JPRS ID: 9836 CHINA REPORT POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030017-6
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• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 17
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9836
9 July 1981
China Re ort
~
POLITICAL, S~CIOLOGICAL ANG MILITARY AFFAIRS
cFeuo 7~s 1 ~
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JPRS L/9836
9 July 1981
CH INA REPORT
- POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AN~ MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 7/81)
CON7ENTS
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
_ MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
' Military Region Political Commissar Defends Policiea,
Opposea Disaenters
(ZHANSHI BAO, 11 Mar 81) 1
Importance of Compulsory Military Service Discussed
(ZHANSHI BAO, 7 Jan 81) 6
Joint Regular Forces - Militia Defense Episode Related
(Li Sugui, Guo Delong; ZHANSHI BAO, 5 Feb 81) 10
Use of Existing Weapona, Development of New Ones Stressed
~(Hao Sheng; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 3 Jun 79) 11
Need for More Study of Tactics Stressed
,(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 10 Jul 79) 12
All Fleets Conduct Training for Senior Headquartera Officers
(Luo Tongsong; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 18 Sep 79)
Conacripts Exhorted To Sacrifice Individual Welfare to Revolution
(ZHANSHI BAO, 11 Jan 81) 17
Building of Rear Area Logistics Defense Forces Discussed
(Chen Yazhou, Liu Shengjun; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 10 Jul 79) . 23
Revised Regulations for Army, Airforce Boat Units Issued
(Wang Shuchen, Yin Hongjun; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 30 Aug 79) . 27
Good Care of Horsea Stressed Pending Ability To Rearm With
Modern ~quipment
(ZHANSHI BAO, 11 Mar 81) 29
- a - [III - CC - 80 FOUO]
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
MILITARY REGION POLITICAL COMMISSAR DEFENDS POLICIES, OPPOSES DISSENTERS
Guangzhou ZHANSAI BAO in Chinese 11 Mar 81 pp 1, 4
[Article: "Correctly Understand the Spirit of the Third Plenary Session As Well
As the Line, the Programs and the Policies of the Party Is the Emphasis of a
Speech Given at the Military Region Political Work Conference by Political Commissar
Xiang Zhonghua [0686 0112 5478]"]
[Text] What is the spirit of the Third Plenary Session, and what is the 13ne, the
programs, and the policies of the party? Are the programs and policies put forward
in the Central Work Conference convened not long ago synonymous with the spirit of
the Third Plenary Session? What is it that stands in the way of some of the
. comr~des in correctly understanding the line, the programs and the policies since
the Third Plenary Session? How can the vague undexstanding and erroneous idea~.
_ of some cadres and soldiers toward the party line, programs, and policies be
correctly dealt with? For those in military units whose understanding of these
problems is not too profound or not tao clear, Xiang Zhonghua, political commissar
of the military region, provided a systematic explanation in a speech he gave at
the Military Region Political Work Conference.
The Spirit of the Third Plenary Session and a Series of Programs, Policies and
Major Policy Decisions Since the Third Plenary Session
What is the spirit of the Third. Plenary Session of the llth Party Central Committee,
and what is included in the P~irty's line, programs, and policies since the Third
Plenary Session? Political Commissar Xi.ang said in his speech that the line,
programs and policies estab~ished by the Third Plenary Session differ entirely
- from the line, programs, and policies of the "Great Cultural Revolution." The
Third Plenary Session revived the fundamental principles of Marxism and Mao Zedong
, Thought, provided for emancipation of thought, using one's brains, seeking for
truth in facts, and looking ahead united as one, which may be said to be an over-
all guiding program for seeking truth in facts and correcting leftist errors. This,
then, is the spirit of the Third Plenary Session of which we so often speak. Under
the guidance of this overall policy, the Third Plenary Session, the Fourth Plenary
Session, the Fif.th Plenary Session, the Second Central Work Conference, and other
major conferences further delineated the party's political line, ideological line,
and organizational line, and put forward a series of p.rograms, policies and major
policy decisions. Those of relative special consequence included the foll~wing:
(1) arrived at tre strategic policy decision of shifting the focus of work of the
entire party to the building of the four modernizations, and ~established a political
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, line for mobilizing the people of the entire nation to carry out the four moderni2a-
tions with one heart and one mind; (2) exposed and criticized the concept of two
"whatevers," and established the Marxist ideological line of seeking truth in facts;
(3) proposed the strengthening and impruvement of party leadership, formulated
"Various Regulations on Political Life Within the Party," perfected central leader-
ship organizations, and established the party~s organizational line; (4) made a
factual analysis of China's class situation in the wake of completion of socia.list
reform of ownership of the means of production, determining that an e~ploiting
class no longer exists in China, that the class struggle continues to exist, but
that it has ceased to be the result of major c~ntradictions in China's society,
and deciding to have no further political campaigns, to correctly handle contra-
di.ctions amongthe people and contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and
to unify the maximum number of the masses to carry out the four modernizations
progra~; (5) examined and resolved some major problems left over from history and
some questions of inerits and demerits, and rights and wrongs of some major leaders,
with rehabilitation incluaing the "Tiananmen Incident," and the unjust, false, and
misjudged cases involving major wrongs against comrades Liu Shaoqi and Peng Dehuai,
proposing a program for realizing national stabili*_y and unity; (6) provided for
establishment of a legal system with a high degree of socialist democracy and
_ consum~at~ socialism, promulgated a series of laws, and brought to trial the Lin
Biao, Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary clique; (7) proposed and began an all around
summarization of the lessons of experience of socialist revolution and socialist
construction since the founding of the People's Republic, including a correct eval-
uation of Comrade Mao Zadong's merits and demerits, noting that Comrade Mao 'Ledong's
merits were of primary importance while his demerits were of secondary importance,
and that the tests of experience have attested to the correctness of Mao Zedong
Thought, which continues to be the guiding thought of our party; (8) reiterated
that realization of China's four modernizations would requi.re adherence to four
ideological and political principl.es; (9) proposed action to reform the party's
and the state's -~?adership systems to solve real existing evils of life-long leader-
ship cadre tenure, and an excessive centralization of autharity; (10) proposed that
while adhering to the socialist road, that cadres gradually come to be younger,
better educated, and specialized; (11) put forward a program for the "readjustment,
consolidation, restr.ucturing, and improvement" of the national economy, institution
of reform of the national economic str.ucture and management system, and full arousal
of initiative in the central government, all provinces, municipalitles, and enter-
prises; (12) put forward a series of policies and measures for development of agri-
cultural production, readjusted agricultural policies in terms of prices, revenues,
credit, procurement of agriculture byproducts, and forms of management; stressed
~ respect for the self-determination of production teams, and development of diversi-
fication through adaptation of general methods to specific circumstances; estab-
lis~ed and improved upon various forms of a system of responsi'oility for production,
e}cpanding limitations on private plots, family sideline occupations and county fair
trade; (~3) insritution of economic policies opening up forei_gn trade, allowing
independent action while retaining the initiative in one's own hands, and practicing
self-reliance; (14) provided for further economic readjustment and further political
stability as rhe only correct programs. Additionally, under the guidance of the
overall guiding thought, the CCP Central Committee also readjusted and formulated
policies pertaining to intellectuals, p~licies pertaining to education, policies
pertaining to literature and art, policies pertaining ~o Yaces, policies pertaining
to a united front, for.eign policies, eCc. 1'olitical Cammissar Xiang noted that
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experience has shown that this series of programs and policies entirely accord with
China's circumstances and have been fully supported by the masses of people. The
huge changes and progress made in China during t:ie past 2 years, and the presently
very good political and economic situation are the result of implementation of the
line, ~~rograms, and policies since the Third Plenary Session.
The Spirit of the Present Central Work Conference and the Overall Guiding Thought
of the Third Plenary Session Are Synonymous
While stu~lying the spirit of the Central Work ConfErence, some cadres and soldiers
supposed that Central Work Conference changes in programs of the Third Plenary
Session amounted to correction of "deviations" of some policies since the Third
Plenary Session. How should this question be viewed? Political commissar Xiang
- noted in this speech that it is necessary to affirm, first of all, that since the
time of the Third Plenary Session up until the present, there have been no changes
in the overall guiding thought of the party's seeking truth in facts, and thoroughly
correcting leftist errors. Beginning with the realities of the state of the nation,
_ and hidden dangers currently existing in the economy, this Central Work Conference
decided on further readjustment of the national economy, deciding to get rid of
tentative plans and sub~ectively high criteria not geared to actual circumstances,
so that the country's economy can gradually divest itself of the fetters of leftist
mistakes, and L-ake the path of steady and healthy development. This is precisely
what the guiding thought of the Third Plenary Session sought to accomplish, and it
is also a continuation of the policy of "readjustment, consolidation, restructuring,
and improvement." However, as with everything where changes occur in development,
programs and policies since the Third Plenary Session have, in t:he course of their
implementation, been subject to enrichment, to perfection, and to development.
Nothing is immutable. We cannot use a static concept tc~ view changes ~.n policies.
� He said that since the Third Plenary Session, party programs and policies have
developed, first of all, under constant eradication of various disturbances. These
included the disturbance of the two "whatevers," the disturbance of the liberaliza-
tion trend of thought, and the sabotage of elements who crave nothing short of
nationwide chaos. It was the elimination of these "l~ftist" right disturbances
that tested the correctness of the progra~ns of the Third Plenary Session, and
. enriched and developed the actual content of .*.he Third Plenary Session's programs.
Acting in accordance with current realities, and while emphasizing the surmounting
of leftist mistakes, this Central Work Conference, pointed to real planning weak-
nesses, conducted necessary criticism and struggle against tendencies to cancel out
or oppose the party leadership, ar.td struck firm blows against anti-party and anti-
socialist activities and against criminal activities. This was only as it should
be. This not only signifies no change in the programs of the Third Plenary Session,
but also happens to support, as well, the Third Plenary Session's principle of
seeking truth in facts, and supports the direction and objectives set by the Third
Plenary Session. Second, as a result of changes in development of the objective
situation, the party's policies also require commensurate readjustment and augmen-
tation.
~ The Third Plenary Session's two documents on the development of agriculture, for
example, have been shown to be effective in practice. But faced with a developing
situation, the C^ntral Co~nittee last year additionally issued document number 75
proposing various forms of a system of responsibility for production, and giving
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f~.irther impet~ls t~ the development or agriculture. Such readjustment and augmen-
t,~tion of pol~.c�ies both accords with realities and maintains the continuity and
unity of policies, which is entirely in keeping with the programs of the Third ~
Plenary Session. Third, in order to correct work faults, some changes were neces-
sary in actuai policies ana measures. Communists are not gods without any mistakes
in their work. This furthex economic readjustment was decided upon only after ~
having recognic~d faults in economic work during the first 2 years after smashing
the "gang of four," and before and after the Third Plenary Session and after having
found the crux of the problem. In other words, to sunpose that today's specific ~
polici.es are in all respects the same and not the slightest bit changed fr~m the ~
policies formulated at the time of thz Third Plenary Session is not, in fact, the~ '
case. However, if upon seeino some change and development, one supposes a c':unge ~'t
fron~ the spir~t. of the Third Plenary Session, that is not in accordance with the
facts either. '
Correct ~rroneous Ideology and Correctly Understand and Implement the Par`ty's Line, '
Programs, and l~olicies �
.
Why is it that some comrades are unable to proper].y understand the line, the programs;
and the policies of the Third Plenary Session? Political Co~issar Xiang said, I
agree with the views of many comrades at this political work conference. Looked
at in ternu^ of ideological understanding, there are two principal impediments: One
is the effects of the erroneous leftist ideology. For the past 20 years, the mis--
takes our party has made have been largely "leftist" mistakes. For a long time,
all of us have lived and worked under the guidance of "leftist" ideology, and have�
studied and propagandized what is embodied in "leftism" as the correct line. To "
one degree or another, "leftist" ideology has left an imprint in our brains. Now, �
some comrades are still filled with misgivings and vacillate in indecision about
the Third Plenary Session as the result of the mischief caused by the "leftist"
thing. For exampie, as soon as a shift in work emphasis comes up, some comrades
suppose abandonment of class struggle is meant; as soon as talk turns to emancipa= '
tion of the mentality, they suppose this means the four fundamental principles are
not wanted; and as soon as the need for adequate appraisal of the effects of leftist~'
ideology is raised, eradication of the influence of "leftist" mistakes remains an
arduous task. Then there is capitalist liberalism, anarchy, and extremism. This
is a very powerful centrifugal force and a corrodent. Today there actually exists
_ in the armed forces a minority of people who are wavering politically about the
four fundamental principles, and who ideologically believe in "everyman for himself
and the devil take the hindmost," and "money is omnipotent," and such capitalist `
articles of faith. Organizationally, they want only democracy and freedom rather
than organizational discipline, and some have even progressed to opportunism and
profiteering, corruption and larceny, and smuggling of people out of the c~untry.
Such people must inevitably be ideologically incompatible with the party line, its '
programs, and policies, and their actions must inevitably encroach upon the welfare
of the majority of people, and cannot be countenanced by party discipline, milita~ty -
discipline, and the laws of the land. Commissar Xiang noted that those two
erroneous ideologies differ in outward form, and they likewi~e impede our'true ~
undei-standing and implementation of the line, programs, and policies of the party. �
We must vigorously correct them. -
~ . ~ ~ I .
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Keep On Enli~htening Programs and Guiding Cadres and Soldiers in Solving Ideological
P rob lems
How can the muddled understanding and erroneous ideology toward the party's line,
its programs and policies that is reflected by some cadres and soldiers be given
help? Commissar Xiang said that the proper way should be to keep up enlightenment
about policies, persevere in "tfiree not-ism," let e~~eryone speak what is on his
mind and speak what is in his heart, after which he should be led through a point
by point solution to problems. When it comes to ideological understanding, people
cannot be gagged, cannot be coerced, and can even less be "scared into submission."
Nowadays some comrades pit political conform~ty against democratic expression, and
dare not express doubts that are in their minds. It should be realized that ideo-
logical conformity is the foundation for political conformity, and so it is neces-
sary to place principal efforts on raising the consciousnesses of cadres and
soldiers, and then to do a good job of political ideology. Commi~sar Xiang noted
that gathering from currently reported circumstances, the problems with most
comrades are problems of ideological understanding, and those who stand in a posi-
tion of opposition to the party's line, programs, and policies are extremely few.
- We must strictly distinguish problems of ideological understanding from political
problems, and unite maintenance of unanimity with the CCP Central Committee and
carrying forward democracy within the party, so that, through study, everyone will
be truly uplifted ideologically. Naturally, statements and actions that evidence
real opposition to the party and to socialism, we urlll not be soft on, and we shall
resolutely refute and struggle against them.
9432
CSO: 4005/2081
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
IMPORTANCE OF COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE DISCUSSED
Guangzhou ZI~ADTSHI BAO in Chinese 7 Jan 81 p 4
~Article: "Important Significance of China's Institution of a System of Compulsory
Military Service"]
~Excerpt~ China's Current Military Service System ~
With the founding of the Chinese People's Republic, our army was the national
_ armed force. Internally it was responsible for consolidation of the dictatorship
of the proletariat, for consolidation of the fruits of victory of the people's
revolution, and for suppressing resistance by all counterrevolutionary elements.
Externaliy, it was responsible for defense against imperialist aggression and
subversion, for safeguarding the socialist revolution and socialist construction,
for protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation, and for
maintaining wprld peace. Its new duties were at once both formidable and
glorious, requiring that we have not only a powerful army, but also a powerful
air force and navy, and requiring not only that we have powerful forces on duty,
but also powerfut forces in reserve. However, because of the lack of a fixed
period of recruitment and a retirement system, a voluntary military service system
could not meet the requirements of the new era. Since we had built a nation for
the people, everyone had responsibility for safeguarding his own country, ar.d
everyone should take up this responsibility for safeguarding the motherland.
Therefore, when the Chinese People's Republic was founded, it was decided "to
mak~ ready for the institution of a system of compulsory military service at the
proper time." At the Second Session of the First National People's Congress on
30 July 1955, the "Military Service Law of the Chinese People's Republic" was
discussed, promulgated, and put into effect on the same day by the chairman of
the Chinese People's Republic. The "Military Service Law of the Chinese People's
Republic" was a law for the performance of military service under which the
Chinese people could consolidate their awn national defense and safeguard their
own welfare. It stipulated that all citizens fully 18 years of age have a duty
- to perform mili~ary service. Beginning in 1955, China instituted compulsor~
military service. The First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress
Standing Committee held on 5 March 1978 discussed and approved ~~Decisiona of
Problems in the Military Service System" put forward by the State Council,
deciding ~o change China's compulsory military service system into a combined
compulsory and volunteer military service system for longterm service in the
armed forces. This is China.'s existing military service system.
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The msin substance of the compulsory military system are as follows: (1) "All
male citizens of the Ch3,nese People's Republic who are a full 1Q years of age,
regardless of na.tional origins, race, occupation, sacial background, religious
beliefs or extent of education, are liable for compulsory military service in
accordance with this law." (2) The stipulated periods of active military
service are as follows: ar~ny, 3 years; air force, 4 years; navy, 5 years.
Also stipulated is that some specialist mainstay cadres become volunteers with a
15 to 20 year period of active duty. It is furthAr stipulated that when some
troops have completed their fu11 period of service, they may continue on active
duty for an additional period, depending on the needs of the service and their
personal wishes. The period of extended service shall be a minimum of 1 year.
(3) It is stipulated tha.t the fixed period for call-up nationwide shall be
annually from 1 November to the end of February the folluwing year. The required
numbers of peogle to be called up and methods of call-up shall be stipulated by
the State Council on the basis of circumstances during the current year.
(4) Military peuple are citizens with full rights. They have the rights and
duties of citizens stipulated in the constitutian of the Chinese People's Republic.
Military persons on active duty and their dependents shall be given preferential
treatment by the state.
Why Institute a System of Compulsory Military Service
In the 20-odd years during which a system of compulsory military service has been
in effect in G'hina, experience has shown that under prevailing conditions in China,
institution of a system of compulsory military service holds numerous advantages
and very great significance:
1. Institution of a system of compulsory military service is for the purposes
of allowing Chinese youth opportun{ty to realize their desire to protect the
country and for everybody fairly and sensibly to undertake military duties.
Ours is a country that belor.~s to the people themselves. The people are the
masters of the country, %.~nd the security of the country depends on defense by
the people as a whole. However, would it be workable for everyone to be a
soldier? No. Our mili.tary personnel meet a fixed numerical quota, and were
this numerical quota ra be exceeded, both the state and the people would bear
an unconsciona.lly heavy burden. 'I'here are also certain requirements for being
a soldier, and if one does not meet these requirements, it would impair fulfill-
ment of missions. Consequently, from among the large numbers of youths who
annually rush to register, the state can select only a relatively~few outstati.�:~g
ones to enter military service. Each year a group is inducted, and a group is
retired, so that the broad masses of youths who meet age requirements have oppor-
tunity to perform their duty. This way is both relatively fair and alsu rela-
tively sensible. During the period of service, one can both perform one's duty
and learn military techniques, improve ideological consciousness and cultural
levels, and be severely tempered by life in the armed forces.
2. Compulsory military service can accumulate for the country large numbers of
reservists who have undergone training, assuring that such war suddenly break
out, our military forces could steadily enlarge and replenish soldiers with the
elements of training. There are numerous points of difference between modern
warfare and the warfare of the past. One is the large scale and the suddenness
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of the outbreak of fighting, frequently requiring mobilization of several million
in the armed forces. Without a large number of reservists, victory in war would
be difficult to attain. Second is the suddenness of modern warfare, with
hosCilities breaking out at once, possibly on any given morning. Unless one ia
able to assure rapid mobilization of a large number of trained troops, the country
may suffer severe destruction, and great lossQS of people's lives and property ma.y
ensue. Third is the large-scale use of all kinds of modern new weapons and equip-
ment, and scientific techniques, things such as new types of aircraft, large gun~,
tanks, naval vessels, military electronic technology, rocket technlogy, laser
techr~ology, etc. Unless advance training has been given the troops, once war
breaks out, it is not possible to master well the use of advanced weapons and
technical equipment. In order to meet these characteristics of modern warfare,
we must have planned accumulation of large numbers of troops who have ander~,one
training. With compulsory military service, call-ups at fixed time3 and retire-
ments at fixed times permit annual induction of a certain numher of youths into
the armed forces where they are given military and politi~;al traini.ng and readied
for combat. Annua~ly, as well, a group of strenuously trained ~;arriors who ha.ve
completed their periods of militar.y service, retire from active service to become
national reservists. In the more than 20 years since institution of compulsory
military service, China has accumulated rather abundant reservists. When needed
by the country, these reservists can be sent in an endless stream as replacements
in military units or be rapidly organized into newly created combat units and
local military forces; so that aggressors will sink in a boundless ocean of
people's war. For example, during the period of self-defense counterattack on
the Sino-Vietnam border, in order to respond to the call of the motherland for
call-up of forces in wa.rtime, and to assure full strength of uuits, in Yulin
Prefecture in Guangxi Province alone, 4.267 retired servicemen below 25 years
of age registered for induction, pex~nitting units to replenish their strength at
once, increase their combat ca~abilities, and assure completion of combat missions.
3. The system of compulsory militaxy service can also save manpower and material
- resources in norma.l times for use in strengthening the building of the national
economy. China. today is still rather poar, and its economy is insufficiently well
= developed. We want to ha.sten the speed of economic construction, and make China
a modern agricultural, industrial power with modern national defense, and modern
science and technology in this century. This is a glorious mission that history
has bestowed upon us. Military expenditures are a very large figure. Military
_ personnel mostly do not create material wealth for society, but rather consume
ma.terial wealth. If the amount is excessive and military expenditures too great,
this holds back the building of the national economy. Therefore, we must correctly
handle the relationship between the buildup in national defense and the buildup of
the economy, whereby the number of people in the armed forces are at the optimum
level so that military spending as a proportion of national disbursements is kept
in proper balance. Institution of a system of compulsory military service is a
fine way ~f achieving this. This is because, when the country has such a system,
in normal times it can maintain the number of troops at a relatively low level
and conserve a certain amount of military expenditures. In this way the country
can. use the manpower, material and financial resources thus saved in building the
economy to hasten the pace of the four modernizations construction, so as to
realize the four modernizations at an early time.
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In summary, a system of compulsory military service not only enhances China's
defense force needs, but also enhances needs for construction of the national
economy, It also accords with the longterm interests of the country and the
_ people, and accords with the present interests of the country and the people.
Thus, it ~ray be said that a system of compulsory military service is commensurate
_ with the advanced and sensible system of mi.litary service of China's cur.rent situ-
ation, and thus it has been warmly supported by people of all races tt~ruugl~out t~hc~
country.
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JOINT REGULAR FORCES - MILITTA DEFENSE EPISODE RELATED
Guangzhou ZHANSHI BAO in Chinese 5 Feb 81 p 1
LArticle by Li Su~ui (2621 5685 6311J and Guo Delong L6753 1795 7893~: "Jo~r.t
Army-Civilian Efforts To Safeguard Power Station"~
~Text~ A winter night with a cold wind blowing and silence everywhere. In a
- grassy thicket of a salient along the Guai~xi frontier, more tha.n 10 pairs of eyes
fla.h, keeping watch on everything along the border. This is a concealed joint
mil~tary-civilian unit sent out by the militia battalion of the Jiebang Brigade,
Longbang Commune and the 5th Comp~ny of a certain unit of the Guangxi Border
Defense carrying out a combat mission to counter ~ ~~botage plot by Vietnamese
agents. By nQw they have been in concealment positions for seven dawns, and they
are preparing to pass their eighth night here.
Eight days ago, our guards discovered frequent border activities by Vietnamese
secret service units who were vainly attempting to ~abotage the Naxi hydroelectric
power station on the border. This hydropower station supplies electricity to
border defense sentry posts, and meets the needs for electricity in production and
daily life of more than 30 communes and brigades and mining areas. How can the
enemy be permitted to sabotage it: The 5th Company immediately worked out a combat
plan with the miJitia battalion of the Jiebang Brigade for joint mi.litary-civilian
defense of the hydropower station.
It is dead of night and it has just begun to rain, dropping temperatures suddenly.
Lying concealed in the cold wet grassy thicket, mosquitoes and bugs biting, the
rain is soaking and it is extremely hard to bear. However, they continue to hold
fast to their concealed position, waiting silently for the arrival of the "unhurried
guest," Suddenly, a short burst of machinegun fire is heard from the enemy's
position. The enemy fires a burst of tracers in the direction of our concealed
position. Our concealed personnel have seen through the enemy's probing trick
and continue to wait quietly. Presently, as expected, from the enemy position
comes the sound of light foo::steps. From 40 meters away from our concealed posi-
tion, three scoundrels carrying satchel charges :ope along stealthily in the
direction of the border hydropower station. Our concealed unit suddenly ~loses
the net, encircling them.
Upon discovering that our side has been strongly fortified, the cunning enemy
explodes their satchel charges for cover and f lee helter-skelter from the border
area. The Vietnamese invaders carefully planned plot has been thoroughly smashed.
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~ MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
_ IISE OF EXISTING WEAPONSs DEVELOPMENT OF NEW ONES STRESSED
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 3 Jun 79 p 2
[Article by Hao Sheng [6787 6115]: "Atomic Bombs Should Be Made, But Hand Grenades
Should Not Be Tossed Aside"]
[TextJ A combat training section chief who fought in the Self-defense Counterattack
- Operation said it this way: In this fight, hand grenades and satchel charges were
used to good effect, but proportionately speaking, what killed and wounded the enemy
most was the various kinds of guns and autowatic weapons." There�ore, he concluded,
"attention to armaments, doing a good job of training, and keeping ones eyes only
on hand grenades will not do; it is necessary to look ahead."
Hand grenades have their place. Without going into the war year~ of the past, they
demonstrated their power in the recent Sino-Vietnamese border self-def ense counter-
attack operations. It would not be fair to ignore the function of hand grenades.
However, hand grenades are only hand grenades after all, and to exaggerate their
, power would be improper as well.
While basing onself on what one has, look toward developments. Our armed forces
are presently in a period of historical transition of millet plus infantry rifles,
and aircraft plus large guns to conventional weapons plus speeial weapons. Our
method is: thorough training in the weapons we p4ssess, study of science and
culture, and further combine men and weapons in order to create conditions for
mastery of newer equipment. If we simply grumble about the modernization of arms
and equipment and put aside existing arm~ and equipment and not train with them, or
if we do not study the modern military science that faces us, when the enemy comes
what weapons will be used to annihilate him? When new equipment comes into our
hands, what skills will we possess to put them to use?
If one bases himself on the equipment in his possession on the one hand while
" hastening the modernization of weapons and equipment on the other, will that render
him unable to make a decision? It will not. The relationship between the two is
one of particular things improving as tlie general situation improves. In handling
the development of weapons and equipment, the proper attitude should be firm con-
viction that victory is entirely attainable through the use of weapons and
equipment in ones po:,,:,~ssion, while resolving gradually to improve weapons and
equipment, steadily modernizing them. To use a common saying to express the idea:
Atomic bombs should be made, but hand grenades should nnt be tossed aside.
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NEED FOR MORE STUDY OF TACTICS STRESSED
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Jul 79 p 1
[Article: "Be a Qualified Commander"]
[Text] People praise Comrade Shan Da [1472 1129] as "a truly outstanding commander
and a qualif ied commander." Comrade 5han Da deserves such praise.
An outstanding and qualified commander must po:~sess at least two qualities:
resourcefulness and courage. Resourcefulness and courage on the battlefield are
- qualities discussed in ancient and modern times in both China and abroad. Sun Zi
placed resourcefulness and courage as the two ma.jor attributes to be cultivated by
commanders. The "Book of History" said, "When a person is valiant and clever, he
- may act, placing resourcefulness and courage on an equal plain. Marx and Engles
said, "There are two kinds of bravery: surpassing bravery, and bravery lacking in
intelligence." ("Collected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 6, p 359), which more .
clearly emphasizes the unity of resourcefulness and courage. To possess courage
without resourcefulness is to be a clumsy, death-defying bungler, which we do not
- need. To possess courage without resourcefulness, when the guns sound, one will be
at a loss about what to do. Naturally, if one cannot put his resourcefulness to
use, he will sustain defeat. Only with a combination of courage and resourcefuln~~ss
can one command forces, overcome the enemy, and attain victory. Shan Da advanced
bravely, charged and shattered the enemy's positions, judged the hour and sized
up the situation, and acted flexibly just as a commander possessed of resourceful-
ness and courage should. Troops have heartfelt confidence in such a commander and
will resolutely obey his commands and listen to his directions with heartfelt
admiration. Thus it becomes possible to have confidence from top to bottom, to be
of one heart and one mind, and to march together to win victory in battle.
Courage is one thing and resourcefulness is another. Put the two together and
only then is victory possible. For many years Lin Biao and the "gang of four"
mad~ a mess of this truth. They distorted the spirit of bravery, threw tactical
thinking into confusion, and "criticized" the accurate saying that a"superbly
skilled person has great courage." This was extremely damagining to the training
- of our cadres, particularly to improving c~mmand skills within the armed forces.
One ma.y often hear the following said among some grassroots level cadres: "When
we're fighting, if superiors want us to attack, we attack; if they want us to
defend, we defend. All we have to do is obey orders and listen to commands." By
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this is meant that command is a matter for higher authority, and that it is only
listening to commands that is one's responsibility. ~'hese comrades forget that it
is the job of commanders to comiaaad. On the battlefi~ald, commanders at all
: echelons have their individual command position, com.mand requirements, command
r~sponsibilities, and scope of command. "Ingenuity in application is a matter for
the person taking action." In the application of tactics, each echelon has its
own ingenious ways. If one is not versed in the command techniques of one's own
echelon, when higher authorities orders that you attack, you will be unable to
strike w;th irresistable force, and if they order ~ou to defend, you will be hard
~ put to really hold fast. For units as large as regiments or armies, when commands
are bad, the mission cannot be accompli5hed. In the person oi a commander, issuing
commands and receiving commands have always been closely related. If you cannot
_ command, you may not be able to follow commands reliably, either, and may become~
like a storeyed house built on a sandy beach. When superior authority commanded
Shan Da to lead a dagger platoon in an attack on certain high ground, had he not
understood the command or blindly issued a command, the high ground would not have
been taken and the combat intentions of superior authority would not be fulfilled.
In that case, no matter steadfastly he "listened to commands," would become
a hollow phrase, would it not?
Cadre training is the key point, but af ter many years of saying this, it is still
just a point without being the key point. There is a tendency in this that is
deserving of attention, namely supposijg that techniques are firm guidance but
that tactics are soft guidance, and consequently emphasizing techniques while
slighting tactics. Techniques are the foundation for tactics. When Shan Da was
on the battlefield, because he was able to fire rocket launchers, was able to use
_ walkie-talkies, and could sight targets for the artillery, he was able to handle
tactical command with ease and proficiency. In this sense, emphasis on technique
cannot be considered wrong. Tactics are the assurance that techniques will play
their full role. During this combat, use of small groups against dispersed forces
and the searching out of forces in concealment demonstrated the power of correct
utilization and variation of tactics. Unless tactics have a built in system for
changing as the enemy changes, or changing ahead of the enemy, then even though
one may be superior in rifles and guns, not all of them may be able to be used,
coordination may be bad, and one may mistakenly injure one's own troops, There-
fore, to slight tactics is unreasonable. As far as our own commanders are concerned,
a general knowledge of all kinds of weapons, their requirements for use, and their
combat capabilities is essential, but the key still lies in the study of tactics
and striving to master command techniques for one's own echelon of organizatio~:.
If one were to say soldiers are "courageous and technical," then commanders must
be "courageous and tactical." The problem now is that leadership comrades in some
units are a little "partial." They are interested only in things such as the number
of points or the number of ineters, but are unable to become interested in the
tactical training of cadres. Some f eel that "the study of formations is not
agreeable, and the study of tactics is not something people are good at." Under
the influence of such a mentality, even if some tactical training is given, it is,
"the squads attack bim bam; platoons attack for 5 minutes; companies attack in a
big uproar." Quality is not high. A rapid end to this state of affairs may be
said to be an urgent matter of the moment in the reform of training.
Insufficient att~ntion to the study of strategy and tactics, and insufficient
attention to improving the standards for command are related to the failure of
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some of our comrades to divorce themselves from the fetters of a single branch of
service mental concept, and accustomed attitudes. Fighting armies are presently in
a historical stage of change from single branches of service to combined forces:
As both the enemy and our own weapons and equipment develop, there will be great
changes, as well, in the style of warfare. In order to adapt to these changes,
troop training and combat must see great changes. When tables of equipment,
education, training, and command organization are shown to be unsuitable, and when
new problems appear, they must be rapidly studied and solved. When we speak of
being a qualified commander, their term "qualif ied" means a process of constantly
moving forward as circumstances change. Thoseformerly qualified for combat cominand
may be still qualif ied for combat command today, or they may not be qualified. Those
who went through the recent self-defense counterattack combat can see this problem
very clearly can't they? At the 1975 enlarged Military Aff airs Committee meeting,
deputy chairman Deng Xiaoping spoke very descriptively: To be a company coim.~ander
today is not the same as being a company commander in the past. The company
- commander of the past would pick up his Mauser pistol and 'charge'! It's not that
easy now, and it is different than it used to be. The company commander's needs
for information are much greater than formerly. When war breaks out and you have
several tanks and an artillery company attached to your unit, how will you command
them! The talk here is about a company commander, and the question is to a company
commander. But it would also not hurt for our battalion commanders, regimental
commanders, or even our divisional or army commanders to ask themselves: Are my
commanders qualified or not? When a new war comes, what kind of an answer will I
be able to give?
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ALL FLEETS CONDUCT TRAINING FOR SENIOR HEADQUARTERS OFFICERS
Bei~ing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 18 Sep 79 p 1
[Article by Correspondent Luo Tongsong [5012 0681 2646]: "Navy Intensifies
Headquarters Training for All Echelons of Senior Off icers To Meet Requirements of
Modern Naval War and To Increase Organization and Command Capabilities"]
[Text] Recently the navy conducted an examination and summarization of this year's
headquarters training for senior officers, and set f orth the future direction and
requirements of training.
During recent years substantial transfers of personnel in combat units of various
_ naval forces have taken place, and some staff off icers are not well-versed in
wartime command work. In a situation of constant development of naval techniques
and equipment, in particular, in which electronic confrontation has become a major
technique of naval war, and in which guided missiles are gradually becoming ma~or
strike weapons, greater demands are placed on headquarters work. Not only to staff
pe~sonnel urgently require improvement of their prof essional abilities, but even
those staff personnel in position for a rather long period of tfine who possess
rather strong professional skills also require constant understanding of new cir-
cumstances and study of new problems in order to meet the requirements of modern
naval war.
- Beginning this year, senior officers and leadership organizations in the navy will
devote strict attention to senior officer headquarters training. Navy leadership
organizations have set up professional military training units for the participation
of senior naval officers and large unit leadership comrades for the purpose of
exploring the characteristics of future naval combat, as well as the guiding combat
mentality and the tactical and strategic principles f or our own forces. As of now,
10 courses have been set up requiring 72 r.ours of study. Headquarters is operating
three staff off icer training classes for the study of general information about
naval branches, navigation, and staff functions. During August, two short training
courses were organized on the subject of "Military Applications of Overall Planning
Methods" in which more than 300 professional cadres were training. At the instiga-
tion of naval leadership organizations, all f leets, bases, detachments, and garrison
districts are also giving serious attention to senior officers headquarters training.
During the first half of the year, units abave the d ivision level in the North Sea
- Fleet ran a total of i0 staff training courses. The South China Sea Fleet organized
headquarters at ~11 echelons on several occasions f or chart exercises. The East
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China Sea Fleet convened leadershtp cadre exercise meetings for above division level
in which exercise experiences were summarized and exchanged and chart work done.
- Units at certain bases of the East China Sea Fleet organized staff personnel for
group training more than 40 times, with more than 1,430 people participating in
the training.
In the course of the senior officer headquarters training, each echelan was at some
pains to closely approximate actual combat. Some units combined the craracteristics
of their naval area with tasks handed them by superior authorities to conduct
diligent study and exercise training. Some units organized airmen, submarines,
- destroyers, guided missile boats, and other surface craft to participate in
combined exercises to train combat units under various complex circumstances,
and to put into practice organizational and command capabilities.
In the course of training, all units also lay great stress on major training points..,:
The number one characteristic of modern naval warfare is speed. "Targeting,"
"calculating," and "commanding" must be done quickly and accurately. This is a
masterly ski'1 that staff personnel must prepare. In the training process for each
unit, staff ~ersonnel were required quickly, accurately, and in a minimum amount
of time to p"lot the foe's p~sition relative to our own. Some units also required
rapidly calculating the time, direction, and speed of attack of four or five assault_
groups.
~ . ;'t
The serious attention given sen.~.or off icer headquarters training by the navy made
a11 echelons of headquarters and staff personnel well-versed in combat operations,
and increased their combat professional levels. A certain base made spot examina-
tion of the chief and deputy chief of staff, and of 35 section chiefs and staff
personnel of a division level unit in which the problem was attack on an enemy ,
cruiser formation. Examination results showed overall evaluation of proficiency at
better than good. Some comrades said that the correlation of the enemy situation
and repeated exerctses gave training a quality of realism. A month's concentrated ;
training was better than a year's ordinary professionai study.
' ~
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CONSCRIPTS EXHORTED TO SACRIFICE INDIVIDUAL WELFARE TO REVOLUTION
Guangzhou ZHANSHI BAO in G`hinese 11 Jan 81 p 4
~Article: "Wholeheartedly Fulfill the Glorious Obligation of Defending the
Motherland"]
~Text~ The responsibilities we shoulder are lofty; the obligations to the mother-
land that we fulfill are glorious, and both th~ motherland and the people hold
extremely great expectations of us. Consequently, we must overcome impure motives
for entering military service, establish a correct attitude of military service,
and wholeheartedly fulfill the glorious obligation of defending the motherland.
In order to defend the motherland, comrades consciously submit to the needs of the
motherland, coming from everywhere including cities, rural villages, industrial
" plants, and schools to ~oin the armed forces. Some comrades give up opportunities
to go into industrial plants or attend university, and some give up substantial
- wage income and comfortable living conditions to enter military units to fulfill
obligations amply demonstrating a patriotic awareness, which is praiseworthy.
However, as the result of a lack of awareness on the part of some of our comrades
about becoming soldiers to fulfill obligations, after they become soldiers, they
frequently are unable to handle the interrelationship between individual weliare
and fulfillment of obligations to the people, and feel they have suffered as a
result of being a soldier. Everyone knows that certain rights ~nd certain ob liga-
tions are mutually complementary. If in earlier times the people of the entire
country ha.d not undertaken and obligation to resist the Japanese and fight the
Chiang Ka.i-shek bandits, what right would the people have today to be masters in
their own house. Unless we undertake our obligation to defend the motherland
today and safeguard the four modernizations, what right will we have in future to
enjoy the well-being of a"comfortable family?" In taking responsibility for the
defense of our motherland and the obligation to safeguard the four modernizations,
our armed forces are representing the fundamental welfare of the working people,
which ramifies to the well-being of posterity. Consequently, from the day that we
become soldiers, we should unconditionally subordinate our individua.l welfares
to the welfare of the revolution. During Spring and Autumn Times, Sima Rangju, a
general, said: "kYhen you receive orders, forget your families; when you face
military regimentation forget your relatives, and when you fee~ anxious at the
sound of the rolling battle drums, forget your own safety." If the ancients could
.be this way about the country, we should be possessed of ar. even greater spirit
of self-sacrifi~e.
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Establish a Concept of Fulfilling Obligations to the Country and Overcomc Impure
Motivations for Entering Military Service
Some comrad~s enter military service to find individual opportunities for them-
se1T!es. Their way of thinking is, First year as a soldier, second year in the
party, and third year get a discharge and enter a plant." Otherwise they `hink
of driving motor vehilcles, b ecoming a health worker, or learning a technique of
some kind to catch hold of an "iron ricebowl." Thus, they become soldiers, not
to fulfill obligations, but rather to parlay their situation into going into a
city to find a job. Comrade: should think that every year the armed forces call
up large numbers of youths f rom rural villages to enter military service, while
at the same time a large numb er of old soldiers retire. In the current situation
in which China's productivi ty is fairly backward, if everyone goes into the city
or ;oes into an industrial p lant, how much of an increase of people eating
commo4ity grain will occur in the citzes? How can the country stand it? Unless ~
rural youths return to rural villages, on whom will the modernization of agricul-
ture depend for its fulfillment? If everybody in the armed forces would like to
do technical work, who will do the non-technical work, and how will combat and
other tasks be completed? Therefore, when we become soldiers, we must establish
a concept of fulfillment of obligations, and not have as our goal the finding of
opportunities for ourselves. Our "opportunity" lies not in going into cities but
in remaining in rural villages, and neither does iC lie in becoming an industrial ,
worker, but rather in becoming a commune member. Even less does it lie in doing
some particular work, but ra ther in making a contribution to the modernization
of the country no matter wha t work we may do. Some comrades haqe the right idea '
when fihey say that revolutionary work contains all trades and professions, each
possessing its own leading authority, and each having a future. So long as during
our period of military servi ce we strive to learn the skill of serving the people .
and improve our competence, no matter where we ma.y go in the future, there will
be bright prospects. When p roductivity decrea.ses, family economic income must
inevitably decrease as we11, and livelihood becomes somewhat impaired. However,
the more wealthy the country becomes, and the more the four modernizations develop;
- the more our personal welfa re can be realized. One cannot suppose on this account
that to become a soldier is to get the worst of things. Combat hero Liang Yingrui;'
[2733 5391 3843~ said it well: "Without trees, where would fruit come from~ and
without a country., where wou ld the family come from?" We otten speak of "protec-
ting the family and defending the country."
~ This concisely and clearly explains the inevitable relationship between protectin~~
the country and protecting the family. When we become a soldier today it is not: '
just to protect the millions upon millions of parents, brothers, and sisters, it`...
is also for the purpose of p rotecr.ing one's own parents, brothers and sisters.
It is not only to protect the fami.lies of others, but also to protect one's own Y
family. In this sense, how can we get the worst of things when we become soldiers,~
If one sa,ys that we get the worst of things when we become soldiers, the tens qf~_
thousands of martyrs who he roically sacrificed their lives got even more of the`
~ ,
worst of things, did they? When,;Dong Cunrui ~~5~16 1317 3843~, Hua{~g Jiguan~`
~ 7806 4949 0342) , Luo Guangxie ~I'S012 0342 3610~ Yu Qingyang I0060' 1987;'~ 7122~
L3ang Yingrui ~2733 5391 3843J, and Li Chengwen ~2621 2052 2429) sacrificed
themselves to the common goo d, they had no thought of getting the worst of things~~~
_ as individuals. Quite the contrary; they were fully prepared mentally for
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- individual sacrifice. After they had sacrificed themselves for the motherland and
for the people, the families of numerous ma.rtyrs sent the younger brothers and
younger sisters of the martyrs to military units to take up the ~.~ms left by the
mQrtyrs. If one says tha.t to be a soldier is to get the worst of things, why then
did they keep on taking the worst of things and go looking for the worst of thinga?
- Qn the contrary, they not only had no sense of getting the worst of things, but
felt exalted. We should learn from the revolutiona.ry martyrs, and correctly
handle the relationship between the welfare of the revolution and personal welfare.
We should also realize that the party and government as well as the broad masses
of people are exceptionally solicitous about the livelihood of the families of
soldiers, have taken a series of ineasures, and have exerted very great efforts
to look after them and give them preferential treatment. After rural villages
implemented the party's economic policies and instituted systems of responsibility
for production, the CCP Central Committee and government departments at all
echelons adapted to the new situation, adopting various measures to assure that
the livelihood of dependents of military martyrs would be no longer than tha.t of
local co~une members at the medium level. The "CCP Central Commi ttee Decisions
on Some Questions Concerning the Acceleration of Agricultural Development" clearly
stipulated tha.t once rural villages have instituted systems of responsibility for
production, "as the collective economy develops, collective welfare endeavors
should gradually be undertaken whereby the old and the infirm, orphans and wi.dows,
disabled commune members, and disabled military men, and the fauii lies of martyrs
receive greater assurance of their livelihoods." Each province, municipality and
autonomous regions has done a lot of work in the implementation c~f party policies
on special care for disabled servicemen, and for family members of revolutiona.ry
martyrs and servicemen. At the Third Session of the Fifth National People's
Congress, numerous delegates referred to the issue of supporting the armed forces
and giving special care to their dependents. In the course of discussions, some
made speeches saying that "effective measures should be taken to resolve hardships
_ in the families of soldiers, and that just as during the period of the Red Army,
the livelihood of the families of soldiers should be no lower than it had been
before the soldier entered the armed forces." In actual fact, every jurisdiction
is in prqcess of implementating special care policies in accordance with instruc-
tions from the Central Committee. Some of our military units have also received
numerous notices in the wail of preferential workpoints and cash assistance. Of
course, the families of some comrades continue to suffer hardships in their lives
_ and we should believe that on this issue the party and the government wi11 gradu-
ally help find solutions.
Some urban comrades who entered military service had formerly intended to enter
~iniversity or take up an occupation. Now they have answered the call to enter
- the armed forces. Their thoughts had been "first to college and then to work,
but never becoming a soldier." They regarded soldiering as a course of last
resort, and this view is also a wrong one. Unless it is corrected, it may easily
_ produce an attitude of simply muddling through in one way or another for the three
yea.rs of service, or may even produce a mercenary mentality. Going to college
and taking up an occupation are all very well and good, of coL;.se. There is
nothing wrong with them, and they are neither higher nor lo~aer than becoming a
soldier. When the nPriod of service for comrades ha.s been completed, they ma.y
still take up occupations, and if conditions permit, they may go to college, too.
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The question is now that they are soldiers, is that worse than going to college
or taking up an occupation. We say that being a soldier is the fulfillment of an
obligati~n and not the selection of a profession. It is different from taking up
an occupation or going to college. The people of the motherland have confidence
in us, and have handed us the guns. It is incumbent upon us earnestly and .
conscientiously to fulfill our obligation and tak~~ up the heavy burden the people:
have given us. This glorious position also provides us a fine opportunity to,.t.~_
temger ourselves. After several years of tempering, improvement in our ideol-: :
ogical consciousness, further strengthening of our will, and increase in our.
= cultural knowledge and some specialized knowledge will create better conditions~.~
for our future employment. If you lackadaisically muddle through a few years in...
the armed forces, neither striving to learn nor assiduously tempering yourself,
but rather throwing your youth away for nothing, without making any progress so '
_ that you possess no skills to take up future employment, you can only blam^ your
own incorrect attitude.
Still other comrades figure that they will first become soldiers when they go inCo
the armed forces, and then become cadres with some official position, figuring
that this is fulfillment of their obligations as soldiers. Nowadays, in order to
improve the military and political quality of cadres, our armed forces ha.ve changed
the system of selecting cadres directly from among company level soldiers, reQuir-
ing that they undergo training in military schools. Some cadres that their desire
to be a cadre is a good one, and that all they have to do is strive to learn
military ma.tters, politics and culture and meet other requirements. Then af ter..-.
testing shows them qualified, they will be able to enter a military school for
further preparation and become a cadre. But this is a matter of future develop-
ment. For the moment, most important is fulfillment of obligations, and being a'
good soldier. This is to say that conscripts do not necessarily have no chance.~
of entering military schools for study to become cadres, but neither does it meaa
that you will be promoted to cadre simply because you have become a soldier. .
If one holds to the idea of becoming a soldier in order to become a cadre, it may
be very difficu?t for one to become an "official," because if you are thinking.~only
of yourself, and calculating everything in terms of becoming an official, you
cannot consciously fulfill your obligations. And if you cannot do a good job of!
being a compulsory suldier, how can ~ou expect to be a cadre? �
Still other comrades have rather simple ideas. They are not concerned with working
or not working, or whether they have a lot of money or little; all they care about
is traveling around, seeing everything possible, and hoping with all their hearts
to go to a large city. This is, in fact, unrealistic. Where military forces:;~~~
garrisoned, and the duties they perform are the result of consid~ration of the:..~
overall situation and the needs for combat preparedness. When we become soldiers,
we may possibly go to a bustling city, or possibly to somewhat out-of-the-way rural
village, or possibly to an uninhabited island or border area. None of this can
be changed to suit our individual wills. It mu~t also be realized at the same ,
time that we are carrying out lofty and glorious responsibilities, and we canao~t-~
think only of light tasks, but.,rather must be mentally prepared to sweat a.'great
deal and ~suffer hardships. For ~irture~combaty~>it is necessary a~ wek}. to ~aepare
to shed blood in resolute fulfillment of the heavy trust of the peopl~`of the
motherland. Being a soldier cannot be regarded as something that is nice and: ~
relaxed and a lot of fun. Of course, depending on mission requirements, movement
, to a new place to do guard duty or undergo training, with a chance to see the
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beautiful rivers and mountains of the motherland, may also expand one's horizons.
But the "horizon" of hoping to be sent to a large city, is too narrow a one.
Strictly Require Oneself To Be an Outstanding Conscript
It is by no means strange that among comrades who strictly require themselves to
be outstanding draftees that there is this or that kind of petty concern. Bef~re
they have understood the ~neaning of fulfilling their obligations as soldiers, it
is difficult for some comrades not to have this or that idea. But once we under-
stand the rationale for fulfillment of obligations as soldiers, we should rid
ourselves of those petty concerns, and earnestly fulfill our obligations as fully
as possible. It must be acknowledged tha t in the fulfillment of obligations as
~ soldiers, some matters of individual welfare must be temporarily shelved.
In terms of the iuanediate, one might say this is a hardship. But hardhip of this
kind is for the fundamental welfare of the people, and is entirely appropriate.
The loftiness of responsibility and the gl~ry of duty of a people's soldier lie
precisely in making this kind of sacrifice. Moreover, every youth of age must
encounter a similar problem. In long range terms, fulfillment of obligations as
a soldier, safeguarding the security of the motherland, and defending the building
of the four modernizations is, at once, also safeguarding the peacPful work of
one's own parents, brothers and sister s. Is it not true that our generation is
able to grow up in health because during the past more than 20 years group after
group of youths became soldiers and carried out their obligations, guaranteeing
the security of the motherland and creating for us a peaceful environment in which
_ smooth growth was possible? Today when we fulfill our obligations, the young
children also benefit. As far as our working people are concerned, if we depart
from the security of the country, the independence of our people and the prosperity
of the motherland, there will be no individual or family well-being, and that wi11
indeed be great suffering. Furthermore, we should also realize that even though
everyone fulfills obligations, the government still gives our families needed
material care and glorious political treatment. For comrades, all clothing, food
and housing needs are provided for, f or some better than before they became
- soldiers. During their period of military service, comrades can also become
- steeled, can study various techniques, and can increase their knowledge, creating
valuable conditions for their future growth. We must not overlook this, being
concerned only with hardships and not about benefits.
In summary, we must combine individual welfare and the overall welfare, and ur~iL-y
immediate welfare and the longterm welfare, bearing firmly in mind the great trust
- of the motherland and the people, never forgetting that one is a glorious soldier
of the people being tempered in the great furnace of the revolution, fulfilling
one's duty and fulfilling one's responsibilities in standing guard and of doing
sentry duty for the motherland, and fulfilling the various missions that the
party and the people have handed us. In launching a movement for striving to be
an outstanding conscript, some military units proposed the following requirements '
~ for evaluating and comparing outstanding conscripts: (1) content to serve with
correct handling of the relationship b etween individual welfare and the welfare of
the revolution; (2) resolute implementa tion of the party line, programs, and~
policies, and the orders of superior authority; (3) sa*isfactory completion of
education and training assignments; (4) good workstyle, discipline, and moral
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qualities; (5) respect for leaders, concern for comrades, and a spirit of fraterna.l
unity. Each and every comrade can use this to place severe requirements on himself
to b ecome an outstanding military conscript.
Glory will forever belong to the soldiers of the people who contributed their
youth to safeguarding the motherland and defending the four modernizations.
9432
CSO: 4005/2079
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
BUILDING OF REAR ARF~r1 LOGISTICS DEFENSE FORCES DISCUSSED
~ Bei~ing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 1~ Jul 79 p 3
[Article by Chen Yazhou [7115 0068 5297] and Liu Shengjun [0491 0524 0193]: "An
Imperative Action; Several Views on Strengthening of Logistics Defense Forces"]
[Text] Victory in war depends on consolidation of the rear, and in modern warfare
in particular, reliance on the rear is even greater. Therefore, when waging war,
both sides emphasize destruction of the opponent's logistics potential and supply
to the front as a major target of attaclc. In World War II, one of the major
reasons for Germany's defeat was that its rear was not consolidated. The German
force's battle line was wide and long, and the rear areas were weakly defended
- with no attention being given to their defense. The Soviet forces used this weak-
ness of the German forces t~ organize various kinds of small force units to attack
the German force's rear supply lines, finally making it impossible for German army
logistics to continue to support the war, and being wiped out in the end. Apart
from the political reasons for Napoleon's defeat on his distant march into Russia,
another reason was a lack of precautionary defense of his supply lines, which
_ consequently sustained attack and destruction at the hands of the Russian forces.
, From this may be seen that in order to take full and timely advantage of the role
of various supply techniques and comba~ materials in modern warfare, and to assure
uninterrupted supply to combat forces by rear area supply, a rather strong
logistics defense force is needed.
How can logistics defense forces be strengthened. A look at the situation of
China's forces today shows only four ways of doing the job:
Building a logistics defense unit. From the time of founding up until the present
- time, China's armed forces have r~ever had a specialized lugistics defense unit.
Along with the need to modernize China's armed =orces will come security functions,
personnel assignments and an organizational structure on behalf of logistic5 in
the armed forces. Today when we propose the establishment of defense units,
platoons, and organizations within the table of organization of logistics, it is
because of the changes in our own forces and the situation existing in the armed ~
forces of numerous countries. The United States armed forces, for example, give
serious attention to strengthening of logistics defense forces. The United States
Army National Guard established the 139 Rear Area Combat Center in Raleigh, North
Carolina in 1973. It was organized from among toops of the 30th Armored Infantry
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Division. United States Army regulations provide that every military commander and
every support group commander in an army combat zone shall have a rear area combat
center. When the army is fighting independently, it is required that two rear area
- combat centers be organized. Each combat center will have 17 officers and 50
enlisted men who have undergone specialized training to be divided into five units.
Combat logistics units shall be composed of specialists from different branches of
services and wi11 be responsible for guarding and carrying out rear area defense
tasks, i.icluding intelligence, communications, anti-airdrop, anti-airraid, engineers,
military police, "three defenses" and disassembly of explosive devices. Each unit
can control from two to four rear area guard platoons. Battalion level and bri-
gade level rear area guard platoons may coordinate dis^ussion of guard matters
with reserve units close by the rear area logistical units. When enemy attack or
infiltration is on a large scale to the extent that logistics defense platoons
lose their capability to guard, combat units may be dispatched to take up s~ecially
prescribed guard duties in order to assure smooth execution of rear area logistics
_ security work. Division level rear area defense measures and their methods of
~ execution are identical with those of the battalion and brigade levels.
The American army's National Guard rear areCan~~nitsCatctheaarmynleveleanddabove in
deserving of our study and consideration.
our armed forces establish a rear area logistics def ense combat commaoons,Iandt
possible under such a command to establish highly mobile forces, p
organizations composed of various branches of service? During war time, these
forces and field combat forces attached to rear areas, local forces, and militia
could jointly decide rear def ense plans, or else units and organizations sub-
ordinate to the command could take direct responsibility for organizing and
- directing units and militia attached toisticsibelowrtheearmy~levelficouldPldepending
and use. All echelons of rear area log
on circumstances, organize a corresponding.number of defense units such as a combat
logistics regiment (or battalion) by a field comb3t army, divi~ional organization
- of a combat logistics battal3on (or company), and organization by regiment of a
combat logistics company (or platoon). These units would be the main force of
logistics defense at each echelon, and these main f orces would play a major role
in organizing, at their own echelon, logistics personnel and attached local
- militia to conduct various security and defense duties for logistics.
Armed rear area logistics personnel. Under modern warfare conditions, use of
advanced weapons and equipment to arm rear area logistics personnel to increase
logistic's forces (platoon) self-defense capabilities, is a matter to which
numerous countries are giving extremely close attention. During recent years,
the Soviet armed forces have not only armed their rear area logistics forces
with relatively advanced logistics se~gontbetecuii~edSwith oneloretwo typesaof
also required that each logistics p q Pp
combat weapons. The Soviety navy has also established a naval combat logistics
defense support squadron able to operate several thousand nautical miles away from
its bases. Therefore, perfection of defense combat equipment for rear area logis-
tics personnel is necessary to meet the combat needs of our armed forces' logistics.
Analyzed in terms of realities in our armed forces' logistics forces (platoons),
drivers, repair personnel, sanitation personnel, cooks and provisioners,maintenance
personnel and communications personnel could all be equipped with light weapons,
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- one to each person being best. Some logistics units (platoons) might also be
equipped with anti-aircraft machineguns, or rocket launchers and such heavy weapons
or new weapons. In the course of the recent self-defense countera~tack against
Vietnam, a motorcar unit equipped with sev~ral anti-aircraft machineguns could
handle small groups of attacking enemy. Now, if equipped with a certain number of
weapons and given appropriate combat training when other specialized training is
given them, our railroad troops, engineers, and linemen could become a strong
logistics defense force.
Intensif ication of defensive combat training of logistics personnel. On the basi~
of the foregoing, specialized training and rear area logistics defense tactical
_ training for rear area logistics forces (or platoons) is very necessary.
Depending on the work to be done by rear area logistics units, while undergoing
rear area logistics tactical and technical training rear area logistics defense
furces should undergo diversified special knowledge training, and while undergoing
specialized training, logistics personnel should undergo military training in
which each person should be required to thoroughly master his own weapon and be
- able to use terrain features in defensive combat. Logistics personnel training and
defense forces training should have a different emphasis, and content of training,
courses, and times should be of suitable proportions.
Organizing Militia to Do Defense Work. Countless times during the revolutionary
war and during the more recent defensive counterattack combat against Vietnam,
militia have supported the front lines and guarded the rear, making great contribu-
tions in both and demonstrating the great power of people's war. However, because
- modern wars of the future will be conducted in three dimensions with battlefield
conditions being complex and ever changing, f or militia to undertake the arduous
task of defending rear area logistics, they must be thoroughly organized and
rationally used. The main matters that must be given attention are as follows:
- (1) When militia participate in wartime rear area logistics defense, they must
be organized su�ficiently well in advance with emergency training being given them
on top of their regular training, so that they will understand their duties, and
be familiar with the organizational structure and personnel. Under ordinary cir-
cumstances, militia should not be permitted to carxy out their duties alone. The
militia organization also should not be made large, for when the military organ-
izations become large, it presents a large target and becomes prone to enemy
attack. Most militia organizations should consist of small platoons exercisit;,,
their duties. These small platoons should operate in conjunction with defense
forces or be organized and led by persons from main force units. All militia
. platoons should operate under the overall organization and command of rear area
- logistics defense units, platoons (or teams).
(2) Participation of militia in defense work should be permitted only after
selection. Depending on the quality of military and political training and the
health of common militiamen and grassroots cadre militiamen, militia platoons or
teams should be organized to undertake different kinds of defense tasks. Militia
platoons (or teams) with fairly strong combat capabilities should accampany main
,force units in def.ense of .rear area logistics bases, communications hubs, important
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bridges, and such major rear area installations. At the same time some mainstay
militia can be organized to work with defense forces in being responsible for
surrounding and annihilating enemy spies and enemy airborr~ troops in rear areas.
(3) Under modern warfare conditions, militia accompanying rear area logistic
defense forces should be fully armed and shoutd enjoy the same emoluments as
on-duty troops. All fully armed militia should be thoroughly organized and rigor-
ously trained so that these mainstay militia are thoroughly familiar with their own
weapons, and possess specialized knowledge of a series of defense matters such as
standing guard, doing sentry duty, and being on the alert to act as a mobile,
capabl~ and vigorous defense force possessed of great combat strength.
9432
CSOL 4005/2077
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REVISED REGULATIONS FOR ARMY, AIRFORCE BOAT UNITS ISSUED
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Aug 79 p 1
[Article by Wang Shuchen [37(9 3219 5256] and Yin Hongjun [1438 4767 6511]:
"General Staff, General Political Department, and General Logistics Department
Promulgate Army Boat Regulations. General Logistics Department Run Short
Training Classes for Boat Unit Leadership Cadres, and Study Measures for
Putting Regulations Into Full Effect"]
[Text] In order to accord with the shift in the Party's work focus and build an
army boat unit compatible with the needs of combat forces in island, border
defense, and internal waterway areas, the General Staff, the General Political
Department, and the General Logistics Department have recently promulgated the
"Chinese People's Liberation Army Army Boat Regulations."
Army boat units will conduct communications and tranportation, reconnaissance and
patrols, combat training, and special operational tasks from Heilong~iang in~the
north to the vast coastal areas and territorial seas of South China Sea islands...
It will be a major force in carrying out various kinds of marine security for the
army and the airforce. Because of the development and renewal of equipment of the
army boat units, the "Army Boat Ma.nagement System" promulgated by the General
Logistics Department in 1960 is no lon.ger suitable. Following investigation and
~tudy by the three departments, summarization of 30 years of practical experiences
by army boat units, and absorption of advanced experiences of the navy and ather
_ technical branches of service, the "Chinese People's Liberation Army Army boat
Regulations" were promulgated.
The "Regulations" continue and carry forward the fine tradition and work style of
our armed forces, carry out and strengthen combat preparation and war preparedness
programs, and are a fine charter for the building of boat forces. In issuing the
notice about the "Regulations," the three departments strongly noted that "this
regulation is the foundation of technical security for army and airforce boat
units to manage, conduct military training, organize and deploy, dispatch and use."
In order to rapidly implement the "Regulations," between 1 July and 19 August
the General Logistics Department ran two short training classes for boat unit
leadership cadres. Comrades involved in the training conscientiously studied
the "Regulations." ~veryone said that the "Regulations" reflect the objective
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laws of boat equipment, are rules for instituting scientific utilization and
management, and are a set of rules and regulations for the various activities of
boat units. With them, we have grounds for taking action; work has standards, and
combat has objectives. The short training class also took account of the work
needs of leadership cadres in studying "Regulations on Avoidance of Collision,"
formulation and approval of navigation plans, and such special knowledge. Boat
units from Guangzhou, Nanjing, and Shenyang military forces gave separate brief ings
on training experiences in guarding against typhoons and fighting typhoons, three
defenses, and navigation in fog.
As a result of their study of the "Regulations," everybody realized more clearly
the position and function of army boat units, and had an increased sense of respons-
ibility. All large units also made concentrated study of ways to carry out the
"Regulations." Some units are preparing this year to group train all cadre~, and
some are preparing to train only half at f irst. Next year, all army boat units
will carry out the "Regulations" to the full.
9432
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
GOOD CARE OF HORSES STRESSED PENDING ABILITY TO REARM WITH MODERN EQUIPMENT
. Guangzhou ZHANSHI BAO in Chinese 11 Mar 81 p 2
[Article: "Work Concerning Military Horses Cannot Be Neglected"]
[Text] It is said nowadays that the armed forces will be mechanized and modernized,
- so mules and horses have become an antiquated means of transportation with little
use. Consequently, in some units, mules and horses have no.t been a matter of con-
cern for a long time; their feeding and care has been careless, and they are with-
- out shelter and .lack fodder. The incidence of sickness is also comparatively high,
resulting in a large number of deaths or early retirements from service, with great
losses both for our combat preparations and our economy.
~ Do mules and horses still have any function in modern warfare? A look at the self-
- defense counterattack against Vietnam provides the answer. In this combat, which
lasted only 28 days and penetrated 80-odd kilometera into Viet~}am,.,in addition to
the use of military horses directly involved in combat with combattant units, a
large number of civilian horses were used to support the front, transporting
material for units. For some units, goods transported by military horses amounted
to mare than one-third the total amount of goods transported. During fighting in
the direction of Caobinh, in particular, as our forces advanced to the Banong area,
tlza enemy put up a lite and death struggle, suddenly dynamicing the d~w of a reser-
voir and sending a torrent of water to cover the highways. Motor vehicles could
not pass, and under these circumstances, commanders actively or~anized mules and
horses for transport, actually transporting case after case of war material to the
_ front lines to assure victory in the battle. These facts strongly attest to tY~
continuing important function and position of mules and horses in modern warfare.
- Considering that any future war in our region will be i*~ mountains, hills, and
forest areas, and be limited by the topography and the roads, in situations where
transportation of materials by motor vehicles would be very difficult, in order to
maintain the mobility of forces and supply logistical materials, it would be
necessary to make the most of the role of mules and horses. As Deputy Chairman Ye
Jianying said: "In future wars, both plains and mountain areas will be battle-
fields, but in holding out for long periods of time, mountair? areas will be impor-
tant. Consequently, mules and horses cannot be neglected. Motor vehicles, mules
and horses are two legs to walk on."
Additionally, it is necessary to realize that China is still very poor, and that
science and technology is not developed. In order to further readjust the national
- economy, it is not possible to allocate more funds to replace the equipment of the
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armed forces. Therefore, a process will be required to mechanize and modernize
China's armed forces. We must base ourselves upon the use of inferior equipment
tn win victory over enemies with superior equipment. Mules and horses continue to
be a major combat force and cannot be suddenly abolished. In the case of the two
super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, despite their possession
of the world's most advanced transportation equipment, for the defense of their
own soil, they still maintain a certain number of military horses. Therefore, we
must keep our eyes on the overall situation on the one hand, think of the future,
and actively improve upon our antiquated weapons and equipment. On the other hand,
it is also necessary to face current realities and do a better job of military
horse work. Every echelon of leadership should take this task firmly in hand,
place it on their agendas, discuss it several times each year, make all ot�` efforts
several times each year, build up a corps of military pack train drivers, intensify
training with military horses, be conscientious about prevention and treatment of ;
military horse illnesses, do a good job of military horse material supply, and ~
_ assure that every military horse is plump and sturdy, able to pack supplies and
- fit to travel. In this way, when fighting breaks out, victory will be more secure`.
r
9432
CSO: 4005/2081 END ~
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