JPRS ID: 9919 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040031-9 FOR O~~FICIAL USE ONLY ~ JPRS L/9919 19 August 1981 - Sub-Sahar~n Africa Re ort p FOUO No. 736 FB~$ FOREIGN I~ROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040031-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040031-9 , NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language ~ sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original informa.tion was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an - item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. T:-ie contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS~REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ODTLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040031-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040031-9 FOR OFFIC'IAL USE ONLY JPRS L/9919 19 August 1981 SUB-SAHARAM AFRICA REPORT ~ FOUO No. 736 CONTENTS . INTER-AFRZCAN AFFAIRS New French Socialist Policy for Sub-Saharan Africa (Jacques Latremoliere; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 3 Jul 81) 1 Reservations Still Prevail About ECOWAS Defense Pact (Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 15 Jul $1) 13 CAMEROON Background Provided on 16 May Incident With Nigeria (Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 15 Jul 81) 15 Briefs Arms From France 18 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC ' Prime Minister Discussas Relations With France (Simon Narcisse Rozanga Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 15 Ju' 81) 19 FPO-PT Leader Discusses Political Situation (Abe? Goumba Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 29 Jul 81) 21 Experiment in Multi-Parties Shatters Into Pieces (Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 29 Jul 81) 23 CHAD Goukouni Viewed as Consolidating His Power (Jos-Blaise Alima; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 29 Jul 81) 25 COMORO ISLANDS Briefs Qadhdhafi's Of~er 27 - a - [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040031-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400440031-9 !Y)R OFFI('IA1. II~N; pN1.Y MADAG~,S CAR Briefs First National Assembly Session 28 MAURITIUS Briefs Relations With France 29 REUNION Countr~'s Economic Situation Described (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITEi'RANEENS, 17 Jul 81) 30 SENEGAL French Reporter Notes Results of Diouf's Six Months in Power (Claude Wauthier; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 15 Jul 81i 33 Representatives of Opposition Parties Proliferate (I~omar Kebe Ndiaye; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 29 Jul 81) 37 - b - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040031-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000400040031-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE O~NLY IiVTl:h-AFRICt1~T AFI'AIRS ~~E~i FRI:~VCI~ ~UCIALIS'1' YQLICY r'OIt SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA Paris i~:AItCIIF,S '1'FtOPICAUl: 1~:T i~;~:DITE~ZR :I~~ENS in French No 1860, 3 Jul 81 pp 1751-1754 ~rticle by Jacques LatremolierP: "A New Policy in Sub-Saharan Afric~,"7 ~e:c~~7 TYie inauouration of a new socialist government, assured of a , parlia.mentary majority, wl~ich intends to radically change banking an~ economic systems, imp.lies new directions in French policy in Afric~.. ~'e know a, few of them through the statements of Fra.ncois Mitterrand. a.nd the membersof his general staff: increase in the volume of assista.nce, without includ.ing in ii~ the grants reserved for DOM-TUN1 Nlinistry of Interior in Charge of Overseas Departmant~, different sectoral ancl ~eographic distribution, priority importance given to the Problems of Southern Africa. But the details are only ~ supplie~ to us by composite documents drawn up by party study groups d.uring the presideiit3al campaign. If they indicate trends~ the cir- cumstances under which they were drawn up and the critical analysis of the previous admi.nistration on ~~�hich t~iey are based sometimes taint them ~cith a certain campai~n cluality and demand cautious con- sideration. Uther statements come from recently apnointed ministers. Often dic- tated Uy the concern to reassure public oPinion by avoiding break- downs in the conduct of business, they are not uniformly enlightening an~ it even can be fe~,red that they will only delay some changes of direction, ~~hich the situa,tion would offer a unique opportunity to eftect, tirhile ati�oiding the inconvenience of having to reverse one's opinion later. In fa.ct, electoral A~Ianichaeism has not operated in a sin~*le direction. 'rhe previous government ha,s responded to a smoothly systematic cr.i.ticism with a, defense which was nonetheless effective ~,nd ~,}tich was aPplied in particular to the files on Chad_ a,nd the Comoro Islands, not to mention Vanuatu, one of the most sur- ' prising "failures" in our lon~* overseas history. 1 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040031-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040031-9 FUit UFFI('IA1. US~: ONI,Y ConYronting Politicai ~lfrica The ~'rench, as a whole declare they ~,re committed to a policy of a,ssistance to the Thircl 1+Torld, but often r. ecoil as individuals ~,nd . groups at the financi~,l sacrifices it entails. This attitude would improve if they were better informed about the undeniable advantages ~ wtiich its African tra,dition provides France. I~To doubt~ on the eco- nomic level, it only ~ets a small, if not negligible part of its raw materials fror,: African countries, but the surplus of its trade k~ith them reduces the deficits of its fareign accounts. "The very nature of this trade operates qualitatively in favor of our technolo- ~;ies, taking into account the considerable sh~~.re of manufactured pxo- ducts wliich these countries buy from us.~" A community of history which has lasted more than half a century strengthens the world com- mercial basis of our language. Militarily speaking, Africa gives to Fra.nce, beca,use of the land bases and the overflight rights which it gr~~nts, a~ role which exceeds its European size. Finally~ in conduct- in~* its foreign policy, the con~idence of the African countries pro- vides it with many ~otes in international assemblies. In return, this si~tuation calls for an increased effort on our part, which is not only financial, but creative, to solve the problems~ which Africa, and especially subsaharan Africa without oil ~aces. Its seriousness, not only for Africa, but for the equilibrium of the eni;ire worlcl,,is poorly appreciated. Following a cycle of droughts ~~hich raged from. 1973 to 1975, whose xeturn was unfnrtunatel;~ con- firmed in 1980, increasing an urbanization monement which already could not be controlled, food production there dropped considerably. It is easier to mention the African countries--Ivory Coast, Cacr.eroon, Kenya and, to a certain extent, Mali--where it was possible to ap- proximately maintair~ this pro~uction than those, almost all the - others, where it has continued to decrease, forcing countries whose resources are a,lready heavily burdened with debt l~ecause of the drop in the price of export products and the rise in t''.ie price of energv to increase their indebtedness by purchases of ft~od products or depend on intern~.tional philan~~nropy to exist. ihese countries~ cauQht between famine and bankruptcy~ the indifi'erence or Pxpansion- ism of the most favored among thcm~ the seliishness of the industrial powers, the false solicitude of the USSR,above all cancerned wit.h assuring itself bases in the prospect of future conflicts~ and the covetousness of some A1~,ghreb countries~ tend to renounce all effect- ive administration of their territory. The world crisis is intensi- ~ied there by a disappointed ~.bandonment of the very idea of tech- nical progress. For economic evils, there exist remedies of the same nature, whose arsenal is far from being exhaustecl. We will examine later those *The Soci~,list P~,rty ~.nd Sub-Saharan Africa. See MARCHES TROPICAUX ET M~:lli'i'~;i~RA~T1:E?~S 22 May 1981 p 1395. 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040031-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400040031-9 FUR OFF[C~AL USE ONLY which coulci be su~~;r..sted by the I~'rench government, to the extent of its resourczs ~Lnd the concern not to compromise its fundamental interests. However, in the political order, we can only be skeptical about the soundness of the western initi~.tives. A coloni~,l regime ~~hich kept a fairl,y low ceiling on the value of thQ individua.l ancl ~.~hich ~as considered contrary to his dignity by many, but which was united internally and generally assur~e3 material secur- ity through an honest and efficient administration h~,s been followed for 20 years, from Biafra~o Uganda~ from Chad to Ghar_a and to Liberia, from the Sahar~, to Ethiopia and from the Comoro Isl~.nds to Equatorial Guinea, passin~ throu~h Shaba, by a series of wars, coups d'etat, executions and masslcres, which cannot lead anyone to glorify decolo- nialization. Also it seems th~.t our political activity in Africa should h~,ve been more marked by prudence and modesty than anywhere else. ~loreovea~ our sources of information have been reduced there - as our nationals left the hinterland. The maintenance of agreements accordin~ to wliich ~ae guarantee the integrity of many eountries aga.inst foreign threats, is certainly essential to the extent that they contribute to peace. However, on the whole, it seems that the - continental policy, which assures the prevention and mediation of conflicts of all types, should be left to the OAU and the regional groups wliich support it. ' As weak as the,y sometimes apPear, these institutions are~ in fact~ the ~nly ones ~Yhich have the right, because their members will bear the consequences, of makin~ a judgment about the viability of state structures inherited from colonializ~,tion. In a period when there are beginning in Africa, through the circulation of people and goods ~,cross frontiers, p~.rticularly African social and economic forms, avoiding the rioidaty of superimposed systems and foreshadowing ~er- haps a new Africa, whi~h would be made by itself, through a general redistribution of the maps, one can understand the OAU's objective in its justification of the intangibility of the colonial frontiers like frontiers inherited from the Treaty of Versailles which were formerly imposed on tlie SDN ~xpansion unknown]. But no one can - foresee the moment when this position will cease to be peaceful and become a cause of k~ar and when the Somali. problem a,nd the ~we problem will have to be sett].ed, amon~ many others. It is enough that a certain disorder be tolerFi.ted to prevent more serious evits. It is not necessary that those who have created it, support this disorder in principle. This is one of the reasons wh,y the resumption of an effort by Giscard d'Estaing in favor of an international conference which would propose solutions for the explosive problems of the Ilorn of Africa, arouses a certain suspicion. One has f~.iled to a.ppreciate in France the almost mira,culous nature of the settlement which took place in 1977 - at Djibouti~ facilitated as much by the circumstances as the skill of those who negotiateci on the spot. It was critical enough to 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040031-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400040031-9 HOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY settle this m~.tt,er ~.t best in the interests of those formerly under our jurisdiction, of 1;}iose in the S~est and o~ peace to avoid incurring new rest~onsibilities in a negotiation ~ahose conditions for success, in tiny case, do not seem to exist. ~pecific Subjects I:owever, some sPecial problems justify positive action~ because they question values of a universa.l nature, involve a security b~yond that of t}ie cotitinent or simply rislc damaging French interests whose legi~t- imacy is unquestiona~~le. 5uch are those of South Africa, Chad, the Comoro Islands, anci additiona,llv those involving the security of navi- - gation in the Incli~,n Ocean. The new minister of foreign ~.ffairs, C~aude Cheysson, h~,s made kno~m sever~,l timcs tliF~ imPortance ~.~hich the government attaches to the r~pid development of Namibia towards indepencl.ence and to unequivoc~,l opposition to South African ap~.rtheid. It is no+, only a humanist ~ ~ittitude, but rea.listic evaluation of the demands of our preser.ce in ~fric;i.. It is for tliis reason th~.t the emba,rgo on weapons des- tine~l for. Pretori~, is imposed, even if it must involve sacrifices for otir indi~stry ~.ncl our workers, which foreign competition will not fail to take ad.v~Lntage of . The United ~Tations has approved resolutions on tliis m~ tter, they ~~ut ~'r~,nce under an obligation. They must be strictly ~.pplie~l.. ~lowever, it ~zould be unfortuna,te to extend this attitude to the field of trade, even to tllat of our own defense, by decreasing our trade - with these two countries to the point of its elimination. The USSR - does not hesitate to purchase the wheat it needs from the capitalist ~~est, nor ~;o sell it the gas which will run its factories. The ex- ports of South Afric~. itself to the Af rican countries in 1980 exceeded 1,150 mi_ll~.on rands or 7.3 billion French francs. Its custom~rs have not asked ~zhether the quality of the ~oods or foodstuffs they bought were alter. ecl by tl~e practice of apartheid. One could not ima.gine, to only mention ttiis example, tha.t ttie future of the Renault car ~aliicti Renault is to construct and introduce soon, in collaboration k~i ~;li T3ril~ish Ley~lancl on the rapici].y expandin~ RSA Republie of South Af'rica7 ma,rket, will be compromised for the benefit of American or Jap~.nesc f irms . , Two ~tues~tions a.re ~.skecl regardir?g South Afric~,n uranium (in fac~ Vamibia.n): its er.richment and. deliveries of the crude ore to Fr~,nce. Tl~e enricliment ~f t~ie ur~nium destined for t}ie Koeberg plant, d~~- - velo~iecl Uy Framatome, ~oes throu~?h the United States and Fra.nce, - which must transform it into IT~' 6 pellets. It is kno~�rn tha.t the ohjections which Presi~ent Carter made about this process resulted in ~~outh lfric~. acceleratin~ the development of a.n economical enrich- ment T>rocess hhich will be operationa.l as early as 1985. ~iowever Fr~,nce is comr~itted to supplying an initial charge, dra.wn from its 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040031-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400440031-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY own stoclcs, as soon ~,s the plant is put in operation. I~Iust this ~:oM~nitment be brolten, with the inconveniences that could involve for ~ur own nurch~.ses of crude uranium? It seems that Claude Cheysson - has answered this question in the ne~ative on last 18 June, during the lunch of tlie vipl omatic Press Associ~~.tion. It is, in fact, .from the point of view of its rest,oration tha,t the problem c~f our tr~,de ~lith the I~epublic of South kfrica should t~e examine~l ~,nd not in the dogmatic prusrect of reducin~ it. Tliis res- tora,tion can onl.v be achieveci 4.t the Present time, by reducing our imports and increasin~ our exports, if possible both at the same tir~e. Tllere is no nriori reason to exclude from tliis realignment Na,mibian uranium, at the ver,y time when the dro~ in prices facilitates supply fror:i other prodticers. Unly the opportunity to diversify our purcha,ses could obstruct this natural solution. It is up to the ~;overnment to decicle it on the basis of the extent and distribution of our needs. ~ In Clzad, it can he concluded that r'rance faces both a pro2~lem of world str~.tegy, connectec? ~~ith the unusu~.l loc~.tion of this country which command.s ~ccess to our allies in Central Africl and the Sahel, and problem of responsibility in the ori~;in of the civil war. That of France goes baclc to it,s establishment in this country and the destruction of preexisting institutions, which then was carried out without this choice ever being denied until independence. riore recently, the benevolent neutrality observed for a long time by our forces tow~.rds those of Iiissene ~I~,bre has added its influence to tha,t o� this initial mistake. A state of affairs exists today in Chad whicli the Libyan presence m~.k~s intolerable. We must understancl that ever.�y attitucle which could be interpreted as favoring, directly or indirectly, a re-L-ui~n to civil war would alienate from us sympa- thies, which haT~pily are ].ong lived. This is what Acyl Ahmat~ whose complex personality hides no doubt views which are rather different from those generally credited. to him, came to say in Paric. We must finally re~,lize ttiat a matter of this scope will not be settled easily t;~e way we want it, which was the position of the previous ooyernment. 1Jhatever the illusions in the political environment in Ndjamena may be, we must be present and cooperate positively there. - The re~irne of Ahmed Abdallah in the Comoro Tslands is not illega,l, or at least it is no more so than that of Ali Soilih which is suc- ceeded since, ori~*inating lilce it from a coup d'etat, it has received in the same manner the approval of universal suffr~.ge and has been reco~nized by most countries in the area and by all the international authorities. I~esides the real creators of these two coups d'etat are the same. We can certainly desire Por the archipela.go a g~vernment which is more solicitious about popular aspirations and an adminis- tra,tion which is less concerned a.bout commercial consider~.tions~ but i;he initiative ca.-~ only come from the Comorans themselves. 5 FOR OFrICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040031-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040031-9 FOR OFFI('IAI. USE ONLY Frnnce t:olds ith :`1,;~~otte, ~�~hose reintegration in the Comoran nation~Ll whole sllould be speeded u~~, a. trump whose repercussions in loca.l. politics must be nroperly evalu~,ted. 1'he recent visit to Paris of Pluz~,walir, Ali Soilih's former minister leads to speculations which ~ it would be advisable to put a, stop to, since any interference, even indirect in favor of a p~~,rty discredited b3r its brutalities and its a.ntireligious attitude could only be disastrous. ~3ut we must not forget either the presence of 30 mercernari~s at Maroni in the form of a, praetorian gsarci, whose versatility could again be demonstra,ted. Financiall}* ancl. lo~istically~ the interested pa.rties, mainly French and 13elgi~.n, do not depend on Fra~~ce, but on a networlt of Africa,n countries a.monf; `chich we count our allies. This explains the dis- ~ cretion of tlie 1~'reric}i police reg~tirding their movements and their pur- chases. It is IlOt very justifiable ~or a French military mission to stay ith i;liem on Great Comoro, thus confirming suspicions of conni- vance betw*een t}iem anc~ our governn?ent. The Inclian Ocean zone of peace is rLn idea sponsored by Pr~?sident t~atsiraka. Af~hanistan and the Iran-Iraq War do not create a favor- able baclc~;round for this objective~ but the proposal to hold an interna,tion~,l conference on this subject is worth considering. I;esicles, one would not imagine that M~,uroy would be any less recep-- tive to it than Barre. It ~aould be advisable tha~t France be invited _ to it ;~s a riparian power (because of Reunion) and not as a mere user. l~rencli soverei~;nty in our southern department, which ttie in- tiabitants of Reunion ha,ve confirmed in many elections has been, in fa.ct, questioned in various ways during the last 10 years, both by Tanzania as well as by Madagascar and tlie Seychelles, who have even m~.de o.f it one of the subjects of the politico-military rapproache- ment planned between them. Our government has never ans~�rered these attacks, about wliich the public in the mother countr,y has little or no information. This is not a reason to let an opportunity escape ~Lo put a,n end to it. ke~ardin~ the mini-problem of the "scattered isl~.nds," more or less connected ~aith the preceding, the only answer which can be made to it is that there is no justification to give to third parties what belongs to the n~,tion and this all the more so since a transfer of soverei~nt,y would be a, formidable leg~,l precedent because of the consequences it would involve elsewhere. On the other hand, the economic utilization o~ these isl~Lnds could be organized for the _ benefit c~f all, undr~r the jurisdiction o~ a scientific office. '~r'it~liout clisre~a,rdin~ the repercussions of the most a.sserted positions o:f principle in the conduct of our policy in Africa, the fact rema,ins that t}le range within ~�rhich changes of policy of a moral or legal nature can be effecteci is narrow, even for the subjects which have - just been brou~ht up. It is only in altering our economic policy with respect to the various African countries that more concrete re- sults c~,n be expected.. 6 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040031-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400440031-9 - FOIt OFFI('(A1. 11~H: ON1.1' Gn a ~;eneral level, Nrance tias advocated for a long time the need for the staUilization of the prices of tropical products, ~aithout w}iich no clevelopment effort can be satisfactorily undertaken. This was the very s-~irit of the systen ?:liich rra,nce used with its form~r Afric~~n colonies until tlie Treaty of I~ome through the creation of loca,l f unds whose revenues were a.ssurecl by the additional prices al- lowed on the products which they sold to it. Historically, it is to com~~ensate for the risks involved by the abandonment of this system _ that France intervened to open up access for these countries to the European marl:et through the first Yaounde Agreement ~.nd to allow them to benefit from a fu~nd supplied by a.ll the partners in the com- munity for financinQ their development projects. STABEX ~xpansion unknow-n7 set up on r'rance's initiative by the Lome I Convention, althouJh incomplete and imper~ect on its terms of enforcement and procedures, f.its in with a tradition for which the ereation of worlcl stabiliza,tion fund. for raw m~.terials, together ~,rith an organi- z~,tion for production planning, even a, s,ystem of price control for imports, more effective than a bank audit taking place after the f~,ct, woulcl be the lopical conclusion. fIo~zever, one must not ignore that if this a,spect of placing aid on a~.~orlcl l~asis seems beneficial for ~.11, it ~~ould be even more so for those Third 1lorlc~ countries ~a}iose develoPment level is t}ie highest and ~~ho thus ~~rould become the main beneficiaries. This is even more - true ~ahen it involves the other aspect, which tends to eliminate all zones of protection or quot~. systems in favor of generalized prefer- ences. ~ Insi~le the Lome ~lssociation itself, it lias not been determined th~,t t}ie entry of the 1~n~lish speaking ACP ~frican Caribbean and Pacific Countries7, in spite of the increases of EDF European Deve:.opment 1~'und7 allocations in current units of account, would ha,ve been eco- nomically beneficial f or the former partners of the Yaounde Associa- tion~ or at 7.e~LSt for the most deprived ~,mon~ them. i`1e~.sures of such ].iber~.l appearance as the absence of all obligation of reciprocal exemption f or the ac?mission of European products inside their fron- tiers, reducina the interest which certa,in EEC member countries could have in them,increases the latter's ~,ttraction towa,rds the most f~,vored countries, with whom the substance of tr~,de is not difficult to find.. ~3eyond Africn ~.nd tlle Lome Association, it is even more certain that the tendency to Put thin~s on a world basis has had the effect~ as that was opportunely pointed out during the ACP-EEC conversation in ~`'.arseille in r:ay 1980, of hardening the ACP trading position with the conimon market countries, while that of the other developing countries improvecl, especially those in South America, Southeast Asi~. or the Far East. This a,cknowledgement that every geographic extension o~ assistance, whether it involves duty free admission, 7 FOR OFFICIAL USF, ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040031-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404040031-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ LI1VQStRIQnt effort or price stability necessarily operates at the ea- pense of the weakest, will not encourage the "privileged rel~,tions" lrith our African friends which Jean Pierre Got recently declared in a.n interview in DAUYI-IINE LIBLRE that he k~as determined to maintain. The t~~o terms of privilege and extension are, to a certain extent, antithetical and it is pErhaps the reason wl:y tne same methods were ' not used in the various areas of subsaharan Africa. The 26 Countries ~tind the Uthersl This com~,ensation ~,ctivity ~~llich formerly motivated French efforts in ~he creation of a Euro-.~frican economic area should be one of the justifications for French cooPeration today, by reducing the initial inec~u~.lities