JPRS ID: 9853 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
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JPRS L/9853
17 Julv 1981
` Near East North Africa Re ort
p
CFOUO 23/81)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORiVIATION SERVICE
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xeTE
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JPRS L/9853
17 July 1981
NEAR EAST/NORTH ~iFRICA RE�ORT
(FOL'0 2 3/81)
CONTENTS
~LGEP.IA
Algerian Transitional Phase Discussed
(Pierre-Yves Cosse; PROJET, May 81) 1
IRAN
Iranians in UK Receive Appeal Re~artedly From Bani-Sadr
~ (Hazhir Teimourian; THE TIM7ES, 27 Jun 81) 7
LIBYA
Briefs
FAO Contribution ~ c~
Saharan Agriculture Conference g
Garment Orders g
1 SC~R OC CO
Various Political Forces in Nation Surveyed
(Fu'ad Abu Mansur; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, various dates).......... 10
SUDAN
Aid for Industrialization Discussed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 15 May 81) 37
Mineral Research Summarized
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MED7.TERRANEENS, 22 May 81) 39
Automobile Import Sources, Amounts Reviewed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 22 May 81) 40
Restoration of White Nile Pumping Stations Reviewed
(MARCHES TROPICAtJX ET MEDITERRANE~NS, 15 May 81) 41
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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Brief s
- Saudi Aid 42
Pesticide Products 42
Loan From Spain 42
Soy Project 42
- b -
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ALC~I61
- ALGFRIA.N TRANSITIONAL PHASE DISCUSSID
Paris FttOJET in French May 81 pp 613-617
jArticle by Pierre-Yves Cosse: "Algeria in Transition"J
- [Text] In March 1979 the high-ranking Algerian officers chose one of their own,
Chadli Bendjedid, the most senior officer in the highest rank, to succeed Houari
Boumedienne. Their choice was ratified by a special FLN congress, specially
assembled by the nation`'s leading cadres. After 2 years of his being president,
one might well wonder if a new economic and political system is in the process
of being established or if tre changes which have been made are still minor ones,
Recognizing Economic Mistakes
jdhat is new certainly style and behavior, both in the analysis and presentation
of problems and in decision-making. There exists a"Ghadli style" marked by cau-
tion, good sense, and moderation which is making its mark in all sectors of govern-
m~nt activity. Algeria no longer parades its~l~ as a"model" for developing
countries, it has no lessons to give, and it has stopped making defiant statements
regarding its rate of development and modernization. It recognizes the errors
which have been made, principally in the economic field, which it is high time to
c ~~�recr..
Thus there is open criticism of the ambitious industrialization of which Belaid
Abdeslam (SONATRACH's first president) was the ardent promoter. The large indus-
; trial complexes, which resort to complex technologies and continuously call on
massive znd costly foreign cooperation for assistance, are creating new forms of
. dependence. Algerians do not have real control over their m~ans of production:
- the most spectacular example of this is given by the Arzew natural gas lique-
fac.tion complex ("GNL [LNG]I which is in the hands of the American E1 Paso
Company, at a time when SONATR.ACH is in open conflict with that company about the
price of gas it sells El Paso. Large production units are spread out all over
Algeria, completely dependent on external sources for their sugplies, still not
_ having sufficient water resources at their disposal--all this is not likely to
- insure industrial take-off. By increasing the number of massive investments,
too many Algerians have delayed the time when they should be taking ~n the
responsibility of making the new means of producxion work. This whole critical
= phase h~zs ~iven rise to appraisals being drawn up under the responsibility of
the new minister of planning, appraisals which have not been made public in
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I~OR OI'FICIAI, I~SF: ~NI,Y
detailed form.* Nevertheless the press has made reference to cases of factories
working at only 10, 20, 40 or 50 percent capacity, but one cannot distinguish be-
tween cases of slow start-up and somewhat definitive failures. From this has
resulted a new industrial "discourse," set out particularly in the Algerian S-year
plan (1980-1984); priority is given to finishing projects underway, to rigorously
programming investments, to creating small and medium-sized enterprises which will
do subcontracting for large national enterprises, to strengthening ~he economic
role of the wilayas, and to redistribution benefiting light industries which are
- less capitalistic and likely to satisfy im.nediate needs.
Regarding hydrocarbons, the debate has been more confused, for questions of per-
sonality have been mixed into it. The Abdeslam and Ghozali group (Abdeslam anc~
Ghozali being SONATRACH's first two presidents) has criticized the present mii.is-
ter in writing (which is a breach of the code of conduct among Algerian leaders):
the dispute revolves mainly around the price of natural gas which at the moment
has not been allowing Algeria to derive a substantial income. More generally, the
criticism is concerned about a certain amount of squandering of scarce natural
resources which become more valuable with the passage of time. Would it not be
better to conserve subsoil resources longer rather than "squander" the dollars
earned from them in costly and unrealistic projects? zt is true that the time
when Algerian oil resources will be exhausted is near (about 15 years) and that
production has already started to decline. To be sure, natural gas is taking
over, but its development (on the technical and co~ercial leveZ) has proved to be
much more complicated and costly than anticipated.
La.rge-scale overexpansion in agriculture has also been condemned. Grouping
cogether 22,000 European farms--which were the most fertile land--into 2,000 so-
called "self-managed" properties which frequently exceed 1,000 hectares has
presented nanagement problems which are not yet resolved. So there 3re plans to
reduce the size of the properties and to assist small private farmers, particularly
with credit. Since "industrial" excess is meant to disappear, establishing
industrial complexes on good farming land is prohibited and the choice of a site
involves consent of the Walis and the municipalities. Agricultural prices paid to
producers and agricultural wages will be raised in order to reduce the disparities
- with remuneration in industry.
One finds the same sense of balance and the happy medium in the financial sector:
new importance is accorded to balancing the big accounts, particularly to elim-
inate any risk of external pressure. Regarding external debt, the debt service
to export ratio rose to 27 percent in 1979; this was considered excessive and led
to imports of heavy industrial equipment being reduced. The inflow of dollars
caused by the doubling of oil prices since the beginning of 1979 is improving the
financial situation and during the second half of 1980 made it possible to import
_ massive amounts of everyday consumer goods with a view to meeting the most pressing
needs. Balancing the budget is also recognized as desirable. The task of finan-
- cial monitoring is being upgraded; a Revenue Court has been set up, while the
authority of banks, which has been weak up to now, has been increased, particularly
in regard to state enterprises.
?~Only the amount of what is "remaining to be completed" under the heading of
projects listed in the two preceding plans have been published.
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Political Reconciliation
Internal politics as well are marked by moderation. There has been nearly total
political amnesty (t�:ith the exception of Boudiaf and Ait Ahmed); Chadli mus~ have
forced Ben Bella's release on his peers. At the time of the Ka.byle unrest (spring
- 1~8Q), tt~ere ~,~as a phase during which the authorities made use of pro~ocation and
- ].ost control of events, after which moderation carried the day, at least tempor-
arily. Arrests were kept down and all persons charged were set free. Algeria
without a doubt is one of Africa's countries with the fewest political prisoners.
Finally, Franco-Algerian relations have been marked by a desire for detente and
caution. The new president gives inr_erviews to radio and the French press. A
, serious crisis over immigration was averted tahen th~e president of the French
Republic abandoned the idea o~ forcing a sizable number o~ Algerians settled in
r"rance to speedily return to th2ir country. The Sahara and POLISARICI are ceasing
_ to be a source of serious tensions between the two countries, and France is gradual-
" ly oecoming genuinely neutral.
If style makes the man, we are beginning to know who Chadli Bend,jedid is: he is a
, man who likes order, he mistrusts theoreticiaiis and technocrats cut off from every-
day realities, and he detests "rabble-rousing" (such as that evidanced by the
~ campaign, a short-lived one it is true, against social i1Ts); he is empirically-
minded and desires to provide concrete solutions to the everyday problems of his
countrymen, particularly by reducing shortages, and housing and transportation
difficulties; he is an Algerian con.cerned about reconciliation and national unity,
and he is ready to com~ to an unders;:anding with his enemies, domestic and
foreign, out of respect for stubborn nationalism.
Not only are L�he pref erences of Algeria's new president well known but also for
2 years now his powers have been considerably strengthened. He has progressively
eliminated his principal adversaries by gentle methods. Also, in the wake of the
Kabyle troubles the party's prerogatives, which had been evidence of the presi-
c?ent's i_mpor_ence, crere cut back to his apparent benefit, though the president is
s'_il? perma~iently n~onitored by his peers. Has a"Chadl~sm" been born af ter 2
ye~~r s af ma.turing,, and is it ready to transform orientations whicli are still
vague i.nto clear policies?
Ti~e Means of Change Are Nonexistent
In ordei- to replace the "state capitalism" set up by Houari Boumedienne, a new
formu?a *aould have to en�~erge. In fact, neither the ideology, the methods nor the
personnel teams for its replacement exist. Perha.ps President Chadli has opened up
a phase oi transition to a new regime, but this phase has certainly not ended.
, First cf all the new president lacks a clear ideology. From this standpoint,
Ctiadli is not an Algerian Deng Xiao-Ping. All one has to do is run through
official documents to observe nearly total continuity. Chadli Bendjedid could
have sifted through ihe legacy of his predecessor, considering that "Algerian
socialism" consisted of several major orientations: harnessing national resources
(lan3 and hydrocarbons), keeping state control over the tools necessary for rapid
dev~lo,nlent (state enterprises), fixing priorities by means of a medium-term plan,
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. , . . .
an active income policy, social expenditures and health, an~i strug~lln~; :a~;uiiist
illiteracy. Other mechanisms would have been considered as means or methods to
adapt according to circumstances: extending nationalization of the means of
production to the service sector or to small businesses, the degree to which there
is concentration in industry and banking, a f ew state enterprises having a monopoly
over import rights, and fixing productiox~ prices in an authoritarian way. Unless
these "gains" are questioned, President Chadli's preferences will remain at the
state of wishful thinking and changes will remain marginal. Rigid official doc-
trines permanently limit his margin for maneuvering.
~ For example, in order to establish either state enterprises or privat'.e companies
which are either medium-sized or small, those companies must not have to wait
- several years to obtain equipment or necessary spare parts from state enterprises
which have "overall import authorizations" at their disposal and use them on a
priority basis for their own needs and those of other large compani~s. Neith:r
- will there be any diversification of the industrial netkork without far-reaching
modification of the import system and without changes in taxes and credits. For
the moment, this mechanism is part of the gains which cannot be questioned. By
the same token, boosting a private sector which would compete for services assumes
that the appropriation of ineans of production be abandoned for activities like the
hotel business which the Algerian Governmen t, given the current state of its capa-
- bilities, cannot adequately manage.
Most of all, a clear method for regulating the economy should be chosen. The
situation is currently a paradoxical one. On the one hand the market does not
take responsibility for determining prices and general production trends. On the
~ther hand there is no real Algerian "GOSPLAN": the Ministry of Planning is a weak
institution and its principal interventionary activity is concerned wlth invest-
ments. The technical ministries and state enterprises have at their disposal a
- large r~argin of autonony for setting their monopoly prices, disregarding the
requirements of the coordination of sectors. At this time, when new production
entities are starting to supply the domestic market in a meaningful way, the
problem of logical consistency is becoming sharpened. Either Algeria has to pro-
vide itself with a mandatory centralized nlanning system which sets objectives
and norms at all stages of production via sector ministries, or it has to agree ~o
let supply and demand gradually come into play in sectors where a certain amount of
competition can show up, although it may mean subsidizing some basic products for
consumer benefit such as is done already. Because of existing shortages and
extensive hoarding--of cash--thi~ last general policy could be implemented only
grad.ually. An essential prerequisite is ma ssive reduction in paper money in
circulation, cahatever way it is done (voluntary conversion into savings at finan-
cial institutions or German-stvle authoritarian monetary reform). If ~ choice is
not madz, the unofficial market will continue to expand and will become official,
while state enterprises will still be in the process of asking the financial
authorities to replenish their operating capital in the form of appropriate funds.
Cadres Are Lacking
For this kind of reorientation there needs to be a homogeneous team which is not
now ~he case. Certainly there are some quite brilliant and competent politicians
surrounding President Chadli, the prototype being the current minister of foreign
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affairs, riohamed Benyahia. But in this underdeveloped country the elites are smal~ ~
and were d~cima*_e~ by the colonial war, There has been an unfilled void since the
removal of Belaid Abdeslam, whose arguments can be questioned but not his intelli-
gence and character. The minister ot planning, who lived for a long time in the
Jnited States, is not sufficiently entrenched politically to assert himself in thE
- areas ~~f bath the.ory and organization. The replacement of leaders is slow and
difficult; the former president had promoted technocrats but they have fallen back
in cases wliere they had not gained sufficient credenti.als i~z the war of liberati~n.
The A;..N [National Liberation Army] has already supplied Algeria with many of its
' cadres and it is not in a position to flood the country with leaders of a high
stars~lard. Cadres with influence benefit from income due to their status even when
the;� are recognized by everyone as incompetent.* To be sure, ministers or leading
figures in state enterprises are replaced from time to time, but those actions re-
main limited. In a context such as this one the Boumedienne system, which is sup-
portpd by only a:ninority but has to its credit the fact that it is established,
shows itselL to be relatively secure. Many Algerians, having seen their country
narrowly escape chaos in the period which followed independence, fear change,
whatever change it may be. They are fearful of the disorder which would be caused
during an initial period by reforms and sudden changes of officials, disorder which
- would be difficult to avoid in a c~untry in which family, regional and political
cZans are powerful. Finally, the president and his government are not protected
from politicai reactions by the late president`s supporters. An excessively pro-
nounced opening up would be interpreted as a"Sadatization" of the economy, and
rapprochement with Egypt by a member of the "Rejection Front" seems difficult to
conceive of in the short term. The behavior of Algerian leaders and cadres is
characterized by great caution, and a wait-and-see attitu3e prevails over the
spirit of initiative.
- Therefore, for 2 years many steps which have been taken are negative, symbolic or
limited in character. The large industrial projects have been checked and even
' called into question (the third Arzew liquefaction plant, for example) but no small
a..d medium-scale industrial policy has begun. The breaking up of SONATRACH into
sever~l autonomous companies was ~nnounced at the beginning of 1980, yet there is
S~LJ~. Ollly a single SONATRACH in existence. The marketing of agricultural products
has beer made more flexible, since self-managed areas can sell directly in the mar-
ket, b:~� tlie restructuri.ng of enterprises has not started. Although a 600-page
document called "Draft 1980-1984 Plan" was debated by 2,000 representatives at a
conference, specific choices were avoided, whether they had to do with sr.ructural
reforms or large projects. Algeria`s march towards development was slowed rather
than its direction shifted. Strict regulations which are still in place are being
bei~t. Thus, every year a million Algerians are able to bring back in accompanying
ba~gage from France several billions worth of goods not recorded at customs, good~
wh~..~?~ sre being financed illegally according to Algerian law, with the help of
S5U,000 Algerian i~nigrants.
Can Algeria remain in this halfway situation for long, the situation of a bureau-
cratic state-controlled but tolerant system? On the strictly economic level r_here
~~The struggle against corruption which started several months ago is introducing
- a new risk for cadres with influence.
S
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is no reason for the system to become rapidl} obstructed: petroleum and natural
gas income allows Algeria to import whatever is strictly necessary ~o ins~ire its
population`s minimal needs and to carry out a certain amount of develop ment, and
the freedom of movement between the two Mediterranean coasts guarantees a flexi-
bility which is indispensable.
On the other hand, in the social area, the risks are considerable but vague. The
emerging working class, which has be~n given preferential treatment by the govern-
ment, is expressing a growi.ng discontent in the forr~ of still isollted strikes.
' The discontent is the result of housing, transportation and supply difficulties,
_ and cost of living problems (including the unofficial market) while democratic
participation efforts are ta~cen over by the FLN or UGTA [General Union of Algerian
Workers] bureaucracy or by the management of the nstional companies. In spite of
the massive school enrollment effort (nearly ~ million children in school), young
people are uncomfortable between two cultures and two mod~ls of consumption, are
often without work (the level of unemployed persons in urban areas is 20 percent),
and can become radicalized, particularly under the guise of Moslem fundamentalism
which is experiencing an undeniable renewal. Even the possibly sizable return of
immigrants who feel attached to certain European values (secularism, union rights)
might disturb the social and political equilibrium.
Algeria lives in uncertaint~ and a state of incompleteness. The enthusiasm of its
leaders and its �oreign supporters, particularly the French ones, has disappeared.
We should not be surprised by a situation like this. A country which was deprived
of its cultural, social and political identity by the colonial power and which is
experiencing a tzemendous population and economic explosion will only achieve a
~ viable and accepted method of regulation slowly. What Third World country can
claim to have found lasting solutions less than 20 years after independence?
COPYRIGHT: by CERAS, 15, rue R.-Marcheron, 92170 Vanves. (1981)
9631
cso: 4800/80
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FOR OFN7('IA1. litiH: ON1..1'
3~
IRAN
IRANIANS IN UK RECEIVE APPEAL RF,PORTEDLY FRUM BANI-SADR
LD~70918 London THE TIMES in English 27 Jun 81 p 1
[Article by Hazhir Teimourian]
[TextJ Iranians living in Britain last night circulated what was described as
- an appeal by Mr Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, the deposed president, calling on the
people of Iran to resis t tyranny. This is the first reported statement f rom
rir Bani-Sadr since he was last seen on June 12, He is in hiding.
In separate messages to the people and to the armed forces of Iran, Mr Bani-Sadr
said he did not recognize the legality of his deposition.
"You must continue to resist the imposition of any tyranny on you, whether it
be of local orig3n, or coming from abroad, so that our people will gradually
gain faith in themselves and in a better, more progressive future," he was
quoted as saying.
Ttiz appeals were circulated in the form of a dupl3cated document bearing the
title Islamic revolution, that of Mr Bani-Sadr's recently-banned newspaper.
E~;le so~.irces said the statements were telephoned abroad on Wednesday from
scr,iewh,-re in Iran.
The Iranian authorities have said the former president was still in th e country
and orders were given to the people to arrest him on sight. There has been
speculation that he had fled to Egypt.
~:is uisappearance came as a climax to a rising tide of criticism by religioss
`~~i-:c.~ ~~~ntalists . He was finally stripped of his of fice by Ayatollah Khomeyni
c~n Aionday.
Cali~_r.g himsel.f the elected president of Iran, Mr Bani-Sadr said the Islamic
Rep ubl~can Party (IRP) of clerical fundamentalists which dominates parliament,
owed its majority to ballot rigging and intimidation of voters. In any case, .
tlie ~otal of its apparent support in the parliamentary elections did not
exceed four million, whereas the president was elPCted to his post by
11 million people.
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NOR OFFICIAL USF: ~NLY
In the first of the messages, addressed to the armed forces, the former president
urged them to fight on until final victory over Iraq was achieved, saying that
in the present critical situation that Iran faced his own predicament was
i~naterial. It was of vital importance that the armed forces should prevent
outside factors from weakening their morale, or traitorous hands stabbing them
:r. t'ye ba~~k.
He u~f~nded his role as the fcrmer commander-in-chief of the armed forces, saying
tha~ h~ had quadrupled their efficiency from the dark days at the start of the
- caar with Iraq, not through interference in mi19_tary matters or oratory, but
through the encouragement of talent ar.d the delegation of responsibility.
"4r Eani-Sadr said many commanders frequently complained to him of interferenc-~
by leaders of the IRP. He quoted a grandson of Ayatollah Khomeyni saying that
the IP.P pref erred the loss to Iraq of the southern oil province�of Khuzistan
to ~he consolidation of his (Mr Bani-Sadr's) political position through victory
in ti~e war.
rir Ba>;i-Sadr also told the armed forces of his faith in Islam and in the Iranian
n~~t:~~~ ; saying that his Islam was not a reli~ion of hatred, revenge and
inferiority complexes, as was that ~f "the plotters that deposed me," but a
religion of lovQ and freedom, growth and initiative.
In his message to the "men and women of Iran," Mr Bani-Sadr particularly praised
the resistance of his women supporters in the face of intimidation by "the club-
tvielding rabble," indicating that the women of Iran had appreciated his efforts
to gain their liberation. He also expressed his hope in the young people of
Iran.
The }*oung, he said, could not grow and fulfil themselves in a country that lacked
freedom, but until they rose to free themselves, "general insecu~ity and civil
war, repression and economic stagnation will continue."
The deposed president ended his message: "I have put my hope in you, the young
generation of Iran. You and I have entered into a pact together, a pact of
solidarity, a pact of resistance. The time has come to be true to our promise."
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited [1S81J
CSO: 4600/45
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LIBYA
BRIEF'S
FAO CONTRIBUTION--In April, Libya made a contribution of $1 million to the drive
by Edouard Saouma, direc~or general of FAO (United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization) for emergency food aid for Africa. This contribution was presented
to Mr Saouma by the Libyan secretary for land reform and development, Bashir
Jaudat, and by Ammar Taggazy, secretary oi the people's committee of the Rome
political office. [Text] [Paris 'MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
22 May 81 p 1409] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981a 9434
SAHARAN AGRICULTURE CONFERENCE--A conference of the agriculture ministers of the
countries bordering on the Sahara, in which Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Chad and
- Libya took part, was held in Tripoli from 17 to 20 April. At the close of this
conference, several resolutions and decisions were adopted concerning coaperation
between the Arab countries in the fields of agriculture, irrigation, transforma-
tion of the Saharan regions into arable land, and the development of underground
water. The conference stressed the need fer meetings between specialists and
technicians in the hydraulics field. It recommended, moreover, organizing a con-
ference on directions in agriculture and the exchange of information and poten-
tialities in this field, just as it recommended cooperation in the fields of cat-
tle food industrialization and cattle raising. [Text] [Paris MARCHES T':OPICAUX
ET MEDITERI~ANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1409] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie
Paris 198L] 9434
GARMENT ORDERS--The bulletin DIMEX ADJUDICATIONS, published in Paris by the CFCE
[Council of Commercial Federations of Europe], reports that the Public Company for
Garments (PCG), P 0 Box 15182 Tripoli (telex 20073 Malabis), uniting the five
national Libyan clothing import companies, wishes to place very large orders in
numerous countries, among them France. It envisages submitting samples to Tripoli
before the end of Ma.y. The PCG is therefore asking interested concerns to go to
Tripoli with documentation, prices cost and freight Tripoli, and samples. [Ex-
cerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May S1 p 1409]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981~~ 9434
CSO: 4519/3
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MOROCC 0
VARIOUS YOLITICAL FORCES IN NATION SURVEYED
Paris AL-wt~,TAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 15-21, 22-28 May, 29 May-4 Jun
/Article by Fu'ad Abu Mansur: "AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI Opens the File on Moroccan
Democracy"/
/15-21 May 81 pp 37, 38/
/Text/ The main characteristic of Moroccan political life is its pluralism. This
- is cLearly obvious from the titles of the damestic newspapers and publications
- that proliferate in vendors' kioaks in Raba~ and Casablanca and in the hands of the
' youths who circulate in front of cafes and bars or line up at corners and before
traffic lights.
A mere quick glance at these newsgapers will underline the different positions of
various groups in the Moroccan family, showing that the options of the right,
center and le�t are sametimes compatible, sometimes discordant, and that the parli.a-
- mentary game 3s based on democratic rules: the majorit,y makes the decisions and
the opposition exercises the veto or the right of refusal. The decisive say ul-
tirtiately rests with the majority, as is the case in deeper-rooted, older democratic
trsditions.
Duri,ng ~y recent stay in Morocco, I met with party heads and organization secre-
taries. I also attended meetin~s in the Istiqlal and Federal Party members' cells.
I visix~d the hames of popular officials and main branches. I talked with the
editorial boards of the Arabic and French language party press. One product of
this trip through the "machinery of the Moroccan party experiment" was Chat I ended
up with a group of facts, most ~mmpnrtant of which are:
1. The majority of the Moroccan people, especially the young generation born in
the iifties, has been 100 percent trained in parties and politically educated in
ideological and union terms in the cities and heavy popula~ion areas, but this de-
- clines or pales in the rural and desert areas where the middle aged and the elderly
provide the family or tribal options, in addition to other considerations.
2. Each of the five major parties has a basic traditional body of people on which
it r2lies in the framework of political activity and mobilization. The Istiqlal
Party relies on bourgeois personnel, particularly the petty bourgeois, who embrace
the orir~~iple of equaliCy. The Socialist Federation of Popular Powers is active
in young and intellectual circles and stresses trade union activity as a means for
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changing social stru~tures. The National Liberal Grouping attracts persons from
the far right and the far left who have came to feel despair over traditional con-
cepts in political and party areas. Then there is a constitutional monarcliist
party under the leadership of Ahmed Osman, who for 7 years played the part of prime
minister in the caSinet which preceded the current one of Maati Bouabid. The Popu-
lar Movement led by Mahdjoubi Ahradane is strong in desert areas and is actively
training Berbers, stressing the values of Moroccan cultural integrity, especially
Berber integrity, by promoring the Amizigh language of the Amizigh peoples wha are
spread about in the Greater Atl~s areas. The Moroccan Conmiunist Party, known as
the Party of Progress and Socialism, under the leadership of AZi E1 Yaata, is active
in workers' cells and industrial concentrations, especially in Casablanca; it issues
its newspaper AL-BAYAN in Arabic and French.
3. The proliferation of parties, with their diverse methods of fighting and their
diverse concapts and demands, function within lines already laid out in the contexC
of the country's basic options. There is a matter which is taken for granCed, or a
fixed element, in Moroccan politics which unites people on the right and the left.
This is the democratic constitutional monarchy, which Moroccans are united in be-
lieving is the safety valve, the moral and material framework of the Moroccan
identity, and the benevolent rule which supervises the progress of the political
game and limits the fouls on the political playing field. Opposition radicals
acknowledge that the ~Cfng always tries to anticipate their criticisms and their
_ reservations and that in a meeting he even laid stress on the need Co improve the
workers' standard of living, and went farther than the opposition in his emphasis.
4. Another fixed or obvious point is the unity of Moroccan territory and the just
nature of the defense of the Western Sahara. This is a common denominator and does
not admit of individual interpretation or debate among the 20 million Moroccans.
The parties are united�in believing that the Sahara war is a facricated issue manu-
factured by Algeria to sap Morocco's vigor and shake the throne and that the Moroc-
cans are prepared to negotiate directly with the Algerian regime to set out Che
bases for a solution and proceed taward a forthcaming union of the Maghreb countries
in which each country will preserve its special economic and cultural characteristics.
5. Do these basic options limit the mavement of Moroccan parties? What are they
left with within these lines? The party officials I met stressed that the option
of the war in the Sahara is a specific decision which all Moroccans have agrPed
upon. This unanimity does not diminish the iu~ortance of party life as a motive
force for individual and group po~wers and a criterion for campetition within the
quest for betCer conditions. They also emphasized party contributions since in-
dependence in the realm of the establishment of modern structures for Morocco, the
provision of public facil{ties and the choice of agricultural and industrial pol-
icies.
6. Here the margin in which the Moroccan parties function possesses a quixotic
character. The media war flares only on the pages of newspapers and stays within
the limits of censure, keeping organizations away from the experience of "lebani-
zation" or the language of blood in the absence of diplomacy. Everyone is a mon-
archist and there are none of the Trojan horses of foreign systems. Even the
newspaper profession reflects the childish quality of the first beginnings of the
Arab press. The editors in chief of AL-'ALAM, AL-P4ITHAQ, AL"MDH~'~~ a~ ~'-~'Y~
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exercise self-crit~~ism and say, "We lack the resources for keeping up wirh thP
press of the modern era. Our ~ctivity does not transcend the release of party
brachures," The parliamentary opposition is also quixotic. The media o� the
Socialist Federation of Popular Powers and the Party of Progress and Socialism
v~ntuxac! to state that fraud was coarmitted.. in the 1978 elections and as a resulC
certain loyal parties received a weight out of proportion to their real strength~
_ The criticism remained within the context of the media and did not get tn the pvint
of the withdrawal of opposition deputies from parliament. Today news is circulat-
ing to the effect that the federalist deputies are proposing to withdraw fram the
discussion again in the event the parliamentary period extexids to next summer.
However, an infQrmed federalist source told AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI that the subje~t of
withdrawal is being carefully discussed in parry circles and has not been resolved
in a final fashion.
5. Isic/ The phenomena which merit attention are the �laxeups within the tradition-
- al Moroccan parties. Schisms have afflicted party life since 1956. In 1959, the
Istiqlal Yarty, which represents a patriotic legacy of struggle, split apart, and
- the Nati~nal Federation of Popular Forces and the Socialist Federation of Popular
Farces branched out from it, the former under the leadership of the father of the
Moroccan left, Abdallah Ibrahim, and the latter un,der the leadership of Abdel
Rahim Bouabid. In 1978, we witnegsed the birth of the National Liberal Grouping
under the leadership of Ahmed Osman, who, in turn, had fought in the ranks of the
Istiqlal Party like many of the technocrats on the Moroccan stage. Today there is
a parlimentary rift in the National Liberal Grouping under the leadership of the
deputy Ahmed Belhadj. However, this secessionist group has not yet conceived a
mature political program or declared its ob~ectives.
In any event, the outbursts in the Moroccan parties are not a sudden occurrence.
Observers emphasize tlhat Chey are a burdensome legacy that has been with Che
nationalist paxties since the dawn of independence. The late Allal E1 Fasi, the
first man of the Istiqlal Party, warned of this phenomenon in his book "Se~f
Criticism~" It is obvious that party rifts are not a Moroccan characteristic but
a~~�t)dwide one. Gaullism has become "Gaullisms," Marxism "Marxisms" and Ma.oism
"Maoi.sms:' It is the struggle of ideas which is fragznenting the traditional struc-
tures. The firsC rift in the Moroccan national movement occurred when Mohamed
Hassan E1 Quazzani was compelled to establish the National Party, introducing into
party Iife a spirit of religious fanaticism and chauvinism--two manifestaCions of
tactics of "slander and reproach" which party people refer to when Chey talk abou~
organizations that star~d in their way.
- i~uroccan party figures arQ united over the fact Chat King Mohamed the Fifth was tl?e
father of Moroccan democracy. He fflrmcd the first coalition government in the his-
Lory of Morocco, which embraced all political. elements, although Allal E1 Fasi
stayed out of it, charging that its members were not campatib].e, in the speech he
gave on the eve of 20 August 1956. To satisfy the criticism, Mohamed the Fi�th
formed a cabinet headed by Moubarak E1 Bakay, with the participation of the
Istiqlal Party, on 27 October of the same year. In the meanwhile, trade union
life was establishing a tradition of regular activity. The MorocGan Federation of
L~abor :::.�ramE a real force in the hand of the Istiqlal Party. 7.'his was the period
- w:~e~~ t~iF party w~s united. However, the shadow of the National Federation of Popu-
1ar Power.s was moving on the horizon of Moroccan political life under Mehdi Ben
Ba:~ka, w~ho rebelled against the paternal framework of the party. The rift did not
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taks final form until 6 December 1959 and that was the basic turning point in the
course of rto~occan parties.
The main split created secondary ones, including the Moroccan Federation of Labor,
the National Federation of Moroccan Students, the General Federation of Workers as
a rival of the Moroccan Federation of Labor, and the Generai Federation of Moroccan
StudenCs as a rival of the National Fed~ration of Students. In this period, that
is, on the eve of the sixties, par*yo urientations defined themselves in the wake
of the radical dispute between M'Hamed Douri, the current minister of equipment
(who at that time was minister of econamy) an~d Abdel Rahim Bouabid, naw the first
secretary of the Socialist Federation of Popular Powers.
In this historical context, there were three force~ of attraction, and these re-
sulted in the emergence of the National Federation of Popular Powers, the loyal
son of the Istiqlal Party and thQ Ss~cialist Federati~n of Popular Pawers. Abdel
Rahim Bouabid stated that the change or alteration in the title was simed at avaid-
ing the confusion which old party members of the National Federation exploited in
. Casablanca, retaining this title though they did not by any atretch of the imagina-
tion reflect its essence.
Mehdi Ben Barka paused at length in his "Book on the Revolutionary Choice" to dis-
cuss the reasons for party fragmeatation, considering it tantaIIwunt to a histor9.c
error. He said: "There are three errors:
"1. Our incorrect evaluation of the half ineasures we were compelled to adopt.
"2. The closed framework through which our struggles passed without the parCici-
pation of the masses of the people.
"3. ~'he obscurity surrounding our ideological positions."
Political and ideological pluralism began a new stage,.proceeding fram diverse
notions of national activity. Public fre-Edolna were not a gift "from above" to
people active i~ the press and in ideas. When the National Federation of Popular
Powers was given responsibility for the cabinet along with Abdallah Ibrahim, a
wave of arrests took place which extended to Mohamed E1 Basri aixl Abdel Rahman E1
Youssofi, two prominent figures in the National Federation. By the time Morocco
was taken with shock at the death of Mohamed the Fifth, the option of public free-
doms had became strongly rooted in people's spirits and had become a demand equal-
ling those of bread and a decent living in importance.
When Hassan the Second inaugurated the first session o� the first elected parlia-
ment in the history of Morocco, he insisted on the need to "pursue the democratic
course to its natural ends." He said, "We have refused to do anything except to
relinquish a11 tasks of our own accord and free will, restricting ourselves to the
areas of competence exercised by heads of atates in democratic countries."
Party pluralism became more firmly imrplanted in the second parliamentary experience
of July 1970. On 22 July of thaC year, the Istiqlal Party and the National Federa-
tion of Popular Powers signed a charter announcing the birth of the National Bloc.
Abdallah Ibxahim addressed himself to the circumstances which dictated its estab-
lishment, say3ng "The new experiment is fertile and has significance not just from
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the positive standpoint but also from the negative one as well. It has caused us
to become sensitive to weak spots in the structure of the struggle and in methods
- of action and initiative.
aithough the National Bloc experiment's activities and results wQre limited, it did
establiah a coalition tradition which strengthened democratic options in Morocco
and helped direct attention to the pitfalls of ignoring defects in the administra-
tive superstructure. The Moroccan ruler put his hand on the defects and held in-
tensified contacts with the parties on the eve of Ahmed Osman's assumption of rhe
Moroccan preniership on 19 November 1973, stressing the need to build a democratic
Morocco which would rely on a government instrument helping to promote the course
of construction and growth. The party heads responded to the royal appeal in let-
ter.a in which they replied by setting out their notions of the creation of a Moroc-
co whl.ch was able to respond to the challenges of the age. The answers came from
Allal E1 Fassi for the Istiqlal Party, Abdallah Ibrahim for the National Federation
of Popular Powers, Abdel Rahim Bouabid for the Sociali.st Federation of Popular
Powers, Dr E1 Khtib for the Popular Democratic Movement, Mohamed Hassan E1 Ouazzani
for the Democratic Constitution Party, and Ali E1 Yatt~ for the Party of Progress
and Socialiam.
The rayal missive and the parties' responses to it were basically oriented toward
the process of "deepening" Moroccan democracy and findi.ng a way to avoid the in-
eptitude of forn?er ruling officials. It was given to everyone to believe that no
party had a monopoly on the right to speak in Che name of the people but that all
conceptions, in spite of their different tendencies and notions, had to be an em-
_ bodiment of collective concerns. Mr Ahmed Osman strove to make this slogan reali[y
- when he assimilated a large number of opposition members into the corps of employees
cooperaCing with him. He worked tirelessly over a pair of reforms in the 7 years
in which he headed up the Moroccan cabinet: the selection of competent personnel
- and the modernization of staffs and structures to accommodate the new economic and
cultural developments.
This }~ard time in the life of the Moroccan parties passed, regardless o� their in-
- ternal contradictions, thanks to the royal safety valve. The political shocks in
the modern history of Morocco were of such force that they created profound up-
heavals in party structures and in addition there were errors, special calculations
and debts on the part of specific persons. Today, each of the main parties bears a
legacy uf accomplishments and frustrations, but the dynamic of renewal has brought
figures and leaders to the fore who are up to the current challenges.
Here the Istiqlal Party is gambling on retaining its basic features, benefitting
from its former brilliance in attracting new staffs, while its adversaries continue
to describe it as "the sincere guardian of bourgeois interests," criticising it for
a sort of stagnatfon of leaders and directives. They also observe that its popu-
larity has not diminished with time, since Chere are broad groups of Moroccans who
- aspire to reap the fruits of private ownership and personal wealth. However, in
the minds of citizens, the Istiqlal Party remains a kind of Moroccan "Gaullism,"
on account of its struggle under Allal E1 Fassi and his comrades.
~1s �or the: Plational Federation of Popular Powers, that witnessed the secession of
~ the majority who founded it ~nder ideological circumstances opposed to the Istiqlal
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H~l}~ 1 G 1 Al, lttil~: l1N1,1'
current, and Abdallah Ibrahim alone remains on the stage. We do not know why he
_ kept the party's name after the c~llective fragmenration which beset it on the eve
of the eighties.
The Party of Progresa and Socialism branched off from the French Co~rtuniat Party
in the days of the protectorate. Its opponenta accuse it of keeping an open line
to Moscow, which is important since Moroccans are concerned with there religious
values and do not accept Cammunism as a political sysCem. The popularity of this
party decli.ned after the defeats of world communism, the termination of the "red
tyranny" in Moscow and the death of 'Abd-al-Nasir. However, Ali E1 Yatta, in his
remarks and statements, emphasizes the "national character" of his party and is
close to the principles and goals of the National FederaCion of Popular Powers. He
also relies on labor and women's organizations in pramoting the class struggle in
Morocco.
While the popular movement manag~d to form a party reserve for the Istiqlal Party,
_ especially since its activists had fought for independence and were a model for
_ Moroccan citizens who were in touch with their country and its actual situation,
- its adversaries rebuked it for having a racist character that made it a trump card
in many people's hands. Proof of that, those opposed to it say, is the fact that
its notions disappointed a large group of its adherents, who split off from it and
formed other parties, including:
E1 Khatib and E1 Oukouti, who formed the Popular Constitutional MovemenC.
E1 Sanhadji Abdallah, who formed the Labor Party.
Abdel Rahman E1 Kouhan, who launched the Party of Reform and Unity.
The trade unions branching off from that, which are five in number.
As regards the National Liberal Grouping, which is relatively new, since it was
founded in 1978, its opponents criticise it f~r "being in debt to the administra-
tive apparatus and lacking a specific political program and ideaLqgy:"' They go so
far as to describe it as "an artificial current which represents a mixture of in-
terests." Naturally liberal officials reject these charges, saying "No onp is able
to monopolize political action and we came onto the political stage to fill a void
that citizens were starting to grumble about."
The gates to debate are open and AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI quotes people's views accurately
in an attempt to determine each party's position and present its acccn~lishments in
the light of current challenges. The pluralism of parties is a phenamenon which
- deserves attention. Through their growth and vigor the democratic experiment in
- Morocco is being integrated.
/15-21 May 81 pp 39, 40/
/Text/ Ahmed Osman, 50 years old, the head of the National Liberal Grouping, the
ruling majority party, is a man of liberal views and discourse. He has been im-
planting the tradition of "democratic struggle" since 1971, when he was appointed
director of ~he Royal Court, then volunteered to lay the principles of the game
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out on clear foundations during the years 1973-79 as prime minister. He was then
appointed ambassador to Bonn and Washington, respectively.
Tod.ay Ahmed Osman is free to devote his �ull time to Grouping affaira, atrivinK to
~stabli~i3 ~ts positions on the Moroccan stage in the framework of the democratic
experiment and its concomitant democratic features. This discussion wfth him was
aimed at ascertaining the Liberals' place on the Moroccan political map and becam-
ing acquainted with the game of majority and opposition in the structure of existing
institutions and the context of aituations caming to the fore on the Arab and
foreign planes.
/4uestion/ Members of the Is~iqlal and federalists say that the Liberal Grouping
arose suddenly without prepar,3tory arrangements and that it is a result of the
Iatest election campaign. How do you view this assessment?
/Answer/ I described this point a faw days ago in my meetings with the activists in
the Grouping and at the massive rally we held in the town of Oujda. We believe in
party pluralism whiie not seeking to balkanize political life in Morocco. The other
parties must agree to enter or leave the new movement without wishing to monopolize
political action in any of the stages of the national forward march. The game of
democracy requires the involvement of a number of partie~ possessing different vis-
ions an~d conceptions.
To state that the Liberal Grouping was the result of the latest elections is not
in keeping with reality. Haw can a diaciplined political mavemeat like the Liberal
Grouping possess the wherewithal of power and legitimacy to came into being over-
night?
When we examine the political terrain in Morocco, we observe that the traditional
political parties, that is, the parties founded for the sake of regaining natianal
in~dependence, have not kept abreast of developments in domestic and international
life. The leaders have not changed. We observe the same people remaining in pol-
icy positions. This does not mean that we do not feel appreciation for these lead-
~rs. I have been and still am engaged in d{ecussions with them and am a friend of
thei~s. Therefore I believe I can speak without embarrassment.
In our new activity we felt, since the seventies, that it was necessary to estab-
lish a new po]itical current to fill a kind of vacuum resulting fram lapses in the
modernization process. We present ourselves as standin~ in the line of auccession
of the National Movement, whose combative past we do not deny, although we are try-
ing to inject new blood into it by bringing in new persons and styles and adjusting
r.4 the requirements of the current situation and the challenges that have accumu-
l.ated.
� In another area, there is apathy in local political life. We are striving to im-,
plant the dynamism of new activity in its place. It would have been easy to give
birth to our movement before the elections when we were in posirions of responsi-
bility and were a~ole to monopolize political decisions. However, we preferred to
make a ~umprehen:,ive opening and mobilization and appealed to the cther parties to
engage in a modern damocratic life which was in keeping with the disturbed atmos-
' ~he:~e inaide and outside Morocco. This issue required planning and farsightedness
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on our part. Therefore we came into being and entered the 1976 local elections, in
an unorganized fashion buf with discernment. We again entered the legitimate elec-
tions of 1977 with more organization and greater com~petence based on a group of
ideas and conceptions which we had carefully studied in depth. Ordinary citizens,
like officials and candidates, discavered that the poaitions we were defending were
= impcrtant and they gave us their strong confidence.
A Realistic Program
- /guestion/ Observers say that your movement does not hav~ an integrated program and
that this imposes growing rifts on it$ ranks. They ciCe the "shock" receatly
caused by a parliamentary group which declared its independence of you, under the
leadership of Mohamed Belhadj, who is intending to crystallize a new plan of action.
/Answer/ The fact that there are rifts does not mean that the movement does not have
a program. Programs are easy to set down. I appeal to all to read the statements
and speeches closely. They are devoid of the stirring promises ~rhich are frequent-
ly repeated in the marketplace to attracting followers but generally remain mere
ink on paper. We have a program which is characterized by realism, transcending
slogans and aiming at the execution of programs. We came into being with a reserve
of accomplishments and we are continuing along this courae within an equation which
matches words with deeds.
/guestion/ Could we have same examples? ~
/Answer/ We have been in the cabinet. I personally held the position of premier
for a period of l years (1973-79). We have accamplished tangible things. Our
equation is the following? achievements, then the development of a presence in-
stead of a background of slogans or aspirations. The fact that there are rifts does
not mean that the party does not have clear notions and specific principles. The
Istiqlal Party is exposed to rifts. The federation that branched off from it has
already experienced rifts as well. That does nat mean that the people who seceded
do not have integrated plans.
The latest secession which took place in the Liberal Grouping's parliamentary for-
mation did not arise from a dispute over principles. We are a"grouping" which has
attracted a number of currents, ideas and political and social families. That does
not stand in the way of our turning into a fighting party which has weight in polit-
ical life, far removed from fanaticism and the tendency to take a simplistia view
of others, Our goal is to eliminate the spirit of party bigotry and to reach a
stage of openness and creative development.
- We Are Not a Prop
/Question/ Why is the Liberal Grouping described as being close to the administrative
apparatus? It is said that it draws its vitality and effectiveness fram this. Is
this characterization correct?
/Answer/ This is a characterization which has no basis in fact. We have gone
through experiments which the administration supported but we have also proved on
numerous occasions that we are not a party which was essentially founded to win
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elections, or which the administration founded to lean on. The popularity of inem-
bership in our. organization disproves these allegations. We have a place on
Moroccan pali~ical soil. We hope that otheLS will recognize our capital. We appeal
to them ta take a more sporting attitude in dealing with us and looking upon ~~s.
/Question/ The economic philosophy of the Liberal Grouping is based on capitalisr
liberalism. non't you believe that there are poor classes in Morocco which vie~~ i_1~~,s
philosophy with a kind of suspicion and rebel against its economic and social p1~e?~:-
ises?
/Answer/ We believe in giving the individual absolute freedom and in givin~ free
rein to individual initiative as an element of social liberalism noi~ capitalist
liberalism. We also put priority on training individuals and groups, overseeing
government activity and holding official.s to account. The government plays a basic
role in the life of the individual an~i the group; we are not against that. We nre
liberals who set forth from the premise of our equation, which holds that the in-
dividual must work, be active and move as a part of and on behalf of the group.
/Question/ Don't you therefore adhere to the class struggle? There are distinctive
_ sociai class~s in Morocco which have special distinguishing features. We observe
that acting to fill the gap moves the young generation in particular and results in
- attracting rich, poor, affluent and needy people. Aren't you neglecting this basic
struggle a littl~?
/Answer/ We do not talk about class struggle because we do not want to apply foreign
- philosophies or imported ideologies. Class struggle is a Marxist notion which we
- reject. Conversely, we are aware that there are social differences in Morocco, as
in other countries of the world. We fi~Zht them with all our strength and devote an
important part of our discussions and statements to them.
Everyone's Party
/~~.~esti.onJ Don't yrni sometimes feel that ~he Liberal Grouping is working to pro-
r^.^t ttae~ interests o� specific groups in Moroccan society?
/Answer/ Not at all. Our line of struggle attracts other classes of Moroccan
society, students, worke:s, and intellectuals belonging to all social classes, the
newness of aur movement noGwithstanding. In a short period of time we have attract-
ed braad groups of Moroccan masses. Let us look at our latest meeting in the.town
of Oudjda with young people, peasants and classes of limited social means. We also
- ~sttract employers and affluent people. What is to stand in the way of that? Other
parties are launching a new level of criticism against us every day: sametimes we
represent the bourgeoisie, sometimes they charge that we are defending capitalism
~fo~F.stically ar~d abroad. These are truly amazing things. Our goal, contrary to
sverything they charge, is to liberate the economy from foreign dominance, gran~
the productive sectors a Moroccan character and preserve our territorial unity. We
have also essentially been foYtnulating laws which will give workers the right to
partic~~nate in pxofits along with cornpany owners. We have given proof, "on the
~rou�:~:," of o~sr principles in support of liberation, and this is what the Moroccan
citi~~n needs.
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/guestion/ Do you believe that party life in Morocco has created a qualitative
change in the thinking and mentality of the citizen? We observe that the major
parties are vertical rather than horizontal in orientation and that traditional
= categories dominate. In other words, have the parties transcended their character
as an instrument for preserving the interests of the groups they represent in order
to embody a natioaal action ovex which all citizens can agree?
/Answer/ Your question forms part of the basic conceptions of the Liber~l Grouping.
We have made it a general practice to state that we are suffering from a void in
~ traditional political life. A grave silence has been hanging over the nation,
especially in the current stage, which is witnessing an intensification of problems
, d,~mestically and abroad. We have said that it is necessary to penetrate the wall
of silence and establish a new movement that will train young people and invite
them to take part iz the forward march of the nation and the young. For a 1 mg
time we have been waiting for awareness, vigilance and participation from the
- political parties, which continue to adhere to their worn out leaders. Therefore
we have decided to cross the baCtle lines and have worked assiduously to wake
citizens up and mobilize them to participate in damestic and national responsibili-
ties.
A Democratic Pluralism
/suestion/ Is the silent struggle among Moroccan parties likely to acquire a bloody
character along Lebanese lines? What deterrent is there to prevent that? Follow- ~
ing that, how is the arteriosclerosis among the parties on the one hand and among
the wings that are fighting one another within each individual party on the other
ro be cleared out?
/Answer/ We deplore struggle among parties, whfle accepting the existence of plural-
ism, having reservations about the chaos it produces, and aiming at preventing the
fragmen~ation or dilution of the scope for political action. Organization, frank-
ness and mutual re~pect are necessary. Therefore we oppose party zealotry and same
parties'attempts to ~nonapolize the poltical scene. There are democratic ways to
separate loyal forces from oppositio~~n ones, such as referendums and elections.
Above and beyond that, we condemn repressive fascistic doctrines because they kill
democracy.
Ths Liberal Grouping categoricaLly believes that democratic conszi~utional monarchy
- is the guarantor of our unity and coexistence within a democratic climate and the
defender of citizens against doctrines of repression and daminance.
/guestion/ Are you satisfied with the government coalition which Maati Bouabid
heads? How do you evaluate its achievements? It is stated that it lacks a harmon-
ious commir.gling among members and that his majesty the king has repeatedly inter-
- vened to resolve the polarizations within it.
/Answer/ There can be no doubt that I address myself to this aspect constantly,
- stressing the need for solidarity and harmony during the difficult stage Morocco is
now going through in terms of the economy, the society and defense. We hope that a
strong government will be his majesty the king's compani~n and will be tantamount
to a strike force along the lines of the royal ara?ed forces.
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It is necessary that his majesty, who is the supreme comsaander of the nation, have
strike forces, and we are proud of our strong army. There is also a need for a
homogeneous government. It is obvious that every coalition government has advan-
tages and faults. The faults generally rise to the surface and a curtain falls
o~er the advantages. Coalitions demand harmony among the political groups who take
part in them and among individuals. This is an extremely difficult matter and re-
quires deep, careful study.
Our grouping is part of the government coalition. We bear responsibilities in the
T.egislative Assembly as part of our participation in the government his majesty the
king has chosen in accordance with the canditions of the Moroccan constitution.
A Fifth Column
/Question/ Is there a fifth coluinn in Morocco quietly working within the framework
~ of party pluralism and preparing for more aggressive activity if circumstances be-
cane favorable?
/Answer/ What is the nature of this fifth column you are talking about?
/Question/ It could be parties, currents within parties, or a group of peaple out-
side the party framework who are prepared to cooperate wi.th foreign bodies in order
to weaken Moroccan resistance.
/Answer/ I know nothing about it to this moment. We are far from falling prey to
~ the Lebanese predicament, because constitutional monarchy is a basic element for
bringing people together and protecting our lines with /at least/ a minimum of pro-
tection against the dangers hanging over us. In sight of the envirornnent that sur-
rounds us, we must remain vigilant, strangthen our vigilance and spread it through-
out the Moroccan masses. The best protection is guidance. The Moroccan people to-
d:~,y enjoy greater resources than in the past for crushing the enemies' plots and
expusing their intentions.
. /g~~estian/ Is it likely that the Moroccan press, with its various tendencies, is in
the absence of censorship, Iikely to play the role of a Trojan horse in Moroccan
society? Are there legal measures to deter any excesses that might occur?
/Answer/ When the situation concerns damestic security and the defense of institu-
tions and sacred affairs, there are natural laws in every organized, well balanced
countr;~. We are struggling for freedom of the press and freedam of expression--
withing the context, however, of the laws and presentation of our national values.
The Moroccan newspapers are characterized by a patriotic nature in general, they
strive to defend our genuine heritage and they are free from foreign involvements.
/Question/ What are the reasons why the Moroccan people are satisfied with the king
and cling to the monarchy as if it were a justification for their existence, nation-
ally and domestically?
/AnsGTer/ That is fu:idamental question. It is generally stated that the Moroccan
pe~p?~~have embraced the monarchy voluntarily and out of conviction. As regards
. the ruling Alaouite family, the people in it have lived as membexs of the Moroccan
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people up to this day. The citizens chose them to take the reins of power after
they had discovered that they possessed the features and hr~llmarks of genuine
patriotism. The ruling family, since ascending the throne, has embodied the aspira-
tions of the Moroccan people. It has always been in the vanguard of struggle and
resistanc~ against enemies. This reservoir of patriotic good will has been deeply
ingrained in the persons of King Mohamed the Second. They are two figures who crokm
the vision which has became firmly rooted in the hearts and minds of every Moroccan,
that is, the vision of struggle and freedom. President Sekou Toure pointed out, in
the Jerusalem Cammittee speech last week, that the Moroccan people closel~ adhere
ideologically to the monarchy. There is no truth to the rumors being spread abroad;
this is our actual situation, with its basic premises, in the life of Morocco on the
domestic, Arab and international stages.
- /22-28 May 81 pp 38, 39/
/Text/ Observers agree that the Soeialist Federation of Popular Powers possesses a
magnetic power on the Moroccar~ stage. People attribute this to the dynamism of its
staff inembers and the fact that it has grasped the premises of social and cultural
restlessness, especially among young people who have lost hope in traditional forms
of struggle and aspire to "revolutionize" Moroccan structures and institutions.
Historically speaking, the Socialist Federation of Popular Powers arose out of the
National Federation of Popular Powers whfch, in turn, arose out of the Istiqlal
Party in 1959 as a consequence ~f the growing gap between generations which had be-
come estranged in their notions of political and national action. The silent strug-
gle among the leaders also had an effect or. the process of ideological fragmentation
which Morocco went through on the verge of the sixtie~. There is n~ doubt that
Abdallah Ibrahim, nicknamed the father of the Moroccan left, reproached Istiqlal
Party people for covering up exploitative acts which well-known Moroccans had been
commi.tting, called for greater equality in the context of equality of opportunity
for all citizens, and prompted the young generation to assume positions of internal
decisionmaking rather than clinging to anoutmoded philosophy.
The Socialist Federation of Popular Powers stayed in the shadow of Abdallah Ibrahim's
notions for some time before he went off on his personal poliCical-ideological
tangent. It is well known that when it arose, ~he National Federation contained
- such prominent personalities in the Moroccan political game as Boutaleb, Ben Barka,
Ahmed Ben Souda, Abdallah E1 Sinhadji, E1 Touhami, E1 Ouazzani, Mahdjoub Ben Seddik,
Abdel Rahim Bouabid and Abdel Kader Sahraoui, but conflicts of views and interests
scattered them in different directions. Secret and open formations and organiza-
tions arose �ram this. Today, Abdallah Ibrahim alone remains on the stage and
mobilization activity has shifted over to Abdel Rahim Bouabid's organization, which
aspires to "establish a sucialist society in which there is no explcLtation of man
by his fellow man."
Young Staff Members
A number of poltical analysts say that there is no radical ideological dispute be-
tween the two federations. Such contradictions as exist are just in the context of ~
personalities. This does not in any event diminish the experiment of the Social-
ist Federation, which wants to be a living academy for young Moroccan staff inembers
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and also turns to political action as a horse which it is betting on as a vechicle
� to mobilize administrative, social and political conditions, train mimerous capable
fighting people and bring the ideologue into the battleground of eve..ryday life.
The Socialist Federation's allure increased as a result of the arrests and suffer~
ings its party members went through, especially in the Oufkir exa. The attainment
of certain goals the federation demanded on the administrative and social levels
also attracted supporters. This does not mean that Abdel Rahim Bouabid'~ organiza-
tion has not experienced internal polarizations. The defects and the goals it was
fighting over helped mend same rifts which might have deepen~ed had they not been
resolved at specific times. This may be attributed to the lack of coordination
among the leaders' wings and branches on the one hand and the fact that the basic
options of the Moroccan government transcended party netions or develaped apart
from them.
A group of premises or considerations determine the Socialist Federation's politi-
cal geography on the map of Moroccan parties. These are:
1. The basic tenet of the federation's brand of socialism is collective ownership
of the means of production and exchange, which are to be managed by producers
through their organizations along with the government apparatus, which is to be
- subject to oversighC by party organizations. This brand of socialism is practiced
as a program of analysis and struggle. It rejects abstract models and the p~.rrot-
ing of foreiga experiences.
~ 2. The application of a com~re:hensive strategy relying on the interconnection and
equal importance of liberation, growth and democracy, with the objective of build-
ing a socialist c.ivi3.ization in keeping with the particular characteristics of the
Moroccan people.
3. The need for economic Iiberation in order to attain. an economic development
possessing numerous complex facets, in the context of Morocco, first, then the
Maghreb countries, as gart of an integrated economic-developmental system which
wiil lead to high rates of industrialization. The premise is an agricultural and
agrarian reform emancipated from relations of subservience and directed toward self-
sufficiency and exports.
4. The So~ialist Federalists emphasize building a material base for development
through integrated industrial projects to guarantee the integrity of the econrnnic
system within the framework of the domestic dynamism of accumulated capital and
the effort to liquidate vertical relationships which could draw branches of pro-
duction into centers of capitalist decisionmaking and guidance.
Responding to collective needs at Che expense of individual ones is a condition
which is connected to revolt~ =onfzing goverrunent structures, implanting real dem-
ocracy and striving to formulate a genuine modern culture which will liberate citi-
zens from dispossession and alienation. The instrument for realizing these goals
is the party. The point of departure is self-criticism, and the success of the
movemenC depends on young intellectuals.. who are liberated fram social reaction.
5. All experiments at unity within the Arab nation are welcomed, no matter what
tl~eir results, and an effort is made to place them firmly ~aithin a unified struggle
which progressive popular organizations with united ideological c~ptions will lead,
followed by development plans which are capable of providing true Arab unity on
- meaningful socialist bases.
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The Particular Character of Morocco
In actual practice, after studying the fonns of the Socialist Federalists' struggle,
we observe that these ideological premises have become confined, or have nearly be-
come confined, to more realistic demarbds which are clos~r to the particular nature
of the situation in Morocco. These are:
Raising the sharply expanding differences in incomes between ordinary families and
- the exploitative classes: 5 percent of the population monopolizes close to half
the national incame. The Socialist Federalists give this class the name "economic
oligarchy."
The issue of the monopolization of farmland, especially irrigated land, by b:g
Moroccans.
The issue of continuing the liberal platform, which eases the tasks of the Moroccan.
bourgeoisie and speculators.
Limiting the intensified economic crisis, the rise in the prices of foodstuffs and
equipment and the growing problems of Moroccan exports, which are adding to the ex-
ploitation of the toiling masses and the spread of uneraployment and misery. To
curb this phenamenon, the Socialist Federation claims that real.planning based on a
dialogue with the masses in the context of local institutions is necessary and that
recourse must be made to the basic nationalization of the means of production,
- transportation, exchange and lending, in addition, as radical change in the admin-
istrative structure remains a basic condition for reversing the economic decline.
Which of the Socialist Federation's economic demands have been realized? What ac-
complishments has the federation carried out in actual practice, now that it has a
history of approximately 20 years of party activity?
A responsible source in the Socialist Federation told AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, "The
political map in Morocco could become clearly known in the event honest election~s
were continuously held. This has unfortunately not hagpened. We had great hopes
of attracting broad new groups to our party and consequently having the political
map take clear form. This requires neutrality, or at least r~spect for the ballot
i box. People talk about guarantees. In mun3.cipal and village elections, these have
- been pro forma, and no consistent fraud ha.s occurred. Therefore the Federal ParCy
_ prevailed in Rabat (we have 29 out of 39 counsellors), Agadir (26 out of 31 coun-
sellors), and Fez (19 out of 39 counsellors), while the Istiqlal Party has 16, and
. there are four independents, in addition to the municipalities of Sila, Ain Ziyab,
Qalat E1 Saraghina, Inzeghane, and small towns like Djaad, Safar and E1 Araiche.
In the town of Safi 20 of our people aut of 31 succeeded in winning seats in the
city council, but meddling disrupted the balance, especially in Tangiers, Safi and
Kuneitra ..n the form of consistent invalidations."
Severe Criticism of the Government
. He continued, "We presented the problem to the government and the cabinet. However,
investigations did not take place in the d~sired depth. In our newspapers we pub-
lished facts and circumstantial evidence on areas where fraud was committed. Since
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~ -
1977 no official denial has been issued. We do not want to stab democracy in the
~ back. We have fought for it for decades. The result is that the first secretary,
- Mr Abdel Rahim Bouabid, lost in the city of Agadir."
The responsibl.e source went on to sumnarize the severe criticisms against the cur-
rent cabinet listing a number of points, including:
- "1. The refusal to review econanic options whose infeasibility has been underlined
by experCs as far as current conditions in Morocco go. For example, we published
= a report by the World Bank in the newspaper AI,-MUHARRIR pointing out that Morocco
- has about 7 million citizens at the poverty level, out of a total population of 20
million. The report cited accurate details ancl figures which we had always used
with officials.
"2. The dominance of irresponsibility. For example, last year the minister of ed-
- ucation took serious decisions without previous consultation or study, and this
created an uproar in the country. We said that no minister has the right to deal
with future generations in this manner. At the education symposium held in Afran,
on the basis of an invitation from his ma.jesty the king, it became apparent from the
- discussion that the government had not agreed to the decisions of Che minister of
education, Mr Azzedine Laraki. The drought which occurred this year and the means
with which it is intended to allevia~e its effects have an influence on the irre-
~onsibility of some ministers. Where are the prudent measures for coping with the
disaster? Why these bureaucratic measures for coping with it, such as the formation
- of coc~nittees and study panels?
He went on, "Following the Afran debate, we kept the country from losing an academic
year in the universities. However, our reco~endations were not applied, in spite
of our practical solutions, which take existing resources into consideration. For
example, we propounded solutions to the problem of professors in higher education,
then professors offering 35 hours of teaching a year, who are prepared to go to more
than or.~ institute. Who, however, is planning to create such a structural shift?
'['he minister said, 'We are short of classrooms.' We counted the classrooms and
found Chat they could accommodate a large number of students, to meet our needs for
audii:oriums. There is a vicious circle represented by a lack of oversight in the
followup af everyday matters."
Easy Slogans
In this regard, the Socialist Federation is playing the part of a constructi.ve op-
position, as its officials say. "It presents alternatives, but there are officials
who do not adopt them," continued the source, "because they consider that their
_ options are correct. Does the disturbance that exists lie within the context of a
conflict between party plans and goveriunent plans, and the refusal to accept specific
concessions?"
, Mr Mohamed E1 Yazighi, second man in Che federation and member of the Political
Bureau, said that it is not proper for such a c~nf lict to be one of the endurin~
phenamena of the coalition government. It is necessary to agree on a mini.mum pro-
gram to prevent the fragmentation of government activity. Regarding ~he "phenc~m-
enon"of ~'emocracy in Morocco, the federalists say that that should be deepened be-
cause retrogression will lead to failure. Therefore, they have agreed to stay in
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the city councils and the parliament, in spite of the fact that they have been "put
on the sidelines," on grounds that through democratic activity they are promoting
further dialogue for the sake of resolving existing problems. They are concerned
about democratic gains, because, if they take a proper course, they can control and
- overcome the challenges of the Sahara. "Because of our record of democratic activ-
ity," says E1 Yazighi, "world public opinion sympathizes and sides with us in our
foreign positions, and our opponents are embarrassed by our democratic atmosphere."
While the positions and conceptions of the Socialist Federation of Popular Powers
are clear and specific and its accomplishments on the level of the ordinary life of
the Muroccan citizen are tangible, the adherents of the Istiqlal Party, the N~tional
- Liberal Grouping, the Popular Movement and the Party of Progress and Socialism Party
criticize the federalists for using easy slogans and glibly exploiting the fr~~stra-
tions of the young people who are seeking a way of life for themselves within Moroccan
society. They also direct blame at the federalists' monopolization of certain areas
of Moroccan culture and refusal to work outside of them. Their observations in par-
liament are also sometimes characterized by a sort of negativism. In general,
Istiqlal Party members say that Abdel Rahim Bouabid's organization has created an
atmosphere of artificial class struggle in the country.
What is the truth behind these criticisms? How does Abdel Rahim Bouabid, first
secretary of the Socialist Federation of Popular Powe~s, respond to Chem?
/22-28 riay 81 pp 40, 41/
/Text/ Abdel Rahim Bouabid, first secretary of the Socialist Federation of Popular
~ Powers, is the most prominent man in the opposition in Morocco. After independence
his name was liked with ambitious schemes for establishing a Moroccan economy liber-
ated from all subordination. He also helped launch the democratic experiment in
Morocco and is considered one of the most prominent defenders of democracy's need
for pluralism, lib~ralization and active trade union dialogue.
This conversation is an atCempt to determine the Socialfst Federation's place on the
Moroccan party map arul unearth its most important notions concerning the economy,
democracy arnd politics in the context of local, Arab and international considerations.
/Question/ Disagreements exist over the orientation of the Socialist Federatio,n.
People say that there was some fraud in the latest parliamentary elections and that
opposition still assumes a theoretical character, since you are holding onto parlia-
mentary representation through the 31 deputies that belong to the Federation. How
do you stand, between theory and practice?
/Answer/ There is no inconsistency in our stand. We could have withdrawn from parlia-
ment, but, after deliberations within the party apparatuses, it became clear that our
struggle i.,r democracy demanded that we not leave a vacuum. When a vehicle for strug-
gle and a means for increasing it and deepening mass awareness exists, we will cling
to it in order to express our critici~ms and our notions concerning basic issues in-
volving the country damestically and abroad. In spite of the fraud, we chose the
path of combat instead of withdrawal and seclusion from the official and parliament-
- ary arena.
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/Question/ Doesn't your obsen?atian concern a specific phenamenon and consequently
fail to deal with democratic life in Morocco in its overall sense?
JAnswer/ I am confining my statement to the recent parliamentary elections. We were
asked to take part in them and a council was established by name of "the Council To
Watch over the Elections." Basically we had deman,ded that the administrative ap-
- paratus hold to a position of neutrality so that the masses could express their op-
tions, if anly in a relative sense. Hawever, blatant interference took place in
every electoral precinct and, ~n addition, presures were brought Co bear by the ad-
ministrative apparatus, which chose people who would represent it. 7'hese adminis-
tration representatives today constitute what is called the National Liberal Group-
- ing. They were chosen by every means available by the administrative apparatus and
that imparted a fraudulent turn to the elections. However, the struggle for democ-
racy has yielded a number of gains which we cannot deny.
Participation in the Regime
/suestion/ What, specifically, are the gains?
/Answer/ Freedom of the press, for instance. Press censorship has been eliminated
as a part Af the temporary positive measures which, it is said, will be final.
There are other gains: a number of political prisoners have been released and some
peogle living abr~uad have been able to come back to Morocco. Hnwever, there ~re
other negative points, such as the 100 prisoners who are in jail because of their
political positions. We are demanding that they be releaseci, in parliament and on
the street. This is a black mark in the ledger of democracy. We do not understand
what distinction was made between the people who were released and the people who
are still in prison. It is as if the administrative apparatus does not want to res-
pond to all the urgent demands at once; it is as if it is asking for something,in
exchange.
_ /Question/ What in your view do they want in exchange? A freeze on demands by the
Federatia~~~ for example?
/Answer/ One thing they want, for exan~ple, is our agreement to take part in the
gover~e*~,~. We have raised a question: How, aiad on what basis, will we agree to
such participation? The government has ignored the fraudulent elections and it is
- propounding capitalist liberalism. How can we find common ground with a group that
is opposed to our choices and conceptions? If there is common ground between us and
thF members of this gavernment, the grounds for dialogue will be easy. We were told,
"Thera is a grave threat to Che unity of Moroccan soil." This is enough to bring
everyone together, aside fram other consideratians; there is national consensus on
this issue at all public levels, and a security council was established in the wake
of this threat. We took part in it because it concerned the Sahara question and
territor~al unity. Our response was that it was not possible for us, however, to
go beyond this participation: While we were concerned with national honor and mo-
bilized ourselves on its behalf, we, as far as palitical, econamic and cultural
matCers were cencerned, could not reach common ground with the current goverrment
under these circumstances.
/suestion/ Are you attempting to bring this gover~ent down and replace it with
other bodies that are in keeping with the Socialist Federatian's aspirations?
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/Anscoer/ Our activity is aimed at rectifying the demoaatic process if only in the
relative sense. We do not aspire to the democracy of England. We want to take
stock of the particular nature of the MQroccan situation and the dangers threaten-
ing it, which also threaten Algeria in the saTne connection.
/guestion/ Are you referring to a specific source of danger for Morocco and Algeria?
Hoca does Che Socialist Federation view the Libyan role in the area, for example?
/Answer/ In 1974 Col al-Qadhdhafi said that it was not useful,for the Arabs to
create artificial entities in the area and that he wanted unity and wanted people
to work toward unity. After that, he went through a change and started financing
and training what is called Polisario, in order to establish a Saharan entity
stretching from Libya to the Atlantic Ocean. This approach is bound to exacerbate
tensions with Algeria and Mali. Today he is again extending his political, finaii-
cial and administrative sovereignty over Mauritania and is asking the Mauritanians
to help create a Saharan Republic. Such a republic, in the event it is established,
will threaten the identity of Mauritania and cause it to explode from within, be-
cause of the existence of the tribes and their proliferating disputes. Black
_ Mauritanians do not accept Che dominance of Polisario or groups from the north,
and they reject Libyan policies.
/Question/ The Socialist Federation opposes some of the economic opti~ns the present
government is pursuing, but the alternative it presents, deep down, does not differ
from the approaches that are being propounded in the Moroccan arena now.
/Answer/ The alternative we are propounding is different fram the options of the
present and previous governments. There is what is called the public sector, which
plays a basic role in eccnomic growth as an energetic, pioneering element. In the
first years of independence, the progressive movement in Morocco was on the fore-
front in creating public sectors, but when governments came to power which e~poused
the liberal capitalisr_ road, the facts of the situation changed: the public sector
was not serving the total nation but voluntarily served the private sector, and the
capitalist bourgeoisie which emerged after independence has deepened social differ-
ences in an increasing manner as a result of the economic policies that are follow-
ed. Our option is not just to nationalize sectors; it is also to include them in
a developmental framework which will serve the nation. There is no point natfon-
alizing if that does not involve the government and the administrative apparatus
in the process of serving the whole people, not of serving the bourgeoisie and
feudalism in the agricultural, industrial acyd commercial fields.
Staff Members and Notions Propounded
/suestion/ Some Socialist Federation leaders are capitalists, like the deputy Ben
Said and Abdel Quahed E1 Radi. Where do you stand between the notions you pro-
pound on the aeople's behalf and your bourgeois staff inembers?
/Answer/ Mr Ben Said is not a feudalist. He is a lawyer and exaggerates in estim-
aring his wealth. Mr Abdel Quahed B1 Radi is a university professor and depends
on his monthly salary. The village from which he is descended is collective prop-
erty. Our leaders do not include capitalists. There are personnel with a bourge-
ois standard of living, but that is a situation which exists in most progressive
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parties. A capitalist may say that he believes in the socialist option but that he
is living in a capitalist system in spite of his struggle to change the structure
of bourgeois society and launch it in a socialist direction. Such cases are to be
found in the French Caa~unist Party and the French Socialist Party, as well as the
Italian one.
/suestion/ In these cases, where is the revolutionary credibility? Is revolution
- a matter of slogans without live examples in the real world?
/Answer/ Let us turn the equation around: there are poor people who are active in
fascist parties. The Istiqlal people, who have chastised us for these contradic-
tions, have forgotten that this way of thinking goes back to the French administra-
tion in the d~ys of the protectorate. The French told nationalists, "You are the
people who are benefitting from the economic situation and the reforms we are car-
rying out." They would organize public demonstrations in downtrodden areas to sup-
port the French protectorate, demonstrations of migrants and bedouins for instance.
People who criticise us for the contradictions aim to defend their own interests,
having taken advantage of colonial conditions. In this fashion they have Caken the
place of the foreign colonialist. Even in the co~anies where they are taking
- "Moroccanization" measures, they have monopolized shares and positions they do not
deserve and have struggled to acquire. These are manna frosn heaven for them. The
serious thing is that they have sometimes used state money to monopolize company
shares in the context of loan policy. Thus the govertnnent has helped create a
capitalist bourgeoisie with the people's money. If Moroccan capitalists were like
European ones, that is, if they had earned their wealth through their own efforts
and their pioneering initiative, we would have said that that was natural and did
not lie within the context of our struggle against them.
Outside the Game
/~uestion/ Of the Socialist Federation group, it is said that they follow a tech-
nique ai~debilitation. Do you agree with me or not? Are there no middle of the
road salutions or openings to dialogue? The king, for example, has proposed a
referendum on extending the Chamber of Deputies' term from 4 to 6 years.
1'a.~ boycotte3 ~he referendvm, w;~r~as you had paTtici~ate:: ~reviuus or_es vn 1~:~ -
ering the age of the crown prince from 20 to 18. How do you explain that?
/Answer/ I see no contradiction in the process of acceptance and rejection. We say
that the recent elections were fraudulent and we do not want mem~ers of parliament
to keep occupying seats they do not deserve. If we agreed that would be a cantra-
diction, not the opposite. The issue is not one of 4 or 6 years; it is the desire
not to lengthen the life of a fraudulent assembly. When we hold a boycott, that
means that there is no guarantee underlining the soundness of electoral procedures.
We want to stay outside the administration's game. We were asked at the end of 1979
to negotiate with the administrative apparatus on a specific matter related to the
number of Socialist Federation deputies. We refused to bargain, out of the concern
not to stab the course of democracy in the back.
/Question/ The Istiqlal members say that your secession from their party was a
"tiistoric crime" and that you have created a climate of artificial class struggle
in Morocco.
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/Answer/ The Istiqlal Party was lacking in coordination and mobilization. There
were bourgeois, lower middle class and peasant elements in its ranks who had
gathered together to oppose colonialism. After independence, the emphasis is on
issues changed and a schism occurred overideology and mobilization. The Istiqlal
members participate in the regime but they have forgotten the slogans they used to
_ propound. The class struggle has arisen from the capitalist options in which they
have sought refuge. We did not manufacture the class atruggle--that is a conse-
quence of the bourgeois environment. When the Istiqlal members monopolize compan-
_ ies, factories and land, they find themselves faced with a class of ordinary people
who resist their acts. Herein lies the truth of the class situation which is be-
coming seriously aggravated.
/Question/ Why do people find fault with you for resorting in a big way to slo~ans
in order to attract young people who are frustrated and feel economic and social
despair?
/Answer/ There is a mass cansciousness which we want to mobilize. Ask the workers
and studants, if you want, to find out how our notions respond to their aspirations.
Society has produced the frustrations and bitterness which you are talking about.
6Je want our young people to be liberated from them and therefore we give them the
means to become liberated. Why shouldn't we mobilize people's powers to eliminate
unemployment and social backwardness? Why do we note a concern to keep things as
they are rather than move them forward? The defects do not lie in the ideas and
concepts--they lie in the people who are given responsibility.
/Question/ How do the Federal Socialists explain the upheavals in the structures of
traditional parties? It is said that polarization and incompatible currents exist
within the Socialist Federation. What is the truth of these items?
/Answer/ There are numerous reasons in the historic context. There is the struggle
of ideas, generations and ideological fragmentation. Lest we speak overlong in
analyzing the past, let us look around ourselvQS. We consider that the rifts which
have occurred in the Liberal Grouping do not inspire our amazement or disapproval.
This is because the Liberal Grouping is a coalition of a group of interests which
are sometimes contradictory. We do not give a great deal of thought to this. How-
ever, in the case of the Zstiqlal Party, there are currents within it that are
creating poles the conflicting positions in which decisionmakers are moving create
further confusion and polarization. I am not qualified to spell out contradictions
within the programs which have been set forCh; the people in the Istiqlal alone can
identify points of disturbance.
Addressing ourselves to the Socialist Federation of Popular Powers, we can state
without reservation that currents exist within it. This is natural and does not
surprise us. The questions our staff inembers raise lay our options and tendencies
out on the table and make them better suited to the tentative activities we are
undertaking. I believe that these currents, which ultimately contribute to party
unity, express the awareness and deep understanding of the nature of the role and
the historic stage Morocco is going through. They are gaining greater effective-
ness and endurance for our goals of democracy, socialism and liberation.
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/Question/ Do you believe rhat there is room within Moroccan parties for Trojan
_ horses working on behalf of foreign regimes? Is there adequate party consciousness
- to protect party lines against these dangers?
IAnswc:r/ I do not believe that there are Trojan horses on the Moraccan party map.
In the past, trivial attempts were made but today the powers are joining forces
with the nation in the face of the escalating dangers which hedge us about. There
is a consciousness which will keep the Moroccs~n masses far away fram the Lebanese
_ experience, from *.~hich intense foriegn intervention has arisen.
Part of the Whole
/Question/ You talk a great deal in your press about the "lack of wherewitha~ for
a dialogue between the government and the unions." To what do you ascribe this
estrangement?
/Answer/ tJe rarely hear of discourse between government officials and the unions,
that vital element in the economic destiny of the country. People say that we are
living in a country that has political and union pluralism. That is not enough.
That is a part of the whole, but the whole ought to be a dialogue with workers and
producers and agreement on procedures bearing on demands. The demands are still
hanging in all fields. We can cite, as an example the Phosphate Organization, the
biggest productive installation in Morocco. It has 1,000 workers and an important
union exists which speaks for this massive group. Since 1976, when the union was
founded, the minister has not received the union bureau, which is emcpowered to
represent the workers. The government states that it is on the side of union rights,
freedams and dialogue, but for 4 years the director general of the ministry refused
to meet with trade union o�ficials. It is not enough to talk about democracy. It
is necessary to impart true meaning to the notion of democracy. If I ask any of the
current ministers abaut agreements he has concluded with trade union officials, he
will not give a positive answer.
/~uestiun/ How can we explain this failure? Are there democracies in the world in
the basic sense of the word, in France and Britain for example? Many criticisms ~
have been made of democratic practices.
/Answer/ We in the Socialist Federation are not despairing. There are areas in our
- exercise of democracy which are improving. However, there are other fields where
we cor,sider democracy has been abolisited.
/Question/ Will the Socialist Federation withdraw fram parliament in the event the
4-year period now in effect is extended?
/Answer/ No one has yet confirmed that the current period of this parliament will
be extended. One hears items of news, but it is not in our power to make decisiona
on the basis of probabilities.
~ /Question/ IC is being said that the circumstsnces Morocco is going through are
crucial and that the country will not tolerate electoral shocks.
/Ans~er/ Two referenda took place last year--to amend the constitution and set off
rhe election campaign--and we particigated in them after we had observed that the
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authorities had mobilized every resource. ~~liy did the government decide on partial
elections this month, in Oued E1 Dahab and other areas of the Oudjda region, Tintane
and Djdida? We decided not to take part in them because the issue of guarantees to
prevent fraud had not been discussed deeply. We do not claim a majority, although
our organizations and staffs fully believe that we are the strongest party on the
Moroccan stage. We want integrity. That is a basic Socialist Federation demand.
/29 May-4 Jun 81 pp 40, 45/
/Text/ Abdel Karim Gallab, head of the Istiqlal Unity and Justice Group, has been
part of the struggle for independence since the thirties. He was a protege of Allal
E1 Fassi and was imprisoned many times before finishing his literature studies in
Cairo. He helped acquaint people with the Moroccan cause as a member of the Tempor-
ary Executive Committee of the Istiqlal Party, then as minister plenipotentiaiy for
Arab affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, before he became fully engaged in
issues of party struggle, as the editor in chief of the newspaper AL-'ALAM, v~ice
of the Istiqlal Party, and the pursuit of literary and pol~ical writing (he has
authored more than 25 literary and polttical works).
This conversation with him is an attempt to ascertain the identity of Che Istiqlal
Party and its political and ideological place in the Moroccan arena and to evaluate
its party experience in the context of the local, regional and international develop-
ments which have recently occurred.
/guestion/ What are the most prominent characteristics of political life in Morocco
as the Istiqlal Party sees them?
/Answer/ The two most prominent features of Moroccan pol~~tical life are freedom of
thought and freedom of action. This freedom may be attributed to a sound concept,
which the Istiqlal Party has believed in for a long time, which may be sum~arized
as the refusal to be assimilated into a system of foreign values, French ones in
particular. The French, during the periods of national struggle, gave the Istiqlal
Party (considering that it was the sole party that existed on the stage at t~hat
time) the offer of incorporation into French political movements. The Istiqlal
members refused to be incorporated into any f oreign movement, since it was their
goal to preserve the genuine nature of Istiqlal thinking. We realize that there
are political parties and movements which have arisen in countries under French
colonization but were directly connected to French organizations. This observation
applies to Algeria and the African countries. In Morocco (and in Tunisia also) the
notion of avoiding French political hegemony took solid form. The people in
Istiqlal implanted the foundations of this principle and rejected the notion of a
single party, although they were the only people on the stage. If we go back to
the writings of A~lal E1 Fassi, in his work "Self Criticism," we will see that he
attacks the notion of a single party and stresses the need for a pluralism of par-
ties in an independent Morocco. After independence, we proceeded to promote an
atmosphere of democratic struggle and freedam. We established intellectual, work-
ers' and union societies to liberate discussion from the fetters of disruption
through a proliferation of voices. There is no doubt that the democratic tradition
has been deeply rootec: in the Istiqlal Party vision from the time we presented a
petition demanding democracy in the early forties. This is the legacy of our
poliCical struggle, especially in the context of everyday practice.
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/Question/ It is said that the Istiqlal Party protects the interests of some afflu-
ent groups in Moroccan society, while its power of attraction in toiling labor cir-
cles is weak. To what do you ascribe this distincCion2
/ana-~er/ Tiie Istiqlal Party arose fran the premises of petty bourgeois groups end
the dawntrodden working classes in the rural areas and towns. The faunders of tl~e
Istiql.al Party were students and pupils in secondary bchools. The events of 1927
and 1928 are clear on this subject. There is no ambiguity in this regard with res-
pect to the party's first title, that is, the National Action Bloc. The party's
mobilization power at that time was concentrated among tradesmen and small merchants,
especially in towns which depended on traditional domestic industry such as Fez,
Marrakesh, Rabat, Sila, Meknes and Tetouan. These towns were the physical birth-
_ places of the national movement. The tradesmen constituted the movement's first
- core, followed by bedouins, peasants and intellectuals of modest means. Up to to-
day, the Istiqlal Party has depended on these professional and social classes. Let
us not forget the role of the working class in the party; it played a vanguard role
in the clashes which occurred in Morocco on behalf of independence, such as those
of 1933, 1936, 1937, 1944 and 1947, when the Moroccan French struggle was at its
peak in the towns and rural areas under the command of Marshal Juin. In Che light
of all this, I do not believe that we are protecting the interests of the upper
bourgeoisie. That charge has been directed against us, but is not founded on any
basis of specific evidence.
An Obsolete Movement?
/guestion/ Well informed circles in opposition garties say that the Istiqlal Party
is an obsolete movement which is concerned with past achievements and does not pay
attention to the challenges of the present, and thus that the party has lost its
earty allure of the days of Allal E1 Fassi, and 3ts power to mobilize has conse-
quently diminished.
/Answer/ That is not true. Let me invite you to the festivals we hold, or the cell
msetings we organize periodically, so that you can see the Is;:iqlal Party's credit
- anc? strength by yourself and our power to attract people by using the method of
"cer~radeship" inside and outside our activity. The cell is a group of "camrades"
in areas of agriculture, industry and education. The National Assembly composition
of the Istiqlal Party (with 400 caaanitted party men) gives evidence of the class
compesition of our staffs. They are all working people of modest social status,
as is L-he situation with the Organization of the General Federation of 3tudents of
Morocco and the Organization of the General Federation of Moroccan Workers.
/guestion/ What was Allal E1 Fassi's role in the Moroccan national movement and the
Istiqlal Party specifically? Why is it said that your party lost its allure after
the death of E1 Fassi?
/Answer/ Allal E1 Fassi was the founder of the natianal movement. He worked con-
stantly to this end from the time he was 15. He based his mass struggle on a
feeling for social justice when he regulated the conditions for the apportionment
of water in the city of Fez. He was a poet on public occasions, which made him a
_ goinr of atL�raction for broad masses of people, especially among the classes of
tradesmen and small manufacturers. He then began to give free classes, which drew
pec~!P to him in Rabat, Sila, Fez and Tetouan. At that point, under his guidance,
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the hational Action Bloc was founded. It held its first organizational meeting
and elected Allal as its head although competitors were present. His Istiqlal
Party leadership goes back to this period. He was in exile 9 years in Gabon, on
grounds that he was the greatest enemy of colonialism, until 1946, when he returned
to Morocco. After a few months the French came to t�iew him as a threat and banish-
ed him to Cairo and the eastern Arab world. Then he settled in Tangiers, whieh was
under the aegis of international government. From Tangiers he arranged the affairs
of the Istiqlal. Party until 1952, when he set out over all areas of the country,
spreading word of the need for Moroccan independence. He attended the Bandung Con-
ference. After the protectorate left Morocco, he returned and remained as a leader
of the nationalists until his death.
/guestion/ National movements in the Arab world are opposition movements, except in
Morocco, where they are a basic part of the loyal majority. Is there a discreiancy
here, and what is it?
/Answer/ The Moroccan national movement differs from movements in the Arab east.
It has a national rather than a political one. It arose to combat colonialism. We
do not consider the monarchy a chance phenomenon. It is the spiritual and moral
framework of the Moroccan nation. Since Islam came to Morocco, we have been linked
to the monarch and the people have pledged a conditional loyalty to it. Since in-
dependence, in particular, we have considered the monarchy part of the identity of
the Moroccan people. Our struggle in the Sahara today shows the profound solida-
rity between the people and the king. The march we held uras a crystallization of
- liberation activity which the people carried out under the leadership of the king.
Thus our participation is not political but one of destiny, a matter of identity.
- When we were in opposition between 1963 and 1977, we exercised the right of refusal
or veto over irresponsible pxactices on the part of administration figures.
The Accomplishments of Democracy
/suestion/ How does the Istiqlal Party appraise the current democratic experiment,
in terms of gains and weak points alike?
/Answer/ The experiment is a new one in any event and springs from the Moroccan
people, who took the risk of formulating the democratic vision. It may be charac-
terized by two phenomena:
1. That of achievements: We have paved the way toward freedom and organizations
such as parliament, local councils and a party life aimed at training and enlight-
ening citizens, proposing laws and discussing government programs.
2. That of the opposition: T'his is one of the fundamental freedoms, taking for
example the form of refusing to vote for plans which people in the opposition con-
sider are devoid of harmony and effectiveness. The democratic experiment in
Morocco is o success in spite of certain slips it has made, which may be ascribed
- to its immaturity.
There is no doubt that the Istiqlal Party has taken part in the crystallization of
this experiment. Our struggle has been going on since 1925, although goals and
directions have changed. Today we are engaged in combatting backwardness, illiter-
acy and religious and intellectual deviation and are striving toward socio-economic
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liberation, basing ourselves on an ideology which springs from the actual situation
of M~rocco. We also present solutions which are inspired by the Islamic religion,
and of course we benefit from the experiences of others, with the intention of drink-
ing directly from Arab and Islamic springs.
/guestion/ Does that mean that the Istiqlal Party does not believe in socialism or
struggle among classes, and, if so, don't you believe that there is a class struggle
in Morocco which you are trying to conceal with nationalist religiou3 slogans?
/Answer/ At the ~ifth Istiqlal Par~y conference which met in early 1960, we set
forth the theore~~iGal foundations of Istiqlal ideology. This ideology is based on
liberalization, essentially, expresses the state of Moroccan society, and lays out
the future lines of development of this society. Thus we do not believe in social-
ism. We propound a socioeconomic credo which we call egalitarianism.
/4uestion/ What is the gist of this egalitarianism? .
/Answer/ Egalitarianism holds that it is necessary to restrict the difference be-
tween classes as a first step in establishing a society without classes. This con-
dition eliminates the class struggle by granting citizens equal opportunities to
struggle to improve their standard of living. In the context of egalitarianism,
peasants can flourish because they are granted access to expertise, loans, equality,
fair wages, housing and medical care. Egalitarianism lays emphasis on the estab-
lishment of an economic structure which benefits from capital, directives, national-
ization of the basic sources of production in the country, the promotion of decen-
tralization and encouragement of national savings.
/Question/ Why do the people in Istiqlal reject the principles of scientific social-
ism?
/Answe~/ Socialist theories are predictable, and they have given birth to notions
which for the most part have failed. In addition, scientific socialism is apostasy,
- :ohile egalitarianism believes in religion, religion as belief and conduct. It is
~orrect Islamic form, ir inspires intellectual, palitical and economic activity.
Belief in God liberates man fxom superstition and links him to the fully-rounded
ma3e1 of the upright life which Islam has portrayed, in terms of individual and
coliective freedom and social justice, on grounds that money is an inexhaustible
means to free mnn from capitalism, usury, human daminance and greed. It is un-
fortunate that the slogan of socialism is generally embraced to conceal totalitar-
ian military apparatuses, in third world countries especially. Today there are
different socialisms, not a single one, whereas there is a single Moroccan egali-
tarianism, which the Istiqlal Party defends.
- /Question/ The French thinker Henri Febvre, in his book "An Introduction to the
~ New Spirit," says that %the term/ scientific socialism has been used by the social-
ist regimes established according to the criteria of some people in Asia and Latin
America and that its prime objective is to establish a society without classes.
/Answer/ Whatever the diverse fornns of socialism might be, they entertain a materi-
alistic view of life and of people and ignore unknown forces and spiritual values.
Et~en the society liberated from classes which it wants to build presupposes the
~icmination of one class by another by enabling what is called the proletariat to
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rise to power and monopolize the material and moral opportunities that had been
available to other classes. This leads to the spread of resenCment and hostility
among people. That does not mean that egalitarian ideology does not adhere to the
struggle against exploitation but rather that we want, before all else, to eat the
grape, not kill the gamewarden--that is, to create equal work opportunities, not
sow animosity. Our sole channel of activity is democratic struggle, not that of
kindling the spirit of monopolization and lust for outrageous profits.
/Qu~stion/ The Istiqlal Party is now represented in the cabinet. How do you embody
the principles of egalitarianism in actual conditions? What achievement have you
made? It is said that you have offered 'oasic concessions regarding your party's
program ir_ order to avoid "balkanizing govertm?ent action." Is this true?
/Answer/ I do not believe that the Istiqlal group in the cabinet has made basi~
concessions concerning the programs and plans it presents in the cabinet. The road
we are following is that of struggling to support our principles to realize maay of
our ideas through democratic channels.The ministries the IstiqlAl people occupy are
of importance in the current lineup, since we are able to fill the gap among class-
- es. For example, the minister of education belongs to the Istiqlal and he is work-
ing to ensure an education for all people and to shift courses into the Arabic lan-
gnage. ~hese are orientations that have been at the core of the Istiqlal program
since the days of the national movement. Let us not forget the importance of lan-
guage unification in drawing ranks together on the national level and making the
= struggle against backwardness effective. There are the two Ministries of Equipment
and Housing, which are both striving to raise the level of the downtrodden classes
and create modern public structures and utilities. These equations lie within the
framework of the development upsurge which all Moroccans are benefitting from.
Unfair Accusations
/guestion/ There is unanimity in Moroccan political and party c~.rcles that the
Istiqlal Party can be characterized by paralysis. Same of these circles criticize
it for failing to develop and keep abreast of the pace of current challenges and
hold that the same persons are in decisionmaking positions and are geographically
and intellectually characterized by a conservative attitude. It is stated, for
instance, that most of the Istiqlal leaders are from the city of Fez. What about
this?
/Answer/ This talk is part of the unfair charges that are directed against the
Istiqlal Party. Tradition does not mean that we are living in another time and
place, and the preservation of intellectual and moral principles and standards does
not mean that we have became petrified. I believe that we are zealously keeping up
with the pace of the times and are sparing no effort in developing and renewing
our party staffs and ideas. The charge of introversion has become an old one, es-
pecially since we are earnestly keeping up with current events in Morocco and the
aspirations of the Moroccan people. In spite ot the developments and shifts that
are occurring in the outer world, we are adhering to our ideology on principle and
- reject mercurial positions and "moving the rifle fram shoulder to shoulder."
Alert staffs exist within the Istiqlal Party ~ahich grasp the most modern economic
and social theories. In addition, new party officials in the regions and provinces
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are elected every 3 years at party conventions. The changes are pyramidal in fash-
ion and cover the base and the apex. The young people are the personnel who are
changed the most and they are the basis of every change in the context of leadership
gnd responsibility.
/suestion/ You contested the results of the latest elections. However, you did not
- boycott the regime. Isn't th~re a schizophrenia between theory and practice?
/Answer/ ~Je have more than once drawn attention to the need to avoid fr::strating
the course of democracy, not in terms of the damage which has befallen us but out of
- our belief that the experiment of political pluralism which Morocco is going through
must continue without letup or disruption. However, our objective in entering the
regime was to fight the deficiencies instead of running away and settling on mis-
leading slogans. Here is whzre the Istaqlal Party is realistic and persistent in
the process of struggling on all levels for liberation fr~ra oackwardness and for
emerging into ~he age of national developmental consciousness in a balanced fashion.
11887
CSO: 4504/13
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sunaN
AID FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION DISCUSSED
. Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 May 81 p 1354
[Text] In our issue of last 10 April (p 997), we reported the convening at Khar-
toum, from 23 to 26 March, under UNIDO auspices, of a"solidarity meeting," with
the participation of 26 developing countries, invited to take part in the Sudan's
industrial development, ~s well as of international organizations.
A series of proposal~= for collaboration with the public industrial sector was sub-
mitted to the delegates, and many representatives of the Sudanese industrial sector
were present, facilitating bilateral-level discussions.
The industrial sectors concerned were the following: construction materials; food
industries; the edible oil industry; sugar; the leather, textile and chemical in-
dustries; production of spare parts; industrial utilization of natural resources;
energy; consulting engineering activities. More than 40 projects were thus pro-
- posed. Many expressions of interest were noted, put in concrete form by several
preliminary bilateral agreements.
With Algeria: a project for modernizing Khartoum's central foundry. Financing:
- $400,000 from the Algerian Government.
With China: a clothing factory in Khartoum. Financing: $100,000 from the Chi-
nese Government.
~~Tith India: technical assistance to study the uses of bagasse; assistance in
set*_ir.g up training centers for the sugar and tanning industries; technical coop-
~ eration with the Industrial Research Institute, the control center for textile
q~~~iity. Financing: $250,000 from the Indian Government.
~4'ith Oman: a feasibility study for a paper pulp project; cold storage of hides.
Financing: $220,000 from the Omani Governr.~ent.
~ With Qatar: a hydraulic and quicklime factory. Financing: gift from the Qatari
Government.
With Yugoslavia: a pilot brick-manufacturing plant. Financing: a gift of
$900,000 from the Yugoslav Government.
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_ ruK urr~~.~At, u>r, viv~,ti
~ Various other proposals were submitted for the agreement of the governments con-
cerned. The participation at this conference of a representative of the Arab
Investment Guarantee Corporation of Kuwait and of the Islamic Development Bank
was noted.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
9434
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SUDAN
MINERAL RESEARCH SUI~fARIZED ~
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 31 p 1409
[Text] The mining of ores should develop an a large scale in the Sudan in the
next few years, in view of the ma.ny contracts in embryonic stages at the present
time in this field and of the important research in progress. Chrome, tnica and
gypsum, and gold are the minerals being worked at this time, with a low, but con-
stantly increasing, *:ate of production, especially for chrome. In 1979, 30,000
tons of chrome ore, 2,000 tons of mica and about 15,000 tons of gypsum were pro-
duced.
In this field of research, a large number of pro~ects are under way:
A study and prospecting campaign in the Bayunda desert north of Khartoum by the
geological studies department of the Ministry of Energy and Mine~, with Germa.n
technical assistance. This campaign made it possible to detect traces of disthene.
The Kloeckner company is studying, at this stage, the formation of a joint venture
for working this deposit. Another research and exploration phase is now under way
in the Nuba Mountains, and copper deposits have.apparently been discovered.
Frospecting for uranium by the Minex company (United States) in the northern part
- of the Nuba Mountains and for gold in the western part of the Red Sea Hills in the
Nubian desert.
A search for uranium and copper in the Hofrat el Nahaz (South Darfour) by the
Chevron company (United States).
Prospecting for diamonds by a United Nations team (UNDP) in the south of the coun-
trq. ~
A search for gold by Belgian technical assistance in the south.
The prospecting phase developed several years ago by the French Geological and
Mineral Prospecting ~ffice (GMPO), with the geological studies department of the
, Ministry of Energy and Mines, made it possible to detect the presence of various
mineral deposits interesting enough to justify a study of their development. The
, GMPO and the French Petroleum Company (FPC) are expected shortly to finalize the
establishment of a joint venture for the working of1various minerals such as tung-
sten, barytes and gold.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
~ 9434
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SUDAN
AUTOMOBILE IMPORT SOURCES, AMOUNTS REVIEWED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1409
[Text] According to indications given by the Sudanese department of statistics,
imports of motor vehicles into the Sudan in 1979 amounted to: 2,572 private cars,
at a cost of 5.4 million Sudanese pounds; 121 vehicles for the public transport
of passengers, at a cost of 511,000 Sudanese pounds; 618 vehicles for the trans-
port of goods, at a cost of 5 million Sudanese pounds. The principal origins of
these imports (in units) are as follows:
Private Cars 2~5~2
United Kingdom 937
Republic of Korea 641
France 331
- Japan 149
Saudi Arabia 334
FRG 38
Netherlands 20
EgYPt 21
_ Belgium 30
- Passenger Transport Vehicles 121
Belgium 70
FRG 13
France 13
Japan 10
Saudi Arabia 6
Vehicles for the Transport of Goods 618
United Kingdom 423
FRG ~ 45
Japan 56
Republi~ of Korea 22
Saudi Arabia 16
Sweden 10
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
- 9434
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SUDAN
RESTORATION OF WHITE NILE PUI~ING STATIONS REVIEWED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 May 81 p 1354
[TextJ In our issue of last 3 April (p 938), we published a note on the project
for the restoration of the Blue Nile pumping stations, to which the African Devel-
opment Bank and the World Bank group are making their contribution. A similar
project is under way for the White Nile.
The project for the restoration of the White Nile pumping stations has as its
goal reviving, in 5 years, the some 174 irrigated farms bordering the White Nile
south of Khartoum, where cotton, sor~hum and wheat are grown. The result of this
- would be an increase in productivity, a rise in cotton exports, increased resources
for the farmers and a better financial balance for the farms. The receipts ex-
pected for the public sector are on the order of 370 million Sudanese pounds, and
the number of families directly concerned is 28,000.
To achieve these objectives, the following means will be made available to the
farms: agricultural mechanization and equipment; financial means; worksh~ps and
facilities for fuel starage; vehicles and a teleco~unications network; the
modernization of pumps and the irrigation network; the construction of offices,
stores and housing for the training personnel. In addition, measures will be
- taken to encourage sound management and administration of the projects, and
studies will be made in order to help the future development of this region.
Among the most serious risks that could hinder the realization of this project,
we should note shortages and delays in implementation of local means, failure
to achieve anticipated production, a shortage of foreign currency, bad management.
Measures have already been taken to solve these problems.
The World Bank has granted a sum of $35 million to finance this project.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
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rvec vrr~~,twL UJG VIVLt
SUDAN
BRIEFS
SAUDI AID--Saudi Arabia has just granted the Sudan a loan of $100 million on f~!vor-
able terms, in order to maintain the Sudan's balance of payments. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1409] [COPYRIGHT: Rene
Moreux et Cie Paris 198]..~ 9434
PESTICIDE PRODUCTS--French commercial services in Khartoum report that the result
of the invitations to tender for the supply of herbicides and insecticides for the
next cotton drive show a new impravement in the position of the Rhone-Poulenc com-
pany, to the disadvantage of the Sfaiss company Ciba-Geigy. Rhone-Poulenc has about
a third of the total market this year, which, added to the share obtained by
Roussel-Uclaf, brings the French sfiare to about 40 percent of a total of $60 mil-
lion in products supplied. This total, divided between $10 million for herbicides
and $50 million for insecticides, will be financed in part by local resources and
above all by aid from various Arab funds, including the Islamic Development Bank.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jun 81 p 1530]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981a 9434
LOAPd FROM SPAIN--Fotlowing the visi+, to Spain, in April, of a Sudanese delegation
headed by Ahmad Salim Ahmad, ministar of cooperation, commerce and supply, the
methods of use of a Spanish loan to the Sudan of $17.5 millinn were clarified.
This loan will serve for the purchase in Spain of goods such as buses, trucks,
electrical equipment and tank trucks for the transport of petroleum products.
Spain will also grant the Sudan credit in the amount of $15 million for the pur-
chase of road equipment, tractors, agricultural machines and industrial bakeries.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French S Jun 81 p 1530]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9434
SOY PROJECT--Under the protocol signed between Canada and the Sudan's Agricultural
Research Corporation, experimentation with different varieties of soybean is being
undertaken at Abu Na'amah. Canada will provide $250,J00 for this project in the .
form of seeds and technical assistance. This project fits in with the line of
similar pr~grams being conducted at present at Kaduqli and at Kinanah by the
United States. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
5 Jun 81 p 1530] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981~] 9434
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