JPRS ID: 9861 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/9861 22 July 1981 West E u ro e Re o rt . ~ p CFOUO 33/8f} FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPR~VED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets ~ [J are supplied by JFRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [ExcerptJ in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is ;iven, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are encl~sed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. ~ The contenta of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or at~itL3ea of the U.S. Government. ~ COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING 04NERSHIP OF MATERIALS P,EPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRF THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE OiVLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400430042-8 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPR5 L/9 861 22 3'uly 1981 WEST EUROPE REPOaT (FOUO 33/81) CONTENTS , POLITICAL FRANC E ~ Giscard's Fo~mer Policies, Mitterrand's New Directions Reviewed (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 20 May 81) 1 A Look at M3tterrand's African Advisers (Sennen Andria~ulrado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 Jun 81) 8 ' Mitterrand's ~'~frican Advisers Profiled African Experts in Socialist Party UNITED KINGDOM ; USSR, PRC Representatives Invited to Labour Party Conference (Julian Haviland; THE TIMES, 30 Jun 81) 14 MILITARY . FRANCE Review of Army Corps Artillery's Equipment, Operations (Jean-Francois Barbotin; ARMEES D'AUJOURDHUI, Jun 81).......... 16 ' ~ ITALY Melara Club Involvement in Arms Trade , (IL MONDO, 19 Jun 81) 22 ~ - a - [III -~WE - 150 .FOtIO] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 I FOR OFFICIAL tISF ONI.Y i ~ POLITICAL FRANCE I ~ ~ ~ ~ G ISCARD' S FORMER POT.,ICIES , MITTERRAND' S NEW DIRECTIONS REVIEWED ' Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 20 May 81 pp 30-33 ; [Article--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics] ' [Text] Kitterrand as candidate already had an Africa policy worthy of Mitterand as president. ~n our last issue we summarized his party's proposals for changing the relationship between France and Africa. These pxoposals ar~ not only ~z counter- weight to the policie~ Giscard has iollowed the last 7 ~ years. They flow frcm an analysis of what Africa today means to i'-self, and how it relates to external inter- � , vention. In this issue we publish, as an exclusive, this document which serves ~s ~he basis of the Africa policy ~ called for hy the PSF. i The first key idea: the rejectirn of any claim that Africa . ; is a special preserve for other powers. The second key idea: a rejection of the anti-Soviet obsession, as the PSF believes that the USSR, "legaliatic" in its inter- ' ventions, is neither trying to create new con~licts nor to stir up old ones. At least it is noC trying to get ~ more than long-term "anchorage pointsr' on Africa's coasts. Third key idea: some African states are on the way to becoming "regional powers." In North Africa, Libyan ex- pansionism is considered a serious threat, while Algeria's positive role is recognized. In black Africa, Nigeria is urged to claim a predaninant positian, as to a much lesser extent are Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Tanzania. ; F ourth key idea: French cooperation must be extended, particularly to Che Froat Line cour~tries, and it must become more selective in thQ future by eliminating aid to notoriously dictatorial regimes. 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY From all this analysis, notable for its soundness, one ; can only draw the conclusion that Mitterrand will remove the French umbrella under which a number of African ' leaders sheltered themselves the better to exercise ~ their absolute power, on the pretext of denying access to . the Sovxet Union. ~ The African continent is at the ~resent time embarked on a phase of change, still i underneath the surface, which may be fecund but whose extremely varied manifesta- ; - tions have but a single co~aon point: they are responding to, and at the same time accelerating, the disintegration of most of the statal institutions wh~.ch _ resulted from d~colonization. This decomposition is not simply the result of the inadequacy of certain leaders, nor of foreign econanic and political d anination. But this shift in the foundations may be perverted by the manipulations of out- side powers. Very simple in its broad lines, the policy of tihe former colonial powers, and especially France, was to maintain the status quo, whatever it was, without paying too much attention to ideological facades, so far as there were any, and to preserve the benefits they enjoyed along with the essential mechanisms for economic domination. The United States, which in the 1950's seemed to want to hasten decolonization for its own benefit, was in reality not very involved in the whole process, except for investing in several countries where operations were profitable (particularly in southern Africa) and giving strang support to a few ~ regimes judged to be of strategic importance, such as Kenyatta's Kenya, Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, and the Portuguese colonial system. This being the case, we h~ve contributed to keeping in~ustice alive and maintaining hotbeds for ma~or explosions, southern Africa and Ethiopia in particular, while on the other hand we have provoked or accelerated a process of general political _ disintegration. The drought in Ethiopia, the fall of the conservative Portuguese regime, were enough to considerably alter the balance of power on the continent, but the establishment of zones of Soviet preponderance was not an inevitable consequence of these important events: the new leaders of Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola only agreed to accep* it under the pressure of circumstances; it was the gross blunders, or the cowardice, of the Western powers that in Large part led to it. Soviet Legalism It must be admitted that Soviet policy in Africa has been distinguised by its l.egalism: the USSR has never supporte:c~ secessionist or rebel movements (except, and one could hardly criticize it for this, in southern Africa), and it has collaborated with the most diverse regimes. While Soviet policy may not thus have created open conflicts on the continent, it has hardly contributed to resolving those which already existed: it could doubtless have hastened the fall of Ian Smith's regime, but did not try, even though it would have been as simple as destabilizing the chrome market; as a big gold-producing country, it could also, doubtless, have created more problems for South Africa. 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400030042-8 In Clte military support it has provided, it has often appeared cautious. Even in Eritrea, where it has provided powerful support to the Ethiopian military, ~ it is not certain that it is aiming for th e most rapid possible elimination of cheliberation movementsz Vot to hasten either the appearance of violent conflicts or Che resolution c~C thosc which have already bruken out seems to be a rule for the Soviets. They aim more to assure themselves,--both in peaceful situations and in confticts--of anchorage points which will be fully utilized whenever the evolution of sociai iorces and the exacerbation of tensions on the continent or elsewhere makes *_hem truly operational and necessary. In the present situation, /Soviet influence appears to be complete only in a few countries where it is not seriously or honesc'ly rivalled;/ that influence is not, however, in any way irreversible, as is sho~ar. by Che evolution of EgypC and Somalia. New Force of Islam Another spectacular chan.~e is the growing weight of the Muslim coun~ries of North ~ Africa and the ~Iiddle East on sub-Saharan Africa. Econanically, it results from the actions taken by almost all the oil-producing countries, who among themselves carry out a subtle struggle for influence which manifesCs itself particularZy in ~ the Sudan-Sahel states, where Islam is strongly esCablished. Culturally, it ~ has gained new prestige because of its status as a non-colonial civilization, and because o� its new oil wealth. Politically, it seems to boil down to a contest between the countries of Che ~Saghreb--Morocco, Algeria, and Libya--the object of which is influence an the Sahara, which is apt to become once again what it was in the Middle Ages, a connecting link between the two halves of the cantinent. The Saharan-rlorocco conflict, like the war in Chad, has brought new life Co the old roads crossing the desert. They have also brought the aninous threat of a new _ predominance of the cor.tinent's northern countries. Incontestably, the greatest anxiwty is caused by Libya's presence in sub-Saharan Africa. Its intervention in Chad, and even more the proposed merger between~the two states, has given rise to a vigorous move by the governments concerned, which feet themselves directly threatened, to condemn the actions taken. Finally, one must take into account an additional factor involved in the evolution of disparities between countries, in their economic weight and their political intluence. Today we see the assertion of influence by Nigeria, the most populous by far of the countri~s in tropical Airica, and also the most wealthy. No other state has the resources to exert in~luence at the continental level, but on a local scale, those ~~hich are experiencing fewer problems, or which enjoy poli~ical and ideological influence, may be exerting growing influen~e on their neighborss this is the case with Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Tanzania, Kenya, and Zimbabcae. In a less Chense context, this ~night be a positive factor for the creation of regional ~ solidarities. Long the private preserve of the former colonial powers, the African continent has thus today become open to influences which are much more varied and are broadly antagonistic. This has not, for the time being, provoked a major crisis. Soviet penetration was not until recently a cause of excessive concern in the United States: �or the United States, in fact, and parCicularly for a man like Andrew Young, the blunders of the Soviets and their inabiliCy to understand African 3 ; FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000400030042-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY societies, as well as the wealth of experience and influence of the Western countries, kept the situation fluid and did not make direct intervention by Washington necessary. One could therefore leave the former colonial powers, and particularly France, a pre-eminent role on the continent. We mi.ght for our cnan part add that the communist countries themselves certainly do not have a perfectly hc~mogenous view of Africa~s problems. Cooperation i,~ith Peoples ~ ~ut the increase in global tensions, then Reagan's accession to power, the inter- play of local expansionist policies, have ctou~tless already more deeply changed the picture than yet appears. Other amb~tions are being asserted, particularly with ~:he r~Qnewal of United States' interest, which is heightened by the fact that the USSR-~d iscreetly but not ineffectively--is showing its resolve to keep a close watch on the maritime routes all around the continent (naval facilities acquired in Anbola and at Sao Tome, sought in Cape Verde). These ambition~ will make Chemselves felt all the more because Africa is no longer a Lethargic continent, but a zone from which, if something is not dot~e quickly, a general crisis of very gr~at scope--already manifest in U~anda, Ch~d, and Zaire--is goin,g to emerge. The general indications are not lacking: stagnatian of agricultural production, and , in certain very remote regions, almost general food shortfalls, extreme weakness in the browth pace of industrial production, cata~trophic indebtedness tied to Crade - balances whose deficit appears irreparable (the consequence of ~he increasing ; weight of oil import costs and the fall of export ca~nodity prices). Fragile ~rom the s tart, the states now lack the minimum of resources essential to management ; _ and cuntrol of their territory. Alas, it is all too easy to paint a v~ry somber picture of the situation in a = number of countries 10 years from naa: most of the territory will become once ; again a"tribal reserve," left to itself, feeding manpower to the few growth centers, or at best destined to welcflme tourists desperate for exoticism. With ~ this as the foundation, the rapidly swollen cities and a few islets of imported ~ "prosperity" will stan~ out with their occasional plantations or industrial plants, controlled at least indirectly by foreign powers. Indeed, because of the continu- ally growing indebtedness, the latter will have an iron grip on the public finances ; and foreign trade: this is already the ~ase for a country like Zaire, which is under the tuS:elage of the IMF. But this may also be the fate lying ahead for countries that depend on the communist bloc. Wearing different clothes, it will be the ultimate refinement to neocolonialism, or, if one prefers, the realization of one of the most economic forms of colonialism: indirPCt administration, or the protectorate. One might try to define Giscard's strategy on the continent as political and economic conservatism, joined with a strategy of expansion beyond the traditional sphere of influence, facilitated for a time by the relative indifference of the other western powers. This policy can be defined in terms of a series of con- centric ares. In the center, the "hard core," of the foztner colonial empire. Immediately beyond it is found a"greater French-speaking Africa," part of which may seem to be in the process of being absorbed into the previous zone. It includes the former T3elgian colonies and both the isolated Portuguese-speaking and English-speaking enclaves. The cases of Nigeria and Ghana are less open and shut: these are "big - mouthfuls" which do not let tliemselves be absorbed so easily. 4 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004400030042-8 ~oughly speaking, it is possible to d~fine ths criteria for membership in botn of :hese zones . The "central core" is defined by military intervention (and from this ~uint of view Zaire, the largest French-sp~aking country in the world, already 3elongs in it), aCtempts at political manipulation {manipulaCion of the statesmen ' in poc~er or attempts to destabilize regimes that are too independent). The second zone is defined by its paxticipation in Franca-African conferences. ;eyond that, one finds Africa "incognita"--basically English-speaking--which is to be approached only with caution, not to say with trepidation (witness, for e:ca~ripie che expectant attitude of the French Government in regard to Zimbabwe). In thst respect we are still in the exploratory stage, particularly in the scientific ~~~i.., and we are not yet ready to take spectacular initiative~. Blunders and Scandalous Actions Finally, there remains the uniq ue case o� South Africa. Contacts with Pretoria - have not been significantly reduced; of course, Giscard was able to say that he respected the embargo on arms...since the granting of F"rench licenses makes it possible for South Afr?ca to make do for itself, but commercial and industrial relations are still solid. France is actively participating in the exploitation of :vamibia's wealth, particularly uranium, in defiance of United Natio~s' resolutions. In the context of Giscard's policy, the expansion of French influence beyond its special sphere, in other words toward counCries that are often extremely wealthy, is inseparable fran an eYtreme conservatism with respect to the central core. It is ?n fact a question of assuring political stabilit~?, or raCher of providing complacent leaders with a sort of "life insurance," albeit at the cost of continual intervention. If we are to judge on the basis (certainly debatable) of the stability of teaders (which does not necessarily mear, political stability), instability in francophone Africa has been twice as great as in English-speaking Africa, whereas Great Britain intervened only twice in Africa, following the granting of independence ~ to Tanzania and Kenya, to put down revolCs with soldiers. Relations With Pretoria French intervention has only rarely (Gabon) had the effect of keeping a head of state in power; often the aim has been (as in Central Africa) ro replace him with someone else, and we are noe even counting the clandestine destabilizing moves ; in the Cc~rioros and Benin, of which it could not have been unaware, and thus en- courabed. The majority of French interventions ai~ed at dealing wirh almost hope- , less situations, at the origin of which, in various ways, lay considerable French cu~pability: the i11-considered, even scandalous support of Bokassa, the Chadian imbroglio which in large part is the result of the complacent attitude toward Tombalbaye, followed by the establishment, with the Elysee's blessing, of an inc~xnpetenC military regime; the "salvage" of ~fauritania, which was thrust into a war by rrench refusal to recognize the rights of the Saharan people. The t~ao ' French interventions in Zaire resulted from a more complex situation, where more states were compromised, but in two respects French responsibility is apparent; in the encouragement giveci co ~he Ar.golan trouble-makers, and in Che continuing support of the ~iobutu regime in its most scandalous aspects. The foundations of Giscard's policy are the following axioms: /the weaker a state, the stronger France is within it; the poorer a state, the less costly it is to maintain it under r~ur influer,~a. 5 ! FOR ~FFIC[AL USE ONLY i ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A scandalous policy, contemptuous of the right of peoples to peace and development, which sets at naught the courageous efforts of our cooperators, which makes our economic aid--already too parsimoniously measured out and poorly directed--mean- ingless. France sets aside for aid to the goorest countries in Airica 0.02 p~rcent nf~ iCe ' GNP: A policy which basically is intended to keep a certain number of Airican g~~vernments in a state of vassalage. However c1~sy and scandalous the actions of the French Goverbment, the other powers scarcely do any better: the USSR, for example, shows itself just as hegemonistic and anxious about its own interests, and it only provides extremely limited economic assistance. Above all, the weakness of the African states is such that they must compromise wisely. They themselves trade too much (often by necessity) with South Africa to be able to call themselves very particular; inde~d, they would certainly like France to take a different position, but they must accoumodate themselves to France's policy. They disapprove of French intervention in Central Africa because - of its modalities, but because th~y were unable to propose an alternative solution, they had to accept it. France has been a cynical piayer, not always a clumsy one. Interventionism in the central core and more selective expansion beyond it are two elements in a concerted policy. � Teo much history, too many friendships, too many common interests, a different conception of France's place in ~he world, and simple honor require us to build a different French p.olicy in Africa, with consCant dialogue with the Africans themselves. Progressively more anemic, more and more ineffective and mercantile, France's contribution to the survival, first, and then the development of Africa needs a profound reassessment. What we call cooperation is only one element, albeit an important ane, and its functioning needs to be completely recast. It is not a question of using it cold-bloodedly to acquire or maintain "influence," thaC is - to say to satisfy short-term political interests, or to consolidate already ac- quired and often questionable econamic benefits. The cooperative etforts carried out by France (and cooperation in Africa is only a special case) should have two functions. First, to engage the participation of all the creative forces of the country, regardless of the social level where they may be found, in the struggle against want on a continent with which we have u~any Iongstanding ties. Second, to establish, within a more nanageable short-term context, bilateral relations--or, to the degree possible, retations between the EEC and the associa~ed countries--and new types of relations which prefigure what might become a new international econart?ic order. F~r the concept of cooperation by itself, a partial remedy but not a definitive solution, must be transcended, and a leftisC government has a duty to struggle actively for the establishment of more equitable relaCionships on a global scal?; this is particularly crucial for a continent which contains almost all of the poorest countries in the world. 6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400430042-8 - ~nprovement or Neoculonialism It is indispensable to build our rela~ions on the African continent on a broader spectrum. Dete nnined support for the Front Line countries is politically essential. That does not in any way mean that France should repudiaCe its special responsi- bilities toward countries which for nearly three-quarters of a century have been intimltely associated with its history, countries which share with France not only ~ the use of the same language for ccmmunicaCion, but many ways of experiencing and evaluating the world that go along with it. B~ increasing its aid to the level of 0.7 percent of its GNP, excluding the DOM-TO~:rI [Overseas Depa rtments-Overseas Territories] (c anpared to the current 0.3 percent), France would have the means to help other countries without abandoning traditional Cies. The possibilities will be wide open. But we would have to exclude from the start both racist regimes (primarily South Africa) and those in ~ohich vioZation of human rights constitutes a sort of governing principle. Unfortunately, of course, as in many other parts of the world, human rights are lightly dismissed in a number of African countries, and on the question of respecting them we have no intention of compromising; but, in a word, there are few countries where the attack on these principles reaches such a level that state-to-stat~ cooperative relations-- ' and even more especially, cooperative relaCions not just with the leaders, buC with th~ people--are made impossible because they are categorically disCorted for other ends. COPYRIQiT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981 9516 CSO: 4400/1258 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400030042-8 hOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY POLITICAL FRANCE A LOOK AT MITTERRAND~S AFRICAN ADVISERS Mitterrand's African Advisers Profiled Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 2 Jun 81 pp 18-21 IA~tticle by Sennen Andriaffirado~ ~ (Text~ The mirnisterial embraces will not feel the same: Only yesterday, Minister of Cooperation Robert Galley was effusively fa lling into the arms of his foreign aff~irs counterparts such as Moustapha Niake of Senegal, Simeon Ake of the Ivory Coast or Martia Bongo of Gabon. - Since 22 May, someb~dy else is in charge and, from now on, the Miaistry of Cooperation aa~d Development will have as its boss a 44-year old "yc,ung man," Jeaa-Pierre Cot, and it will take him a while to get used to this kind of effusive manners and to know which partners he should embrace two, three or four times. Unless he never gets used to it: ~ _ Although he has a warm personality, is known to be a"nice guy" and a"man who likes to.make coatact with people" and who rejects the label of technocrat, he does not have toward Africa that "gut feeling" which his predecessor claimed to have. From the vi,ewpoint of physical appearances, Robert Galley was famous for his three-piece doub le-breasted suits while Cot will be known for sporting blazers. With a youthful face, long and curly haix casually groomed, this professor of international law f rom the University of Paris will be "the voice of Fraace" during negotiations with African countries. The Ministry of Cooperation continues to exist but its style will be different. . And its spirit will also be diff erent. The ministry would have ceased to exist long ago but for the insistence of the senior Senegalese head of state, Leopold Sedar Seaghor, who again pointed out to President Mitterrand that he should nat "frighten" some African leaders by giving the impression that he was going to do away with Freach-Africaa cooperation. ~ Little known in Africa but vitally important for many African regimes siace it handles French-African relations, that ministry located on "Rue Monsieur" was seen by some as the successor of the "Rue Oudinot" ministry, the former MinistrY of overseas France. Others, in a more prosaic vein, saw it as the keeper of the keys to the French m~oney chests--Ehe FAC (Aid aad Cooperation Fund) and the CCCE (Central Fund f.or Economic Cooperation). 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400430042-8 1 The "African Paper" of the Socialist Party (see JEUNE AFRIQUE issues Nos 1062 and 1063) indicated that the ministry would be replaced by a National Agency ~oz~ Cooper.ation similar to the ACDI (Canadian Agency for International Development). But w~.~,ping out a policy is one thing while governing is something else if one takes into account, as in this case, the reactions of foreign gartners. Yet, why was a minister who knows nothing ab.~~it Africa selected to such aa "African" post? T'he first reason is past experi~nce. In 1950-1951 whea Francois Mitterrand took over the Miaistry of overseas Frlnce, he had no insight about Africa. When Gaston ' Defferre, now minister of interior, took over the Rue Oudinot Ministry in 1956- 1957, he cauld not claim to have that kind of insight either. And, under the Fifth Republic, Robert Galley practically discovered Africa when he became minister of cooperation. A man such as Jean-Pierre Cot can go through the same apprenticeship even if he foZlows a different course. A second reason: Francois Mitterrand has wanted te strike a balance in his government team between the various t-ends within the Socialist Party. Jean- Pierre Cot, who is the right-hand maii of Michel Rocard, appoiated to the post of minister of state in charge of planning and of territorial planning, will contribute to represent the Rocard group in the government. And finally, a thir3 reason: Presideat Mitterrand undoubtedly wants to break away fro~ the past by appointing to the Ministry of Cooperation a man who is not ' an offspring of the colonial seraglio. However, such men exist in the new Freach � government team. ~ S The French president himself knew Africa during the dark years of the continent. - At that time, he opposed the arrest of Felix Houphouet-Boigny, then leader of the ~ RD~A (African Democratic Rally) and, as such, hounded as a rebel. With skillful . moves, he becamP the architect of the divorce between that important African party and the French Communist Party. ' The number two "Africa hand" is Gaston Defferre who, during the 1956-1957 period, moulded French-speaking Africa as we know it today by means of the famous outline law. The change introduced by that law was to grant internal autonomy to the colonial territories. But when he insists that this law was the first step toward decolonization, Defferre undoubtedly forgets that for ma.ny Africans it still represents a baltcanization: the law carved up the large federations of the AOF (rrench West Africa) and of the AEF (French Equatorial Af rica) into small terri- tories whicli later became states. ' ~ In additi~*~ to the "Black Africa ha~ds," the French Government also ha~s its - "Maghgreb hands." One of them is Mi~~i.ster of National Education Alain Savary (age 63) who resigned in 1956 from the post of secretary of state for Moroccan and Tunisian affairs as an act of~protest when the aircraft ~arrying the Algerian Revolution leader Ben Bella was searched in mid-f light. 9 FOR Q~'FICiAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400430042-8 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY Another "Maghreb hand" is Michel Jobert, minister of state in charge of foreign trade. Born in Meknes, he is reputed to be one of the top French experts on Morocco. As such, his presence in the ranks of the government should counter- _ balance ~the f riends which Algeria aad the POLISARIO have among the members of the socialist team. In addition to his Moroccan trump cards and to the high regard which the oil- producing Arab countries have for him, Michel Jobert has a wide experience going back to the newly-independent Black Africa. As princ ipal private secretary of Gaston Cusin, then French high-commi.ssioner for French West Africa in Dakar (1956-1958), he had to implement the famous outline law; as assistant to the principal private secretary, and larer principal private secretary (1959-1961) of the minister of state in charge of cooperation, Rob ert Lecourt, he was the - one who tested the first "noncoloni.al" relations between France and French-speaking Africa. But if anybody deserves the title of "Mister Third World," it is Claude Cheysson, the minister of foreign affairs. Apart from his Vietnamese experience, this career diplomat has been an adviser to Pa.erre Mendes- France (for foreign affairs) and to Alain Savary (for Moroccan and Tunisian affairs). From 1958 to 1962, he headed the General Secretariat for Technical Coopera tion with Africa, then became director general of the Sahara Organization--that unf ulfilled dream of a Sahara shared by all the Maghgreb countries--and was later put in charge of the Organiza- tion for Industrial Cooperation in Algiers. - After serving as ambassador to Indonesia (1966-1969), Claude Cheysson weat back to the object of his early love. As a member of the EEC Cowu?ission since 1973, ha becam~ commissioner for developmeat and was the architect of the two Lome Conventions (signed on 28 February 1975 and 31 Octob er 1979 respectively) which regulate the cooperation between th e nine Co~on Market countries and the 56 ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries. Thus, Claude Cheysson has c:merged as the "Mister Thi rd World" and this is how he ~ is viewed by a number of African leaders whose confidant he has become, if reluctantly. Cheysson is, without doubt, the minist er who has been in the closest and best position t~ follow and even participate in Af rican d:velopments over the last 10 years. From now on, as boss of French diplomacy, he will be in control of France's policy in Afri~a. Still, he will not be the only person in charge of th e African file in Paris. . Jean-Pierre Cot, his minister delegate in charge of cooperation and development, will share this task with him. ~s the Socialist Party's national representative for European affairs, Cot established an excellent relationship with Claude Cheysson when Che latter wa.s posted in Brussels. To compensate for his lack of knowledge on Af rican affairs, he has already selected experienced aides. The first is Jean Audibert, hfs p rincipal private secretary, a former director of the FAC (Aid and Cooperation Fund), then director of cultural and technical cooperation and, finally, chairman of the ASECNA (Association for Air Navigation Safety in africa). All along, Audibert has been one of the main organize:~ of ~he Socialist Party's Africa Group. . 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400430042-8 , ~ Then there is Renauld Vignal, head of mission. Until his latest appointment, this career diplomat worked on the "North-South" file in zhe depa:tment of economic affairs of the Quai d'Orsay and he is known to have established a good relation- ship with the American liberal tes.m of Jimmy Carter, particularly with Andrew Young whose militant humanism he shares. That same huma.nism is a characteristic of the last and most unexpected "Africa hand," Jean Le Garrec, secretary of state to the pri~e minister. Without specific portfolio, Jea.n Le Garrec is repor ted to be the right-hand man of Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy. But even more important, as far as the Africans are concerned, is the fact that this 52-year old man spent his career in the CFDT ~French Demo- cratic Confederation of Iabor~ union and in the Socialist Party defending the rights of immigrant workers in France. There is little doubt that Jean Le Garrec will be "Minister Immigrant" but wi.th a slight difference: from now on, they will not be referred to as "immigrant workers" but as "iuunigrant population." The reason for this change is that socialist France does not want to 1 ook upon foreigners as mere bunker-hands of the French economy. A symbolic nuance, no doubt, but a nuance which signals a frame of mind--human warmth and re~pect for mankind. In this respect, one could even say that, from now on, those Africans who are - having human right troubles will b e likely to find a more receptive ear in the French Government. The Mitterrand team is full of "human rights' champions" - and for a long time now they have b een demanding that moral standards be applied to French-African relations. They are even advocating cooperation on a selective basis depending on whether human rights are observed or disregarded by the recipient nations. When Claude Cheysson was draf tiag the Second Lome Convention, he suggested that the pream5le . to the treaty incl~ide a reference to human rights. He failed in this point to the delight of many African governments. The presen[ minister of state in charge of researcY~ and technology, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, set the cat among the pigeons when, in 1979, he questioned the government of Valery Giscard d'Esta ing on the issue of its African policy which, at that time, was at least suspect ed of being in ~ilent collusion with the despots of Africa. Francois Mitte rrand himself stands as a champion of these famous human rights. Although he was rather discreet on the subject of the past friendship between Gisdard d'Estaiag and Bokassa, there have been times when he has refused to be associated wi th some undesirab le individuals. A few months ago, while he was on a trip to the Ivory Coast, he did not visit a member of his family who lives in a neighboring country, to avoid finding himself in a situ~*ion where he would have to shake hands with a president who is known to be following on the footsteps of someone like Boka.ssa. 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004400030042-8 FOIt OFFIC[AL USE ONLY African Exgerts in Socialist Party Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 2 Jun 81 pp 20, 21 CArticle by 5ennen AndriamiradoJ ~Text~ On the fourth f loor of 10 Solf erino Street, Paris, at the ~ocialist ~ - Party ~PS~ headquarters, four telephones are ringing nonstop in one of the offices assigned to the Natianal Secretariat for International Affairs. From the time that Francois Mitterrand was elected and until a government was formed, telephone calls and unexpected visitors turned that office into a kind ~ of hidden Foreign Affairs Ministry. One day, Francois Fugier, who is in charge oE the "Third World desk," took a ~ call from Caracas. The caller was the French ambassador to Venezuela reques~in~ instructions. She kindly advised him to appLOach the Quai d'Orsay where Giscard d'Estaing's minister, Jean Francois-Poncet, was still dealing with everyday matters. Another time, a special envoy from President Ahmed S ekou Toure came tu that office to assure the "French socialist comrades" of the joy felt by the "Guinean revolutionary comrade on the occasion of Francois Mitterrand's splendi~l election to the post of president of French-speaking Afsica at the EHESS (School of Advanced Studies on Social Sciences Gabriel Arnaud, in cha.rge of external relations in the CCFD (Catholic Counmittee Against Hunger and for Development) who "is very knowledgeable" on the subject of southern Africa; Jeaa Audibert, chair- maa of ASECNA (Association for Air Navigation Safety in Africa) who is reputed to be one of the top French experts on Chad and generally on all the countries in the Sudanese area; Roland Colin, director general of IRFED (Institute for ' Research and Training in Education and Development) and former chief private secretary of Mamadou Dia, president of the Senegalese Council until 1962, and I who "deals" not only with Senegal but with Ma.li, Guinea-Bissau and the Central ~ Af rican Republic as well. ; That inner core is surrounded by a second circle which consists of experts from various ministries and specialized agencies. There is, for instahce, Andree ' Audibert, head of social services in the Ministry of Cooperation; Denis de.Sevres, the driving spirit behind the magazine RECHERCHE ET PEDAGOGIF, who has been put in charge of the "French-speaking countries" file by the PS; Yves Person, a historian who is the director of the African Research Center; Georges Cancade f rom the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation and Claude Wauthier, a journalist working for AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE. _ Finally, the last circle is a sort of semi-clandestine network of "friends"-- some are party activists, others are not; some are French citizens, others are not--who have also contributed to the mapping uut of the PS's African policy (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, issues Nos. 1062 and 1063) by preparing background noCes or supplying....some confidential documents. 'I'he same as all those who are in the National Secretariat for International Relations, the members of the Africa Group have a reputation of being "travel junkies." This unkind reputation came to them as an inheritance from some of their predecessors who were said to love traveling. Another lab el attached to 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000400030042-8 - FOR OFFI('IAI. IItiF ON1.1' the "African experts ot the party" is that of being "young Turk ideologists." - In fact, and apart from Veronique Neiertz and Francoise Fugier, all the members of the Internationa.l Co~ission are over 40. Philippe Farine, who is over 60 and a retiree, could ever. be taken for an old ma.n if he did not have such a strong physical appearance. Jean-:ierre Raison (age 45) separates the rest o~ ~ them into two categories: "Those who go back to the colonial years like Gabriel Arnaud, Roland Colin or Jean Audibert, and the Algerian war generation to which I belong." ~ How much weight do these "African experts" carry within the party? A lot consid- ering that they are also known to be Lionel Jospin~s proteges. But how much weight will they carry fram now on in a France ruled by socialists? Discreet or bitter in advance, their only answer is to say tha.t the party is not the gover.rt- ment and that the PS program is not necessarily the same as President Mitter~and's program. This is perhaps their way of saying that Francois Mitterrand will not feel tied down to every program although the party coffiaissions will act as watch- dog committees of the government. But, at least, the "African experts" of Solferino Street have had a first satisfac- tion: as they recommended, the French-African Su~it Meeting of Kinshasa, sched- uled to be held in September this year, will not take place. Firstly, because one must find out what is the point of that tradition established by Giscard d'Estaing. And secondly, b ecause Francois Mitterrand wants to be free to choose the first African country that he will visit. COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981 8796 CSO: 4719/28 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400034442-8 i 9E ONLY POLITICAL UNIT~;D KINGDOM USSR, PRC REPRESENTATIVES INVITED TO LABOUR PAR1R CONFERENCE PM301320 London THE TIMES in Engliah 30 Jun 81 p 1 ~ [Report by Julian Iiaviland: "Labour Invites Russians and Chinese"] - [Text] For the first time, representatives of the Communist parties of the Soviet L'nion and China are to be invited as official observers to the annual conference of the Labour Party in Brighton next September. The decision by Labour's National Executive Committee last week has aroused , misgivings among some Labour MPs and party members. ~ One member of the NEC, Nir Eric Heffer, objected to any communistg being invited. But in the end he agreed on condition that representatives of five or six dissident groups from the Soviet Union and eastern Europe should also be invited. That was ; agreed. , Senior Labour Party figures expressed regret last night that the party should be sliowing the Soviet Communist Party, in particular, this mark of favour. But there is a strong group, believed to include Mr Michael Foot, the leader, who hold that such contacts with the Soviet block can only help detente. I . i ' Eastern European Communist parties, w~re first invited in 1975 to send observers, ; on the grovnd that by listening to conference debates they would learn how true democracy works. But the Soviet and Czechoslovak parties were excluded, because of their treatment of dissidents. - When Labour's international committee met early this month to approve the list of ; invited observers, Mr Eric Clarke, of th~ National Union of Mineworkers, suggested ; that Asia was under-represented, and that the Chinese party should be asked. i Mr Frank Allaeui, MP for Salford East, said that if the Chinese came, the Soviet ' p arty could hardly be left out. Mr Heffer ob~ected stronglp to the Russians. Indeed, he did not want any eastern ; European parties asked. If they were to have communists, then let them invite ' representatives of western European Communist parties, who had shown some indepen- dence and been willing to criticize the Soviet Union. ~ 14 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000400030042-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY + In the end it was agreed that the invitation would go out, but balanced by invita- tions to dissidents in good standing with the socialist international. A list of diseidents is due to be approved by the international committee next week. There was further argument~over the Czech party because of its treatment of the ~ dissident group Charter 77. However, the Czech party was said last night to be ' on the official list. . When the international cammittee's invitation list came to the full NEC last Wednesday it was approved without discussion.~ There is some interest now at Labour Party headquarters in seeing if the invitations are accepted. There seems little doubt that the Russians will come: they have been looking for such an invitation for years. Their piiotographs will no doubt be prominently displayed in the press, to the chagrin of some party members who were saying last night that they hoped Mr Alex Kitson, the party chairman, would not welcome them too warmly from the platform. ~ Because the Russians will come it is generally assumed that the Chinese will decline. COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1981 CSO: 3120/62 15 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 F'OR OFFI('lAl. (1RM: ON1.Y MILITARY FRANCE i i REVIEW OF ARMY CORPS ARTILLERY'S EQUIPMENT, OPERAmIONS Paris ARN~ES D'AUJOURDHUI in French Jun S1 pp 28-30 ~Article by Gen 3ean-Francois Barbotin~ ~Text~ Created with the reorganization ot the gsound �orces, and consistin of some 10 units organized as a selt-contained body, the Army_Cotps Attillery ~ACA~ not only provic]es the army corps ~AC~ commanding general, the capability of instant artillery intervention throughout his zone of action but also provides him with a decisive interventional component. --8,000 men, including 450 officers and 1,400 noncommissioned officers. --2,000 vehicles, of which ].50 are armored. --Some 10.0 missile launchers and as many artillery pieces of all calibets. _ These figures give an idea of the size of an ACA. ~ Possessing its own entity as an EOCA ~army corps organic component~, this virtual: ~ "artillery division" represents, in the hands of the AC commanding general, an instrument of choice that enables him to back his operational effart with fire- power. It is nevertheless not a widely known bod~ and sometimes a misunderstood one des- pite articles that have already been published regarding it. * A graduate of Saint-Cyr (class of Leclesc), and holder o� a technical certificate and an EM5 ~National War College~ certificate, Gen Jean-Francois Barbotin has - held successively the posts o� chiet ot the Ground-to-Ground Artillesy section, Research De artment, EMAT ~Ground Forces General Staff~; commanding of~icer of the 8th RA ~Artillery Regiment~; advocate genecal of the CHEM ~Advanced Mil.itary Studies Center~ and oE the IHEDN ~Institute �or High National Defense Studies~; then chief of the General Stud3.es Bureau of the EMAT. Currently, he is deputy to the commanding general of 2nd Army Corps Artil.lery. 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400030042-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY It therefore seems o� interest, as part o� this ongoing reporting that is beinq devoted to artillery, to review the ACA type organization, and then to discuss in turn the problems posed by the existence o� this "major unit" in peace time, its capabilities, its purposes and its use in case of conflict. A Diversifiea Artille:y... ~ The artilleries of the lst and 2nd AC's are of substantially similar makeup and of the same size. That o� the 3rd AC is smaller but is capable o� being stacked with additional units in time of war, in accordance with the mission assigned to this entity and with the gene:al deployment of our forces. Each ACA is cmnmanded by a general oEfi~cer who is at the same time the artillery deputy of the AC commanding general. The ACA commanding general is assisted by a de~uty commanding general and by two colonels chargeci respectively with the use and th~ maneuvering o~ its ground-ground and its ground-air artilleriea. He has a headquarters ataff of some 20 officers. . Each ACA contains the following 10 or so units operating as an entity: --one headquarters equadron; --two nuclear artillety regiments equipped with Pluton missiles; --one nuclear artillery support group belonging to the Ordnance Corps; --two or three ground-ground artillery regiments; --one medium-ranqe ground-air artillery regiment; --two short-range ground-air artillery regiments; --one surveillance and acquisition regiment. Coupled with this diversification of units is a wide geographical dispersion. The regiments are often separated by long diatances �rom each other and from the ACA command post ~CP~ and sometimes stationed in different military regions. Under these conditions: How is the necessary cohesion to be maintained? How are the activities of all these units to be dir~cted and monitored, given their common misaion in time ot war? How is the presence of the commanding general to be made felt down to the lowest echelons7 These are the problems with which the command- ing general o~ an ACA must deal in time.of peace. ...That Must Be Made Fully Cohesive ' To exercise his authority and achieve the cohesion of this entity, the ACA com- ananding general functions in three major oapacities: 17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400030042-8 - --He ia the deputy for artillery to the AC commanding general,; ' --He exerciaes, with respect to all ACA tormations, the responsibilities normally asgigned to a aommander of troopa= --He is "manager of delegated authosity" with regard to the operations budget. As the AC comm~anding general's deputy far artillery, he is charged with the respon- sibility, from peaae time on, ~or coordinating specialized tr.aining and overseeing the application of the technical and opesatcing regnlations by all the AC's artil- lery units, includinq those organic to divisions. His responsibilities are substantially the same wi~th respect to ground-ground and ground-air artillery. With regard to nuclear artillery, he moreover assumes per- sonally the conducting o� annual .tests .and of �.cer.tain ~speaiEic .exer.cis~s: As commander of troops, he is vested with authorized powers with respect to ratings and discipline at the command echelon immediatel~! above that of the unit commander. Lastly, with reapect to the operationa budget, he is delegated to head~ --the study and the drawing up of unit plans, --the overseeing ot program progress during the cursent year, --the followup monitoring o~ budget per�ormance. The ACA commanding general is thus equipped with the means tor training his "divis- sioc~" in accordance with its war time mission, �or aEtixinq his.personal imprint to it, and for making it a coherent instrument. This of course means, both ~or him and ~or his deputies and atat� o�ticers, many visits to the field and to the tiring ranqes, as well as many personal contacts and participation in exercises. It is a price that must be paid to achieve overall operational e��iciency. A Wide-Ranging Flexibility of Use It is obviously in time of war, however, that the ACA takes on its true scope in fulfilling the AC oommanding general's titepower and informational needs. At this level of operations, air and ground maneuvers are integrated into an over- all operation combining firepower and movement. But a].though these two components are complementary, artil,].ery remaine the ~ssential element. For the ground-ground artillery, the AC, with its organic regiments and its rein�- forcement, as required, with general seserve or mobilization units, remains the privileged level of artil~ery maneuvering. 18 ~ ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY T2iis maneuverability must not be thought o� in terms o� curzent.weapons but tather in tesms o� future systems--155 Au E'-1 ot 155 Tr F-1--with which out units wil.l shortly be equipped. Whereas the division commander'~ cancetns ate centered primarily on the zone o� contact and are conducive to his use of division artillery primarily with priority , on direct oper.ational support, the A~C commander's more distant perspective and view ; ot operations as a whole sequire that he, on the other hand, place his emphasis on artillery operations at ~hat echelon. ~ The new weapons--because o~ their ranges, the �lexibility of theis trajectories, ! their precision, their power, and the inatantaneouaneas o� their interventional effects--will again make such operations possible. They will enable the AC com- manding general to bring artillery operations ef�ects to bear throughout his zone , of action and to intervene in depth against enemy emplacements. Furthermore, the unitary nature oP the battle, the variety of forms oE combat, and the rapidity of situational, developments militate against a strict da.fferentiation of missions between ACA and division arti.llery. From this stand~oint, the AC co~nanding general--without encroaching upon the preroqatives of the division conamanding generals and while preaerving a tw~o-level overall artillery organization--muat be in a position to order: --artillery reinEorcements of divisions by ACA units, --a maximum concentration of ~irepower on a given major objective wi.th the possible participation ot divi$ion ar~illeries, --mutual a=tillery support between divisions if needed. ~ The use o� ground-ground ACA in time o� war derives Erom these imperatives. It is maneuvered fsom its operations CP (PC MANART de 1'ACA ACA Artillery ~ Maneuvers CP~) via an artillery coordination network that l~nks all ACA units in- cluding the division artillery units. As the only command echelon with specific artillery weapone and the means of coor- dination with the planes of the "third dimenai,on," the AC is responsible ~or the antiaircra�t defense of the zone above its area oE deployrn~nt. its ground-air artillery helps guarantee the treedom o� action of the AC's major units,~by conducting an overall de�ense action it possib].e and, at the very least, a concentrated defense of priority zones. As in the case of ground-ground artillery, it is the responsibility ot the AC com- _ mandins~ genetal, at the requeat of the ACA commanding general, to set the priori- ties and to order the deployment best suited to the ground-air defense of h3.s zone of responaibility. ~ 19 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004400030042-8 As currently structured or being etsuctured, the~AC includes: � --one 8awk-equipped regiment; --tw~ regiments~eqtiipped with Roland and 30-~mm.twin gun turrets. . The Hawk is the backbone of the AC's entire antiaircra�t defense.:system, but the Roland and the 30-mm double.gun are indispensable oomponents at low and very low altitudes: --to extend Hawk action forward to division levels, --to de�end vital zones, with priority being given tA those covered by the Hawk. Roland, by virtue oE its operational cha=acteristics and its~tactical mobility, can be: --adapted to use by major units; in this case, it de�ends forward-based arn?ored regiments, which is the purpose for which it was designed; --used for the defense of sensitive zones designated by AC. The 30-mm twin.qun. is used to defend specitic sensitive points, route sections, obligatory crossing points... This artillery is ma~euvered from the Ground-Air Artillery Maneuvers CP in ac- oordance with orders received from the Thi,rd-dimensional Section ot the AC CP. Lastly, the AC is the echelon responsible for ordering into operation the tactical nuclear. weapons of the Pluton regiments. ~ The decision to use these weapons is made by the head ot state and the aoordination of their use with that of the sir-ground nuclear weapons ie handled at the FATAC ~Tactical Air Force~-Army headquarters level. But it devolves upon the AC oommanding general to order and to follow in minutest detail the maneuvers of the Pluton regiments so that the latter will at all times be in a position to respond in the shortest time possible tn orders from the head o~ state committing them to action. As a deterrent wea~on, its use is intended to be a last and solemn warning to the aggressor that the nature of the battle has changed. But the more e�fec- tive the military use of the tactical nuclear weapon is made, the more etfectively will its political intent be attained. From this standpoint, the AC's operation must be oonducted in accordance with the following imperative: to be at all, times in a position to: --locate the tarqets suited to treatment by nuclear ~ire, 20 FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400430042-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY --o.arry out the firing immedia~ely �ollowing the governmental decision, --take tull advantage o� the pause i.mpoaed on the enemy by the strike to calmmit its ~~c~hting forces. This demands coordination of all the AC's �orces and in particular a tight integra- tion of the operations of the Pluton regiments.~ These operations are directed by.. the Nuc].ear Artillery Section o� the AC. Far-Sight.for More ~ffective Interver.tion This article would not be complete without mentioning the acquisition artil.lery, whose role will become more and more determinative as higher-performance means become available to it for providinq usetul information to the Maneuvera CP and targets to the artillery. This is what it will take to enable our ACA to adequabely fulfill~its three tradi- tinnal missions: ~ --participation in the conquest o� artil].ery superiority, --support o� interservices units or g~oups t?y intervening on targets beyond the range of their organic weapons, --disruption of the enemy's deployment in depth by artillery operations coordinated with the commitment of mobile forces. The ACA, a virtual "artillery division" totally oriented toward a single purpose-- to intervene eftectively in the air-ground battle writh the object of upsetting the local balance to the advantage o~ our Eocces--is a coherent whole and.an indispen- eable AC combat instrument. its seeming heterogeneity, sometimes vommented by ill-informed observers, stema - from the diversity of ite weapons and equipment rather than from the state.a� mi:nd of those who.:are part.o� it. Whatever it may be tonarrow, it will, with its new wgapons and equipment, be the indiapensable instrument for responding to the AC's artillery and in�ormation needs. COPYRIGHT: 1981 - Revue dea forces asmees francaises "Armees d'aujourd'hui" 9399 CSO: 3100/197 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004400030042-8 ~ MILITARY ITALY : MELARA CLUB INVOLVEMENT IN ARMS TRADE Milan IL MONDO in Italian 19 Jun 81 pp 78-79, 115 [Article: "The Cannon Club"] [Text] It is called the Melara Club. It has no clubhouse. The members meet from time to time at a restaurant table or in the office of one of them~, It has a presi- ' dent, Gustavo Stefanini, who is also president of Oto Melara, but his is not a real post ~ust as there is no leadership of some group or other. It is a formula rather than a structure, derived from the idea of eight or nine companies, private and public, large and medium-sized, to associate informally, in order to sell on the international markets absolutely complete turnkey military naval units, provided with all the necessaiy equipment, finished in detail. Alongside the Melara Club, there is another organization that has played a deter- mining part in the amazing affirmation of Italian industry on this difficult market. It is a question of EPIN [Naval Defense Industry Promotion Agency], headed by Enrico Bocchini, president of United Shi~building Ya'rds. The agency, which was established 6-7 years ago, has among its maia productions the Genoa naval show, which exhibits: Italy's total production for defense at sea every 2 years in the fair pavilions of . the capital of Liguria. In spite of. the fact that it arrived last with regard to the other exhib~tions bq the sector held in France and Great Britain and is only in its third edition (1980), the Genoa naval exhibition has already attained, if not surpassed in some cases, the ~ level of the most important foreign exhibitions. A prominent part in the commercial development policy of military shipbuilding is recognized to EPIN, which, among other things, is supported by a sgecial interministerial committee. And, in this connection, it is recalled how, in the wake of the success of the 1978 naval show, Italian industry was able to acquire sizable orders from Ecuador (six corvettes), Thailand (three corvettes) and Iraq (four Lupo-class frigates, six corvettes, a lo- gistics unit). Genoese and.Ligurian industry has a leading role in military shipbuilding, as well as in the production of precision weapons and electrical and electronic systems. Of the limited number of companies belonging to the Melara Club (Oto Melara, United ~ Shipbuilding Yards, ELSAG [;~n Giorgio~Electronics~'; ~T:ar"geMactors;~.~~AT;~redA ma~fi~:ti:~ry in Brescia, Selenia and ELME�. [division of Montedel],'the first three have their head- quarters and production units in the region. But the number of enterprises, even - small- and medium-sized, aperating entirely or in part in this sector is quite larger. There are at least about 10 industries ~fi the electrical machinery sectox, about 20 in the shipbuildin~ sector. ~ 22 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000400030042-8 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY Among the largest companies, there is, first of all, United Shipbuilding Yards, in Genoa, which has concentrated production of military units in Liguria in the two Riva Trigoso and Muggiano shipyards, where ahout 3,300 persons are employed. In 1970, iC~.wad d~e~iaz?~d.b.ankr.upt~a~ a committee, of which Enrico Bocchini, the present president of the company, was a member, among others, wers-ap~b~~~fi t~-.~Ldle~i'ts'-i~~qYi3~ dation. In 1973, with the payment of 84 percent of the debts, it was possible to - reach an agreement, but the shipyards had to start from scratch in a market situa- tion that was anything but encouraging. Interest in the military sector, in which Italian industry had practically no longer su~ceeded in being r~presented, and the understanding with the other industries in the sector that led to the establishment of the Melara Club date back to the middle of the 1970's. At present, in the sector of corvettes and fr~gates, the shipyards boast of an order portfolio of roughly 35 percent and 50 percent, respectively, of the world market. The latest order was placed only 3 months ago. It specifies furnishing of four Lupo-class frigates, six corvettes and a logistics unit for Iraq and probably represents, in value, the largest deal concluded abroad by Italian in- dustry after acquisition of the Isfahan (formerly Bandar Abbas) iron and steel cea- ter, in Iran, by ITALIMPIANTI [Italian Industr~al Plant Company]. The United Shipbuilding Yards component in construct3on of these ships will range around 30 percent. A sizable contribution is made then by Oto Melara and the electrical machinery industries, including ELSAG. The role of this contribution and, especially, of the Ligurian companies, is considerable. In the United Shipbuilding Yards, they estimate that about 40 percent of the outside costs tha.t the company is incurring for these ships can be atrributed to supplies from Ligurian companies in the sector. Military shipbuilding, however, represents only part of the CNR [United Shipbuilding Yards] activities. The company, which is controlled by FINCANTIERI [Shipyards Fi- nance Corporation] and employs a total of 11,000 persons, including a~so two other shipyards at An~ona and Palermo, controls a lar~e ship repair center in Genoa, ~on- sisting of OARN [Ship Equipping and Repair Facilities], Grazie, MGN [expansion unknownJ, Dry Docks Corporation. This sector is precisely the one destined to have the greatest development in the company's programs. . B~cchini points out that "the military sector cannot be regarded as a miracle-making factor, because it is a limited market, affected by many factors and of which we al- ready control a very large slice. Repairs are the priority ob~ective. It is true that times are difficult at present. But, taking everything into account, the market - is there an~lalso quality. A few important things are missing. That group of fac- tors called reliability is missing especially. Therefore, everyone must do his own part in this regard." Oto Melara, in La Spezia, has a history similar in part to the history of the United Shipbuilding Yards and, like the CNR, it has developed especially in the last 10 years, becoming, under the guidance af Gustavo Stefanini, a company with a solid position on the international market, instead of inerely an industry primarily sup- plying the Italian Navy and Army. At present, Oto (originally Odero Terni Orlando) provides employment for 2,500 persons, exports its naval products (missiles and guns of.its own design and with sophisticated technology) and land products (tracked ve- hicles, cars and various types of heavy weapons) to 30 countries including the United Statea, Great Britain and Germany. 23 FOR 0 r FICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400030042-8 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The La Spezia company, which is a member of the EFIM [Manufacturing Industry Holding and Financial Company] and which will probably b e 3oined shortly by another company in La Spezia, the TERMOMECANNICA [Thermal~�Machinery] company, has made considerable progress recently in the field of technological independence, especially in the aec- tor of land weapons. After producing Leopard tanks under German license, Oto re- cently developed, in collaboration with FIAT, a tank of its own design, the OF-40. The ob~ective is ambitious: to be ready to play an important card when, in a few years, the European NATO partners will sit at a table to decide the line of tanks to adopt for the 1990's. ELSAG is a Genoese company estabiished 12 years ago from the disincorporation of the new San Giorgio company. The company, a membe~,of.~the'IRI=$TET [industrial Recon= . st~'uction.Institute - TelephQne Finance Corporatibn] and which atarted off, in 1969, with 400 employees and a turnover of 2 billion lire.~and now".employs 1,6Q0-:persons, achieved a turnover of 81 billion lire, in 1980, and an order portfolio.amounting to 242 billion, at the end of the year, 22 percent of which came from�abraad. ELSAG, a vigorous company with considerable production in the field of digital controls and processing and in postal mechanization, owes roughly 50 percent of its tumover to the naval systems sector. Marconi , controlled by the British Marconi Company, also plays a considerable part in the military sector. It has a turnover of 60 billion lire and employs 1,000 per- sons. It operates primarily in the field of telecommunications and is divided into four divisions: civilian, military, avionics and systematics. Selin, in Sestri Ponente, with 200 employees, also produces electrical and elec- tronic parts. It is, however, a company that has decided recently on a partial re- conversion of its own activity in the civilian field. Rinaldo Piaggio, in Genoa, one of italy's oldest aeronautical industries, also has production intended for the military market. It is a question of the twin-engine P 166-DL 3, used in sea patrol, search and rescue. Finally, Gajon is a company in process of strong development. It specializes in supplying complete training systems to the Armed Forces and is capable also of directZy providing training - courses and services. COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1981 10,042 CSO: 3104/309 E~ 24 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030042-8