JPRS ID: 9918 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9918
18 August 3 981 ~
_ West E u ra e Re o rt
p p
(FOUO 39/81)
FBI$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9918
18 August 1981
1
i
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 39/81)
CONTENTS
ECONOMIC
, FRANCE
Economic Challenges, Unforeseen OECD Trends Face Government
(Georges Laverdines; PROJET, Ju1-Aug 81) 1
ITALY
Commentator Discusses East-West Economic Relations
(Frane Barbieri; LA STAI~A, 31 Jul 81) 5
MILITARY
FRANCE
Changes Affecting National Gendarmerie Outlined ~
(Frederic Pons; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 13 Jul 81) 8
GENERAL
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Brief s
Franco-Swedish Armaments Cooperation 11
FRANCE
- New Matra Space Center in Toulouse Described
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 20 Jun 81) 12
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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ECONOMIC FRANCE
ECONOMIC CHALLENGES, UNFORESEEN OECD TREIVDS FACE GOVERNMENT
Paris PROJET in French Jul-Aug 81 pp 799-804
[Article by Georges Laverdines]
[Text] Standing with windsprayed face at the helm of a small boat being tossed
about by a very rough sea: this is haw L'EXPANSION chose to F~resent the recently
- elected president of the republic to its readers.
Is the image exaggerated? The metaphor of the storm here stands for the outburst
of the financial forces which one imagines ready to throw themselves against the
currency, the fragile symb~l of the compass in a~ifficult voyage. Indeed, the
first oil shock was itself followed by major monetary adjustments: one should not
be surprised to find that the second produces a new rpordering. This seems to be
happening in a fairly systematic way. In order to appreciate the freedom of man-
, euver the new team has, it is first of all necessary to understand the changes under
way in the international economic scene. One will then be in a better position to
see the exact location of the baGr of the good ship "L::nce" at the moment the new
_ ship's crew took over, and comprehend the inflections of course it undergoes in
this next leg of the journey.
A World Recession That Is More Persistent Than 1974-1975
The second oil shock came in successive jolts between the spring of 1979 and the
end of winter 1980, several months before and after the brief respitP of the OPEC
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] conference at Caracas which fixed
the price of crude at'$26 per barrel, double the mean price of 1978. Guided by
previous experience, forecasters around the world at that time predicted a"dowr.-
ward adjustment" from this 30 percent rate. The consequences for the price of crude
oil were immediate; in the case of France, a pric~ increase of 44 percent was record-
ed between the summer of 1980 and April 1981. It is almost as if the second oil
shock had been prolonged by an additional "semi-shock," which in the short term
translated into a revival of inflation and a new growth of the external deficit.
Beyond the specific wounds inflicted on France since the presidential election,
when even the German mark was heavily hit, we must try to discover the deeper
significance of these changes in the exchange rate. Their suddenness is excessive, "
but doubtless they reflect slow transformations in economic relations. Thus from
October 1980 to April 1981, Euromoney depreciated 20 percent against the dollar and
- 25 percent against the yen; only the pound sterling maintained its parity with the
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dollar. ror Japanese currency, it was the inevitable recognition of exceptional
industrial success; barely affected by the skyrocketing costs of energy, Japanese
industrial production increased 7 percent by volume in 1980, while in the same
period it went down 1 percent in Europe and 3.5 ~ercent in the United States; by
the end of 1980, Japan's trade deficit, even though it is a big importer of raw
materials, was practically resorbed.
Interpretation of the dollar's fluctuations is more complex; its substantial, almost
ridiculcus, increase in June 1981 most certainly resulted from psychological factors
genera;:ed by the aura of a realist Republican president, and from technical temporary
fact.,rs such as the rising interest rates on the money market, which raised the
basic bank rate to 20 percent at the end of the first half of 1980. But these 3is-
ordered movements should not mask the real improvement in American wage competitive-
ness, nor the innovative force of an industrial web capable of revolutionizing
space flight techniques in a 3-year period: after several years of under-valuation
engendered by deliberate contempt for external constraints, the strength of the
Am~rican economy was to return with a vengeance.
In short, the international economy finds itself in a supercooled state, as it waits
for a deceleration of American inflation. This is the signal being awaited by the
inflexible monetarist who presides over the destiny of the Federal Reserve Board,
even if it means provoking a second recession in his country. Already North Ameri-
can price indexes are wavering: inflation was down below an anrrual rate of 10
percent in the first quarter of 1981, compared to 12.4 percent in 1980. It is no
- longer unreasonable to hope for a de-escalation of the inflation rate between now
and 1981, which would allow the European ec~nomies to begin a phase of slow con-
valescence. They are in fact suffering the effects o~ a violent devaluation which
for several more months will fuel a persistent inflation capable of reducing the
increase in household purchasing power to a minimum. But families should also
benefit gradually from the competitiveness of their exports, wherever they are in
competition with Japan and the United States: the first signs of light at the end
of the tunnel can be glimpsed, first of all in the FRG, where there has been sub-
stantial improvement in competitiveness for several A~onths, as equipment orders from
the OPEC countries return to normal.
France's Economic Policy Choices .
Such is the state of the world economy faced by the new managers of the French
economy. But where is France in all this? There will be many efforts to come up
with the answer to this crucial question, and first of all the testament handed
over by Mr Barre, who omits neither the stigmata of the crisis--a bud;et deficit of
[Fr] 43 billion instead of the predicted 30 billion; 1.7 million job-seekers in
April 1981 or nearly 7.3 percent of the ~ob-active population; inflation which has
slowed down only marginally--nor the surprising results of imperturbably consistent
management: the stability of the franc on the exchange market during the monetary
hurricane that burst in the fall--despite relatively modest interest rates--, the
deceleration in the growth of the money supply thanks to a revitalization of the
money market, the re-establishment in 1980 of a balanced budget despite the slowdown
in growth.
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France, indeed, has been sorely tested by the second oil shock. It has moved in
step with the world economy, but the decline in French industrial production is
especially acute: 8.3 percent between February 1980 and February 1981,�compared to
5 percent in the FRG and 4.5 percent in the European Communi~y as a whole. Never-
theless, this slump in activity did littZe to intensify the slowdown in inflation
that started in the *hird quarter of 1980: during 1980, the rate of inflation of
- prices only declined about a point; in the first months of 1981, it was once again
at 14 percent, in other words at the average level of the previous year, as a
, result of the greatly increased cost of imports. As it did in all the other
countries in the Community, unemployment received a strong new impetus: the number
of job-seekers grew by 200,000 between December 1980 and April 1981; it is a small
consolation that this increase is not as severe as among our neighbors: in March
1981 the unemployment rate in France reached 7.3 percent, compared to 7.5 percent
in the Community as a whole, 4 percent in the FRG, 8.8 percent in the United
Kingdom, and 10.7 percent in Belgium. The particularities of the economic changes
in France during the past year will doubtless be exhaustive?y analyzed by the new
team in power. But right here and now, two explanations can be advanr_ed: thE
first is to be found in the severe deter3oration in the domestic competitiveness
of French industry in its own market since 1979; the reasons for this ha~re not
been clearly established, the stability~of the franc against the German mark sinr.e
the creation of the SME [expansion unknawn] not being the sole cause. The second
is doubtless to be found in the sectors protected from international competition;
even in 1980 they created Iarge numbers of jobs, despite poor demand, which has
not failed to put stress on prices.
At the beginning of .Tune 1981, there was still no perceptible sign of economic
recovery. The rep~rt on the condition of industry in May was deeply pessimistic
and, correspondingly, prospects for domestic purchasing power remained very reserved;
on the eve of the presidential elections, intended vehicle purchases remained medi-
ocre. A persistent stagnation in activity up to the summer of 1981 remains the
most likely prospect; a prospect which the attacks on the franc and the increase in
the basic bank rate to 17 percent since the presidential election have made even
more probable.
In these circumstances, one may better understand the extreme moderation of the
first economic policy steps taken at the start of the new president's term of
officez The 10 percent izcrease in the SMIC on 1 June was intentionally much more
selective than comparable increases in the past could be. The compensatory lower-
ing of social assessments on those making 1.2 times the SMIC had a doi.ible purpose:
to encourage a ceiling on additional increase, whatever may happen; and to avoid
exacerbating by too much the strains on industrial profits, which would then fuel
~ new inflationary tensions. The increases in social services and public spending,
Lhough quite spectacular in their presentation, will only have limited impact in
the second half of 1981, because of their ~hasing over time; a revival of the
French economy that moved too far ahead of the recovery of its trading partners
would once again precipitate a decline in external trade, whose prospects for 1981
are already unfavorable enough.
Such prospects are not able to substantially modify the trends in employment and
unemployment: a worsening is to be expected once again between now and the end of
1981. This wi11 force the moment of truth for economic policy. Keeping prospects
alive really requires broad consistency in the main lines of macro-economic regu-
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lntory policy: monetary policy, budgetaLy policy, and income policy. Now it is
illusory to count in the very short term on the possibility of significantly
re-orienting Franc~'s trade flows, and in particular of achieving self-sufficiency
relatively ~oon in equipment goods. 'llie new majority that emerged from the ballot
boxes on 21 June will have to confront the same choices that toppled its predecessor:
--accepting moderate growth in the purchasing power of wages (a new increase in
real prices could push down purchasing power), or choking off the growth in public
spending;
- --adapting to unemployment by increased deductions for social assessments, or
organizing industrial life in such a way as to reduce the ~rork week without lowering
productivity.
In order ~to make new decisions in the context of such constraints, the new tea.m will
� have to take into account the attitudes of wage-earners. Above all it will have to
- overcome the wave of employer skepticism which threatens to engulf it.
COPYRIGHT: by CERAS, 15 rue R. Marcheron, 92170 Vanves. 1981
9516
CSO: 3100/885
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ECONOMIC ITAI,y
- CONII~IENTATOR DISCUSSES EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS
PM041447 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 31 Jul 81 pp 1-2
[Article by Frane Barbieri: "If Europ e Goes to Sib.eria"]
[TextJ The sudden offensive announced by Haig in the economic sphere reveals
Peagan's suspicion that, of the many promises made in Ottawa by the magnificent
seven, or if you like six-and-a-half, one wi?.1 almosr certainly not be kept. This
is the coordinated containment of industrial trade with the Soviet Union. The
polemics between Reagan and Schmidt at the Chateau Montebello were presented in
strategic and at times even philosophical terms. The American maintained that a
cutback in Western supplies and credit wi~l make the crisis in the Soviet
imperialist system break out more quickly, while the Gezman retorted that
Western technological aid strengthens the moderate reformist factions in the
_ Soviet power structure, cutting the ground from under the expansiontst faction.
In Reagan's view, intensive economic relations give the Soviet Union a hold over
the West, while Schmidt thinks that it is the West which will determine future
Soviet lines. Nonetheless, even in this case it seems that the crisis comes
before philosophy. First it was discovered that trade with the USSR represents
not only an inevitable but a natural solution for the Europeans: nobody in
Europ~ exports and offers credit to soothe the Soviet regime; they do it because
they do not have better business outlets. Immediately afterward the business was
given a philosophical ~ustification. In this case it is not a question of the
clash between an open and hence progressive outlook on the par~ of the Europeans
and Reagan's presumably reactionary closed attitude, and of the former's
historically inevitable prevalence over the latter. It is rather a question of
the simple fact that economic interest had always prevailed over political
interest and that policy is determined on the basis of the economy and not vice
versa (whenever the reverse happened both the pol3cy and the economy collapsed).
Marx remains valid on this point in every sense. It is another matter if this
rule is not observed in the countries of so-called real socialism. There
politics really does dominate the economy, doing violence to it. But for the
capitalist systems to remain capitalist, they are paradoxically obliged to adhere
to Marx. The communist systems, on the contrary, preserve themselves by d3s-
owning him.
For ot~:er markets Europe has always been a processing industry that uses their
raw materials and energy. This is how it became an economic power. And only
thus can it remain one. Having failed to act fast ~nou~h to make the Third World
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not only a secure and stable source of raw materials but even an equally secure
and stable new market, Europe's outlets are being increasingly reduced to the
vast Soviet sources arid markets.
Even tsarist Russia was destined to becume the outlet for th e European economy.
Primarily in view of the collapse of the colonies, the coimnunist regime estab-
lished in the Eastern Bloc has changed little in this regard. Indeed, to be
frank, it is precisely the authoritarian plan-making and centralizing state
that inspires trust as a partner among European businessmen. Amid the extreme
fluidity of world mark~*_s--primarily with the Third World--they feel more
secure with the Soviets. As chairman of the Germa:l Industrialists Association
Wolf Van Amerongen says: "With whom could i feel more secure in business dealings
if not with Brezhnev in person, especially when he offers me nothing less than
uranium in exchange?" It is clear from his name, moreover, that he is no
overambitious progressive.
There is an inherent element of danger in the great Siberian adventure. You
can try to climinish, but not avoid, this danger. If the British fail to seize
those markets the Germans will, if not tha Germans then Che French, if not
the French then the Japanese, and if the latter withdraw then the Americans will
push their way in, The Japanese di~ iuvolve themselves in 5iberia but later
withdrew--not for philosophical reasons but because the cost seemed excessive
(oil was costing twice as much) and because meanwhile the new Chinese alternative
has emerged (offering oil at the sar:e price but with more attractive political
prospects}.
The supremacy of profit over philosophy has in any case been confirmed by Reagan
himself who, though having beaten Carter because of the latter's permissiveness
toward Moscow, eventually ended the grain embargo introduced by Cartex. It was
the ultraconservative Texan ranchers who asked him to. In any case, Europe
has many fewer options than the Americans and even the Japanese. If within the
framework of these pressures Euro-Soviet plans still do not seem to project
far into the future and if the volume of business still does not seem very
great, this is due not so much to strategic restrictions as to the bureaucratic
sluggishness and the clumsiness with which the Soviets move in the business world.
In fact it is the Soviet leaders who suffer from ideological preconceptions. They
always have to supply a theoretical answer to the dilemma posed by the omnipresent
priests of orthodoxy: who exerts the most influence or is the most influenced within
the trading context and what is the danger of the Western lifestyles and outlooks
being imported along witl~ technology? If Soviet trade and business with the
West remain restricted, the credit or th e blame would be Suslov's rather than
Reagan's .
In the inevitable expansion of trading between economies that are basically
complementary the greatest specific danger to the West that has hitherto emerged
is that of Moscow's ski11 in ~nanipulating and securing credits. Soon the Soviet
zone will hold a total of almost 100 billion [currency unspecified] in Western
credits. They bear witness to the anx~ety to open up new markets but also to
the skill with wh ich the Soviets are exploiting this anxiety so as to promote
their own industrial investments and the West's consumer requirements, while
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~ keeping their own financial resources free for the arn~s race. There is no need
to resort to complex financial calculations to realize that the Soviet Union,
with its economy's very low capitalization rate, would never have become the
military superpower it is without the West's financial contributian. Be that ~g
it may, this is a danger that must be measured, since it cannot be avoided.
The danger to the West is attenuated by the fact tha*_ the great adventure is not
without risks for the Soviet Union either. On~ result of the inflvx of
technologies and the intermingling of the economies has been to strengthen the
industrial, a.s against the military, sector within the Soviet power machine--in
, other words, the pragmatic and technocrztic rather than the ideological and
bureaucratic. Both are obsessed by the ancient Soviet conplex of encirclement.
But whereas the military-ideological sector tries to shake it off by progressively
pusliing hack the borders of the USSR's supposed security (thus transforming the
self-defense complex into actual expansionism and turning the "security zone" into
a full-scale empire), the te~hnocratic current is discovering that the ~ost of
the unnatural empire (unnatural inasmuch as it is the metropolis that ma.intains
the colonies and not vice versa) constitutes such a burden on the Soviet economy
that the latter is grinding to a halt and becoming a subpower.
Consequently both currents are prompted to seek margins of security and perhaps
the empire's strength by setting a modern economy in motion, rather than in ~
astroncmically expensive weapons. It is impossible to say who will win this
very complex matct-~. All that can be said is that it is a match that must
inevitably be played. Perhaps the West will thus be forced to "sell even the
rope with which it will be hanged," As Lenin forecast, unless the blessed new
European left itself finds a rope with which to hang Leninism.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A.
CSO: 3104/334
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MILITARY FRANCE
CHANGES AFFECTING NATIONAL GENDARMERIE CUZZINED
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 13 Jul 81 pp 23-25
[Article by Frederic Pons: "Armed Forces: The Star ot the Gendarmes"]
[Text] In the 14 July parade the gendarmerie always marches ahead of the army troops,
clearly separate- That is a tradition, a homage because of its 8 centuries.,of
history. This year, the 83,000 gendarmes perceive another symbol in this arrangement:
A sign of the interest focused on the gendarmerie by the new government.
Presiding on 10 July 1981 over the swearing in of the new graduating class of the
Gendarmerie Officers' School, Mr.~Hernu recalled the decisions made on 10 June 1981
by the Cabinet "to restore its legitimate place to this service which is a moral
imperative:" The crearion of 1,000 positions for gendarmes, the establishment of
a study committee on the revamping of internal regulations, and the conferral of a
fourth star on Lt G~en Jacques Boye, inspector general of the gendarmerie. Tt~~s rank
has never yet been conferred on a gendarme.
Aged 58, Gen Boye has retained, from his initial training as a highland infantryman,
a sporting constirution an~i the tan of an outdoor man. He spends 6 months of the
year on maneuvers or visiting his units. He does so "to retain contact with his men"
but also with the prefects and magistrates.
A close adviser to the minister of defense on matters relating to the gendarmerie,
Gen Boye sees to the training and the advancement of each gendarmerie officer.
Under his authority two committees are studying the following: Th~ f irst is studying
- the status of the gendarmerie in 1~81 and the second "the ^eeds of the security of
Frenchmen in 1990 and the role which the gendarmerie will be able to play." The
initial reports will be ready in October 1982. But already now, ths gendarmes told
me, "a11 these committees reach the same conclusion: The need to revamp the
regulation of the domestic service."
"The new regulations must modify what is outdated," Gen Boye asserts.
This revamping of the regulations has been the headache of the gendarmerie's general
staff for 25 years. Established by a law of April 1798 (28 Germinal of the year 7
of the Revolution), the regulations have been changed--and merely by simple amendments--
only in 1820, 1824, 1903, and 1933. When he took office in February 1979, Charles
Barbeau, director of the gendarmerie, had committed himself to review the
regulations during his f irst year.
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"The resolve was there but nothing happened," it was said at the general staff.
Yet, some annoyances relating to the regulation of discipline are borne less and
less well by the young generations: The unpleasant chores of the barracks, the
necessity to li~.: in barracks "mandated by the absolute need of the service," �
the need to request "duly detailed" permission to receive friends and ?~ave pet
animals. Hence the joke of the gendarmes: "In view of regulations, women and
dogs will be tolerated."
There is especially the need for the permanent availability of the gendarme
"soldier of the law," on duty round the clock for his "daily warfare." In some
_ brigades the men put in 70 hours of active duty a week.for 3,500 francs ~ month.
Motorized gendarmes are on the move 170 days a year, that is, every other day on
the average.
The creation of 1,000 additional jobs is the start of this lightening of duties
of the 3,678 brigades, which are thus ail slated to increase from five to six men
each at least. "Free time" will make its appearance in the gendarmerie. Beginning
on 1 Oct 81, each gendarme will be entitled to 48 hours of real rest each week
(now it is one a month) and ta 4 consecutive weeks of leave in summ?er.
Is there a cause-and-effect relationship? This is the first time since Cardinal
Richelieu (son of a provost) that the minister of defense (or of the armed forces)
is the son of a gendarme.
In May 1y81 Francois Mitterrand was the first to commit himself when he said:
"It will be appropriate to examine the conditions under which a special increase in
funds can be approved for the gendarmerie. The capabilities it has must be increased."
This resolve should offset the d~crease in credits allocated to the gendarmerie
since 1977. With a total of 9.5 billion francs, its~1981 budget was equivalent to
9.1 percent of the total defense budget compared to the 9.8 percent anticipated by
the military program law for 1977-82. Expressed in constant francs, this year's
budget barely exceeds that of 1976, there being a lag of 110 million francs compared
to estimates. This discrepancy has been reflected in the numbers. With no more
than 730 new jobs in 1981, the cumulative shortfall in the past 2 years has been
498 gendarmes. The only budgetary item clearly on the rise this year is the data-
processing program which was assigned 17.6 million francs in credits.
~ao networks have been set up: The "Araignee" [Spider] system for control purposes
and the "Saphir" [Saphire] system being tried out in the Somme region. In this
department each gendarme dispatch rider is equipped with a terminal linked to an
electronic control center at Bosny-sous-Bois. The latter includes an [electronic]
data bank of individuals being sought and of stolen automobiles. "Saphir" saves
a lot of time in making connections and in information retrieval. This time saving
makes it possible not to lose contact with the population.
In some areas, the gendarmerie is striving to return to foot patrols, always in pairs.
The extension of the "Saphir" network, planned in each department, will make it
possible to reduce the number of ineetings at the brigade level and the excessive
number of reports.
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"The statistics explosion has strangled us," I was told at the Melun school. Each
- administration has earmarked for its own use blanks in questionnaires which include
no fewer than 200 items.
It was necessary to limit that. Accordingly, in 1977 a"committee for the
simplification of forms" was designated. Reports every 10 years and in 12 copies
each have disappeared [from the gendarmerie].
At the same time recruitment has never been better: There are six applicants for
every slot. The same success is evident among officers graduated for the major
military academies or recruited from among the best noncommissioned gendarmerie
- off icers on a competitive basis. The attractions? "ImmE~diate operational
responsibilities," was the answer of the lieutenants who I met at Melun. Additionally,
- gendarmes benefit from more interesting career development than in the other armed
services.
At corresponding ranks, the responsibility of the geadarmerie off~cer is greater.
An example: The brigadier general commanding the gendarmerie legion of Metz has
nearly 12,000 men under his orders. His counterpart in the army, the general
coum?anding the territorial military division of Nancy, has half as many troops under
his command.
On showing me the fourth star on his sleeve Gen Boye stressed: "This new rank
symbolizes recognition of the important role held by the gendarmerie at the side of
the three armed services."
Young officers went further. They even expressed the wish for a change at the top
of their command through the abrogation of the decree of July 1933 placing a civilian
magistrate at the head of the gendarmerie.
"It is not inconceivable to create a chief of staff of the gendarmerie as in the
other armed services; the gendarmerie is older."
There are at least 17 candidates for the position: These are the generals of the
service. Menti~ned are not only Gen Boye, the most senior-ranked officer, but
also Gen Rigaud, regional command~~ in Paris, and Gen Bernadac, regional commander
in Lyons. That is where the deputy mayor of Villeurbanne, Mr Hernu, was able to
appreciate him.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeurs actuelles"
- 2662
CSO: 3100/860
, 10
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GENERAL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
FRA.NCO-SWEDISH ARMAMENTS COOPERATION--France is the country with which Sweden will
exchange the largest amount of information in the field of military technology.
The agreements already signed with the United States, Britain, and the Federal
Republic of Germany being of lesser scope, Marcel Dassault will have access to the
technology perfected by SAAB [Swedish Aircraft Corporation] and the LM Ericsson radar
system. Comment: The Swedish parliamentary circles which used to oppose France's
policy of arms sales were reportedly reassured by the positions taken by the new
government. [Text] [Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 13 Jul $1 p 4]
[COPYRIGHT: 19~1, Groupe Expansion S.A.] 2662
CSO: 3100/860
11
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G~:N E RAL FRANCE
NEW MATRA SPACE CENTER IN TOULOUSE DESCRIBED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French No 865, 20 Jun 81, p 91
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "Matra Puts a Vast Space Cen~er into Service in Tou-
louse"]
[Text] Matra has placed in service in Toulouse its new space center for the ass~ma-
bly and testing of satellites and space payloads. The new installations, built in
the industrial zone of Palays, near Montaudran, represent an investment of Fr 100 mil-
liCn, financed essentially by Matra. They comprise 26,000 m2 of offices and labora-
tories and 3,000 m2 of assembly rooms, including two zones under laminar air flow for
work that requires very high cleanliness, as well as an antenna-testing base (without
radome) on the roof of one of the buildings for testing the satellites' telecommuni-
cations equipment during assembly. In addition, the Matra space center of Palays en-
joys the benefit of the proximity of the CNES [National Center for Space Studies]
space center in Toulouse, where the SOPEMEA [expansion unknown] has space-testing fa-
cilities that are unique in Europe. The staff of the Matra space center presently
totals 280 persons, recruited largely from the local labor force. The personnel will
reach 350 at the beginning of 1982. Matra plans to increase its t~tal space-division
personnel from the present 650 persons (531 at the end of 1980) to 900-1,000 persons
in 1983, half of them at Velizy (Products and Technology Department) and half at Tou-
louse (Systems and Assembly Department). In 1980, Matra had a turnover of Fr 380 mil-
lion and logged Fr 1.8 million [as publishedj in orders. Matra anticipates a turn-
over of Fr 700 million in 1981 and Fr 1 billion in 1983 in the space sector.
The new space center in Toulouse will make it possible to assemble the satellites of
six programs per year. It will be used for integration of the five ECS [expansion
unknown] satellites, the three Telecom 1 satellites, the Spot 1 satellite, and the
equipment cases of the, Ariane launcher (four cases per year at present, and five per
year starting with the 15th launcher).
But this sizable investment by Matra will come into full utilization with the future
programs that Matra counts on obtaining--specifically, the operational Spot satel-
lites; the Europen ERS remote-detection satellite (which uses the
Spot platform); the future European scientific satellite Hipparcos, for which the in-
vitation to bid will be issued in 1981; and the future SAMRO military ob.servation
satellites for France.
Matra also hopes to win between three and five telecommunications-satellite programs
for export in the coming years, within the framework of the association with British
12
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~
Aerospace Dynamics Group and Thomson-CSF within the new GIE [Economic Interest Group]
Satcom International recently created for exportation of telecommunications satel-
lites derived from ECS and Telecom 1.
T'he first invitation to bid to which Satcom International has responded, under the
prime contractoship of Matra, is that of the Australisat domestic-telecommunications
satellite program for Australia. But Matra is also prospecting for other national
telecommunications-satellite contracts, notably in Latin America (Colombia, Brazil,
Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela), the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Iraq), and Africa (Ni-
ger, West Africa).
Matra considers that the Telecom 1 platform will be very well-suited to these pro-
jects. It should be a valid one for at least another 3 yeais. But beyond that,
Matra will have to have a new space platform available, heavier and adapted to the
capacities of the new European launchers Ariane 3 and especially Ariane 4.
Matra might also decide to launch into the direct-TV satllites market, taking advan-
tage of the experience of its British associate BADG [British Aerospace Dynamics
Group] thanks to the European L-SAT experimental satellite project, which will use a
heavy platform of the Ariane class. A decision on construction of the L-SAT satel-
lite is to be taken in principle by the ESA [European Space Agency] in October 1981.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1981
11267
. CSO: 8119/1558
END
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