JPRS ID: 9932 CHINA REPORT POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 44
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9932
25 August 1981
China Re ort
p
POLITlCAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILItARY AFFAIRS
CFOUO 12/81)
~BIS FOREI~GN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9932
25 August 1981
CHINA REPORT ~
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 12/81)
CONTENTS
PEO~LE' S REPiIBLIC OF C~iINA
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
Yunnan Defense Regiment Scores Victories in Border Clash
(Qian Gang, Sun Haogan g; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 2 May 81)........�....... 1
Learning About the Enemy Stressed in Military Training
( Chen Xiangmin, e t al. ; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 1 Mz.y 79) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Border Defense Stressed
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 3, 25 May 79) 6
Daim tless Radar Company, by ~eng Jixu, et al.
Good Party Commi.ttee of the Military, Editorial
Regiment Improves Antitank Slcills, Tactics
(Du Yongxue, Zang Xiaohua.; JIEFANG ~UbTBAO, 10 May 79)........... 11
Ra.ilway Forces Promote . Technical Cadres
(~ao Hongchang, Zhao Shusan; JIEFANG JUNBAO, 10 May 79)........ 13
Com~ any Awarded Honorable Designation for Combat Success
(Zhang Guangtong, et al. ; JIEFAl~'G JUNBAO, 10 Ma.y 79) 14
Anti-Chemical Warfare Forces Provide Effective Support
(JIEFANG JIJNBAO, 10 May 7~.) 16
Navigator Directs Safe Landing of Aircraft in Poor Weather
(Han Hesheng, et al.; JIEFANG JUNB A0, 10 May 79) 18
- a - [III - CC - 80 FOUO]
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Reform of Various Aspects of Air Force Training Discussed
(JIEFANGTUN BAO, 30 May 79) 20
Teaching Materials, by Jin 7.hifu
Training Ground Personnel, by Zhou Huan
Air Circling, by Gu Weizhan
Composite Air Force Training, by Du Jicheng, et al.
Logis tics Must Be Pno tected in a Future War
(Gu Deru; JIEFANGJIIN BAO, 10 Jul 79) 26
Naval Logistics Cadres Study Economic Read~ustment Policy
( Chen Shimgen; JIEFA?V~JLmT BAO, 17 Jul 79) . . . . . . . . . 29
Artillery Division Trains Top Logistics Cadres
(Tian Zongzao, et al.; JIEFANG.TUN BAO, 27 Sep 79) 31
Logistics Cadres Exhorted To I~rove Proficiency
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 27 Sep 79) 34
PLA Unit Information, Designations 36
Infarmation on Military, Other Personnel 39
Top PLA Organizations Issue Criteria for Rules Inspection
(JIEFANGJUN B A0, 9 Mar 81) 40
Flight Safety Practiced by Fuzhou Airmen
(Wu Tingzhu; JIEFANGJifii BAO, 9 Mar 81) . . . . . . . . 42
Liaaning Teams Give Companies Border Defense Training
(Li Weij~; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 MaX 81) 44
Briefs
'Logistics Studies' Journal 45
Surgical I,am~s Aboard Ships 45
PARTY AND STATE
Devising Metnods To Defeat Superior Force Emphasized
(JIEFANGJtJN B A0, 9 Mar 8~.) 46
Party Demands Genuine, Not Superficial, Political Unanimity
(Qi Chengzhang; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Mar 81) 50
Unhealthy Tendencies in Party Must Be Stamped Out
(Li Jingrong; JIEFANGJIRd BAO, 9 Mar 81) 53
Shenyang Units Hold Conference on Four Basic P rinciples
(Gong Ganyang; JIEFANGJIJN BAO, 12 Mar 81) 55
-b-
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MILITARY AND FJBLIC SECURITY
- YUNNAN DEFENSE REGIMENT SCORES VICTORIES IN BORDER CLASH
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 2 May 79 p 1
~Article by contributing correspondent Qian Gang ~6929 6921] and correspondent
Sun Ha.ogang ~1327 3185 04743: "Victories in 29 Consecutive Battles in 21 Days--
A New Chapter in the Glorious History of Fighting Written for Certain Border
Defense Regiment in Yunnan Province"~
~Text~ Carrying forward the glorious tradi;:ion of continuous fighting without
rest, a certain regiment of the bo-rder defense units in Yunnan ha.s won 29 consecu-
tive battles in 21 days. The unit party committee has decided to request the
higher authorities to give this regiment a collective Merit Citation, First Class.
Fang Yi ~2455 3015~, head of a Central Comforting Team, personally visited this
regiment and lauded it for "fighting we11,"
~ This regiment was born during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression,
- and has since been distinguished for its courage in battles, particularly for
wiping out a Japanese company in a hand-to-hand fighting. In the early stage of
the War of Liberation, it intercepted the advance of twu Kuomintang brigades at
Wanfuhe, where it fought 7 days and won a citation from the commander of the
Second Field Army.
In the recent counterattack in self-defense, this regiment was able to fight tough
' battles against great odds, destroy the enemy by fighting at close range, and make
new contributions to the defense af the motherland despite ha.rrowing ccnditions.
On 17 February, this regii�ent made a two-}~rong thrvst deep iizto an enemy column
after blazing trails through entangl.ed vines and tall grasses with their heavy
knives. Led by Capt Deng Tuodian ~67i2 1122 0368~, the company commander, the
fighters of the 4th Company, which had engaged in bayonet combat with the Japanese
aggressors, rollect downhill for tens of feet with their combat gear. Z'hey
climbed six_ high :nountains and destroyed or annihilated enemy troops in two
encounters. Thus they arrived at the designa.ted 1^~cation at the appointed time,
controlled the highway between Banangun ai~d Fengtu, and disrupted the enemy's
defensive system.
To occupy the strategic point, Basha Pass, the hi_~h Coum~and ordereci them to take
Hill 106, a protective barrier for Basha Pass. The company had had no sleep for
2 days and nights but still kept up their forced march and arrived at the battle-
ground. With artillery support, the 7th Company braved enemy fire and was the
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first to occupy that hill. To recapture this strategic point, the enemy
organized two companies of the so-called "crack" Division 316A and some local
units, totaling more than 300, for a fierce counterattack. Despite their fatigue
and hunger, the co~anders and fighters of the 7th Company bravely fought on and
successfully repulsed these enemy attacks. Its battle array rema.ined as secure
as a mountain.
In every engagement, this regiment fought the enemy tr~ops a.t close range in order
to completely destroy them. The regiment comma.nders usualZy directed the operation
in the battalions and the battalion comnoanders directed cne attack in the companies.
In fact, the comma.nders at all levels were close to the firing line when they
directed the fighting. On many occasions, the cadres and fighters all went as
far as 2Q or 15 meters within the enemy's front positions to lead the attacks
under heavy enemy fire. In the attack on Hill 149, the 9th Company bravely ma.de
several outflanking thrusts and then fought its way into enemy positions. Ma.ny
enemy troops were killed before they had time to put on their pants. On its home-
ward ma.rch on S Ma.rch, this regiment was harrassed by enemy forces. It promptly
= surrounded a reinforced Vietnamese battalion entrenched in Banxiaosan. At the
ver~ onset, the three battalions of this regiment, like three sharp knives, cut
the+e;~emy column into three sections. The 2d Company, serving as the main attack-
ing forc~, bravely dashed into the enemy position and fought the enemy at short
range, WiLh overwhelming heroism and sagacious tactics, the fighters soon
siienced the enemy forts and firing spots, captured one trench after another, and
finally occupied the ma.in pea.k. More than 300 enemy troops including one Viet-
namese major and two captains were killed in this single action.
During the counterattack in self-defense, which lasted 21 days, this regiment
fought 29 large and small battles and won victories in all of them. It captured
24 eaemy defended mountains, some of them more than 1,000 meters high, and this
~ was how two combat heroes Tao Shaowan L7118 4801 2429] and Jiang Jinzhu L5592 6855
_ 2691~ becarne famous. The unit party commi.ttee has requested the Military Commis-
sion to confer honorable titles on two companies. They ha.ve written another new
chapter in the glorious history of the regiment.
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
LEARNING ABOUT THE ENEMY STRESSED IN MILITARY TRAINING
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 2 May 79 p 2
~Article by correspondents Chen Xiangmin ~7115 0686 3046~, Tang Yongsheng
L0781 3057 3932~, Chen Wenbao ~7115 2429 1405~ and Li Zhixi ~2121 0037 3556~c
"Learning About the Enemy Should Predominate the Entire Course of Training--
Technical and Tactical Training of Certain Regiment Shoc~s Ma.rked Improvement"~
~Textl Benefiting from the experiences of the counterattack in self-defense along
the Sino-Vietnamese border, a certain infantry regiment of the Shenyang PLA Units
is now attaching great importance in its technical and tactical training program
to learning about the enemy. In so doing, it has highlighted the most important
point of training and improved its quality. The proportion of people who know
how to use rocket 40 in the infantry compan~es of the regiment ha.s now increased
from 16 to 89 percent, and the ra~e of accurac~~ in live ammunition practice has
been raised to 97.2 percent. There has also been ma.rked improvement in both
offensive and defensive tactics among the individual fighters as well as the .
squads, platoons and companies.
~ While conducting training in the past, this regiment was not quite clear about
the primary need to oppose tanks. Therefore, it did not take ~imely action to
ma.ke up for the shortage of cadres in the rocket 40 platoons and the recoilless
gun companies. There were insufficient men in the rank and file, and even so,
~ these units were frequently called on to undertake certain odd jobs. As a result,
the antitank training of the regiments was very poor. In a military exercis~
held in 1980, these defects were fully exposed. From this experience, the
responsib le persons of the regiment deeply realized that if they did not learn
about the speca.al characteristics of the enemy or failed to bear in mind the
situation of the enemy while conducting traini.ng, they would fail to grasp the
_ ma.in point of training. Therefore, to grasp this main point, they have to pay
great attention to learning about the enemy. Later, they were even more convinced
after studying the experiences ~f the counterattack in self-defense along the
Sino-Vietna.mese border. They further realized that we must know ourselves as
well as the enemy before we can be invincible, and that learning about the enemy
should predominate the entire training course bef~re the quality of training
could be improved. In the past 2~onths, they organized the cadres and fighters
to read and study articles from some journa.ls, such as JUNSHI XUESHU ~MILITARY
SCIENCE~ and WAIJUN JUNSHI XUESHU ~FOREIGN MILITARY SCIENCEJ, dealing with the
organization of the enemy's armed forces, their equipment, the special features
of their fighting techniques, and other similar materials, and dezens of articles
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and monographs about the enemy. These activities have broadened everyone's vision
and enriched their minds. Subaequent training has been more to the point.
Learning about the enemy has helped the PLA Uni~grasp the key point of training.
They now understand that in land warfare, the enemy relied mainly on tanks, and
our infantry regiment should first be well trained in the use of antitank weapons,
which, in our infantry regiments, mainly consist of rocket 40. Therefore, the use
of rockets becatne the key subject in training. In training on the use of rocket
40, they organized the cadres and fighters to study how one of our infantry
battaliun should fight an enemy tank company and to Zea.rn about the enemy's situ-
ation. From such study, everyone now knows that each enemy tank company is
equipped with 10 tanks, and that each infantry battalion on our side is equipped
with 54 rockets. This means an average of 5 or 6 rockets against one enemy tank
with the odds in our favor. From an ana.lysis, they learned about the special
features of enemy tanks as well as the functions of our rocket 40. Then they
determined to step up training on the use of these rockets and changed their atti-
tude toward antitank units. These units were then fully staffed and their time
- and personnel were available for training with particular stress to assure
substance and quality. At the same time, they quickly solved the problems of
insufficient personnel, teaching materials and equipment, and ran 2 terms of
training for backbone rocket 40 elements. They also comgiled teaching ma.terials
on the tactics of opposing tanks with rocket 40 in a unified teaching program. '
~111 the necessary equipment and materials were prepared; two dummy t~nks serving
as moving targets, 24 breech-loading guns and more than 700 rounds of training
buliets made of cement and wood were manufactured. They also paid attention to
the popularization of these skills, and everybody from rocket shooters to rifle
shooters, from leading cadres to miscellaneous personnel was taught the use of
rocket 40. Be~cause of their serious efforts, training in the use of rocket 40
soon achieved exc?llent results. The rate of accuracy in live a~nu*::~tion practice
was raised to 97.2 percent.
Tactical training has been enlivened as a result of greater effcrts to learn
about the enemy. Before early February, they did not pay sufficient attention
to the study of enemy tan~~s when training was carried out on offensive and
defensive tac~.ics among individual fighters and squads. Ia.ter, benefiting from
the e~tperiences of the counterattack in self-def.ense along the Sino-Vietnamese
border, they decided to study more about the enemy and the topographic features
of the battleground, and gained a better idea of enemy tanks. In the last 10
days of February, when offensive and defensive tactical training was carried out
among the platoons and companies, changes in varying degrees were made on eneary
equipment and tactical maneuvers. For example, in making use o~ the terrain and
its features, they were very attentive to the grave mounds and other earth mounds
projecting out of the ground's surface. After learning about the ma.neuverability
of tanks and their iu~~pact on other objects, they became aware that grave and
earth mounds could only be effective in dealing with ground forces, but not tanks.
~ Thus they stressed the need to take advantage of shell craters, ditches and other
concave structures as well as tal.l blocks and high dams that can provide protec-
- tion against shelling from tanks. Again, in order to advance in spurts under
enemy fire, the former practice was that each spurt should cover a distance of
30-60 meters. Is this still possible? After learning about the en.emy, they
realized that in modern warfare, when the enemy is amply equipped with tanks,
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armored cars and automatic high-speed weapons with intense firing, there can be,
generally speaking, only .3 break of approximately 5 seconds from discovery of the
target to the completion of a mission. If a distance of 30-60 meters has to be
covered by each spurt, the time of exposure wi1Z last up to 7-15 seconds, and
casualties can easily result from enemy fire. Therefore, in advancing by spurts
under enemy fire, the time required is reduced to 4-7 seconds and the distance to
be covered reduced to 15-30 meters. Along wi.th the deepening of their study on
the enemy in greater details, they felt the need to "think more and learn more"
and gradually discarded the old rules and conventions. Training in offensive
and defensive tactics among the companies was raised to a higher level.
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BORDER DEFENSE STRESSED
Dauntless Radar Company
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 3 May 79 p 2
[Battlefield report by Zheng Jixu [6774 4949 4958], Sun Maoqing [1327 5399 1987],
and Liu Ye [0491 0048]: "The Steely Radar Soldiers"]
[Text] How can a strong, erect heroic tree be afraid of storms? How can the
motherland's vigilant radar soldiers be afraid of cannon fire and gun smoke?
During the war of self-defensive counter-attack, the 12th radar company of a
, certain contingent of the air force underwent the test of fire and gloriously
earned a MeYit Citation Class II. It deserves t:: be called the motherland's
steely "telescope."
The 12th company was stationed on top of a tall mountain along the Guangxi border
across a valley from Vietnam. After the war of self-defensive counter-attack broke
out, the Vietnamese aggressors saw this company as the thorn in their eye and
bombarded it ceaselessly. Within half a month, nearly 100 cannon shells fell on
- the mountain top and the entrenchment around it. The officers and men safeguarded
their ground and fought heroically in vigilant defense of the motherland's sacred
airspace. Ignoring the deafening salvoes of the bombardm~nt, operators calmly
sat in their radar trucks with eyes fixed on the fluorescent screens, continually
cleared away the interference of electric sparks caused by the bombardment, let
go of no points of suspicion, and inspected and reported conditions in the sky
with despatch. In the underground command office of the company, company commander
Yan Chuanchen [7051 0278 5256] held the telephone transmitter in his hand to issue
his commands with quiet resolve. Plotting leader Huang Guolai [7806 0948 0171]
bent over the plotting table, swiFtly and accurately plotting the conditions in
the sky as reported by the radar operators. Ignoring the thick smoke, the sentries
at the mountain top under the guidance of deputy company cammander Zhao Qin~quan
[6392 1987 0356J calmly continued to convery conditions in the sky and reported
the points af impact of the Vietnamese cannon shells.
A misty rain fell, and cannon smoke filled the air. Wire communications squad
leader Yang Ban~rong [2799 6721 2837] and his comarde-in-arms Shen Guangyin [3088
0342 6892J carried two rolls of insulated wire on their shoulders and got ready
_ to set up a new communications line. It turned out that there had been only one
wire linking this company with its superior command. It occurred to them that if
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by chance this line should become damaged by enemy fire, then the communication
between the company and the superior command would be cut. Hence they decided to
set up a couple of lines at the mountain to the rear. The mountain slope was
steep and slippery. Squad leader Yang and young Shen tied the insulated wire on
their waists and slid down the steep slope just like boatmen pullinp their boats.
Thorns tore their uniforms and young Shen's legs were scratched and began to bleed.
But they paid no attention. After some stubborn fighting, they set up a line
more than 1,000 meters long in less than an hour. A short while after they came
back, enemy fire ac.tually severed the line at the front of the mountain, but the
command office was qui~:kly able to establish contact with army units in the neigh-
borhood by using the line just set up. Later on, Yang Bangrong and Shen Guangyin
still ignored their fatigue and braved the firing to quickly reconnect the line
_ that had been cut off.
The enemy attempted in vain to destroy our radar position with cannon fire and
send special agents to ~arr,y out sabotage, so they tried other stratagems. Once,
just as the 12th radar company was closely watching conditions in the sky, an
"order" was suddenly received by radio asking the 12th company to turn off its
equipment. After this order was received, company commander Yan Chuanchen, who
- was on duty in the command office at the time, felt that something was wrong. He
immediately repor*_ed this to the superior co~umand office by telephone. It turned
out that the superior command had not issued such an order, rather it was the
enemy who was playing a trick on them. Thus the enemy's plot was again defeated.
"We m~ist never let the radar antennas stop for a single minute because of equip-
ment malfunctions!" This was the fighting determination of the maintenance cadre-
men of the 12th company. In order to ensure that the antennas would never stop
revolving, they missed their sleep and forgot their meals and often simply slept
beside their radar sets and kept on diligently repairing, testing, and servicing
them. Deputy company commander Yan Zhaoyun [0917 0340 6663], who was in charge
of maintenance work, ingnored his sickness and insisted on eating ar~d sleeping
right beside the radar sets. He often took advantage of the intEr~Tal when the
radar sets were shut off in the night so as to inspect weapons, and often a whole
night was entirely spent on this. Qnce, just as he got one radar set adjusted,
another mountain top entrenchment reflected that the pitch ~f their set was not
functioning properly, so that the radar would pick up a tar~et oniy when it was
very close. He immediately hurried through the dark to inspect it, and personally
mounted the set to observe and adjust until dawn. From then on, the emitter and
receiver have been in top-notch condition. Even though a given radar set sometimes
had to continue operating for more than 20 hours consecutively, they never had a
critical malfunction.
- Good Party Committee of the Military
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 25 May 79 p 1
[Editorial by staff co~entator: "Effectively Defend and Build Up Border Areas"]
[Text] The Central Military Commission recently commended the Party co~ittee
of the First Garrison Division of the Beijing units, praising it as a good group
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rooted in the border area, struggling hard, and prepar~d to fight. At the end of
the year before last, the Military Commission established for us the Party committee
of the First Airborne Division of the Air Force as an advanced model; now it has
called upon us to learn from the Party committee of the First Garrison Division.
Party cownittees and leading comrades of troop units stationed in the border areas
should learn from them, Party committees and leading comrades of troop units of
the whole army should learn fr~m them,so as to defend and build up our border
areas well, and so as to make positive contributions to the defense of the construc-
tion of the motherlar.a's four modernizations.
Our great motherland has a vast territory; its land boundary line alone measures
~ore than 20,000 kilometers. Because of historical reasons, the economy uf the
border areas has always been backward, transportation inconvenient, and culture
not very developed. But this is only one side of the problem; there is still
another side. Residing in the border areas are the industrious and courageous
people of various nationalities, and deposited there are precious minerals, large
tracts of forests, boundless prairies, and ferti.le land awaiting us to reclaim.
The border areas are connected to the heart ef the motherland; they are the protec-
tive screen for the motherland. Without solid border defense, there can be no
solid national defense; stable borders reinforce the tranquillity of the interior.
If we love our motherland, we must love our border areas. If we wish to defend
our lovely motherland, we must defend our lovely border areas.
"The founding of a state places emphasis on border defense, the responsibilities
of the soldiers are therefore very heavy." Patriotic, enlightened men throughout
out history have taken defense of the border areas as a glorious undertaking.
Patriotic poets of various dynasties all warmly praised heroes of the frontier
garris~ns who protected the security and unity of the state, shed their blood in
the }attlefields, reclaimed virgin Iand in the border areas while posted there,
kept company with weapons and horses, grew old in remote deserts, feared neither
difficulties nor dangers, and sacrificed their lives for the sake of the state.
Among the poems written during the Tang Dyna:~ty, there is one category called
frontier poems. Li Bo [2621 4101], Li He [2621 6320], Wang Changling [3769 2490
7881], and I,i Yi [2621 4135] all left poems in this regard. Stanzas such as "Fubo
[0126 3134] wanted only to return with his corpse wrapped in horse hide; did
Dingyuan [1353 6678] have to come back alive?" have always been relished by all.
Fubo and Dingyuan denore the two famous generals of the Later Han Dynasty, Ma
Yuan [7456 2266] and Ban Chao [3803 6389]. Ma Yuan said: "A man should die in
the remote frontier areas and have his body wrapped in horse hide when returned
- for burial; how can he die in bed in the hands of women and children?" These two
stanzas are meant to say that since Ma Yuan fought back and forth in battlefields
_ and wished only to die while i.ighting and return with his corpse wrapped in horse
hide, why did Ban Chao have to request his return while still alive? Patriotic
- officers ar_d men stationed at the frontiers to guard against the enemies in history
had their limitations under the historical canditions of th~i~ times; yet cheir
spirit of dedication in protecting state integrity and national unity is undoubtedly
praiseworthy. However, "when counting romantic heroes, we must still look at today."
Those most worthy of our praise today are our proletarian patriots, the people's
fronti~r defense warriors. Just as Comrade Zhou Enlai pointed out, the~ are
unstintingly dedicating their all to the strengthening of frontier defense and
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protection of the motherland with such heroic sentiments and fierce determination
as can be only described by "In the green mountains are buried bones of the loyal
anes everywhere, Why should anyone need to wish to return with his corpse wrapped
in horse hide!" In the long-term arduous struggle in keeping guard over fronti.er
defense and coastal defense, in the war of defense over the Zhenbao Island, and
in the war of self-defensive counter-attack along the Sino-Vietnamese border this
time, many heroic personalities have surged forth who are glad to endure hardship
and most ready to dedicate their lives for the security of the notherland and the
happiness of the people; their spiritual state is superior to that of the national
heroes in history by, indeed, innumerable times!
For a very long time before liberation, our country actually had frontiers but no
frontier defense. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, we began
only to build up our frontier defense. Lin Biao and "gang of four" promoted a
reactionary principle of so-called "political frontier defense" and led to the
b~iilding of our frontter defense suffering a great sabotage. Today, in the north
there exists this big hegemon, the Soviet Union, whose ambition to annex us never
_ dies, and in the south, too, we face this little hegemon, Vietnam, which continues
to challenge and bother us. Once war breaks out, whether the fighting is going
to be of large, medium, or small scale, frontier defense is bound to be first and
foremost called into question. It is imperative that we quickly build up our
frontier defense well. Generally speaking, conditions in the border areas are
less enticing and life there is harder and more difficult. In order to put down
roots in the border areas and build up our solid frontier defense, we must have
the lofty ideal of viewing the security of the motherland as superior to all other
concerns, submitting unconditionally to the demand of the revolution, taking the
border areas as our home, and finding glory in being stationed at the frontier,
and we must have the heroic disposition of fearing neither hardship nor death.
In a word, we must have the revolutionary spirit of hard struggle. Comrades of
the First Garrison Division have put it well, "Don't say that environs beyond
the Great Wall are harsh, They are closely connected with the happy homes of
millions." The selfless working spirit, lofty revolutionary sentiments, fine
workstyle of paying attention to the livelihood of the masses, and the precious
quality of strick self-discipline on the part of the comrades of the Party commit-
tee of the First Garrison Division are worthy of our study and need to be given
full sco~e. Our Communist Party members, Co~nunist Youth Corps members, and every
revolutionary warrior, especially leading cadre, must emulate them, must give full
play to the genuine political character of hard struggle on the part of our army.
With a good leading group dedicated to hard struggle and good cadres dedicated to
hard struggle, the motherland's frontier defense can really be built into an iron
wall, the fighting power of the troops can be quickly improved, and the pace of
_ construction of our army's revolutionary modernization can al~o be greatly accel-
erated.
In order to strengthen the building of our frontier defense, we must energetically
develop socialist economic construction and cultural construction in the border
_ areas. And in order to build up our frontier defense well, we must protect peace
and stability in the border areas; otherwise conditions for working out the con-
struction would be lacking. Our frontier defense units must actively participate
in, and support, socialist construction in the border areas, and carry out re-edu-
cation on nationality policies in order to strengthen the unity among the people
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of various nationalities and make contributions toward a quick change in the out-
look of the border areas. Meanwhile, we must give full play to the spirit of
patriotism and revolutionary heroism, learn the fighting experience in the war
of self-defensive counter-attack along the Sino-Vietnamese border, raise our
vigilance by a hundred times, grasp and put into effect various measures for war
preparedness, do a good job on joint military-civilian defense deployment, and
_ be prepared at all times to exterminate all enemies who dare to invade us.
Frontier defense posts are extraordinarily glorious; frontiex defense tasks are
formidable. The Party committee of the First Garrison Division stationed at such
a post have worked selflessly and achieved results; we must learn from it, catch
up with it, and surpass it.
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REGIMENT II~'ROVES ANTITANK SKILLS, TACTICS
Beijing JIEFANG JUNBAO in Chinese 10 May 79 p 1
[Article by Du Yongxue [2659 3057 1331] and Zang Xiaohua [5661 2556 5478]: "A
Certain Regiment Trains the Various Service Arms in Coordinated Techniques and
Tactics for Use Against Massed Tanks"]
[Text] In the middle third of March, units under the Nan~ing Command and a cer-
tain army held an on-the-spot meeting in a certain regiment to disseminate this
regiment's new experience in antitank training. After this regiment conscientiously
investigated ways of training the various service arcns in techniques and tactics
for combatting massed tanks, it replaced the previous simple methods of training
individual service arms, attacking individual tanks and focusir.g on the actions of
the individual soldier, a change which improved their antitank training.
- At the beginning of this year, when the command designated antitank warfare as the
focus of strategic training, although the cadres and fighting men initially made
- adequate efforts, after a certain amount of training they felt that they had not
yet achieved good results. What was the reason? The leadership discovered that
the crux of the problem was that for a long time antitank training had been sub-
ject to the "three stops": it had stopped with single service arms, with attack-
ing individual tanks, and with teaching operations by individual soldiers. This
type of training could not meet the requirements of future combat, and the cadres
became frustrated and the fighting men bored with it. The leadership decided to
change this state of affairs by changing the training method, and they conducted a
painstaking study of techniques and tactics for the various service arms to wage
coordinated warfare against massed tanks, producing the "three changeovers" in
training.
The first of these was the changeover from attacking individual tanks to attacking
massed tanks. The party committee began by stressing the study of enemy armies,
and assigned deputy regimental commander Zhang Tianfu [1728 1131 1381] the task of
organizing personnel to set up an intelligence room in which they collected and
organized data on enemy tank units' organization and firepower, their combat capa-
bilities and their characteristic methods of combat and drew up charts so as to
- heZp the cadres and fighting men understand the enemy. The training sections also
introduced the units to examples of modern limited war, giving the cadres and fight-
ing men a wider horizon. In conducting antitank training, they no longer set up
the enemy situation on the tiasis of wishful thinking, but instead concentrated on
training in skills and tactics based on the way in which the enemy uses tanks in
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the offensive and disposes his defensive firepower. For example, when Company No 7
was conducting company defensive training, they assumed that their defensive fron~
- tage could withstand an assault by 30 to 40 tanks and armored vehicles, so that the
company's antitank units would have to deal with an average of two tanks each, in
addition to enemy air, artillery and chami.cal attacks, which made the situation
even more complex. These assumptions about the enemy presented a real challenge
to the cadres and fighting men.
The second changeover was from the use of a single service arm against tanks to
the use of several service arms in coordinated antitank combat. The training was
centrally organized and the unit`s technical arms and fire subunits were attached
to the individual infantry subunits, so that the latter gained increased under-
standing through ~oint training and achieved close coordination. In this way the
cadres learned organization and command, the fighting men received training in
joint operations, and skills and tactical ability were rapidly improved. When this
task of demonstration and education was undertaken, in addition to assigning a pla-
tocn each of [illegible] recoillesss rifles, 82 mm mortars and heavy machine guns
from battalion assets, the leadership also requested the higher levels to assign
Company No 7 a tank platoon, a platoon of 85 mm guns, an engineer squad and a flame-
thrower squad. When company commander Xu Huixin realized that the subunits assigned
to him had more manpower than his own company, for a while he had difficulty keep-
ing track of them all and did not know where to start. Then, with the help of the
various subunits attached to his company, he gradually became familiar with wea-
pons deployment and the construction of field works, control of communications and
conduct of joint operations during exercises and the like. In the training pro-
cess, the cadres and fighting men adopted the "strike, bombard, impede" method of
dealing with enemy massed tanks, their interest in the training increased, and they
developed some experience in resisting tank assaults and resisting enemy develop-
ment in depth, and in caordination between the various service arms in a~oint
struggle with sister units to counterattack and regain positions.
The third changeover was from operations by individual soldiers to tactical train-
ing at the squad level and above. Previously, in antitank training the cadres and
fighters had only to master the use of five types of materiel and they were fin-
ished. Now, however, this unit laid full stress on integrating individual soldier
operations into squad, platoon and company level tactics, and in squad and group
exercises in dealing with massed enemy tanks it str.essed ways of providing mutual
cover, ways of changing formations and misleading the enemy, and techniques of
mutual support between fixed and mobile troops and firepower. The result was that
~ the cadres and fighting men were able to coordinate effectively the skills and
tactics they had learned.
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RAILWAY FORCES PROMOTE TECHNICAL CADRES
Bei~ing JIEFANG JUNBAO in Chinese 10 May 79 p 1
[Article by Zhao Hongchang [6392 3163 2490] and Zhao Shusan [6392 2579 0005]:
"Railroad Troops Promote Thirteen Technical Cadres to Division Leadership Posts"]
[Text] Recently a group of engineering and technical cadres in units of the rail-
way forces were pr~moted to division leadership posts; seven were made division
deputy commanders, one was made a division chief of staff, and five were sent to
assume division-level leadership posts in educational institutions, offices and
other units.
Most of these technical cadres were promoted from the posts of division chief en-
- gineer or deputy chief engineer. Al1 of them are graduates of institutions of
higher education, and some have also studied abroad. Their level of basic theore-
tical knowledge is very high, and they have all been active in the railway forces ,
for a long period. Most of these comrades participated in the construction of
such railways as the Yanxia (Yantan-Xiamen), Baolan (Baotou-Lanzhou), Chengkun
(Chengdu-Kunming) and Xiangyu (Xiangfan-Chongqing) lines, and they have rich prac-
tical experience in railway building in the hot, rainy south, the icebound, snow-
- blown north, the frigid, rarefied plateaus, and the climatically variable Gobi.
During a prolonged of technical work, they have helped leadership at all levels
to organize and command construction, and they have a certain organizational and
command ability. When the order promoting these comrades to divisional leadership
- posts was published, there was an enthusiastic response in the units. It was
universally felt that given leaders with such expertise, it will unquestionably be
' possible to build the railways faster and better.
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MI LI TARY AND P~ LI C S E CURI TY
CO?~ANY AWARDED HONORABLE DESIGNATION FOR COMBAT SUCCESS
Beijing JIEFANG JUNBAO in Chinese 10 May 79 p 2
[Article by Zhang Guangtong [1728 1639 2717], Wang Zhenying [3769 2182 3602] and
Xing Shicao [6717 4258 2347): "Energetically Carrying on the Glorious Military
Tradition, Winning Combat Glory by Invincible Boldness"]
[Text] Recently, Company No 1 of a certain regiment was given the glorious desig-
nation of "Heroic Company of Koudang Mountain" by the Gunagxi Border Defense Com-
mand.
On 1 March, the company received a combat assignment to make the main attack on
Koudang Mountain. Koudang Mountain is one of four commanding elevations surround-
ing Liang Mountain and a part of the Liang Mountain "fortress." It controls two
railways passing from Liang Mountain to Bei~ing and Nan~ing, and forms a natural
barrier northeast of Liang Mountain. Before the main peak are 33 hills of various
sizes, and on both sides of the mountain are extremely precipitous cliffs. More
than 200 Vietnamese soldiers were dug in on this natural barrier. If this key point
were not taken, not only would our forces attacking Liang Mountain from the side be
blocked, but the main force that was carrying out a frontal attack on Liang Moun-
tain might be threatened. To achieve victory, Company No 1's commander rapidly
completed his preparations for a bold assault in spite of the fatigue of several
days and nights of continuous marching.
Covered by powerful artillery fire from our border defense forces, and lying con-
cealed in the rain on the edge of Hill No 1, Company No 1's officers and men sud-
denly leapt up and took advantage of a thick fog to launch a furious assault on the
enemy. The point platoon, led by platoon commander Tang Lunxiu, broke through
two enemy defensive perimeters in less than an hour and a half and ascended Hi11 No
2. As soon as Company No 1 had reached the top of Hill No 2, enemy troops on both
sides frenziedly sealed off their avenues of retreat and advance with dense fire
from antiaircraft machine guns. Under the enemy crossfire, the company commander
did not panic, but continued the assault towards Hill No 3. They struck deep into
the enemy forces defending Koudang Mountain, assuring that our large units would
be able to advance successfully on Liang Mountain.
Nightfall was approaching. Company No 1's commander received the order to go over
to the defense where he stood. The soldiers were only 60 or 70 meters away from
~he enemy, and could even hear clearly the sound of the enemy's coughing. The
branch organized the men to build defensive bunkers and dispatched concealed sen-
_ tries. Shortly after 4 o'clock the next morning, the party branch held a branch
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committee meeting in the rain, analyzed the lessons of the first day's fighting,
and decided to make concentrated use of heavy weapons to destroy the enemy's bunk-
- ers and open and concealed firing positions and to provide cover for an infantry
assault that would take the main peak of Koudang Mountain.
At 7:30 in the morning, the commander of Platoon 2, Chen Shijin, cradling a sub-
- machine gun, led his platoon in the assault on the enemy. Unfortunately, Chen
Shijin was wounded in the right foot by shrapnel. Deputy Co~ander Yan Faming
- rushed forward and took over from Coummander Chen; he and Platoon 1's commander
Song Jiaqi combined their units and drew the enemy's fire with a machine gun, while
six rocket launchers and two 82 ~ recoilless rifles were divided into two groups
which covered each other and silenced 16 enemy open and covered firing positions.
After 4 1/2 hours of heavy fighting, the officers and men of Platoons 1 and 2 had
reduced t~ze key defensive positions which the enemy had painstakingly built up
over ma.ny years to chaos. The enemy retreated steadily like birds at the sound
of the rifle. The company's officers and men fought with ever-increasing fierce-
ness and pressed close on their heels, taking Hills No 4 and 5. This time the com-
pany was divided into three groups, like three sharp swords piercing the enemy
formations. The Vietnamese forces scrambled southward in disorder. Some of them
ran in panic off the cliffs and fell to their deaths, some were shot dead by our
forces, and some threw away their weapons in their rush to save themselves.
In the attack on Koudang Mountain, many heroic soldiers with epic achievements
emerged in Company No l. After the assault, rocket launcher squad commander Bi
~ Zhenhe boldly destroyed two enemy firing positions on Hill No 2, opening the way
for the entire company. In the assault on Hill No 3, platoon No 3 was converted
to a reserve force. Bi Zhenhe said: "I am a Communist Party member, and I cannot
leave the front line!" He hurried forward with platoons 1 and 2, and he and his
comrades in arms destroyed three enemy firing positions. After being wounded, he
persevered in the struggle, destroying two enemy machine gun emplacements. When
the commander of Squad 8 was gravely wounded, deputy coffinander Wang Fengming led
the squad forward, and when he was wounded he resolutely refused to leave the front
line, but commanded his men with recoillesss rifles and rocket launchers as they
destroyed three enemy firing positions. When his comrades came to his rescue, he
kept shouting in his delirium, "Rocket launchers! Rocket launchers fire over
here!" When the fighting started, deputy company commander Huang Bingsheng led the
point platoon's charge at the battle line. While leading the comrades of P1aCor~n
No 3 in the assault on Hill No 3, he was wounded in the right foot by shrapnel,
but he gritted his teeth, pulled out the piece of shrapnel, and continued leading
the fighters against the retreating foe. When the attack was launched at dawn the
next day, although wounded, he led Platoon 1 as it captured five hills. After the
main peak was captured, he led nine comrades of Platoon 3 in a mopping-up operation,
fully carrying out his combat assignment.
The officers and men of Company No 1 continued our arnry's indomitable and glorious
traditions and accomplished with distinction their mission of attacking and holding
Koudang Mountain. The unit's party committee awarded them a collective citation
for merit, first class, and gave them a pennant reading "Bold and Indomitable, Va-
lorous in Assaulting Fortifications."
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MLLITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
AIvTI-CHEMICAL WARFARE FORCES PROVIDE EFFECTIVE SUPPORT
Beijing JIEFANG JUNBAO in Chinese 10 May 79 p 2
[Article: "Bringing Antichemical Capabilities into Play, Supporting the Combat
Operations of the Infantry and Artillery"]
[Text] In the defensive counterattack and the stxuggle to protect the border,
Company 5, Battalion 2 of a certain antichemical unit displayed a revolutionary
spirit of not fearing to sacrifice themselves and thoroughly brought antichemical
protective effects into play, energetically supporting infantry and artillery com-
bat operations, for which many of their comrades asked the higher command levels
to record their achievements.
As soon as Company No 5 joined the combat unit to which it had been attached, it
took the initiative in helping conduct education and training in the "three de-
fenses." It inspected the protective materials which each unit had at its dis-
posal, trained a large number of key "three defenses" workers for the unit to which
it was attached and for the militia, and prepared more than 670 simple, easy-to-
use protective items.
When the battle started, these troops concerned themselves over the critical mo-
ment at the beginning of battle, and over enemy chemical attacks, and neglected
no doubtful cases. In order to be able to observe and diagnose every enemy she11
burst, they led the way when the infantry and artillery were advancing and attack-
ing, and when positions were being held they set up sentries at the perimeters to
maintain continuous observation day and night. In order to resolve difficult cases,
they also constantly hurried out of the bunkers and trenches, risking death fron
enemy artillery and rifle fire, and rushed to locations at which enemy shells had
- exploded to conduct chemical reconnaissance. On 18 February, a certain artillery
position to which Squad 8 was assigned suffered an enemy artillery attack, and the
concentrated fire made observation difficult. But for the safety of their com-
rades-in-arms, the artillerymen, the three comrades who were on watch risked death
and left the bunkers 21 times to go to the sites of enemy artillery shell bursts
and conduct reconnaissance, eliminating one dubious case after another with dis-
patch, for which they received the praise of the artillery commander and comrades.
During the battle, the cadres of Company No 5 led the way and were always at the
most dangerous and difficult locations. When the battle was the fiercest, the com-
pany commander and political officer went to the forward positions to carry out
observation and to pass on their experience in distinguishing enemy chemical rounds.
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_ Commander of Platoon 2 Liao Jun~ie and Squad No 6 were responsible for chemical
protection tasks at a certain ferry point on the Red River. They set up an anti-
chemical observation post on an unnamed height to the right of Hill 230, and main-
tained observation along with the fighters day and night, without closing their
eyes for several nights running. At the moment when the observation post was
under the fiercest enemy attack, platoon leader Liao would always make the fighters
take cover while he himself took over observation. This cadre's exemplary actions
were like an unspoken order, and the comrades of the entire company were inspired
to be fearless of death, to disregard fatigue, and to persist scruplously in keep-
ing watch at the observation post. Platoon No 1 was in charge of chemical protec-
*ion work for a deep-thrust unit. Although every comrade carried a load of more
than 50 ~in, in addition to protective materials, they went wherever the unit went.
One day, Squad 2 advanced with the unit to the vicinity of Longjin and ran into an
artillery attack. The commander gave the order to put on protective masks. March-
ing with protective masks on is a drain on energy, and in order to keep the infan-
try comrades maintain their combat vigor, the chemical squad immediately made a
- reconnaissance, found out the true situa.tion, and reported it to the comuoander,
who canceled the order to put on protective masks.
At about 9 AM on 26 February, Squad No 8 returned to Hill No 4 at Buting with an
artillery grouping. In order to post observers, deputy squad commander Hou Shishou
set out to examine the position. Suddenly a muffled explosion was heard at a dis-
tance. When he raised his head and looked, all he could see was a white curtain
of smoke over a neighboring unit's antiaircraft battery forward and to his right,
in addition to which he smelled a strange odor. Immediately his voice rang out:
"This is bad: a chemical round. Detachment 2, follow me!" No sooner had he spoken
than he darted toward the antiaircraft company's position. The three comrades of
Detachment 2 were close behind him. They quickly made a reconnaissance under enemy
fire, determined that it was an enemy chemical round, and immediately filled in the
shell hole and carried out decontamination treatment for the comrades who had been
affected, thus avoiding casualties.
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NAVIGATOR DIRECTS SAFE LANDING OF AIRCRAFT IN POOR WEATI~R
Beijing JIEFANG .NNBAO in Chinese 10 May 79 p 2
[Article by Han Hesheng [7281 0735 3932], Li Yingjie [2621 5391 2638] and Xiong
Shusheng [3574 2885 3932): "Boldly Shouldering a Heavy Task with Courage and Reso-
lution"]
[Text] Officer in charge of the instrument landing radar station of a certain air
force airfield under the Fuzhou comma.nd navigator Comrade Bai Taihai showed bold-
ness and resolution in guiding 12 endangered aircraft to a safe landing. The
higher level party committee decided to award Bai Taihai a commendation for merit,
second class, and gave him a money award.
On 17 January, a certain air force unit was conducting a bad weather flight train-
ing exercise. At about 11:15, a large, dark cloud mass arose suddenly in the
northwest, with a ceiling of 200 meters, and cor~pletely covered the entire air-
field; the visibility dropped to 1.5 kilometers, lower than the minimum permis-
sible flying visibility. At that time, 11 fighters on a training mission and one
civilian aircraft carrying more than 40 passengers were urgently waiting to land.
At this point the pilots could not see the runway, and the commander could not see
the aircraft; their fuel was limited and the only possible way out was to use the
instrument landing radar to bring them in for a landing. Navigator on duty Bai
Taihai had never encountered such a complex situation, but he boldly took respon-
sibility, and intensely and concentratedly observed the aircraft blips on the
screen. At 11:20, the first aircraft completed a circle and descended toward the
airfield. Bai Taihai discovered that the aircraft was 50 meters too low and its
course was 150 meters off the line of the runway. It was only 40 seronds between
completion of the circle and the touchdown, and there was no time to correct such
a large deviation. He immediately reported to the commander, and suggested that he
pull up. The first aircraft was unsuccessful on the second pass as well. It was
low on fuel, so that it must succeed on the third pass; otherwise the results
would be unthinkable. Bai Taihai kept calm, and rapidly found that the reasan why
the first aircraft had failed on its first two approaches was that it had locked
in on its objective too early. On the basis of precise guidance calculations and
the pilot's operating characteristics he gave the comma.nd to exit from the circle
at just the right time. The aircraft moved into the ideal flight path, and when
he found a deviation he gave timely instructions for its correction, so that the
first aircraft successfully touched down on the runway. On the basis of the first
aircraft's success in landirig, he watched the aircraft blips on the screen and
continuously gave out concise, correct, clear orders and made timely corrections to
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the planes' altitude and heading. One after another the aircraft broke through the
cloud barrier and descended smoothly to the runway. After 50 minutes of intense
struggle, all 12 aircraft had landed successfully. For his spirit of bold accom-
plishment of the assigned task, Bai Taihai received everyone's co~endation.
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- MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
REFORM OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF AIR FORCE TRA.INING DISCUSSED
Teaching Materials
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Ma.y 79 p 3
~Article by Jin Zhifu ~6855 1807 4395~ of the Air Force under Jinan PLA Units:
"There Is an Urgent Need To Revise Teaching Ma.terials for Aviation Training"J
~Text~ When I came to the PLA units for news coverage, many air crew members had
complaints about the teaching materials for training aviators and hoped that the
high command would attach greater importance to the question of reform.
Even now, the air force does not have a complete manual for technical and tactical
training that conforms to the cha.racteristics of modern air combat. Most of the
~eaching ma.terials now in use are of the 1950 vintage, copied from the Soviet Army,
and there are ma.ny problems with them. First, there is the lack of uniformity.
There are more than 20 different textbooks for the air force, and the numerical
data in them are nor, the same. The data contained in the textbooks for the air
service are different from those for the ground service even though they deal with
the same subject. The crew members are in a predicament, not knowing which set of
data to follow in conducting training. Secondly, the teaching materials and equip-
ment now in use are not being developed adequately. In air target shooting, for
instance, the speed per hour given in the teaching material is based on our air-
craft performance in the 1950's. Now, after a lang time, the speed per hour still
remains unchanged even though the air for~e has supersonic planes. The training
has to be based on the old speed. In fact, we are using other people's teaching
materials, and they have already revised theirs. Yet we are still "following the
old ruts" and using the same old teaching materials for training with new equip-
ment. Thirdly, there is the lack of teaching material for tactical traini.ng.
We have not carried out tactical training for the air arm for ma.ny years. Now,
many units have completed their traini.ng according to the maximum program, and
conditions are ripe for tactical training. Yet, without the required teaching
materials, the airn~en can only study the old subjects repeatedly, no matter how
eager they ma.y be to learn.
The crew members have made ma.ny suggestions concerning reform of the teaching
material. These suggestions can be summarized as follows:
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, ,
The teaching ma.terial should be more to the point. The crew members mentioned
that training according to the present teaching material is by no means reassuring,
because they have no idea of the enemy's equipment, the characteristics of the
enemy's plane performa.nce, and the enemy's fighting techniques and tactics.
Therefore, they do not know how to conduct the training in order that advantageous
methods of fighting can be adopted. They hope that the leading organs wi.ll campile
some materials for air force training with particular reference to the enemy's
weapons, equipment and the tactics likely to be encountered in future counter-
attacks in self-defense. They proposed that some textbooks be compiled for the
study of the characteristics of the Soviet Air Force and our tactics, with a
detailed description of the wea.pens and equipment used by the Soviet Air Force,
their merits and shortcomings, their principal tactics, the way to use our strength
against their weakness and so forth.
~ The teaching material should give prominence to the key points. The present
training progra.m deals at very great length with basic training and is very time-
consuming. On the other hand, specific training for combat is not enough accord-
ing to the present training program. It is hoped that the ma.terials can be
i.mproved using the method of the difficult leading the ~;asy and using tactics to
consolidate techniques, so that the substance of training can be carefully chosen
and prominence given to key subjects. Let us compare ourselves with other coun-
tries that have remodeled the same type of fighter plane and are using the same
type of training aircraft as ours. The number of their exercises is only 42 per-
cent of ours, but their time required for each exercise doubles that of ours.
Thus in comparison, the time required by them to complete the remodeling of the
fighter plane is 12 percent less than ours and their qua.lity of traini.ng is even
better than ours. This shows the urgent need to reform our training program.
In our teaching materials, we should give prominence to combat training. The crew
members hope tha.t more combat training wi.ll be provided by the teaching ma.terials.
They also mentioned that in the war in the Middle East, Israel with better tactical
training was able to win even though the ratio of plane numbers was two to one in
favor of the enemy. We should draw our lessons from this experience. The crew
members earnestly hoped for a good volume of tactical training materials. They
also hoped that the leading organs would keep them constantly supplied with ma.teri-
als concerning the tactical ideas and methods of the enemy, and the trend of
tactical training in foreign countries, so as to broaden their vision and improve
the qualitq of tactical training.
The air force is a highly technical military arm. In reforming the training, we
should ema.ncipate our minds and take a strictly scientific approach. The crew
members held that in reforming aviation teaching materials, experiments can be
first carried out, and popularization can go side by side wi.th experimentation
so that a complete set of textbooks can be compiled in the course of practice.
We should neither hope for quick success after only one single trial, nor rema.in
_ unchanged at all, but rather make cha.nges along with the changing conditions.
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Training Ground Personnel
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 May 79 p 3
~Article by Zhou Huan ~0719 570i:~ 1344~, commander of a certain air division under
Gua.ngzhou PLA Units: "In Flight Training, There Should Be Specialized Ground
Commanders"~
'~Text~ At present, flight training is being undertaken by the leading cadres
of divisions and regiments serving as ground co~a.nders. In directing a certain
number of flights, a great deal of specific organizatianal planning and other
preparations are required. In fact, a lot of energy has to be expended in air
dispatching. Divis:.ona.l and regimental aviation's leading cadres ha.ve toiled for
months and years on complex and hea.vy ground jobs which ma.y aff ect their own flying
skill and divert their attention from the technical and tactical train.ing of air
units. Furthermore, because of the lack of concentration in training on energy
and attention to details, their ground control work can be affected, even to the
' point of causing air accidents. T'he shortcomings of this arrangement outweigh its
merits.
At present, air force ground control of many countries is undertaken by the ground
crew, and sometimes by women, who are responsible for directing take-offs and
landings, air dispatching, and providing na.vigation,al aids. Based on the experi-
enr_e of many years' organized training and on foreign military experiences, we
hold that flight training directed from the ground should not be undertaken by
divisional or regimental cadres. This job can be given to ground cammanders chosen
from grounded aviators or qua.lified members of the general staff, provided they
have received special training for this type of work. This will ena.ble the divi-
sional and regimental cadres to devote their main efforts to the improvement of
their own skill in leading flight formations, in giving directions and in raising
the technical and tactical levels of their units. The specialized ground commanders
can also become experts in their own field by concentrat=ng their energy on the
study of air dispatching. This will further strengthen the air command and be of
great benefit to the training of air units.
Air Circling
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Ma.y 79 p 3
~Article by Gu Weizhan L7357 4850 1455~ of the Air Force under Shenyang PIA Units:
"'Circling in Air' Does More Harm than Good"~
~Text~ Every year, the high command sets a new flight time standard for aviation
training. W'hat shall we do with this standard? The phenomenon of "circling in
the air" has now appeared in some units.
Let us take the bombing traini.ng corps of a certain aviation school, for example.
In 1980, the effects of circling in the air in order to meet the training time
standard set by the high comma.nd were not keenly felt. This year, however, the
high command has increased the traini.ng flight time according to a new standard,
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and the practice of circling has become more startling. In instrument flying, for
example, two circles had to be completed in the air last year; now it has to be
three circles, and if the tank fuel permits, two more takeoffs and landings have
to be made. Thus each flight will last more than 90 minutes. In fact, this type
of circling is unnecessary, because it is no more than "sightseeing in the air."
- There is still this spectacle in the skyraider units: Short navigation routes
have become long; and a sma.ll radius has become large; and so forth. This
"circling in the air" has become an expedient to increase flight time.
Of course, there is nothing wrong in flying long distances and making a few more
circles, if this is conducive to better flying techniques and better familiariza-
tion with the plane's ma.neuverability in the air. However, if the purpose of
"circling in the air" is only tn m.~ke up the standard flight time, it will do more
harm than good. First, it means waste of fuel and loss of state wealth. Secondly,
there is the waste of aviation ma.terial and~the shortening of engine life.
Thirdly, the waste of time may slow down technical improvements. Although
"circling in the air" adds to the f light time, the aviator learns less from the
same amount of time. Thus the time is wasted, and no progress can be made in the
study of the required subjects or the mastery of the required skills.
Since flight time is very precious, how could there be "circling in the air"?
- It is because people at both higher and lower levels have mistaken ideas in the
evaluation of the quality of aviation training. Some of them one-sidedly believe
that as long as the rigid standard of flight time is met, they can safely report
to the high command on the fulfillment of their assigned duty. In most cases,
no question is asked about technical and tactical improvement gained during the
flight time. Thus no improvement is made even though the flight-time standard is
met. Technical and tactical training still remains at the "first-yea.r" level.
~ This practice of evaluating the quality of training only in teYms of flight time
must be corrected, and the time, progress and quality factors must be considered
jointly. Flight time is one of the indications of the quality of training, but
not the only indication. The time factor is only an outward appearance, but skill,
progress and qua.lity are the essence, and the goal. The time spent can only be
valuable provided it is associated with progress and higherquality. Only in such
a spirit can the aviator really learn his flying techniques and tactics and improve
his fighting skill by making use of his precious flight time.
Composite Air Force Training
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 May 79 p 3
LArticle by Du Jicheng ~2629 0679 2052~, Zhang Jieying L1728 2638 5391~ and Dong
Youlan ~5516 0645 5696) of Air Force Training Department: "Strengthen Co~nposite
Training for Air Force"~
~Text~ In modern warfare, the coordination of various participating services is
a complex task. For the air force, there is the question of not only coordination
with the infantry and the navy, but also coordination among different types of
aircraft, and with the antiaircraft units, surface-to-air guided missile units
and radar units. Therefore, the strengthening of composite.training is an
important task in increasing the fighting capacity of the air force in modern
warfare.
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In foreign countries, the armed forces generally attach great importance to the
composite training of various arms and services. The Soviet Armed Forces regard
this as the "highest form" of training and the "most important means" of raising
the quality of the military service. According to incomplete statistics in 1978,
the Soviet Air Force at the frontline conducted more than 3,000 flights during its
participation in composite training.
The U.S. Armed Forces also attach great importance to effective coordina.ted action
in combat traini.ng atter the completion of training in solo flights. Accordingly,
the Tactical Comma.nd of the U.S. Air Force worked out composite training programs
designated by different "flags." According to these programs, the Soviet Armed
Forces are generally taken as the enemy, and the substance includes operationa.i
directions from the cadres, fighting with joint forces, offensive and defensive
exercises, and so forth. In these exercises, every possible attempt is made to
imitate Soviet weapons, tactics and equipment as much as possible so tha.t the
composite training will be as close to real life as possible. In the case of a
penetration exercise designa.ted by the "Red Flag," the targets used are imi.tations
of the surface-to-air guided missiles, antiaircraft artillery, and radar used in
the defense system of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact group, and all services
are accordingly organized for the composite training. In this way, the crew
members will feel as though they are in real action, and will improve their fight-
ing skill by learning to deal with the enemy's air defense wea.pons and radar
system,
In t'ne past several years, our air force has carried out ma.inly techni.cal training,
but very little composite training for the various anns. Even in the few composite
exercises we have conducted, some services were there just for show. Therefore,
Iack of knowledge among the services and inefficiency in fighting with joint forces
constitute a rather striking problem in our air force training. Now that ma.ny units
have in~the main completed their basic technical training, we should quicl.cly adopt
= measures to strengthen the composite training of various services in order to meet
the requirements of modern warfare. Therefore, we should stress the following
points :
1. Step up the study program for all arms and services so as to fami.liarize them
with the organization, equipment and fighting characteristics of both the enemy
and oursel~es. They should also understand the different functions of and tasks
for different arms and services. It should be possible to run collective training
classes in which different services can learn from one another. Also, we can keep
them better informed by organizing more composite exercises which are close to
real life.
2. Carry out training in simulated combat between different types of aircraft,
ranging from combat between single planes to combat between mixed formations
including ~ombers, scouting planes and fighters. Under conditions close to real
life, we should conduct combat exercises between planes of different types so that
the crew members will have ample opportunity to engage in dogfights with simiilated
enemy planes. This will familiarize them with enemy tactics in air combat and
thus help them devise effective methods to fight the enemy.
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3. Conduct mure composite exercises with participation by the air force, anti-
aircraft artillery and surface-to-air guided missile units. These exercises should
take place against a simulated background of real fighting, so that the commanders,
crew members and ground personnel can all become familiar with the real environments
of a battlegrounc the terrains and weather conditions in the combat zones, and the
enem~'s deployment, equipment, tactics and so forth.
4. In strengthening the composite training of various services, the key lies in
the attention of the organs at or above army uni.ts to the work of organization.
They should organize regular training in the coordination of fighters, bombers and
transport planes, and in supporting land and naval forces. All arms and services
should be trained in the direction of operations, tactics, cau~unications, and
mutual protection, so that they will thoroughly know one another's special charac-
teristics, strengthen their will in fighting with joint forces and give play to
the great might of combined efforts.
- S. Set up training grounds for composite exercises. In these training grounds,
there should be a simulated air defense system and equipment for co~nunication
and radar jamming on the eneury's side; and fighter bombers and reconnaissance
planes to oppose enemy intrusions on our side. The air and ground units should
be organized to carry out comprehensive exercises in offensive and defensive
operations promptly to solve the problem of exposure and to raise the joint
fighting power of all arms to a higher level.
9411
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY ~
LOGISTICS MUST BE PROTECTED IN A FUTURE WAR
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Jul 79 p 3
[Article by Gu Deru [7357 1795 1172J: "Modern Warfare and Logistics Defense"]
[Text] In modern warfare, all belligerent states make the destruction or the
blocking off of the other side's rear area and the paralyzing of its rear area
supply an important part of their strategy and tactics for preserving themselves
and destroying their adversary. The fourth Middle East war was like this, and so
- were the Vietnamese war to resist U.S. aggression and our war of self-defensive
counterattack against Vietnam. In the Vietnamese war to resist U.S. aggression,
the United States, in order to stop the transport of materiel from the northern
part of Vietnam to the southern part along the "Ho Chi Minh Trail," threw in large
numbers of aircraft to bomb this long, narrow corridor. From October to December
1970 alone, U.S. aircraft made 2,746 bombing sorties against the "Ho Chi Minh
Trail," an average of 31 sorties a day, dropping over 89,000 tons of bombs, an
average of 81 tons per kilometer a day. In our war of self-defensive counter-
attack against Vietnam, even though the Vietnamese army was neutralized by our
superior military force, it still sought in vain by all means opportunities to
reach and make harassing attacks on our rear area with the objective of cutting
our logistics supply.
With the continual development of weapons and equipment for the military forces
of various countries in the world, the dependence of combat units on logistics
supply has become even greater, and the rear services units (elements) [fendui
0430 7130] increasingly have unavoidably become the key target of attack by the
other side. The Soviet Union, the United States, and various other countries in
the world all devote attention to improving the defensive capability of the rear .
services units. The Soviet Union stresses that in a future war "it will be neces-
sary to organize the guarding and defense of the vast rear area and all the long
_ lines of communication." The United States emphasizes that in a future war it
will be necessary to protect the safety of the rear area: "It is necessary to
gua,rd against reconnaissance by Soviet military forces, to attack or wipe out the
latent threat posed to logistics units by the Soviet military forces, and to take
protective measures." The Soviet Union and the United States are not just talk-
ing about this; they have already taken some actual steps in an effort to improve
the defensive capability of the rear service units. For example, in order to
avoid serious damage to its lines of communication and transportation during war-
time, the Soviet Union has begun to set up a railroad engineering corps and
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highway construction units that can undertake formidable rush repair tnissions:
Moreover, the Soviet Armed Forces, in the past 10 years of military exercises,
_ have on each occasion paid a great deal of attention to drilling in rush repairs
of railroadc, bridges, and highways. During the "Dnieper" exercise in 1976,
units of the railroad engineering corps took only a few hours to erect a railroad
ponton bridge. In order to guard against nuclear attacks on stored goods and
materials such as fuel, civil equipment, and foodgrain during wartime, the Soviet
Union widely uses the storage capacity of civil departments; in order to avoid
the destruction during wartime of its stored goods and materials, the United States
has spared no expense in funds and effort to provide storage in caves and under-
ground. Of cour.se, these are not the only measures taken by the Soviet Union and
the United States, but we will not list the others one by one here.
In order to meet the requirements of a future war against aggression, we must
vigorously strengthen the self-defense capability of rear services units (ele-
ments). The Soviet revisionists are bent on subjugating our country and one day
they will strike at us. Once war breaks out, the Soviet Union will probably take
the following combat actions against our rear area and rear area supply units:
1) it will use reconnaissance aircraft and satellites to observe our supply activ-
ities and materiel storage points and accordingly issue orders to attack; 2) it
will dispatch aircraft to bomb and make conventional airborne assaults; 3) it will
send artillery units equipped with tactical nuclear guided missiles to carry out
artillery blocking fire; 4) it will use atomic, chemical, and bacteriological
weapons; and 5) it will make fierce assaults with tank groups and motorized infan-
try, or concurrently carry out coordinated harassing attacks with small detach-
ments. It is not hard to see that in a future modern war, the destruction and
counterdestruction of the rear areas and rear services units, the struggle between
blockade and counterblockade, will be extremely intense. If we do not understand
or have not already understood this kind of threat and do not actively make good
preparations, then we will suffer big losses when that time and situation come.
To improve the rear area's self-defensive capability and smash the enemy's power
to destroy or blockade, we must strengthen the rear area's protective eng~ineering
works and self-defensive works. The important strategic and campaign storehouses
must have facilities for the "three defenses." There must be detour routes for
communication hubs and principal sections of highways or railroads, and air de-
fense and engineering rush repair forces must be strengthened. The transportation
lines between military depots must be built into unbreakable lines on which the
many service arms can be combined for "trans~porting, fighting, repairing, and sup-
plying." There must be unified plans and organization for all sorts of forces in
the rear districts, and civil-military joint defense should be put into effect.
We must learn to be adept in the skill of working during intervals between the
enemy's destructive activities, such as skills in working at night. The logistics
leading cadres msst learn the skills of analyzing and judging situations so as to
disperse or deploy logistics units and equipment to meet the changing requirements
on the battlefield. They must also study the establishment of logistics security
forces at every level in order to strengthen the rear area security forces and
the armed logistics personnel. In short, the situation must he like it was in
the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, in which "supply was assured dur-
ing battle and battle was waged while assuring supply."
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In the past and during the war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam,
we accumulated much rich experience in launching struggles against the enemy and
protecting the safety of the rear area. In the future if only we will comprehen-
sively and accurately comprehend Mao Zedong's military thought; analyze, in the
spirit of seeking truth from facts, the features and guiding laws of logistics in
modern warfare; conscientiously solve the problems in wartime of organizational
command, logistics communications and liaison, as well as protection o.f logistics
safety, we will certainly, in a future war of aggression, overcome enemy destruc-
tion and blockade, insure the uninterrupted flow of large amounts of materiel to
the frontline, and create conditions for winning complete victory in the war.
9727
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
NAVAL LOGISTICS CADRES STUDY ECONOMIC READJUSTMENT POLICY
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 17 Jul 79 p I
[Article by staff correspondent Chen Shungen [3088 7311 2704] et al: "Study To
Comprehend the Readjustment Policy and Strengthen Logistics Construction"]
[Text] The party committee of the Naval Logistics Department recently conducted
a reading class for divisional and regimental cadres so that the cadres would com-
prehend in earnest the great significance of the policy of readjustment, restruc-
turing, rectification, and improvement of the national economy, would link the
policy to reality, and would discuss and study, based on the spirit of this policy,
how to carry out well naval logistics construction.
In the reading class, first of all everybody was led to study the revolutionary
teacher's exposition of the economic laws of socialism, the resolution of the
Third Plenary Session of the Cen~ral Committee, and the relevant documents on the
national economy, which gave them a clear understanding that beginning this year
the goal of the party Central Committee is to carry out the readjustment, restruc-
turing, rectification, and improvement of the national economy over a 3-year period
- so as to put the national economy gradually on the path of perma.nen.t, proportionate,
and high-speed development, and that this is the first campaign for realizing the
four modernizations.
On the basis of their improved understanding, closely linking up with reality,
they also carried out a thorough discussion of the problem of how to build up
naval logistics well in the spirit of the national economic readjustment policy.
The comrades pointed out that at present, in implementation of the readjustment
policy, they should switch the focus of the building up of naval logistics to the
modernization of logistics at sea. To this end, they must strengthen logistics
supply measures, strive to change the backward ways of supplying forces at sea,
and as much as possible adopt advanced techniques. They must also construct well
the sea and rear area bases; increase material reserves; reduce the administrative
levels of supply; strengthen the comprehensive capacity, transportation capacity,
and medical and hygienic capacity; and simplify supply procedures--all these mea-
sures will make things more convenient for naval ships and be advantageous for
combat preparedness. They must grasp well the logistics supply work of first-line
units so that the troops o.R naval and air bases, in mountains and on islands, have
the necessary food, housing, and working facilities. Everybody resolved to grasp
- this work as of now, and for their own units to formulate practicable plans and
strive to carry them out.
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During the discussion the comrades brought up the fact that the members of the
study class in departments that manage money and materiel often "give the go-ahead
to the outflow and inflow of large amounts of money and materiel." Whether the
idea of constructing modernization with thrift and hard work is firmly established
in their minds and whether it is embodied well in their actions has a great bear-
ing on naval construction and a very big influence on the workstyle of lower levels
and units, and they must certainly play a leading role _.i putting this idea into
practice. The study class also specifically organized a,;rip to a certain ware-
house complex of the Naval Logistics Department for purposes of observation and
study. Under the leadership of its party committee, this warehouse complex did
not wait for or depend on the four modernizations to regularly undertake the in-
crease of output and savings. Seven of its warehouses have been partially mech-
anized and automated, thereby saving manpower and materiel, reducing labor inten-
sity, and improving work efficiency. This example was a profound lesson for all
members of the class, who indicated that after returning to their own units they
would pattern their actions on those of this advanced unit, and in the units of
which they are in charge they would make thrift and hard work the order of the
day.
The comrades pointed out in the course of their discussion that the logistics
cadres, during the construction of the four modernizations, highly value the word
"diligence": diligence in studying management and techniques, diligence and con-
scientiousness in serving the people, and diligence in using their brains to study
new problems in absorbing new experiences. This wi11 lead them increasingly to
make discoveries and progress in their work, to handle all things with hard work
and thrift, to become good "good Red stewards," and to contribute their strength
to the construction of modernization in naval logistics.
9727
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,
ARTILLERY DIVISION TRAINS TOP LOGISTICS CADRES
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 Sep 79 p 1
[Article by staff correspondents Tian Zongzao [3944 1350 4478] and Ma Shifa [7456
1102 4099] and staff reporter Lei Xinlong [7191 2450 7893]: "Grasp Firmly and
Well the Professional Training of Logistics Leading Cadres"]
[Text] The key to improving the organizational command capability of logistics
organizations lies in the training of logistics leading cadres. This is the ex-
perience in practice summed up by the logistics department of a certain artillery
division of the Beijing units. Since the beginn:tng of this year, the department
has made the training of logistics leading cadres the focal point of cadre train-
ing, grasping it firmly and meticulously, and getting results.
The logistics leading cadres of this division are comparatively new, the majority
of them have no experience of actual warfare, and they are comparatively unfamiliar
~ith logistics support work during wartime. This year the divisional logistics
department ran two consecutive short training classes for leading cadres at the
level of logistics office chiefs and above in which the cadres studied wartime
rear services work. The department's methods were:
Based on the characteristics of modern warfare and the actual conditions of the
unit, the cadres emphasized the study of basic knowledge necessary to master rear
area command during wartime. In the first half of the year, they completed study-
- ing four topics: the basic principles and missions of rear services work in an
anti-aircraft gun unit, the deployment of rear services supplies according to the
co~nander's operational intentions, and the marking of rear area work charts.
The cadres studied the experiences of actual warfar~~, deepening their understand-
ing of wartime logistics supply work. They conscientiously read materials per-
taining to experience in logistics work during our army's war of resistance
against Japan, the liberation war, and the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid
Korea, and also asked veteran department head Su Wanyuan [4479 8001 0337] to i~
part to them his experiences in logi.stics supply work during wartime. In the
war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, Su Wanyuan's unit took gart in the
fifth campaign. At that time, when the enemy was conducting large-scale air raids,
the logistics leading cadres of this unit, in accordance with the commander's
operational intentions, carried out correct organizational command and insured
supplies during the battles, forming rear area supply networks that combined
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"transport, attack, repair, supply, and rescue" functions, and powerfully insur-
ing victories in combat at the fro~it. From the experience in logistics supply in
this campaign, everybody saw more clearly the decisive role that the organiza-
tional command capabilities of leading cadres plays in ?..~gistics supply. They
also made a point of studying, after the war of self-defensive counterattack
against Vietnam, the experience in logistics supply of units that took part in
this war, and conducted discussions on the problems of rear area command, ammuni-
tion and material supply, first aid for the wounded, vehicle transport, and the
control and use of militia in rear areas supporting the front. All the comrades
said that modern warfare is a coordinated operation by all military (service) arms
- and that artillery units act as units attached to other military (service) arms.
If logistics leading cadres do not have some knowledge pertaining to combined
forces, it will be very difficult for them to rationallv deploy and organize the
various logistics supply forces. Therefore, in combination with their mission of
preparing against war, they acquired general knowledge about the functions of the
weapons and equipment,,the battle principles, the tactical features, and the
logistics supply system of the units an artillery unit would be attached to in a
future war. .
They researched materials on the logistics supply of foreign armies, learning
from the strongpoints of others to make up their own deficiencies. They made some
analytical studies of the guiding thought, logistics equipment, maintenance capac-
ity, material transport, POL supply, and battlefield first aid aspects of the
Soviet Army's logistics supply work, and extracted from them things they could
use. Once, unit commander Ceng Zixi [2582 13I1 6007] read in some foreign army
materials that every regiment of some countries is equipped with a bakery truck,
which is convenient and timely for mess work in wartime. He realized that in a
future war against aggression it would be necessary to solve the problem of feed-
ing the troops. Because in wartime anti-aircraft gun units are scattered, are
highly mobile, and often engage in combat, there are many difficulties in supply-
ing food to these units, and if we solely depend on the method of burying pots to
cook food it will be very difficult to meet the requirements of combat. He led ~
a work team to stay in succession at two "grassroots" regiments, where, together
with the cadres and fighters, the team conducted research, pooling the wisdom and
efforts of everyone. They refitted the "Liberation-80" towed battle vehicles
[tuodouche 2094 2435 6508] into regimental field kitchen trucks, regimental field
bakery trucks, and company field bakery trucks, and thus provided experience in
changing the traditional method of burying pots to cook food.
They drilled while studying and studied while drilling. When studying the topic
of military terrain, the department chief personally led all of the students on
an on-the-spot study assignment in the field, and on discovering problems imme-
diately corrected them, so that the students got a fairly good grasp of the basic
methods of determining their positions on a map. In a drill carried out not long
ago, they selected complex terrain and, w~th the department chief and the polit-
ical commissar leading the way in a vehicle, made a night march by map in which
they accurately reached their destination. During their realistic drills, they
also made a point of summing up the lessons of their experiences and focused on
strengthening their study of existing problems. During one drill, the march
formation of the logistics supply element [fendui 0433 7130] became disrupted,
contact was broken, and it did not reach its assembly area on schedule. After-
ward, the leading cadres went to the masses, investigated the reasons for this
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failure, and solicited the masses' opinions, and also convened a special meet3.ng
to study the failure. It was decided that the main reason this problem had oc-
cured was that the leading cadres had not clearly and definitely divided up the
work and that there was a lack of well-concerted, detailed plans for organizational
command. Therefore, they restudied the basic sequence of rear area co~mnand.
The logistics leading cadres of this division, in a spirit of responsibility con-
cerning a future war, study assiduously and take the lead in training. From being
unfamiliar with wartime logistics supply they have become relatively familiar,
from understanding very little they have come to understand quite a lot, and their
organizational command capability and their leadership level have both improved.
- In a comprehensive test on the logistics supply profession held not long ago, the
logistics leading cadres throughout the division scored an average of 89 points.
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LOGISTICS CADRES EXHORTED TO IMPROVE PROFICIENCY
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 Sep 79 p 1
[Short commentary: "One Must Have Real Ability and Learning Commensurate With
One`s Post"]
[Text] That the organizational command capability of a logistics organization de-
pends upon the military accomplishments of its leading cadres is an unarguable
truti~. When war comes, the way the rear services are carried out is a matter about
which the staff and assisting personnel can and should provide situation reports
and suggestions, but the final decisionmaking power rests with the leadership.
Whether the logistics leading cadres can, based on the determination of the com-
mander ot the combined arms force and the actual situation obtaining in the unit,
satisfactorily 3eploy the rear services, is related to whether the logistics sup- .
ply for the entire battle or campaign can be successfully accomplished. The party
committee of the logistics department of a certain artillery division of the Bei-
jing units has seen the importance of this question: he has taken seriously the
professional study and training of the department's leading cadres, and has ob-
tained a certain success in this respect.
"Once a person has power, he begins to order people around." When people say this
they often do so in a derogatory sense. Actually, when the party or the state
gives you power, you are expected to order people around. The problem is that you
must issue orders correctly, and must not issue confused orders and not avail
yourself of your power of office to seek private gain. To be a leading cadre and
n.ot be bold and resolute, not stand up for oneself, and to be irresolute and hesi-
tant when something crops up, are manifestations of a neglect of one's duty. Of
course, for a leading cadre to exercise his power of command is not easy. Com-
rade Mao Zedong pointed out: "A commander's correct deployment originates from
correct determination, his correct determination originates from thoughtful and
necessary reconnaissance and from pondering the connections between the ma.terials
gathered by reconnaissance." Every one of these links is a topic for study:
Without a detailed understanding and ample knowledge of actual conditions, it
will be difficult to make a correct decision. The logistics supply work in a
future war will be wide in scope and highly difficult, and there will be many new
situations and problems that we have never encountered. All logistics leading
cadres certainly must be adept at learning both to understand our army's combat
characteristics, being proficient in the work of the various departments and the
professions of the various specialized elements [fendui 0433 7130] of logistics,
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and to have a good idea of the conditions of the enemy army--that is, knowing
oneself and knowing the enemy. They can then, on a complex and constantly chang-
ing battlefield, have a well-thought-out plan, ~e calm and unhurried, exercise
correct command, and appropriately respond to all sorts of situations. ,
It should be pointed out that some of our logistics leading cadres still pay little
- attention to their own professional study and training. They exercise the func-
tions and powers that go with their posts and put their hearts into issuing orders,
but they are somewhat lacking in learning and real ability, have only a Yiazy'notion
and indistinct picture of the professional work for which they are responsible,
and they often issue confused orders. This state of affairs can cause losses to
the party work in peacetime and bungle the chances of winning a battle in wartime,
when the price for it will be paid in blood. Ma Su, during the Three Kingdoms
period, did not encamp his army on an important road but instead quartered his
troops in the mountains, where Sima (?Yan) cut off his source of water, so that
Ma. Su lost his strategic position. Zhao Kuo, of the Warring States period, was
only an armchair strategist and could not handle troops in battle, and in the
Battle of Changping his line of communications was cut by the Qin army, which ir~
the end led to the destruction of his entire army. We should take a warning from
the lessons of the ancients. The party and the people have given us posts and
bestowed power upon us; we must strive to possess the commensurate ability and
skills. If we do not have real ability and learning and are unworthy of our posts,
we should feel ashamed.
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PLA UNIT INFORMATION, DESIGNATIONS
[The following PLA unit number and information are taken from various issues
of JIEFANGJUN BAO, pub lished in Beijing. The date in parenthesis ref ers to
dat~ of newspaper report.]
Unit 00065--This unit is engaged in earthwork excavation of a ventilating passage
as part of a war preparedness project in an undisclosed area. (2 May 79 p 1)
Unit 00282--A photo shaw~ members of a research lab of this unit carrying out
spectrum analysis on rock minerals. (18 Apr 79 p 2)
Unit 32412--This ~mit is mentioned. (10 May 79 p 4)
Unit 33610--The ordnance personnel of the logistics and repair deparGcnent of this
unit successfully developed a paratrooper target which indicates blank cartridge
hits of light weapons. This has resolved problems for infantry units engaged in
antiairborne training. (16 Apr 79 p 3)
Unit 34139--This unit is mentioned. (10 May 79 p 4)
Unit 36021--A technician of this unit developed a temiinal for an automatically
controlled signal device. (27 Apr 79 p 2)
Unit 37614--The 52d Fendui is mentioned. (10 May 79 p 4)
Unit 39328--Th e 82d Fendui of this unit wrote a letter to the editor pointing out
that the leadership organ is placing too heavy of a workload on cadres and fighters.
(23 Apr 79 p 2)
Unit 51026--The 6th Company of this unit is mentioned. (9 May 79 p 4)
Uni t 5102 7--A photo cap tion s tates that the commanders and f igh ters of the
3d Antiaircraft Artillery Company of this unit are rigorously carrying out
antiaircraft combat training using existing equipment and in accorda.nce with the
characteristics of modern warfare. (2 Apr 79 p 1)
Unit 51036--Proceeding from the needs of a f uture war, the commanders and fighters
of the lst Tank Battalion of this unit conscientiously carried out a coordinated
infantry-tank exercise under atomic warfare condition. (9 May 79 p 1)
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Unit 51041--Fan Hongliang [5400 3163 0081~, political instructor of the 8th Company
of this unit. (29 May 79 p 2)
Unit 51049--The party committee of this unit is paying attention to the strict
- running of the a~unition depot. (24 Apr 79 p 2) �
Unit 51272--The 69th Fendui is mentioned. (10 May 79 p 4)
Unit 52851--The lst Artillery Company of this imit is mentioned. (3 May 79 p 3)
Unit 52941--A technician of a signal company of this unit wrote a 30,000 word
training manual on radio relay equipment. (18 Apr 79 p 2)
Ltnit 53836--Commanders and fighters of this unit are shown in a photo rigorously
carrying out training to safeguard the four modernizations. (16 Apr 79 p 1) .
Unit 54583--This unit is mentioned. (23 Apr 79 p 2)
Unit 54721--A working gxoup of the political department of this unit helped
a h eavy artillery company of an unidentified regiment and the 2d company of
anoth er unidentified regiment to carry out education on the party's policies.
(30 May 79 p 1)
Unit 54831--The party committee of this unit issued an order of cou~endation
to 39 cadres at the regimental level for their wark in carryi~g out the four
modernizations .(27 Apr 79 p 2)
Unit 56100--This unit is mentioned. (16 Apr 79 p 3)
Unit 81224--The party branch of an 100~ artillery c~mpany of this unit helped
new fighters who had been transferred from other units make the pro~er adjustments.
(13 Apr 79 p 2)
Unit 81244--The 9th Company of this unit used th e heroic deeds of the border units
in the self-defense counterattack war as teaching materials to educatie cadres
and fighters on patriotism. (2 May 79 p 2)
Unit 81257--This unit is mentioned. (23 Apr 79 p 2)
Unit 81658--This unit is mentioned. (23 Apr 79 p 2)
Unit 83024--This unit is mentioned. (30 May 79 p 2)
_ Unit 83107--The CYL party branch of a warning signal [6226 6639J company of this
unit held a democratic election. (30 May 79 p 2)
Unit 83221--This unit is mentioned. (16 Apr 79 p 3)
- Uni t 83225--The 60th Fendui of this unit is mentioned. (23 Apr 79 p 2)
Unit 83302--This unit is mentioned. (23 Apr 79 p 2)
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Unit 83315--The party committee of a machine gun and artillery company of this
unit used the heroic deeds of the Guangxi-Yunnan border units in the self-
defense counterattack war as examp les to launch ideolog3cal-political work to
enhance war preparedness training. (9 Apr 79 p 2)
Unit 83435--Wang Yizhong [3769 5030 1813], leader of a telephone communications
squad of a command company. (2 May 79 p 2)
Unit 83475--This unit is mentio ned, (16 Apr 79 p 3)
t3nit 89204--A photo shows three members of the headquarters of this unit
oPerating a Chinese typewriter. (30 May 79 p 2)
CSO: 4005/2105
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
INFORMATION ON MILITARY, OTHER PERSONNEL
[The following biographic information is taken from various issues of
JIEFANGJUN BAO, published in Beijing. The date in parenthesis refers to
date of newspaper report.]
- Chen Zhongsheng [7115 0112 3932J Deputy political commissar of an artillery
regiment of Unit 54831. (27 Apr 79 p 2)
Li Erban [2621 0059 2647] Commander of Ship 622. (30 May 79 p 2)
Li Jiulong [2621 0046 7893] Co~ander of an uni:dentified division of the Guangxi
border units. (8 May 79 p 1)
Liu Shuxian [0491 2579 6343] Chief of staff of an unidentified division of the
Beijing Units is shown in a photo studying combat plans together with comrades
of an unidentified regiment during an antiairborne training exercise. (9 Apr 79 p 2)
Ma Wensheng [7456 2429 0581] Secretary and political commissar of the party committee
of an unidentified regiment of the Shenyang Units. (27 May 79 p 2)
Mei Shaohua [2734 1421 5478] Coffinander of an unidentified regiment of Unit 54831.
(27 Apr 79 p 2)
Wang Junhai [3769 0971 3189] Deputy political commissar of an unidentified
artillery regiment. (1 May 79 p 2)
Zhu Xinmin [4281 2450 3046] Commander of an unidentified antiaircraft artillery
regiment of Unit 54831. (27 Apr 79 p 2)
- CSO: 4005/2105
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TOP PLA ORGANIZATIONS ISSUE CRITERIA FOR RULES INSPECTION
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Mar 81 p 1
[Article: "The Three General Departments Issue 'Criteria for Inspecting the Imple-
mentation of the Common Rules and Decrees"']
- [Text] The [PLA] General Staff Department, General Political Department, and Gen-
eral Logistics Department recently formulated and handed down "criteria for in-
_ specting the implementation of the common rules and decrees [of the armed forces],"
- calling on the entire army, in accordance with these criteria, to conscientiously
organize inspections, promote the implementation of the rules and decrees, strength-
en the management of units, and push forward the all-round construction of units.
The "rules and decrees governing discipline," "rules and decrees governing internal
affairs," and "rules and decrees governing enlisted men" are the common rules and
decrees for all officers and men of our armed forces. Due to the disruption and
destruction of the construction of our armed forces caused by Lin Biao and the
"gang of four," as well as the influence of anarchist ideology, some comrades are
unfamiliar with the rules and decrees. In the past few years, through education
and rectification, order has been brought out of chaos, and the work of thoroughly
implementing the rules and decrees has greatly progressed. However, there are
- still many units and militarymen that have an inadequate understanding of the im-
portance of implementing the rules and decrees, and are not serious and conscien-
tious about enforcing them. Some do not follow the rules and go their own way;
some do not make strict demands, are not fair in meting out reward and punish-
ment, and relax the organizational discipline among the troops to such an extent
that the undesirable tendency to violate laws and discipline is ignored and not
controlled, which affects the building of a disciplined workstyle among the troops.
In order to change this situation as quickly as possible, the three general depart-
ments, in accordance with the demand by the Military Commission of the [CCP] Cen-
tral Committee to strengthen troop building, and on the basis of widely soliciting
the opinions of each large unit and the departments concerned, has formulated and
handed down the "criteria for inspecting the implementation of the common rules
and decrees [of the armed forcesJ." The contents of the criteria are: 1)organi-
zational discipline; 2) the relationship between officers and men; 3) the duties
of military men; 4) workstyle discipline; 5) enlisted men's training and daily
cultivation; 6) daily system and regulations; 7) daily routine cleanup and sanita-
tion tasks; 8) barracks area construction and barracks product management; 9)
mess management; 10) management of weapons and equipment, vehicles, army horses,
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bedding and uniforms; 11) duty, guard, and emergency musters; and 12) safety work.
The "criteria" lay down clear and specific regulations for all ti~ese items. The
criteria also lay particular stress on ideological and political education and on
the building of a disciplined workstyle among the troop;-, and cal~ on the officers
and men of the entire army to firmly carry out the party's line and its general,
and specific policies, to carry out consciously and thoroughly the three main rules
of discipline and the eight points for attention, to obey management and comply
with orders, to unite internally and externally, to maintain a high degree of cen-
tralized unification, to establish new socialist habits of stressing civilitya
being polite, being ethical, and observing discipline, and to consciously resist
the influence of nonproletarian ideologies.
The circular in which the "criteria" were handed down calls on each unit to proceed
from the reality obtaining among its troops, in line with the spirit of benefiting
the strengthening of preparations against war and the convenience of life and of
making management easier, to carry out inspections in the spirit of seeking truth
from facts, and both affirm successes and point out existing problems, so that the
inspections and tests will ~ruly play the role of supervising and urging on the
building up of troops.
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FLIGHT SAFETY PRACTICED BY FUZHOU AIRMEN
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Mar 81 p 2
[Article by Wu Tingzhu (0702 1694 2691] et al: "Fuzhou Units Air Force Sets
2-Year Flight Safety Record"]
[Text] On 22 February, the leading comrades of the [PLA] Air Force praised the ad-
vanced deed of the Fuzhou units air force in setting a 2-year flight safety record.
It was an outstanding achievement to insure flight safety continuously on this
large a scale for over 2 years. The safe flying saved the state a great amount of
funds and insured the successful completion of the units' combat-readiness train-
ing. As of now, all their combat regiments have reached the "A" category level,
and the number of pilots capable of flying in the four kinds of weather conditions
has doubled compared with the number in 1979.
Three years ago, some flying accidents occurred among the Fuzhou units that af-
fected the building up of the units. The party committee of the Fuzhou units air
force, conscientiously summing up the lessons from these accidents, held that the
main reason for the serious nature of the accidents was that the training guidance
was divorced from the reality obtaining in the units, and confused orders were
is~ued. In order to change this situation, since the beginning of 1979 the com-
mittee has mainly taken three measures: First, it has rationally formulated train-
ing plans. Adopting the method of proceeding from top to bottom, it allows the
division and regiments, in accordance with the intent of the upper echelon, to
integrate the plans with their own reality and decide by themselves the training
arrangements, with the upper echelon providing help and guidance, thus avoiding
taking on what should be done by others and "waging a messy battle." Second, it
is guiding the training in the spirit of seeking truth from facts. It has changed
the past state of affairs in which the slack and peak periods for flying were
automatically divided into the first and last three seasons of the year so that
the beginning of the year is a"slack" period, the middle of the year an "inten-
sive" period, and the end of the year a"catchup" period, thus suiting the train-
ing content to changing weather conditions. The committee also, proceeding from
the actual level of the flyers, both stressed the laying of a good foundation and
the organizing of the units vigorously but carefully to surmount difficulties,
improve their technical level, and actively maintain safety, so that there has
been a considerable improvement in the units' ability to carry out their pursuit
mission and to handle special situations. Third, the committee, in accordance
with rules and decrees and the training outline, has done good preventive work.
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Based on historical lessons and according to relevant stipulations, tt reduc~d the
incidence of duplicative questions; by paying attention to the special features of
the topics for study, it took focused measures; and, under favorable conditions,
~ it got a firm grip on unsafe factors, thus obtaining the initiative in safety work.
To prevent the issuance of confused orders, the committee paid a great deal of
attention to changing the leadership's workstyle and developed the spirit of doing
a thorough job. For the past 2 years and more, the leading comrades of the Fuzhou
units air force have regularly gone into the units to make inspections, conduct
research, and solve problems. Some comrades, even though they are over 50 years
old, still do not fear intense cold or heat and continue to go to the flight line
to gat the feel of the situation and grasp the practical aspects of the work there.
Once, political commissar Zhang Xiyong [1728 1585 1661] went to a certain regiment
that was just about to start on five training outlines, and, disregarding his frail
physique and painful illness, carried out investigation and research with meticu-
lous care. He led the cadres of the division and the airfield termi.nal in a care-
ful inspection of the technical state of the runway. They discovered that over
1,000 cement pieces had caved in. He then instructed the unit to 3.mmediately re-
pair the runway, thereby insuring flight safety.
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LIAONING TEAMS GIVE COMPANIES BORDER DEFENSE TRAINING
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Mar 81 p 2
[Article by Li Weijun [2621 4850 6511] et al: "Border Defense Companies Helped To
Train Well in Basic Skills"]
[Text] On 19 February, a group of cadres, selected from the [Liaoning] provincial
military district and the border defense military subdistrict for their experience
in border defense training and their strong organizing capability, came to a cer-
tain army school, where, together with 100 graduating members of the border de-
fense forces, they took a 26-day concentrated course in teaching methods. After-
ward, they were formed into several tens of training and teaching teams and sent
to various border defense line companies to help the companies train for 1 year.
This was one measure taken by the leadership organizations of the Shenyang units
to strengthen the training of border defense companies. These teaching teams
focus on teaching the border defense companies how to get a good grip on the prin-
cipal training topics. They help the companies to solve problems connected with
individual soldier and squad defense in training to fire the 40-mm rocket launcher
and the 80-mm recoilless rifle, as well as teach the subjects of capturing enemy
personnel for intelligence purposes, going on patrols, observing the enemy, post-
ing guards, reconnoitering, and pursuing and capturing enemy personnel, thereby
helping the companies in a down-to-earth manner to train well in the basic skills
and fostering in the companies "four skills" cadres and backbone elements.
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MILITARY AND PIJBLIC SECURITY
BRIEFS
'LOGISTICS STUDIES' JOURNAL--In accordance with the Military Commission's
directive calling upon.the academic research departmen~ of the Institute of
Logistics to carry out the task of logistics academic research throughout the
armed forces, the General Logistics Department and the party ~o~nittee of
the Institute of Logistics have decided to officially publish a monthly ~ournal
entitled HOUQIN XUESHU [LOGISTICS STUDIES] which will be distributed to logistics
departments above the regimental level throughout the armed forces. LOGISTICS
STUDIES is a publication of specialized theories on logistics and mainly contains
the following: articles on the study, research and application of Chairman Mao's
military thinking and instructions on logistics work; theoretical issues on
various specialized logistics research; academic theses studying logistics
support in a future war against aggression; our army's historical experiences
in logistics work during past revolutionary struggles; selections of foreign
armies' logistics academic developments and usef ul experiences; and our arnied
forces' f ine tradition in logistics work and logistics academic research
developments of PLA units and academies. In order to speed up our armed forces'
- logistics modernization, LOGISTICS STUDIES also introduced some modern logistics
scientific and technical know-how which has applications in the field of logistics.
~[Text] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 18 Apr 79 p 2]
SURGICAL LAMPS ABOARD SHIPS--For surgery in a low and narrow ship cabin, the
- lighting equipment cannot be too bulky, although sufficient light must be assured;
otherwise, it may be a hindrance to the surgical operation and affect its result.
After research, a new surgical lamp has been manufactured with the application of
a new technology--cold lighting with coated filamehzs. This lamp can turn 360
degrees and has a tilting angle of 90 degrees. A single lamp can emit 8,000-10,000
lux. The light is low in temperature, soft in color, and easy to operate. It is
also sturdily built, and is able to withstand force one tremor and force two shock.
It is superior to the present Model CB 384-64 surgical lamps. ~Text,~ ~Beijing
JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 26 May 79 p 3l 9411
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PARTY AIJD STATE
DEVISING METHODS TO DEFEAT SUPERIOR FORCE EMPHASIZED
- Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Mar 81 p 2
[Article by staff special commentator: "Bring Forth Methods That Promote Strong
Points and Overcome Weak Points"]
[Text] During discussions on how an inferior force can vanquish a superior force,
we had to say again and again: Method! Method! Method! Why? Because it is really
of the utmost importance in vanquishing a superior force with an inferior force to
bring forth methods that promote strong points and overcome weak points.
Only look at history. The burning of warships in the Battle of Chibi, tihe attach-
~:ent of knives to long shafts by the Yue Jia army, the stealthy entrance into the
enemy's position during the breakout fram Jin Wushu's "floating iron seige" and
"captured horses," and the use of high-pressure water hoses to break the sand dike
line along the canal bank during the Egyptian-Israeli war all show the power in
battle of promoting strong points and overcoming weak points, and they all embody
problems of devising and applying good strategy and clever tactics. The emergence
and application of a good method can often greatly strengt~ien one's defensive power,
add a great deal to one's striking power against the enemy, and raise the combat
effectiveness of one's troops, and can even become the turning point in transform-
ing inferiority into superiority or defeat in.to victory.
Again, look at present reality. In a future war against aggression, many new
situations and many new features will emerge, and this poses many new tasks in our
training work and forces us to being forth new methods for subduing the enemy. For
example, in conditions in which we aze in the strategic defensive stage and have
inferior equ~pment, how are we, in modern conditions, to fight a positional war,
a mobile war, or a guerrilla war; in conditions in which we do not have control of
the air, how are we to insure troop mobility; when on the offensive, how are we, ~
giving full play to the role of the existing equipment of all service branches,
to break through barriers, open routes, and effect a breakthrough; when on the de-
fensive, how are we, with regard to the enemy's "three broadazes", to resist fierce
bombing by the enemy's air force, strong surprise attacks by his artillery fire
(guided missiles), successive breakthroughs by his massed tanks, and vertical pene-
tration by his airborne forces? If we can bring forth methods for dealing with
these problems, then we wi11 be more certain of vanquishing a superior force with an
inferior force.
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History and present reality both prove that confidence and methods are linked to
each other, complement each other, and that one cannot exist without the othei.
Without confidence in victory, one cannot talk about war or about victory. Si~ilarly,
without methods to secure victory, one also cannot talk about war or about victory.
This is the case when a superior force is pitted against an inferior force, and it
is even more the case when an inferior force is pitted against a superior force.
If an army with inferior equipment pitted against an enemy with superior equipment
has confidence in victory but doesn't have the methods in hand to secure that vic-
tory, then "the confidence is hollow and the lack of inethod is real," and it can
only "remain in a position of inferiority and grieve" an~ cannot "vanquish a superior
force with an inferior �orce." If the army has both confidence and methods then
it wi11 truly "be in an inferior position and not grieve" and can truly "vanquish
a superior force with an inferior force." From this we can see that there is a
definite dialectiCal" relationship between confidence and method. Between them they
can produce two kinds of cycles: one cycle is good--the more methods the better
the situation, and the more confidence the more adequate the situation; the other
cycle is bad--the fewer the methods the more mistakes are made, the the less the
confidence the more inadequate the situation is. The two kinds of cycles inevi-
tably lead to two kinds of results: one is victory and the other is defeat. In
the final analysis, the decisive factor in determining which cycle will be produced
is method.
At present this kind of phenamenon is occurring: wher, the subject of conf idence is
brought up for discussion, it seems that there is enough confidence to spare, but
when the sub~ect of inethod is brought up for discussion, not even a few methods are
forthcoming. What is the reason for this? O~iginally, some comrades still had not
placed the subject of inethods on their daily agenda of prolilems to think about. The
main reasons for this were that their thinking was ossified, they did not think
of forging ahead, and they had not completely shaken off the fetters of the in-
fluence of the two "whatevers" and of inetaphysics.
Some comrades are content if the troops have high morale with regard to being
victorious over a strong enemy who has superior equipment, and in their hearts tae-
- lieve that "the brave will be victorious." Beyond the shadow of a doubt, our troops
are courageous, and the courageous spirit of inen is an 3mportant factor in being
victorious. However, material force can only be destroyed by material force, and
the outstanding achievement of vanquishing a superior force with an inferior force
can only be accomplished by courageous people employing the method of promoting
strong points and overcoming weak points. For even the most courageous people to
vanquish a superior force with an inferior force, a reliable method that closely
combines people and weapons is necessary.
- Some comrades are content just to shout the slogan "vanquish a superior force with
an inferior force" and forget about bringing forth methods, as if it were enough
to ha.ve a correct slogan. To be sure, the slogan "vanquish a superior force with
an inferior force" is correct and certainly must be re~ularly raised and must pene-
trate into people's minds until it changes the present reality. However, slogans
cannot take the place of inethods, and strategic slogans cannot function as tactical
slogans. We must change the habit of shouting much and doing little. After adopt-
ing the correct slogan, the most important thing is to implement it, and the most
valuable thing is to put it to use in dealing the concrete matters. We must con-
scientiously "deal" with "concrete matters" and bring forth methods that promote
strong points and overcome weak points.
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Some comrades believe that "when a cart comes to a mountain there will certainly
be a road over it." The meaning of this is that once the guns have sounded, the~e
will naturally be methods and it will not be too late at that time to bring them
forth. Actually, they are fooling themselves. In the world it is to be feared
that there are not many cases in which after "doubting whether there is a road
through a complex landscape" then automatically there will appear "another village
amid the dense willow trees and bright flowers." With regard to the question of
war, which is a matter of life and death for the state, we cannot leave the slight-
est thing to chance. If we are to vanquish a superior force with an inferior force,
we must, by all means and in a down-to-earth fashion, seek methods that promote
strong points and overcome weak points.
The bringing forth of inethods that promote strong poin.ts and overcome weak points
is not just the affair of a minority of the people but is the affair of the majority
of the people. Good methods must be brought forth both by the "Zhuge Liang's" and
by the "cobblers" [a reference to the saying "three cobblers with their wits com-
bined equal Zhuge Liang the mastermind," i.e., two heads are better than one]. If
the organization and the companies, the cadres and the fighters, each and every
service branch, all get moving and use their brains, they certainly can create
superior strategy for promoting strong points and overcaming weak points and bring
forth clever schemes for vanquishing a superior force with an inferior force.
The problem is that at present some comrades still do not cl~arly recognize their
own responsibility in this regard. They do not play their conscious dynamic role
i.n creating methods, but wait for higher levels to give them methods and for other
- people to teach them thQ methods. In the process of doing research on methods to
vanquish a superior force with an inferior force and to promote strong po3nts and
overcome weak points, the higher level organizations and the scientific and re-
search departments can and should bring forth some good methods, but they are only
"processing factories" and "wholesale departments," and a considerable portion of
the "materials" and "goods" should come from the masses' practice. Such being
the case, we--the masses, in practice--should synthesize the actuality of training
to think about this question, pay attention to it and bring forth methods. If we
f ighters wait for the cadres, the companies wait for the organization, the sma11
organization waits for the big organization, the ordinary unit waits for the scien-
tif ic research department, and one level waits for another level, then the methods
of promoting strong points and overcoming weak points in the end can only be like
the horse looking at a picture of baked cakes in a mirror, i.e., feeding on illusion.
It is up to the ma.sses to think up and bring forth methods. In the Middle Eastern
war, the Egyptian army's high-pressure water hoses brake through the Israeli
army's sand dikes on the canal bank, thereby solving a big difficulty that neither
heavy artillery bombardment nor bulldozers could solve. This tactic cannot be
called unmasterful, but this master stroke was not thought up by a general but by
an ordinary staff officer.
In May of last year, the training in directly aimed fire against tanks conducted
by a certain regiment of the Shenyang units fundamentally achieved laser seriation.
This set of seriate laser training equipment was successfully developed by an in-
novation team led by a leading cadre of the regiment.
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Due to improvements in the packing and wrapping method, the armor-piercing power of
the satchel charge used against tanks by a certain regiment, with the same amount
of charge as before, 3ncreased by 10 times. The person who improved the packing
- method was not a scientific researcher or a cadre but ~ust an ordinary f ighter.
Some units, based on the characteristics of the enemy army's defensive operations
and proceeding from the reality of our army, have conscientiously studies, re-
peatedly practiced, and combined both indigenous and foreign methods in prelimi-
narily probing into and testing a method of opening a route through 400 meters of
enemy obstacles, thereby providing experience for future combined research into
overcoming such obstacles.
Faced with these facts, comrades who think tha.t they cannot bring forth good
methods should change their views. There is nothing they cannot do. If only they
have a sense of responsibility, think of "doing" and be willing to "do," then, when
seeking methods of vanquishing a superior force with an inferior force and of pro-
moting strong points and overcoming weak points, they will be able to develop their
ability to the fullest. If only the intelligen.ce ~nd wisdom of the masses is brought
into play, there will certainly be a steady flow of good methods. Of course, at
times the methods brought forth by some people, due to limitations in various aspects,
may be inadequately perfected and even fundamentally impracticable. However, their
responsible spirit of assiduous study is extremely valuable. With this valuable
spirit there will be the finest methods. Therefore, we must be adept at bringing
into play, developing, and protecting the creative spirit of the masses, fully
mobilize the masses, and let both the "Zhuge Liang's " and the "cobblers" pitch into
this work in concert, so tha.t there will be a reliable guarantee for bringing forth
methods that promote strong points and overcome weak points.
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PARTY AND STATE
PARTY DEMANDS GENUINE, NOT SUPERFICIAL, POLITICAL UNANIMITY
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Mar 81 p 3
[Article by Qi Chengzhang [2058 2052 4545]: "We Must Have Conscious Unanimity and
Not Be Satisfied With Superficial Unanimity"J
[Text] When studying how to carry out the spirit of the central work conference,
with stress on maintaining political unanimity with the party Central Cammittee,
some comrades worry that their improper remarks will be considered by people as not
maintaining unanimity with the central authorities, and so they are unwilling to
speak up at party conferences about questions that they otiviously do not understand
and cannot see t.he logic of. They think that by 3ust making known their support,
~egardless of how they really think, they will be regarded as maintaining unaniruity
with the central authorities. In fact, this kind of superficial unanimity is de-
finitely not true unanimity, and it is definitely detrimental to the correct under-
standing and implementation of the party's line and its general and specific policies.
Whether one can maintain political unanimity with the central authorities is a
question of a Communist Party member's stand and party spirit, and obviously should
be dealt with seriously. However, the serious attitude we are talking about means
a good grasp of the ideas and a common understanding. Therefore, whether mistakes
are committed with regard to this question is not determined by whether one speaks
or remains silent, whether one speaks much or little, but rather Iiy how one learns
the party's line and its general and specific policies and by whether one's under-
- standing of them is correct or not. If one studies them well and understands them,
one's incorrect views will be corrected and one will not commit mistakes; conversely,
if one does not speak up but cannot see the logic of the line and policies, then it
will be diff icult to avoid making mistakes.
To maintain unanimity with the central autharities, there must be organizational
obedience, but even more there must be ideological unan3mity with the party's line
and its general and specific policies. This unanimity must be truly conscious and
not superficial or hypocritical. To fail to understand but pretend to understand,
to be unwilling to speak what is on one's mind, and to look as if on~ were maintain-
ing unanimity while in actuality one is far from doing so, is not the attitude of
seeking truth from facts that we Co~unist Party members should have. Our party
has millions upon millions of party members, and due to their different levels of
understanding and degrees of comprehension and their different positions, it is
not surprising and it is permissible for some comrades at times not to understand
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certain general and specific policies of the central authorities or to misunder-
~ stand them. We stress the maintenance of unanimity precisely because certa3n ideas
objectively exist that are not in unanimity with Che central authorities, and
through conscientious and careful work we must seek a common understanding. What
we must criticize are those people who do not conscientously study in order to com-
prehend the party's directives and documents, but rather fjn.d fault as the~ please
and even doubt or oppose them; this definitely does not mean that we do not allow
party members to express their ideas and views at party conferences in the spirit of
seeking truth from facts, including different opinions and suggestions. Our party's
organizational principle is to allow party members to express different opinions
within the party and to retain their own opinions. Of course, no matter what views
party members themselves have, they all must f irmly obey and carry out the party~s
decisions. This is absolutely necessary organizationally in order to insure the
party's centralized unification. Every comrade who sincerely maintains unaniinity
with the party will be honest and frank with the party, will hold nothing back from
the party, and will, through the organization, tell the party what he thinks, being
in a state of unanimity with the party Central Committee on wha.t he personally
thinks, and of course this is good; if there are things about which he is not in a
state of unanimity with the party, then he should conscientiously make comparisons
and check on himself, and in study and practice, as quickly as possible unify his
ideas with the spirit of the documents of the central authorities. This is the
correct attitude of responsibility to the party. To express unanimity on the sur-
face but in one's mind not to understand, to speak insincerely and to cover up
one'strue thoughts, is of no help in straightening out one's own understanding, is
of no help in unders*.anding the situation of the party organization and is of no
benefit to the unification of the party's thinking.
We stress the unification of thinking and the maintenance of unanimity with the
central authorities in order to eliminate the disruption caused by all kinds of
mistaken ideas and to use correct ideas in guiding Che practice of the four moc~erni-
zations, to guide all items of work and unify the actions of the entire party. If
we are satisf ied with superficial verbal unanimity and with merely repeating what
the documents and directives of the central authorities say, only going through the
motions of making known our position, then we can only make some superf icial ob-
servations and cannot conscientiously link up with the reality of our unit and
carry out work in a down-to-earth fashion, so as to implement the directives of
the central authorities in every unit and every item of work. This kind of ph~nome-
non often appears: i3nanimity is talked about but not maintained; at meetings,
verbally, and on paper we find the words "maintain unity," but in reality people go
their own way. This kind of ideological workstyle, in which one's deeds do not
match one's words and in which one thinks one way and acts another, is an indication
that the pernicious influence of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" has not been
eliminated and it is also an indication that the party spirit is not pure. It
only corrupts the party's workstyle in its internal and external relations, damages
the party's image in the eyes of the masses, adversely affects the masses' faith in
the party's cause, and hinders the thorough implementation of the party's line and
its general and specific policies, and it should be resolutely corrected.
With regard to the leaders, when organizing the study of the central authorities'
documents, they should be adept in quiding everybody Co say what is on their minds,
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and, through active propaganda, guidance and painstaking ideological work, gradually
unify the understanding that is not in unanimity with the party so that it becomes
unified with the spirit of the central authorities' documents. They cannot simplis-
tically demand that their subordinates make lmown their position and be content with
verbal expression s of unanimity; even less can they slap labels on someone when they
hear about some small difference in understanding. Many facts show clearly that
without the normal practice of democracy in the party there can be no true central-
ized unif icat ion .
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PARTY AND STATE
UNHEALTHY TENDENCIES IN PARTY MUST BE STAMPED OUT
Bei~ing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Mar 81 p 3
[Article by Li Jingrong [2621 2529 2837]: "The Correct Party Workstyle, and
Stability and Unity"]
[TextJ "The question of a political party's workstyle is a question of the party's
very existence." This statement by Comrade Chen Yun brought before t he entire
- party in a serious fashion the extreme importance of a correct party workstyle,
- and further conveyed the party Central Cammittee's unswerving determination to
have a good party workstyle. This is a powerful impetus for every one of us Com-
munist Party members, especially the party's leading cadres, conscientiously and
thoroughly to implement the "guiding principles."
However, some comrades worry that laying stress on correcting unhealthy tendencies
wi11 hinder stability and unity. Is this idea correct? We should make an analysis.
The practice of a good party workstyle is fundamentally consistent with the streng-
thening of stability and unity. Stability and unity are not something we can do
without, or something that will automatically be achieved; to achieve them requires
a lot of work, and an important part of this is to overcome all negat ive factors
that hinder such stability and unity. The unhealthy tendencies of all kinds tha.t
exist within the party and the socie*_y constitute one of these negat ive factors
that wreck stability and unity. At present, the broad masses, on the one hand, see
that since the smashing of the "gang of four," many f ine traditions of our party
are being restored; on the othPr hand, they also see that not a few unhealthy
tendencies still exist within the party, with the result that there are many com-
ments and opinions on the sub3ect. In these conditions, to f irmly correct the un-
healthy tendencies is obviously a necessary measure for promoting stability and
unity. Is it better to protect and preserve the unhealthy parts of the party's
workstyle? Or is it better to firmly point them out and correct them? The facts
prove that it is better to firmly correct them. Our partq is one that is respon~
sible to the people, a serious party. We have always advocated the launching of
criticism and self-criticism in order to overcome our own shortcoming s and mis-
takes. This is advantageous for cementing the relationship between the party and
the masses, for raising the party's prestige in the eyes of the people, and in the
final analysis for stability and unity.
Some comrades say that, since everybody has a few unhealthy tendenc~.es which they
cannot get rid of, how can stability not be affected? First of all, these comrades
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exagge~ate_ the unhealthy tendencies. The great ma3ority of the members and cadres
of our party are good or relatively good. Only a few of them have unhealthy ten-
dencies; the majority of them resist unhealthy tendencies, or have a few unhealthy
tendencies that are not difficult to correct. Therefore, for the great number of
members and cadres of our party, the main thing is to conscientiously study the
"guiding principles," integrating them with realit}~, improving our understanding of
them, and consciously and thoroughly implementing them, and not to require that
everybody pass a test on them. With regard to a tiny number of comrades whose un-
healthy tendencies are serious and who have committed mistakes, we must carry out
serious criticism and treatment. But we also must deal with them in a gentle and
mild way, upholding the policy of "curing the sickness to save the patient," and
permit and welcome the correction of their mistakes and not harshly attack them. In
short, the correction of unhealthy tendencies must be carried out in accordance with
the principle of criticism and self-criticism within the party and with the correct
policy. In this way, confusion will not be created and stability and unity wi11 not
be hindered .
"The spearhead of correcting unhealthy tendencies is directed against the older
_ cadres!" Not so. Older cadres have unhealthy tendencies, and so do middle-aged and
younger cadres and the masses. They must all be corrected. The older cadres shoulder
the burden of leading the masses of people in the construction of the four moderni-
zations. They have received much education from the party, and they should take the
lead in implementing the "guiding principles," take the lead in correcting unhealthy
tendencies. In fact, the majority of our older cadres are maintaining the party's
glorious traditions and support the opposition to unhealthy tendencies. But there
are a sma11 number of older cadres who have forgotten the party's glorious tradi-
tions and who use the power of office granted to them by the party and people to
seek personal gain and indulge in unhealthy tendencies. Naturally these comrades
should be criticized, helped, and educated. The broad masses are reasonable. If
these comrades will humbly solicit the opireions of the masses and sincerely correct
their unhealthy tendencies, they will obtain the masses' support and the unity be-
tween top and bottom will be strengthened.
By speaking in this manner, will the opposition to unhealthy tendencies not hinder
stability and unity? This is not the case. We must also see that in society there
are still a very few people who sow discord to serve private ends, including some
remnants of the "gang of four" factionalist setup. They are the ones who oppose
the four basic principles. They frequently take the opportunity presented by the
existence of healthy and unhealthy tendencies to stir up dissatisfaction with the
party and the older cadres, equating the older cadres with those who have become
privileged, and even saying that they are "feudalist roaders," a"privileged stratum,"
etc, deliberately exaggerating in order to create a situation, in a vain attempt to
create disorder, wreck the party's leadership and seize its authority. We must warn
these people who harbor ulterior motives that we will in good time lay bare and
criticize all their reactionary viewpoints, strengthen the legal system, and let
the broad masses clearly see their features. In this way, we will be able, in con-
ditions of stability and unity, through thorough and painstakingly ideological and
political work and through conscientious criticism and self-criticism, to gradually
overcome the unhealthy tendencies within our party and spur the people of the entire .
country to build an even better social atmosphere and a highly spiritual socialist
civilization.
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PARTY AND STATE
_ SHENYANG UNITS AOLD CONF'ERENCE ON FOUR BASIC PRINCIPLES
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 12 Mar 81 p 1
[Article by Gong Ganyang [7895 3058 2799]: "Boldly Carry Out Education in the Four
Basic Principles"]
[Text] In the last third of February, at a political work conference held by the
Shenyang units, the comrades attending the conference, after thorough discussion,
proposed that, in accordance with a Marxist stand, bold and active propaganda and
education in the four basic principles be carried out in order to correctly under-
stand these prfnciples and to eliminate the disruption caused by the "left" and the
right.
The conference synthesized the conditions on which it was briefed by representatives
of eight units and summed up the experiences and lessons gained in the previous
phase. Everybody expressed the view that the situation in the units in which educa-
tion i.s being launched in the four basic pr3nciples and in. which the four basic
principles are being upheld is very good. Aowever, some units have not been suf-
ficiently bold in this respect and some have laeked persuasive power. To thorough-
ly carry out propaganda and education in the four basic principles, they must
eradicate the influence of the "left" and right mistaken ideologies: For example,
when the subject of adhering to the socialist path is raised, same comrades think
this means that the more the system of public ownership o~ the means of production
is put into effect, the better; the more equal the distribution, the better; and
there are also some comrades whose understanding of the superiority of socialism is
inadequate.
When the sub~ect of proletarian dictatorship is raised, some comrades frequently
see too many subjects for dictatorship, and some people relaz their vigilance with
regard to class struggle. When the sub~ ect of upholding Marxism-Leninism-Mao
Zedong Thought is raised, some comrades fa11 back into the habit of the two "what-
evers," and there are also some who are slack in studying the fundamental theories
of Marxism. When the sub~ect of upholding the party's leadership is raised, some
comrades always think of undertaking the whole thing and that what they themselves
say is what counts; while there are some comrades whose concept of the party is
dim, even to the extent of doubt#.ng the party's correct leaderstiip. We cannot turn
a blind eye ta, or treat lightly, the problem of these obstacles to the educati~n
in the four basic principles.
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Taking into account the reality of the units, everybody made concrete analyses of
these problems. Dai Xuejiang [2071 1331 3068], director of the political depart-
ment of a certain army, said that the confusion created by the distortion and falsi-
fication af the four basic principles by Lin Biao and the "gang of four" has not
yet been thoroughly cleared up. The minds of some of our comrades to this day are
- still he.mmed in by some "left" restrictions. Added to this are their inadequate
study and their failure to understand the situation, so that they lack the correct
understanding of the four basic principles and thus often regard "leftist" things
as co~rect and regard correct things as rightist. Wang Zhaoying [3769 0340 5391],
acting chief of the propaganda office of a certain army, pointed out: Another jm-
portant reason for this is that their minds lack the dialectical method and so they
take a one-sided approach to problems. For example, when the sham socialism of
Lin Biao and the "gang of four" is criticized and certain faults in our work are
corrected, the faith of some comrades in scientific socialism is shaken. When
feudalism is criticized and a display of socialist democracy is advocated, some
people ignore centralization and discipline and are influenced by ultrademocracy
and bourgeois liberalism. When the idea that the "spirit is omnipotent" is criti-
cized, some people ignore the role of the revolutionary spirit and weaken and slack
off in their political and ideological work. Everybody at the conference held
that matters of both "left" and right depart from the four basic principles and
that we must handle affairs according to the dialectical method and cannot again
indulge in metaphysics. Only by straightening out the ideological line and er~dicat-
ing the disruption caused by the "left" and the right can we correctly understand the
four basic principles and boldly carry out propaganda and education in them.
Liao Hansheng [5220 3352 3932], first poli~ical commissar of the Shenyand units, in
ihe final speech at the conference, pointed out: The task of top priority in cur-
rent political work is to concentrate our efforts and expend our energy on the four
basic principles, guitlirig the great number of cadres and fighters to correctly
undersCand and uphold the four basic principles. Therefore, this conference de-
cided to begin now to undertake well three items of work. The f irst item is to
launch throughout the units a reeducation program in the four basic principles, and,
closely adhering to the reality of the situating, to eliminate the influence of the
"left" and right mistaken ideologies. The second is to stress good rational train-
ing for cadres, particularly those at the regimental level and above, conscientious-
ly organizing the study of the fundamental theories of Marxism, measuring oneself in ~
respect of the four basic principles, and summing up experiences and lessons. The
third is to closely integrate the education in the four basic principles with the
education in the party's general and specific policies. A11 units that have
grasped weakly or studied superficially the general and specific policies since
the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee must make up the lessons in good
fashion and truly gain a clear idea of what socialism is and what capitalism is, and
emphasize improving their understanding of the present agricultural economic policy
_ and the national economic readjustment policy.
9727
CSO: 4005/2068 II`1D
56
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040044-5