Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 1, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4.pdf2.87 MB
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440400050035-4 FOR OFF'iCIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/9985 15 September 1981 r _ West Euro e Re ort p p (FOUO 46/81) FB~$ FOREIGN BROADCASI' INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions an~ broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [ExcerptJ in the first line of eacl~ item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rend~red phoneticaliy or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government. COPYRIGH~ LAWS AND REGUI~ATIONS GOVERIVING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION � OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-40850R040400054035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/9985 r 15 September 1981 WEST EUROPE REPORT (FOUO 46/81) CONTENTS TI~ATER FORCES ~ FRANCE Brief s Nucleax Submaxine Base 1 ECONt7MIC ITALY Treasury Minis~~er~s Proposal for Cutting Public Deficit (IL MONDO, 17 Jul, 7 Aug 81) 2 Andreatta: Cut Now, Pay Zater, by Nicola Forti Opposition to Proposal, by Maurizio Valentini State F`inances, by Bruno Siracusano Problems Facing Genoa's Port Facilities Described (Dante Ferrari; IZ SOLE-21~ ORE, various dates) 13 POISTICAI, FRANCE y - Mauroy on PCF Ministers, NationaliZation, Decentralization (Pierre Mauroy Interview; II, MONDO, 17 Jul 81) 32 Hernu Queried on Changes in Military Service (Charles Hernu ~nterview; PARIS MATCH, ll~ Aug 81) 35 - a - [III - WE - 150 .FOUO] FOR OFF[CIAL USE uNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400054435-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ITAI~Y Analysis of PSDI Election Results (Paolo Passerini; IL MONDO, 17 Jul 81) 39 MII,ITARY F~'RANCE Brief s Help for Military 46 -b- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY THEATER FORCES FRANCE BRIEFS NiJCLEAk SUBMARINE BAS~--The nuclear submarine base at L'Ile Longue, in the Brest roadstead, will not be expanded as the preceding gov~rnment planned to do. After abandoning the civil construction site at Plogoff; it would have been [politically] delicate to increase the surface of a military nuclear base in the same department. The existing base, however, will be enlarged so as to create a new drydock, the third one. This is made necessary by thP decision to launch a seventh missile- launchirig nuclear submarine so as to permit keeping, on a permanent basis, three submarines at sea (as opposed to two at present), as ordered by President Mitterrand. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 24 Aug 81 p 7] CSO: 3100/930 1 .~w~~r~ ~ ~ � rn~. /~~T~ \I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ECONOMIC ITALY TREASURY MINISTER'S PROPOSAL FOR CUTTING PUBLIC DEFICIT Andreatta: Cut Now, Pay Later Milan IL MONDO in Italian 17 Jul 81 pp 13-14 � [Article by Nicola Forti] [Text] In an attempt to whittle the budget deficit down to manageable size, 7.`reasury Minister Beni~mino Andreatta would like to postpone 10 tri?lion lire in payments until 1982. He has three more ideas, though, for getting at the r.oat of the problem. "Andreatta beats Pa~ldolfi 24,000 to 0.~~ This is the latest comment at tlie Treasury Ministry anent the difference (in billions of lire) between what the present minister, Beniamino Andreatta, is doin~; and what his predecessor, Filippo Maria Pandolfi did in the summer o� 1980, which ended in a substantial worsening of the budget deficit. Reapgointed at the last passible moment by Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini,~ An- dreatta has done everyt~zing he could to hold the 1981 budget within sta~utory limits, to the point where people are already ta3.king about a treasury gone wild. Just what does his maneuver amount to, actually? And will he really succeed in his announced intention to get the deficit back into rea- sonable dimensions? Andreatta has drafted an extremely severe proposal in his.bill for bal- ancing the budget. This performance, which theoretically was to have been approved by Parliament before 30 June, is the act under which the government updates its costs and authorizes payments called for under the budget bill. Last year Andr.eatta's predecessor, Filippo Maria Pan- dolfi, overran the budget figures by a whopping 1� trillion lire, ~here- by concentrating all the overrun in the last quarter of 1980 ~nd the beginning of 1981. This year Andreatta wants to do just the opposite: cut back appropria- ~ tions funding far below the figure approved in the budget act by 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400054435-4 ~oR oFHr~~~n~, usF oN~.v a. ~aU trillion lir�e. 'Phis meaiis iYl essence that close to 1~ trilliora lire in spending already approved by Parliament will go unspent this year, and must await settlement next year. From a financial point of view, this operation is important indeed: it will bring the deficit down to 41.8 trillion, and when payments on bonds and foreign loans are deducted, the public-sector borrowing ~eed will be pared down to 36.5 trillion, which is the figure somewhat optimistically pencilled in in September 198'~� All this notwithstanding four stagger- ing facts: l. the S trillion in additional spending approved by Par- lianient at the time; 2. the extra interest the government will have to pay as a result of the rise in money costs; 3� increased govern- ment spending for goods and services trigge~ed by the avalanche of emergency payments authorized in 1980; and 4. the breakneck rush by - local governm~ents, the independent ager~cies, and Social Security (INPS) to draw funds out of the Treasury. What do they glan to do with the cash? Slap it all in the bank, that's what, thereby increasing the grossly swollen 21 trillion lire sums al- ready on deposit at the close of 1980. Or again, and even more bizarre, invest it in BOTs (T-bill~), as reported in the latest PROMETEIA release (see box, below) to ear more interest and to avoid a possible mandatory call for return of funds. On top of all this comes the fact that, as usual when credit is tight, a. great many companies are systematically witfiolding payment of their INPS contributions, despite the very heavy penalties asse~sed for late payments. To offset the huge hole gouged out by these four dodges, it is surely going to take more than cuts in Phase 2, which will reduce the 1981 budget provided, of course, that Parliament approves them by the end of July by a scant 2 trillion. So, with 10 t rillion lire in payments postponed and with public agen- cies required to have no more than 12 percent of their revcnues in the bank (which ought to bring more than 2 trillion lire into the Treasury), the people responsible for the public-sector books can heave a sigh of relief. That relief, though, will have all too short a lease: next year all the unpaid bills all accounts payable, that is, which together wi11 come to a record 75 trillion lire will start coming in again. By lae, those accounts payable can be written off for keeps only by special act of Parliament, certainly not by any decision of the Treasury Minister. The one exception is current expenditures (wages and salaries, pensions, income transfers, interest payments) which fo to peremption, meaning that they lapse after every 2 years, but, be~ause they are what they are, are almost never allowed to carry over. So how do you go about making temporary relief permanent? Andreatta has three ideas. First of all, do away with the seven built-in distor- tions that make public spending intractable: unauthorized recourse to the money market, lack of coverage for multi-year expenditures, appro- val of appropriations in the course of the fiscal year, utilization 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-40850R040400054035-4 FOR OFFfC1AI. CJSE ONLY for miscellaneous measures, allowing the INPS unlimite3 access to the postal system, settling accounts wi~h intra-agency operating funds, and indexii~g payments due to local governments. " Without these modifications, the Treasury Minister's role is merely that of a baokkeeper. "It's as if a bank director wanted to keep his depo- sitors from withdrawing their funds,'~ says one of Andreatta~s aides; "He can hold out for a few days by pleading technicalities and raising pretexts, ~ut eventually pretty soon there is nothing more he can do." For right now, though, there are two other ideas that just might wo~k: the first, which also has support from the Socialists and Repub- licans, is to establish an inheritance tax that would give local govern- ments some revenues, cez~tering on real estate. The second one, though, has to do with the IRPEF [expansion unknown]. "Fiscal policy,~~ Andreotti has said, "must encourage the emergence of spontaneous balancing or offset mechanisms which would allow revenues to grow with greater elasticity than expenditures." Translated, that means that the planned cut in the IRPEF tax will have to � a - little or it will have to be minimal. On this score, though, the new socialist Finance Minister Rino Formica is of a very different opinion. The Miracle According to PROMETEIA Either a Brazilian-style devaluation of the lira, or the old carrot-and-club ploy. The latter is the only feasible way to bring inflation down, as the economists at PROMETEIA have been saying for the past 2 months with great patience and equally admirable discretion; just a few days ago they released their qvarterly report. The club, they say, is for anybody who makes his income outpace the rate of in- flation. The carrot, on the contrary, is to reward ar,~yone who agrees or is forced to accept a reduction in his own real income. The system is simple: use higher taxes to punish those who fuel inflation and use tax incentives and exemptions to reward those who have helped us hold down inflation. The idea, born years ago in America where it was known as TIP~(tax--liased income policy) has now emerged full-blown upon the Italian scene, with enthusiastic backing f rom economists like Lucio Izzo and Vincenzo Visco of the PROMETEIA staff (among the many others are Angelo Tantazzi, Paolo Onofri, and Filippo Cavazzuti), and, most .important of all, from Benia- mino Andreatta. In Italy, the club-and-carrot policy has one primary objective: to keep businessmen, and the service sector in general, which is mainly parasitic and snugly sheltered from international com- petition, f rom devouring all the advan~ages of a slowdown in inf lation achieved by reducing the cost of labor. So what do we do? Prevent any increase in prices to the consumer caused by retailers through preven- tive action which would ease the taxes and costs that are most importar~t to retailers (light, rent, and employee fringe benefits); if, in spite of all this, retailers boost their prices to consumers by more than the increase in their wholesale costs, then the club comes into action, in the form of painful tax bites to transgressors. ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-40850R040400054035-4 , H'UR Uh'r'ICIAL USE ONLY Tlie samc: i�atioiir~le z~pplie5 to wor~kcrs: they must nut look 5olely at t/n~ escalator clause, but bargain for the whole ~+rage increase, including increases built into the contract (a position not too distant from that of the CGIL). What would the result this policy be? Remarkable, a~c- cording to PROMETEIA: with a practically stal~le exchange rate, rate5 going up by ~nly 13 percent, an escalator clause pegged at 10 pcints pea� quarter for a year and at 9 points in the suc~ee~ing year, contract in- creases of 3.$ percent in 1982 and 6 percent in 1983, and stawle retail profit margins, inf ldtion would drop to 16.5 percent by mid-1982 and to 12 percent in 1y83, while the workers would stand to lose nothiag at ail 1~ and + 14 percent) and by 1982 industrial prices would alref~c~y have dropped below 13 percent. Opposition to Proposal Milan IL MONDO in Italian 7 pug 81 p 25 [Article by Maurizio Valentini] [Text] Once recovered from the initial shock, the critics of the prun- ing proposal show no signs of tapering off: on. the contrary, in many instances the initial opposition on the merits of the proposal are now being shored up with a healthy dose of skepticism. "I've been a deputy f or f ar too long to pin any f aith in the high-sound- ing figures one treasury minister after another claims he is going to trim," was what communist Pietro Gambolato, a member of the parliamen- tary commission on the budget and planning. "Before voicing any opin- ion, I should rather wait until the shears begin to prune public spend- ing in earnest. And yet, despite the prevailing skepticism, the revolution tr~ggered by the massive spending cuts Treasury Minister Beniamino Andreatta ordered at the cabinet meeting on Saturday 18 July is still very much the topic of discussion. "Last year, " huff ed Paolo Ciofi~ vice president of the Lazio Region, not to mention its councillor tor the budget, "the minister accused local governmer.ts of inefficiency. The basis for that cha.rge? the l~igh le- vels of our debt carryover. Now he has turned a~omplete somers~ult, and is forcing us to increase them." And in fact the motivation behind the oppos~tion that has sprung up on many sides has to do precisely with the ~conornic policy measures pro- posed for reducing the State deficit. Gr~.~ics tend to concentrate main- ly on four points two of them technical, two of them political. Timetable for Spending Diszribution At the close of 1980 the sutm of carr~edwover debt came to something on the order of 48 trillion lire. Eve~ if you subtract the year's carried- over funds (which are State revenu~s ~ttributed to a particuiar fiscal year without actually having beer~ co'llected) , amounting to a~round 18 5 FOR l~F~'ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400450035-4 FOR OFFICIAI. L1SE ONLY trillion lire, you come up with a negative figure of around 30 tril- lion lire. Then when you go over the record of carryover settlements of recent years you f ind that this figure tends to increase geametric- a].ly. And according to the experts, cutting back on authorizations : without cutting back on that item in the budget would constitute a fear- some incentive to just that sort of behavior. In view of the fact that these remainders are not really idle liquid funds, ~but are rather firmly committed to spending, there will have to be an increase in the deficit for the next fiscal year in order to finance those items. And at the General Accounting Office they point out that, quite apart from any considerations of economic policy, to concentrate increases in spending in the generally limited period of time available to government agencies can give rise not only to problems with economic stability, but wotz).d in aIl likelihood swamp an already badly winded bureaucracy and put it completely out of action. Remembering the fact that spending authori- zations usually get to offices anytime from August to October of t he year the money is to be spent, there is always the risk that when a double load (twice that of 81 and 82) hits them, the whole system will light up and say "tilt." Quality of Spending. This is the second point that has evoked criticism fi~om many economists. By this they mean the real relevance of these measures. Since Andreatta~s proposal is a buf~er measure, and hence cannot affect the volume of the outflo~v, the cuts would be made not on the basis of a political decision, but on the basis of the ease with which the various items in public spending can be reduced. And this will inevitably mean a decline in the quality of that spending. But, in view of the fact that the present makeup of the outflow already fa- vors current expenditures (by 32 trillion lire as against 16 trillion f.or capital expenditures), and that it is a great deal easier to cut _ investment spending than spending for provision of services or for sa- laries and wages, the inflationary potential of public spending will come through the restrictive maneuver strongQr than ever. Corr.patibility Between Government and Parliament Decisions. In the view - of the legal experts, sliding some expenditures already proposed by Parliament (for example, pa~tponing implementation of the middle-school teachers~ contract or the health system reform), while it is not an il- legitimate decision on the part of the treasury minister, is neverthe- less perplexing: substantially~, the government is not sticking to the scale of spending priorities jointly adopted by both houses of Parlia- ment. "The truth is that the government~s anti-inflation commitment is a rig- orous one. We cannot say as much for Parliament's commitment: the blame for this really cannot be laid at the executive's door," argued several staff advisers to Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini. The 1982 Finance Bill. Everybody agrees: if the gover�nment does not take steps to cut spending when th~ budget is being put together the economic situation will really get tough. To do this, though, the go- vernment will have to manage to for~ce revision ~f a lot of decisions 6 FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440400050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Parliament has already made. The areas where the experts and e~con~orJ?is~s say the cuts must be made are health, welfare, local government, and State Participations. The job will be an exceedingly difficult one, partly because a number of parties have already voiced their in~en~ic~~i of fighting the maneuver, tooth and nail. The stakes are high: if' the government loses this fight, the result will be doom for the slow- down policy it announced in July. And the result of that would be a huge torrent ~f highly inf lationary spending crashing down on ttie ` Italian economy. ~~What it all boils down to, " as somebody wrote, ~~is whether or r~ot a fight against inflation and Parliament are actually compatible." State Finances Milan IL MONDO in Italian 17 Jul 81 pp 130-131 [Article by Bruno Siracusano of the Stidues Office of the I~alian Trade Bank (COMIT), headed: "Perils of the Divorce"] There are two possible appr~,a~hes to an analysis of th~ int~rr~,~.ation~ between the public sector and the rest of the Italian e+conomy: you can do it by scrutinizing the effects of budget policy 4S~at~ rev~enues and expenditures) on the real economic variables; or you can do at by ex- amining the ef f ect s of government def ic it f inancing, polic,~ am the mo:iey and credit markets. In striving for an impartial ev~lu~tion of the economic consequences that may be imputed to the hehav.ior ~of public cor- porations it is a good idea to use both approaches; p.r~oceding in this fashion lets you assess the amount of influence the pu`blic sector ac- tually exercises over the economy as a whole. From the real-world point of view, we all know that Italian public cor- porations are beset by serious structural problems. One need only cite the abnormal proportions of current expenditures, which now account for more than four-fifths of their total spending. the resulting laggard levels of capital expenditure (public investment~), which in most cases boils fown to mere welf are-style handouts; and the inf lationary boost that can be traced to their revenue structures. In the last analysis, the behavior of the State fuels the process of rising pricess, both di- rectly by current spending and t ax revenues, and indirectly, 3n that it does not contribute to improvement of the nation's productive potential through a sound investment policy. Beyond the aspects of practical reality, ttiough, we find extreme impor- tance, too, in analysis of the constraints impased by public-sector de- f~icit financing policy on the behavior of financial variables. We are reffering, for instance, to the massive drain of available credit to cov~r the deficit; of its inf luence on the interest rate structure; of the market effects of the monetary base; of its impact on the way the banking system~reacts. Given the importance of the variables in- volved, it is clearly evident that it is overall management of monetary policy (and hence the allocation of financial resources) that is inhi- bited by the presence of high public-sector borrowin~ needs. 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY Moving on now to look at the quantitative evidence, we note at once that the public-sector debt reached 220 trillion lire by the end of 1980, a level better than double that of 1976. More recently, we have also been witness to a profound alteration in the struc.ture of that indebtedness. To sum up, we might say that: a. short-term indebtedness now clearly prevails throughout the system (about two-thirds of the indebtedness shows a high level of liquidity); b. the role of the market has expand- ed markedly (pervading the whole family and corporate credit system) as purveyor of funds to the public sector. ~The underlying causes of the first of these changes can be found either in the explosive growth of T-bill issues, or ir thP worsening of the short-term picture which has sharply eroded the traditional investor preference for longer-term go- vernment bonds. Increasingly rout~ne resort to the market for funds to cover the private-sector deficit is the result partly of the unusual competition, in terms of return, risk, and liquidity, from government securities by comparison with alternative investments for savings; and partly that of increasingly stringent administrative measures (suc~h as the ceiling on loans) designed to hold the activities of the banking sector in check. The growing readiness of the market to accept government securities has, furthermore, allowed the Bank of Italy to reduce its own portion of the public-sector deficit financing burden, and hence to contain its mone- tary coverage. The recent boom atmosphere in financing for the public sector has, how- ever, raised a whole string of problems, both in terms of debt manage- ment and in terms of controlling the monetary and credit variables. As to the first aspect, we should note the exceptional rise in interest costs, whose annual rate of increase over the 1975-1980 period reached 32�4 percent. Disregarding interest, the current balance for the public sector is in . the black by an astonishing margin: better than 8 tr~llion lire in 1980). The practical impossibility of sustaining the present debt-ser- vicing cost (more than 21 trillion lire in 1980) becomes apparent when you stop to think that public spending on interest is f ar greater than spending on either acquisition of goods and services or capital outlays although the latter is far more healthy and productive. The problem thus becomes one of breaking the vicious circle that has come into be- ing: increasing public-sector deficit, stepped-up issuance of securi-- ties, rising iizterest costs, and another round of deficit growth. In recent times, as a consequence of the accelerating inflationary pro- cess, we have also witnessed a considerable shortening of the average term of public-sPCtor indebtedness. Analysis of a few data clearly re- veals a worrisome situation: considering the total circulating debt as of the end of May, we find in f act that 88.8 percent (around 120 tril- lion lire) of the securities issued will mature within the next 2 years, and that '7~.3 percent (about 105 trillion lire worth) will actually f all - due within a year. A debt structure like that makes it more than a"lit- tle difficult to keep a rein on liquidity, poses a dangerous threat of 8 FOR UFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400054435-4 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY f urther inf lation, and severely hampers orderl.y growth in activity on the financial market. This last, furthermore, is clearly increasingly dominated by the perva- sive presence of the public sector, whose issues ncw total more than ~0 percent of all securities in circulation. This one datum is of it- self enough to underscore the public sector's insatiable appetite for resources and the consequent steady expulsion of the private sector from - the securities market. If you accept the view that financial resources soaked up by the public sector are less productive, the increasingly pervasive presence of government securities on the market can only re- sult in an inefficient allocation of resources. Furthermor�e, given the ~ features of this paper, it becomes clear how difficult and costly it is f or the other operators (most of them companies and special credit in- stitutes) to find funds on the financial market when their paper must compete with public-sector issues. Finally, it should not be forgotten that coverage of the public-sector debt fuels a continuous process of edging out the banking system, both from ~he cash-flow side, as a consequence of it~a-gradual withdrawal from financing productive businesses (bear in mind that the lending agencies right now are channeling almost 60 percent of their assets for invest- ment into public-sectar securities), and from the deficit side, as a re- sult of the massive shift of savings away from savings accounts and into public securities. From all the foregoing we can clearly discern the need for an economic policy program that would give top priority to containment of the public sector presence in the money market, not only by reducing the public deficit, but also by readjusting the coverage procedures. One first step might be for the Treasury to call in funds transferred by the State to the decentralized governments (primarily the regions and comunes) and deposited by them in the banking system. We are talk- ing about more than 20 trillion lire which, were they put back into the treasury, would make it possible to bring down both the deficit and in- terest costs. A regulation was recently approved that calls for a grad-- ual recall of bank deposits: however, since similar measures in the past have been ignored, rigid enforcement procedures musb be implemented and, at the same time, the recall es~imated at only 2 trillion lire for this year should be speeded up. In 1980 the postal savings operation, which has traditionally been the channel for financing public-sector requirements, touched the lowest level in 6 years. That was the direct consequence of the gap between returns on postal savings (frozen at 9 percent since 1976) and the re- turn offered by alternatives, particularly bank savings accounts and T-bills. Even without trying to get back to the capital formation le- vels of the early Seventies glory years, when the postal savings provi _ ded coverage for about a quarter of the public requirement, an increase even a modest one in y:ield might once more lure back idle funds from marginal investors. 9 F~~ OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440400050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Still with an eye to cutting interest costs, it might be helpful to broaden the treasury's access to overdrafts on the current account it - has with the Bank of Italy. That sort of financing, limited by law to 14 percent of the annual e.cpenditure estimate, is in f act the least costly to the State, since remuneration is fixed at 1 percent. Of course, more frequent utilization of the drawing account will expand the monetary coverage of the requirement: it would be up to those in charge of economic policy to make the unenviable choice between ex- panding the monetary base (which mioht be rendered innocuous by various means) and an uncontrolled rise in interest costs (which today are run- ning at more than half the public-sector~s borrowing needs). Speaking of monetary financing for the public-sector deficit, it is worth noting in any case that recent experience would seem to indicate that there is no direct correlation with inf lation there. Averages for the past � years show in fact that 18 percent of public-sector borrow- ing needs were met by the Bank of Italy. This observation provides an opening for a brief comment anent the now-notorious suggestion of a divorce between the Bank of Italy and the Treasury. That proposal would abrogate the rule that requires the Bank of Italy to buy and hold in its own portfolio al]. T-bi11s not absorbed by the market, the rationale being that this will allow the Bank to retain its autonomy in coltrol- ling the money supply. It needs pointing out, though, that T-bills represent only one of the three components of the monetary base genera- ted by the Treasury, the other ttvo being subscriptions to government bonds both medium- and long-term by the Bank of Italy, and the Treasury's current account. If we look at the fibures for the past 4 years we find that additions to the money supply from the Treasury have - come through the two sources other than T-bills. In other words, the Bank of Italy has max~aged to dump all its unwanted T-bills back on the market by means of auction sales. In the future, after the divorce, should the market'be asked to buy more enthusiastically before the auction mark-downs, it is obvious that the additional drain on liquidity would leave very little room to market longer-term issues. That means that the long-term bonds would have to be underwritten by the Bank of Italy, and that would be tantamount to creating still more liquidity. There are, however, two other factors that would caution prudence in entertaining the notion of divorce. In the first place, under present conditions, further expansion of the public-sector share of available credit which would derive from the necessity of placing a greater volume of government securities on the market does not look very desirable. In the second place, one side-effect of the divorce might be the intro- duction of elements of instability into the rate structure, or in any case a further rise in rates. This would increase government i.^.terest costs, thus swelling the operating deficit, at a time when the government has been pushing for mandatory ba~:ance. It must be noted, though, that announcement of the Bank of Italy's re- spectfully declining from now on to finance whatever volume of expendi- tures may come its way is an event of major importance, and that there is room for hope that this announcement will beget a little more respon- sibility in the quarters that manage public spending. But to avoid 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY uptoward distortions in the market, somebody should first get control over the public-sector deficit by disarming the mechanisms that perversely fuel spending. This is the ~nly way to straighten out the current precess of resource allocation. In conclusion, above and beyond possible and certainly helpful changes in financing procedures for the public sector, the change of course must involve prima.rily the level, the quality, and the reliabie predictability of public-sector spending. If the new government demonstrates its capacity to control this variable and hence to rein in the inflationary thrusts it generates, directly or indirectly, then it will be possible to restore investor confidence and thus to lay the fcundations for a lasting restoration of balance in public-sector finance policy, which is a condition sine qua non for more efficient operation of the money markets. - Gomparison of Debt Structure, 1976 and 1980 1976 1980 Titoli ~ M/L /l1\ C]) , l ~ Altri d`iti 1,1 ~rmine sul mera o 6 AI~A debiti 0,8 Titol i M%L ~ ~ termine sul B~ 2~~ Debiti verw mereata (6 ) ' e~�ui~ D~biti merato - var~o (5 BI-Uie $ ..:d Impie�hi drqli irth~tf R3a61ni eradito ~ 2 ~ Bot wt . ~ 5 ` poRale ~3~olh mercato ~ pr~rtale ImpieqhidegliJ ~~~itamento~~F~ Indebitament iftituti dI uedito i~ miliardi di lire 98.268 in miliardi di lire 219. $~in 96 wl credito totale int~rno 48,8 ~ 9~ In 96 sul aedito totale interno 64,3 xey : 1. Medium- and long-term securities on the market 2. BOTs (Treasury bills) on the market 3. Postal Savings deposits 4. Indebtedness in billions of lire (1976: 98,268; 1980: 219,096) 5. Lending institutions' commitments 6. Debts to BI-UIC � 7. Other debts ~ 8. In % of total internal credit, 48.6 9. In % of total internal credit, 54.3 11 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400450035-4 FOR OFFIt1AL USE ONLY 1`c?bli~-~~~: c.~t� ~t~a~t~c~a?t~~y C.'urt~~tvy o G3aea ~u 5uyyly aatd) t~7e t977 t~� 1'7s ~e~o Titolf a M/L lermine sul mercato 15,7 19,9 24,9 27~ x1,7 Bot sul mercato ( 2~ 9,8 21,0 22,5 2A,1 iZ,O Raccolte postab ~3~ 18,3 18,3 15,9 1e.i /M Implephi depll Istllutl dl cradito ~4~ 17,2 12,2 9,3 M Debltl versc BI-Uk (5 ~ 39,9 29,7 26,5 M.1 ~?,f ANrldebitl ~6~ 1.1 1.0 0,9 OA , ~ T O T A L 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100.a Indebitemento In mlliardl CI I~e ~ 98.268 . 117.758 151.139 1t?.i~7 21~.016 In % sul credlto totate interno 8~ 46,8 49,4 52,8 8~,i it,~ Fonte: Bance d'IteUa, rMulone ennuale. ~9 ~ Key : . 1. Medium- and long-term paper on the market 2. BOTs (Treasury bills) on the market 3. Postal Savings deposits 4. Lending institutions' commitments 5. Debts owed BI-UIC 6. Other debts 7. Indebtedness in billions of lire 8. Indebtedness in % of total internal credit 9. Source: Bank of Italy, annual report COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1981 6182 ' CSO: 3104/354 12 FOR 4FFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400054435-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ITALY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS FACING GENOA'S PORT FACILITIES DESCRIBED [Milan IL SGF.E-24 ORE in Italian 21, 24, 29, 31 Jul, 2 Au~ 81 - [Articles by Dante Ferrari] [21 Jul 81 p 4] ~ [Text] Genoa in Pursuit of Rich Merchandise. Genoa--'In jargon, they are called "bulk," but to the user they~are essen- tial raw materials: scrap, pre-reduced metals, pig iron, ores, coal, sulfur, kaolin, etc. Tt is poor merchandise, hauled by special-purpose ships or by tramp ships, but sometimes it arrives aboard the most modern of vessels. It must be - unloaded by traditional methods: elevators, crane, buckets and so forth. A good fourth of the piers of the Port of Genoa have from time immemorial been equipped to handle this type of cargo. ~ There is, however, little liking for this "bulk" on the part of the Port authori- ties and much less on that of the members of the sole dock workers Company. It is the "mangy" sector. Lots of traffic, lots of movement, lots of work, and little yield for everyorae. The management of the port neglects this part of the facili- ties because "it produces nothing but problems," say some of the officials. The dock wozkers Gompany considers this zone as a sort of "lazaretto": poorly paid, tiring, hard work, hence--the ~anion leaders maintain--always subject to negotia- tion. If the Port of Genoa could in one fell swoop rid itself of all its "bulk" sector traffic, the general feeling is that it would do so without a single moment's hesitation. Even though tradition has from time immemorial assigned to Genoa a fundamental role with regard to this activity, the new concept that prompts the strategists of our largest maritime port of call is th~t the scrap, the pig iron, the coal and everything that is part of the "bulk" family the space occupied by its piers, the technical �acilities it ties up, the railway movements, the customs clearance procedures--could all be eliminated to the benefit of "clean" traffic. In sum, the ideal, it seems, would be to replace all "bulk" facili- ties with container-handlinq facilities: all clean work, in all the space needed, and all highly lucrative to both the Rort administration and the dock iorkers Company. 13 FOI~ OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPR~VED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000400050035-4 ~ ;IAL USE ONLY it has even been proposed quite recently that "bulk" operations be moved out of Genoa and assigned to a distant, sort of special-purpose port, to be suitably equipped, beyond Voltri, in a zone th~t would have to be entirely restructured from the standpoint of roads and railroad facilities. In shart, the "bulk" is unwanted in the Port of Genoa. The Port's administrative authorities of course indignantly deny these charges and insis~ that "everything has now been done that could be dene." But the fact remains that the "bulk" sector is one of the most chaotic and disas- trous of the entire Genoese port o� call: Extremely high costs, low productivity, throughput times double or triple those of nocthern European ports, obsolete facilitie~, excess personnel, absurd regulations and loading and unloading sched- ules (suffice it to consider that a few raindrops halt all work, that there are only two shi~Ets a day, and that nothing moves on Saturday and Sunday). The "bulk" scene harks back to the port of a century ago. By contsast with the container sector, the "bulk" sector conveys the impression of a past world, that of the "boss of the ironworks," when scrap and coal was being delivered to an industrial system (the one just outsic3e the Port of Genoa) that has in fact stood still in terms of time. No one, however, seems to have considered the fact that "bulk" does not necessarily signify an activity that should be rejected or abandoned; that "bulk" means in- stead, for the Po valley's productive systpm, the flywheel that keeps it supplied with a flow of essential raw materials, for its steel industry first and foremost, and for other activities that are basic to the production of energy, industrial transformation, construction and so on. But Genoa does not welcome this way of thinking. There is a long-standing grudge, a perpetual protest, and even a copious body of controversy, involving accusati4ns on the one hand (the users) and promises and proposals (never maintained, say the users) on the other. The fact is that dissatisfaction on the part of the "bulk" users in the Po valley has now reached the point where exasperation characterizes their informal "gripes" as well as their formal protests against the entire in-out operation of the Port of Genoa, whose "service on the whole ~s extremely costly and is not even mini- mally comparable--in the judgement of its users in almost every other category-- as regards efficiency, processing times and productivity, with that of the other Mediterranean and northern European ports. The complaints have now taken on the character of a controversy that is involving other institutional organizations as well, such as Chambers of Commerce. The protest by Enrico Salza, president of the Turin Chamber of Commerce, dates back only a few days; and, over the past few days, a number of ineetings have been held in other zones of Northern Italy to examine the problem of difficult relations with the Port of Genoa. l1~ ~ ~'(1R OFFICIAI. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440400050035-4 FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY But let us return now to "bulk." To begin with, this reopening of the "bulk" issue seems to tlabbergast the authorities o� the Pott o� Genoa. "But what are the Po valley steelmakers complaining about at this moment?," is being asked at the Por~. "Imports of scrap have been at a standstill for months because of the steel industry crisis. Not a single carload of scrap is being sent through~~the Port of Genoa." The Po valley steelmakers respond: "There are spelled-out commitments on the part of the Pori~ to improve its service, to replace i.ts facilities, to streamline its procedures, to review its rules and regulations. Nothing is being done. True, the steel industry is now in crisis and is not using scrap imported via ocean freight. But this is not a valid excuse �or l.ettinq everytriing go to the dogs. Genoa has formally undertaken commitments: Genoa must respect those commitments and there is no better time to do so than now. It imports are resumed, the crisis of deliveries is certain to follow. It is unthinkable," says Marco Formentini, deputy general manager of Assider in Milan, "that a system as chaotic as that can continue to be left unchanged. A year ago, when imports via Genoa were current, the Po valley steel plants were receiving the trains of carloaded cargo 100-120 days after the arrival in the Genoa roadstead of the ships carrying that scrap or ~ther 'bulk' cargo. "Thirty days of anchorage, on average, outside the port; one month and sometimes 40 days docked at a pier to unload the ship; and 40-60 days to put the cargo train on the tracks from Genoa, via Arquata, that is, over the Ligurian Appennines, to the plants in Lombardy, Piedmont and the lower Veneto." "We have protested this situation repeatedly. No one has yet remedied it. Now there is time to do something about it; the dock facilities are empty, it is true; the steel industry is in crisis; but this is certainly a transitory situation." Scrap, therefore, is a raw material: True, less o� it is being imported today, but resupply planning cannot possibly avoid consideration of the Port of Genoa as one of the cardinal points of the system. In any case, let us consider the trat~ic volumes involved. For its normal needs (not those of this particular moment) Italy's steel industry must process 13 mil-- lion tons of scrap annually, particularly to feed hal� o~ its plants consisting of electsic furnaces. About half of this, or around 6 million tons, is recovered from within the con- fines of the damestic market by the steelmakers~ This leaves some 7 million tons, of which 3 million come from Germany, 2 million from France, and the rest, or over 2 n~illion tons, must necessarily be imported from countries outside the European Community. The imported scrap is predominantly destined for Northern Italy where 90 percent of Italy's electric furnaces are installed. Almost hal� the raw material, that is, the scrap, needed to feed these furnaces is imported from countries outside the Community, and more specifically the United States and the Soviet Union. T~e des- tination of all ships carrying scrap ta Italy is Genoa. 15 FO~ OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440400050035-4 FOR aFFICIAL USE ONLY The relationship between the Po valley steel mills and the Port of Genoa is there- fore one of strict dependency. ~oday, this relationship is interrupted for well- known reasons. But tomorrow, it k~ill be resumed and it is not certain that the importation of scrap from overseas, and even �rom sources other than the present ones, will not be more substantial. "But in Genoa," Formentini continues, "everyone thinks that scrap will no longer be arriving by sea. No maintenance work whatever is being done in the 'bulk' area. This is the reason for our protest. We have offered our utmost cooperation, having gone so far as to set aside the funds for the procurement of two large cranes. Well, Genoa's response has been: 'You pick out the model, we will install it.' "We ask ourselves 'How can this be? Does the port not have technical people qualified to judge what would be the best hoisting equipment for the purpose?.' We are the users. We want to pay more for service in order to obtain a more effi- cient one. And they respond: 'If you want new cranes, buy them yourselves.' Is that not an absurdity...?" [24 Jul 81 p 4] [Text] Port of Genoa Criticized: High Rates, Low Productivity. Genoa--At Genoa, discontent is expressed unequivocably through "griping." In Milan, Turin and other cities, if one speaks of the Ligurian port one hears colorful, pungent expressions that convey disappointment. Most recently, relations between the Port and the Po hinterland, that is, between - the users and the providers of the service have greatly worsened. The coup de grace was administered with the recent substantial increase in rates. During the past several months, the tension has not risen because the movement of merchandise has diminished. June seems to have been a"disastrous" month: The figures on port operations--not yet officially published--show a heavy drop in traffic. The reason? Certainly the crisis, the difficult economic situation, exchange obstacles, the drop in imports, the diversion of certain export trends. But from behind this leading array of objective causes, the serious consequences of poor service, high operating costs and low productivity are beginning to emerg~; and above all, there is evident a deep sense of no-confidenee in the future of rela- tions between the users in the Po hinterland and the Ital}~'s principal port. Enrico Salza, president of the Turin Chamber of Commerce, is very explicit: - "We had expected of the Port of Genoa a decided developmental program of its own. It is to blame for major current problems: An entire industrial system--the 16 !F~3R OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440400050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Lombard-Piedmontese one--is not only sutfering the consequences of the high costs of its services but is also paying, in terms of lost competitiveness, for the poor organization of its work. It is never possible to base a calculation on the arrival or departure of a shipment, a container, or a'bulk' cargo. Every shipmen~ _ and every arrival becomes a venture. We continue to hear talk of the drawing up of a port developmental model: In reality, almost everything eontinues at a stand- still. Not even a problem as simple as the governing of a crane is able to be - resolved. The so highly ballyhooed teaming up of Consortium and sole workers Company, instead of paving the way for an improvement of the situation, is vnly continuing to exacerbate it. "We have always expressed confidence in regard to the Port of Genoa, adding to this attitude on our part an abundant dose of patience. Now, we have lost both our con- fidence and our patience. Things cannot go on this way." Turin is complaining about the same things that Milan for a long time now has also been protesting: The Port of Genoa is pursuing a policy entirely unglued from any consideration of Po valley industrial growth. It is not merely by chance that the most severe criticisms are being leveled first and foremost against that part of the Port's services which should be the best organized and most efficient. "Genoa," Northern Italy's production circles affirm, "boasts of its leadership in the field of containers. True, its service in this field is costly and not always efficient, but it has decidedly improved. However, a large productive econ- omic system also needs to feed its productive installations with poor merchandise, which is, after all, crude, raw material, the cost of which at its origin is very low but can become prohibitive when the shipping costs snd delivery times exceed certain limits. In the case of sc~ap, for example, the chaos that exists in the Port of Genoa results in an increase of 10-.12 percent in the delivered cost; with- out taking into consideration the effects on cost resulting from missed work sched- - ules in the steel plants." Antonio Chiurco, general manager of Campsider, the consortium that handles combined procurement of the scrap, says: "At Genoa, poor merchandise has always been treated ' with indifference. Yet, for our industries, this source of work is extremely im- portant. Over the past 10 years, the situation has grown worse. As of last year, when the steel production crisis had not yet brought about a suspension of scrap imports, the Port's handling capacity was 80,000-100,000 tons a month, as compared with 200,000 tons a month during the 1960's." ~Question~ In your opinion, what is the cause of this drop in productivity? ~Answer~ "Disorganization and the total absence of a desire to actualize a restruc- turing plan." ~Question~ Is it true then that Genoa subjects "bulk" cargo to a sort of torture treatment to discourage the traffic? 17 F~lg OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~Answer~ "The tigures would seem to point in that.direction. I do not believe, however, that this precise intention exists on the part of the port authorities; that would be the last straw." FIGURES OF THE DECLINE (5teel Scrap Tonnages Handled) Percent 1981 Ports 1979 1980 Difference Jan-May Total traffic 1,554,000 1,319,000 -15.12 Ligurian ports 1,159,000 798,000 -31.15 Genoa 984,000 576,000 -41.46 11,000 Savona 98,000 130,000 +32.65 59,000 La Spezia 77,000 92,000 +19.48 22,000 Other ports 395,000 521,000 +31.90 35,000 Scrap, therefore, means poor merchandise. True, total traffic has dropped; but the steel industry could suddenly recover. The Port of Genoa was at one time.hand- ling close to 1 million tons, or the equivalent of 50,000 carloads., ot scrap annually. "That is exactly the point," Chiurco a�firms further. "The Port of Genoa's facili- ties for receiving and forwardinq these cargoes date back 40 or 50 years. The connecting railroad network has deteriorated; the transfer of a load of inerchandise from a pier to customs, then to the Arquata switohing yard at the top of the Appen- nines, before forwarding it to the Po valley, is an ordeal. In no port in the - world is there such a badly arranged service." Today, it is scrap and other bulk cargo; but tomorrow, another major probl.em could emerge: The supplying of coal-fired thermoelectric genera.ting plants in the Po val- ley. This is not just an idle hypothesis. The plans are complete, the funding is on its way, and the energy plan could be put into operation within a very shflrt time. "That would be a disaster. The Port of Genoa is not even able to handle 1 million tons of scrap now; heaven knows what would happen i� coal ships were to arrive with millions more of tons o� cargo to unload and forwatd rapidly to the electric power plants. This is the point that must be addressed: A major port cannot aban- don poor merchandise. It is precisely the handling of these large quantities of material that speaks for productivity." 18 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONtY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY An exa3nple? The unloading of a bulk shipload ut scrap at Rotterdam casts between 3,000 and 4,000 lire per ton; at Genoa, the same operation costs not less than 11,000 lire per ton. Competitiveness under these conditions is nciw a mirage. Th~ - "bulk" sector is an extremely sensitive indicatar o� the situation. And the fact is that during a period in which its most important traffic, that of scrap, is down in volume, Genoa has lost even more ground: The other Li+~urian ports, with their lower rates and better services, are taking away Genoa's clients and traffic. [29 Jul 81 g 4] - [Text) H igh Costs and Low Productivity Port of Genoa's Major Faults Genoa--A port is a business. And like every business,, it must accept, not elude, the laws of the marketplace. A port produces a service; its product must therefore be sold, advertised, marketed. What is its service worth? That must be determined by the market of its users. Are it~ ~ariffs (the equivalent of the price of a product) competitive? Once again, the response must come from the ~ marketplace. A port is thus a business. Now, let us ask: "At G~noa, does this rule apply? To judge from the results of its operation, from the degree of "acceptability" of its service on the part of the users, from the condition of its install.ations, from the state of relations between the independent Consortium (3,500 employees, with a budget of 180 billion lire) and the sole dock workers Company (around 6,000 mem- bers), from the inadequacy of its investments, from its loss of prestige in some areas of its traditional activities, it seems clear that i~ts business has entered a phase of crisis which some consider to be irreversible. A crisis of concept, of structure and of management, a crisis that without even yet having found a serious cause in the hegemony and in the "public" control that is in fact being exercised by the dock workers Company (which monopolizes virtually in total the ground sector of loading and unloading operations) has spread its roots in a terrain devoid of entrepreneurial and manaqement humus. The Port of Genoa, in substance, has rested on its laurels and has neither moved to promote its image nor to study a revision of its marketing policy. Many freight traffic specialists who are users of port facilities say: "Genoa is the same as ever. It simply sits back waiting for clients, without going after them; it im- poses term and conditions thE same as in the past when it was the only easily reachable port of call and, above all, a highly functional and economical one. These conditions no longer exist. Genoa is a most important port o~ call, per- haps the Mediterranean's most tunctional one from the standpoint o� structure and underlying concept, but it is being run based on outmoded criteria that take into accour,t solely a need first and foremost to guarantee the survival of its work force, and within constraints of autonomy deriving from a misguided attachment to antiqua~ed norms and laws that regulate the management and administration of the Port. 19 F(~!: OFFICYAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400054435-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY These are clearly dependable, well-thought-out crit~.cisms having no basis in re- sentful polemics. Criticisms, be it said again, without the least intent to pull to pieces or to divest of value the efforts, the dedication of those who, eapecial- ly over the past few years, have applied themselves with the utmost devotion and diligence to the governing of the Port. Enveloping this problem is a veil o� indifference and skepticism that probably had its origin in the disappointment experienced during the past several years by every force or organized voice (operators associations) that has tried, without success, to take part in the drawing up of proposals for chanqe. What are the main criticisms gathered from among the users of the port? They come under three headings: The first heading concerns commercial policy, that is, its commercial operation strictly speaking; the second brings into question its tech- nical operation, which for more than a decade, according to some technical experts, has been deteriorating for lack of a coordinated and innovational overall ~echnical policy; the third concerns the relations between CAP ~Independent Port C~nsortium~ and the sale dock workers Company, which have deteriorated over the past several years. Let us consider th.e aspects of these criticisms. First, the commercial operation. The users say: Genoa is not yet cognizant of the fact that the structure of ships has changed, that for each type of cargo there is a specialized transportation facility with productivity standards and requirements that in turn necessitate modern ports with installations designed to carry out loading and unloading opera- tions with maximum speed. They add: At Genoa, almost everything has remained at a standstill: The composition of the dock workers crews has not changed, just as there has been no change in - their rate of output (the amount of work per member of the crew). Shifts are rigid; there is no flexibility. Movement is slow. Specialized shortcuts to speed up the loading or unloading of a ship are out of the question. They cite further the increasingly higher costs of ships, that must be amortized in shorter times, faster running speeds, cargoes ot increasingly higher technolo- gical content or market value. The capital turnover involved is enormous. And the risks of loss are a function of transportation times, the meeting of delivery schedules, the prompt use of an asset ordered months in advance to be put into use or installed. All of this translates into unused money or super�luous expenditures, then into - net losses that prevent maximized use of ships, port facilities and labor. A vicious cycle, in sum, originates with the �act that the trunnion of the system, namely, the organization and work methods of the port have not changed. Not even in the most modern area o� the Genoese port, that of the "containe~s," is the work sufficiently rationalized for the application o� the rules o� maximum ef~iciency. In this regard, users of the Port of Genoa state: Genoa owes the growth o� its container port mostly to its strategic position, and very little to the efficiency of its services. 20 F4R OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440400050035-4 , FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY The proof: The Port of Livorno, much smaller and decentralized ~aith respect to C9noa, has had an incredible growth, proportionately,in this field. Lower costs, higher efficiencies, willingness o� the port operating company ta make changes in shifts, crews, output rates, tariffs and so forth. Work methods are changed there in accordance with the work requirements. At Genova, instead--according to the complaints of many users--the exact opposite ocaurs: fixed rules, with extremeI.y few exceptions, inso�ar as concerns organiza- tion of work, and consequently the obligation on the part of the user, or compul- sion by force ot circumstances, to accept them. At this point, however, Genoa can no longer fall back or? a predominant position (it is not the sole port monopolizing traffic) and is losing new clients. The Port's fundamental undertaking must therefore be to review and rethink the organization of its work. As for technical operations: Is the port antiquated? Let us riot exaggerate, say the users themselves. First of all, the port has little space; this is the funda- mental problem. This is what conditions its overall growth. It is also true, however, that many of its structures are obso].ete, no longer res- ponsive. The Consortium has jealously def-~nded its autonomy of management (this is evident from its balance sheets), but has not dared to go beyond the limits set by absurd laws in search of additional capital and tinancing. Thus, what has been done fsom a technical standpoint and that o� its structures is somewhat the result of a good but modest management eftort (ordinary financings) and of the application of rules and regulations deriving ~rom legislative provisions, plans, etc. But there has not been on the part of the Port an independent choice of financ~ng methods capable ot attractinq influxes of capital or loans commensurate with the drawing power and intrinsic worth ot the Ligurian port. A policy of "governance from a choir stall," sealed in like a sea urchin, in sum, impervious to the outside world. The result has thus been, according to tYiis view, a"leopard-skin" pattern of renewals of port facilities. An installation today, another one later, a project started, another one halted, all as a function of the starts and stops of public financings, appropriations, and so fbrth. In short, th~re has not been a plan coupled with coordinated funding and phased in accordance with a predetermined ti:metable. As for relations between the Port and dock workers: Recently, despite the ongoing drumbeating in this regard by both parties, their relations have worsened. At the last meeting of the Consortium, the outgoing pr~sident, Giuseppe Dagnino, who for more than a decade has actually been the champion of the policy of inediation with the dock workers, accused the sole dock workers Company of hQgemony, shouldering it, in �act, with the blame for the drop in work management e�ficiency. Constrainment by the dock workers has always been strong; indeed, it is institu- tional. What is occurring at Genoa, however, has ceased occurring in other ports throughout the world: The dock workers refuse to accept any change in their concept 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 HOR nFNiC'IA1. 115~: (1NI,ti' of work management; their attitude is more corporative; they reject out of hand any innovative proposal that would bring into question their "composition of crews and work output coefficients" dyad. They react about like industry mana~gement association leaders when, with respect to labor costs, they say: "The indexed wage scale cannot be touched; the organization of work is not negotiable." The corporative mold is identical; the ideological one at Genoa is perhaps different; that is, it is more radical and hence harder to change. So much for the three capital flaws of the Part of Genoa. [31Ju181p5] [Text] A Long List of Uncorapleted Programs in Recent History of Port of Genoa. Genoa--In the traditional oleograph illustrating the hundred sailor's knots and indicating the procedures for releasing them, one is missing: The one that interlaces the authorities (and the responsibilities) shared by the CAP ~Indepen- dent Port Consortium~ and the sole dock workers Company. The two ends of the ropes disclose the diverse origins of the strands that compose them. The CAP is an economic agency, but by law it must operate in strict accord- ance with independent management criteria; the sole dock workers Company, on the other hand, is at one and the same time a cooperative (all the warkers are members) and a labor union. Those holding the opposite ends of the ropes seek to apply each his own force to the knot, and in this way the knot closes with::viselike tightness and becomes inextricable. But the applied force relationships are unequal: The sole Company's _ rope is pulled with greater force and perseverance; that of the CAP, instead, is frequently slackened. Thus, the sole Company is becoming the manager of the Port and is imposing its policy--its traditional policy, the same one as always. No one - has ever succeeded in changing it. The sole dock workers Company, secure in its monopoly, dictates the law, decrees prohibitions, exerts pressures and erects massive protective walls. Its policy guidelines are two: The first is of a clearly political nature; the second is unionistic. That policy is enforced by a vast organizational apparatus that interweaves the exercising ot shareholders rights (in the valorization oE participating shares, hence in the ordering of individual earnings) with the exercising of union action: protection of employment, strict application of the rules, imposition of inethods of determining service charges. In the Port of Genoa--as the old proverbial saying goes--"not a leaf stirs but the Company wills it." Over the yeazs just past, the authority o� the Consortium has gradually been voided of all content and meaning, The pro-pub~.ic, that is, 22 k ~R OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY anti-private, wave that translated into a progressive dismantling and subsequent absorption o~ many highly specialized functions exercised by private service enter- - prises has borne bitter fruits. Entrepreneurial levels, manayement criteria, ef�iciency standards, hsve all, little by little, been lowered, modified, eroded. Bureaucratization has become the rule. The private entities having been eliminated (for debatable, although in some cases also historically acceptable, reasons), the technical and managerial 1�eadership having been dismantled, the Consortium identified itself with a sort of conciliar governance of the Port. This situation did not weigh heavily in strategic terms during the early years of the "era of the 1970's," because Genoa, like other major ports, continued to avail - itself of the natural advantage of its strategic position. Genoa was an obligatory and only landing place. Anyone having to receive or ship merchandise, raw mater- ials or goods by sea was compelled to depend upon the Ligurian port. That is the = way it was. _ During the decade of change, of renovation,and of bold choices of new strategic directions in the administration and management of port operations in which the major Mediterranean, North Sea and Atlantic and Pacific coast ports were taken up in the search for new solutions (redimensionings, renewals o~ p].ant and personnel, automation of operations, functional autonomy concess~ons, construction of special- ized port sections to handle specialized ships and cargoes), Genoa--say many of the experts in maritime matters--was afraid and declined to take the risk. The Consortium used up a large pazt of its energies seeking a formula that would conciliate the management ot the Port with that of the union. During the 1960's--these circles claim--Genoa with its port had a well-worked-out � growth plan: Renewal of the old but still highly worthy port; opening of a third Apennine railway crossing-point; construction of the Voltri-Ovada superhighway, roads linking it to the main Po Valley superhighway and an interconnection with the Sempione route; and lastly--considered a winning card--constzuct~.on of the new port at Voltri. Ten years later, how much of this grand design had been actualized? The port had been partially renovated, but without a city-planning scheme based on a long-term financing plan. Genoa built its container port with intuitive irsight, but this idea was less ascribable to originality or boldness on Genoa's part than to its essentiality within a minimal approach to the planning o� growth. Today, in Consortium circles, this accomplishment continues to be ballyhooed; for Genoa, however, the choice was a forced ane. Without a container port, Genoa would have become a second-rate port. The third railway crossing was not built. Railway �reight car operations inside the port are a disaster: The waiting times involved in loading and unloading ar:a 23 " F'U?EE OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-40850R040400054035-4 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY TARIFF SCALES (Lire per Container) Genoa 20' 315,000 Full, lower hold to terminal 40' 394,000 20' 204,000 - Empty, lower hold to terminal 40' 236,000 Livorno 20'/40' Full, lower hold to terminal 167.000 20'/40' Empty, lower hold to terminal 83,819 Venice 20' 139,400 Full, lower hold to terminal 40' 198,700 20' 108,000 Empty, lower hold to terminal 40' 147,900 - Naples 20' 210,000 - Full, lower hold to terminal 20' ~as published~ 256,000 20' 118,000 Empty, lower hold to terminal 40' 134,000 - Marina di Carrara 20' 156,000 Full, lower hold to terminal 40' 240,000 20' 71,500 Empty, lower hold to terminal 4Q' 110,000 ~continued on facing page~ 2 FOR OFFICIA USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TARIFF SCALES ~c~nt'd~ (lire per Container) Palermo 20~ Full/empty, lower hold to terminal gg,000 and return 40' Full/empty, lower hold to terminal 129,000 and return Marseille 20' French francs 67 per ton with minimum of French francs 450 per container 40' French francs 67 per ton with ninimum of French francs 900 per container (Lump sum rate obtained by shipping companies from time to time: 2G, Shipboard to French francs.700,800 ~as pub- terminal lished~ - * Figures given in this table are taken from a comparative study of the principal Italian ports, using as a basis the unloading charges for 20' and 40' con- tainers. Source: IL PORTO - June. FOR OFFI~IKL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY in the sending oE loaded cars on their way to the switching yards on the other side of the Apennine barrier are double, and in any case lpnger than, those of the other international ports. An organic plan for developmental funding has never been studied together with the State Railways: The Port Consortium has preferred to safeguard its autonomy (the movements of convoys are regulated by internal rules and regulations, and effected by personnel and locomotives belonging to the Consortium or to the sole Company); and the Railways have never addressed the study of a binding plan for the renova- tion of connecting routes. As for the superhighway, true, the Voltri-Ovada section over the Apennines was completed, but the planned idea of linking Genoa with the Sempione trunk was left on paper. St may indeed be asked in this case, "But what could the Consortium have done?". But the real unaccomplished project is the pott of Voltri. Its consttuction was programed 25 years ago. Dozens o� laws and by-laws have provided for its construc- tion, but its financing has never been approached on a sound, organic set of criteria. To date, for work already done, 63 billion lire--the appropr~iations under all of three laws (1200, 492 and 843)--have been spent. For 1982, only 43 billion lire will be available; in 1983, another 43 billion will become available to spend on the project. To complete the first installanent of the project, that is, to render ready for use a first part of the works now under construction, enabling the retrieval of 220 hectares (three berths for roll-on/roll-off ships, and three for container ships), will require another 150 billion lire. But the port of Voltri will require another mountain of billions: For its completion, pro~ected for 1987, 491 billion lire of overall costs have been calculated, inclusive of project costs at 1981 prices, price revisions and incidental IVA ~value-added tax1 costs. But who can guarantee continuity of funding to the Port of Genoa? An overall ports plan does not exist; the bills that reach Parliament benches always address the port network as a whole; and in this way appropriations are parceled out, frag- mented. Genoa never manages to obtain in substantial measure the capital funds needed for rts development. Again in this case, one might ask, "But how can the port Consortium or the dock workers Company be blamed for this?". And this is the big question to be clarified. Administrative blame? None, to be sure. But blame with respect to policy? Very much. The Consortium has always administered its autonomy with absolute exactness: Its accounts always balance cortectly. But no dash, no elan, no challenge of the status quo--say many critics--have contradistinguished the decadal manaqements. The dock workers Company has operated likewise, �ully occupied with safeguarding corporatively its monopoly on labor setvices, and--let us be quite frank about it-- its high earnings levels (especially if compared with those of the dock workers of 26 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404050035-4 FOR OFFICIAI. l1SF. ONI.Y other cities, in relation to actual hours worked). Outside the port enclosure no one has gained much �rom this situation. But outside, many changes have taken place. Thus, Genoa has a future tull of and it is not even true that the competi- tion now cominq from other Ligurian and Tuscan ports (today, very pressing indeed but quantitatively still o~ minor relevance, owa,ng to their obvious lack o~ ade- quate basic structures) will be success�ul. Clearly, if the Port does not take on a new entrepreneurial mentality, if the organization of work does not change, if the ~inancing concept does not surpass the strict limits of the "autonomous" Consortium's budget in an imaginative search for more substantive underpinning than is provided by funding from state budgeting alone, the knot that binds Consortium and port Company will never be loosened. But a few signs that changed times may be in the otfinq are already being per- ceived. One in particular has ~ttracted Genoese public opinion and that of econo- mic circles: The resigned tone that pervaded the proceedings of the Consortium's annual meeting. Traffic in a downtrend, clientele abandoning p�rdock1workersfC mpanynhegemonyh(by costs and low productivity, denouncement ot the President Dagnino): All explosive issues. There was no debate. The proceedings concluded in a general consensus. Why this acquiescence? Perhaps there is an explanation: All things considered, it appears quite clear from the outcome of that meeting that the moment has come to turn the page. The 1970's are now behind even the Port of Genoa--as they are now remote in the memories of other sectors that are beginning to consider again, with new ideas and new principles, the restoral of universally acceptable rules of good govern- ance, of sound economy and of bold management. In short, one may now speak again of entrepreneurship. [2 Aug 81 p 14] [Text] A Talk With Giacomo Clerici, head of one of the Port of Genoa's Major Operating Groups. Indeed, there is the danger that the choice of the new presidency and the identify- ing of the criteria on which the r.?anagement of the Port and the relations between the autonomous Consortium and the port Company are to be based will be a long- drawn-out affair, in keeping with the way of doing things that characterizes the current Italian record in this �ield. 27 F(?R OFFICIAL USE ~~NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY But that the page must be turned there is no longer any doubt; if for no other reason than because the serious crisis that is taking shape imposes it. What ap- proach is to be taken, then? The problem is a complex one, but an initial response at least might be based on same comments gathered from within Genoese maritime circles and from among the spokesmen �or the users in Lombar~y and Piedmont. Not more should be bitten off than can be chewed. So, the first thing to be done is to come to an agreement on who is to run the Port, with what powers, authority and degree of autonomy; next, a detailed recovery program must be put together. To debate beforehand on a program of change, without having previously chosen who is to manage it; is tantamount to creating in advance the cunditions that will lead the Port of Genoa into total paralysis. At Genoa, on one front, and at Milan and Turin, on another, that is, between the direct operators of the Port and its users, an endeavor is being made not to draw up a case against any particular individual; nor is it desired to rehash the record of J.0 years of difficult management of the Port system. For greater clarity, therefore, it may be said that one aspect of Dagnino's manage- ment has definitely characterized it: He succeeded in achieving, within the ambit of the Port of Genoa, a minimum of harmony in the relations between the management structure (Consortium) and the sole workers Company. Dagnino got his operancy under way with ~n initial act of delimitation, as patient as it was difficult, of the boundaries of operability: He staked out, that is, the limits of the ambit of his operance and of his powers, accepting de factp, however, the change of a number of management functions within the Port from a privately controlled to a publicly controlled status. He then proceeded to construct the CAP ~Autonomous Port Consortium~-sole Company dyad, that is, a sort of "Port pact." The understanding, proposed in 1975 and agreed to in 1978, was never implemented. "The dyad," someone has noted, "became a wedlock that turned out badly." Badly to thc point where one ^f tr~ matchmakers, nor.e o~rer tran President ncgnino, at the Consortium's most recent meeting, proposed abandoning it, accusing the dock workers Company of hegemony. We have thus reached a point of no return. Forget any ideas then, some will say, since to talk at this point of a sole Agency, confronted as we are by the Ligurian ports and by other plans, is absolutely out of place. What is to be done? Opinions in this respect, as we have said, are many; but the urgency of deciding is pressing. Well--as a first proposal--why not choose a new presidency, coupling it with a general management of operations (nonexistent today) capable, first and foremost, of overcoming the emergency, and having thus gained breathing space, of drawing up a plan �or revival and revitalization of the Port. To subject this idea to a"qualifying" test, we have talked with Giacomo Clerici, president of Coe & Clerici, the operating group that dea'ls, in practice and within its ambit, with all the activities having a connection with the Port: shipping FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY companies, maritime agents, carsiers, warehousing operations, and so forth. Giacomo Clerici does not like intierviews, expresses his apinions laconically, and refuses to discuss the operance of persons. He adheres to certain rules and speaks with extreme clarity. "P.irst objective: Waste no enetgy in absurd polemics. Let us not get into idle case-building. This is one of our ~laws: While the case is being stitched up, the accused escapes. The Port is in crisis, I agree; everyone knows it. But let us not yet celebrate its funeral services~. Genoa can again sparkle with its former splendor; a climate of surrender is unacceptable." ~Question~ Agreed, polemics are out. But who must resolve the problem? ~Answer~ First and foremost, the political forces; they must find a way to resolve the problem. Balancing acts, administrative power plays, negotiation of agree- ments; the whole works; on condition that it be soon done and without adhering to the rule of compromise, which always mediates the solution at the lowest possible level. ~Question~ Your professional opinion, please: Why this crisis? , ~Answer~ The reasons are known. At its base there is unquestionably a gap between management objectives and strategic tra��ic patterns. Genoa is no longer an obli- gatory port of call: Other routes have been opened to the sea. Secondly, the nature of traf�ic operations has changed and the trend is toward specialization at breakneck speed. Conventional ships are constantly decreasing in number. For each type of transport there must be a corresponding type of organization, unloading facility and unload- ing method. Some ships are now equipped to load and unload merchandise and materials using their own on-board equipment; a minimal assistance from the port suffices to re- solve everything. At Genoa, however, this sense o� adaptability, in terms of pier facilities, installations, composition of dock worker crews, flexibility of tar- iffs, working hours and shifts, has nat yet penetrated fully into its operations mentality. This must therefore change absolutely and uncompromisingly. ~Question~ Is it true that Genoa is a high-priced port7 ~Answer~ In certain respects: de~initely; in others: less. In some cases it is still extremely competitive. But regarding tarif�s, let me make one point clear: The impact of the tariff itselt may be minor or nil if the operation as a whole is economical. But if a ship must remain at an~hor in the roadsteads for 10 days, then remains berthed longer than necessary; and if then the onward forwarding of the cargo to the hinterland is delayed owing to a lack o� railway connections or to traffic bottlenecks on the roads, then the overall cost becomes prohibitive. ~Question~ May we now talk of innovation, o� reorganization? 29 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400054435-4 FOR OFFIC.IAL USE ONLY ~Answer~ I see no reason, speaking of the future, why consideration should not be given to the reinsertion o� private initiative within the leadership. What has been the sense o� having excluded it aver the past decade? In some cases, per- haps--let us recognize it--there were activities that could not be lefti in the hands of the private sector. But those were the exception. Today, however, the private sector must be viewed as a provider of capital, ot technology, of modern work methods. Private enterprise, today, must be seen as a scion of.initiative, o~ capital funds, to be grafted on in accordance with precise rules and ironbound norms that must be rigorously respected. The complex of Port activities needing to be renewed today requires financial resources on such a vast scale that it is impossible to pretend that the public sector, through management, can find them and make them available. ~Question~ For example, could an undertaking for the new presidency be the resump- tion of the port of Voltri? ~Answer~ Certainly. Voltri, with public Einancing as it has been planned, will never see the light of day: What is needed is a plan that includes the gratting on of private capital. Ways and terms and conditions can be found: It is the concept that requires acceptance. Otherwise, with the lac'~c ot space at Genoa, everything dies. ~Question~ As regards the presidency ot the Consortium, future re].ations with the dock workers Company, and funding: What can be done? ~Answer~ First, it must be understood that the right person must be found. It is not true that the Port is ungovernable: A person must be found having the necessary firmness, credibility, know-how and managerial ability to govern it. Genoa has always had in its port the best labor in the Mediterranean basin; well, this characteristic must again manifest itself. The president of the Port of Genoa is a prime minister (Clerici continued); he has all the powers he can want to exercise. The important thing is that the one selec- ted be himself convinced of this. The future president must move around, travel, build business relai:ions; his world must not be confined to a choir stall in Genoa. Traffic is captured today in the marketplace like any other merchandise, at its source. In the case of containers, for example, the clients are in Milan and in Turin: Agencies of the Port must be opened in those cities. ~Question~ A managerial characterization shed of po~itical influences, as one might say today? ~Answer~ The political label could even not have a determin~ant value; in fact, it should not have any for purposes of a selection. What must count instead is exper- ience, not uncoupled from a middle age, responsive to today's mentality; and if the 30 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY future manager o� Italy's most~important port could cl.aim successes as a public - administrator,as a manager oE public interests, so much the better. But he need not be a Genoese. What is important is that the one who will go to Palazza San Giorgio shall have the ability and the will to govern a large-scale system. COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editrice I1 Sole-24 Ore s.r.l. 9399 CSO: 3104/352 ~ 31 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY POLITICAL FRANCE MAUROY ON PCF MINISTERS, NATIONALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION ~ Milan IL MONDO in Italian 17 Jul 81 pp 28-30 [Interview with Pierre Mauroy: "The State Can Wait"] [Text] For the moment, nationalization is in abeyance. The new French government is now stressing ma.inly administrative and social reforms: decentralization, a 35-hour week, and unemployment. But the economic crisis. . . His government is the firsC since the war to be led by the socialist party, with the participation of co~unist [cabinet] ministers. Formerly mayor of Lille, a prominent socialist, and leader of the party's centrist current, Pierre Mauroy goes this week (8 July) before the national assembly to win the chamber's confidence. The result is fairly assured, since the socialists have emerged triumphant from the recent legislative elections, and are eagerly awaiting a detailed review of the government's long-term commitments. Will anything be nationalized? What? How? When? In foreign policy, what innovations will PCF participation in the government introduce? In this interview, Mauroy anticipates his government's political program. Question: For some months, the communists have bitterly attacked the socialists; suddenly their mood has mellowed. Why? Only because you included them in the government? Answer: I think the validity of our decision is incontestable. So many people ask: why communist ministers? But we reverse the question: why not communist ministers? To omit them would be discriminating [against them] if you consider the recent electoral resulCs. We did not create the new ma~ority; the French people did that. Certainly we have imposed conditions on their parCicipation; first of all, they must support Francois Mitterand's program. You only need to peruse the text of the PS- PCF agreement to realize that such conditions have been fully met. Question: Will it be a long-lasting participation? Answer: It's not up to me to answer that. I can only say that an agreement has been concluded between us. After 3 years in limbo, with what results we know, the com- munists have agreed to join with us on the left. The voters even anticipated the PCF, which has come around to ratifying the will of the French electorate. 32 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-40850R040400054035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Question: What would you do if during a very crucial strike, a communist minister should declare the strikers' ob~ectives legitimate? Answer: Although we foresee some difficulties, the government is honoring this single logic: respect for the directives given by President Mitterand. The communist ministers have accepted this logic. There is also another rule: government solidar- ity--and they have made commitments in this area. When an official position has been adopted, the communist ministers will support it, like everyone else. Likewise - respected will be the secret methods by which decisions will be made. Question: The co~nunist party.continues to proclaim its revolutionary goals; further- more, its bonds with Moscow are well known. Don't you think you will have problems in keeping secrets, especially in the cabinet? Answer: No, I think not. Look at the ministries entrusted to the communists. I see no problem of secrecy. Question: The first parliamentary session of the new legislature opens this week. What will the government's first demands b.e? Answer: We will begin by asking for an examination of the budget, the amnesty law, the proposal to abolish the state security court, and the question of administrative decentralization. All these matters will be taken up in an e~ctraordinary session, which cannot ~nd before 25 July. Perhaps there will not be enough time to approve our proposal for decentralization, however I hope that the assembly will get through most of its agenda. Question: Why are you beginning with decentralization instead.of nationalization? Answer: Because it is very important. With this law we can turn back to our history; remember, the left has always been Jacobin. We want to recast the citizen's condition so that we will have more freedom and more responsibility. Everything we do, including nationalization, will bear the stamp of decentralization. Question: Your program ca11s for direct elections of the regional assemblies. When will these elections be held? Answer: The people cannot keep going back to the voting urns. That would present serious difficulties, especially in the economic sector. Therefore we will study the possibility of combining elections, for example regional and district elections to be held at the same time. 33 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400450035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Question: Some of your supporters contend that if you delay your nat~onalization projects, you will run the risk of finding empty shells. - Answer: I cannot believe that the grEat industries which come under the national- ization program would act against the nation's interests, anci take advantage of the time lapse to find ways of stripping nationalization of its purpose. In any case, let us not delude ourselves: they will be nationalized anyway. We have said it and we will say it again when we present our program before the national assembly. Question: Will these industries be put under state control on the basis of their status on 10 May? Answer: Certainly. Question: Can you say how extensive the nationalization of credit will be? Answer: We have already announced this: we will nationalize the banks, althoug'h we must, of course, fix limits on our intervention in every sense--including the prevention of foreign banks from taking over the role hitherto played by the French banks. Question: How do you foresee the buying power of salaries over the next few months? Answer: T4ze policy of social progress and the rise in buying power will go hand-in- hand with our policy of economic expansion. Abiding by our electoral commitments, we want to increase the mi.nimum guaranteed wage by 10 percent as well as the principal social taxes. The rest will follow with a progressive relaunching of the economy. Question: Aren't you in fact following Raymond Barre's line? Answer: Absolutely not. We are doing the opposite. Barre tried to tighten belts; we hope at least to stabilize buying power and, if possible, increase it, particularly among the less favored classes. Of course we wi11 encounter difficulties, especially were credits are concerned. Interest rates are too high, and we must find a solution to the problem both on the national and international levels. Question: You have made the 35-hour week a priority to be achieved by 1985, but man- agement refuses to back you up. What do you plan to do in the fall if this stalemate continues? Answer: The industrialists' attitude is nothing new, but they know that we are de- termined to win. Negotiations are being resumed, but so far no one has expressed any definitive proposals. Employers say that they alone cannot sustain reduced working hours, and that some industries will face serious problems. We must find ways of assisting them, and I have declared by availability to help. If the employers will go along with us on the right road, we will work to overcome the various ob- stacles by degrees. Question: The rate of unemployment is climbing, yet the first decis3,ons taken by the government seem inadequate. How are you planning to contain and reduce the rising tide? 34 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USF. ONLY - Answer: It is true the employment rate is accelerating; chiefly resulting from the closing down of companies to which the preceding government granted credits for election purposes. Many of these companies are now making public their balance sheets, which a special commission will study. To combat this unemployment, we are moving on two levels--first, stepping up the creation of new jobs, renewing economic expan- sion, and undertaking large-scale works, of which I wi11 submit a detailed list to the chamber. Secondly, we must enact social measures, such as lowering the age limit of pensioners to 60 years, opposing the practice of individuals working at 2~obs, and reducing working hours. Then we will create 210 thousand new jobs within 18 months. The country is acutely in need of more workers, especially in the health sector, which is short of nurses, paramedics, and so on. Question: All these programs will require sound financing. How will you manage that? Answer: Economic expansion will facilitate the task of raising funds. Furthermore, we want to reduce class inequities by means of a fiscal reform. Question: Since 10 May you have run into mounting difficulties in reorganizing the radio-television network, which has been falling into administrative and directorial chaos. What do you think of doing about it? Answer: The television crisis is a very delicate one. We avoided any direct inter- vention in the television sector before the June legislative assembly to head off futile controversies. We have succeeded aIl the same, and no one can accuse us of manipulating the news in our own favor. Question: Despite everything, the pressures and interventions you denounced in the - past are with us again, even though they are coming from different directions. Answer: You will not find a single journalist who can say that the prime minister has exerted any pressure on him. I would never do that! Indeed, I have given my collaborators strict orders on this count. Z'he law we are now drawing up for reform- ing television expressly provides for the network's independence. Question: Some television directors close to Giscard have already res,igned. Do you hope others will follow suit? ~lnswer: We are not holding anyone back nor are we asking anyone to leave. I must also say that just as behaviors differ from individual to individual, we will deal with each case on its own merits. When Claude Contamine resigned from the first channel, we accepted his decision immediately, and appointed his successor. But when Maurice Ulrich asked to leave his television post, I urged him to stay on until we . could find a substitute. As for the others, we do not want to let loose a witch hunt. Every man is responsible first of all to himself, but on the understanding that his primary responsibility is to work in a public service. - Question: Do you or do you not favor private television networks competing with the public monopoly? Answer: I do not foresee a wave of pioneerin g or an eruption of improvised radio and television stations. COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1981 9653 CSO: 3104/343 35 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400400050035-4 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY POLITICAL FRANCE ; ~ HERNU QUERIED ON CHANGES IN MII.ITARY SERVICE Paris PARIS MATCH in French 14 Aug 81 p 90 [Interview with Minister of Defense Charles Hernu by Laurence Masurel; date an.d place not given] [Text] [QuestionJ Many French people were shocked when you stated that the army should serve "France and socialism." Do you still think that? [Answer] I did not say exactly that. I said that it should.serve France and I added, speaking of the national service, that I was speaking'as a socialist and not as a minister, that in certain circles of young people, one could serve it all the better under a leftist government. It is very obvious one has but to re- read all the books I have written in 23 years that for me, the role of the armed forces consists above all of defending the republic and the nation that is, France as a whole. [Question] Imagine if Bourges or Galley had said that the army should serve "ad- . vanced liberalism." How would you have reacted? [Answer] Galley has not deprived himself of such an opportunity beeause in the National Assembly, he stated that the army was "the last rampart of the liberal society." This set off a reply from Alain Savary, socialist deputy, who protested that assimilation of the army with the defense of an ideology. [Question] In your opinion, should the army be, as you have said, an army of "deterrence by the people"? [Answer] I did not say that even if this theme of "nuclear and people's deter- rence" has bePn used by my colleague, Jean-Piarre Chevenement. As for myself, I prefer the theme of "people's mobilization." ~ [Question] Which means? . [Answer] My concept is that of an overall defense. In the society in cri~is in which we live, we must fight on all fronts: when our agricultural and food indus- try threatens to collapse, when the data processing industry weakens, when we risk losing our aeronautics iiidustry, in short, when we risk losing our vital industries, it is as if we were losing military battles. They are true defeats. What would France's military defense be if its entire industry were rmultinationalized, or if 36 Fnp n~x'rrr nT rTCF nrrr v APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-40850R040400054035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY it lost its brains? My ministry, a unique case, employs 750,000 persons. It participztes and will participate in the fight against unemployment by the creation of jobs. In the same way, my minister colleagues are in posts where they defend France. [Question] It is said that there is in the army and its staffs a certain malaise due to the many changes that have taken place (in a year, four ministers and three chiefs of staff). Is that true? [Answer] If several ministers have succeeded one another, I have had nothing to do . with it. At any rate, since I have been in this post, no chief of staff has been changed. Everyone has remained where he was. When I submit appointments or changes to the Council of Ministers, my criteria are quite .simply aptitude and the promotion index. The military leaders have applied the mottos they received from the current government and consequently, one cannot make them responsible. Is there some malaise? I do not believe so. That info~mation is spread about by a bitter right that would like such to be the case. How nice it would be if such and such a military leader resigned! How nice it would be if movements of disobed- i.ence emerged in the armed forces! But that is not happening! [Question] And yet, it is said that general or highQr officers fear a politiciza- tion of the armed forces? [Answer] If some officers believe that, let them write to me and tell me so! [Question] Are you going, as some have understood, to reduce the length of mili- tary service? [Answer] We must improve the content and effectiveness of military service. For the young men involved, doing their time must not mean wasting their time. Their service must be useful and responsible and therefore, we must anticipate a number of restructuration measures. This cannot be done in a week. .Bq autumn, I shall go mysslf to open a session of the "Army-Youth" commission in which trade union organizattons, conscientious obj ectors, the League of Human Rights, Scout organiza- = tions and, naturally, military men will participate. There will consequen~ly be a great debate on the subject, in the course of which there will be important concer- tation between the military men and the young people. I am convinced that this can help things along. Nine months later, we shall report on our hypotheses and reflections to the head of the armed forces: the president of the republic. [Question] What about military service for women? [Answer] I believe, and this is but my personal opinion, that there must be more female volunteers. There j.s great demand. When we have recruited 100 women for gendarme positions, we have received over 10,000 letters from young girls. [Question] With respect to training for the draftees, you said: "One cannot expect everything of the officers and junior officers. One must come into the army trained 37 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-40850R040400054035-4 by the elementary school, lycee and univer5ity. There must be a symbiosis with national education. What are your ideas on this symbiosis? [Answer] There must be a symbiosis, not only with the Ministry of National Educa- tion, but also with the ministries of Labor, Youth and Sports, National Solidarity _ and the Interior. How can you expect young people to want to defend thEir country if they have no historic awareness of it? One must therefore teach history in the schools, just as one must try to be in good health and just as it i$ important to develop civic education. The army cannot do everything. On both sides of it, ef- forts must be made to train young people. COPYRIGHT: 1981 par Cogedipresse S. A. 11,464 ~ CSO: 3100/909 38 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY POLITICAL ITALY ANALYSIS OF PSDI ELECTION RESULTS Milan IL MONDO in Italian 17 Jul 81 pp 16-17 [Article by Paolo Passerini: "Longo's Second Appeal"] [Text] A more careful analysis of the administrative election returns of 21 June shows that, compared with the regional elections of 1980, the headlong social democratic advance that in the heat of the moment iiad caused surprise among poli- tical cammentators actually did not take place. The PSDI [Italian Social Demo- cratic Party] despite its image as a party interested in power for the sake of - power, involved in various scandals, confirmed that it was substantially stable in the Italian political panorama. In other words, during every election there is a tendency toward recreating a band that goes from 4 to 5 percent of the voters (a large part of whom are nomads traveling from one party to the other). They gravitate toward the party of Pietro Longo~ despite the fact that thts political force does not express an original strategy, that it has almost completely lost the function for which is was founded in 1947 (to break the united front of the left on the eve of the clash of 18 April 1948), and sees its political area con- tested by other more powerful forces such as, for example~ the PSI [Italian Social-~ ist Party]. To what estent does a social democratic phenomenon exist? What w~re its or3gins? To answer these questions IL MONDO asked Bologna's Carlo Cattaneo Institute of flistorical and Political Research to develop an analysis. Here are the results. Arturo Parisi, head of the Cattaneo Institute, says~ "For some time we have been observing an entirely predictable minuet: Opinion makers reduce voting behavior to a simple opinion and exchange voter opinion for their own, considering the PSDI dead or dying. The returns confirm that, despite everything, there is some difference between opinion and opinion makers. Between the surpxise of the com- mentators and the exultation of the ex-dying who have surviv~d, there has developed a virtuous circle that transforms any sign of improvement into an overwhelming victory." But aside from the electroal prize that goes to the PSDI from the sense of sufficiency with which it is normally consi.dered, an explanation of its holding power is necessary. Research by the Cattaneo Institute takes int~ consideration three elements. The first considers dominant opinion according to which its strength is determined by a social democratic presence in gover~ent positions and in the subgovernment. FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-40850R040400054035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY It has been often calculated that the PSD1 is a party that presents the highest relationship between the number of ~members and the number of local administra- tors. Parisi comments, "With a pawer which, in political elections, is more or less one-tenth that of the DC, the PSDI captures 24 out of 100 councils, while the DC is present in on1.y 55 (see Table 1). Certainly this presence is in general secondary, and it succeeds in capturing the post of mayor only in 2 percent of the city councils. Nevertheless, a councillor elected from the social democratic ballot has a far greater possibility of becoming a member of a council committee jassessoreJ than a Christian democratic councillor." Therefore there se~ms to be a confirmation of the image of the PSDI as a party possessing a great ability to infiltrate the organizations of power. It could be pointed out that the fact that the obvious disproportion between electroal weight and administrative weight poses the need to seek other explanations for this imbalance that are not tied to the social democratic vocation for patronage. A second element therefore appears which is more directly political and is tied to the central position occupied by the PSDI in the party arena. This produces a series of benefits the first of which is to be present in the most different kinds of government coalitions. In fact, Table 1 demonstrates that, if it is true that the preferential allies remain in thE order of the PSI and DC, there are many administrations in which the PSDI is tied to the PCI. But the second ad-- _ vantage the PCI gains from its central position is still more important. The Cattaneo Institute explains: "The attraction that the social democrats exercise on the cadres and militants of the other parties." Parisi says, "The social democrats certainly are the party toward which there is the most consistent flow of transfers coming from the most diverse party sources. Only in the PSDI can there be a simultaneous home for the MSI jItalian Social Movement] and tfie PCI, the PSI, and the DC, without losing face and voter support." Table 2 shows how high is the number of DC members that consider the PSDI as the party to which they would be attracted "if the DC did not exist." The hypothesis could be advanced of an electoral refuge cammon to the DC and the PSDI consisting of public employees, state bureaucracies, sectors of business tbat could vote al- most indifferently for either party finally, the Cattaneo Institute researchers add, "In the few existing analyses on shifts (therefore not only on the firm ones) of voting available to us, the PSDI appears as one of the principal exchangers of . flows coming simultaneously from the left and the right; from the PCI to the MSI." Finally, there is a third element to consider in addition to the administrative weight and political centrality, and this Is the survival, on the level of public image, of the identification of the PSDI and social democracy. Parisi affirms, "It is precisely this component, that which is often negZected by the opinion makers or better that which too many men of culture refuse to recognize." A study of the results of elections fflr the European Parliament in 1979 is indicati~e in this regard. Not only did the PSDI obtain more votes in the European elections than it would have obtained a week earlier in political elections, but (a more significant phenomenon) Italian workers who voted in the EEC nations caused the PSDT to advance more than any other party compared with its na.tional following - FOR OFFICI~L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (see Table 3). The PCI, the party with a relative ma~ority in emigration, gained only one point; thp PSI which espected recognition from the European - point of view, lost one; instead the PSDI, with an increment of 4.3 percent, doubled its quota. Parisi maintains, "The secret weapon of the PSDI is to be _ found in the fact that in the eyes of immigrants the corresponding party to the European social democracies is first of all the PSDI." The research report adds to the analysis the identification of certain tendencies of transformation that can be found in the PSDI rank and f ile. In the first place~ there emerges a shift in the baricenter of the party from the north to the south, which was seen in the last three political elections. In fact, the weight of the southern electoral rank and file of the party moves from 24 percent in 1972 to 28.5 percent in 1976 and 32.1 percent in 1979. In the second place, there was an increase in t e incidence of the social democratic vote in the cities of the south and the islands and the simultaneous diminution of the weight of the cities in the center-~north. Parisi concludes, "While we recall the basic stability of the presence of the PSDI and its many roots, these data cannot fail to raise a shadow of doubt concerning the stability of its following. In fact, to hypothesize for the PSDI a future characterized at the same time by a growing presence and by an increase in relative weight in the sma11 centers of the center- north, with increasingly weaker linkage with the large industrial centers, means to evoke a tendency toward a shift in the electoral rank and file as well as a strong propensity toward fluidity of following." 41 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Tabie 1. T.bei~ Pr~s~nz~ � oll~an:� d~l Psdi n~il~ yiunt~ d~i son~uni +yo.~r+o?i . n I - ~J sr t~e ~nb ~ ~ wnM~ n~.~ obrno (8) N wat ~ p...�~~ tn ~t as ~ � ~e (9 U Psdi a aNeato con (10 le Dc In 16 21 21 4 17 t1~. a~~ 16 '23 9 8 19 (13' M Pr1 in 7 ~6 3 3 12 (14) c~orr~a?endo~a ~rrrw., ro.c.n+, un,ar., M.?an.. � (15) f21 Ca?wiends'?~ch. r tara. Font�: krnuro can.nso. ~y . �1. PSDI Representation and Alliances in 9. PSDI allied with City Councils---over 5,000 Inhabitants 10. The DC in (1 January 1981) 11. The PSI in 2. Out of 100 councils 12. The PCI in 3. Italy 13. The PRI jItalian Republican 4. Northwest Party] in 5. Tri-Veneto area 14. (1) Includes Emilia, Tuscany, 6. Red regions (1) Umbria, the Marches 7. South (2) 15. (2) Includes Lazio. Source: 8. PSDI represented in Cattaneo Institute !~2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table 2. Ta~i.2 - Prossin~ita d~lla bas~ de~ a~li altri porfifi. (.lWM'~s~! eA~ N Oc ran rtktrw a quW p~~Hfo d aent6rb6~ DW WcJno~) . (2)o~y.~e (3) ~+ea (4)T.w. ~S~inl al Psdl 23 18 19 - 6 Psl 11 15 14 7 Prl 19 12 13 $ PN 6 8 6 9 ANrI 12 17 16 0 Non so 29 33 ~32 1~ TMN~ 100 100 100 12 ~onte: bNfuto Cattenw. Key: - 1. Closeness of DC Rank and ~ile to 6. PSI Other Parties C'If the DC did not 7. PRI e.xist~ which party would you feel 8. PLI jltalian Liberal Party] closest to") 9. Other 2. Leaders 10. Don't know 3. Members 11. Total 4. Total 12. Source: Cattaneo Institute 5. Close to the PSDI FOR OFFICIA~ USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table 3. (1) Tabe~~a s - Elo=ioei ~urop~~: ' ibulfatJ In % nN bMtorlo w~ h~ QN qal~N iNld~nN N'~stao (3) T�m�io (4) oin~i- ~26) pa~~a.n~ ~9~ (10) (11) ra.w msia+~N Nlpb nww Fnnob in~ni~ MN. bwOo Mand~ q~ ~ Dc 36,5 20,5 28,9 21,1 29,7 48,1 , 23,4 50,2 23,0 25,7 Pci 29,8 31,5 23,3 34,6 29,0 13,9 37,6 b,6 32,2 30,6 Psl 11,0 11,3 10,0 8,5 11,5 4,9 14,4 4,6 10,8 10,1 Msl 5,4 2,8 3,8 . 2,7 3,8 2,9 1,5 4,1 4,4 3,0 (13) p~ 0,4 2,9 2,5 3,2 2,4 6,0 1,1 2,6 1,7 3,0 Psdi 4,3 � 9,6 8,2 8,4 8,8 8,3 , 5,7 4,6 11,4 8,6 Pri 2,6 1,9 6,3 2,0 1,3 2,1 2,5 6,1 2,2 1,8 14 P11 3,6 2,7 6,3 2,3 2,6 3,6 4,3 5,6 � 3,9 2,7 15 Pdup i, t 6,3 - 7,4 3,1 2,5 4,6 1,5 3,3 5,3 16 Dem. Prol. 0,7 . 3,9 1,9 3,9 2,8 8,9 1,8 , 5,6 2,3 3,7 1j P. Red. 3,7 4,8 8,2 4,1 1,7 1,8 2,4 2,5 3,8 3,3 Iti Ppst 0,6 0,4 - 0,3 1,9 0,1 0,3 - 0,6 0,8 19 U.V. 0,5 1,5 0,6 1,6 1,4 0,9 0,3 - 1,0 1,4 20 Tot~N /00,0 100,0 100,0. 100,0 100,0 /00,0 t00,0 100,0 100A 100,0 ~ Z j~ Fonte: Mlnhtao deB'M~smo . Rey: 1. European Elections: Percentage 12. EEC Total Results in Geographical Confines 13. DN jNational Democratic Party] of Italy and among Italians 14. PLI jItalian Liberal Party] Living Abroad 15. PDUP jltalian Democratic Party 2. Italians living in of Proletarian Unity] . 3. National territory jltaly] 16. Proletarian Democracq 4. Belgium 17. P. Rad jItalian Radical Party] 5. Denmark 18. PPST jSouth Tyrol Popular Party] 6. France 19. UV [Aostan Union] 7. Germany 20. Total 8. Great Britain 21. Source: Interior Ministry 9. Lin~embourg 10. Ireland 11. Holland ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table 4. Percentage Distribution of Votes for PSDI ~Sy Geographical Area in 1972, 1976~ 1979 elections for the Chamber of Deputies) North North Center South Islands Italy West East PSDI 1972 32.6 24.2 19.2 16.8 7.2 100.0 1976 31.0 23.9 16.5 19.2 9.3 100.0 1979 30.7 31.9 15.2 20.7 11.4 100.0 By Cattaneo Institute based on Interior Ministry data. COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1981 6034 _ CSO: 3104/345 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400400050035-4 FOR O~FICIAL USF ONLY MILITARY FRANCE BRIEFS HELP FOR MILITARY--The projected national defense budget for 1982, as determined by Francois Mitterrand and Pierre Mauroy, has a ceiling of 3.9 percent of the GNP, that is, an increase limited to 15 percent compared with this year but less than what the 1977-1982 military program-law, conceived during Giscard d'Estaing's administration, provided for. This slight increase in military expenditures will probably be used mainly to create jobs (mainly in zhe gendarmerie, the navy and the arsenals) and raise the pay of the enlisted men, certain corporals and sergeants. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 24 Aug $1 p 7] CSO: 3100/930 END 46 ~no n~~rrr ~ T T TC~ l1Ni V APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050035-4