JPRS ID: 9933 JAPAN REPORT
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FOR OFFI('IA1, IISF. ONI,Y
JPRS L/9933
25 August 1981
Ja an Re ort
p p
cFOUO 5ois > >
Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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.7rR;; i~/9~3:3
25 August 1981
JAPAN REPORT
(FOUO 50/81)
CONTENTS
ECONOMIC
FY-80 Business Performance of Major Industries Analyzed
(NIHON KEIZAI SHIl~UN, 14, 15, 16 Jul 81) 1
SCIENCE AND TECHNOI~OGY
FY ~1 Projected Sales of Computer Industr~,~
' (NIKKAN KOGYO SHIl~IDIJN, 16 May 81) 11
MITI Guidelines, Industry Biotechnological Activities Zisted
(Vaxious sources, various dates) 13
Government Policy .
Toyobo Co Ztd
Takeda Chemical Industries
Asahi Chemical Industry
~ Toyota-Ford Tie-Up Talks Unfruitful
(TOYO KEIZAI, 18 Jul 81) 17
Business in Seamless Steel Pipe for Drilling Booming
(TOYO KEIZAI, 18 Jul 81) 20
Government-Industry 1}iscord Seen in Japan-Saudi Project
(TOYO KEIZAI, 18 Jul 81) 23
- a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
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ECONOMIC
FY-80 BUSINESS PERFORMANCE OF MAJOR INDUSTRIES ANALYZED
Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 14, 15, 16 Jul 81
[14 Jul 81 p 15]
[TextJ Expansion of Direct Financing for Plant and Equipment Investment; Marked
- Advance in Efficient Management; Internal Reserves Increase to 1.5 Times the
Amount of the Previous Year; Switch to Active Posture of Expanding Personnel
If we analyze the FY-80 financial reports of companies listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange, it is clear that Japanese companies are greatly expanding their plant
and equipment investment and they have taken a new direction in using their own
funds for this investment. 'They are not reverting to operations based on outside
borrowing. Their operations are characterized by balance, and the overall self-
financing rate is increased by obtaining a high level of profit and conducting
vigorous direct financing by means such as capital increases. Based on the con-
fidence attained in successfully weathering the sgcond oil shock, they have
increased personnel for the f irst time in 6 ycars. A switch from "defensive" to
- "offensive" management can be seen in the attempt to come out ahead in interna-
tional competition.
The plant and equipment investment of 1,550 listed companies (excluding financial
~ instl.tutions and insurance and securities companies) in FY-80 was 9,001,600,000,000
yen, a 26-percent increase over 1979 and the largest growth since the first oil
shock. In addition to increased investment for energy and labor conservation in
order to rationalize industry, there has been an increase in forward-looking
plant and equipment investment connected with a surge of technological innovation.
The overall number of employee~ in industry has continued to decrease through
reduced operations from a peak of 4.33 million in 1974 to a low of 3.87 million
in 1979. In 1980, the number increased for the first time in 6 years to 3.907
million persons. Industrial operations are actively being expanded.
The recovery of manufacturing industries is startling. Plant and equipment invest-
- ment began to grow in 1979, and the rate of increase has expanded from 20 percent
in 1979 to 25 percent, going f rom 4.3 trillion yen in ].979 to a new peak of 4.5
trillion yen. Another important development in the manufacturing industries was
the increase in the number of personnel for the first time in 7 years. Also,
these industries, which had been concentrating on repayment of long-term loans
since 1977, have begun to borrow more. .
1
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Long-term borrowing for all industries r~ached a low point in FY-78 and then began
to grow. By FY-80, it had incre~sed 8.9 percent. This is because industries with
surplus f unds moved from a phase of rushing to repay loans to a more efficient
use of funds, and depressed industries increased their borrowing.
This renewed increase in personnel, plant, and �unds came about because these
companies were able to come through two oil shocks successfully and reach the
highest profit levels in history.
The recurring profit rate of total liabilities and net worth for all industry
grew to 4.7 percent, more than *_he previous peak ~f 4.6 percent (in FY-73) along
with improvements in the rate of profit and asset efficiency.
Although the unpaid balance of borrowing has risen, financial conditions continue
to improve. The :.iversification of financial procurement accompanying the inter-
nationalization of Japanese industry and the issue of stock at current prices for
capital increase brought tha amount obtained through direct financing to 1.71
trillion yen, 1.6 times the amount of the previous year. Internal reserves have
grown 1.5 times. The amount of self-financing for all industry rose to 9.59
trillion yen, far exceeding plant and equipment investment. The rate of self-
financing grew from 102.1 percen~ (in 1979) to 106.5 percent. The net worth ratio
for all industry rose from 18.4 percent in 1979 to 19.6 percent, and in manufac-
turing industries, from 23.1 percent to 24.6 percent.
The electrical industry is one of the representative industries experiencing this
favorable cycle. Active plant and equipment investment is continuing mainly in
electronics areas such as semiconductors and VTR. Executive Managing Director
Miyauchi of Hitachi Ltd says the company has adopted a policy of "investing with-
out reserve in growth areas, making a plant and equipment investment of 75.9
billion yen. Internal reserves plus depreciation and profit for FY-80 easily
exceeded this at 100 billion yen. Looking at th~ entire electrical industry, we
see that total plant and equipment and investments and loans rose 32 percent, to
- 1.08 trillion yen, breaking the 1-trillion-yen barrier. Funds raised through
capital increases and higher income increased by 2.2 times and the amount of self-
financing rose to 1.4 trillion yen.
- The automobile industry rapidly increased its plant and equipment investment in
order to meet the challenge of GM's "world car" and reached a financial turning
point. It utilized high profits and liquid assets and increased the emphasis on
direct f inancing to get through the crisis. The Nissan Motor Company liquidated
approximately 100 billion yen worth of short-term securities and CD's (certificates
of deposit) and avoided borrowin~ in raising money for a 150-billion-yen investment.
All automobile companies have expanded direct financing in Japan and abroad this
year by increasing capital and issuing convertible debentures. They are attempting
to strengthen their international competitiveness by balanced and vigorous manage-
ment, not by rushing to rely on borrowing.
- On the other hand, the materials industries which are weaker in international com-
petitiveness such as chemicals and paper pulp have again been forced to increase
borrowing. They have begun to take the same path as they did during the recession
following the first oil shock, when income fell and inventory rose due to poor
sales.
2
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- The competitiveness of the chemical industry has suffered due to the rising price
of naphtha. The obsolescence of petrochemical plants has almost reached the
limit. "We have no other choice." (Mitsubishi Chemical Industries) These
industries cannot move resolutely in investment and fund procurement because of
their slow recovery in performance. Therefore, they are being left out in the
current trend of balancing and expanding operations.
_ _ _ ~ 1) ~3~~0~#~'~'#~
( 2 ) ea~~tra~ ( 3 )~~~ex ( 4 )
c~> (6)c�hR;, (7~
(9)=t~c(~k~r~~r~ ~~~55~.~ G~~r~G~~S~r~lr~r~~~~~}~~
~i d'~ ( 86) 143.� t48.6 ~ 218.335 2t5.51d 1.23 �1.25 23.06 24.73
(i9) ~it 4~ ( B1; t04.5 183.2 176.937 itt.604 1.76 1.87 41.62 46.65
~i4)~!C .'e ~ 32) t~C.3 94.~ 178.31t ~5C.775 1.Y0 i.�3 57.88 53.82
(~o)~! ii27' 115.8 I~d.B 488.595 456.459 1.05 1.92 47.71 d6.31
.~c ( 34~ t?~.C ;86.? 90.2d5 7~.d49 2.~~ ~.81 ?8.7q ~?.22
(~J) ~ t 13i ~~4.6 i22.3 ~~4.367 t~6�B37 J.d2 ~~.91 16.98 ' 4~.90
(~3~ y~( 52) 108.6 132.2 2St,681 150.383 2.2~ 2.a2 at.73 ~2.61
f~u` i~ 9q c 60) '.65.6 t56.9 593.817 584.t53 i.79 1.i0 48.95 50.63
UsJ 81? 125.1 t35.7 tA9.08? ~58,802 t.o7 1.55 48.31 47.06
- ~ 61! ii59) 181.8 156.5 257.29Q 116.~47 2.51 2.11 5i.'S~ � 5d.34,
~ai1 t~ c155) 162.2 '72.5 829.71d 569.094 1.11 1.84 20.06 21.7b-
(~y,~~ ':0) 75.2 ItS.i 136.dC0 71.580 i.95 , d.31 12.20 45.id
!,tr, ~ 3h ~t ( 52) tt7.? 135.1 737.t14 505~852 i.Ct 1.17 + 18.20 ~ 20:0't
(3e~ ~it i ~2) 216.5 145.4 101.541 ;3.210 2.29 2.40 23�95 29.38
(3~)'~ 8 ftC1071) 139.8 14T.7 4.499.813 3.585.2T2 1.64 1.77 38.83 38.05
(~zlSi ~ i127) ?63.4 157.0 17d~457 113.�67 2.:5 2.52 25.15 25.85
i~ ~6 2G) 8~.7 BC.d 63~563 55,640 5.1d S.E~t3 61.51 62.~J8
/j,~~.t~i ~ i10T, 244.5 313.1 115,518 �4,G65 0.60 0.65 C5.23 4d.04
($51�oa�, Y~ 21i 56.5 54.4 Z7b.871 294~915 3.51 3.96 65.60 65.26
~ i 27) ~8.2 i11.3 205,506 t37.O5t 2.14 2.55 53.09 Sd.45
�y, j7. ( 9; St.S 25.5 2~177~011 2.i92,��28 0.82 ~~.81 69.2? 71.56
~~j~#~~SRt C479) 73.5 59.4'4.501,775 3.819.228 0.9T 1.04 48.53 4B.M
3~ atC1550) 106.5 102.1 9.001.588 7.404.500 1.2T 1.38 42.42 43.03
(y~~ ~ -v'$i~9tt:~4e�!Z^~II[9l'!~$ffirt~llf~'9Q ~ 'M~F~~:~ � 'fA~+~AfJ~7i~~~~'7fC3fiE
!Qt'_^~1~>~~G~o pc~A[9'~:~. %1y~Ri`. 'J~tf~'6 ' ~A)+ t j7F-~~~C~~~B1:~ff,-'y3~E~7~:"~~~~
?lt~:~~791. ?t~89~, ~eP~~ I ~~~d~s!! l, , !~J~~43~~?li,~. (~l'~l~~t#+ $~t~f~:~
~r'r7G~.~c~~o d~k~iiSt~~(4~~}!~~~Vt~ : !l~4t~Xfi: + ~~tlt � ~'E~oBt+$~3t~W;~1
c~=~~~~dcf~fx~t~~~0~atto ~7c~ib ; ~I~ ~ i~~~f~'3i) .
1. Management Targets of Major 16. FY-79
- Industries 17. Food
2. Self-Financing Rate 18. Textiles
3. Plant and Equipment Investment 19. Paper, Pulp
4. Available Liquidity Rate 20. Chemicals
5. Borrowing Dependence Rate 21. Pharmaceuticals
6. 10,000 yen 22. Petroleum
7. Monthly 23. Glass, Earth, Stone [Building
8. Number of Companies Materials]
9. FY-80 24. Steel
10. FY-79 25. Nonferrous Metals
- 11. FY-80 26. ,tachinery
12. FY-79 27. Electrical Equipment
13. FY-80 28. Shipbuilding
' 14. FY-79 29. Automobiles
15. FY-80 30. Precision Instruments
[Key continued on following page]
3
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31. Manufacturing Industries Total 36. Marine Transport
32. Construction 37. Electrical Power
33. Real Estate 38. Non-manufacturing Industries
34 ~ Co~nerce Total
35. Electric Railroads 39. Total of All Industries
40. Note: The self-financing rate is the amount of self-financing divided by the
amount of plant and equipment investment. The self-financing amount is the
sum c~f capital increase, depreciation, internal reserves, and increase in
special reserves. The amount of plant and equipment investment is the sum of
the increase or decrease in tangible fixed assets. The liquidity rate is
determined by the formula:
(cash and deposits + securities included in liquid assets) + monthly sales
and operating income
~ The rate of dependence on borrowings is determfned by the formula:
(liabilities with interest + endor~ed and transferr~ed notes receivable) +
(total of liabilities and capital + discount on notes receivable and endorsed
and transferred notes receivable)
[15 Ju1 81 p 13] '
[Text] U.S.-Japan Earning Power Gap Narrowing; Japan Moves Ahead in Electrical
Equipment, Etc; Investment for Rationalization and Increased Production Takes
Effect
The gap between the United States and Japan in both earning power (cash flow) and
financial position (stock) has rapidly begun to shrink. The deterioration of
industrial resilience due to high inflation has caused a drop in the earning power
of American industry. In contrast, the competitiveness of Japanese industry,
which cut back operations and concentrated on plant and equipment investment for
rationalization, has increased markedly. In steel, automobiles, a~nd electrical
equipment, Japanese industry has already moved ahead of the United States. U.S.
industry has begun expanding plant and equipment investment to regain its lead,
but for the time being, this effort is leading to deterioration of its financial
- position.
Following the first oil shock, the gap in earning power between U.S. and Japanese
industry actually widened. In 1975, the recurring profit rate on applied total
liabilities and net worth in the United States was 13.2 percent. In Japan it was
only one-third that figure, 4.3 percent. Subsequently, however, the earning power
of Japanese industry slowly began to recover and the same recurring profit rate
in FY-80, following the second oil shock, was 6.7 percent, close to the previous
peak of 6.8 percent (1973). The rate for American industry dropped to 13.0 per-
cent from the 14.8 percent of the previous year, so the pattern was opposite that
following the first oil shock.
4
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The shift in earning power was particularly dramatic in the auto industry. Until
1978 the U.S. auto industry overwhelmed the Japanese in earning power. However,
in 1979, the recurring profit rate on applied total liabilities and net worth for
Japan was 8.5 percent, which was in line with the U.S. rate. As the price of oil
shot up, the fuel efficiency of Japanese cars became attractive. In 1980, the
U.S. auto industry went into the red, and the superiority of the Japanese industry
was clearly established. The rapidly advancing electrical industry also moved
ahead of the U.S. industry in earning power in 1979 and 1980. In machinery and
chemicals, U.S. industry has boasted high earning power, but due to developments
in mechatronics technology and other fields, the gap is narrowing.
In materials industries such as fibers, paper and pulp, and chemicals, there is
no change in the overwhelming superiority of the United States. But even in
materials, Japan moved ahead in 1979 to show its strength in international cr,mpeti-
tiveness.
What is behind this narrowing of the gap? Before the first cil shock, Japanese
industry, especially the materials industries, invested heavily in plant and
equipment. This resulted in increased ~epreciatiox~ and interest burden and slowed
down earnings. However, as this burden lightened, plant and equipment investment
for rationalization and increased production moved ahead, especially in manufac-
turing industries such as the automobile industry, and this caused a steady improve-
ment in earning power. In U.S. indust_ry, on the other hand, management emphasized
quick profits and mad~ little plant and equipr~ent investment in the late 19b0's
and early 1970's. In the late 1970's, obsolescence hit U.S. plant and equipment,
causing a drop in labor and equipment efficiency and a weakening in international
competitiveness.
In order to overcome this, U.S. industry has recently begun giving more attention
to plant and equipment investment. Beginning in 1977, U.S. investment in plant
and equipment has increased and companies such as GM ha~re launched large-scale
investment programs to regain lost ground. However, because of the drop in U.S.
earning power, dependence on borrowing has increased. As a result, the owned
capital rate, an indicator of financial position, has been dropping since 1976.
In 1979 it was 45.4 percent. This is still far ahead of the rate in Japanese
industry (19.6 percPnt) but the gap is narrowing.
Of course, there is no telling whether the gap between Japan and the United States
will continue to shrink in the years to come. Some see the present situation as
resulting from the plant and equipment investment cycle. As U.S. investment
increases and begins to take effect, the gap may widen again, putting the U.S.
in a more favorable position. In view of this situation, the Japanese auta indus-
try is clearly carrying out a policy of vigorous investment to compete w~th GM.
It will be very important for Japanese industry to conduct vigorous, buld, and
effective investment in research and development as well as plant and equipment
in order to move ahead of the United States.
~
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Note: The data used in the analysis below was obtained from 1,550 companies in
NEEDS (the Nippon Keizai Shimbunsha Comprehensive Data System) and 400 companies
in th~ Standard and Poors Index. The data by industry for the United States wea
taken from 1,516 cowpanies listed in Standard and Poors.
(1) ~~o~~~~t~1550#fo~~4~tf~~f 55~1~~%
- ~;.~t~
(3) t12) :2:~
f ~2~ ~~if~i38.8 (l~) ~~`54'~~~ �;s:~qi,4
I R~ p ,~.9 -
01.5~0 '81.3�0
I (1 )`to 2
~ .+~x~~~.~
' S) ~-;,~..=i~~~s.o ' xe.~ '
~ ~l~Y~i~ ~C%1~~.Y
~6~ 26.3` i5.4
~s.:�~i~~ a~'sf#?~~i~0.d8 :..,.,d.
38.1 I~ . _~T~Y~.9
~ (9 ~t~f~~~11.2 18.1, rk~!'~r3.3
- I (IQ)wili[~Y0.03 ;~;~~~89.5
~24~r3~~t~~ 0.8
25)~#
OO~to~S~f~~f~~E 55~~~x
~27~ ~!.~ffit .3
(Z�,~ ~~i~~~n.o (34) ~~,a~~
^,.D�i A'# +~~t3 4.3 ~
40.3��, 54.6~, 12�~
28 ~~~k~.1.c k~Q~ y ~~te~~t
2 ~~'E1.3 s,K. '6 17.1
(3~~ 21.9~y~ ;c~+e10.
~t;a~~t:~ 43 1t~~a.e
18.8
i ~44,~+~~~~
_ 59.1 45,~ ~ 35~5
( 3 i.3
;n~3.6 � 6~~t1~5.1~
1. Balance Sheet for 1,550 Listed 13. Purchasing Debt 22.0 '
Companies (end of FY-80) 14. Short-term Borrowing 12.9
2. Current Assets 61.5 percent 15. Miscellaneous 19.2
3. Deposits 38.8 16. Debentures 6.1
4. Inventory 17.8 17. Fixed Liabilities 26.3
S. Other Current Assets 5.0 18. Long-term Borrowing 15.9
6. Fixed Assets 38.4 19. Miscellaneous 4.3
7. Tangible Fixed Assets 26.8 20. Total Capital 18.1
8. Intangible Fixed Assets 0.4 21. Capital 5.9
9. Investments, etc 11.2 22. Capital Reserves 3.3
10. Deferred Assets 0.03 23. Other Surplus 9.5
11. Liabilities 81.3 percent 24. Special Reserves 0.8
12. Current Liabilities 54.1
[Key cor_*_inued on following page]
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.25. Balance Sheet for Standard and 35. Current Liabilities 26.6
Poors Major 400 U.S. Companies 36. Pt~rchasing Debt 10.3
(end of FY-80) 37. Short-term Borrowing 4.3
26, Assets 40.3 percent 38. Miscellaneous 12.0
27. Deposits 22.0 39. Fixed Liabilities 27.9
28. Inventory 17.0 40. Long-term Barrowing 17.4
29. Miscellaneous 1.3 41. Miscellaneous 10.5
30. Fixed Assets 59.7 42. Capital 45.4
31. Tangible Fixed Assets 48.8 43. Capital 4.8
32. Investment 7.3 44. Other Surplus 35.5
- 33. Miscellaneous 3.6 45. Capital Reserves ~.1
34. Liabilities 54.6 percent
Comparison of U.S.-Japan Earning Power in Ma~or Industries
(Recurring Profit Rate on ~.pplied Total I:iabilities and Net Worth, expressed
as a percentage)
FY-72 FY-74 FY-76 FY-78 FY-80
Automobiles Japan 7.7 3.3 8.1 6.9 8.1
U.S. 16.7 6.0 15.2 14.5 5.6
Electrical Japan 8.9 7.0 7.2 7.1 9.2
Equipment U.S. 7.1 6.7 8.1 8.1 7.6
' Machinery Japan 5.7 7.4 5.0 4.2 7.3
U.S. 12.6 14.4 14.7 16.5 15.1
Steel Japan 6.6 8.5 5.2 6.2 8.4
U.S. 5.7 15.4 5.9 7.2 5.9
Chemicals Japan 5.7 9.0 5.2 5.0 6.5
� U.S. 10.2 15.8 13.6 12.0 10.4
(16 Jul 81 p 15]
[Text] Changing Structure of Plant and Equipment Investment; Shift to Manufac-
' turing Leadership; Support for Higher Added Value
The structure of plant and equipment investment by Japanese industry has changed
a great deal. Materials industries such as steel and chemicals which played a
major role in the late 1960's and early 1970's are receding, and manufacturing
industries such as electrical equipment and automobiles are rapidly increasing
their plant and equipment investment. This change supports the move toward
7
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higher added value in Japanese industry occasioned by the two oil shocks. The
industrial structure seems to be changing in a way appropriate to a national
economy ba~ed on a hig~ degree of processing and trade.
In the high growth period of the 1960's and early 1970's, the raw materials indus-
tries were highly motivated to invest. The plant and equipment investment of all
industry in 1976 was 5,143,700,000,000 yen. Of that, 3,045,800,000,000 was
inve~zted by production industries. Amcng the production industries, an over-
whelming 60 percent of investment was made by major materials industries (six
major industries: steel, chemicals, fiber, paper and pulp, petroleum and non-
ferrous metals) and 29 percent by manufacturing industries (six major industries:
electrical equipment, automobiles, machinery, precision equipment, shipbuilding,
and pharmaceuticals). The materials industries were the leaders in plant and
equipment investment.
This structure began to change markedly in the late 1970's. Under the influence
of the rapid planned increase in electric~.l power investment, there was a drop
in the relative weight of plant and equipment investment in the production indus-
tries. But even within the production industries, the investment motivation of
the materials industries hss fallen off rapidly in comparison to that of the manu-
facturing industries. In 1978 the share of the six ma~or materials industries in
total production industry investment fell belora 50 percent, to 48 percent. In
1979, when the economy began to recover, the plant and equipment investment of the
materials industries rose for a short time to 45 percent, but in 1980, affected
by the second oil shock, the six ma~or materials industries' investment was 1.71
trillion yen, compared to 4.5 trillion yen for all production industries, a drop
to 38 percent. `
In their place, the manufacturing indusltries began to invest actively. In 1971
the six ma~or manufacturing industries accounted for only 29 percent of the total
production industry investment. However, in the late 1970's there was steady
growth. In 1978, their sYiare grew to 44 percent, exceeding th~a 42 percent of the
six major materials industries. This trerid speeded up in 1980, rising to 48 per-
cent. The structure of Japanese industry had :.learly shifted in favor of the
processing and manufacturing industries.
The second oil shock speeded up the structural change in plant and equipment
investment. While the materials industries were trying to survive through opera-
tional cutbacks as raw material costs rose, the manufacturing industriea undertook
a policy of vigorous expansion under conditions of greater international competi-
tiveness. This difference appears clearly in the plant and equipment investment
of the two industrial sectors. A wave of technological innovations in fields
such as electronics and mechatronics is surging through the electrical equipment
and machinery industries. They are doing some streamlining, but at the same time
they are actively investing in plant and equipment. New products are appearing,
such as VTR and numerically controlled machine tools, and this leads to a more
favorable environment with greater earning power and further growth in plant and
equipment investment.
8
,
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For example, the recurring profit rate on applied total liabilities and net worth
. of the electrical equipment industry in 1980 was 9.2 percent, close to the peak
figure of 9.5 percent (1973). The machinery industry is also up to its previ.ous
maximum standard. The recurring profit rate on applied total lia~ilities and neC
worth for automobiles and pharmaceuticals exceeded the peak figure of the late
1960`s and early 1970�s.
_ On the other hand, the materials industries have all been slow in responding to
the oiI shock. Excluding steel, which has tightened up on production and is making
pro~ress in coping with market changes, industries such as chemicals, paper and
pulp, and fibers suffered from poor domestic demand caused by the deflationary
effect of the oil shock and their inc~me fell. Naturally, they have no motivation
for investment.
These materials industries have excess equipment and their international competi-
tiveness is weak because of the current raw materials situation. There are thasE
who believe that a recession will continue in the medium ~~ange in the chemical
and paper and pulp industries. All companies streamlined their operations after
the first oil shock, but they are now at the stage of streamlining operations on
an industrywide basis by making structural improvements.
` While Japanese industry has problems in such areas as paper and pulp and,c:zemicals,
overall it is moving toward more efficient management and greater international
competitiveness. Plant and equipment investment is becoming more active and a
financial structure is being built which is suited to a national economy based on
trade in processed goods c,rith high added value.
1. Comparison of Plant and Equipment Investment
in the Production Industries
2. Steel
3. Chemicals
~1~~~~~~~~ 4. Automobiles
i~~ -2 ~ y~ 5. Electrical Equipment
yo ~ ~ ~q;4 6. Miscellaneous
3E s.~a 7. E'Y-71
60 '~S
~ 9tAi t~�~ lh 8. ~-80
d~ ~5 z 9. Fibers
f: (1a
Z~ ~ ~ ~ 10. ~1on�errous Metals
= U
~ - ~6 ;o~~e s.~~ 11. Petroleum
~ ( , 12. Paper and Pulp
13. Shipbuilding
14. ~Iachinery
15. Pharmaceuticals
16. Precision Instruments
9
- FOR OFF[CIAL L�SE ONLY
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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