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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404050015-6 FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/9965 8 September 1981 Worldwide Re ort p _ LAW OF THE SEA (FOUO 3/S 1) FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440400050015-6 NOTE . JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- _ mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the - original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- - cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government. COPYRIG4iT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL,Y. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404050015-6 JPRS L/9965 8 September 1981 WORLDWIDE REPORT LAW OF THE SEA (FOUO 3/81) _ CONTENTS WORLDWIDE AFFAIRS Problems Expected Over U.S. Stand on Sea Treaty (~iE GUARDIAN, 8 Aug 81) 1 USSR, Japan Seaweed Harvest Controversy (Editorial; ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 7 Jul 81) 2 IATIN AMERI CA ~ INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS Briefs Venezuelans Attack Trinidad Boats 4 BRAZTL Daily Views Territorial Waters Question (Editorial; LATIN AMERICA DAILY P06T, 25 Aug 81) 5 CUBA Contamination of Sea Dis cussed at Havana Conference (Gregorio Hernandez; BOHEMIA, 3 Jul 81) 6 MEXICO Cub a Notes Criticism of U.S. for Shelving Sea Border Treaty (PRELA, 16 May 81) 7 - a - [III - WW ~ 136 FOUOj FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440400050015-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USSR Convention of Antarctic Marine Liv~ig Resources (V. N. Trofimov; SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAA~O, ~y ~1~��~~~~~~~~~~~.~~~~~~~~e~~~~.~~~~~~~~~~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~� ~ - b - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440400050015-6 WORLDWIDE AFFAIRS ~ PROBLEMS EXPECTED OVER U.S. STAND ON SEA TREATY ~ PM101424 London THE GUARDIAN in English 8 Aug 81 p 4 [Ian Gue~t dispatch: "U.S. `tay Rock the Sea Treaty Boat for Britain"] [TextJ Geneva--Developing countries are preparing to confront the Reagan administration , J about its nlans for a sweeping review of the Law of the Sea treaty, which has been laboriously negotiated for the past eight years. Delegates at the Law of the Sea conference, which resumed here this week, say the ~nericans will be told on ;1onday that their objections to the treaty--particularly its provisions on deep sea mining--are too extensive to be even negotiable. This raises the possibility of an ~merican walkout f.rom the conference. This could cause problems Eor U.S. allies, like Britain, which is satisfied with the presenC treaty. The dispute represents an abrupt change from the mood at the beginning of the conEerence last week. President Reagan announced in Karch that the treaty would be reviewed by his administration, but most delegations were prepared to allow the ~mericans time to voice their concerns. as one delegate here said: "~1ny treaty boycotted by the Americans doesn't stand much chance of success. In addition, delegations concede that the treaty stands little chance ot ratification by the conservative U.S. Congress. _ But the mood changed after Thursday, when Kr James ~lalone, the newly-appointed head of the U.S. delegation, detailed the U.S. ob~ections. He effectively repudiated the treaty's deep sea mining regime, which establishes an international "authority" to regulate the e:~ploitation of deep sea mineral nodules and in the view of the Americans hinaers free access to deep sea minerals. Another ~merican complaint is that production from the seabed would be limited, in deference to Canada, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Zaire, which iear their land-base mineral industries would be swamped if deep sea mining moved into full swing. The ?.mericans are also worried that the 36-member council, which wouid decide mining policy, could fall prey to an alliance of the Eastern bloc and Third World, and angry that the U.S. has not been guaranteed a sea~ on the council. This position has been denounced as a co�;plete "sell-out" to the U.S. mining lobby. Within the Third World's Croup of 77, only Chile, Indonesia, and Colombia are said to be sympathetic to the American line. The clash may cause problems for Britain, which has gained a good deal from the last few years of bargaining. Countries like Britain, which have wide continental shelves extending beyond the 200-mile exclusive economic zone, will be allowed to exploit them (in return for royalties), and Britain's claim to North Sea oil is strengthened by the treatv's confirmation of the 200-mile zones. The treaty poses another British worry--the growing tendency of Third World coastal countries to :.mpede fr.eedom of navigation. Under the treaty, even warships will be allowed free passagp chrough territorial seas, straits, and archipelagos. U.S. allies like Britain are ~rurried that if the treaty unravels a free-for-all will result--and that one of the firs[ casualties could be NATO's hopes of free-rang~ng fleets to counter the Russian navy. COPYRIGHT: Guardian Newspapers Limited, 8 Aug 81 CSO; 5200/2112 1 FOR OFFICIAI. USE UNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R044400050015-6 rvK urri~~wL u~r. VIVLY WORLDWIDE AFFAIRS USSR, JAPAN SEAWEED HARVEST CONTROVERSY OW081029 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 7 Jul 81 p 5 [ASAHI SHIMBUN 6 July editorial: "Seaweed Agreement"] [TextJ The waters around Kaigara Island, which is one of the Habomai Islands, are a treasure house of tangle, but Japanese fishermen cannot gather it because there is no agreement between Japan and the Soviet Union. , The Hokkaido Fisheries Association has now prepared the draft of an agreement thr~ugh independent negotiatians with the Soviet Government, but the draft contains an article which seems to recognize Soviet sovereignty over the island and the adjacent waters. The two controversial points are that Japanese tangle gatherers are to carry permits 3.ssued by the Soviet Government and submit to Soviet jurisdiction in Kaigara waters. Even though it is a non-governmental agreement, the Japanese Government, which claims jurisdiction over the four northern islands, cannot possibly approve of the agreement as it is. In the drafting of the temporary fishery agreement attendant on the establishment of 200-mile fishing zones by Japan and the Soviet Union, "territory" always thYew a heavy shadow over "fish." This time it is not a fishing area that is at stake, but the problem of territorial waters itself is involved. It is to be hoped that the Soviet Union will reconsider so that the Hokkaido fishermen will not be caught in the crossfir~~ in the territorial dispute. Small fishermen very much want to gather tangle around Kaigara Island. On the basis of the agreement signed in June 1963 between the Lainippon Fisheries Association and the National Fisheries Cocim~ittee attached to the Soviet National Econanic Council, tangle gathering continued until 1976. This agreement said nothing about jurisdiction, and fishermen had only to carry certif icates issued by the Dainippon Fisheries Association. In 1976, 330 f ishing bcats from the three f ishery cooperatives in Nemuro City gathered 960 tons of tangle worth 750 million yen, which was a great help to ~he fishermen, who were suffering from the recession in the fishing industry. 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 FOR nNFI('!A1, 115N: ONI.Y Tangle gathering around Kaigara L.sland, together with permission to visit graves on the northern islands, playQd a very important role in advancing friendship between Japan and the Soviet Union. After 1977, however, because of the problems connected with the 200-mile fishing zones and the 120 mile territorial waters, the S~viet Union decided against the extension of the agreement and submitted new conditions. This was most ~ regrettable. It is true that diplomatic relations between our two nations have been very cool since the Soviet advance into Afghanistan. It is precisely because of this situation that we should like to say the following to the Soviet Union: Even if Japanese fishermen agreed to - recognize permits and Soviet jurisdicticn, the voices calling fer the return of the northern island3 will not disappear. The Japanese people will take it as a naneuver to split public opinion in Japan, and their antt-Soviet feelings will becom~ stroi~ger. The late Tatsun~suice Takasaki, the chairman of the Dainippon Fisheries Association who . drafted the first non-gover rnnental agreement between Japan and the Soviet Union, remarked about these probtems: "Fundamentally, these problgns are humanitarian, before they are political or economic." ~ Cannot the problems of tangle gathering and visits to graves be handled as hunanitarian problems transcending politics? Doe~ the Soviet Union believe that its security will be threatened if the new agreement does not contain a reference to jurisdiction, which is connected with the territorial question, and if Japanese permits are used? The return of the northern islands is the desire of the Japanese people as a whole, not just the fishermen concerned. The Soviet Union may be able to force its agreanents on the fishermen, who are in a weak position. But, if it does so, it will make the antipathy of the Japanese people even stronger, and it stands to lose much more. ' � IJe had thought that Che Soviet Unfon would try to find a way of improving Japan-Soviet relations by making s ane concessions over the tangle-gathering and graves-visit proMlems. The Soviet Union would lose nothing, and it would be the best possible way of . making relations more friendly. The draft of the agreement was, in consequence, very disappointing. This will only make stronger the impression that Soviet foreign policy is unyielding and depends only on force. If the Soviet Union is really interested _ in h~nanitarianism and really wants to ease tension~ it should agree to the renegotiatio n ' of the draft of the agreement. COPYRI(~IT: Asahi Evening News 1981 CSO: 5200/2100 3 FUR OI~ F[CIAL USE ~NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404050015-6 FOR OFFI CIAL US E ONLY ~ INTER-AMERICAN AF'FAIRS , BRIEFS VENEZUELANS ATTACK TRINIDAD BOATS--Kingston, 1 May (PL)--The Venezuelan Government has admitted that its troops opened fire on 11 fishing boats from Trinidad-Tobago during a recent incident in the Gulf of Paria, which separates th e two countries. Ignacio Silva Sucre, Venezuelan ambassador in this capital, made the admission yesterday in Port-of-Spain, saying that the fishing boats were in Venezuelan waters. The diplomat's statements came amidst charges by Trinidadian fishermen that they were attacked by gunfire by the Venezuelan National Guard while operating in the Gulf of Paria with the proper permits. The crews of the 11 boats were taken to the town of Pedernales after being notified that they would have to pay $720 each to recover their fishing equipment and boats that had been conf iscated. In the past few weeks, Venezuela has increased actions against f ish{ng boats from Trinidad-Tobago despite an existing bilateral agreen~ent on the sub~ect. Over 30 Trinidadian boats have been detained in the month of April while f ishing in Venezuelan waters with official authorization. [ExcerptJ [PA020130 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1600 GMT 1 May 81] CSO: 3010/1308 4 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY - BRAZIL DAILY VIEWS TERRITORIAL WATERS QUESTION P~252349 Rio de Janeiro LATIN AMERICA DAILY POST in English 25 Aug 81 p 4 [Editorial: "200 Mile Limit"] [Text] Last week's incident when the U.S. shot down Libyan planes over the oceat~ points out the danger that exaggerated claims about territorial limits on the se~ can cause. A number of countries around the world in recent years--Brazil ir.cluded--have decreed a 200-mile limit on icean rights and this position has caused constant attrition between neighbors and fleets. Libya's 60 m~le c~aim in the Gulf of Sidra was the direct cause of the U.S. naval maiaeuvers that ied to the dawning of their aircraft in a dogfight. Latin American nations such as Peru and Ecuador have seized fishing vess~eis of many nations for violating the claimed 200 mile territorial limit. Needless energies and economic resources have been spent in trying to patrol the vesry large ocean expanses created by governments who have decreed rights over thee~e waters. The government of Brazil, it was revealed over the weekend, is planning~ to change its position on the 200 mile limit decreed during the Medici administration. _ Itamaraty, the Poreign Ministry, is to tssue a set of guidelines that won~ld give Brazil national sovereignty over a more manageable and internationally recognized 12 mile sea limit. At the same time, Brasilia would claim "econom~.c rigYnts" for the remaining 188 miles. This is a wise position. The Brazilian Navy cannot patrol Brazil~~, 200 mile limit effectively along its entire 4,500-mile-long coastline. The 200 mile decree always was mostly an empty gesture which could not be backed up by milit~xy resources. By recognizing reality and keeping in step with the ma~ority of the worldys mari, time nations regarding a coastal limit, Brazil is showing mr~tu~e judgment. Outside the 12 mile limit free navigation to all ships is to be percnitted. Meanwhile, the idea of reserving the 200 mile area for "economic purposes1� is correct, meaning Brazil's petroleum driTling program is ~iot a risk. There are f ishing rights and even mineral prospection possib~~ities that also are at stake. Brazil's justifiable concern with the utilization e�~d~ep sea resources within its basic sphere of geographic influences is theredy acknowledged and reaffirmed. CSO: 5200/2113 5 FOR OF!~ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CUBA CONT['zMINATION OF SEA DISCUSSED AT HAVANA CONFERENCE Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 3 Jul 81 p 55 [Article by Gregorio Hernandez] � [Text] The Solidarity Room of the Habana Libre Hotel was the scene of the very important Symposium on the Treatment of Contamination of the Sea, an event spon- sored by the Transport Research Institute of the Ministry of Transportation, to- gether with specialized UN agencies. The Institute had been assigned responsibility for practical handling of the main government problem entitled "Research Into Contamination of Havana Bay," a part of which is the Pro~ect Cuba 80/001, sponsored by the United Nations Developmen.t Program (UNDP), the United Nations Program for Environmental ?'rotection and the L'~iited Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which are being carried out by 14 institutions belonging to the central administration of the Cuban Government. This Havana Bay Pro~ect is a pilot project within the framework of the general project on the Greater Caribbean, sponsored by the United Nations. The basic topics taken up included questions having to do with principles for the identification and characterization of sources of ocean pollution; standards for the selection of treatment and the environmental impact of pollutants on marine - ecosystems; monitoring of the environmental impact of pollution of Havana Bay; and a report on the surveying and quantification of pollutants in the bay. Scientists also analyzed results obta~ned to date in polluting plants and the monitoring of Havana Bay ana the coastal zone, which made it possible to select and adapt research strategies that should be taken up in this second phase of research into the problem. In addition, Cuban specialists had the opportunity to exchange opinions and exper- iences with foreign experts on methods of evaluating the environmental impact and treatment systems in different industries for minimizing the pollutants incorpor- ated into the ecosystem of the capital's bay. Presiding over the closing session was Mario Fernandez, director of science and technology of the Ministry of Transportation, who summed up the event, Dario Mor- cirax, ITNESCO representative in Cuba, and other foreign guest officials and direc- tors of Cuban institutions participating in the pro~ect. COPYRIGHT: BOHEMIA 1981 6 11, 464 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY CSO: 5200/2104 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440400050015-6 - MEX~ICID CUBA NOTES CRITICISM OF U.S. FOR SHELVING SEA BORDER TREATY PA161836 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1425 GMT 16 May 81 [Text] Mexico City, 16 May (PL)--The shelving by the United States nf t:he ~atif~- t cation of the bilateral treaty on sea borders with Mexico, is an exampl~e u~~ ~rr~- gance and contempt foz bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, declar.~d A;lfonso Gomez Robledo, a Mexican specialist nn internatic~nal relations, whcn ar~ded ~~-a~: the U.S. at~titude is unfriendly and uncalled for because it could kead~ to~~rery s~erious international conflicts. Gomez Robledo s~id that in this case the policy used to establi~ah tl~e barders was based on agreements reached at the Law of the Sea (LOS) me:ting hQlc~ in 1958 in Geneva and accepted by the International Court tribunals. Aespite the~~a agree- ments and the fact that the Group of 77 has said it is ille:ga.l, t~i~ere fs a U.S. law which allows the United States to unilaterally explore the sea, b~attoms out- side its jurisdiction. This means that outside the argumer~ts m~ ~nternational laws on the sub~ect, all Mexico can do to get the U.S. Sena~e tn approve the sea borders treaty between the two Countries is to maintain its firm position. The treaty was signed by the two countries' govemment commissions in 1978 and it , immediately was considered acceptable by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee, which recommended its immediate approval. A few months after, the Mexican Senate approved the agreement, hut the U.S, Senate still has not. Mexican Senator Alfonso Zapata recently made a survey of the reasons for the U.S. Senate delaying its ratification. Zapata found the main reasons are the big deposits of strategic - minerals, among them oil, that U.S. pri~~ate and state enterprises have discovered in 25.0~0 square miles of the Gulf of Mexico, which would become excluaively Mexican property under the new treaty. During the conversations held in 1978 to - reach an agreement on the sea borders of the two countries, the U.S. delzgation exerted pressure on the Mexican delegation to give up a rich fishing zone near California in exchan~e for a 25,000 square km [as received] strip in the Gulf of Mexico, which turned out to have the largest mineral resources including poly- metallic modules of great strategic importance. CSO: 5200/2088 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 FOR OFFICIAT. USE ONLY USSR CONVENTION ON ANTARCTIC MARINE LIVING RESOURCES ERFLAINED Moscow SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO in Russian No 5, May 81 pp 98-103 [Article by V. N. Trofimov: "Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources"] (TextJ The international-legal regime of the Antarctic is currently defined mairly by the 1959 Agreement on the Antarctic. Conclusion of this agreement permitted "freezing" of territorial claims , guaranteed use of the Anta.rctic only for peaceful purposes, and created a regime of freedom in scientific research in this - region. It did not touch the question of using living and mineral resources of the indicated part of the ~lo~e [1,2J, however, the rapid development of science and technology, universal expansion of the scales of product.ion, exacerbation of ' the problem of supplying raw materials and food have now placed the examined question on the agenda. Mineral resources are hidden under a layer of ice many meters thick in the depths of the continental section, Antarctica, Until now there have not been sufficiently complete and reliable data on the presence and dimensions of these resources although they apparently are no less rich than on other continents. Exploration, and more so, their extraction, are associated with a number of serious problems however. The f irst of them is ecological instability and vulnerability of this region. The features of the natural processes here are such that even pollution which is permissible in other regions of the earth, will be maintained for many years or even decades in the Antarctic. Correspondingly, the damage that this pollution can inflict rises many times. The extremely complicated conditions for the existence of living organisms on the continent predetermine the extreme fragility of the ecological eq~iilibrium whose disruption may be irreparable. It seems in addition, that exploration and extraction of mineral resources in the Antarctic will be accompanied by very high material outlays, since it is necessary to adapt the equipment not only to complex climate conciitions, but also to high ecological requirements. Therefore, the states that ~udiciously assess this problem are supporting the conducting of a comprehensive evaluation of the ~ossible consequences of industrial activity on the continent in the first place. This would permit an accurate calculation of the requirements for the extraction methods 3nd based on the corresponding agreement, would prevent predatory use of the mineral resources. A special situation developed in respect to the living resources of the Antarctic, i.e., fish, crustaceans, plankton, etc. that live in the cold seas adjoining the Antarctic continent. Of, their use also creates certain difficulties of an 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404050015-6 eco.lo�; n~ilure, huwever they are comnarable to similar problems in other marine regions whose resources have been used by mankind for a long time. The accumulated experience, sometimes sad,. of regulating the reserves of living resources in other - seas and coastal regions does create a certain foundation. A number of states are already conducting industrial extracting of living resources of the Antarctic seas, but far from those major dimensions to significantly affect the ecological balance formed here. The use of Antarctic marine living resources has already been exposed to interna- tional-leg^1 regulation to a certain measure. TY~is affects whales in the first - place. Whaling has become traditional on the Antarctic coast. Currently whaling is regulated in the framework of the International Whaling Commission which was set up in accordance with the International Convention on Regulating the Whaling Industry in 1946, although a new convention draft has already been developed. There is also the 197~ Convention on Preserva~tion o~~the Antarctic Seals [3] that was developed in the framework of consultative meetings held according tothe1959 Agreement on the Antarctic [4]. Questions of preserving marine living resources have been examined in a number of consultative meetings. They resulted in the adoption of "General Rules of Behavior for Protection and Conservation of Living Resources in the Antarctic" (Recommendations I-VIII) [5] and "Approved Measures for Protection of the Fauna and Flora of the Antarctic" (Recommendations III-VIII, adopted at the third con- sultative meeting in Brussels in 1964). However, the establishment of 200-mile economic and fishing zones placed on the agenda the question of the need to create a more flexible and eff ective mechanism for regulating marine living resources. Under these conditions, the states which are undertaking considerable scientific and industrial activity in the Antarctic have a special responsibility for con- servation of marine livin~ resources of this re~ion. They were participants in the consultative meetings on the Agreement on the Antarctic within whose framework work was done to formulate a convention draft. The Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources was finally a~reed upon at a diplomatic conference held in Canberra from 7 to 20 May 1980~(6], A ch aracterisfiic feature of the conven- tion is that it contains statutes of a political nature. They confirm a number of the most important statutes of the Agreement on the Antarctic, and directly tie the convention to them. Article 3 of the convention states that the "Contracting Parties, regardless of whether they are participants of the Agreement on the Antarc- tic or not, agree that in the region of action of the Agreement on the Antarctic they will not perform any activity which contradicts the principles and purposes of this Agreement, and that in their relations with each other, they are bound by the commitments contained in articles 1 and 5 of the Agreement on the Antaretic." At the same time, approval was given to the agreement statutes that are interlinked and which state that the Antarctic is used only for peaceful purposes and that any nuclear explosions or disposal of radioactive materials in this region is forbidden. The convention also touched upon the most complex political and juridical question regarding ter.ritorial claims in the Antarctic. Resolution of this question in the - i.ndicated agreement is the basis for the present international-legal situation of this region. The essence of the problem is that such states as England, France, 9 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404050015-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Chili and Argentina unilaterally declared the spread of their sovereignity to different regions of the Antarctic. The territories they claimed differed in area, but in their configuration represented sectors that con- _ verge towards the South Pole. This form of territorial division was justified supposedly by the possiblity of spreading to the Antarctic continent the practice of delimiting the rights of states in the Arctic. The Soviet Union, being the legal successor of Russia who had historical credit in ' discovering ~the Antarctic, could make very signif icant territorial claims in the - Antarctic on this basis. Nevertheless, it did not take this path, considering that the resolution of the Antarctic question by negotiations of the interested parties on an international basis would correspond to the interests of peace in this region [7]. Wanting to guarantee a peaceful solution to the problem and to create the possibility of fruitful international cooperation in the Antarctic, the Soviet Union consciously abstained from proclaiming its rights in this region. As a result of diplomatic negotiations, the appropriate compromise was finally found which corresponded to the real situation, namely, the insufficient legal grounds for the claims made. Earlier, in working out the Agreement on the Antarctic, five ~lements of this compromise were fixed: 1) conclusion of the agreemznt does not mean abandonmen~t of the rights or claims of territorial sovereignity (subpoints "a" and "b" of point 1, article 4); 2) the agreement does not damage the position of any of the partxes in relation to acknowledgment or disavowal by it of the right for claims of any other state (subpoint "c", point 1, article 4); 3) no actions or activity constitute the groun~?s for announcement, support or negation of any claim to territorial sovereignity (subpoint "c", point l, article 4); 4) new claims are not made and the already existing claims are not expanded (point 2, article 4); 5) not.hing in th2 agreement infringes upon or touches upon the rights of any state in relation to the open sea to the south of the 60th parallel southern lati- tude (article 6). The convention develops the question of claims, including territorial.l Point 1 of article 4 in the convention states: "As for the region of action of the Agreement on the Antarctic, all the Contracting Parties, regardless of whether they are participants of the Agreement on the Antarctic or not, are bound in their relations caith each other by the statutes of articles 4 and 6 of the Agreement on the Antarc- tic." Moreover, the convention is not limited to this reference to the agreement, but again repeats some of the statutes fixed in it: in subpoints "a" and "d" of point 2, the sense of point 2 of article 4 from the agreement is reproduced. Subpoints "b" and "c" of point 2, section 4 of the convention cover new questions that are not treated in the Agreement on the Antarctic: "2. Nothing contained in this Convention, and no actions or types of acrivity that ~ccur while this Convention is in force: . ...b. must be interpreteci as the clenial of any of the Contracting Parties of any right or claim, or grounds for claim, or as their curtailment or damage to them ~The question of territorial claims was covered to a certain measure in the 1972 Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Seals, where article 1 states: "The a~tions of this Convention cover the seas to the south of 60� southern latitude, in relation to which the Contracting Parties confirm the statutes of article 4 of the Agreement on the Antarctic." 10 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 in relation to the jurisdiction of the coastal state according to intern~tional law in the limits of the area of application of this Convention; c. must not be interpreted as dama~ing the position of any of the Contracting Parties in relation to the acknowledgment or disavcwal by it of this right, clgim or grounds for the claim." It should be noted that, first of all, the statutes of the presented subpoints concern the entire region of action or the convention, and not only that part of it which coincides with the region of aetion of the agreement. Secondly, they are no longer concerned w'ith the claims for territorial sovereignity, but the claims for jurisdiction in the sea regions that adjoin the territory of the adjacent state. The meaning of these two points should be understood as follows. The region of action of the convention covers both the sea regions adjoining the territories where claims of sovereignity are not acknowledged, and the territories where claims of sovereighnity are not disputed (for example, Kerguelen and CrozetIslands which belong to France). Essentially, the attempts to impose jurisdiction in the sea regions adjoining the territories where sovereignity claims are not acknowledged can only be interpreted as attempts to support or expand the existing claim to these territories, i.e., as violations of the Agreement on the Antarctic. The practice of regulating these questions is pr.ecisely this. However, one should note that the agreement does not directly regulate the question of jurisdictior in relation to the sea spaces adjoining the dry land. It only uses the term "territorial sovereignity" and "any actions" are viewed in the sense of supporting the claims to sovereignity or rejection of it. Moreover, article 6 on the question of rights iri relation to the open sea suggests being guided by the rights acknowledg~ by international law. Consequently, the convention confirmsnot only the statutes on "freezing" claims in relation to territories, but also in relation to their adjacent sea spaces. This is a further develnpment of the corresponding statutes in the Agreement on the Antarctic. As for the territories whose sovereignity is not disputed by anyone (in particular, Kerguelen and Crozet),certain aspects of the regime for the waters adjacent to them have become the subject of difficult discussions. It is evident that the sea spaces of these islands comprise an important element in the total ecological balance in thP Antarctic region. To exclude them from the region of action of the conven- tion would mean to ignore this element. Understanding by the participants of the consultative meetings of .the special. responsibility in relation to pre::ection and preservation of the Antarctic environ- ment, as well as the need for th~~ most rapid international regulation of preserving its marine living resources allowed a certain compromise to be worked out in the framework of the convention. Confirmation in subpoints "b" arid "c" of point 2, - article 4 of both the rights of the coastal state to the waters adjoining its territory, and the rights of the states disputing ttiis eliminated certain obstacles to the creation of an effective mechanism for regulation in the framework of the convention. On the other hand, a statement of the chairman was included in the final act of the conference which was not objected to by any one of the parties. Its essence is that measures for conservation of marine living resources in waters adjacent to islands in the convention region where the existence of state sovereign- ity is acknowledged by all the contracting parties, are only used with the agreement of this state, and are not used in the case o� clear disagreement. ii FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Nevertheless, as follows from the convention text,these measures may be developed and recommended in ar,y case. The fact that the convention in over 20 years again con- firmed the statutes of the Agreement on the Antarctic regarding demilitarization and "freezing" of territorial claims has very great political importance. Its enforcement wi11 strengthen the basic grounds of the international-legal regime of the Antarctic, and will tie them to new types ~~f human activity in this region. It is also signif icant that the contracting parties directly acknowledge the special commitments and responsiblity of the states participating in the consul- tative meetings on the Agreement on the Antarctic concerning protection and con- servation of the environment in the sphere of activity of this agreemenr (point 1, article 5). This statute strengthens the pratice that has already been formed for many years of solving the Antarctic problems in the framework of consultative meetings, and creates the basis for further development of a regime for other types of activity. Representatives of Australia, England, Argentina, Belgium, the GDR, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the USSR, the United States, the FRG, France, Chili, the'UAR and Japan participated in the conference in Canberra. Representatives of the EEC, FAO, International Oceanographic Commission, International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, the International Whaling Commission, Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) and the Scientific Committee on Ocean . Research were invited as observers. The editorial committee of the conference, according to predeveloped procedural rules, only included representatives of Austra- lia, England� Argentina, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the USSR, the United States, France, Chil:L, the UAR and Japan. The convention made a demarcation between its oxiginal participants and parties that could be added to it in the future. According to article 26, states can become original participants who have participated in the conference and who sign the convention before 31 December 1980. According to article 28, the convention goes into force on the 30th day after the 8th ratification instrument has been stored, a document on the adoption or approval by the states mentioned in point 1, article 26, i.e., those participating in the conference and who have expressed the desire to become its participants before 31 December 1980. Any state or organization of regional economic integration set up by sovereign states can join the convention according to article 29. At least one of these skates must be a member of the Commission on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources that was set up in the framework of the convention, and the member states of the organization must completely or partially transfer to it competence in relation to questions covered by this convention. Moreover, the joining of these regional economic organizations is the subject of consultation among the commission members. In signing the final act of the conference, the USSR delegation announced that presentation to the organizations of regional economic integratioa of the possibi= lity of becoming participants in the Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources does not alter the Soviet Union's position in relation to various international organizations. The delegation from Poland and the GDR made similar announcements. Examination of the goals, subject and reg~on of action of the convention has definite importance in understanding its value. Article 2 defines the goal of the 12 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050015-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440400050015-6 convention as conservation of the Antarctic marine living resources. The same article, however, pinpoints that the term "conservation" includes efficient.use. Thus, although the name of the convention does not contain the concept "use of resources," nevertheless, its statutes assume efficient use which guarantees conservation. Point 3, article 2 defines the principles according to which induatry and any activity associated with it can be conducted. In particular, it indicates the need to grevent reduction in the numbers of any population caught to a level below that which guarantees its stable replenishment. For this purpose, it must not be allowed to drop below a level close to that which guarantees the greatest pure annual increase. In addition, it stipulates maintenance of interrelationships between the caught populations, those dependent on them and those linked to them, as well as restoration nf depleted populations. It speaks of the need to prevent changes or to reduce to a minimum the danger of changes in the marine ecosystem ~ that are potentially irreversible in the course of two or three decades. Among the marine living resources, the convention includes the populations of finned fish, mollusks, crustaceans and all other types of livino organisms, in- cluding birds living to the south of the Antarctic convergence.l Z'hus, the conven- tion covers krill, whales and seals, although the latter two species with definite stipulations. In this respect it is indicated in article 6 that "nothing contained in this Convention infringes on the rights and commitments of the Contracting Parties according to the International Convention on Regulating the Whaling Industry and the Convention on Conservation of the Antarctic Seal." Article 1 defines as follows the region of action of the convention: "This Con- vention applies to the Antarctic marine living resources of the regi~n to the south of 60� southern latitude and to the Antarctic marine living resources of the region that is locat~ed between this latitude and the Antarctic convergence which are a part of the marine ecosystem of the Antarctic." This same article further gives the precise coordi.nates of the Antarctic convergence, defining it as a line lying - between 45� and 60� southern latitude. The fact that the convention is not limited to indicating only the Antarctic convergence, but also presents the boundary passing through 60_ southern latitude is explained by references of the convention, in parti- cular, on questions of demilitarization and territorial claims, to the Agreement on the Antarctic whose action is limited to 60� southern latitude. Thus, on questions of conservation of marine living resources, the region of action of the convention exceeds the region of action of the Agreement on the Antarctic, while on questions of the use of the Antarctic only for peaceful purposes, banning nuclear explosions, "freezing" claims to territorial sovereignity, as well as other principles and goals of the agreement, it coincides with it. It is proposed in the framework of the convention that a commission be set up for conservation of Antarctic marine living resources whose function wi11 be the imple- mentatiun of goals and principles of the convention. "Each Contracting Party that p