight web of initiatives to
which certain Western foreign offices cannot have been strangers, the Nationalist
Party becam~ Qadhati's true Maltese interlocutor.
The trip made in April by Fenech~_Adami, accompanied by his second in command,
Guido De t~arco, and by the entire top leadership of the Nationalist Party, of
which Adami is the undisputed leader, to Tripoli for meetings th~re at the summit
level, passed completely unnoticed. Plans were actually~ laid there for the near
future. In fact, 1982 could see the nationalists back in power in Malta, it being
not too improbavle that they will emerge the winners in the elections to be held
before the end of this year.
The Maltese people have trouble understanding riintoff's sudden about face, coming
as it 6id on the heels of the incessant pro-Arabic pounding to which they had been
- subjected for almost a decade. But this is by no means the dominant aspect of the
. Labor Party's policy. There is something far more determinant to consider, and
it has to do with the internal situation and with the cultural ambit of the archi-
pelago. It involves certain political and social decisi~ns that have character-
ized the Mintoff decacle.
We refer in particular to the educational policy, which is the principal bone of
contention between the government and the Church. And the significance of the
Church in Malta is attested by the fact th;~t one out of every 300 inhabitants born
there becomes a priest, a reservoir, in sum, capable of supplying to some extent
_ the shortage of vocations in our own country.
Many in Malta maintain that Mintoff was able to win the last two electoral rounds
_ thanks to the neutrality of the Church, cahich was at that time headed by Monsignor
Gonzi (the primate is now Archbishop Joseph Percieca). In exchange, however, he
was compelled t~ declare the Church's assets untouchable. With the enactment of
the law that institutes the gratuitousness of any and all scholastic orders,
public oz private, the hardest hit sector is undoubtedly that connected with the
Curia, which reacted spiritedly, and it seems to us impossible that it will want
to maintain its political.neutrality. To this must be added the fact that the
Church's interests were also hit by bringing the entire health care system under
public manaqement.
As things stand now, Mintoff can cast into the pan on his side of the balance
some undeniable ec~nomic successes, improvements in social well-being, the resump-
tion of oil exploration by AGIP ~National Italian Oil Company~, and his having
lifted his country--which although tiny is highly important internationally--out
of the colonial lurch. He will perhaps not be able to.make much political capital ,
out his having 3.inked it up again substantively with the West, the traditional
strongpoint of his adversaries.
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It is difficult to predict at this early date who will be the future P4altese.
interlocutor for the impl.ementation of the bilateral accord with Italy, because
the nationalists will in all probability cast into the pan on their side o� the
balance their active alignment ~ith the Church and a pro-Westetn credibility,
strengthened by their accusatian that Mintaf� has eold out Malta's national
independence tk~,rough the terms and conditions o~ ~he ac~ord just signed with our
country. In addition, they will be~ab~e to capitalize on the rest~lts of their
above-cited mission to Tripoli.
In this regard and to dispel.any lingering doubts, some of the.Nationalist Party's
top leaders are affirming (in place of "old" Mintoff) t~iat "Qadhafi is a highly
respectable statesman and that many people misjudge him because tl:~y find him
unlikable." And this may even gain for them~the blessing of the Italian "Arabic
Par~ty." We have no doubt that if the Nationalist Party were to win the election
it would be tempted to impugn what the present government has signed. We will
know in a few months.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editrice 11 Sole-24 Ore s.r.l.
9399
CSO: 3104/293
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. ~
POLITICAL
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
, SPD'S GLOTZ ON LOSS IN BERLIN, LE,ADERSHIP PROBLEMS
Hamburg DER STERN in German 'll May 81 pp 200, 202
- /Interview with SPD Led..~~~,;1 ~:~ecutive secretary ;?eter Glotz by S'fi~:Rfi editors Woliram
, Bortfeldt, Werner Heilemani~ and Peter Pragal: "1Je Have Committecl rli.stakes"/
/SPD federal executive secretary Peter Glotz explains why his
= party has plunged in the opinion polls, and why it is losing
followers, especially in large cities and among young ci.tizens.
/Question./ If Bundestag elections were to be held now, the SPD would drop to 33 per-
cent of the vote. The government is receiving poor.grades. Is Helmut Schmidt respon-
sibie for this precipitous dec line?
/Answer/ He is not. A neoconservative wave is flooding many countries of the
Western World. Mitterand is the first symptom of a countermovement. Office holders
are being swept out all over the place; remember Carter. It is currently very dif-
ficult indeed to get the public to appreciate the compelling necessities to which
government is sub,jected.
/Question/ Surely that is the fault of the office holders. After all, the voters
have not gotten more stupid.
/Answer/ Ttao factors make current politics immensely difficult. One is the inter-
national economic situation which does not exactly arous2 enthusiasm. The other is
foreign policy which is overshadowed by fear of crises. Many SPD followers are ir-
ritated by the delaying tactics of the new American Administration, in particular
with regard to disarmament.
/Question/ Still, none of that explains thz drarnatic loss of public support.
/Answer/ At a meeting in the course of the Berlin election campaign I spoke about
Berlin in the year 2001. After 10 minutes the audience ceased to listen. They
were interested only in the preservation of peace. The SPD was much too late in
turning its attention to the discussion of peace and the overwhelming fears af many
people.
/Qiiestion/ By now thousands of Social Democrats have signed communist inspired dis-
armament appeals. Do you intend to institute expulsion procedures against all of
them?
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/Answ~r/ Of course not. The SPD wiil have to become more.actively involved in this
peace movement and thereby free Social Democrats from the presumed necessity of
aigning DKP instigated appeals. We muat demonstrate--in historical and topical
terms--that the SPD is itself an effective movement for peace. Here the party lea-
dership has been at fault up to now.
/Question/ Do you really believe by these means to regain the adherence to the SPD
of the disaffected young?
/Answer/ Discussion acust be out in the open. We will not quickly persuade anybody
that the NATO double resolution was right. That is something we will have to live
with. On the other hand security canaot be achieved merely by throwing away all
weapons. The prevention of war can be advanced only by complex steps and in cooper-
ation with major organizations, such as the trade unions and the SPD.
/Question/ Are you telling us that the SPD gains credibility by expelling from the
party such critics of the double resolution as Bundestag deputy Hansen?
/Answer/ Nobody should be expelled from the party for opposing the double resolu-
- tion. However, Hansen conducted the debate with his comrades in such a manner that
he obviously no longer considered himself one of them.
/Question/ Is not the party so much preoccupied with its internal situation and so
much at odds about issues that the majority of citizens feel them no longer elect-
ib le?
/Answer/ We have been too little concerned with the anxieties of the citizens, as
for example in Berlin. Also, on behalf of the federal SPD, I must say that a year
without election campaigns, without actual political compulsions, tends to get us
into trouble. That happened in 1973, and it is happening again in 1981. Obviously
a party such as the SPD is poorly equipped to wait.
/Question/ Surely the SPD is in a cleft stick. On the one hand its young and criti-
~ cal voters are drifting away. On the other it scares off the middle class voters
without whom it cannot maintain its ability to govern.
/Answer/ You are quite right. In Berlin people ran off not in one but in two direc-
tions. Once we are in the hole it is no longer possible by sudden and momentary
affects to gain a few percentage points from the one or the other side. The only re-
course them is to carry on the policies judged to be correct, champion them credibly
and try to remove the causes of the problems.
/Question/ What exactly does that mean for Berlin, for example?
/Answer/ Many problems in Berlin are caused by the rotting of various residential
blocks, by an ill-considered aliens policy or the insensitive exercise of power by
many senior comrades. At the same time it is surely wrong to believe that voter
loyalty can be gained by opportunist behavior--for instance by flaunting nightsticks.
/Question/ What is your prescription for dealing with Green and Alternative voters?
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/Answer/ At this time more than 30 percent of.those in the 18--23 age groups are
opting for the Greens federation-wide. The background to this phenomenon is built-
up anger about the lack of credibility of established politicians. As the CDU has
failed to provide a proper opposition, many young people are opting for an alterna-
tive culture. We will have to demonstrate at a few points first of all that we
listen and secondly that we are prepared to change some things, in other words that
politics do in fact caork, and that the dialogue does lead to definite happenings.
/Question/ Still, that will work only when party and Federal Government pull togeth-
er.
/Answer/ Of course. However, the party is bound always to be a few paces ahead of
a cnalition government. On the other hand these paces ahead shu~~ld amount to
15 rather than 1,000, because in the latter case it begins to 3uvk as if they were
not in the same camp at i11..
/Question/ Once upon a time the SPD strongholds were in the large cities. Now it
tends to lose them precisely there. Did the party commit so many mistakes in the
- cities?
/Answer/ I cannot dispute that we are guilty of some omissioris. ii.l, you mu::t
take into consideration the burdens the SPD had to shoulder. Let ~i~; consi.der the
issue of aliens. Obviously they do not move to the elegant districl.s where CDU cure
voters reside; they move to working class districts where housing is cheapest. What
happens then? The stronger social strata, including skilled workers, flee to the
suburbs. Those who stay are seniors and the socially disadvantaged who, pushed
aside, begin to nurse hatred for the strangers and stop going to the polls. And
that directly affects the SPD potential. We simply have no short term solution.
The so-called integration policies are unfortunately most inadequate. It is there-
fore not just the stupidity of social democracy but also a little the course of Che
class conflict, which more adversely affects the factor work and, therefore, the
SPD.
/Question/ Your party has about 1 million members. However, many local officials
lack the necessary credibility and awareness of immediate problems.
_ /An:~wer/ Admitted. As all other parties we have too many officials who are inte-
rested only in climbing one step at a time, one salary grade at a time, and who
have ceased to represent our real intentions. We do need credible representatives
both of the skilled workers and the new middle class.
/Qucstion/ That is easy to say, but how do you do that in a party which gives the
impression that its functionaries tend mainly to be careerists?
/Answer/ Nonsense! There are hundreds of ~housands involved in the SPD, who are
totally uninterested in political office. To achieve political success we will
have to arouse the enthusiasm of as many of them as possible. This kind of politi-
cal culture, to live together, dispute together and celebrate together, has tended
to be disregarded by social democracy. The old subculture of society became obso-
lete. We failed to put anything new in its place and instead fled into society.
That, certainly, was a big mistake.
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/Question/ A few years ago five federal Laender had a social-liberal coalition.
The only one now left is Hessen. Does not this trend work against the coalition in
Bonn also?
/Answer/ First of all we won absolute majorities in Hamburg and North Rhine-West-
phalia. You cannot expect me to regret that. Secondly the loss of the majority in
Berlin is of course going to present a psychological difficulty for Bonn politics.
On the other hand, at federal level cooperation between the heads of the FDP and
the SPD is good. Admittedly, some developments in the Laender will bear a good
deal of scrutiny.
/Question/ Your double job in Berlin and Bonn was designed to be temporary. Will
you soon resign from the Berlin Land chairmanship?
/Answer/ I will resign but cannot exactly tell you when. I would like to see
Hans-Jochen Vogel occupy my chair. He, though, is in some doubt whether to do that.
I am not certain yet whether it will be possible to persuade him.
COr'~niuiii': 1981 Gruner & Jahr AG & Co
11698
CSO: 3103/328
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POLITICAL ITALY
PCI~S INGRAO CALLS FOR DIALOG WITfi EUROPEAN SOCiALISTS
Milan PANORAMA in Italian 1 Jun 81 pp 76-81
[Interview with Pietro Ingra~~, one of the recent historic PCI l.e:~~lers, by Fabrizio
Coisson, of PANORAMA; date and place not given: "Ingrao WeZcome:> L-he Unorthodox"]
[Text] In this interview Pietro Ingrao, one of the recent historic ].eaders of the
PCI, initiates a dialog with European social democracies--a signi~icant signal
that could be the forerunner of new choices for the Italian Communist Party and a
change in strategy.
Pietro Ingrao and social democracX---an approach that startles those who were
accustomed to facile labels ("Ingrao, you are our Mao" was the slogan of the young
cammunist followers of a few years ago). "And instead it would really be absurd to
speak of a left in Europe while ignoring the social democracies." Convinced on
Che contrary that in this realm the PCI must make up for a great deal of lost
time, Ingrao, as president of the Research Center for State Reform (CIRS), promoted
a series of ineetings on the social democracies, and invited scholars and political
representatives from various countries. The first meeting will be with Sweden, on
Friday, 29 May; then, with Germany, and England.
Ingrao is used to anticipating the choices of the PCI. He was the first, in
November 1980, to express doubts concerning "the prospects of the policy of national
_ solidarity." This was harshly ~iisputed by top level communists; and yet 15 days
later the same PCI top level group gave up that policy in order to launch the line
of a democratic alternative (Ingrao prefers to be cautious concerning this episode.
"From debates in the central committee of the party comes public information.
Everyone can judge for himself. Why ask me for an opinion? In this instance I am
directly concerned in the matter, and therefore a suspect source.") PANORAMA
asked Ingrao, himself, what was behind his work with respect to the social democra-
cies. This conversation took place the day after the triumph of the no's in the
referendum on abortion, and which thus could begin only with a reflection on the
vote.
Question: A vote that has to do only with Italy, or which, according to you, is of
sign3ficance for all of Europe?
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Anawer: There is a m~re immediate, more obvious, and also more partieularly
Italian aspect. The rebelZion of mariy voters, including believers, against A
return of clerical statism and against the arrogance and the lightness with which
the clerical crusaders (and also the radicals) have treated a delicate and difficult
sub~ect. It is strong proof of a camman lay sense that is apreading, that goes
beyond the boundaries of our country. The confirmation that there has been a
change in the attitude of women on basic questions of everyday living. That is,
half of the human race is beginning to think of its existeace in a drastically
different manner; and it is beginning to involne the male world in this change.
Question: Aow?
Answer: Specifically, an age-o1d notian of the relationship between sexuality and
procreation is waning; a more camplex viewpoint of motherhood and fatherhood is
being put forward. To put it plainlq: the meaning, and what it involves, of havi.ng
children is changing--and what children are, what this word means, the problems it
involves. These questions go beyond party and class boundaries. Changes have
taken place. Whether one likes it or not, 1968, to use a symbol, is not a dead dog.
The serious error of the ecclesiastic hierarchy...
Question: Might one say the error of Pope Wo~tylg?
Answer: I do not know. One would have to know how the atfair went. I was saying:
the serious eTror ~f the ecclesiastic hierarchy is to have believed that these
changes did not exist or that they were an ephemeral gust of wind. Pope Roncalli
reasoned otherwise; if I am not mistaken, he appealed to the ecclesiastic co~nunity
to pace itself precisely according to these kinds of changes.
Question: In short, has the change in customs, already manifested by the referendiun
on divorce, been extended?
Answer: Instead, I would point out the difference. Tn the case of d3vorce, one
could also speak of an adaptation on the part of Italy to customs already prevalent
in the West. In the case of abortion, on the other hand, it is a question of an
unresolved and controversial sub~ect Chroughout the world, having to do specifically
with the relationship between sex and procreation. Entire continents and age-old
labels have been summoned to reckon with these things. That is why it seems to me
that the Italian vote said so~mething that goes beyand our boundaries.
Question: The referendwn in Italy, the victory of Mitterrand in France: bringing
all of this to the immediate political level, does it mean that the rightist wind
that had led to the defeat of the Labourites in Great Britain and of the social
democrats in Sweden no longer blows over Europe?
A~swer: I say that the crisis that we are experiencing cannot be solved by taking
- old formulas out of the closet. The right is also experiencing it. Mrs Thatcher
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tried it; it se~ed that it should have been an easp victory; instead she is
beginning to be defeated. Even the more subtle and refined ~iscard did not last.
As for the new American leadership, we shall see. We are only at the beginning.
In short, there is a struggle. And the labor movement aad the people are not only
resisting in this struggle, t+ut are also succeeding in advancing. Look at
_ Mitterrand. I insist on an opinion of mine: no ~or~ce can remain sti11; everyt~ing
is in motion. Therefore the most mistaken thing is to think of living on a revenue
from what already exists.
Question: If the rightist wave in Europe did not succeed in being predominant, it
is also true that the left does not have a formula...
Answer: The European left today is a polymorphous body, marked by conflicts, but
also by approximations on points which in the past caused historic ruptures. It
has paid for delays and inadequacies. But there is little use in complaining.
What counts is how one starts again in the struggle, through comwon analysis,
defending ourselves on certain ~rounsis.and.in~.kiating_a couRt~r9ffenS.~.v~_aga~nst ~thers,
always looking beyond the boundaries of every single country. I say these things
also to explain the meaning of our attempt 1to compare the various components of
the left in Europe. One must start precisely from the ascertainment of the
pluralism of the ideas of the left, from the fact that there is not just one model,
that laborism is different from German socia7, democracy that ~his is different from
Mitterrand's socialist party. Animated discussions are taking place in connection
with all of these experiences. We com~unists have long recognized the importance
of pluralism in the Italian left. Why should we deny it in Europe?
Question: In reality up to now the PCI had re3ected the validity of the social-
democratic experience, accusing it in substance of not having succeeded in over--
coming capitalism.
Answer: This is not an accusation; it is an ascertainment. And it is interesting
that it is precisely on these structuzal choices of a system that the debate among
the socialist and social democratic parties has been reopened. It would be strange
- if we communists in particular, in the face of such a deep crisis, should now~;.
attenuate the critfcism of the capitalistic society.
Question: You cannot deny, however, that for a long time the mere word "social-
democracy" was like blasphemq...
Answer: It is true that in the international communisC movement there has been a
great sectarian error in the appraisal and even in the knowledge of the experiences
realized by social democratie govermnents in certain Western countries. We Italian
communists have resisted this sectariaaism, and we have often been reproached for
this by the international co~unist movement. But there has also been a serious
delay on our part with repect to the study of the significance and of the results
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af that "compromise" between the labor movement and capitalism that has brought
gbout considerable social conquests and alao redistributions of power in a series
of capitalist countries.
Question: But you now say that tltis "compromise" is in a state of crisis. And
therefore same, like the Craxi socialists, accuse you of once more underestimating
these models.
Answer: I rea.lly hope that those who criticize us will participate fully in our
meetings. But perhaps from the very things that foreign reporters w~~il tell us
will come the proof that these countries and these parties are discussing the end
of that "compromise," and that new paths will be sought. In any case, what counts
is a confrontation of facts.
Question: Another current ob~ection: the history of the communist party is too
different from that of the Europea~ socialist parties.
Qnswer: It would be time to seriously esamine what the PCI has taken from Leninism
and what it has changed in Leninism. I am not thinking only of Gramsci. The
"new party" that Togliatti wanted was already tending to incorporate elements of
the Western socialist tradition; and it suggested a camplete strategy of a union
of democratic and revolutionary forces. And why not emphasize how much we have
learned and assimilated also from certaia currents of trade unionism and of the
- Catholic movement? I am not at a1~-ashamed of this. I say instead that the revolu-
tionary force of the workers party lies in its capacity,to add innovative energies
that are not in its ranks. We must know how to do this even more.
Question: Does it mean that the PCI is rapidly becoming a social democratic party,
like the German SPD?
Answer: We did not copy the Stalinist party model, nor will we copy the German
social democratic party model--for the simple reason Chat neither the one nor the
other corresponds to our strategy for change in the cap3talist society and for the
image of socialism for which we fight. But they, themselves, are discussing their
nature, their choices: therefore why copy this person or that thing when everyone
is searching? So: in the meantime we waat to know and to discuss these problems.
Question: And the USSR? Does it not view so much interest in the social democracies
with a certain amount of suspicion? Another comanunist party, the Spanish one,
experienced, at least for a while, the consequences of the vicCory of the pro-Soviet
wing in the PC congress in Catalonia.~ Do not these kinds of risks exist also for
the PCI?
Answer: First: The USSB as a state and the CPSU [Co~mmaunist Party of the Soviet
Union] as a party have had, and have, very intense relations with socialdemocratie
governments and the leaders of these parties. I do not see why it should be a sin
for us to discuss with scholars like Walter Rorpi or Klaus Offe when the USSR
discusses with Chancellor Schmidt. Second: It should be time to get rid of the
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idea that to discuss and to compare ideas means agreement. The unity of the left
will never be achieved on this basis: beeause if a European monolithic and uniform
lef.t ever did eaist in the past, it certainly ~today is no longer thinkable. Third:
The PCI is a completely~sutonomous party. We determine our line and we do not 2et
it be imposed or suggested by the East or the West, by the North or the South. And
- we are not at all afraid of the political struggle. Is tliat clear?
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Arnoldo Mondadori Editore S.p.a. Milano.
8255
CSO: 3104/294
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POLITICAL ITALY
SURVEY OF PCI OPINION ON GOVERNMENT FORMULAS
Milan ZL MONDO in Italian 1 May 81 pp 17-19
[Article by Paolo Passarini: "Forced Change"] .
[Text] A survey that IL MONDO publisi~es as a preview reveals
that rank and file displeasure forced Berlinguer to abandon
the historical compromise.
The earthquake that leveled Irpinia in Novembe;r 1980 was the opportunity far the
emergence of the communist [party line] shift caf 27 November only 22 days before
a party Central committee meeting when Secretai~y Enrico Berlin~uer had peremp-
torily reaffirmed the line of national unity. What was behind the shift? How
had the body of the PCI reacted on the 30th yea~~ of DC ma~orities? Two young
_ sociologists, Marzio Barbagli and Piergiorgio (:orbetta, have conducted a survey
on behalf of the Carlo Cattaneo Institute of Bcrlogna. It supplies some answers
to these questions. The results of the survey~ which will be published in the
next issue of the magazine IL MULINO, shows clEarly that in the period from
August to October 1980, that is, before the sh9.ft was decreed, the PCI section
' secretaries had anticipated it with a clear sh~.ft in direction.
The Subject
First of all: Who are the section secretaries? The PCI organization, which con-
sists of about 12,000 groups (each with less than 20 members) and actual sections.
There is an equal number of section secretaries, a stratum of traditionally more
orthodox militants drawn from the broad band of inembership (compare the first
. two columns of Tab le 1), even though in general they follow the line less
strictly than the smaller elite group of off icials. The large majority of actual
leaders is found within the latter group. In 1978, Barbagli and Corbetta had
- approached 1,060 section secretaries repr~;enting the entire nation and asked
them a series of questions. Two years later a panel was set up to re-interview
a sample of 250 among those interviewed in the first phase. This provided a
check on the evolution of their opinions. Here are the results.
Which Government?
Formulas like PCI plus PSI [Italian Socialist Party] plus DC [Christian Democra-
tic Party] or a government of national unity seem :o have declined considerably
in popularity (see columns 2 and 3 of Table 1]. In 1978, 99 percent of the
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Table 1. Which Government?
Attitudes and Forecasts Regarding Government Formulas of
Members (1978) and Section Secretaries (1978 and 19p~)
Members Section secretaries
(1978) (1978) (1980)
Government believed "more suitable,
more possible, more achievable"
PCI + PSI + DC 31 20 22
~ Government of national unity 47 79 69
Government of the left 13 8
Government with only PCI 5
Dictatorship of the proletariat 1
No answer 3 _1 1
Total 100 100 100
"Preferred" government
PCI + PSI + DC 12 36 28 "
Government of national unity 10 12 10
Government of the left 31 27 45
Government with only PCI 37 4 2
Dictatorship of the proletariat 8 19 10
No answer 2 2 S
Total 100 100 100
Forecasts on position of PCI in 5 years
In coalition governments with DC 50 72 35
In the opposition 5 7 30
In a government of the left 37 10 17
Governing by itself 2 1
In a clandestine operation
(through a coup) 1
Other 5 5
No answer 5 6 12
Total 100 100 100
secretaries had considered these two formulas to be about equal in terms of a
"most suitable, most possible, most achievable government." This figure fell
to 80 percent, and 8 percent appeared more convinced of the practicality of a
"government of the left" (and it is worth repeating that the shift had not yet
taken place). But the data are much more explicit under the heading "preferred
government": 45 percent of the secretaries favor a government of the left
(against 27 percent in 1978), while the historical compromise formulas further
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lose ground (10 points less). The answer is given under the heading "forecasts
of the PCI position in 5 years" are still more significant: Only 35 percent of
the secretaries see the PCI "in a coalit~.on government with the DC" i.n the near
future, while others see it either in the opposition (30 percent) or in a gov-
ernment of the left (17 percent). The authora of the survey note that the ob-
vious decline of prospects for a government~with the DC is accompanied by slip-
page within the party membership: The number of, those who give no answer
increases as does the spread of hypotheses considered. The historical compro-
mise loses ground, but uncertainty increases.
Concerning the historical compromise strategy, it is interesting to note that
PCI militants with a Catholic background (that is those who became communist
"by conversion," as Barbagli and Corbetta say) were much more favorable in 1978
than were the "traditional" communists. The decline of the historical compromise
acquires greater importance considering that the former show an increase compared
with the latter (it is sufficient ta reflect that compared with the 1950's, the
percentage of secretaries with FGCI [?Italian Communist Youth Federation] exper--
ience has dropped from 60 to 30 percent), the decline of the historical compro-
~ mise seems still more important. At the same time, the authors of the survey had
noted since 1978 a"cumulative effect" bet~aeen the two data: that from the
Catholic source and that from areas governed by councils with PCI participation
(see Table 2): If the communists with a Catholic background are by tendency more
inclined than the others toward unity in regard to the DC, the communists who are
used to being in the ma~ority in the places where they live are in general more
inclined toward unity than the others. The conclusion can be drawn that it is
precisely in these two bands (in addition to that of functionaries) that it is
necessary to look for the militants most disoriented by the 27 November 1980
shift.
_ Table 2. Yes or No to Compromise
Percentage of Section Secretaries Opposing, or Partially Against, (in 1978) the
Histor_ical Compromise, According to Area, Kind of Community Council at Place of
Residence, and According to Whether, as Youths, They Attended.Parish Church
North Center South Italy
[figures in percent]
Leftist council in community of residence
--Went to church 26 36 30 33
--Did not go to church 37 34 32 35
PCI in opposition in community of residence
--Went to church 45 59 39 43
--Did not go to church 65 43 43 52
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Friends and Enemies
In 1978 the PCI section~secretaries considered that the party "closest to them"
was the PDUP [Proletarian Unity Party] (37 percen*.) along with the PSI (26 per-
cent). Esteem for the PUi3P among PCI members almost doubled 2 years later,
jumping to 69 percent, while the PSI dropped rathe~ sha~~ly_ to 15 percent (see
Table 3). In a limited way, it is curious to see the unpleasant drop i.n papu- -
larity of the PRI [Italian Republican Party] the classical hinge-party of nation-
al unity (from 4 percent to 1 percent). The DC, which in 1978 was considered the
`'most distant" pzrty by 26 percent of those interviewed (Lotta Continua [Contin-
uing Struggle] and radicals together totaled 31 percent), in 1980 no longer has
any rival under the heading of unpopularity and 54 percent of the secretaries
consider it the most distant party (Lotta Continua and radicals maintain a con-
siderable 32 percent of dislike). The number of those interviewed who gave no
replies dropped sharpl~ from 1970 to 1980. Perhaps this was a sign that the
choice of friends and enemies became much sharner.
Table 3. Friends and Enemies
Party Considered Closest and Party Considered Furthest Away
(Among Those Shown) From Section Secretaries in 1978 and 1980
Party closest Party furthest away
1978 1980 1978 1980
Proletarian Democracy 2 3 2 2
Lotta Continua 19 32
Radicals 12
_ PDUP 37 69
PSI 26 15
PRI 4 1 1
~~r~
DC 1 26 54
PSDI 6 6
No answer ~ 31 11 34 6
Totals 100 100 100 100
There are other data that refer to the DC and, more in general, to the strategy
of the historical compromise. In a round table published in RINASCITA in
January 1975 (and later on other occasions), Pietro Ingrao maintained that the
historical compromise would have caused "real ruptures" within the DC. The PCI
leaders in general considered this a heterodox approach. The section secretaries
were asked to give an opinion on this point, too: 39 percent said they "completely
agreed" with Ingrao's approach (22 percent in 1978) and 43 percent "merely agreed"
- (44 percent in 1978). The dream of drawing out the "popular soul" of the DC or
that of "changing its nature" has almost entirely vanished. Eight section secre-
taries in 1.0 have given it up.
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. .
_ _ .
An End to Sacrifice
In a famous interview in LA REPUBBLICA in 1978, Luciano Lama eaid: "Wage policy
_ in coming years must be very carefully controlled, the improvements that can be
demanded must be spread out over 3 years in collective contracts, the entire
mechanism of the supplementary aid fund must be reviewed from top to bottom."
And Giorgio Napolitano, invited party militants at the seventh PCI workers' con-
ference, to "limit wage demands and increases." The line of austerity was at
its peak of popularity and, overall, in 1978 the PCI rank and file accepted this
position as is testif ied by the Barbagli and Corbetta survey (even though in the
south the policy of wage limits met some opposition). Only 2 years later however
the situation was reversed. To the question: "Do you believe that in the coming
contract negotiations the workers should limit their de:nands for wage increases?"
Sixty-six percent of the section secretaries responded with a flat "no" in 1980
(14 percent in 1978). Replies favoring restrictions dropped from 35 percent to
9 percent.
Party Machine Running Roughly
At the beginning of the 1970's, the PCI machine speeded up prodigiously: Member-
ship increased, meetings and projects were more frequent, participation increased.
The year 1976 represented the "point of ma~or change." From that year there was a
slow decline but, for the 2 years of the Barbagli and Corbetta survey, there was a
further weakening of participation within the PCI. The average number of hours
dedicated to the party by section secretar3es dropped by about 10 percent (from a
weekly average of 12.9 to 11.7 hours). Some work committees (particularly school
and women committees) are deteriorating. The executive committees, above all the
most active, make their meetings less frequent. But above all the section secre-
taries who report political fatigue complain that they are between the hauQner (the
leaders) and a hard place (the rank and file). Berlinguer was the first creator
o� the historical compromise and later the superman of the party line change. He
unquestionably had this situation in mind last November. And even if the party
- line change had been a sudden su~nit decision, it seems to have been a response
- to a widespread party demand. To the point that Barbagli and Corbetta conclude:
"Used for a long time to feeling the rank and file pulse, to scrutinizing and
analyzing through investigations the consensus of the membership and the degree
of militant commitment, tt-?e communist leaders have always had a fairly precise
picture of what happened and what was happening on various party levels. And if
it decided to change its political line it is also because it saw this picture
clear].y, because it knew that it could not continue for ].on; periodically, and
always more wearily, to repeat the validity of the old line, to stretch things
oue further, without in a short time losing that heriLage of experience and
energies that it had accum~ilated s~ well in the 1970's.
CUF'YRIGl1'C: IL MONDO 1981
h0;3/~
~:~r~ : 3:104 / 27'L
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POLITICAL ITALY
REVIEW OF CRAXI-BERLINGUER CONFLICTS
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 8 Piay 81 pp 12-14
[Article by Paolo Passarin~: "Two Different Men"]
[Text] Craxi is an empiricist and ridicules those who
cry about the emergency; Berlinguer is an ideologist and
_ believes in the values of austerity. Before the PSI
Congress the two had not spoken for 2 years. Yet, at
Palermo...
The last time they spoke was on 20 September 1979 at a meeting between the
communist and socialist summits but that meeting did not dissipate recipro-
cal distrust. Then, for many months, their paths cros~ed at a distance in
Montecitorio [Parliament] or at state funerals. And even on Thursday
23 April, following the conclusion of his salute to the Palermo Socialist
Congress, PCI Secretary Enrico Berlinguer, perhaps surprised by the unexpected
leading from the platform. Bettino Craxi had to chase him and call him in
order to shake his hand.
- Then, while the PCI secretary took his place between Achille Occhetto and
Armando Cossutta in the section reserved for delegations, the metal roof of
the Mediterranean Fair vibrated with the whistling [denoting disapproval] that
accompanied the appe~rance of DC Secretary Flaminio Piccoli. And while Piccoli
shuffled along, Craxi's men commented: "Well, this Berlinguer is capable."
And Berlinguer was saying to Occhetto: "Well, these socialists are all right."
The next day, Assistant Editor Claudio Petruccioli wrote in L'UNITA, "We want
to say without wasting words...the meeting at Palermo was the congress of a
party of the Italian Left that wants to be an essential part of the t~adition
and reality of the Left."
And thus, "Without wasting words," Petruccioli, with the approval of Berlin-
guer who was seated near him at the Palermo Congress, had nullified the main
prejudice of the communists regarding the "new PSI." In fact, during the de-�
Uate in the Chamber on the confidence vote regarding the Forlani government,
it was Berlinguer himself who described Craxi's policy as "a variant of the
Christian Democratic power system."
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What does all this mean? That the two main parties of the Italian Left have
decided to erase a near and distant past of rivalry, conflict and polemics to
,join again on the single road of the workers movement tradition? That what
Giacomo Mancini has described as the "curse" that afflicts relations between
the PCI anc ~'SI has finally been lifted? Or that, at least, a cure capable of
containing it has been found?
Judging by facts, an affirmative reply to these que~tions seems premature at
the least. The curse showed some signs of its devastating action even at
Palermo. This was seen when Claudio Martelli spoke. He started out by advising
- the communists to take a conservative road (a socialist presidency within a few
months as a step toward the later participation of the PCI in the government),
had the reverse effect of irritating Berlinguer and his camrades beyond measure.
So much so that San Tullio Vecchietti, a member of the communist dalegation,
commented, "Martelli's speech made me young again. Have we gone back to the
years of the church of silence?"
Another manifestation of the curve was seen at the end of the congress. After
having listened to Craxi's conclusions, Occhetto, who is considered one of t!ie
communists most open toward the PSI, said rather brutally in a Palermo square
that "there are things in Craxi's report that we would not accept as a basis for
a government even with a communist president." There was a harsh renly by Rino
Formica and a new incident.
One thing remains to be noted: "During the week of the Palermo Congress, the
diagram of conflict between socialists and communists showed the high and low
points of someone suffering from sinusitis, while until a week ago this could
be described as an arrow rising in a straight 1ine," according to a delegate
to the congress. In short, better the highs and lows than an unstoppable ten-
dency toward conflict. And the fact that Berlinguer and Craxi met directly at
Palermo certainly favored this change in trend.
It has been known for some time that relations between the two leaders of the
Italian Left were not the best. Craxi never made a mystery to his collabora-
tors that he considered the presence of a man like Berlinguer at the head of the
PCI a great obstacle to the resumption of a relationship of unity between the
two parties. And if Craxi read in L'UNITA (he himself recalled this in the con-
clusions of the Palermo Congress) the accusation of "marinettismo," [could be
"marionettismo," like a marionette; or being like G.B.Marino, a 16th century
writer noted for his somewhat euphemistic literary style], someone certainly told
him that members of Berlinguer's staff attributed the characteristics of Musso-
lini to him ~and Craxi recalled this, too, in his conclusions).
Craxi is an empirical politician who hinges his policies on a few clear points
to which he remains loyal (independence from the PCI, competition with the DC
[Christian Democratic Party], making the PSI the most important party of the
Left, opposition to any rebirth of bi-polarism). However, he reserves for him-
self great freedom of movement on the tactical plane so that he is accused of
being too even-handed. Berlinguer prefers organized conceptional constructs,
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always justifies tactical moves by complex strategic references and he therefore
moves more slowly; every time the PCI came to grips with the DC, the historical
compromise was put into discussion ~r redefined. In fact, in the years of
national solidarity, the ruptures of 1978 and 1979 were explained by emphasizing
the aspect of conflict with the DC that the formula of historical compromise con-
tained. However, in order to ~ustify the abstention from the single-party
government of Giulio Andreotti in 1976, the accent was put on contact with the
DC as the fundamental premise of the historical compromise. Finally, the defini-
tive passage of the PCI to the opposition in ~979 ripened a new strategy, the
democratic alternative, which from time to time is cqnsidered either a new stra-
tegy or a tactical variant of historical compromise. In reference to Craxi, Ber-
linguer feels a little bit like the Invincible Armada faced by the English brigan-
tines.
- Craxi manifests optimism regarding the Italian economic-social situation, he
ridicules those who "cry over the emergency," he lets it be und~rstood that he
believes that well-being cuiricides with an increase in private ~~onsumption in
addition to the orderly administration of institutions. Berl.iiiguer fears that
Italy could from one minute to the next plunge into the abyss, warns against
"barbarism" always lying in wait, believes that the supreme ideal of humanity
is identified with an austere and frugal life. Craxi sPeaks of the freedom of
men who reason with "their own heads." Berlinguer prefers to :~pe~k of peace an3
democratic participation. Craxi preferably becomes i~nersed in his historical.
references to the years of the unified state and of the Risorgimento. Berlinguer
almost always, instead, refers to the horrors of fascism and the redemption pro-
vided by the resistance. Craxi likes Giuseppe Garibaldi who, with some occasional
inconsistency, was a terrible enemy of the priests; Berlinguer always quotes
Palmiro Togliatti and his Bergamo speech on "the destinies of man." That speech
was the basis for the PCI opening to the Catholics, in addition to being a warning
to seek peace in the face of the growing threat of an atomic war. Craxi is fun-
damentally extrovert and cammunicates the feeling of rage controlled with diffi-
culty. Berlinguer is reserved, patient and tormented. Craxi cultivates numer-
ous public relations. Berlinguer sees only party friends and comrades. Craxi
- often indulges in personalities while Berlinguer, in almost 10 years of leading
the party, did it publicly only once following the 1979 elections. He said that
if someone had raised the problem of his resignation, he would not have fought
to retain a position he had done nothing to obtain. There is no doubt that they
are two very different personalities, but above all they are inspired by com-
pletely opposite political plans. Berlinguer believes, as did Aldo Moro in his
later period, that the Italian political system must in the end produce an
alternation between the two blocs, the Christian democratic and the communist.
Craxi drives toward an alternation between the DC and a"majority of progress,"
within which the PCI would function as a small appendix of a large socialist
party. Berlinguer so far has thought of achieving his plan by taking advantage
of the more progressive part of the DC. And today no one responds. Craxi pre-
f ers to act alone in a corsair war, finding support in various places.
Both these plans, which conflict, are far from being achieved (Craxi is still
too weak, Beringuer too isolated). But the fact remains that at Palermo, after
having read Craxi's report and considered it bad, Berlinguer made a speech which
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brought the parties closer rather than moving them further apart. And the
fact remains that in Plaermo Craxi emphasized hi.s polemics against the DC,
pulled the ears of the Forlani government and made statements of personal
appreciation for Berlinguer's qualities after having denied Berlinguer his
immediate aupport for PCI participation in government.
COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1981
6034
CSO: 3104/272
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MILITARY INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
SPANISH, PORTUGUESE MILITARY INDUSTRY, WEAPONS PRODUCTION FIRMS
Paris LA PENINSULE LUSO-IBERIQUE in Freneh 1980 (signed to press 3d quarter of
1980) pp 55-62, 213-214 �
[Text of Chapter 1("List of Military Industries in Spain and Portugal") of
ParC 2("Political and Economic Stakes in Military Cooperation") from the book
"The Luso-Iberian Peninsula" by Alberto Santos, National AefensP Studies
Foundation, Journal No 18 supplement to Paris ST1tATEGIQUE in French No 8, 4th
quarter 1980) 235 pp]
[Text] Spain, ~ust like Portugal, is a country which has a long history of
military industry, but it was only after World War II and more specifically after
the Spanish-American agreements of the fifties that this sector expanded and
placed this country 12th worldwide.
One of the principal factors in this expansion was the takeover of this sector
. by the INI (Instituto Nacional Industrial), a state agency created in 1941 and
managed primarily by the military. From its 3.nception INI showed great interest
in military industry, but it was only after 1959 that it was instructed to
modernize this sector intensively. Today the INI alone employs around 26,000
people who are subject to working conditions approximat3:ng those established by
the Law of 9 March 1938: "Le Fuero del Traba~o" [Work Code]. Around 70,000
Peoplel work in milita~y ~i.~d~Lries ~ah^se capitdl i~ semi-~rivate, se~:-guhlic.2
To this figure must be added the thousands of workera employed in dozens of other
military support industries, which for the most part are private enterprises.3
Weapons production is to all intents and purposes divided into three groups which
on the whole correspond to the three sectors of the armed forces: the ENSB (army),
the ENB (navy), and the CASA (Air Force). Each of these groups can participate in
the development of industries consolidated within another group.
The ENSB (Empresa nacional Santa Barbara jSanta Barbara National Company], an
enterprise founded fn 1959 within the INI, works principally for the army. This
group has factories in Seville, Oviedo, Palence, Toledo, Grenada, and La Corogne,
and has more than 50 small or medium-sized support enterprises working for it.
Most of its production is in the metal~nechanical and electronics sectors; it
produces~proj ectiles and miscellaneous artillery pieces such as the NATO-type
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106 millimeter M-40-A1 recoilless rifle, MG 41 machine guns, various riflss and
' many of other NATO-type light arms.
The production of this type of conventional weapons is in large measure national
and is exported to such countries as Portugal, Guatemala, Chili, Argentina,
Uruguay, South Africa, Jordan, Pakistan, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines.
- A good part of the ENSB activity is also directed towards the manufacture of the
MAX-30, a tank dating from 1966 in France, buflt under French license. Eighty
percent of its parts is domestically produced. ~.'he Spanish MAX-30 is a direct
product of the Franco-Spanish program for co-ma.nufacturing war materiel signed in
1969. Like ma.ny other weapons, this tank, manufactured mainly in Seville,
is an export tank which at the same time equips the Spanish armed forces.
In June 1979 there were 180 Spanish MAX-30s on the national and international
market, corresponding to an average production of five tanks a month which,
according to the INI, can exceed, in case of demand, 15 tanks a month.
Among the many enterprises this group has working for it number some with an
international reputation including among the latter the ENASA, the ENOSA,
Chrysler Espana, Marconi Espanola, the CETME and the EISA.
--The ENASA (Empresa nacional d~ autocamiones SA [National Truck Company])
employs around 13,000 people. Founded in 1948 within the framework of the INI,
it is working on the creation of the BMR 6X6 (Blindados Medios de Ruedas)
under the cover of an American model and is at this time developing a BMR
program relative to a series of amphibious vehicles.
--The ENOSA (Empresa nacional d~optica SA jNational Optics Company~) employs
around 1,000 people, mostly technicians. This enterprise was created in 1950
- with predominately American capital, and since its creation has had very close
relations with the German optical company Karl Zeiss. At this time, the ENOSA
is working in collaboration with the TPA (Taller de precision de artilleria
[Artillery Precision Laboratory]), an army subsidiary, and with the LTIEMA
(Laboratorio y Taller de investigacion de la armada [Investigative Laboratory
and Workshop of the Navy]). The ENOSA participates in the manufacture of
optical components for the ANIX-30 tank as well as in the manufacture of a
telescopic rifle sight. The group is also active in developing research.
--Chrysler Espana, whose head office is at Vilaverde near Madrid, employs over
14,000 people. A private firm, it is primarily entrusted with the modernization
of M-47 and M-48 battle tanks and the VTT M-113s, which are in service in the
Spanish army. This group also builds specialty trucks, transmission units and
gear boxes for American M-151 A2 ~eeps.
--Marconi Espanola: This firm is almost wholly owned by the American ITT and is
linked to many defense sectors (radio, communications, telephone, radar and
navigation, fire control, simulation, monitoring, counter measures...). This
group was the first private enterprise to work directly for the Ministry of
Defense after 1917. With Franco's coming to power in 1939, English capital was
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withdrawn from Marconi, which remained in the hands of American capital and the
- INI. Later, ITT bought out the INI shares. In addition to its links with the
army, this group also has links with the Spanish air force. It is at this time
negotiating with American manufacturers to implement a program of cooperation for
the construction of FIO and F18 fighters.
--CETME and EISA are the two Spanish enterprises the most involved with research
and development. On an average, 400 people work in CETMIE (Centro de estudios
tecnicos de materiales especiales [Central for Technical Studies of Special
Materiel]) which was created in 1949 with the help of primarily American credits.
One of the most widely known CETME projects is the MEROKA anti-aircraft gun whose
license belongs to LOCKHEED. EISA (Experiencias industriales SA [Industrial
Experiments]), for its part, employs 600 people, and 87 percent of its activities
are directly tied to the.Ministry of Defense. This enterprise, created in 1921,
builds hydraulic systems and electronics components for the AMX--30 and coproduces
with the firm Selenia SPA ASPIDi missiles and ALBATROS launchers earmarked for
Spanish corvettes. At this Lime, EISA is negotiating with the French navy for a
license to manufacture modern torpedoes, but the bulk of its future work is
centered on the development of the Laser rangefinder.
The INI plans in the near future to merge this enterprise with ENOSA and a new
- enterprise recently created which already employs 300 people, E~SA -'Equipos
electronicos SA [Electronic Equipment Ltd.]) into a large optical-electronics
group.
--ENB (E,mpresa Nacional Bazan de constructiones navales militaxes [Bazan National
Company for Naval Military Construction]) works primarily in the naval industrial
sector, although the group sometimes participates, through the channel of ENOSA,
EISA, and ENSB, in arms production for the army and the air force. This enterprise
also belongs to INI, and around half of its activities derive from contracts with
the Spanish navy. The ENB also turns a profit on exports to third world countries
such as Brasil, Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia as We11
as several African countries. Founded in 1947 and restructured following the
Spanish-American agreements, this group thoroughly altered the former shipyards
of E1 Ferrol, Cartagena and San Fernando, located in Cadiz. These three shipyards,
which have greatly contribuCed to the rapid growth of the Spanish commercial
empire, have in fact been in service since Philip t~e Fifth and Carlos the Third.
Today 14,000 people work in these three yards and their annexes, of which 9,500
are workers, 2,500 are technicians, 1,700 are office personnel and 300 are
engineers.
Most of the weapons produced at E1 Ferrol, Cartagena or San Fernando are manu-
factured under American, French, and even German license. In addition to routine
repairs it carries out on warships of the Spanish navy and the American navy, as
well as on ships of the national or international merchant marine, E1 Ferrol
in Galicia is currently building, under American license, an aircraft carrier
and three frigates equipped with the Harpoon surface-to-surface missile, as well
as four corvettes of the "Discovery" class.
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The Cartagena shipyard located on the Mediterranean coast has started a
construction program under French license of four "Daphne" class submarines as
well as four "Discovery" class corvettes. This yard also builds diesel engines
under German license.
San Fernando, located in Cadiz, has at this time a program to build 10 maritime
surveillance patrol boats and is involved primarily in the manufacture of the
anti-aricraft weapon MEROKA.
The developmenC of these three yards ranks Spain in third place among European
naval constructors after Sweden and Germany.
The CASA (Constructiones aeronauticas SA jAeronautic Construction]) group was
created in 1923. It controls almost the entire Spanish aeronautical sector after
having absorbed, in 1972 and 1973, its principal rivals, "Hispano aviacion" and
the EMASA respectively, as well as CECSA (Compania do Electronica y communications
- SA [Electronics and Communications Company]) which was founded in 1962 with the
aid of ITT and Hughes Aircraft Company capital. CECSA alone employed 1,300 people.
The CASA group possesses more than 90 percent of the Spanish aeronautical industry,
and maintains close links with foreign companies, such as Airbus Industrie, a
group in which CASA owns 4.2 percent of the capital.
In Spain, CASA collaborates with most of the enterprises linked to the aenonautical
industry an~ with Marconia Espanola and AISA (Aeronautica Industrial SA) in
particular.
More than 8,000 people are distributed in factories located in Madrid, Seville,
Cadiz, Getafe and Agalvir. These employees handle repairs and storage of American
planes based in Torrejon, Mnron, Rota and Saragossa, as well as of Spanish planes
which comprise the air force, such as Phantom F4s and RF4s, Mirage IIIEs and
Mirage Fl-Cs, MA 100s and 200s, C 212s, etc.
CASA factories manufacture primarily light transport planes and support planes.
Almps[ the entire output of f inished products produced in the group's five
factories is manufactured under American license. At this time there is a question
of diversifying this production somewhat. There is talk of an imminent start-up
of an intensive program to build Mirage 2000s, which, however, are on the verge
of being superseded by new m~dels.
CASA is doubtless more dependent for material than are ENSB and ENB.
The giants of the American aeronautical industry, particularly, McDonnell Douglas,
NortY?rop, Lockheed and Hughes Aircraft, are very strongly established in this
group. ivorthrop for example holds 20.8 percent of CASA capital.
In order to ensure better coordination between ENSB, ENB and CASA and all the
enterprises linked to the weapons inc~ustry, the Suarez government has just
created three management and oversight structures for the entire national weapons
- 3ndustry sector, namely DGAM (Direccion General de armamento y material [General
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Armaments and Materiel AdministrationJ), JIRCEAE (Junta interministerial regulators
del comanercio exterior d'armas y e.xplosivos [Interministerial Regulatory
Committee for Foreign Trade of Arms and Explosives]} and DAD (direction para
agsuntos da defensa [Administration for Defense Ma.tters]).
These three structures, subsidiary to the Ministry of Defense, the government and
INI respectively, also have the ob~ective of further encouraging the modemization
of the weapons industry and increasing the degree of competitiveness of these
industries internationally. This tends to hold them hostage to a predominately
"Managerial" conception of weapons industries.
Military industries in Portugal employ around 10,000 people who are distributed
for the most part in the metal--mechanical, navy shipyard, chemical and electronics
sector.
Among those sectors which expanded the most during the colonial ~~riod, the most
important is ttie metal-mechanical sector. More than 5,000 people are working
there distributed as follows:
--The FMBP (Fabrica militar de Braco de Prata [Braco de Plata Military Factory])
employs more than 2,000 people. This enterprise, located in Lisbon, specializes
- in manufacturing several types v.~ light arms, including the NATO G3 which was
widely used during the colonial war. The models of weapons produced by this
enterprise are for the most part American, German or national.
--The FNMAL (Fabrica nacional de municoes e armas ligerras [National Munitions
and Light Arms Factory]) employs more than 1,500 people and backs up the preceding
enterprise.
--The OGMA (Oficianas gerais de ma.terial aeronautico [General Aeronautics Materiel
Bureau]) located at Alverca de Ribate3o in the country area around Lisbon employs
more than 1,000 people. This enterprise is reported to be at this time manu-
facturing technologically advanced weapons with American aid.
--The OGME ~Oficianas gerais de material de engenharia jGeneral Bureau o~
Engineering EquipmentJ) employa more than 500 people. The principal activities
of this enterprtse are repairs of military vehicles. The enterprise has very
strong links with the Luso-Brasilian Car and Equipment Company whose factory is
located at Porto-Alto nea.r Lisbon. This company manufactures battle tanks under
American license, of the V-200, V-300, V-1000 chaim3.te type.
The Alfeite shipyard, which belongs to the War Navy and is located at Baneiro,
is, after Lisnave and Setnave, the third largest Portuguese naval industry,6
with 3,450 employees. The workers at this navy shipyard also work for other
agencies besides the War Navy.
The chemical industry sector increased its workforce considerably after the
outbreak of the colonial war in 1961. This sector is represented by the LMPQF
_ (Laboratorio Militar de productos quimicos e farmaceuticos [M3.litary Laboratory
for Chemical and Pharma.ceutical Products]). This laboratory employs over 700
people and specializes in trogical medical research. It is noteworthy that in a
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country which, like Spain, has become a field of inedicinal experimentation for
large international laboratories as a result of facilities granted, at the
beginning of the sixties, to foreign investments, the LMPQF is one of the national
laboratories which is in the best shape. In particular it exploits pharmaceutical
products earmarked for the military and their familiea.
Ttao other sectors expanded considerably during the colonial war: the processing
industries and the food industries. The chief group of transformation industries
is the OGFE (Oficinas gerais de fardamento e equipamento) whose head office is
at Lisbon and which employs 1,600 people. This group is expanding its development
mainly in ready-made clothes, the manufacture of shoes and fabric. The OFGE has
a large commercial center, the "CASAO," where everything produced in their
factories is displayed.
The food industries sector is represented by the MM (Manutencao militar) which is
still today the largest Portuguese commercial enterprise in the supermarket
field.
A quick calculation of the employee workforce in the different military industries
mentioned above totals over 10,000, which seems large, for it represents one
percent of industry employees. It must also be remembered that all of these
enterprises, the ma~ority of which are located in Lisbon or its surroundings, make
work for several dozen small or medium-sized enterprises~ with which they are
sometimes associated. Fifty-one percent of the shares of the Portuguese Fxplosives
Company belong to FMBA and FNMAL. Most of the enterprises mentioned above are
- managed by senior officers who still nowadays adopt a militarized hierarchial
organization of production shifts, as has been the case since the thirties.
Several of the enterprises mentioned above, in particular FMBA, FNMAL and the
Alfeite yards have greater workforces than those of French weapons industries
such as Luchaire, Thomson Brandt, and approach the workforces of the largest
groups such as Manurhin.8
Today, it is the question of a reorgani;zation of weapons industries with the
purpose of making them more competitive ;nternationally.9
FOOTNOTES
1. While the magazine CINCO KIAS in its 12 September 1979 issue reckoned at
64,500 the total number of jobs in the three weaponry sectors (43,500 army,
13,000 navy and 8,OOQ in sectors linked to aviation), the REVUE INTERNATIONALE
DE DEFENSE of 1 January 1980: "Le potentiel defensif espagnol, 2e partie:
1'industrie de 1'armement," j"Spanish Defense Potential, Second Part:
Industry and Armaments"] an article by Sanchez Mendez, speaks of 70,000
people distributed as follows: 46,000 in t.he sectors linked to the army,
14,000 in the navy and 10,000 in aviation.
2. On the initiative of the government the Defex firm was created in 1972, which
controls the overall weaponry production and whose capital belongs 51 percent
Lo the enterprises integrated in INI (ESBN, ENB, CASA, EISA, EESA...) and 49
percent to private firms which maintain very close ties with the Min3stry of
Defense,
33
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3. For a detailed description of the number of private enterprises linked to
the weaponry industry, see the rich empirical study of Peter Locke and Aerbert
Wulf: "Register of Arms production in developing countries," March 1977, a
study available from Arbeitsgruppe "Ruestung und Unterentwicklung," Parkallee
72,2000 Hamburg 13, West Germaay; see also Revue de Defenae internatioaal2
for January 1980.
4. "Memoria y Balance E~ercicio," 1978, ESBN.
5. CASA maintains in fact close contacts with many private factories, among
which EXPAL (Explosivos Alavezea), FEMSA (Fabrica Espanola de Magnets SA),
SASPA (Sampece Paracaidas), Sanchez Quionones, Gressel SA, Alvica, Ciba Geigy,
EISA, cf the magazine RECONQOISTA for Apr31 1979.
6. Oscar Mota: "A industria naval Portuguese, ["The Portuguese Naval Industry]"
REVISTA NACAO E DEFESA, no. 6, 1978.
7. Among the dozens of small and medium-sized enterprises which work with
Portuguese military industries are th~ Espingardaria de Tavira, the Oficina
Soldadura Electrica, Eugenio and Severino, 9aquinhas and Gertrudes, the firms
Explosivos de Parry and Filho, Construcoes Metalicas, Orgitay, Construcoes
e m~canicas.
8. Jacques Isnard: "La France, marchand d'armes," [France,~Arms Merchant],
LE MONDE for Sunday, 11-4-1979.
9. A law decree tabled in the Assembly of the Republic in May 1980 on the
' revitalization of weapons industries.
- COPYRIGHT: 1981 Strategique
9330
CSO: 3100/714 ~
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