JPRS ID: 9971 USSR REPORT POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9971.
9 September 1981
l1SSR Re ort
p
POLITI~AL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
- CFOUO 23/81)
~
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_ JPRS L/9971
9 September 1981
USSR REPORT
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(FOUO 23/81)
CONTENTS
INTERNATIONAL
Book Reviews Costs of Pursuing Arms Race .
(Yu. Ye. Vlas'yevich; EKONOMICHESKOYE BREMYA~MILITARIZMA, 1980).. 1
NATIONAL
Debate on Decentralization To Be Journal Feature
(M. I. Piskotin; SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, May 81)......... 3
Journal Defends RoYe of Private Pldts in Socialist E~onamy�
(D. Ye. Tagunov; SOVETSROYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, Jul 81)......... 15
REGIONAL
Review of Book About Republic Economy,New USSR'Constitution
(I. Sh. Muksinov; SOVETSKOYE GOSUDAR5TV0 I PRAVO, May 81)..0.... 22
- a - [III - USSR - 35 FOUO]
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INTERNATIONAL
BO~K REVIEW'S COSTS OF PURSUING ARMS RACE
Moscow EKONOMICHESKOYE BREMYA MILITARIZMA in Russian 1980 (signed to press 18 Jul 80)
pp 1-2, 183-184
_ [Table of contents an~ annotation of book by Yu. Ye. Vlas'yevich]
[Excerpts] Title Page:
Title: EKONOMICHESKOYE BREMYA MILITARIZMA (The Economic Burden of Militarism)
Publisher: Mysl'
Place and year of pul~lication: Moscow, 1950
Signed to Press Date: 18 July 1980
Number of Copies Published: 12,000
- Number ~f Pages: 184
_ Brief Descr iption:
This book examines the costs of the two world wars in the 20th century and the
present arms race. It studies the ~auses of the increasing costs of wars, the sources
and methods for covering them. The policies of imperialists, who make a profit from
wars and the arms race, are disclosed. The active role of the CPSU and the Soviet
state in the struggle for relaxing international tension is shown. A critique is
given of the views of bourgeois sociologists on the arms race.
Table of Contents
Introduction 3
Chapter 1. Military-Economic Costs in Light of Marxist-Leninist Theory 7
1. The economic costs of warr~ as an expression of the
interdependence of war aad economics 7
2. Military-economic costs and the interests of different classes 20
3. A critique of anti-Marxist conceptions of military-economic costs 26
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- Chapter 2. Economic Costs of the First and Second World Wars 39
1. Human losses 42
2. Material and f inancial expenditures 53
3. Materia.Y destruction 68
4. Indirect costs of war 78
S. Sources and methods of covering costs of the world wars 87
Chapter 3. Economic Costs of the Present Arms Race 100
- 1. Social-political causes for the growth of military costs after
World War II 101
2. The influence of the scientific-technical revolution on the
volume and structure of military expenditurES llk
3. Measures, dynamics aad structure of expenciiture~ for military
goals 128
- 4. Sources for covering costs of the arms race 143
Chapter 4. It Is Passible to Rsduce the Burden of the Arms Race 156
- 1. The econamic expediency of disarmament 157
2. Factors that work against military-economic waste 170
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl", 1980
CSO: 1807/15?.
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NATIONAL
DEBATE ON DECENTRALIZATION TO BE JOURNAL FEATURE
Moscow SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRA,VO in Russian No 5~, May 81 (signed to press~
- 30 Mar 81~ pp 39-49
[Article by Professor M. I. Piskotin, doctor of ~uridical sciences: "Democratic
Centralism: Problems in Combining Centralization with Decentralization"]
[Text] When the 26th CPSU Congress defined the main ob~ectives
oi Sovist economic and social development in the 1981-1985
period up to 1990, it acknowledged the need for constant improve-
ment in planning, organic interaction by plans, economic leverage
and incentives; and improvement in the organizational structure
and methods of administration. A broad program of ineasures has
been drawn up to improve administration and bring it up to the
level of present requirements. One of the chief ineasures will
be the better coordination of centralization with the develop-
_ ment of democratic principles in Soviet state administration.
Speaking at the October (1980) CPSU Central Committee Plenum,
L. I. Brezhnev said that "the correct relationship between
centralism and democratic principles" is on~e of the apecific
problems in plan adminiatratinn. '
With a view to the great theoretical and practical signi�icance
of tihis problem and its extreme urgency, the editors of
SOVETSROYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO felt it would be expedient to
arrange for a thorough discussion of the matter in the magazine.
The diacussion begins with the article by M. I. Piskotin
printed below. The editors invite the magazine's readers,
scientific and practical personnel, ~urists, economists, phi-
losophers, sociologis.ts and histo~ians to part~cipate in the
discussion of various aspects of this mult3,fac~ted topic. The .
editors plan to publish articles, notea, comments and selectec;
letters and responsea under this special new heading.
One of the chief principles governing the organization and ~ctivi.*.y of t.he Soviet
state is democratic centralism. It is specifically referred to in the constitution
of th~ USSR and reflects the ob3ective need for a certain degree of centralization
in public administration under the conditions of socialism. At the same time,
' this principle means that centralization must be accomplished only, as V. I. Lenin
- put it, "in the basic, in the fun~amental., in the essential" and musti be
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- organically combined with democratic principles. This combination is reflected,
on the one hand, in the democratic nature of the organization and activities of
central state bodies and, on the other, in the guaranteed independence and developed
initiative of local bodies, enterprises, associations and other organizations or,
_ ~ in other words, in a definite degree of decentralization. A recognition of the
need for centralization, V. I. Lenin sa~.d, does not exclude the poasibility of
questions about "how much centralism is ne:eded in a specific area at a specific
time [2]. With a view to this, we can distinguish between two groups of prablems
connected with the realization of democratic centralism. The first takes in ques-
tions connected with guaranteeing the democratic nature of centralized administra-
tion. These include the democrRt.ic organization of central government bodies,
their ar.countability to the public, the development of democratic forms and the
methcds of their activity. The second group takes in problems in combining cen-
tralization with decentralization. It would seem that the most important of these
are, f~rstly, questions connected with the division of ~urisdiction and authority
among organ;~ of the USSR, the union and autonomous republics and terr,itorial
administz�ative units; secondly, forms of combining centralized administration with
the economic independence and initiative of enterprises, associations and other
organizations; and, thirdly, the distinctive feat~ures of the combinat3on of cen-
tralization and decentralization in administration in the sociocultural sphere.
Questions connected with concentration or deconcentration, the distribution of
decision-making responsibilities and the degree of administrative centralization
on various levels, includirig central, union and repubiic organs of public adminis-
t:-ation occupy a position midway between these two groups.
Reinforcing the principle of democra.tic centralism, the Basic Law of the Soviet
� State indicates the general guidelines for tha combination of centralization, or
individual management, with democratic principles, or decentralization. The prin-
- ciple of democratic centralism is discussed in some detail in the sections of the
constitution pertaining to the national government structure of the USSR, the
soviets of people's deputies and the fundamentals of the construction of state
organs of authority and control. Many specific forms of centraliza~ion combined
with decentralization, however, are specified in current legislation and stem from
the practice of state construction, often evolving into organizational traditions.
It is these specific forms that determine the actual degree of centralization and
_ the developmental level of organizational and legal conditions for the display of
initiative and creative activity on the local 1eve1. The existing correlation
between centralization and decentralization is one of the ma~or features of the
system of national administration, the development of socialist democracy and forms
of political, economic and social life. In the socialist society this correlation
is extremely important because it affects the managerial organization of the entirE
USSR economy and largely determines the degrea of national production efficiency,
for which reason the formatiive process of specific combinations of centralization
ar.d decentralization can be categorized as one of the fundamental aspects of the
organization and activity of the socialist state.
The carrelation between centralization and decentralization does not and cannot
remain unchanged. It is constantly developing under the influence of various
factors. The primary ones are ob~ec~tive factors: changes resulting from specific
historical conditions of national existence, primarily the development of produc-
tive forces, the growth of economic acales, the elevation of the public's cul-
turaZ level, etc. Although these factors sometimes dictate necessary changes in
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the correlation of centralization to decentralization (for example, the increasing
c.omplexity and capital-intensiveness of equipment necessitate stronger centraliza-
- tion), they do not have an automatic effect. Each of them is assPSSed by the
appropriate state organs and is examined from the standpoint of theory, and it is
only on the basis of. the resulting conclusions that the factor then influences the
development of the cor~elation between cer.cralization and decentralization. Con-
sequently, the subjecti~~e factor plays an extremely important role in this process.
Its importance is compounded by tYie fact that this pr.ocess is directly influenced
by ideology, public awareness and existing and prevailing beliefs and traditions.
- For a correct understanding and thorough assessment ~f the state of affairs in
this sphere and, in particular, for the determination of necesaary changes, it is
important to analyze not only ob~ective factors, but also the subjective factors
at work here, particularly the important factor of traditions which have taken
shape during the process of historical development.
When we look at traditions in the development of the Soviet state, we generally
begin our survey in October 1917. This is quite understandable because the Great
October Socialist Revolution broke the old machinery of state and created a new
type of state. The social agents of the grevailing political ideology and
govemmental-legal beliefs of the past--landowners, the bourgeoisie and their
spokesmen, including the upper echelon of the bureaucracy--have all disappeared
from the p~litical arena. There have also been changes in the foundations of the
societal order, state structure and system of political institutions. The r~volu-
tion created a new governmental-legal system and ideology, backed up by Marxist-
Leninist theory. New political traditions took shape. Nevertheless, part of the
beliefs and traditions in the sphere of government and law, connected wi.th the
historical peculiarities of Russia's development, it~ geographic location, its
international status, its vast territory and its level of mass political culture,
could not disappear along with the old machinery of state and overthrown classes.
It was more stable because the factors which gave rise to it were either constant
(geographic location and territorial dimensions) or required an ~xtremely long
period of time for change. To a certain degree, this was also true of traditions
and beliefs connected with the relationship between centralization and decentralization.
Prerevolutionary Russia was a centralized state. The desire for political central-
~ ization was deeply rooted in history. It was born during the struggle for liber-
ation from the yoke of the Golden Horde and became particularly strong in the
16th century. Russia's lenghty borders and the nPed to guard them against fre-
quent enemy invasions required the maximum unification of all Russian forces and
the reinforcement of central authority. Although later this rigid centralization
_ became a means of reinforcing autocracy and intensifying its arbitrary rule and
helped tsarism conduct its great-power policy, it was long perceived by the public
mind as something absolutely essential, particularly from the standpoint of safe-
guarding the country's external safety. The huge territory over which the popula-
tion was scattered, the lack of roads, the illiteracy of most of the laboring
public, the inadequate political culture and the resulting underdevelopment of
political life on the local level, the eradication of the traditional popular as-
sembly in the older cities, the lawlessness perpetrated by bureaucrats and the
_ impossibility of obtaining satisfaction from them on the local level (for example,
through the courts) all strengthened the belief of the middle strata in the need
for centralization. The population saw the central authority as a force which
- could protect them from the arbitrary dictates of local authorities.
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The land reform of 1864, which was "one of the concessions wrested from the auto-
. cratic government by the wave of public indignation and revolutionary fervor" [3],
- marked the beginning of the development of distinct decentralization in Russia.
The seeds of local self-government were planted. Publie awareness underwent
some changes under the influence of the liberal intelligentsia and tl~e oppositio~
movement of district cour~cil members. The topics of self-government and decentral~-
ization were discussed ~uore frequently [9, 10]. But it took a long time to set
up local land administzations. Their powers were extremely ~imited and they were
dominated by landowners. As a result, the ideas of developed ~decentralization ax~d
struggle against bureaucratic centralism took a long time to penetrate the mass
mind.
- After the February revolution of 1917 the provisional governmenti expanded the au~-
thority of local government, proceeding from the basis of its own class interest~�
and assigned it many of the functions connected with day-to-day management in ~t~e
country. In an atmosphere of fierce class struggle and declining faith in the
_ bourgeois provisional government, this caused the center to lose mo~e and more o.f
its control over local government. In a number of key regions, org~ns~ of aut~ority
sprang up and de~lared themselves independent of the center. There wa,s excessive
decentralization and this, under the extraord:.nary circumstances of that ti~e,,
became one of the reasons for the progressive pulitical ~risis and co'~~.apse of the
bourgeois state. This facilitated the victory of the October Revolution,, but it
a=so showed the laboring public that the new socialist state they had ~crea~ed
could not perform Yts functions if they did not take a lesson from the ~ecen~ past
and did not ensure the political unification of the country and the ade~qu~at.~e cen-
t~alization of authority.
When V. I. Lenin and the Bolshevik Party drew up their revolutionary program, they
stipulated the liquidation af bureaucratic centralism as one of their ma~ar ,po-
litical ob~ectives. The first program of the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic
Workers' Party], adopted in 3.903, declared the need for "extensive ~.ocal self-
government; oblast self-governm~ent for locations distinguished by a s~ecific way
of life and populatian makeup" [7]. The demand to secure the "right of self-
determination for all nationalities making up the state" was dire~t~d against
great-power centralism [7]. The second party program, adopted after the October
Revolution, in March 1919, reflected the fact t1~at "the Soviet has accom-
plished...on a much greater scale than ever before, local andc a.~blast self-
government, without any authorities appointed from above" [8].
The Bolsheviks, however, were nQt against centralism in gen%:ral, but only bureau-
- cratic centrallsm. Furthermore, the party associated th~ socialist reorganization
- of society with the achievement of the necessary degree mf centralization. Social-
ism, V. I. Lenin sa~d, "is the construction of a centraZized economy, managed from
the center" [4]. The leading role of state property in the country's econnamy and
- the management of economic development by means o~ a single national economic plan
certainly presupposed the appropriate degree of cer:tralization. In the first
- decades of.Soviet rule, a number ~of political factors aro~e which also c~i~ctated
stronger centralization.
The Soviet central government, built on the rui~ns of the old government, could not
- immediately establish.strong interaction wi~h l.ocal government, and the establish-
ment of the new authorities on the local ~evel. often proceeded ir_dependen~ly anc~
_ gave rise to noticeable centrifugal tendencies. These tendQncies were most
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distinct in Russia's ~utlying districts. Some of the nationalities on the out-
skirts were striving for governmental isolation because they had been liberated
from the oppression of tsarist autocracy but had not yet found ways of uniting
with the people of Central Russia on the basis of the principles of socialist
internationalism. These tendencies were strengthened by the civil war and foreign
intervention. The Bolsheviks had to overcome these centrifugal tendencies and
achieve the political unification of Russia's peoples on the platform of Soviet
authority. Centralization became a major means of solving problems.
Another important factor was that the desire of the new local organs of revolu-
tionary authority for extensive independence often led to serious excesses, par-
ticularly ~n view of the fact that the old 1ega1 system had been discarded but the
new oiYe was just taking shape. The need to strengthen law and order and to insti-
tute a single set of laws also called for stronger centralization [11].
The fierce class struggle, the need to overcome economic chaos and to carry out
industrialization as quickly as possible and the mounting threat of a new world
war required "iron discipline, constantly heightened vigilance and the strictest �
centralization of control" [12]. A high degree ~f centralization was necessary
during the years of the Great Patriotic War and during the first postwar years,
when the war-ravaged economy had to be restored.
These features of our country's history left a deep impression on the public mind.
The emphasis on the role played by centralization in various periods of our history,
- beginning with the creation of the Russian centralized state and ending with the
" periods of socialist industrialization and the war against German fascism, points
up primarily the positive side of centralization. The necessary nature of many of
the steps taken toward its reinforcement is often disregarded.
Any degree of centralization facilitates the unification of authority and leader-
ship and makes it possible to conduct a single policy in a specific area. It aids
in developing a uniform approach to law enforcement. In the sphere of resource.
distribution, centralization provides for their concentration for the attainment
of primary ob~ectives and, if necessary, for their maneuvering. In some cases,
the concentration of aome types of operations (primarily of a supporting or aux-
iliary nature), not in each individual unit where the need arises (territorial
administrative unit, production unit, etc.), but on higher levels can produce a
significant savings in labor and improve the quality of performance.
Centralization as such is not contrary to democracy, and this is why democratic
centralism is possible. But this requires centralism "in the truly democratic
sense" [1], or, in other words, centralism which takes democratic forms and gives
local authorities, lower production links and individual workers enough independ-
ence. When centralization reaches the extreme, when the authority to make deci-
sions in an increasing number of areas is concentrated within central organs of
coz~trol or, in particular, in the hands of a small group or an individual, the
possibility of democratic action and the display of initiative on the lower levels
is extremelq limited, and the sources of initiative are radically reduced. The
strictest centralization of leadership natcrally "has a negative effect on the
development of some democratic forms" [12].
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Initiative and a creative and responsible attitude toward one's duties are what
determine the quality, intensity and, in the final analysis, efficiency of wo~~k
and the degree of each individual's social activity. The development of initiative
and responsibility is indisputably one of the most significant reserves for emhanc-
ing the efficiency and quality of work in any area. Conversely, their limita~ion
gives rise to great losses, pa~rticularly material losses, which cannot be calculated
or measured but can take on huge proportions. Excessive centralization restr~cts
_ the possibilities for the development of initiative and responsibility, not only
in administrative personnel but also in members of labor collectives and all
c~tizens, by reducing their sociopolitical activity. This is why the resultin~
losses, includin.g a loss of morale, are exceptionally great.
The centralized procedure of examining cases concerning territorial admin~st~ati~re
or production units generally gives less consideration to specific fac`tors a~d c~n-
ditions than investigations conducted directly on the local level. And tk~is ~na~-
voidably reduces the effect~veness of decision-making: The disregard �or 1~.r,~1
peculiarities leads to unutilized opportunities or simple losses. Wh~n the a~uthbri-
ty to make important decisions is centralized and concentrated to a~i~h riegreeA
it can take a long time, and sometimea too long, to settle matters, bY:-~t t.t~gh~ be
too urgent to postpone. Furthermore, many people gradually grow accust~~ned ~ta an
abnorma]. situation in which something must be changed (for example, when i~ b~comes
necessary to stop producing a commodity that is not in demand and ~taster the pro-
dLCtion of another), but the changes do not take place, and they begin ~a reconcile
~zemselves to this and even stop noticing these defects. The type of indi~ridual ~
wao simply acts on instructions from above and neither feels f~illy res~onsible for
- e~isting conditions nor displays any kind of serious initiativ-e or.enter~rise is
being encountered with increasing frequency within the administr~tiee s}~stem. It
is also a fact that a high degree of centralization increases tlhe volume of admin-
istrative work, as the same matters have to be considered by several agencies.
This increases the nwnber of administrative personnel and stimu~ates the develop-
ment of bureaucratic tendencies [13, p 193].
The alleviation of the negative consequences of centralization and the eradication
of the harmful results of its excessive development can only be accompliahed
through the use of decentralized forms of management wherever possible. As the
accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress
noted, "we must develop democratic principles and initiative on the local level,
relieve upper administrative echelons of minor matters and ensure efficiency and
flexibility in decision-making." In the 1950's a number of steps were taken in
our country to eradicate the excessive centralization that had taken shape in the
preceding period. Union and autonomous republics and local soviets were granted
. more extensive powers in several spheres, including the spheres of legislation,
. finance, national economic management and the resolution of problems in the ter-
ritorial administrative structure. The dissolution of the national economic
councils in 1965 and the transition to the sectorial principle in the administra-
tion of industry t?rought about increased centralization in national economic
management. This affected primarily the distribution of authority among union,
republic and local go~~ernment bodies. As for the relationship between centraliza-
tion and decentralization in individual branches of the economy, a process of
definite decentralization began within the ministerial system. The decisions of
the September (1965) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the decrees adopted on this
basis by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers on 4 October 1965
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considerably expanded the economic independence of enterprises. Economic reform
was instituted. In addition, on 10 July 1967 the USSR Council of Ministers
published a decree "On the Transfer of Additional Matters of Economic and Cultural
Construction to the Jurisdiction of Union Republic Councils of Ministers" [14]. ~
This was a significant step toward decentralization in the interrelations betw~en
the U~SR and the union republics.
This was accompanied by the influence of a few factors which not only inhibited
the reinforcement of the economic independence of production links on the lowest
level but also strengthened centralization somewhat. The leading role was played
by the growth o� production concentration, the transfer to the system of industrial
and production associations and the acceleration of scientific and technical
progress. The economic reform of 1965 was largely intended to strengthen the eco-
nor~ic independence of enterprises. Given the existence of many small and medium-
sized enterprises and the insufficient degree of production concentration, this
detracted somewhat from the integrity of the plan and led to the un~ustified
decentralization of such production support functions as material and technical
supply operations, product sales, marketing research, the incorporation of new
equipment, etc. They could not be performed effectively enough on the level of
small and medium-sized enterprises; in addition, this increased their cost. Expe-
rience soon suggested the need for stronger centralization in this area. It was
connected with the enlargement of enterprises and the creation of the system of
associations, which took on several production administrative functions that had
once been nerformed on the enterprise level.
The development of production concentration was largely due to scientific and
technical progress. The technological revolution in itself demanded considerably
stronger centralization in production control. The manufacture of such comglex
and costly items as m.odern airplanes, ships, hydraulic turbines and others could
~ only be secured by large centralized capital investments, by industry of primarily
union jurisdiction, and by the more orderly and coordinated activity of central
government bodies. Under the conditions of technological revolution, the growing
scales of economic and sociocultural construction and the increasing complexity
of this construction, it became more important to have a single scientific and
technical policy, standardization and informational services in all spheres of
~ public life. The extensive use of centralized, goal-oriented comprehensive
programs became essential. The volume of statewide supervision and control grew
in a number of branches. In other words, the number of tasks a.zd functions
requiring centralized execution grew.
3ut the probiem of finding the correct combination of centralization and decentral-
ization still exists and demands constant attention and a thoroughly corisidered
_ approach. The reason for this is that, to a considerahle degree, whereas the
factors demanding centralization are vigorously paving their own way, the factors
_ giving rise to the need for developed decentralization are ob~ectively determined
and can only be reflected in the administrative system through purposefuZ pffort.
, These factors are not of equal strength, and it would take constant purposeful
regulation by the state to ensure equal consideration for both groups of factors.
The problem of combining centralization with decentralxzation is ncw particularly
important because there are a number of significant circumstances which demand
the development of decentralized administrative forms in addition to better
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centralized management. The fact that the necessary conditions for. the more
- extensive use of decentralized forms exist is equally significant.
Reflecting the vital needs of the Soviet economy, the 26th CPSU Congress set the
ob,ject~�ves of continued economic progress and profound qualitative changes in the
material and technical base through the acceleration of technological progress,
the intensification of national production and the enhancement of production ef-
ficiency. In this way, the congress delineated the three basic channels of con-
tinued economic progress--production intensification, heightened production
efficiency and accelerated technological progress. The use of the possibilities
of each, however, presupposes, as an essential condition, a flexible combination
of centralization and decentralization and the development of democratic prin-
c_ples and creative initi~ative on the lowest levels.
Production intensification and heightened production efficiency will depend largely
on the augmentation of the producti~*: sphere's technical equipment, the elevation
of the power-labor ratio and the ~esolution of other economic engineering problems.
But the "efficient use of soci:l factors of economic growth" will be of equal
importance [6J. It is not en~ugh to provide the production sphere with progressive
equipment; in addition, each worker must use this equipment efficiently. It is
not enough to increase the output of mineral fertilizer for agriculture; in addi-
tion, those who must treat the soil with this fertilizer must have an incentive
to use it as productively as possible. What is needed, therefore, is a better at-
t~tude toward work, increased initiative and enterpris~ and heightened interest
ia the results of labor, or a better incentive system. We have every reason to
believe that these factors will become even more importont as the volume of tech-
nical equipment grows and the power-worker ratio rises. it is one rhing, for
instance, when a man armed with a scythe or building tool stands idle or works in
- a"slipshod" manner, but it is quite another when modern technica.l equipment stands
idle with him or is used unproductively. In the first case, work can be intensified
- to some degree through the use of administrative means of leverage, but in the
second these possibilities are limited and internal stimuli become increasingly
necessary for active work and initiative on the job. It is this that pushes
"social factors of economic growth" to the foreground. And they are closely
related to the expansion of democratic principles and decentralization, without
which it would be impossible to develop initiative and responsibility and provide
workers with effective incentives in each area of production. Besides this, the
intensification of national production and the enhancement of its efficiency pre-
suppose the mobilization and utilization of all existing possibilities and reserves,
great and small, even the most insignificant, in any production link and in each
- labor collective, and this is also related to the development of the initiative
and responsibility of all labor collectives and workers. .
_ It is known that the acceleration of technological progress depends, on the one
hand, on the effectiveness of scientific research and development.projects and,
on the other, on the degree and speed of the incorporation of their results. Both
are closely related to the initiative and incentives of collectives on the lowest
levels, scientific and production. In particular, experience has taught us that
centralized measures in the incorporation of scientific and technical achievements
cannot be particularly successful if production collectives have no real incentive
to use them. Furthermore, this must be a long-range, and not an immediate,
incentive. Some scientific achievements can be incorporated from above with the
use of either administrative leverage or special material incentives. But onl.~
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the stable economic independence of production units can ensure that enterprises
- or associations, their collectives and administrations, will investigate and try
to master everything new that science and technology has to offer and agree to ~
additional expenditures, temporary production delays and other "inconveniences'~
for the sake of future benefits.
The present urgency of the need for developed decentralization is connected with
the growing volume of governmental objectives and functions in recent decades
which has affected primarily the central or.gans of public administration, especially
all-union organs. As a result, they are overloaded. In order to cope with the
increasing volume of decisions which, according to existing legislation and tradi-
tion, must be made on the union level, more and more new union organs of public
administration have been created. In addition to new state eommittees and minis-
tries of the USSR, many committees, main administrations and other departments
- under the jurisdiction of the USSR Council of Ministers have also come into being.
But this complicates the system of public administration to the maximum and does
not even solve the problem as a whole.
The fact is that there are now more decisions that can only be ma.de by agencies
with general jurisdiction or supra-departmental bodies. They cannot be entrusted
to sectorial organs, even if the number of these organs should continue to grow.
For this reason, it is increasingly difficult for the Council of Ministers, state
committees, Ministry of Finance and other supra-departmental agencies of the USSR
- to ensure the timely settlement of supra-sectorial matters under the ~urisdiction
~ of the USSR. Experience has shown that the possibilities for the centralized
management of state affairs are limited. Other procedures must be found to
"unburden the upper administrative echelons" [5]. In view of the fact that an
overload of day-to-day matters has a negative effect on the functioning of any
organ, not leaving it enough time for analytical work and the thorough and pains-
taking study of long-range problems, it is particularly important to gnard against
these negative consequences when the work of the upper echelons of public adminis-
tration is being organized.
The stronger centralization in national administration in the first years of
Soviet rule was connected largely with the shortage of cultural forces loyal to
- socialism and the shortage of educated people on the local level who could make
decisions on local matters independently and intelligently. Since that time,
- however, the situation has changed radically. By the end of 1980, 83 percent of
the employed population in the USSR had a higher or secondary (complete or partial)
education [15]. Consequently, personnel problems ceased to be a factor limiting
the development of decentralization. The overall rise in the educational and
cultural level of the population has cre~ted solid prerequisites for the broader
independence of territorial administrative units and production units. Finally,
it should be stressed that the construction of developed socialism and the creation
of a nationwide state, backed up by the sociopolitical and ideological unity of
all members of society, have eradicated the factors which demanded thP ";,trictest
_ centralization of control" during the first stages of the Soviet state's develop-
- ment. The present search for specific ways of combining centralization with
decentralization can be related much more closely to the requirements of scien-
tifically efficient administration. ~
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The development of decentralized forms of administration could be accomplished
through the expansion of the group of decisions made independently by union and
autonomous republics and local soviets and through the reinforcement of the inde-
_ pendence of enterprises, associations, sociocultural establishments and other
organizations on the lowest levels [13, pp 195-200; 16], by reducing the degree
- of concentration of decision-making authority on all levels and in all organs of
administration. Each of these methods will require special analysis and discus-
sion. Here we will only examine some of the general aspects of the further combi-
nation of centralizatioa with decentralization.
The distribution of powers among the USSR, union and autonomous republics and
terlitorial administrative units is closely connected with the distribution of
jurisdiction over national economic facilities and soc9.ocultural establishments.
It appears that the present concentration of these facilities and establishments
under union jur~sdiction is not completely sound. The transfer of some without
any real unionwide significance to the ~urisdiction of union republics and the
transfer of facilities which essentially serve local needs to the jurisdiction
of autonomous republics and local soviets, accompanied by the expansion of the
powers and responsibilities of republic and local organs in the economic sphere,
= particularly the branches serving the needs of the public, would, in our opinion, ~
not only unburdent}~e "upper administrative echelans" and stimulate the initiative
of republic and local organs, but would also help the economy react more quickly
- a~::d flexibly to changes in supply and demand patterns.
l:e spheres of administration which require a higher degree of centralization
include state finances. But they are distinguished by their effect on all spheres
of administration. This is why the degree of financial centralization largely
determines the correlation between centralization and decentralization in public
administration in general. Any significant measures to develop decentralization
in the administrative sphere will not be successful if they are not accompanied by
_ corresponding measures in the financial sphere. It was no coincidence that one
of the major steps taken in the 1950's to reduce excessive centralization was the
expansion of the budget powers of union and autonomous republics and local soviets.
No matter how quickly state financial resources grow, they cannot satisfy the
constantly growing demand for them. This is why some degree of centralization is
needed in their distribution. It helps to channel resou?-ces primarily into priori-
ty areas and prevents their dissipation. It is important, however, to not only
distribute resources correctly, but to also ensure their i~tensive growth and the
development of sources of income in order to create a basis for the satisfaction
of more public needs. This goal cannot be attained by means of centralization
alone. Initiative, social{st enterprise and incentive are also required, and they
are related to decentralization.
A clear understanding of the way in which the reduction of financial centralization
leads to the significant growth of national financial resources, and not to their
reduction, can be gained from a look at some periods in the Soviet state's history,
such as the transition from "War communism" to the New Economic Policy and
the beginning of the economic reform of 1965. In the first case, the partial self-
funding of enterpxises and economic organizations was instituted. Whereas prior
- to this all of their income had been completely centralized by the state, the
transition left a considerable portion of their. income at their disposal. Int~e
second case, measures were taken to strengthen the economic independence of
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production units, including financial independence. It is known that financial and
economic activity was stimulated in both cases, leading to the growth of profits
and total state resources. ` ~
Under present conditions, in addition to improving the centralization of financial
planning, it seems wise to envisage some measures to expand the financial independ-
ence and responsibility of union and autonomous republics, territorial administra-
tive units, enterprises, associations ~nd other econotaic organizations. In
particular, the time has come to discard the present practice of ca"lculating deduc-
tions from statewide taxes and revenues to be~deposited in republic and local
budgets each year and move to a 5-year procedure of calcLlation. This could be
- done during the compilation of the 5-year state budget revenue and expenditure
summaries, envisaged in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee a~d USSR Council
of Ministers �1On the Improvement of Planning and the Reinforcement of the Effect
- of the Economic Mechanism on Production Eff~.ciency and Operational Quality" of
12 July 1979 [17]. The experience of other socialist countries has shown that
_ this would give republic and local organs an incentive to develop sources of income
and seek additional resources and would promote the more intelligent use of budget
funds.
The development of decentralized forms of administration should be combined with
centralization in fundamental matters of state, economic and sociocultural con-
struction. Centralized management in this area must be flexible. Among the
methods of this management, policy making, the formulation of its principles and
basic content, and legislation could play an increasingly important role. A vivid
example of the use of this kind of centralized management, ensuring a cohesive
� party and governmental policy in ma~or areas of national development, can be seen
in the Basic Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the ~7~SR
During 1981-1985 and During the Period up to 1990, adopted by the 26th CPSU
Congress. The basic guidelines specify a single poiicy line but they aiso place
- strong emphasis on the encouragement and development of initiative and ex~terprise
in all spheres of state and economic life, presupposing the effective and flexible
combination of centralization with decentralization and the precise legal regula-
tion of these processes.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
_ 1. Lenin, V. I., "How Should Competition Be Organized?"--"Polnoye sobraniye
sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], Vol 35, p 203.
2. Lenin, V. I., "Speech in the Organizational Section on 8 December: Seventh
All-Russian Congress of Soviets, 5-9 December 1919," Ibid., Vol 39, p 429.
3. Lenin, V. I., "The Persecutors of Local Administration and the Hannibals of
Liberalism," Ibid., Vol 5, p 33.
_ 4. Lenin, V. I., "Speech at a Joint Meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive
Committee, the Moscow Soviet and the All-Russian Trade Union Congress on
17 January 1919," Ibid., Vol 37, p 421.
5. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow,
1976, p 60.
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- 6. PRAVDA, 5 Mar~h 1981.
7. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i Plenumov Ts1F'
[The CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and ~
Plenums of the Central CommitteeJ, 8th Ed, revised and supplemented, Moscow,
1970, Jol 1, p 63.
8. Ibid., p 42.
9. Vasil'chikov, A. I., "0 samoupravlenii" [On Self-Government], Vols 1-3,
St. Petersburg, 1869. .
10. Zhilin, A. A., "Uchebnik gosudarstvennogo prava" [Textbook of State Law],
Pt 1, Petrograd, 1916, pp 381-422.
11. Kuritsyn, V. M., "The New Economic Policy and Revolutionary Legality,"
VOPROSY ISTORII, 1967, No 9, pp 74-76.
12. "Spravochnik partiynogo rabotnika" [The Party Worker's Handbook], Mosc~w,
1957, p 327.
13. Aganbegyan, A. G., "Upravleniye sotsialisticheskimi predpriyatiyami. Voprosy
teorii i praktiki" [The Management of Socialist Enterprises. Questions of
Theory and Practice], Moscow, 1979.
14. SP SSSR, 1967, No 17, p 118.
15. "The Results of the Fulfillment of the State Plan for the Economic and
Social Development of the USSR in 1980," PRAVDA, 24 January 1981.
16. Sitaryan, S. A., "Centralization and Independence," EKO, 1980,~No 2, pp 3-13.
17. SP SSSR, 1979, No 18, p 118.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel�stvo "Nauka", "Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo", 1981.
85 88
CSO: 1800/639
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NATIONAL
JOURNAL DEFENDS ROLE OF PRIVATE PLOTS IN SOCIALIST ECONOMY
Moscow SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO in Russian No 7, Jul 81 pp 129-132
[Article by D. Ye. Tagunov, graduate student of the Institute of Philosophy and
Law of the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences: "Private Subsidiary Farming and
- Individual Labor Activity"]
[TextJ Our country's economy is b ased on the socialist system of management. This
has been legislatively reinforced in constitutional norms. The ovezwhelming ma~ori-
ty of able-bodied population is employed in state, public and cooperative enter-
. prises, institutions and organizations. The average annual number of workers and
. employees presently amounts to 112.5 million, and the number of kolkhoz workers--
13.5 million [1]. In addition to participating in public production, a certain part
of the population can engage in individual labor activity in their free time and
carry on private subsidiary farming. Additionally, there are able-bodied people
who for some reason are not employed in public production, and it would be inexcu-
sable mismanagement not to utilize the labor potential of this part of the popula-
tion for the good of the society.
. The USSR Constitution of 1936 allowed "small business of individuai peasants and
craftsmen based on their awn personal labor and excluding the use of outside labor"
(Article 9). The USSR Constitution of 1977 included a new, broader formula which
emb races the actually existing kinds of labor activity of citizens outside the
_ sphere of public production. Article 17 of the USSR Constitution, like the corres-
ponding articles of the constitutions of the union and autonomous republics, con-
tains the main revisions that pertain to individual labor activity: "In the USSR, ~
in keeping with the law, individual labor activity is allowed in the sphere of arts
and crafts industries, agriculture, consumer services, and also other kinds of ac-
tivity based exclusively on personal labor of citizens and members of their family.
The state regulates individual labor activity, ensuring that it is utilized in the
interests of the society." As one can see from the content of the article cited .
above, the legislator reflected essential changes in the Soviet society that have
taken place since the adoption of the USSR Constitution of 1936, primarily the
. change in the ec~nomic conditions and the social base.
During the course of the natiornaide consideration of the draft of the USSR Consti-
tution of 1977, various opinions were expressed regarding tt~e content of the con-
cept of individual labor activity. There were suggestions to "prohibit" such ac-
- tivity sinc~ it could "crowd out" the state sphere of services and so forth. But
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" the ~ost important argument of the opponents of this article was the so-called
"private initiati~e" which leads to personal gain and greediness and exerts a nega-
tive influence on the education of the new man, the man of communist morality. In
a survey regarding this, the head of the department of budget statistics of the
USSR Central Statistical Administration, D. Dumnov, wrote: "But one finds letters
which raise the question of eliminating Article 17 from the Constitution, of pro-
hibiting any kind of individual labor activity. It is difficult to agree with this
position." [2].
- Individual labor activity is activity of the citizen which is allowed and regulated
by the nationwide Soviet state within the limits envisioned by the Constitution and
legal documents based on it. It can be based exclusively on private labor and be
utilized in the interests of socic.ty.
1. A main form of individual labor activity in the area of production of agricul-
tural products is the labor of citizens on private subsidiary farms and garden
plots. In his report on the draft of the USSR Constitution and the results of the
nationwide discussion of it at the extraordinary 7th session of the USSR Supreme
Soviet of the 9th Convocation, L. I. Brezhnev said: "There were suggestions
- to eliminate or sharply limit all subsidiary businesses. But still it is known that
this form of labor, which is not related to exploitation, plays a useful role in our
economy at this time. Tlzerefore, in our opinion, those comrades are right who sug-
gest emphasizing in the Constitution that the state and the kolkhozes render assis-
tance to citizens in conducting subsidiary business." The Soviet society is inter-
ested in conducting private subsidiary businesses not only because part of the ne-
cassary agricultural products are produced on them, but also because in the current
stage, with the leading role of the public economy of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes,
within whose framework subsidiary farms appear and develop, while based on this pub-
lic farming, private subsidiary farms are a necessary constituent part of the so-
cialist system of agricultural production [3]. The products obtained from these
plots (milk, meat, potatoes, vegetables and fruits) constitute a significant contri-
bution to public production. Thus in 1979 the proportion of production of the main
agricultural products on private subsidiary farms amounted to the following: pota-
toes--59 percent, vegetables, milk and meat--about 30 per.cent, eggs--33 percent, and
wool--19 percent [4]. Moreover, individual labor activity on private subsidiary
farms produces additional income for their owners.
The decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, "On Pri-
vate Subsidiary Farms of Kolkhoz Workers, Other Workers, Empl~yees and Other Citi-
zens and Collective Orchard and Garden Production" of September 1977 [5] is a land-
mark in the development of small, but necessary forms of economy. The decree notes
the importance of fuller utilization of the possibilities of private subsidiary
farms for producing vegetable and animal husbandry products.
A primary task in the area of agriculture is efficient utilization of the land--the
basis of the production of food products and raw.materials for various branches of
industry. "Such a statement of the problem is of principle importance," writes K.
Yanchuk, "since with all the apparent importance of the country's land resources,
the possibilities of utilizing them in agriculture are fairly limited. Agricultu-
ral land comprises approximately one-fourth of the land, and arable land--10 percent
of the territory. Moreover, despite the growing scope of work for assimilating new
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land, the overall area of arable land has remained practically stable in recent
years" [6J. Therefore immense importance attaches to questions of more efficient
and effective utilization of the main resources for life support and fertility, and
- also to obtaining a maximum return from any fruitful section of land. From this
standpoint it also becomes extremely significant to continue to take advantage of
the actual possibilities that lie in the private subsidiary farms of workers and
employees and land allotted for collective production of orchard and garden pro-
ducts.
According to statistical data, as of 1 November 1979 the area of farmstead plots of
kolkhoz workers amounted to 4.1 million hectares, the ~.rea of kolkhoz land being
privately used by workers and employees--0.39 million hectares, and the area of land
in private use by workers and employees-4.0 million hectares [7, p. 237]. On these
lands they cultivate gardens, raise vegetables and feed and other crops, and keep
domestic cattle and poultry. As practice shows, with efficient organization and a
certain amount of support on the part of state agencies (primarily local soviets of
peoples' deputies) and public organizations, private subsidiary farms can not only
provide a certain amount of ineat, milk and vegetables of the residents, but can al-
so quite significantly affect the food balance of a given rayon or oblast. Nor can
one fail to take into account that private subsidiary farming corresponds to long-
existing habitual needs of rural residents, and helps to instill respect for labor
in the younger generation and to develop labor habits in children. The private sub-
sidiary farm will continue to be important in the future since the main consumers
- of the products produced on them are the rural population. For example, the kol-
khoz workers satisfy the following proportions of their demands through private
subsidiary farms: potatoes--95 percent, vegetables--75 percent, meat--79 percent,
milk--82 percent, and eggs--97 percent [8]. The rise in the material and cultural
level of the life of the soviet people which is taking place consistently in our
country is inseparably linked to a constant increase in agricultural production both
on sovkhozes and kolkhozes and on the private subsidiary farms of the citizens.
The main branch of the private subsidiary farms is animal husbandry. As of 1 Janu-
ary 1981 the number of head of productive livestock on them amounted to 22.9 mil-
lion head of large-horned cattle, 13.2 million hogs, and 29.2 million sheep and
goats [1]. Economists think that approximately 65 percent of the gross output of
- all private subsidiary farms and approximately 75 percent of the labor expenditure
of the kolkhoz workers go precisely for animal husbandry [9].
In individual stages of the development of the Soviet stata there have been changes
in the evaluation of the economic significance of arts and crafts industries, par- ,
ticularly private subsidiary farms and dacha and garden cooperatives. There has
been a certain instability in the attitude toward these businesses and a randomness
in their formation. Those employed in private business have sometimes been consid-
ered to be antisocial, and varous limiting normative acts have been introduced.
In October 1964 the CPSU Central Committee adopted the decree, "On Eliminating Un-
justified Restrictions on Private Farms of Kolkhoz Workers, Other Workers and Em-
ployees" [10]. On the basis of this, the union republics developed and adopted si-
milar decrees [11]. Thus unjustified restrictions on private farms were eliminated.
On the basis of the decree, the corresponding decisions were developed and adopted
which determined specific measures for eliminating shortcomings in this area. But
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- even after the adoption of the decree there were cases of underestimation of the
- socio-economic significance of.private subsidiazy farms. But the main mistake, in
our opinion, is to contrast socialist agriculture to this important constituent part
of it--the private subsidiary farms of all categories of citizens.
Not a single legislative act that pertains to private subsidiary farms contains a
description of them from the standpoint of their public importance and social na-
ture, although many monographs and even sources of an official nature consider them
as a constituent part of socialist agriculture. Thus the statistic annual, "The
USSR National Economy," includes them in the concept of the country's main produc-
tion funds, in the national income and in the gross agricultural output [7, p 39].
They are regarded on the same plane in the statistical annual of the CEMA countries.
This position seems correct since the main producers of products on private subsid-
_ iary farms are workers and employees who are kolkhoz members--direct participants
in socialist production. On the other hand, as practice confirms, private subsidi-
ary farming is conducted more successfully in places where there is assistance from
public production. The leading farms are concerned about the creation of a stable
feed base which would satisfy the needs both for public animal husbandry and for
- livestock belonging to the citizens. Nany kolkhozes and ~ovkhozes bought technical
equipment for cultivating gardens, help with mineral fertilizers and toxic chemi-
cals, and organized veterinary service and the sale and delivery of young livestock
and poultry.
:'he decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, "On Ad-
c'_itional Measures for Increasing the Production of Agricultural Products on Private
Subsi3iary Farms Belonging to Citizens," of 8 January 1981 [12] will contribute to
fuller utilization of the possibilities of these farms. Local soviets, econo~ic
agencies, ministries and departments have been given responsible tasks whose suc-
cessful implementation will make it possible to appreciably increase the production
of products on the private subsidiary f arms of the citizens. It is also important
- to create a local public climate whereby people would feel that by raising 13.vestock
- and poultry on private subsidiary farms and engaging in orchard and gardening work,
they are doing a useful state duty.
2. Such a form of individual labor activity as collective cultivation of orchards
and gardens has become very popular in recent years. It also has specific peculi-
arities as compared to other forms of individual labor activity, but the main one
is the lack of a commercial dimension. In essence, collective cultivation of or-
_ chards and gardens is now becoming a kind of active recreation, and it satisfies
aesthetic needs. In 1978 there were 3.2 million amateur gardeners in the country
[13]. From the standpoint of efficient utilization of the land, collective culti-
vation of gardens and orchards makes it possible to bring into agricultural circu-
lation less productive and even unused land--marshes, mines that have been worked,
and wasteland. The organization of collective orchards and gardens facilitates �
control over the correctness of the utilization of land plots and in some cases
_ makes it possible to use more modern methods of cultivating and gathering the
crop. At the present time the union republics have adopted effective measures for
improving the activity of gardening societies of workers and employees and to the
development of collective gardening. In 1978 the country allotted about 40,000 ~
hectares for these purposes. In the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the
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USSR Council of Ministers, "On Private Subsidiary Farins of Kolkhoz Workers, Other
Workers and Employees and Other Citizens, and Collective Cultivation of Orchards
and Gardens," of 14 September 1977, one of the points is devoted to the activity
of gardening societies. The councils of ministers of the union republics were di-
rected to contribute to improving their work, to find land that was unsuitable and
not used by kolkhozes, sovkhozes and forestry enterprises and allot it to enter-
prises, institutions and organizations [5].
The decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of 8
_ January 1981 [12] envisions a complex of ineasures for the development of collective
cultivation of orchards and gardens.
3. A constituent part of individual labor activity is the labor of pensioners who
are still able to work and have energy because of state protection of labor and free
medical assistance, but for some reason can not continue to work at state enter-
prises (including home labor enterprises). The USSR allows the manufacture of items
- for sale to the population and the rendering of certain paid consumer services.
_ Thus the provision concerning arts and crafts industries of the citizens which was
approve~ by a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 3 May 1976 permits the
production of pottery and woven items, a number of construction jobs, photography
and the production of photographic portraits, repair of automobiles, motorcycles,
bicycles, television sets, watches, footwear and so forth [14]. Other individual
labor activity is also possible to render services to the population (for instance
music teachers, coaches). But it is still prohibited to engage in a business with
hired labor and also to engage in those kinds of arts and crafts businesses which
can cause harm to the interests of the soc:Lety (the manufacture of items from valu-
able metals and stone, reproducing and copying equipment, any kinds of ~adications,
chemical equipment, reproduction of movie films and records, and so forth).
According to data of the 1979 census, the proportion of noncooperating craftsmen
in the overall balance of the country's labor resources amounted to less than 0.1
percent. This took into account craftsmen specializing in carpentry, stove repair,
tin working, ~oinery, tailoring, knitting, and cobbler work, and also artists,
music teachers, coaches, dentists and people in other vocations. As compaxed to
the 1970 census, the number of noncooperating craftsmen decreased, and the most
marked decrease was noted in places where the state consumer service operates effi-
ciently. In places where it does meet the demands of the people and does not fully
satisfy them, individual labor activity will be quite useful [2]. It seems pos-
sible to take advantage of the positive experience of the socialist countries. For
~ example, in Hungary there is a broad network of shops where, under the leadership
of an instructor, it is possible to learn any trade and subsequently practice it.
The craftsmen are also supplied with raw materials and semi-manufactured products,
and instruments are leased to them.
In conclusion let us note that in this stage of development individual labor acti-
vity in all of its forms not only has a right to exist, but must even be encouraged
and developed as long as there is an economic and social need for individual kinds
of arts and crafts industries, collective cultivation of orchards and gardens and
- private subsidiary farms of the citizens. In the accountability repor~ of the
CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress, L. I. Brezhnev noted: "Experi-
ence shows that these farms can be a significant support in the production of ineat,
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milk and several other products. Orchards, gardens, poultry and livestock belonging
to the workers ars a part of our common wealth."
Individual labor activity requires systematic control. The society is interested
in its development arid in making sure that this process does not exceed the limits
- stip,ulated by legislation. Such systematic local control on the part of state
agencies and the public presupposes prompt application, wher~ necessary, of both in-
dividual economic and legal measures against excessive growth of individual labor
activiry, and also administrative, civil and other sax~ctions against violations of
the rights of citizens regarding engaging in this kind of activity.
In our opinion, in developing Article 17 of the USSI~ Constitution, it would be ex-
pe3ient to adopt a legal act which would define the concept of individual labor ac-
tivity and earmark its social significance and its main varieties and limits. One
should also formulate principles on which individual labor activity and forms and
methods of contributing to its development should be based, and strengthen the poli-
cy Qf exercising control over this activity.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Announcement of the USSR Central Statistical Administration, PRAVDA, 4 January.
1981.
- 2. Dumnov, D., "Comments on Letters," PRAVDA, 23 August 1977.
3. Shmelev, G. I., "The Private Subsidiary Farm as a Sphere of Public Interest
. Under Socialism," IZV. AN SSSR, Ser. Ekonom., No 6, 1975, p 85.
4. Zlomanov, L. P., Umanskiy, L. A., "Nashi prava; politicheskiy i ekonomicheskiye
_ garantii" [Our Laws: Political and Economic Guarantees], Moscow, 198'l, p 10.
5. Resheniya partii i pravitel'stva po khozyaystvennym voprosam [Party and Govern-
ment Decisions Regarding Econo~aic ProblemsJ (1977-1979), Vol. 12, Moscow, 1979,
p. 104.
6. Yanchuk, K., "More Attention to the Private Subsidiary Farm," KHOZYAYSTVO I
- PRAVO, No 1, 1978, p. 28.
7. "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1979. Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik" [The USSR
_ National Economy in 1979. Statistical Annual], Moscow, 1980.
8. D"yachkov, G., Sorokin, A., "The Role of the Private Subsidiary Farm,"
EKONOMIKA SEL'SKOGO KHOZYAYSTVA, No 1, 1980, pp G2-63.
9. "On the Private Subsidiary Farm," PRAVDA, 10 September 1977.
10. Resheniya partii i pravitel'stva po khozyaystvennym voprosam, (1962-1965),
Vol 5, Moscow, 1968, p 517.
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11. SZ BSSR, No 5, 1965, p 48.
12. SP SSSR, No 6, 1981, p 37.
13. Gusev, N. P. "Not A Clump of Wasted Land," LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 1 May 1979.
14. SP SSSR, No 7, 1976, p 39.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo", 1981
11772
CSO: 1800/648
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REGIONAL
REVIEW OF BOOK ABOUT REPUBLIC ECONOMY,NEW USSR CONSTITUTION
Moscow SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO in Russian No 5, May 81 pp 145-146
[Review by I. Sh. Muksinov, candidate of juridical sciences, of book "Novaya Kon-
stitutsiya SSSR i upravlenfye na.--^dnym khozyaystvom (Uchet otraslevogo i terri-
torial'nogo printsipov)" [New i:' SR Corlstitution and Control of the National Economy
(Consideration for the Branch and Territorial Principles)] by M. Kh. Khakimov,
K. M. Nazarov, S. I. Yigitaliyev and B. I. Mirbabayev, Fan, Tashkent, 1979, 201
_ pagesJ
[TextJ The authors have set themselves the goal of studying the concept and limits,
legal fundamentals and organizational forms of branch and territorial control of the
national economy in the Soviet multinational state, and the state-legal means for
their optimal combination. The juridical design of the branch system of economic
control has been reflected in numerous acts which have been adopted starting in
1965 and which have defined the competence, organization and activity of the
ministries, state committees and other departments of the USSIt. However under
_ conditions ot such a federal state as the USSR, strengthening of branch control
cannot result in a reduction in the importance of territorial control, first of all
on the level of the union republics. The new system required the resolution of a
whole series of scientific and practical problems associated with the optimal combi-
nation of branch and territorial control of the national economy. 1'he materials of
the latest CPSU congresses have stressed the need to combine them. The attempt of
the scientific workers to make their contribution to the practical resolution of
these questions is a response to the most urgent questions of Soviet state and legal
activity.
The authors analyze the vast practical activity of the state agencies of the union
republics, first of all the Uzbek SSR, as well as the USSR. An advantage of the work
is the examination of the problem in a historical aspect. This is especially true of
chapters 1 and 2. They begin quite rightfully with a statement a.nalyzing the first
decrees of the Soviet power which even then reflected the branch and territorial
principles in control. The book was written with regard for the new constitutional
legislation. The working out of practical suggestions to perfect legislative
regu'lation of the branch and territorial control is important. These suggestions
many be taken into account in the development of all-union and republic legislation.
The authors stress that new laws of the USSR and the republic afford scope for
further democratization of state control in general and territorial control in
particular. The main laws contain a number of new constitutional concepts and
formulas which are directly concerned with the problem under study: ','complex
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economic and social development of the union republic" (paragraph 2, article 125
� of the RSFSR Constitution); "conducting of a unified socioeconomic policy" by the
higher ag~ncies of the state power and control of the union republic (paragraph 7,
article 74 of the Uzbek SSR Constitution); "supervision of the economy of the Uzbek
SSR" also by its higher agencies of state power and control (paragraph 7, article
74 of the Uzbek SSR Constitution); "environmental protection" (paragraph 11, article
74 of the Uzbek SSR Constitution) anci many others. At the same time it is not
indicated anywhere that these powers of the higher agencies of the republic only
cover the enterprises, institutions and organizations of republic subordination.
It is evidently meant that they cover the entire republic territory.
Unfortunately, the content of the new constitutional formulas is not sufficiently
_ covered in the monograph. The authors did not show their understanding of the
importance of these formulas in perfecting control of the national economy. In
fact, what is "complex economic and social development of the union republic" as it
is guaranteed by the Supreme Soviet and the republic council of ministers, what
does "st~pervision of the economy of the Uzbek SSR" mean as a whole from the aspect
_ of the highest agencies of state power and control of the repuhlic, and how c~:n it
be guaranteed if almost 40% of the industry is directly controlled by the all-union
and union-republic ministries and departments of the USSR?
The book stresses the role of the laws regarding the union republic councils of
ministers in strengthening territorial. control in the union republic (p 78) and
presents considerations on the desirability of issuing all-union acts on further
expansion of the competence of the union republic counclls of ministers in the .
area of national economic control in order to make more specific the new formulas
contained in the new constitutions and in the laws of the councils of ministers.
Unfortunately, this direction of study was not brought to working recommendations
in many parts, although the need for them is currently felt.
There are more particular remarks. It should ~iardly be indicated that the activity
of the councils of ministers of the union republics is done, in the same way as the
ispolkoms and branch organs of control, "under the influence of the principle of
double subordination" (p 19). The councils of hiinisters of the union republics
is the government of the republic, its highest executive and administrative
agency of state power. Its relations with the USSR Council of Ministers should
be discussed in the framework of article 18 of the law on the USSR Council of
Ministers. In the opinion of the authors, the need to adopt laws on the ministries
and departments of the USSR follows from the USSR Constitution ( p 67). It seems
that this is too broad of an interpretation of the main law, especially evident
in relation to the law on the USSR Council of Ministers. The auth~rs view the
complex question of the correlation of acts of the councils of ministers of the
union republics with the acts of the USSR ministries and departments, and note the
- obiigation of the first for central agencies of control of the USSR under definite
conditions (pp 118-1I9). However, the active USSR legislation does not contain
this standard, in the same way, by the way, that the obligation of the.laws of the
union republics of the USSR ministries and departments has not been set until now.
On the whole, the authors have made a stuciy of a problem which is very urgent in
a scientific and practical sense.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo", 1981
9035
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