JPRS ID: 9858 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030039-2
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 39
• Content Type: REPORTS

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- JP~S L/9858
- 21 Juiy 1981
- I~lear East North Africa Re ort
p
(FOUO 24/81)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADC~4ST INFORi1/IATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and materiai enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JFRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
_ or [ExcerptJ in the first line of each item, or following the
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Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
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original but have been supplied as appropria te in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an
, item originate with the source. Times with in items are as
given L~y source.
T:~e contenta of this publication ~n no way represent the poli-
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~
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JPRS L/9858
21 July 1981
NEAR EAST/NORTH A~RICA REPORT
(FOUO 24/81)
CONTENTS
TNTER-ARAB AFFt~IRS
Arms Find Disrupts Syria-Iraq Overland Traffic
(Patrick Cockburn; FINANCIAL TIMES, 30 Jun 81) 1
IRAN
Paper Ca11s Western Journalists U.S. Spies
_ (David Hurst; THE GUARDIAN, 4 Jul 81) 2
Bank Orficial Discusses Domestic Gold Sales
(Terry Povey; FINANCIAL TIMES, 8 Jul 81) 4
Brief s
Abadan Refinery Reconstruction (
~
I SR11EI,
i:nterview With Foreign Minister on Palestine Issue
(Yitzhaq Shamir Interview; LA STA1~iPA, 4 Jul 81)........ 7
LF. BA1v0iQ
Interview With Former Lebanese President Franjiyah
(Robert Fisk; THE TIMES, 8 Jun 81) IO
SAUDI ;ABIA
Saudis To Resume Gold Output, Produce Copper
(Richard Johns; FINANCIl~L TIME~, 3 Jun 81) 12
SYRIA
Mini.ster of State Discusses U.S. Policy, Lebanon Crisis
(Faruq ash-Shar' Interview; LA STAMPA, 26 Jun 81) 13
- a- [LZI - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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_ Soviet-Syrian Military Exercises Doubtful
(Robert Fisk; THE TIMES, 6 Jul 81) 16
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC
Coup Predicted for North Yemen
(James Adams; THE SUNDAY TIMES, 31 May 811 18
- b -
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~
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
ARMS FIND DISRUPTS SYRIA-IRAQ OyERLAND TRAFFIC
PM3U1322 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 30 Jun 81 p 7
[Report by Patrick Cockburn: "Syria-Iraq Overland Traffic Hit"]
[Text] Overland traffic from Syria's Mediterranean ports to Iraq, which has
expanded its import progra~e despite the war with Iran, has been disrupted
by the introduction of a convoy system from the port of Latakia to the Iraqi
border.
The reason for this is the discovery of a truck from Scandinavia filled with
arms intended for Syrian dissidents, according to the Syrian authorities.
They say the truck was stopped near the city of Homs, just south of Hama where
- at least 150 people are reported to have been killed by the security forces
in late April in retaliation for attacks against government officials and
troops. Homs and Hama are both centres of anti-government feeling.
An important route for traffic to Iraq is through Syria despite the bad rela-
tions between the two countries. Many trucks cross Europe to the Greek port
of Volos for the voyage to Latalcia.
The increasi~tg popularity of this route has led to a fall in traffic through
'Tur6:ey tNit3~ berths vacant at, Iskenderim? and the port of Mersin which is used
b;~ many container vesse,ls.
Gverland traff ic to Iran is now flowing freely with the biggest hold up at
th~ customs in Tehran. Waiting time is four or five days.
Iran has an advantage over Iraq ~f possessing ports in the southern Gulf away
from the war zone. The most important of these is Sandar Abbas.
COP~KIGHT: The Financial Times Ltd, 1981
CSO: 4300/45
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~ `
~
TRAN
PAPER CALLS WES'TERN JOURAiALISTS U,S. SPIES
PP1061507 London THE GtiARI)IAN in English 4 Jul 81 p S
jArticle by ~avid Hurst: "Iranians Accuse Foreign Press of Spying for U.S."]
[Text] Throughout the week, in the wake of the bonb explosion which killed ~
Ayatollah Beheshti and several prominent members of the Islamic Republican Party,
Ayat~llah Khomeyni and the revolutionary leadership have been urging the people to
act as their own vigilantes for the security of the regime.
[dith,America once more bearing the brunt of the propaganda campaign the authorities
are apparently trying to incalculate in the masses that evary foreigner in the
country is a potential American agent.
This is not new but for the small group of foreign correspondents in the country
it has taken a disturbing turn. In a front-page unsigned editorial, JOMHURI-YE
ESLAMI, mouthpiece of the IRP, said, in effect, that all correspondents in the
country are American spies in the employ of the CIA. It called on "the people,
along with officialdom, to "bring the activities of foreign journalists under
their stern control."
"Most of the information sources of the superpowers," it said, "are composed of
journalists, and the CZA has at its disposal more than 1,000 j4urnalists for
gathering information. The blows that we have suffered result from the ways that
~a: hav~ not barred.
...the foreign correspondents, whose espionage line we have announced in JOMHURI-YE
ES1.A^fI are an imp~rtant source of information to the enemy.
'1'he speed of their word is unimaginable. The news of the catastrophe reached the
B';C in perl~aps less than five minutes, and experience shaws that foreign corres-
pondents are the most dreaded security agents. 'They work, under the name of such-
and-such a news agency, for Israeli radio, Iraqi radio, Bakhtar (the former prime
minister now in exile in Paris) and spying networks."
6Jith the banning of Mr Bani-Sadr's newspaper and fiJe others, JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI
is mor.e tl~an ever the voice of the regime. Its editor, Mr Hoseyn Musavi, has been
nominated as foreign minister.
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Foreign correspondents are preparing a formal protest. For in their view, with
this editorial, a fundamental contradiction in the authorities' attitude to the
foreign media has been reached. The Islamic Republic has made no secret that it
considers most of the 47estern media to be hostile, and for that reason it is
extremely discriminating in granting v~sas to foreign correspondents.
There are no American journalists in the country and very few Europeans. Those
admitted are therefore those who are deemed to have made some attempt to be objec-
tive--or "to tell the truth" as the authorities like to put it--especially over the
caar with Iraq. The foreign correspondents propose to inform the authorities that,
in their view, it is one thing to refuse entry or to expel correspondents of whose
reporting they disapprove, but quite another to treat them as "friends" one day '
and "spies" the next.
The particular bete noire of both th~ government and, it would seem, almost the
entire populace is the BBC, not merely for its own coverage but for relaying that
of f..oreign correspondents in the country. It is impossible to mingle with any
; crowd--such as that which gathered for last week's funeral--without being asked
. whether one is from the BBC, and given to understand that if one was one would be
far from welcome.
COPYRIGHT: Guardian Newspapers Limi*ed ~4 Jul 81] .
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IRAN
BANK OFFICIAL DISCUSSES DOMESTIG GOLD SALES
PM081102 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 8 Jul 81 p 3
[Dispatch by Terry Povey: "Iran May Sell Gold on Domestic Market"]
[Text] Tehran--Iian's Central Bar~k may sell gold on the domestic market in
order to force prices down, its governor said yesterday. The move may involve
Iran buying gold abroad.
' Dr Mohsen Nurbakhsh blamed profiteers for the fact that the government-minted
- "azadi" gold coins were selling at more than four times international levels
on the uncontrolled domest'c market.
- Gold, a traditional refuge of.. the Iranian merchant and the small saver in
periods of political crisis, has b een much in demand in Iran over the last
two years. Eighteen months ago the azadi coirss, which contain ~ust over
seven gra~es of gcld, were selling for rials 9,700 ($140). At the end of
June, after r.he dismissal of Mr Abolhasan Bani-Sadr irom the presidency and
, the bomb explosion that killed 74 of the region's leaders, it had risen to
rials 39,000 ($4t30),
World gold prices are low and if the profiteers continue, then we will buy
gold on tl~e international mark~:~ and se11 it within the country," said
Dr Nurbalchsh. "I am sure we could make a considerable profit on this."
Iran's Central Bank is believed to have about $1 billion in gold reserves of
its own, though much of this is kept abroad.
In the 24 hours between Dr Nurbakhsh's statement and its publication yesterday,
rials 2,000 were clipped off the coin's market price and it stood at 37,000.
The azadi was yesterday selling at $460 in Iran compared with its international
gold value of $104,
Spot prices for gold yesterday averaged $403. Gold coins are used in Iran both
for saving and decoration, as jewellery and are often given as gifts to newlyweds.
In the villages they, or ti~e half and quarter coins, are sewn onto traditional
- dresses.
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r~ux ur~r~i~i~. u~~ uN~.Y
On Iran's money supply, Dr Nurbakhsh said yesterday the Central Bank kould not
issue any new notes excep t for those repla cing the currency of the previous ~
regime. The bank's reserves of foreign currency were "~zough to meet our needs
for quite a long time," he said.
~ On the settiement of outstanding claims between Iran and the United States,
arising from the agreement which freed the L'.S. hostages in January, the
governor said that 2,200 to 2,500 of the claims were for amounts of less than
$1/4m, which did not, ther~fore, have to go before The Hague Arbitration Board.
- These small claims would be dealt with by examining contracts and other legal
documents, he said.
Dr Nurbakhsh referred specifically to the contract between Iran and a U.S.
company for the completion of the work on the $lbn Sarcheshmeh copper mine
- and extraction scheme.
COPYRIGHT: The Financial Times Ltd, 1981
CSO: 4600/62
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IRAN
BRIEFS
ABADAN REFINERY RECONSTRUCTION--Bahrain, 6 Jul (REUTER)--A decision on the recon-
struction of the war-damaged Abadan Refinery, the biggest in the Middle East, could
be expected within a month, an Iranian Oil Company official said in an int~rview
published today. "Abbas I3ejan, director of personnel and administration of Kala
Limited, a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), made his comments
to the Middle East Economic Su~vey (MEES). The Nicosia-based oil industry journal
did not say when the interview took place. The refinery in the southern oil
province of Khuzestan has been under Iraqi fire since Iraq and Iran went to war
last September. But there have been conf.~icting reports about the extent of damage
to the sprawling installations. Mr Nejand told MEES that the economic embargo
imposed against Iran in retaliation for the holding of U.S. hostages had a negligible
impact on Iran's oil industry needs. He also said that shortag~s of specialised
skills in the wake of the Iranian revolution were not sufficient to prevent any
increase in Iran's oil ~roduction, should such a policy be decided upon. [TextJ
[JN060929 London REIITER in English 0923 GMT 6 Jul 81]
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_ ISRAEL
INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ON PALESTINE ISSUE
PM081417 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 4 Jul 81 pp 1-2
[Interview with Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir by Arrigo Levi in
Jerusalem; "I Defend Greater Israel: PLO Already Has a State"--date not given]
[Text] Jerusalem--"In a few days' time Israel will have another coalition
government h~aded by Menachem Begin": Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir,
regarded as second-in-command in the Likud Party, Begin's political movement,
told me that he is certain that this will be the outcome of the current
consultations among the parties following last Tuesday's election. Shamir,
who received me at the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem for his first interview
- since the start of the election campaign, discussed at length both domestic
and foreign policy matters: he asserted that the Likud Party has now estab-
lished itself as one of the two major Israeli parties; he indicated that the
- new gover.nment's first task will be to res~e negotiations with Egypt and the
Unit~d States on the autonomy plan for the occupied territories; and last,
though he did not say so explicitly, I believe that he left no doubts ab~ut
the fact that the Begin government regards these territories as destined to
belong one day to a"greater Israel."
[Question] Who won the election?
LAnswer] The Likud Party, without a doubt. The Laborites returned ta their
1973 position, that is, they rega.ined only the votes that went to Yigal Yadin's
Dash Party 1978, as a result of the scandals that exploded within the Labor
government. We have further increased our strength, and whereas in the 1973
election we won 34 seats as against Labor's 50, we both now hold about 50.
The Likud Party has therefore become one of Israel's two major parties, in some
respects similar to the Western co~:ntries' ma3or conservative parties. And
it is not only Begin's party: it is destined to remain. It is true that a
large proportion of its grassroots are among eastern Jews who understand our
- policy better because they are very well acquainted with th~ Arabs through
- direct experience. For the time being we will form a coalition government;
but some day one or other of the ma.jor parties could even govern alone. The
voters showed irritation with the minor parties and their blackmails; the
political framework has been simplified and normalized through the strengther~ing
of the two major parties, and this is a positive development.
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P(1R (1N1~11'1,~1. li~l~ ONI Y
, [Question] Would a new Begin government be weaker than the previous one, if
the new coalition had fewer votes behind it?
[Answer] tt will in fact be stronger and more stable, because it will be more
homogeneous and compact. The first Begin government lost the voters' confidence
until a year ago, because it seemed divided.
With an obvious reference to Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizmann (who left the govern-
ment over disagreements with Begin), Shamir po3nted out that "the government
_ regained ground following the departure of the major stars. It is diff icult
to move foYtaard with stars. Without them the government demonstrated greater
cohesion and regained the public's favor."
I pointed out that since its foundation in 1948 the State of Israel had only
five foreign ministers before Yitzhaq Shamir: Moshe Sharett, Golda Meir,
Abba Eban, Yigal Alon and Moshe Dayan. I asked him whether he will remain
the sixth even in a new Begin government. He replied: "I hope so."
[Question] What would be your first step if confirmed as foreign minis~er?
[AnswerJ I can only make hypotheses, but it is easy to indicate the framework
in which the new minister will move, because we have a work schedule and we
must observe it. First of all, we must complete the autonomy negotiations,
and I hope that we will reach agrQem ent soon. I foresee no difficulties that
would justify a delay, because both sides' positions are clear--ours are, at
least. After all, we are dealing with an autonomy plan valid for 5 years,
- during which time wp should reach a subsequent agreement on the final
destination of the territories of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and during this
period there must be peaceful coexistence. It is to be hoped that it will
be easier now to find a solution acceptable to both partners (Israel and
Egypt). [answer ends]
Shamir confirmed that the Begin government is "opposed to the creation of a
second Arab-Palestinian state" and opposed to the granting of "self-determination,"
since it is convinced that "the Palestinians already have their state, their
country, namely Jordan: therefore the right to self-determination has already
been realized." The ~amp David agreement was based on the idea that "autonomy
is not sovereignty, not independence, and a solution must be sought within the
framework of this idea: the Egyptians have accepted Camp David and know that
it is impossible to go beyond this framework."
Shamir rejected my reference to "territories occupied" by Israel in 1967, and
replied: "The territories were occupied by Jordan in I948, but their
annexation to Jordan was never recognized by the international community. The
territories were part of the British mandate over Palestine, according to
which there was an obligation to establish a Jewish national home in part of
these territories. King 'Abdallah would ~have liked to call Palestine the
Kingdom of Transjordan: Jordan is in fact a Palestinian state; it is part of
Palestinian territory and is in fact 80 percent of Palestine: its population,
culture, language and religion are all Palestinian, so why establish another
Palestinian state?
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[Question] What, then, is your sol~stion to tbe "territories" situation?
[Answer] With re~ard to the territories, there is the problem of the Arab
poptilation in tliese territories, which does not want to la.ve under Israeli
military control. This is why we havp proposed an autonomy plan, a solution
= to be found in ma.ny of the wor?d's countries, including the Alto Adige in
= Italy. Such probl ~ns arise whez there is a populat3on etnnically different
_ from ti:e majority of the population of the state to which the territories
- belong. [answer ends]
_ I asked, following these remarks that leave no doubt 3bout Begin's.
view of the "territories" as part of a greater state of Israel, whether a new
Begin government would plan to request the annexation of the territories
themselves after 5 years. Shamir replied: "I cannot say naw: first we
must reach an autonomy agreement valid for 5 years. Then we shall see."
In reply to a question concerning plans to ex~and Jewish colonies in the occupied
, territories, Shamir told me that he expects that ~n autonomy agreement with Egypt
can be reached "without Israel's having to ab andon these plans." He pointed
out that the Camp David agreement was signed desp ite the clear difference of
viewpoints on this point and after Israel had merely been asked to suspend
colonization plans for 3 months.
[Question] What if, despite Israel's hopes, the autonomy agreement with Egypt
proved impossible on these~conditions? Would the peace plan with Egypt still go
ahea.d? Will the final portion of Sinai occupied by Israel still be returned
in April 1982?
[Answer) The two things have nothing to do with each other. We have always
kept our promises and honored our obligations. In any case, I am sure that
we will reach the agraement on autonomy, that the normalization of relations
with Egypt will continue and ~hat we will have peaceful relations with Egypt.
[Question] Do you believe that the Palestinians' movement for a Palestinian
state could ever disappear?
_ [Answer] Some day this movement will disappear. There is no other possibility.
Tlii.s organization was born in 1964 and has done nothing for the Arabs of
Pale.st~ne, has never managed, throu~h terrorism, to stop us leading a normal
life or to jeopardize Israel's normal existence. We have less terrorism than
= many Europ~an states, which I will not name, despite all the aid to the PLO
irom the Arab state_s and the Soviet b1oc. The PLO has been a total failure
and will have to draw the necessary conclusions. The Arabs have tried to destroy
us first with conventional weapons, then with terrorism and then with nuclear.
weapons. All these hypotheses have proved infeasible. Only one option remains,
and that is peace. They will have to accept us; they will have to live in peace
w i th us .
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A.
CSC: 4528/3
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LEBANON
INTERVIEW WITH FORMER LEBANESE PRESIDENT FRANJIYAH
LD~81439 London THE TIMES in English 8 Jun 81 p 6
- [Dispatch by Rob ert Fisk: "Lebanon's Loneliest Leader Awaits Revenge"]
[Excerpt] Zgharta, northern Lebanon, 7 Jun--In an interview with THE TIMES,
his first with a Western newspaper sinca he left the presidency, he [Sulayman
Franjiyah] called upon President Sarkis of Lebanon to step down.
"Any man with a minim~ of patriotism and a sense of responsibility and a
- minimum of energy would do mors far Lebanon than tYie current president,"
he said.
President Franjiyah, the Lebanese retain their titles of head of state, admitted
that he could not succeed Mr Sarkis if he resigned tomorrow. Lebanese
prevents a former president from running for election for six years after his
previous tezm of office expires.
But Sulayman Franjiyah clearly has no replacements in mind and his candidature
for next year seems an unspoken promise. Even the Syrians, it is said in
Beirut, are growing tired of Mr Sarkis.
"What I ask from President Sarkis," Sulayman Franjiyah said, "is a choice between
two propositions. If he is convinced that the Syrian army in Lebanon is an
army of occupation, then his first duty is to tell the Syrians to go back home.
"Tf he beJ_ieves the opposite is true, then he must say so and tell the Syrians
to get on with their job of maintaining order.
"The Lebanese are waiting for President Sarkis' answer and they are asking
themselves how two legitimate armies (the Syrian and the Lebanese) can fight
among themselves on the same front line and within only a hundred yards from
the Presidential Palace in Beirut. How can a responsible statesman allow this
to take place?"
President Franjiyah believes that during his occupancy of that palace outside
Beirut, he succeeded in preventing Israeli expansion into Lebanon. The Phalange,
he maintains, have become Israeli agents and he claimed that their military
council in Beirut was now co~nanded by an Israeli army officer.
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roH c~r�F t c; ~ ni, usi~: ~Ni,Y
Sulayman Franjiyah's antipathy towards the Isareli state extends further than
politics: some might say it bordered on anti-Sem3tism.
He claimed iaith angry insistence that the JeRaish Talmud provided irrefutable
proof of an anti-Christian program by the Jews of Arabia that ended when the
, Jews put their victims in underground crematoria.
- He seemed convince~ that hardly a word of what he said would emerge in a
Western newspaper undistorted by what he mysteriously called "Zionist pressure."
At one point he shuffled through his private papers to find the official Lebanese
government minutes of his meeting with Dr Kissinger at the Lebanese town of
Rayak in 1974,
He produced a copy of his private statement to the then American Secretary of
State. It ins.isted upon the rights of Palestinians to return to Israel and
emphasized the international status of Jerusalem as a religious capital.
But th en it rambled off into a long account of Arab victories over Europ ean
- crusaders and of Arab guarantees of civil rights to Jews thraughout history.
- What Dr Kissinger made of all this was not disclosed.
President Franjiyah prefers not to link his views with his friendship with the
al-Asad family. His father was a close friend of President al-Asad's father
and he remembers playing with Hafiz al-Asad and his brother Rif'at when they
were all six-year-olds.
Outside, in the roads of Zgharta, the Sy~ian troops are members of the special
_ forces, the unit personally commanded by Rif'at al-Asad.
- T'here is no doubt who President Franjiyah's friends are. Nor of his o~tim
intentions.
The flag of the giants carries a cedar tree surmounted by a large golden
broadsword, the weapon with which the Maron3tes once threw their Ottoman
oppressors from the mountains of the cedars above Tripoli.
COPYRIGHT Times Newspapers Limited, 1981 '
CSO: 4300/45
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SAUDI ARABIA
~
SAUDIS TO RESUME GOLD OUTPUT, PRODUCE COPPER
LD031245 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 3 Jun 81 p 5
_ [Article by Richard Johns: "Saudis 'To Resume Gold Output Soon
[Text] Saudi Arabia should resume output of gold and also become a producer of
_ copper in the near future, it was asserted in London yesterday at a conference on
the role of international companies in Saudi Arabia's development plans.
Attention focused mainly on the Kingdom's mineral potential and manpower problems
on the second day of the meeting--sponsored by the Saudi Gazette and the Avicenna
Foundation--and organised by the FINANCIAL TIMES.
Mr Ghazi Sultan, Saudi deputy minister for mineral resources, said: "It is confi-
dently hoped that mining ~vill start very shortly" from the site at Mahd ad-Dhabab,
only half a mile from;where gold was exploited from 1937-54 by an American-Saudi
syndicate.
He v;as referring to the positive feasibility study carried out by Consolidated Gold
Fields in conjunction with Petromin, the State Hydrocarbons and Mineral Development
A~P_RC~1, with a view to a joint venture that now seems certain to proceed.
Asked about the prospects for copper ore, Dr Abdul Hardy Taher, governor of Petromin,
expressed optimism that "within the next three years," exploitation of the deposits
?.00 miles north-east of Jidda would begin.
Mr Stiltan said that iron ore from the Wadi Sawamin might prove competitive as a
result of an improved process for the Kingdom's own steel industry, despite a low
feed grading of 42 percent and a high silica content.
- A pilot project is being developed 4~ith a view to completion of a full-scale
feasibility study by 1985.
Mr K.B, Smale-Adams, chairman of Riofinex, a wholly owned subsidiary of Rio Tinto
Zinc, stated.that he was "frankly surprised that there are not more foreign mining
companies investigating the mineral scene in Saudi Arabia."
He c~F~~crl.bed the Kingdom's mining code as offering scope for flexibility which had
been generally well received by the industry.
From the floor, Mr Peter Tress, an executive director of Consolidated Gold Fields,
paid tribute to the mining code as being "exemplary," but foresaw that a major
difficulty would be the extent of "Saudi-isation aimed at by the government."
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SYRIA
r
MINISTER OF STATE DISCUSSES U.S. PQLICY, LEBANON CRISIS
- PM011313 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 26 Jun 81 p 4
[Interview with Syrian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Faruq ash-Shar'
by Igor Man: "We Have no Impositions From Mos cow; Dialogue Wou1d Be Useful
With Washington" in Damascus; date not given]
[Text] [Question] Syria has always had two constants in its policy: nonalignment
and Arab solidarity. Now we are confronted with a Libya tied to the Soviet Union
by an iron pact. Now we have a Syria that has broken off relations with Iraq,
that has had some moments of serious tension with Jordan (relations between the
two countries are certainly not at their best), while relations with Libya
(with which a merger was even announced) remain uncertain. Minister, what has
happened to your nonalignment and Arab solidarity?
[Answer] For Syria the linchpin on which its Arab and foreign policy hinges is
the Palestinian cause. Consequently, we have every interest in consolidating
Arab efforts in that direction, in doing our utmost to strengthen relations
with the Arab countries working for the cause. However, the Arab countries
that ~;.re seeking solidarity for other reasons cannot have our support (the
illusion to Jordan and Iraq is clear; ash-Shar' preferred to ignore the question
of Libya---LA STAMPA editor's note) .
The same applies to nonalignment: we cannot remain neutral between two super-
powers when the USSR is supporting the Palestinian cause and the United States
opposing it, openly and stubbornly b acking Israeli expansionism. Even con-
servative Arab states which believe in the Palestinian cause do not question
our policy and, moreover, from time to time, despite their profound ties with
the United State.s, they acknowledge the realism of Soviet policy in the Middle
Eas t .
Permit me also to correct the term "iron pact" which you used. I would talk in
terms of a friendship pact, since the USSR has never tried to impose on us its
policy or its way of lif e, neither before nor af tex the signing of the friendship
pact.
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?4J
[Question] Your press, radio, and so forth, fiercely accuse the United States
- of supporting Israel's policy of aggression. Can a~;~ attempt on your part to
reestablish dialogue with Washington be ccnsidered abandoned?
_ [Answer] We are convinced that a dialogue with the United States is useful,
_ as long as the U.S. administraCion does not try to impose its political ~iew-
point on us, either directly or through Israel's military action. When our
press and radio criticize U.S, policy they are merely emphatically pointing
out that Washington is on the way to a possible violation of the rules of
dialogue.
[Question] You entered Leb anon at the request of that country's government, to
halt the disastrous civil war. Now, however, many Leb anese are say ing that your
"deterrence" forces have gradually become occupation forces, no longer loved
and e~en perhaps, as in the Phalangists' case, hated. What is your answer
to that?
[Answer] Let me tell you that you do not give.a true picture of the situation.
If anything your assertion could apply only to the Phalangists--and not even
to all of them, and in any cas e certainly not to the majority of Lebanese. First,
the major mistake made by certain major representatives of the Western press,
radio and television is to regard the Phalangists as representatives of the
Christians. In fact, they represent 2 percent of the~m, no more. Second,
for your readers' information, the Phalangists are hated by the majority of
Christians, as well as by the Muslims in Lebanon. Their "fas cist style" has
led them to kill in a single day 700 Christians of Camille Sham'un's party,
not to mention all the Muslims that they have eliminated. .
Syria is not involved in the Lebanese conflict: the Arab deterrent force is under
the Beirut government's control. Syria is willing to help a11 sides, including
the Phalangists, as long as "national pacification" can be achieved. But there
are two obstacles: Israel's continuous intervention in Lebanon's internal
affairs and the Phalangists' connection with the Israelis. When these two
- obstacles have been removed, we are confident that "national understanding"
= can at least be reached.
[Question] Do you believe that Habib's mission has failed?
[Answer] I co uld reply with a simple "yes," but I would rather elaborate ou it:
only the Israelis can answer that question. In fact Habib's mission can fail
only if Israel persists with its aggressive and expansianist demands. Our
missiles in Lebanon are purely def ensive, as is interna.tionally acknowledged.
They are not there to attack anyone, except the aggressor.
(Question] Do you believe that there will be war between Syria and Israel? Do
you believe that such a war could spread to other countries?
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[Answer] The same applies here as I have already saici. Following the Israeli
attack on Iraq we have to take the Israeli leaders' character into accoim ts
th eir deep-rooted militaristic and terrorist tendencies. As I have already
had occasion to point out, a war can break ;,~ut only if Israel decides to
spark one off. In that case the war would inevitably involve other countries.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A.
- CSO: 4528/4
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SYRIA
SOVIET-SYRIAN MILITARY EXERCISES DOUBTFUL
PM061341 London THE TIMES in English 6 Jul 81 p 4
[Dispatch by Robert Fisk: "Syria Discounts Report of Soviet Exercises"]
[Excerpt] Beirut, 5 Jul--Syria today maintained silence over reports of
Soviet-Syrian military exercises off Latakia, pref erring to suggest that
- the manoeuvres were a figment of the American State UeparCment's imagination.
"If. you really want to know about this, why don't you ask the people who
started the story in the first place," one off icial in Damascus asked, indicat-
ing that he regarded the reports as little more Chan propaganda from Washington.
In reality, there has been considerable military traff ic over the north
Lebanese border with Syria in recent weeks, and it i.s indeed possible that
Syrian troops are cooperating in some form of ship-to-shore communication
exercises w ith Soviet naval craf t in th e eastern Mediterranean.
The Russian vessels arrived in the area almost three weeks ago when Israel
seemed on the point of attacking the Syrian ground-to-air missiles in
Leb anon, but th e easing of tension between Syria and Israel has now reduced
the importance of the Soviet presence.
Despite the re~orts from Washington, it seems unlikely that President al-Asad
would now permit Soviet marine landing manoeuvres on the Syrian coastline.
With most of the Arab world still deeply angered by the Russian military
invervention in Afghanistan, President a1-Asad--though he has himself never
condemned the Soviet presence in Kabul--wi11 not want to risk opprobrium by
inviting Russian troops to visit his beachheads.
There are at present perhaps as mairy as 4,000 Soviet advisers in Syria and
their movements are already clos ely circumscribed by the president who is
anxious to prove to his Arab colleagues that he is no lackey of the Soviet iJnion.
If Syrian-Soviet naval exercises have indeed begun today, they will be the
first ever between the Soviet Union and an Arab state, and the most important
military contact between Russians and Arabs since President an-Nasir invited
18,000 Soviet troops into Egypt in 1968.
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The Russian presence then prevented Israel from continuing a series of air strikes
deep inside Egyptian territory and the Syrians would no doubt be happy for the
Soviet Union's shadow to pass briefly along the Syrian coast if this were to
~ further dissuade Israel from any military adventures in Lebanon.
President al-Asad, together with General Mustafa Tlas, his defence minister,
was reported here to have paid a secret visit to Moscow last May, and at this
meeting it is possible that Syria and the Soviet Union agreed on some form of
military warning to Israel.
The pro~pect of a Soviet landing exercise, however, seems to have receded as
American intercession lessened the chances of a Syrian-Israeli war.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1981
CSO: 4300/45
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YEMEN ARAB REPU~LI:C
J
COUP PREDICTED FOR NORTH YEMEN
LDO11511 London THE SUNDAY TIMES in English 31 May 81 p 10
[Article by James Adams: "Ruler They Could Not Kill Now Faces Coup"J
[TextJ There have been three assassination attempts on the President of North
Yemen, 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, in the past month, according to sources in the capital,
San'a'. The three-year-old regime is looking increasingly shaky and after a series
of purg~s of government officials, the 34-year-old president appears to have been
the target of disaffected factions inside the country.
"A coup could happen at any time," says a Yemeni close to the presidential palace.
"Salih is now so isolated that every hand is turned against him."
North Yemen has had a vialent past, but Salih, a former army lieutenant-colonel,
has survived by a combination of political astuteness and a ruthless approach to
any opposition. He has shrewdly played up the strategic importance of North Yemen
to draw support from east and West while carefully maintaining some semblance of
neutrality.
Saudi Arabia, in particular is a close supporter and has been financing the bankrupt
Yemeni economy. In return, the Saudis have expected Salih to remain pro-~Jest and
distanced from Moscow and the Russian-backed regime in South Yemen.
However, the Saudis have been unhappy about rumors of Salih's impending visit to
rioscow which the president has been using to obtain increased aid from both the
Saudis and the West. Also, Salih recently arrested the former foreign minister,
'Abdallah al-Asnaj, iaho is a close Saudi supporter.
Salih threatened to execute Asnaj unless the Saudis increased their aid. The
Saudis agreed, but Riyadh appears to have decided that Saleh has gone too far.
"Salih is only hangir~g on because he has the support of the security police," said
one North Yemeni. "The army, as usual, is waiting to see what will happen and
dissidents are becoming incr.easingly active around San'a'."
- The atmosphere in the capital is tense. The last two presidents of North Yemen
were both assassinated.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1981
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