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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/ 10007 23 September 1981 West Euro e Re ort p p CFOUO 48/81) Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SER!/ICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 NOTE .TPRS publications contain infc~mation primarily from foreign - newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language � sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [TextJ - or jExcerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original infar~aation was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was siimmarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in paren~theses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. ~ Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item origir~ate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, viec�:s or at.titudes of the U.S. Government. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400440050057-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/10007 23 September 1~381 WEST EUROPE REPQRT ~ (FOUO 48/81) CONTENTS THEATER FORCES ITALY Defense Minister on Libyan Threats, Cruise Basea (CO:tRIERE DELLA SERA, 3, 8 Sep 81) 1 Threats Discounted, by Dino Frescobaldi Cosimo Missile Base, Lelio Lagorio Interview ',"ERRORISM INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 'MediCerranean Dossier' Reveals International Terrorist Ties (Corrado Incerti; PANORAMA, 24 Aug 81) 6 POLITICAL FRANCE PS Decentralization Policy: Responsibility, Responsivenesa (Gaston Defferre Interview; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 18-24 Jul 81) 9 - ITALY ~ Reasons for Increase in Tension Between PSI, PCI (Fabrizio Coiason; PANORAMA, 17 Aug 81) 18 - a - [III - WE - 15Q FOUO] FOlt OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNITED KINGDOM ~ Mori Poll: Liberal,SDP Alliance Could Win Next Election (Robert Worcester; THE TIMES, 14 Sep 81) 22 GENERAL FRANCE New Government's Structural Changes in Police Force ~ (Philippe Krasnopolski; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 24 Aug 81) 27 -b- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400440050057-0 � FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLti' THEl4TER FORCES ITALY DEFENSE MINISTER ON LIBYAN THREATS, CRUISE BASES Threats Discounted ?M071150 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 3 Sep 81 p 1 [Report by Dino Frescobaldi: "Italy Demands Explanation From al-Qadhdhafi o~f - Threats to Attack Sicily"] [Excerpts] Rome--We asked Defense Minister Lelio Lagorio about the real chance;s of al-Qadhdhafi's Libya putting its threats into pxactice. "Let us start krith the political aspectr" the minister said. "The most important part of al-Qadhdhafi�s remarks concerns the possibility of abandoning his policy of neutrality. In that case it would be useful to know the Soviet Union's view- point, too." Summing up the defense minister's thoughts, we shall have to see whether Moscow will in turn be willing to "cover" a possible future ally as unpredictable as the Libyan colonel. For one thing, the Kremlin cannot accept Tripoli's vaunted claim to extend the limits of its territorial waters 200 miles into the Mediterranean. If such a claim were to spread and be taken up by other Mediterranean countries, it would become a"close3 sea" inaccessible to the fleets of nonlittoral countries, including the Soviet fleet. "We know," Lagorio said, "that in the past certain Libyan requests for increased military aid presented to Moscow by both Jallud and al-Qadhdhafi have already been received with some degree of coolness. It is true that Moscow may one day find it convenient to establish one or more bases in Libya, though this is some- thing that al-Qadhdhafi has hitherto refused to grant. But F~::h a concession on the Libyans' part ~~ould undoubtedly have negative repercu~sions on the other Arab countries, including the ones whose positions are close to Tripoli's. Moreover, - it must not be forgotten that a1-4~dhdhafi is keen to maintain his nonaligned ' in the eyes of the African world. "In fact the OAU conference should be meeting in the Libyan capital next year. After that al-Qadhdhafi would hold the chairmanship for a year. Is the colonel ' willing to give up this plan by neutrality." We pointed out to the minister that all this presupposes a logic in his policy. But it is well known that events often get out of hand, especially in the case of dictators, so that one must consider the pos~ibility of al-Qadhdhafi carrying 1 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLI' out his threats, feeling cornered. But does he have the practical resources to - do so? The minister said: "From the technical military viewpoint, he does not _ have any great potential for reprisals. The military strength available to him does not in fact enable him to assume very much with regard to Italy and the other countries threatened, such as Greece and Turkey." In this connection Lagorio po~nted out that Libya has no nuclear weaponry and that even a conventional bombarc~ment "would not cause a nuclear chain reaction because explosives are always kept- separate from detonators." So the threat of a nuclear apocalypse brandished by the fiery colonel can only impress a Libyan audience. Furtherm~ore, examining the matter in detail, it is known that Libyan aircraft--and even the Mi~25's, which are the most advanced model in al-Qadhdhafi's arsenal--can at most reach Italy's islands or southern regions and then return to Libya only by flying at the highest altitude, where as is known, fuel consumption is lower. That would mean that they would be identified by both Italian and NATO radar. _ Does this all mean that we should not attach too much importance to al-Qadhdhafi? The minister replied: "That is not what I said. A1-Qadhdhafi may perhaps carry - out a few commando demonstrations. Indeed, it seems that special groups of saboteurs are being trained in Libya. It seems that each Libyan battalion includes a component of so-called 'special forces.' As for the Tripoli navy, it can use eight Soviet-made patrol boats for fast sea transport. Aowever, I do not need to point out that NATO has already taken the necessary precautions for every eventu- ality. We too have strengthened our security measures. Italy," Lagorio concluded, "could defend itself even from a more treacherous and less conventional form of attack." COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s. - Cosimo Missile Base PM1~1236 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 8 Sep 81 p 6 [Interview with Italian Defense Minister Lelio Lagorio by Gianfranco Simone: "Lagorio Describes Comiso Military Map"] [Text] Rome--The Italian general staff is planning to strengthen the southern regions; Italian arms supplied to Libya are about to come to an end; in the event of an attack, trucks mounted with cruise launchers would not leave Sicily, though - they would leave Comiso, surveillance of which will be entrusted to 200 specialized caribinieri, among others. Last, there will probably be a revision of the proce- dures of the "dual key" system to prevent a launching of the cruise missile without agreement between the Italian and U.S. Governments. This is what eLnerges from ~ Defense Minj.ster Lagorio's interview with CORRIERE and from a conversation with - a general staff colonel. The minister wanted to make the following two points before answering our questions: 1--Now that the preparation of the bases has been started, every effort must be directed toward making East-West negotiations possible, with the following objec- tive: "We will not deploy the cruise missiles if the Soviets withdraw the SS 20's that have been targeted on Italy since 1978." 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400440050057-0 FOR OFFICIAL USF ONLY 2--The preparation of the base is no obstacle to negotiations: This belief stems ~ from statements by high-level Soviet sources. In practice during the Brezhnev- Brandt meeting, the former said: "We understand that the Americans must produce the tnissiles and that you must prepare the launch areas. But do not deploy the missiles until negotiations have settled all the disputes." I asked whether the choice of Sicily, only 500 km from the Libyan coast, was due to the need to point a deterrent southward too. Wh~.reas the general staff officer explained that only an agreement among all the NATO nations would make it possible to use the cruise missiles against Libya and that this would only be envisaged if Soviet missiles were deployed there and targeted on Italy, Lagorio replied: "The cruise and Pershing II ~rogram ori~inated in 1978 to reduce an imbalance in the European ~heater. Indeed we also examined plans for bases in the north. So Africa does not come into it." [Question] Even following al-Qadhdhafi's recent statements? [Answer] The issue must not be viewed solely in connection with al-Qadhdhafi's arguments, but also bearing in mind what kind of reaction the Soviet Union might t ake . [Question] What might the USSR's reacti~n be? [Answer] It is difficult to imagine the present Soviet leadership group intending to create further destabilizing elements on the Euzopean chessboard. Moreover, there are the aspects of the Libyan military threat announced by a1-Qadhdhafi though subsequently qualified by the Libyan ambassador in Rome. Theoretically it is possible, though more difficult to put into practice. Our job is to - create a situation whereby a Libyan atCack would prove particularly burdensome, difficult and unprofitable for the Libyan gavernment and therefore Co have a defense system that will discourage the planning of an offensive. [Question] Is the possibility not being considered of stopping supplies of Italian weapons, such as the Lion tanks (simplified and Leopard tanks) produced by OTO-Melara? [Answer] A rapid procedure is in progress to dry up the sources of Italian arms f or Libya. [~~uestion] Why was Puglia not chosen instead of Sicily? [Answer] Yes, the Puglia region was considered, but finally Comiso was chosen because of the existence of an airport, state-owned land and a suitable road system [Congrua Viabilita]. [Question] So the choice based partly on reasons of viability confirms that the missiles will not be taken out of Sicily. [Answer] Yes. The choice reflects a nationai option because it is fairly clear that in U.S. eyes a base located elsewhere would have involved less expenditure and would have been preferred by the U.S. Government. 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000404050057-0 FOR OFFI~'!AL USE ON1..1~ [Question] Would it have cost less in Puglia? [Answer] Anywhere else [but Sicily]. [answer ends? The inference is, partly also on the basis of other statements that the Americans would have preferred to deploy the missiles in one of their e::isting bases (Aviano or Camp Derby, near Leghorn) or in an operational Italian base, such as Istrana or Gioia del Colle. Perhaps the rumors circulating earlier this year in Brussels, - naming these bases, were designed to force our government's hand. They would have been chosen erroneously from a military viewpoint because as targets they are too valuable: At a strike it would have been possible to destroy an entire army brigade, a fighter-bomber airfield and the cruise base, as well as densely popu- lated and industrialized areas, which are all e~qually important targets. The negotiations undoubtedly continued several months longer than envisaged: In June 1980 NATO Secretary I.uns told us that a decision on the Italian bases was expected that year. "We have had tough but excellent relations with the Americans," the colonel said. "We reached a perfect, though hard-won, agreement," [Question] Mr Minister, who would defend Comiso in the event of a commando or paratroop raid? The 200 Italian troops responsible for external surveillance belong to the air force's military 'airport vigilance,' a poorly armed group, not very well trained, often demotivated and recruited on a regional basis? Nor would the army be in a position to act in time, with a single motorized brigade split up among the island's main cities. How will Comiso be defended? [Answer~ We are preparing a quick strike military force with a civil intervention capabilit~~, which will cost 650 billion lire through 1983, in accordance with the finance law. In a few months' time Parliament will be informed of further details. Sti11 with regard to the south, the main guideline is to rapidly strengthen our radar network for continuous monitoring of low-flying aircraft. As for surveillance of Comiso, the plan is not to use the military airport vigi- lance but to use 200 highlv qualified carabineri and 200 Americans. The mobile escort squad will be Italian. There are increased surveillance and security measures at our military bases, a strengthening of the air force squadrons in the south and a plan for air, land and sea exercises in Sicily and the Ionian Sea so as to keep our military units operationally efficient. We will be discussing this again in few weeks' time. [answer endsJ It seems that a group of 12.-18 starfighters will be replacing the squadron of four aircraft stationed in Trapani on a rotational basis from the other bases. The carabinieri might belong to the same units, equipped with German shepherds, which guard the other Italian bases, in very small groups of about a dozen men. - As for the intervention force, its basic model is the Second Governolo Light Infantry Battalion of the Legnano Brigade, Centauro Division, trained particularly well for this task since 1979. Other similar units will be established. [QuestionJ Mr Minister, the "dual key" system is unconvincing. Whereas groups of air force F104's fighter bombers or the Aquileia missiles brigade, both of which 4 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ON1.1' are equipped with nuclear devices kept at U.S. bases, could refuse to use the nucl.ear weapon wit'hout orders from our government because the aircraft and launch systems are operated by the Italians, on the o~her hand in the case of ttae cruise missiles, even the delivery vehicles are in U.S. hands. Even officers belonging to those units are expressing doubts about the existence of a credible "~dua1 key" if the entire system was conceived by the Americans and is, moreotier, secre~. Who will guarantee us that our "key" is not useless .and that there is no copy held by the "locksmith" who made it? Were the FRG and Britain more realistic in leaving both "keys" to the Americans? [Answer] I can only give you a oolitical reply, namely that the Italian government does not accept that the use of nuclear weapons from its own territory shoul.d be decided without express and prior consent from the Italias~ authorities. However, the techni~~al realization of this point, which we consider essential, must remain classified information. [answer ends] We can combine the minister's reply with the reply from the above-mentfoned officer: "As far as Germany and Britain are concerned, it is by no means cer~ain that that - is how things stand. On the other hand, with regard to our direct rekations with the Americans, there is a bilateral agreement which defends oa~r sov~r~eignty. How- ever, since we are dealing with systems some aspects of which ar~e new, it will probably be necessary to view the implementation of the agreem~nes ,precisely in relation to the newness of these weapons." COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s. CSO: 3104/372 5 FnR nFFi('iAT. iJ,4F. nNI.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000404050057-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TERRORISM INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 'MEDITERRANEAN DOSSIER' REVEALS INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST TIES Milan PANORAMA 24 Aug 81 pp 36-37 [Article by Corrado Incerti] . [Text] French President Mitterand has evidence of terrorism~s international ties linking the e7usive Carlos with a gang of Palestinians, Soviet intelligence, and the Red Brigades (BR) with the Italian neofascists and with Licio Gelli's Freemasons. A document from France reveals an insidious network of terror. "The Holy War has reached Pinerolo in the Piedmont. It has since cros- sed the Alps, and now has sent down deep roots in Paris. This is the threat of the future: today it is busy with the propaganda phase, but tomorrow it will shift into action." At the French Interior Ministry on the Place Beauveau, they are worried: fur almost a year, now, the Holy War launched by Iran~s holy man, the Ayatolla Khomeyni, has had , a beachead in Europe, carrying with it its explosive destabilizing po- ' tential. Here is the evidence gathered by French President Francois Mitterand's security forces, collected in a thick "Mediterranean~D.os- . aier" crammed full of documents and testimony on the destabilization of Europe, beginning to the South. The latest confirmation comes from an Islamic periodical which has its corporate headquarters and editorial offices somewhere beyond Postoffice Box 160 in the Piedmont town of Pinerolo. The name of the magazine, printed in an Italian and a French edition by its publisher., Oggero, at Carmagn~la, a small town outside Turin, is JIHAD, which in Arabic means "holy war." The editorial staff consists of five people, apparently all Arabs: Rudollah Idris, Umar Amin, Abb A1 Qadir, Mujahid Abd al Haqq, Hossein. Even so, French intelligence people are certain that these are all assumed names cloaking the iden- tities of Italians, Germans, and French nationals active on the extreme right. One of them has been identified: "Umar Amin is Professor Claudio Mutti, who was converted to Islam several years ago," the French file avers. Mutti was in the past a known neofascist (a meraber of the group calling itself Giovane Europa [Young Europe]), a nazimaoist (he headed the People~s Struggle organization), and a propagandist for Libya's leader, Muammar. Qaddhafi (he founded the Italy-Libya League); he was 6 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000400450057-0 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY involved in the investigation inta the Piazza Fontana massacre and into the slaughter at the Bologna railroad station. The front cover of the maiden (October 198~) issue of JIH.ND h~s a~Qt to say about its political line: it shows Amin el Husseini, t~e Gi^and Mufti of Jerusalem, ari~Isla~ic religious leader, smiling in a:~g~.4 ,~hot of Hitler's Berlin. As to the content of the magazine, the F'~ench ;in- telligence note pulls no punches: "This periodical dissemina~tes a pro- Islamic ideology with elements of antisemitism, fascism, and phony anti- imperialism. It is a confused ideology, in which extreme right-wing and equally extreme left-wing talk is blended inextricably." Atta~hed to the magazine is a membership appli~:ation form put out by a nascent Europe-Islam Association. "Underlying it is the convictiarr. that it is possible to revive in Islam the principles that could i~~pire a Euro- pean renaissance," comments the report. ~ The file labeled "Islamic Holy War - European Fascis,~t~,T' i.~ n~t the only one among those in the French Interior Ministry " s "~I~ec~iterx~a~iean Dossier" that documen~ts tight connections with Italy. Ir~ tF~w~~ r~or~ files, one on the Palestinians and the other on secret societies, t~er~ are frighten-- ing links witri Italian terrorism. The Palestinians No news to the French is the dependence of Italian ~ted terrorist Illich Ramirez Sanchez, a.k.a. Carios, on the Palestini~n ext~remists of the rejectior~ist front ("No to any negotiations tirith ~sr~el"), itself obe- dient to political orders from the Soviet Union. Car'los has put his signature on assassinations in every country in Europe and has ccordina- ted his action with the Basque terrorists in t.Yae ETA, with the Irish in the IRA, with the Germans, and with the Italians in the Red Brigades (all of it documented in the "Mediterranean Dossier." Real news, however, is the report that European right-wing (Black) ter- ro rism, which exploded a year ago with the almost, simultaneous mass murders in Bologria (at the railroad station) at the Oktoberfest in Mu- nich, and in Paris (at the synagogue on the Rue Copernicus) may stem from the same source: the Rejection Front Palestinians. The whole story grew out of the investigation into the attack on the synagogue on Rue Copernicus. Suspicion fell initially on the French f ascist groups, but for months there was no shred of specific proof. Then suddenly came the turning-point. The man who had organized the massacxe, it was found, had paid $1,000 in cash 10 days prior to the att ack at a store on the Avenue de la Grande Armee in Paris f or the Suzuki motorcycle which was blown apart by the bomb it carried. He had shown a Cypriot passport made out to Alexander Panadryu. The pass- port was f alse, but the French intelligence investigators managed to piece together every move the terrorist had made. Panadryu had come to France on ~ September of the previous year. He had taken a room at the Hotel Celtic, on the Rue Balzac, a hotel which of recent years has been a haunt for a good many Italian fascists. He had bought the 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040400050057-0 _ F'OR OFFI('IAI. IItiF: ONt.l' motorcycle and rented a yellow Citroen GS. He had met and often visited an Italian prostitute. On 3 October, immediately after the ~ttack on the svnagogue, he had taken a plane to Rome, where he had dropped out of sight. _ It was a"coincidence,"reported to the French by Palestinians in the Palestine Liberation Organization opposed to the Rejection Front's pro-Soviet line, that provided the vital clue in the investogation of the synagogue attack: Carlos the terrorist, the the pro-~~- viets, who provided would-be revolutionaries "rrom every nation, be they of the Black or Red persuasion, with fake Cypriot passports, had been busy throughout the whole month of August on Cyprus, recruiting young- sters for a training camp set up on the island of Socotra, in South Yemen. Furthermore, the Italian prostitute Panadryu had patronized in Paris had told police that the attacker had told her that he was circum- cised because he was an Arab. The French are sure that the terrorist belongs to the Black October gang, the newest and most mysterious af the Palestinian extremist organizations. The Secret Society "I am convinced that the terrorism and arms traffic in the Mediterranean - played a central role in the Auri~l killings," a friend from Marseille told French Interior Minister Gaston Def~erre. The inquiry into the massacre uncovered the existence of a secret Maso- ~ nic group which was infiltrated by arms dealers and fascist terror~ists: it was known as the Sovereign and Military Order of the Temple of Jer~i- salem, commonly referred ~o as the Templars. The first person to meration the Templars, or rather those who had infil~ trated them in France they are known as the negative Templars ("But we have them in Italy too,"'report Maria Lo Mastro and Rocco Zingaro, who head the Italian Order) was Dominique Calzi, a 00~ agent who has worked for several European intelligence agencies. In a book about the _ way they operate in secret, he revealed kidn.apings, drug trafficking, and links with terrorism. Most important of all, though, was their heavy traff icking in weapons, most of it on behalf of terrorist groups. Calzi, whose charges were borne out by the Marseille inquiry, maintains that the Templars are not the.only secret society tilling this parti- cular field in Europe. And he talks of several deliveries of diploma- tic documents in Rome tq French fascists by the Hospi~~alers of the Or- der of St . John of Jerusalem, the Knights of Malta. The Me~literranean Dossier ordered by the new-direction French government under Francois Mitterand is waxing still fatter with the results of in- quiries into the activities of these secret societies, too, not to men- tion reports of their ties with Licio Gelli's P2, which used to meet with the Templars in Marseille. COPYRIGHT: 1981 Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, S.p.A. 6182 CSO: 3104/367 8 FOR OFF[C(AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004400050057-0 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY POLITICAL FRANCE PS AECENTRALIZATION POLICY: RESPONSIBILITY, RESPONSIVENESS Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 18-24 Jul 81 pp 24-27 Lfnterview with Gaston Defterre, minister of state for inter~or and decentralization, - by Josette Alia and Georges Mamy, date and place not specifiedJ a LText7 Decentralization: What the New France Will Be It is a quiet revolution, but it is nevertheless a revolution: as of 15 July the way France looks is goingto change. The . reign of tentacled Paris, of Paris as absolute master in the Fr.ench wilderness, is over. The regions are regaining power and recovering their freedom. In order for this to occur it took the stubborn determination of one man, Gaston Defferre, minister of state for interior and decentralization, who with ~ great eftort has just gotten a body of ineasures adopted in the Council of Ministers preparing for decentralization and devolution in France for the first time, a fine dosble victory. Local elected officials, freed from the meddlesome supervision of Paris, will be masters in their own houses. But as a fair exchange they will also be held responsible and will be able to be punished in the event of a serious mistake. Freedom is winning out. As for prefects, they will no longer be the executory agents of excessive central government but they will find an indispensable role to play at the department level in monitoring and coordinating; the facade of govQrnment admin- istration is splitting up. In short, "Jacobin" France, which has been in place for centuries, is beginning to fade away before the reawakening of the former provinces. This is a - gr~at watershed which has just begun. Gaston Defferre received Josette Alia and Georges Mamy this week in his Marseille mayor's office; he conjured up the new prospects opening up and also tackled some hotly debated subjects: Corsica, the Basque country, the police, and "cases" left in . abeyance by the previous government. [�uestion7 Are you in such a rush to decentralize? You have the political assets and you have time ahead of you. Then W~y this haste to have irreversible pieces of legislation voted on as early as the next parliamentary session? 9 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000440050057-0 FUR qFl~'it'tAL t'~F: U:~.Lt LAnswe~ Experience has taught me that right after an election and the formation of a government, for a fairly short time period, it is possible to get really innovative pieces of legislation through parliament. Once that period of time is over everything becomes more difficult. Now then,the legislative texts I am proposing are going to change a lot of things. In short, it is a matter of taking power from where it is at _ present--in ministries in Paris which decide everything--and transferring it to the communes where they are affected, to the departments, and to the rEgions. This is a revolution and like any revolution it implies an end to ti~e exercise of some powers: for example, the Paris offices of ministries are going to see their jurisdictions cut down. How will they accept this? To be sure, the new ministers supported decen- tralization during the election campaign. Decentralization has even proven to be very popular. But as time passes and ministers get settled into their agencies. I am starting to feel the beginning of resistance, which is quite a normal development. Agencies have explained to their ministers: "You cannot do that: they will take - away your funds from you!" In these conditions, if decentralization is not done now, - it wil~ be more difficult to do it in a few months: that is the first point. The second point is that we are coming to power as a government carried by a real popular current. If we let the enthusiasm die out without our acting, we run the risk of sinking and being jeopardized. On the ccntrary, if we act quickly, we will create a favorable political and social climate. There are three successive and important pieces of legislation to get passed. If the first does not pass now, the other two _ will not follow within the anticipated deadlines. - LQuestion] The first piece flf legislation involves the transfer of powers. What does that mean exactly? LAnswer7 The transfer of powers has two aspects. Number one: There is no more super- - vision over local authorities. Communes, departments and regions deliberate and make decisions without a prefect or minister having to step in. So the decision will be operative without prefectorial or ministerial approval. Local elected officials will be completely free. Number two: However, since they are free, they must also be responsible. I lay stress ~n this because it is a very new idea. Decisions made by local authorities can be contestea after the fact by the representative of the national government (for that he will rely on the Court of Accounts' examinations which will take place each year). If the mayor, the chairman of the general council or the chairman of the regional council has violated the law, if he has committed a serious error, the decision which he made can be voided. In addition there will be a penalty which can go up to dismissal from office which can be invoked against the deliberative assembly and, if n~ed be, against the mayor or chairman. LQuestion7 On a personal basis? [P;nswer7 On a personal basis. Freedom must be accompanied by political and personal responsibility. Otherwise people sink into carelessness, disarder and ineffectiveness. LQuestion] But this penalty will come too late: The decision will already be implemented. LAnswer7 It is true that the national government's recourse will not involve post- ponement. So the decision will be implemented while awaiting the outcome of legal proceedings. For example, if it is a question of building a tunnel, then studies or even actual construction will be carried on. 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY LQuestiof What happens then if this decision is subsequently voided by the state? [~Answe) It is the municipality or the department or the region which suffers the political and financial consequences. ~ ~uestion] That will be expensive. LAnswer7 No, because I do not believe that mayors or elected officials will put them- selves in that situation. Let us take an example: In my capacity as mayor, I decide, along with my municipal council, to build a subway line in Marseille. This decision is challenged by the national government. At this point I have two possi- bilities, either to say to myself, "Too bad, I will just keep at it," or to ask ~ myself, "It is challenged: wk~y?" I believe that in this case a responsible politician wil'1 ask himself questions. I believe also that before taking important steps a responsible man does some consultation. If in spite of everything the alarm bell rings and the government's representative says, "Watch out, you are not abiding by the law," what mayor, elected officeholder, or official is going to persist and continue on without asking questions? - ~uestion7 Are you not thinking too much about the hig cities? There are also some pretty small c..ommunes. Do you believe that elected officials will all be capable of facing up to their new responsibilities? Will they have sufficient competence, and are they not running the risk of being paralyzed at times? LAnswer7 I believe that the mayors of small communes are competent. And then perhaps those mayors more than others will be influenced by the observations which the govern- _ ment's representative might make to them. But it is true that one must consider what their situation is. When the mayor of a small commune works out a plan he does not have services at his disposal for conceiving and executing it like they do in large cities. What does he do? He turns to either the installation people or the agricul- tural engineers, which is to say he turns to a government agency which will advise him just as it has always done. From now on the decision is up to him but he will make it after consultation with representatives of the national government. Therefore - there is little risk that he will make an enormous mistake. ~uestio) But is that not indirectly a form of supervision? LAnsw~~ Yes, it is. True freedom presupposes that studies not be carried out by those who were the supervisors up to now. That is why we are searching for another system. For example, some intercommunal research agencies might be devised which are answerable only to mayors, like the ones which already exist in large cities except that they would group together several small communes. ~uestio] Then there would be a political risk. You are we11 aware that in certain large municipalities the rese~rch agencies are in the hands of political parties.... LAnswe] Perhaps. But I believe it is important to settl~ on a formula which will ensure both the independence of communes and the effectiveness of the work. ~�uestion7 All the same the prefect was useful. When something was not going well, people went to demonstrate in front of the prefect's office. Where will they go now? In front of the mayor's house? Are you not afraid of an extreme politicizat.ion of the local scene? ~ 11 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2447/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R444444454457-0 FOR OFFICIAI. ilti1~' ON1.1 LAnswer7 It must not be thought that the prefect is no longer of any use. Quite the contrary. What exactly is his role these days? In order to find out I looked at how things went on in the field in my own department. What was to be seen? All the ministries--installation, public health, agriculture, youth and sports, cultural. affairs, and others--all have their department-level management personnel tied in directly to the Paris offices and they are not responsible to the prefect. The c3epartment-level management sometimes work in collaboration with the prefect, but when they are not in agreement with him, off they go and telephone, turn ~ap in Paris, and settle the matter in Paris. Not to mention the interministerial missions sent for 6 months--we have the Fos group mission and the Berr~ pond mission here--which are still there 10 years later. So much so that there is a tangle of gov~rnment operations in the departments which totally eludes the prefects. That is what we are going to change. All these operations are going to be under the command of the prefect who will represent the state, which will be the gurantor of nation~l unity. Matters will no longer be able to be sent up to Paris by bypassing prefects. The key to the reform _ is there. - ~uestion] In sum, prefects will be Paris local-s~yle. LAnswer] Yes. LQuestion7 Is not this a purely theoretical view? LAnswer7 Not at all. It is in fact the only way to arrive at genuine decentrali- zation--since power is going to be handed back to elected officials--and also to arrive at genuine devolution--since the ministry offices will no longer be answerable to the Paris ministries. So the prefect on the spot will have ext~r.sive respon- sibilities and will make decisions which did not fall to him previously. He will no longer be the representative of only the interior minister but of all the ministries. You see that his role is not diminished. Quite the opposite. LQuestion] Do you not foresee great difficulties in implementation when you cut the ministries off from their regional offices? LAnswer7 Yes indeed. But that is reform. LQuestio~ In the end what will be left in~the central government if everything is decentralized in this fashion? Very little. ~Answer7 A great deal will be left. There can be no confusion or difficulty within the division of powers between the central government and regional authorities: the jurisdictions are clearly establi~hed and they will not change. Communes take care of street lighting, refuse disposal, traffic, etc. Hospitals for general medical - treatment and for surgery come un~er the municipalities, mental hospitals come under the departments, and welfare system expenditures come under the general council. All of that is very clear. Mayors will take action but will always do it within the con- text of the law and their jurisdictional competence. [�uestion7 Then the problem of standards for public health, sanitation safety, urban development, etc. will arise. According to which criteria is action to be taken? ~ Criteria set in Paris? In that case nothing will have changed. 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050057-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000400450057-0 t~�~~u c~t~~-~a