JPRS ID: 10042 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Sequence Number: 19
• Content Type: REPORTS

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- JPRS L/ 10042
_ 9 October 1981
- i~l~ar~ East (~lorth Afric~ Re ort
p
= CFOUO 35/811
FBIS FOREIGN BROA~rAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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, JPRS L/10042
9 October ~981
. NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
_ (FOUO 35/81)
CONTENTS
INTE.4NATIONAL AFFAIRS
Iraq, Turkey Strengthen Ties
' (AL-WATAN AI,-'ARABI, 21-27 Aug 81) 1
Iraq, FRG Stress Economic Cooperation
- (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 21-27 Aug 81) ....e 3
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Brief s
Iraqi, Egyptian Aut~ Ventures 5
- PERSIAN GULF AftEA
~ Reasons for South Korean Contracts Aiscussed
(AL-WATAN AI~-'ARABI, 1L~-20 Aug 81) 6
IRAQ
U.S. ~leutrality Towards Iran-Iraq War Questioned
- (AI,-WATAN /~.L-'ABABI, 7-13 Aug 81) 8
LIBYA
Italian Paper Cites Libyan Agenc y on Ties
(~'ORRIER.E DEI,ZA SERA, 11 Sep 81) 13
Briefs
Desalination~ Power Plants 15
SAUDI AR.ABIA
Implications of Neumann ~ s Resignation 1}iscussed
(AI~-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 7-13 Aug 81) 16
SUDAN
A1-Sharif al-Hindi on Opposition Plans, Impending Uprising
(A1-Sharif al-Hindi Interview; AL-WATAN AZ-'ARABI, 31 Jul-
6 Aug 81) 20
- a- ( II I- NE & A- 121 FOUO ]
rnn nnr. r~ � ic n ni?Tr V
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INTBRNATIONAL AFFAIRS
I
i
-i IRAQ, TURKEY STRENGTHEN TIES
I
I Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI i.n Arabic No 236 21-27 Aug 81 p 56
i
[Article: "Iraqi-Turkish Rapprochement After Signing the Economic Agreem~nt"]
[Text] Baghdad--There is a feeling of great satisfaction prevalent in the Iraqi
capital concerning the development of relations of friendship, cooperation, and
good-neighborliness between Iraq and Turkey. This feeling took h~ld after the emer-
gence of the agreement concerning economic, technical, and cultural cooperation
which was signed by the two countries last week in Ankara, alon~ with thE protocol
concerning rema.pping the border which was signed in connection with it.
Through this agreement the Iraqis hope to have Turkey once again be concerned with
the Arab and Muslim worlds. Turkey's concern with problems in the Middle East
subsided somewhat after the emergence of the military regime there about a year ago.
Mr Taha Yasin Ramadan, member of the Revolutionary Command Council and first deputy
prime minister, who was the chairman of the Iraqi delegation in the Ankara talks,
described the agreement as being a progressive step along the path of cooperatian
between the two countries.
Turkey's high officials who participated in the talks were led by the head of state,
Gen Kenan Evren, and the Turkish prime minister, Bulend Ulusu. Mr Ramadan informed
them that Iraq hopes that Muslim Turkey will play a more progressive role in the
Palestine question. Iraqi officials hope that, in this particular realm, Turkey's
solidarity with the.Arabs will help to deter Israel and discourage it from engaging
in ~ggressive adventurism in the Middle East.
Mr Ramadan explained the the high Turkieh officials Iraq's position concerning its
~ conflict with Iran, and emphasized Iraq's ardent desire to end the conflict. He
told them tfiat Iraq has no aspirations concerning Ira~.ian territory, but that Iraq
will not renounce its legitimate rights even though the war might continue for
several years. He also affirmed that the Iraqi forces will withdraw whenever Iran
recognizes Iraq's rights.
The Iraqis consider the new agreement to be an affirmation by the Arabs of the
necessity of establishing economic and political relations with Turkey on the level
of the historic and religious tiQS and relations which bind the Arabs and the Turks.
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The Turkish officials assured Mr Ramadan of their determination to develop their
" country's relations with Iraq and with the othzr Arab countries, and expressed
their hope that the war between Iraq and Iran would end.
The protocol concerning the border included.the formation of a~oint committee
between the two countries which will take over the task of remapping the border
and fixing the demarcation lines during the next 3 years. This is to be done on
~ the basis of the border treaty between the two countries which was signed in 1926.
Others who took part in the Iraqi delegation were Mr Tayih 'Abd al-Rarim, minister
of oil, and Hasan 'Ali, minister of trade.
- COPYRIGHT: AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 1981.
- 9468
CSO: 4303/138
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IIITERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
a
IRAQ, FRG STRESS ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 236 21-27 Aug 81 p 55
[Article: "Economic Cooperation Thrives Between Iraq and West Germany"]
[Text] Baghdad--Iraq has expressed its hope that the economic cooperation between
I it and West Germany will continue on a clear and firm basis of respect for each
~ other's sovereignty, equality, non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
i and respect for the laws in the other country."
I This commentary was made by an official Iraqi source in response to a West German
~ protest following the arrest of an Iraqi interpreter, Ys'qub Butrus, who was accom-
panying a West German delegation which recently paid a vi5it to Iraq. Butrus was
charged with committing "crimes punishable by Iraqi law."
i
~
I The prevailing belief here is that the incident will not constitute an obstacle to
' further improvement of economic cooperation between the two countries. In fact, the
i value of contracts which Iraq has awarded West German companies now totals about 10
' billion DM. Thus Iraq has replaced Saudi Arabia as the primary market in.the Middle
I East for West German products. The latest contract which was awarded to the West
; Germans is the contract which was granted to the M.A.N. Company to supply 400
i
~ large-size trucks. There was stiff competition among the companies of t e estern
~ nations to receive this contract.
; These trucks will be imported for the Iraqi-Jordanian Transport Company and will be
i ,:sed on the ~oad between 'Aqabah and Baghdad. The contract, which totals abaut 270
million DM, also includes the provision of spare parts and maintenance.
I Economic relations between the two countries have undergone tremendous development
- since 1974, which was the year when diplomatic relations were restored batween the
two countries after they had been cut off for 9 years.
~ Two temporary crises occurred [dffecting relations between the two countries). The
first one resulted in a limited cessation of awarding contracts to West German com-
panies, the purpose being to correct the large gap in balance of trade in favor of
West Germany. The second one resulted in the West German Hermes Insurance Co~cpany
refusing to insure West German companies operating in Iraq. This happened shortly
after the outbreak of the conflict with Iran. But in spite of this, mutual
cooperation and exchcnge have once again reached a high point at the present time.
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Between last December and last April, West German companies were awarded contracts
worth about 4.5 billion DM. The West Germans are interested in participating in
the implementation of public service projects such as those concerning the building
of roads, dams, and those having to do with the automobile and cement industries.
The Iraqis are interested in obtaining advanced West German technology. However,
they are complaining about the fact that West Germany is not buying very much Iraqi
oil and thus is not helping to eliminaY.e the large deficit in balance of trade
payments between the two countries.
Economic cooperation between Iraq and West German,y has been thriving ever since the
latest visit to Bonn which was made by Mr Taha Yaein Ramadan, member of the Revolu-
tionary Command Council and first deputy prime minister, and Mr Hasan 'Ali, minister
of trade.
COPYRIGHT: AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 1981
9648
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

�
BRIE~S
I~iQI, EG'IPTIAN AUTO VENTURES--The Arab World is looking with special interest
toward establishing automobile industries, aimed at saving large amountQ of hard
currency, which it spends annually to import thousands of trucks and automobiles,
as well as to ensure work for the domestic workforce. Currently in the Arab World,
Iraq and Egypt are the most interested in establishing a domestic in.dustry for auto-
mobiles. Iraq intends to spend atiout $5 billion to establish this important in-
dustry. Production of trucks should begin in ]985, when annual production, after
- a short per3od of time, should reach 25,000 vehicles. In the past week, Egypt
signed a basic contract with the Daimler-Benz company to build an automobile pro-
duction complex in the city of Tenth of Ramadhan, which is considered one of Cairo's
suburbs. The value of the contract if 3bout $22 million. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN
AL-FARP.~i in Arabic No 234, 7-13 Aug 81 p 53] ~OPYRIGHT: 1981 AI,-WATAN AI~-'ARAB17
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PERSIAN GULF AREA
REASONS FOR SOUTH ROREAN CONTRACTS DISCUSSED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-"ARABI in Arabic No 235,. 14-20 Aug 81 p 53
[Article: "Eight Billion Dollars Worth of Contracts to South Rorea in 1981"]
[Text] Riyadh--The success of South Rorean companies in getting contracts and
implementing construction and road-building pro~ects in the Arab Gulf countries is
! considered to be an indication that a Third-World country is capable of competi.~xg
I with the advanced countries in the international market if it makes the effort,
' demonstrates perseverance, shows det~rmination, and knows what fields It can
I specialize in.
Although the Arab Gulf countries complain about the foreign labor force which
threatens to have negative influences on the structure of their Arab society, these
; c:ountries nevertheless find tfiemselves comp~lled, because of the urgency of their
I development programs and their lack of a skilled domestic and Arab labor force, to
'j draw upon the help of Korean companies which have demonstrated their efficiency in
carrying out projects and their excellent workmanship.
Probably the first South Korean company which began operating in Saudi Arabia was
the Sam Hwan Company about 10 years ago. Although this company carried out a
~ road-building pro3ect which was not financially profitable for it, this did pave
~ the way for the company to conclude other deals and engage in other pro~ects which
brought the company ample profits later on.
South Korean companies are considered to be the most successful foreign companies
operating in the Middle East in the field of contract work, construction, and
road-building. The Haeunda Company is one of the foremost contracting companies in
the world.
Unoffiical estimates indicate that South Korea currently occupies sixth place among
the countries which engage in pro~ects and are awarded contracts in the Arab Gulf
countries. For example, in 1979 Korean companies were awarded contracts worth
$6.5 billion--out of a total of $40 billion worth of contracts awarded in the`~rab
countries. It is believed that this figure has already gone up to $8 billion thia
year.
Saudis and Gulf Arabs have no explanation for this Rorean phenomenon other than the
fact that it demonstrates the vitality of these companies which possess an organized,
disciplined, trained, skilled labor f~rce which is also perhaps relatively cheap.
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The Koreans depend on using their heads in order to get contracts. For example,
they do not compete with Japanese, American, and European companies in an effort
to get contracts which require advanced technology. But theq do enter into
~ alliances and partnerships with theae companies in order to carry out the construc-
tion jobs which these pro~ects require such as building plants--including parts and
stages of buildings which constitute steel, petrochemical, and water desalinization
plants.
Nevertheless, Rorean companies have started ta face stiff competition due to the
fact that the Gulf countries are anxious to acquire advanced technology and skills
- in the projects which they entrust foreign companies with the job of implementing.
There has also been a decrease in allocation for construction projects in the Gulf
development plans generally. The decrease has been from 24 percent in the
seventies to 14 percent in the first half of the eighties. Furthermore, the wages
of Korean workers have gone up and workers from Bangladesh and India have begun to
compete with them.
It has also happened that several South Korean companies have suffered bankruptcy
and financial difficulties while carrying out pro~ec*_s in the region. An example
of this is the (Shin Supung) Company which was implementing pro3ects in Kuwait and
Jordan worth $170 million.
South Rorean embassies, which look after the interests of these companies and their
workers in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf countries, say that the Koxean government
. has established a capital fund amounting to $500 million to encourage their
- companies to change over from using intensive labor to using advanced technology.
These embassies are also calling upon the companies to work together with local
comapnies, as stipulated by the new regulations in the Gulf countries and in order
to facilitate the process of getting contracts.
COPYRIGHT: AL-WATAN AL-'A1tABI, 1981
9468
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IRAQ
U.S. NEUTRALITY TOWARDS IRAN-IRAQ WAR QUESTIONED
Paris AL-WATAN AI~'ARABI in Arabic No 234, 7-13 Aug 81 pp 33-34
[Article: "The Principle of America'e 'Non-A ;ig~ent':~Wash~ngton Wants a War in
Which Iran Cannot Win and Iran Cannot Lase'
j [Text] Iraqi doubts about American "neutrality" in the Iraqi-Iranian war go back
' sometime before the disclosure of the Argent~ian sirplane. However, the real Y~raqi
scorn is directed against Teheran~s "Ara~as", who put their "weight" and rested their
~ hopes on supporting Iran against IYaq. ~Ie~ask Lhem: What do they think, now, about
~ Tran's "good intentions," after the evidence o~ Igraeli�-Irani.an cooperation.
~I The Israeli~Iranian arms deal did not surprise Baghdad. Infarmation from varioua
sources had reached the Iraqi capital, con~irmtng the existence of Iraniain--Ierae~.i
cooperation in providing spare parts and anm?un{tion for the Ainerican weapc~ns, wi~ich
Iran owns.
~ Baghdad ~zas never reluctant to express its suspicions regarding thia relationship.
- Its voice was constantly zaised, accusing the Americans of standing behind this
; cr.i~ninal relationship. Some doubters among tfie Arabs accused Baghdad, prfvately or
openly, of exaggeration or of not camplying with the facts and with ob3ectivity,
; regarding its accusations against the "Islamic religious reg3me" in Teheran.
; Iraqi suspicions, regarding the American role, reached their peak during the final
stage of the negotiations over the American hostages. Baghdad believed that the deal
' included, as one of its points, exchanging the hostages for weapons, through a third
paxty, which would have been Israel or someone else. In~a letter to the UN special
com~ittee for Palestinian rights, on the day of world solidarity with the Palestin-
ians which was celebrated at the end of last year, Presid~nt Saddam Husayn said:
"Once again we find the United States helping this country, Iran, which has waged
- a~gression a~ainst our land and our people for 2 years. This is what forced ue to
defend our rights, our nation, and the aecurity of our citizens." It is no secret
that the suspicions regarding the American positian formed one of the reasons, which
prevented and continues to prevent the resumption of diplomatic relations between
Iraq and the United Sfates, which have been severed for nearly 14 years. This is in
addition to the basic reasoa, which is that tfiere has been no noticeable change in
America's biased position towards Israel and Zionism, and against the Arabs and their
basic issue of Palestine.
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All this bolstered the Iraqi suspicions, in addition to all the information received
about the Iranian-Israeli connection, with American approval. The clincher was the
American press campaign, in pdrticular, and that of the Western media in general,
_ against Iraq in an attempt to distort its victories and image in the military con-
frontatio~ with Iran. Such distortions continued even at the height of the American-
Iranian dispute over the seizure of the hostages. The least that the American cor-
_ respondents, ~ournalists an~ analysts said was that Iraq was the "surrogate" of
Russia in the war with Irs;n.
American diplomacy did not resitate from whispering in Baghdad's ear, thro~~gh its
Arab and non-Arab channels, that the United States stood neutral regarding the Iraqi-
~ Iranian conflict, but Ataerican neutrality always seemecl, in Baghdad's view, to be
mere wor*3.s, with no basis in fact.
Washington: Tactics and Strategy
One could say that the U.S. Strategy, which has been based on exploiting the Iranian
attack against Iraq, from the early days of the revolution until now, and which has
been carried on behalf of American interests in the region, has n~t changed. How-
ever, the tact ics have varied and fluctuated, depeading on the circumstances of the
- con~lict.
During the first stage of the armed conflict, the U.S. [hiding their true convic-
_ tions] tried to appear as being understaading of the reasons, which led Iraq to re-
spond to the Iranian attacks.
_ In the second stage, after Iraq~s military superiority became clear, American logic
~egan to take on the appearance of "non-alignment" with respect to either side.
However, at the same time, Washington was using Iraqi victories, and Iranian threats
against the Gulg states, to '~frighten" those statea away from the co~nbatant parties:
~~com Saddam Husayn and from Khomeyni.
It used the def3,ance and excessive tactiGs of the Tranian revolution's attacks against
Izaq and the Gulf Arabs, on the one hand, and the Soviet inva~ion of Afghanistan,
on *.he other, as ~ustification for building up its armed presence in the region, on
the pretext of protecting the oil and the lines of navigation. Witfi its allies, it
built up a vast f leet of 60 ships~ in the Indian Oeean, the Ana~iian Sea, and the
entrance to the Gulf. It concluded an agreement to establish bases or facilities for
its ~orces in Somalia, Kenya, Oman and Egypt. It philosophized all this with the
Carter doctrine, which came into Fieing in the early 1980's, and which was tantamount
to reinstituting'the Eisenhower doctrine, and the theory of "filling the vacuum,"
of the 1950's.
As for the third stage in the U.S. tactic, it began with the f~ceeing of the hastages.
It was manifested in a tendency to bolster and support the Khomeynj. regime, on the
basis that he had corrected his mtsts~C.e~ an~ that there was no longer any ~ust.ifica~-
tion for incompatibility of interests tietween Washington and Teheran.
I?uring this stage, the Iraqis began to notice that something was going on between
Iran and Israel, and that Iran had xeswned nibbling at the forbidden Tsraeli apple,
despite all its Arab and Islamic slogans that it had raised; and that Washington
was not far from reopening the channels betweea the two countries.
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On the contrary, Washington used some of its Arab friende to persuade Iraq not to
prepare a military campaign to liberate the three Arab islands in the Straits of
Hormuz, which Iran had forcibly seized from the United Arab ~irates in 1971. It
- alluded to the use of force to defeat the Iraqi campaign, on the pretext that carry-
ing the war to the southern Gulf would threaten the oil shipping lanes.
Later it became evident that Washtngton had obtained, 3n one way or another, a
- "gentleman's agreement" from Iran not to shell the Straits of Hormuz, in exchange for .
preventing Iraq's liberation of the three islands.
- Now, a~ter having confined the flatnes of war~to the upper Gulf, and the U~ited
States having made sure that it did not spread to other oil wells in the region, or
to the Straits of Hormuz, it became evident, through increased infiltration of
- American spare parts, weapons and amuaunition to Iran, through Ierael or some other
country, that it wanted to prolong the war, or as a senior Iraqi off icial told me,
"the United States wants a war that Iraq cannot win and Iran cannot lo~e." ~
The Iraqi View of the American Pos~tion
The Iraqi view of the American position, before and after the diaclosure of the
recent Israeli-American deal, can be sumroarizeii to the effect that the United States
does not want Saddam Husayn to stand alone in a prominant and powerful role in the
= region.
This view concentrates on.two matters: the ~irst is America's covert and overt dip-
lomatic and military activities in the region, and the second is Saddam Husayn's
policy, which displeases the strategic planners in ~,Taehington. He insists on his
co~plete independence, and on the right of the Aralis and the nations of the region
to make their political decisions themselves, in accordance with their national and
pan-Arab interests. He rejects the international polarization, represented by the
buildup of the U.S~. military presence in and aroun.d the Gulf region. Further, he
- is opposed to Camp David, and has barred Sadat from the role given him to carry out
in the Gulf, after his role ended in the confrontation with Israel.
Iraqi suspic~ons regarding the hidden American role in the Israeli bom~ing of the
Iraqi nuclear facilities are incorporated into the ~framework of this view: Namely
the United States, whether it encouraged Israel, o~,supplied it wtth tfie necessary
in~orntation, or not, does not want the Traqis to realize'their high aspirations
; thxough internal stability, economic proaperity, and victory on the f3.eld o!' battle.
The strange thing is that the Soviets, whose international interests are totally in-
compatible with Azqerican interests, have found themselves captive of ~4erican logic
in dealing with Iraq, at one of the stages of the Iraqi~Iranian war. They expressed
~ their annoyance at the strong ~raqi response to Iranian armed intervention along
their borders, and, for not too short a period of time, they stopped fulfilling the
contracts to supply arms. Perhaps they even encouraged Libya and Syria to off er
- aid and assistance to Iran.
Whateyer the case might be, what one hears constantly in Baghdad is tkiat Ixaqi
policy will not be changed, whether by positions of the United States ar the Soviet
Union, and Baghdad will continue to call on the region to adhere to an independent
Arab line, because that is the only way~ to safeguard Arab interests, and to keep
the region free of the international polarization.
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If Iraq had deal~:h with the facts and the reality of the international situation as
. it is, it would not have gone on record, when the Foreign Ministry su~oned Barbara
Bowdin, an off icial of the U.S. interesta sect ion in the Belgian Embassy, with either
its protest or its complaints about the increased flow of American weapons into Iran,
. through Israel or through world black ~arlcet channels. It would have seen that it
must stop here to hold accountable Teheran's "Arabs", who have moved heaven and
earth [became furious], when Iraq forcibly responded to the new Persian regime's
attempts to attack Iraq, interfere in its internal affairs, and threaten the Arabism
of the Gulf .
Iraq did not need the disclosure of the Argentinian aircraft to conf irm the truth
and integrity of its position regarding Iran, or to convince Teheran's "Arahs" to
- refrain from continuing to support Iran at the expense of their brotherly relations
with Iraq. There was a great deal of evidence, prior to the aircraft (incident), to
the effect that Khomeyni Iran's eupport for the Arab issues does not go beyond mere
words and propaganda, neither hindering nor advancing them. The painful thing is
that Teheran's "Arabs" no longer remember their Arabism, except for their language
for which they are laughed at in the service of Pereian barbarism.
What Happened to Abu Walid in Teheran
It is suff ieient here to point out what happened to the Palestinians. The PLO
- trained the nucleus of the revolutionary guard, who today are charged with protecting
the Iranian regime. 2'he Palestinians tried to be the spokesman of the Iranian revo-
lution in the Gulf and elsewhere, or rather, some in the PLO thought sa highly of
the Khrnneyni regime's "intentions" ti~,at such views reached the point of disagreement
and rupture with Baghdad.
iFl.hen the decisive hour came, the Khomeyni regime denied the PLO, in the person of
its leader Yasser 'Arafat, a golden opportunity to reap international diplomatic
and propaganda value, when Khomeyni persistantly rejected his earnest reques~s to
'riand the hostages over to the PLO, so that it could carry out negotiations with
Washington. That would have been the o~ca~ion to force the U.S. into a direct
dialogue with the PLO, to recogni.ze it, and to void Kissinger's pledge to Israel in
1975 not to conduct this dialogue with the PLO beroie its recognition of the Zionist
state.
- Abu Walid, a senior off icer in the Palestinian command, went himselg to Teheran to
renew "arafat's ef�orts, by virtue of the fact that he had aupervised the training
of the Iranian "fedayeen " in the past. It was a surprise to him when they rebuked
the PLO, because Zahdi al-Turazi, its representative at the UN, had said that the
Palestinians would act as mediators to solve the hostage crisis.
The second shock was that Khomeyni refused to receive him. Then, Abol Hassan Bani
Sadr received him. At that time, he was acting foreign minister. He told h3m that
- the Iranians were shocked, because the Paleatinians were interfering in an internal
matter on behalf of the U.S.
Abu Walid replied that the Palestinians~ goal was to serve the Iranian revolution,
and painted out to him that the seizure of the hostages, and the occupation of the
U.S. embassy tiuilding, were not benefiting the revolution. He warned him that the
United States might use those two th3ngs as ~ustification for occupying the Gulf.
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Despite all this, Teheran's "Arabs" have not ceased the "jihad" on the side of Iran.
It could be understood, for ex:3mple, why the Syrian regime offers assistance to Iran,
on the basis of the pro"verb, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," i.e., its hatred
of the Ba'thist regime in Iraq. However, it is not understandable, for example, tha.t
~ the Libyan regime should show such increasing enthusiasm for financing and arming
Iran, and should have adopted some of those who are outside of the law, like Barzani's
supporters.
There ;night be a"connection" which President al-Qadhafi suddenly discovered, that he
througt:t would unite himself and Khomeyni, as a motive for his enthusiasm. But what
is his view today, regarding the compelling, decisive and defini~e evidence of the
arms "connection" that has been planted for the Rhomeyni regime in Israel?
COPYRIGHT:1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
7005
CSO: 4303/J27
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LIBYA
ITALIAN PAPER CITES LIBYAN AGENCY ON TIES
PM151503 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 11 Sep 81 p 15
[Unattributed report: "A1-Qadhdhafi Backtracks with Italian Ambassador"]
[Text] Tripoli--JANA has issued a nofie concerning a meeti.ng between al-Qadhdhafi
and the Italian, Turkish, Spanish and Greek ambassadors. The main topic of the
~ document is the interpretation of the 1 September speech in which the Libyan
leader threatened, among other things, to attack Sicily in the event o� further
i incidents with the United States in the Gulf of Sirte.
i
I The JANA note states that there is a"defamatory campaign" against the Jamahiriyah,
~ that is, the Libyan People's Republic.
"This campaign," the document states, "has been mounted by the U.S. administration
~ through its propaganda means and through the various reactionary rightwing press
organs with the aim of distorting the Libyan stance and upsetting and damaging
~ the relations of friendship that bind Libya to the friendly Mediterranean countries.
This campaign has been furthered by spreading a false interpretation of the con-
tent of the speech which the leader of the revolution delivsredc*n the 12th anni-
versary of the 1 September Revolution.
"The ambassadors of the four friendly countries," the note continues, "agreed in
- their statements released following their meeting with the leader of the revolu-
~ tion. They said that their countries refuse to accept any aggressive U..S. stance
, with respect to th~ Jamahiriyah. They added that their countries will not permit
' the United States to use their territory for any aggressire action against Libya.
"The Italian, Turkish, Spanish and Greek ambassadors said that their countries
will not sacrifice their interests and historical and civilized relations with
Libya for President Reagan's sake. The ambassadors stressed that their government
leaders assess their relations with Libya posftively and safeguard t~-~ese relations
for the sake of mutual interests and for the ev~lution of their interests with
Libya."
- "The statements by those countries' ambassadors," the note continues, "were made
to reject all the accusaCions and false claims circulated by the U.S. administra-
tion and by the interpretations of the rightwing newspapers within the sphere of
influence of the United States ar.d its security services."
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The Libyan note accuses LA REPU~R?.ICA, among others, of reporting "false state-
ments" and asser~ts that "the daily COk.4IERE DELLA SERA has published a speech
by the Italian defense minister containing direct threats against Libya.
"A statement by the Italian Government," the note adds, "reports an anza version
of an official communique, according to which the Italian Government has expressed
its desire to pursue a policy of stability and peace in the Mediterranean region
- in cooperation with all the littoral states.
"Moreover, Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo said in an interview broadcast
on Italian television Channel ~ao that there is no crisis between Italy and Libya,
adding that we refuse, despite the disturbances in the Meditertanean, to describe
them as a crisis."
"Apart from the official Italian statements, which point to the re3ection of all
U.S, pressures to damage relations with Libya and falsify Libya's stances in its
legitimate right to defend its people's freedom against U.S., zionist and reac-
tionary imperialist attacks, the Italian people's masses," the Libyan note con-
tinues, "have expressed their stable and independent stance with respect ta the
patent U.S. interventions, rejecting the attempts to destroy the relations of
mutual interest and the historical relations with the Jamahiriyah."
- COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
CSO: 4528/1 ,
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LIBYA
. BRIEFS
DESALINATION, POWER PLANTS--Libya has commissioned the German-Swiss Brown-Boveri
Cie. to implement a contract to expand a power station in Tubrsq, on the shore of
the Mediterranean Sea. The contract is valued at 200 million West Germsn marks.
Work will be completed by the middle of 1984, and the power output will be increased
- to 260 megawatts. Libya concluded a similar contract, 3 months ago, with the same
firm to expand a generating.station in Darnah. The two plants will produce
electrical energy and desalinate sea water, in order to meet the needs of the
developing industrial area in North East Libya. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
in Arabic No 236, 21-27 Aug 81 p 55] 7005 [COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI]
CSO: 4504/75
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- SAUDI ARABIA
IMPLICATIOIVS OF NEUMANN'S RESIGN~?TION DISCUSSED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 234 7-13 Aug 81 p 22
[Article: "The First Victim of the AWACS Deal: Robert Neumann Reaigned in the
South of Lebanon"]
[Text] The replacement of the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia was not an innocuous
decision. The removal of Robert Neumann, one of President Reagan's closest associ-
ates, is considered to be a concession on the part of the White House in an ~.ssue
which is closely connected with America's stumbling around in its dealings with the
hot situation in the Middle East. Exactly what is this concession?
Washington--Last 20 July the phone rang in Senator Charles Fercy's office in
Washington. The person on the other end of the line was Robert Neumann, U.S.
ambassador to Saudi Arabia and an old friend of Percy. He asked him: "Did you
watch TV yesterday? I heard Haig`s statements, and believe me he made me want to
vomit." Neumann continued talking, not knowing that what he was saying would be
used as a pretext, a few days later, to force him to resign from his position.
Neumann was recalled from Riyadh to Washington early last month after the White
House had made an "internal decision" to propose to Congress the sale o� AWACS
planes to Saudi Arabia next September. Since the White House lmows that those
members of Congress who oppose the plan are gathering their forces in order to
defeat it and prevent the deal from taking place, Neumann was recalled so that he
" could make a number of contacts with these members of Congresa in an effort to
convince them of the necessity of selling the AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia.
When he arrived in Washington it was clear to him that his task would involve
numerous difficulties. Relations between the ambassador and his direct superior,
Secretary of State Alexander Haig, had never been good. Neumann had occupied the
position of foreign affairs adviser in Reagan's transition team, and after Reagan's
victory he was appointed head of the "transition team" in the Department of
State. This team was entrusted with the task of examining the policies of the old
administration, rendering an opinion ~oncerning them, and then incorporating these
policies into the work of the new administration.
When Reagan announced his choice of Gen Alexander Haig to occupy the position of
secretary of state in the new adminstration, Neumann felt that the efforts of the
transition team were in danger [of being in vain]. Haig did not support the "policy"
which he had adopted and which he had expressed during Reagan's election campaign
and when the new government was taking over its functions--particularly in the
Department of State.
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One of the most important differences between the two men concerns U.S. strategy
with regard to the Gulf. Neumann is in favor of developing relations between the
U.S. and the Arabs and disregarding Israel's reservationa concerning this matter.
Haig is in favor of continuing the policq of the "critical balance" between the
Arabs and the Israelis, guaranteeing that the Israelis will have the upper hand to
some degree or other.
When the situation in the Middle East exploded after the events which took place
starting this summer, it became clear that the differences between the two men would
lead them to a parting of the ways similar to that of a divorce. After the bombing
of the Israeli nuclear reactor, Neumann pointed out that it was necessary for the
U.S. to reconsider supplying Israel with F-16 planes, whereasHaig, after the raid,
announced that delivery of the planes to Israel would be resumed after a"temporary
delay." Then came Menachem Begin's victory in the Israeli Knesset elections, which
was followed by the savage attacks on Lebanon, and all of this made Neumann even
f irmer in his stand.
The former ambassador said that the U.S. had more than one good reason to review
its policy with regard to Israel. But Haig, in the television program which Neumann
referred to in his telephone conversation with Percy, stated that he refused to link
the delivery of the F-16 planes to Israel's raids against Lebanon, and he reaffirmed
that these were two separate matters.
After that the Wnite House made the decision to suspend the shipment of the airplanes
to Israel. Neumann said that the secretary of state did not mean what he said, and
pointed out that the White House's decision contradicted the opinions which Haig had
expressed during ABC's television program "Issues and Answers" on the evening of
19 July. ~
- Neumann told many of his friends who were members of Con.gress that it was necessary
to quickly reevaluate American policy in the Middle East before it was too late for
Washington. He added that the real obstacle to accomplishing this was not in the
Congress, but rather "in the Departmemt of State"--a reference to Alexander Haig.
On 23 July, after Haig had gathered together sufficient evidence that Neumann "was
putting the secretary of state publicly in a bad light," he summoned him to his
office in Washington in order to confront him with this evidence. A number of
Neumann's friends have said that the meeting was a stormy one. Haig suggested that
the real reason for Neumann's acrimonious remarks was the fact that the ambassador
aspired to occupy a position more important than that of ambassador to Saudi Arabia
in the Department of State, and that perhaps he aspired to occupy the position of
secretary of state itself. But Neumann insisted that the real reason for his
remarks was the policy of the Department of State and that he refused to allow the
matter to be transformed into a"clash of personalities."
These are the interpretations which the two men have presented concerning their
differences. However, rumors which have gone around government offices in Washington
after Neumann announced his decision to resign have tended to explain things quite
differently.
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Israeli Condition?
- One of these "unofficial" interpretations says that Neumann's dismissal was one of
the conditions set by Begin before he would stop his'raids into Lebanon and observe
the cease-fire. The basis of this interpretation is that, before Neumann was dis~-
missed, he was active in trying to push the AWACS deal through Congress and this is
what led the Israeli prime minister to demand his dismissal.
This unofficial interpretation goes on to say that Begin's demand wae indirectly
welcomed by Haig who already lrnew the nature of the criticisme which his ambassador
in Riyadh was directing against him.
There is also another "unofficial" interpretation which says that the strong opposi-
tion among the White House staff to Haig's policies led the secretary of state to
fear that the White House staff would "polish up" Neumann's image in preparation for
the time when Haig would be resigning--and it was believed that this time was not far
away.
, It has been confirmed that, during the last few days before he was dismissed,
I Neumann was saying that the secretary of state's principal concern was to prepare
for the coming presidential elections which he intended to enter, and that this was
precisely the thing that caused him (that is, Haig) to hesitate to take a decisive
~ position with regard to Israel since he desired to maintain good relations with the
~ Zionist pressure groups in Washington.
I
~ The important thing is that, after the 23 July meeting between Haig and Neumann, the
i secretary of state made a direct request from the President to give him "a free
~ hand" to deal with his reTiellious ambassador. Haig succeeded in receiving this
authorization after he convinced Reagan that differences between the Department of
; State and one of its ambassadors concerning such a sensitive position could paralyze
~ the effectiveness of American foreign policy.
~ After that one of Haig's aides got in touch with the ambassador and informed him
that the secretary of state felt that it would be better for him to submit his
i resignation. Then he explained to him that the secretary of state had received
i authorization from above to do what he wanted.
II It should be noted here that Reagan apparently is determined to continue the game of
~ balancing people off against each other inside his administration. The dispute
between Haig and the White House staff is growing, and the atmosphere is growing
heavier with each new crisis which the Reagan administration faces. However, the
President is always careful to compensate one faction for any gain which is achieved
by the other faction. The matter here goes beyond personal considerations. Reagan
knows that his administration will be in a very criticalposition if he disregards
the alliances between the huge American establishment groups which are represented
in his administration. He realizes that the differences between Haig and
Weinberger, for example, are not personal differences as much as they are tactical
- differences between the institutions which each of the~two men represents. Thus
if he decided the dispute in favor of either one or the~other person, such a
decision would go beyond personal cunsiderations and would involve political
considerations--considerations in which any internal disorder could make it more
difficult to formulate "American policy."
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The unfortunate th{.ng is that the continuation of this dichotomy within the
American administration also makes it more difficult to formulate Amer.ican policy.
Proof of this is the absence of a definite U.S. position with regard to the Middle
, East. This absence of a position is the thing that, up till lately, Menachem Begin
ha~ been able to profit from and which has led the U.S. itself to be at the top of
the list of the victims.
COPYRIGHT: AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 1981
9468
- CSO: 4304/134
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SUDAN
AL-SHARIF AL-HINDI ON OPPOSITION PLANS, IMPENDING UPR~SING
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 233, 31 Jul-6 Aug 81 p 38-39
[Interview with al-Sharif al-Hindi, leader of the Sudanese Opposition, by Ahmad
Hafez: "The Sudanese Regime is the Fourth Partner in 'Camp David in London, date
not specif ied ]
[Text] A1-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi (58 years o1d) is the senior leader of the
opposition political parties in Sudan, and their most inf luential and ambitious.
He alone among the national leaders has re~ected concilistion. He insists on re-
building a more democratic, just and economically developed Sudan. AL WATAN AL-'
ARABI met with him in London, aad interview~d him concerning his future endeavors,
and the regime's troubles.
[Question] Why are you in opposition from London? Would it not be more appropriate
for you, a historic party leader, to be there in Sudan, among those members of
y ouur party that are fighting?
[Answer] Opposition from abroad was not something we invented. It is a recognize
method all over the world, and throughout history. Emigre opposition began during
the time of the Prophet Muhammad, when he and his followers fled to Christian
_ Ethiopia, to avoid the injustice and oppression of the Mecca unbelievers. The
- Islamic call was spread by the emigres abroad, and the supporters at home. Karl
= Marx did not set foot in Leningrad until the revolution was successful. [sic]
What I wish to stress is that all liberating forces began with work abroad, coupled
with action at home, in continuous coordination. That is the course of world
struggle, of which we consider ourself one supporter. Our presence abroad allows
us to:
*Report our case on the international level, and to inform all the world of the
Sudanese regime's worsening pr2ctises against the people of Sudan.
*Support, materially and morally, the opposition forces at home. We now have
armed organizations, trained on the latest weapons, based in the various remote
areas of Sudan. We have our organized polit3cal cells, which the regime cannot get
at. That could not be done, were it not for the leadership's freedom of movement,
which would not be in our power, if we had remained inside Sudan, where it would be
easy to find us and throw us into the darkness of prison.
*We have been able to gain material and political support from politically liberated
nations and organizations, through tireless contacts that we are making from our
exile abroad.
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Economic Bankruptcy
[Question] Exactly what do you have againat the Sudanese regime?
Let us begin on the domestic level.
[Answer] Are you prepared to write a large volume? Am I going to be able to dictate
it to you in one sitting?
[Question] A volume, no.