JPRS ID: 9791 CHINA REPORT POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060030-8
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• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 30
• Content Type: REPORTS

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- JPRS L/10053
15 October 198 ~
N~ar East North Africa Re ort
_ p
(FOUO 36/81 }
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~ NGTE
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~ ,
JPRS L/10053
15 October 1981
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 36/81)
. CONTENTS
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
UK Journalist Diacusees Arab Gold Market
(David Mareh; FINANCIAL TIMES, 28 3ep 81) 1
AFGHANISTAN
Soviet Newsman Terms Mujahedin Bandits, Aeassains
- (I. .~ndronov; PARIS MATCH, 11 Sep 81) 4
_ IRAN .
Anti-Regime Role of "Great Mute", Leftiats Diacusaed
(Ghazi Sa~rhane; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 31 Aug-13 Sep 81) 14
Role of Religious Peraonalitiea, Khomeyni .Analyzed
(Hedi Dhoukar; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 21 Aug-73 Sep 81) 16
Briefa
Ambulancete Transport Miniaters 21
MOROCCO . ,
- Unrest in Rural Areas Described
(AFKIQUE-ASIi~, 22 Jun-5 Jul 81) 22
- a- [III - NE ~ A- 121 FOUO]
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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
UK JOURNALIST DISCUSSES ARAB GOLD MARKET
PM238131 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 28 Sep 81 FINANCIAL TIMES Survey: Arab
Banking and Finance, p V
[Article by Da~,-~d Marsh: "Oil Countries' Demand for Gold Strengthening World
Bullion Price"]
[Text] A resurgence of demand for gold from the wealthy Arab oil producers has
been an important factor behind the recovery in the international bullion price
during the last two months.
Following the sharp drop from the peak price of $850 per ounce in January last
year to around $390 in Early August, many o� the private Arab investors who had
piled into the bullion market in the hope of making quick gains had good reason
to feel demoralised. One London precious metal dealer tells of disappointed
Telex messages sent to him this summer by a key Middle East client addressed to
"the big bear"--reflecting anguish at the constant news of falling prices.
Since then the mood has changed perceptibly, with the price regaining the $450
level by mid-September. Demand both from investosa and the ~ew~ellery industry
has picked up as market participants came round to the view suddenly that gold
had been oversold. Some official Arab institutions whick? emerged as heavy buyers
in 1979 and 1980 have also shown revfved intereat.
Reflecting the aoli,dity of physical demand, particularly from Saudi Arabia, many
jewellery fabricating factories in northern Italy--tr?e traditional supplier to
the Arab market--are reported to be fully booked until the end of the year. This
is a marked contrast to last year, when Italian ~ewellers were hard hit by a
slump in orders and heavy flows of dishoarded metal from the r,uif.
Pattern ~
The pattern of buyin~, however, seems to have shit:ted compared with the latter
half of 1979; when many Arab merchants and private sector consortia threw them-
selves enthusiastically into both the gold and silver market--and had tfieir
fingers badly burnt wlien the price aubsequently alumped. ~
- This time the etnphasis is far more on trading rather than one-way buying. Inves-
� tors are careful to prevent their po~itions from becoming overexposed. A series
of quick-moving incursions into the market, buying at the lows and then creaming
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off profits when the price moves up $10, now seems to be the preferred strategy
for many Gulf investors. "The t~iiddle East has learnt that there is money to he
made by ~obbing," says one Arab bullion dealer in London.
The extent of the turn-round in demand last year is illustrated by figure~ com-
piled by Consolidated Ghold Fields, the London-bas~d mining finance house. These
show that total holdings of carat ~ewellery in the main Arab countries of the
Middle East were hardly changed last yePr after ri.sing by about 115 tonnes in~
1978, when demand was particul~rly strong during ~.:he run-up to the price explosion
of 1979.
Swing
When the whole of the Middle East is considered, the swing is even more dramatic.
If Turkey and Iran are included, tfltal ~ewellerq holdings in the area rose by
226 tonnes in 1.978 and then dropped by nearly ~0 tonneg last year, reflecting
large-scale dishoarding--in particular from Iran. '
This year the heavy dishoarding has atopped. But physical shipments to the Middle
- East from the main gold trading centres in London and Zurich will still remain
modest in comparison to the boom year of 1978. One reason for this is that the
market has become a great deal more speculative and geared to short-term profits.
To assist dealing and quick disposal, manq investment consortia prefer to keep
stocks in bank vaults in Europe, ~ather than in their home base in Saudi Arabia
and the Gulf.
Additionally some private investors--and, most probably, members of some of the
Arab royal families who habitually trade in precious metals--like to maintain
holdings in stable places like Switzerland as a form of last resort insurance
- against a change ot regime or other political disturbance in their country. It
� is significant, for instance, that at least two of the big gold-dealing entre-
= preneurs in Beirut--the traditional centre of Arab gold dealing before the civil
- war--have since moved their operations to Zurich, where they are by all~accoun~s
- prospering.
= Although its significance as a trading centre has declined, Beirut is stiil an
= important entrepot for Middle East gold. Much of the dishoarded supplies which
came back to Europe from the region last year were sent by air from the city to
Switzerland.
Dubayy remains an important shipment point for supplies of inetal passing from the
Gulf and the Indian sub-continent to Europe and vice versa. Recently the Soviet
Union has shown increased interest in the posaibility of selling small gold bars--
the most popular form of investment in India--in Dubayy for transshipment further
east.
The exception to the general pattern of lower physical shipments to and from the
Arab countries this year stems from the activities of central banks and other
official institutions in the area.
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~GI~ ~F~lC'If+~. USl? C~TVII.Y
Iraq and Libya have emerged as the two main Arab statea which have ahown great
~ enthusiasm about buil~ling up th~ir gold res~erves--partly on purely financial
considerations but par.tly tc~o for poli~ical r~easons. The United Arab Emirates,
Kuwait, Oman and Oatar have also o~erated in *_Yae ma~:l;.et from time to time in.
varying degrees. Outside the main oil-exporting group, Syria and Jordan have
occasionally sh~wn incerest.
Convert
Only in the case of the most p o~oerful potential gold convert, the Saudi Arabian
Mon~ta~y Agency (SAMA) has there been no sign of any official buying--although
rumors abound that SAMA 1-~as in fact purchased gold at times through intermediaries.
Last year large-scale shipmezts of gold from Zurich to Baghdaci were revealed in
Swiss customs statistics, providing the first confirmation that Iraq had emerged
as one of the biggest buye~s of bullion in OPEC. The Swiss figures are n~ longer
published following complainta from the Swiss banks' clients that their traditional
secrecy was being violated.
But this year it is believed that Iraq, after selling some of its goid stocks at
pric~ of $550 to $600 per a,.ince, may have been baclc j.n the market to buy gold
again recently. Iraq has been much less �~n~~ci.ally hit by the war with Iran
than Tehran (which has also made large ~o1d ~urchases through its c~ntral banks
� over the past few years, but been forced to sell some recently).
Tr.aq's gold reserves have no~ been published for four years; they are classified
as a state secret. Other countties are morc~ obliging, however. Accarding to
statistics supplied to the I:~ternational Monetary Fund (IME'), Libya's gold reserves
rose to more than 3.5m ounces as of M,ay this year from only 2.7m ounces last
autumn.
Libya has been building up its goid holdings in Tripoli, mostly, it is believed,
through purchases on the London market.
Buying has been motivated pa~ticularly by the desire to maintain a stock of inter-
national assets free from possible intprference from the West. With the memory
still fresh of Prssident Carter's action to block 50 tonnes of Iranian gold held
in t,ne New Ycrk FED in Novemhar 1979, and o~i~h the political temperature between
the Libyans ar~-i the U.S. fr.eez.i.n~ -rap3dly, Co1 al-Qadhdhafi is in no mood to take
chances.
Similar but smaller purchases of go]d hava shown. up in IMR statistics for Oman,
Jordan, Qatar and the Uni.ted P.rab Emir.ates, although it is certain that the IMF
figures do i~ot tell tl~e who.l.e stor.y berause of the proliferation of semi-official
reserve-investing institutions in these 9~3tGS.
- SAMA is sti"11 thoup,ht tu b~ ba,ically too r_onservative to make large forays into
the gold market. In a sense, I~owever, th~ Saudi Arabians have already provided an
example for the other more aiiventiirous Arab states to follow. During the 1970's,
~ motivated by the desire to be master of its own reserves, the Saudi government
transported all its gold stocks from the New York FED back to the security of
Riyadh.
COPYRIGHT: The Financi.al Times Ltd~ 1�8i
CSO: 4400/9
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AFGHANISTAN
SOVIET NEWSMAN TERMS MUJAHIDYN BANDITS, ASSASSINS
Paris PARIS MA'_r.CH in French 11 Sep 81 pp 3-9
[Report by I. Andronov]
[Text] The very colonialistic reportage of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Afghanistan.
There have been many articles reporting on the Afghan people's
resistance to the Russian invasion. The text we are publishing
today is quite unusual in one respect: It was written by a
Soviet ~ournalist and published in Moscow by the official
literary review, LITER,ATURNAYA GAZETA. What does a popular
uprising represent to a special correspondent who travels
through the country under the protection of the artillery
- and tanks of the invaders, his fellow- countrymen? How does ~e
explain the hoatility of the people to the reforms imposed by a
government which itself is an emanation of the Kremlin? I.
Andronov's reporting gives the answers, even while he claims
only to be interested in safeguarding Afghanistan's archeoZogical
treasures. All conquerors, buildere, and defenders of colonial
_ empires have been followed by r_hroniclers or repo�rte~s whose ~ob
it is to s.tng their praises and discre3it the resistance of
vari~us "bari.~arians." The present article is no exception:
whatever the invaders may be, they present themselves as .
- liberators, and those who dare resist them are nothing but
- frightful bandits, assassins, and incidentally enemips of
progress...
Not far from the Kabul-Peshawar highway, near the Pakistani border, a rapid inver-
vention regiment of the Afghan army is deployed. The regiment protects this artery,.
which has always been of exceptianal commercial and strategic importance, from the.
incursions of the "basmatchs" (Counterrevolutionary bandit during the civil war in
Central Asia 1917-1926). Since time imc?emorial, caravans of inerchants have traveled
this ancient road. Along the same road once passed the military cohorts of
Alexander of Macedonia, and the mounted hordes of various foreign conquerors from
India hurled over it. On three separate occasions, the legions of the British
colonialists followed this road to seize Afghanistan. Following in their footsteps
today, armed bande of Afghan rebels from Pakistan are erupting in t'he East. I had
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Ft)R ONI~IC'IAI, [~.~'+E nNi,Y
- ~oined up with this regiment of seasoned veterans who confronted them. I was some-
what hesitant about introducing mysel� for the first time to the brave officers
who co~and it, for l did not know how they ~aere going to receive ~he modest but
rather unusual requist I was going to make: I wanted to ask them to find me a
guide to go visit the archeological museum near the village of Hadda.
To justify my unusual request, I had intentionally brought tour guidebooks from~
Rabul, (now, alas, rather uselessl) which cited among other Afghan historical
curiosities the unique archeological treasures of Hadda, which were described as
especially interesting. The digs carried out on the site had resulted in the
discovery of an ancient temple, in which the alcove of the altar was decorated with
an extraordinarily rare asgemblage of sculptures of divinities: a Greek Heracles,
, dressed in the skin of the lion he had killed. and seated next to Buddha. Surraunding
the central temple was still standing a fortified monastery fram the third centurq
before our era, containine aeveral dozen sacred "stupas" an3 prayer rooms, full of
statues of gods belonging to the various Western and Eastern religions which inter-
mingled here--Buddhism, Hinduism, and the religions of Greek antiquity.
A Protective Escort to Take Me to the Museum
_ ~i
This incomparable monument to the epoch of Greco-Bactrian civilization was built by
the descendants of Alexander of Macedonia's comrades-in-arms, who were allied wj.th
the distant anceators of the Afghans of today. This architectonic synthesis of
the various civilizations had produced such a magnificent masterpiece of sacred
architecture that for 7 centuries thousands of pilgrims came from a11 over to per-
form their devotions, even from India and China.
Later, the wild nomadic hordes who subdued almost all of Asia left the sanctuarq
- of Hadda intact. But ~ust recently, alarming rwnors from Afghanistan reached the
capitals of Europe: the rebels, it was said, had attacked Hadda and irreparably
- damaged it.
So it was the veracity of these reports that I had come to determine, at the request
in the first place, of the department of foreign culture o� LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.
In the second place, finding myaelf in Kabul, I had an int~rview with an expert on
art, Azam Zariab, director of the departmpnt of culture in the ministry of informa-
tion of the Democratic Republic of Afghaniatan, who told me the following facts:
Starting in 1965, Afghan archeologists carried out excavations at Hadda, carefully
restored the sculptures, the bas-reliefs and the fresco.s of the temple, and ended
up putting together a remarkable museum complex, which has become an ob~ect ot
national pride for all our people. But last year, the "douchmans" (Afghan word
signifying bandit and hooligan, overall "rebels"), as we call the enemies of the
- people's revolution, forced the experts to leave Hadda.
Since then, we have received information that the bandits may have destroyed most
of the sculpturea of Hadda and atolen the most precious of the ob,jects, reportedly
to be smuggled into Pakistan, where they were soZd. ~ro months ago, we sent a group
of experts to Hadda to make a detailed inveatigation. But ~ust at that very moment,
on the outskirts of Hadda, some fierce fighting with rebel detachments took place
and as a result our experts had to circle back and return t~ Kabul...."
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When I related this conversation to tlle staff officers of the regiment deployed about
10 kilometers from Hadda, ~y interlocutors gave me an eacort and vehicle to get to
- the museum: an armored vehir_le arrived at headquarters. Along with it came nine
soldiers, a lieutenant co~nander, and three sappers equipped with a mine detector
and long poles, the purpose of wY~ich I did not understand.
The guide who had been assigned to me--Lieutenant Commander Abdul Raouf--explained
to me that the road leading to Hadda might have been mined by the douchmans who
traveled in the zone at night. They are currently receiving, secretly, from Pakistan,
special American miaes, encased in a plastic substance against which mine detectors
were ineffective; thus we would be obliged to reconnoiter suapect sites along the
road wirh these "feelers" 4 meters long and pointed at the and. Before starting,
Lieutenant Raouf tried to reassure me~
"Don't be afraid! We will be seated on the top of the vehicle, and if we land on
a mine, the wArst that can happen is a little free flight."
I tried to manage a carefree smile, but without too much success. The Afghans who
accomp~nied us climbed onto the vehicle along with me. We left the garrison behind
and were soon covered with duat. The dirt road we followed massed through fields
devoid of any signs of human habitation and bare, reddish hills.
I will never forget the first few kilometers of this journey : one's eyes were
fixed ahead on the road which stretched out in front, one scrutinized every spot
of loose dirt, every bump and pothole, expecting the fatal explosion at any moment.
The path zigzagged its wa3? to the forest, then plunged into its depths, and we
suddenly found ourselves hemmed in on every side by thick, dark vegetation. A
_ deathly silence reigned in the shadows. E~en the birds, heaven knows why, were
also silent.
A Spectacle of Devastation Confirmed Our Fears
Finally, the leafy obstacles were behind us, the trees grew farther apart, and we
came out on the edge o~ a steppe. To the right, on a solitary knoll, stood the
cubical complex of the legendary monastery. To the left stretched a wasteland,
beyond which one could see the clasely walled-in enclosure, and the worn soil, of
a small village, which seemed dead. No smoke rose from the rooftops, no voices
reached our ears. No sign of life. Acco-rding to the leader of our troops, a man
- of experience, that was not necessarily a good eign, and he deemed it preferable
not to allow the driver and the machine-gunner to leave the vehicle. Seven members
of the commando team fanned out rap~dly and ~Fell flat on the ground on the left
slope of the knoll on which the monastery stood. At the eame time, three soldiers
testing the ground ahead of them with the f eelers and the mine detector, went ahead
of us, the lieutenant commander and myself, toward the goal of our expedition.
_ The spectacle of desolation which greeted us confirmed our worst fears. Nothing
remained of one of the world's artistic wonders but ~:he gutted cloister walls. The
vandals had burned down the celebrated museum. The roof restored by the archeologists
had collapsed. The pillars which had supported it were nothing more now than bJack-
ened stumps which protruded monstrously from a pile of ashes. All the sacred "stupas"
had been broken into pieces. All the sculptures had been literally evaporated. All
the bas-relief wurals had been shattered. The entire group of mythical divinities
!
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of the undersea kingdom of the flowering lotue, a ac~ilpture known throughout the
_ world, had been annihilated. Room by room, We found only debris from the past
- splendor, fragments, rubble.
"We should take a look into the monastery's underground vaults," said Raouf, That
was where the gallery of frescos depicting the iife of man from birth to i~eath was
located. Perhaps they had been spared?
Alas, the entrance to the vaults yawned as wide as the entrance to a cave. Once
again, the sappers took the lead, as scouts, and we followed behind. The lieutenant
commaander used his cigarette lighter to illuminate the stone uault. 'I'he little
tongue of light enabled us to glimpse a procession of Hellenistic figures ~arbed in
bright red, blue, purple, or silvery tunics and with gold diadems on their hea3s.
But their faces were completely ~one: they had been lacerated by the blows of
bayonets and daggers. In addition, the gallery of frescos was dotted with bullet-
holes. To ~udge from the numl~er of hole~, the vandals had not tried to economize
on ammunition. A tragic and symbolic provocaiiAn: this is not the firat time in
history that counter-revolutionaries machine-gun, alash, and burn to ashes works
~f popular art.
This Monstrous Sacking of Hadda Was In No Way Accidental
Once back out in the open air, we at: ance heard the crack of gunfire in the distance.
The sounds of the .firing came to us from the village, but fortunately we were not
the targets. Raouf, who unc~erstood what was happening, explained it to me: "The
viliage is undoubtedly occiipied by the douchmans. They are probably too few in
mumber to attack us. Thos~ shots are a signal. T~~y are asking for reinforcement.
I am under or.ders not to exposs you unnecesaArily to danger and to avoid any engage-
ments. So we are going to return straight back to the garrison. Tomorrow, we wi11
return here with a company that will ri.d Hadda of all that riffraff." A week later,
in Kabul, I had another upportunity to talk with Zariab, in his miniaterial office.
I related to him my unhappy news. Even though there was nothing surprising in it,
Zariab still spol:e of the basmatch vandalism with bitternesa and anger: .
"This monstrous sacking of Hadda was in no way accidental, if you know the savagery
and religious fanaticism of the douchmar.s," said Zariab indfgnantly. Practically
everywhere those degenerates burn an.d blow up museums, schoaZs, colleges, scientific
establishmenta, hospitals, and libraries.
"What they want is to destroy every source of knowledge and cul.ture, to keep the
people in ignorance and slavery, and by fire and sword, to atrangle the revolutionary
democratization of our society. Meanwhile, their admirers, in the West extol the
_ vi~~tues of these murderers and butcri~rs, whom they depict as "freedom fighters!"
But the rea~ons f~r which they fight, in truth, and with what reprehensibse means,
sust be made known."
The day of ray visit to Hadda, I had the chance to see with my own eyes a wounded
douchman, captured by ttte man of an Afghan commando unit. He had been brought in
an armored transport vehicle to the regimental headquarters. Then, *_hey changed
the dressings on his leg, which had been pierced by a bullet, before interrogating
him.
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The weapons that had been found on him were displayed before me: an automatic
pistol, a high-caliber Colt, a bandolero, and a razor-sharp saber. . The basmatch
had been taken on the outskirts of the market town of Gaziabad, during a skirmish
- between.the troops and a band of about 30 rebels. More than half o� the latter
had been killed, some had succeeded in escaping.
The wounded bandit was named Moudir Zarbab-khan. He said that before the revolution
he had been a rich landholder. Subsequently, along with another wealthy proprietor
named Kahfir Oul-khak, he had become the leader of the band that had ~ust been put
out of actian. Head hunched between hia shouldera, shrin}~ing like a beaet caught
in a trap, the moustachioed bandit, his hawk-like nose planted in the middle of a
bony face, made his statement in a monotone voice.
"Our last mjssion was to liquidate Assif Khamker, the president of the Gaziabad
agricultural cooperative. We laid an ambush for him on the road, near the village,
but we ourselves were spotted and aurrounded."
"Wb.o gave you the oruers to commit this assasaination?"
"A foreigner whose name I do not know, who had been brought from Pakiatan by one
of our confederates. After sending us off to the ambush, both of them left for
parts unknown."
"What about the foreigner?"
"He was an officer. He had white skin. He was dressed in a pea ~acket and baggy
trousers. He spoke English, and al~o Pushtu. He participated fn the raids we made
in the districta of Chinvar and Tchapriar. ~ie was always telliag us: "You are
struggling for a~ust cause; to puniah the communiete and their accomplices."
Chiraz-khan told me, in aecret, that the mission of thie white officer who was sent
to us was to pull together our isolated detachments."
_ "How many of your compazriots have you killed?
Silence from the prisoner. He looked around him, with a haunted expression. Patently
he had clammed up, in hopes no doubt of eacaping the punishment he deserved for his
murders. A~ for the "white officer" of whom he had apoken, the epy infiltrated
from Pakistan, he was one of those swarms of instructors training the basmatchs at
_ almost all douchman bases south of the Afghan border. Before my expedition to
Hadda, I had attended a press conference in Kabul, held on ths occasion of the
arrest of a terrorist, Vali Moukhammed. He recalled the instructions given the
rebel-saboteurs at a training field near Peshawar:
The Rebels Tr~ed to Divide the Populace
"The American instructors teach us how to uae their mines and exploaivea to destroy
government buildings, bridges, and any other strategic construction. The Americans
also taught us how to burn down schools quickly and efficiently. They told us that
a single grenade akillfully thrown into a meeting convoked by the authorities could
terrorize the atheists enough that in future they would no longer want tu attend
public meetings...."
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In DjelalaUad, I saw with my own eyes the results of their work with grenades: the
attack was carried out at the municipal etadium during a soccer game. The toll:
11 dead, including a little boy 4 years old, and 17 seriously wounded. The douchman
who had thrown the grenade was taken unharmed, but he had been arrested. During
his interrogation, he said that he had acted on the orders of the Peshawar training
center.
Col Couliam Kadyr, commander of the Afghan division garrisoned near D~elalabad,
- shared with me the inf~rmation he had put together about the basmatch movement:
"Today, all the ma~or armed groups of douchmans have been liquidated and disgeraed
- by lawful forces. Besides their military fiasco, the rebels have tried to divide
the peaceful populace, promising them to abolish agrarian reform, restore the govern-
ment of the semi-feudal oligarchy, and eliminate the program of popular education.
� Now, the military and moral im otence of the counterrevolution has reduced their
terrorist activity to criminal banditry by small groups who are trying, through
assassination and pillage, to sow panic, disorder, and ruin.
"In the agricultural outskirta of Djelalabad, the douchmans blow up irrigation
ditches and bridges, they.cut down the power lines, theq burn the food storehouses,
they destroy the Soviet tractors, agricultural combines, and trucks we have sent
them. For the moment, these criminal vermin are still causing enormous damage
along the main highway linking D~elalabad and Kabul."
"What is the role of the basmatchs along that road?"
"They pillage, torture unarmed passengers on the buses which serve the route," an-
swered Col Kadyr. "We man posts all along the highway, but it is practically
_ impossible to supply a military escort for everq bus. The douchmans slip up to
the road under cover, and when the bua comes, they throw themselves into its path,
armed with automatic rifles. The driver is forced to atop.
. A Cannibalistic Ritual of Head-Hunting
"Then, the assailants most often force their victims to line up side by side. All
the prisoners are meticulously searched, and their money and papers are taken from
them. The rebels use the papera to try to identify the ~membera of the people's
democratic party and the revolutionary youth organizationa. Theae people are ~
immediately tied up. An eyewitness has reported that these sadists cut off their
ears and nose, gutted them, and decapitated. them. The heade were then stuck into
the opened bodies.
"These stories are not perhaps for people with weak stomachs, but all ~he same every-
one should know how these douchmans, armed by our foreign enemies, are treating
Afghans."
South of D~elalabad, in the mountainous Afghan province of Paktia, which borders
Pakistan, my ~ournalistic calling enabled me to see the leader of theae head-
choppers who for a whole year were engaged in Chese excesses on the roada surrounding
the town of Gardez. Now he has been atopped. On the eve of his aentencing, in the
pri.son, I found myself face to face with this predator in human form, who answers
to the name of Afridi Anatkhon.
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N'Uli UH'Hl('L~l. USN: (1NLY
Along with his followers he attacked the local bus, and with his own hands
personally tortured to death eight local party militants and also killed some 20
peasants who refused to give their allegiance to the basmatchs. His victims were
all decapitated. The bloodthirsty Af ridi was here following the instructions of
Bourkhanouddin Rabbani, the leader of a sect of rebel conspirators, the "Djamiate
Islami," who introduced among his satraps a head-hunting cannibalistic ritual. 1'he
lieads are brought as trophies to Rabbani's well-guarded headquarters.
�
�
= Afridi a Rebel "Under the Wing" of the Westerners
Elis principal plac~ of residence is in the city of Peshawar,.in Pakistan. From
~ there, he goes frequently to Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Western Europe.
- President Sadat holds sumptuous receptions for him: Former U.S. Secretary of State
, Henry Kissinger is his secret mentor. The British press sings his praises until
it is out of breath: "Rabbani, an eminently respectable interpreter.of Islam,"
"Rabbani is in no way a fanatic," "Rabbani, a Muslim professor of philosophy."
Not a word, mind you, about the f act that this torturer of Afghan patriots, as his
accomplice Afridi has now revealed, clandestinely receives on behalf of their
obscurantist sect thousands of dollars and tons of American guns.
"How did Rabbani reward you personally for the execution of your~compatriots?" I
asked Afridi.
"Rabbani summoned me to Pakistan," declared Afridi, and told me: "The more of the
enemy you ki11, the richer you will be. Keep their money, their clothing, for
- yourself, ~verything that belongs to them, their ~ewelry."
"And this is what you have done?�1 '
"Yes." ~
"Is this what Islam prescribes?"
,~No. "
At ttie time of tiie arrest, they had found on Af.rtdi a tobacco pouch containing two
dozen gold dental crowns torn from the mouths of prisoners. It was this gold, not
devotion to Islam or an ardent love of freedom, which drew Afridi into the rebel
camp. Tc~ my mind, in fact, it is not quite correct to call them rebels. They are
- nothing but venal marauders, as venal as they can be.
The unleashing of the d~uchmans' banditry has come back, as if by poetic justice,
to haunt all of Afghanistan's neighbors who were giving them refuge. In Peshawar,
the Afghan "Bachibouzauks" are kidnapping women, selling them for harems a:~a
massacring the Pakistanis who try to protect them. In the Pakistani border town of
Quetta, they (?ave kidnapped children and demanded ransom of the parents. Not far
from ther.;, Ln Paratchinar, they suddenly began firing into the open market and
robbed the frightened merchants. Near the Pakistani town of Nushki, they cut down
the trees, steal the livestock, gun down the shepherds, and have so persecuted the
local populace that the latter, in despair, called regular troops and tanks to their
rescue.
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Further east, in Iran, the parliament in Tehr.an is considering emergency measures
to expel the armed bands of basmatchs and Af ghan smugglers who have infiltrated
into the country. A band of these smugglers wa., arrested just recently in India.
They were transporting drugs: opium, heroin, hashish. Seen from above, the Kunar
[river], which in summer does not carry much water looks like a yellowish-white
ribbon, when overflown from a border-post helicopter. The men at the post had
taken me on one of their helicopter reconnaissance missions. There, above the
unfathomably high banks of the river, 25 km from Pakistan, the douchmans were
~ pressing forward once again, having succeeded in infiltrating into the country.
But how can they be spotted, even flying cl~ose to the ground? During the day, they
- hide in tY:e rocky crags that border on the Kunar valley; they only come out at
night to carry out their brigandage.
The commander of the airborne Afghan forces invites me, however, to ~oin him in
the completely glassed cockpit, points his finger to the ground, and says with no
hesitation:
"Douchmen!"
Below, I can see nothing, except the green grass that covers the steep banks of the
river like a tapestry, and the little parcels of cultivated land, covered with pink
flowers of striking beauty. I find it difficult to believe that the basmatchs
have turned their energies to horticulture.
"Those are opium poppy fields," explains the major, noting my astonishment. Opium,
and the heroin derived from it, are the ob~ect of the smuggling trade which brings
the ~ nice little second income. We, in the provinces of the Kunar and the Nangarkhar,
can easily spot the bandits' lairs thanks to the areas sown with opium poppy. In the
central parts of Pakistan, where the Afghan Gounterrevolutionaries are entrenched,
they have established immense plantations and had a record harvest last year: 400
- tonG. Tliey have equipped clandestine laboratories to turn the opium into heroin,
and have succeeded in monopolizing the Middle East black market in narcotics."
'I'o wtiom clo tliey sell tliis magical poiaon? That I learned last year in New York,
wtiere I was then working as a correapondent for LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. ltao big shots
.iti the American Mafia, and six of their accomplicea, had just been arrested, and all
were accused of having smuggled back from tlie Afghan-Pakistani Uorder a cargo of
I~eroin valued at $10 million.
At that time, acoording to the New York police, the Mafia was already supplying
about half the drug addicts of New York from a new source of heroin, and was
beginning to broaden its clientele to innocent schoolboys aged 14 to 16. Meanwhile,
the number of deaths attributed to this poison being marketed clandestinely leaped
up 77 percent over previous years. Naturally, the American public was indignant:
was the government incapable then of controlling the smuggling activities of its
Afghan puppets and preventing them from associating wieh the Mafia?
But precisely ttie opposite was the case. Tiianks to the farce of release on bond,
_ all the Mafia dignitariea who were arrested with the heroin were free. The "Agency
for tl~e Struggle against Narcotics Trafficking"--an agency of the government--dealt
very mildly wi~t1 these Afghan suppliers of opium and heroin. "As time goes on,
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they will probably have more need to obtain money by selling the opium harvests, to
buy arms to continue their struggle...," wrote the WASHINGTON POST, quoting the
sgenCy in question. By encouraging local and overseas gangaters, the authorities
in Washington are truly taking little account of their own people's best interests.
Worlds away from New York, at the Fort Alikheil border post, an old stronghold built
of masonry which dominates the intersection of three small roads which wind up into
- the gigantic mountains with their blindi~gly white snowq capa, I remembered again
that New York was the epicenter of A.merican narcotics a~diction.
~From the towers o� the fort, one could eee the trail from the east hea3 3nto Pakistani.
territory. The other road headed toward the north, toward Kabul, and the third,
toward Kandahar. Thia strategic 3unction is constantly beseiged by bands of basmatchs
coming from Pakistan. Each time, they are repulsed by the Afghan infantry regiment
holding the fort. Lt Massoud Mirod~an is a soldier in that regiment: he is a yo+ang
Afghan. If he went to New York tomorrow, he ahould Le made an honorary citizen of
that American metropolis for the work he accomplished here today. In effect, he
told me:
- "The government of our republic has given explicit orders to put an end to the
enemy's narcotics activities. But the orders are easier to carry out in the pro-
vinces of the Kunar and the Nangarkhar, where there are no mountains, than around
here. Here, quite often, the traffickera make a detour so as not to be on the raads
and succeed in slipping by on footpaths that disappear in the mist--entire caravans
of mules loaded with packs of opium and hashish.
"We intercept them, but some succeed all the same in getting to Pakistan. The
unfortunate thing is, if one must believe the information we have been given, that
in the douchman bases far from the front, the resident Americans in the special
services have themselves acquAred a taste for the profitable traffic in narcotics.
Under their hypocritical and aecret protection, a real opium market is operating in
the Pakistani town of Landi Kotal.
A veteran of the ~udicial police, M~oukha~ned Aziz led me, upon my return to Kabul,
into a lane of atalls, called Chicken Street by the American tourists who used to
buy souvenirs there. Before the revol.ution, this atreet had two "dens" for drug
addicts--two holes-in-the-wall--where one could pass the night: the "Green" and
the "New-East-Life," both havene patronized by Yankee hippies attracted by the
moderate prices charged for the unusual guest services that could be obtained there.
Customers of "New~-Eas.t-Life," for example, were surreptitiously given a piece of
paper on which the prices were indicated: "Bed for the night--25 cents; dose of
heroin--10 cents; dose of opiuII--35 cents."
"I saw these American drug-fiends, at the time!" moaned Aziz with a touch of amuae-
ffient. "We.swooped down on them sometimes, to search their rooms. There we found
young people, dirty, dishevelled, sweating, aprawled all together on the straw
mattresses, in a state of semi-stupor. We confiscated their drugs and they began
to cry hysterically, to scream, to flounder around in convulsions. Under the law,
we should have put them in prison; but we preferred to send them out to various
clinics. The revolution ehut down the Chicken Street ~oints, cleaned up the capital
city and purged the country of this imported scum; we are also going to expel them
from our border regions.
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1~()R ()FI~1('IAI. lltil~: l)NI,Y
The illicit trafficking of the basmatchs, the ma.rauding, the organized vandalism,
the assa~sinations, sadistic executions and torture--none of all that would still
take place, if the counter-revolution in its death-throes were not.being resupplied
with arm~ and dollars by its foreign benefactors.
COPYKIGHT: 1981 by Cogedipresse S.A.
9516
(:50; 461.9/41 ~
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IRAN
ANTI-REGIME ROLE OF 'GREAT MUTE', LEFTISTS DISCUSSID
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 247,31 Aug-13 Sep 81 p 30
[Article by Ghazi Sarhane: "The Erosion"]
- [Text] In addition to increased repressioa, showing a weakness
in the present gcvernment, there is also a serious weakness
within the military.
After a stormy parliamentary debate, the cabinet of President Ra3ai was finally put :n
together. ~'his government, presided over by a person miraculously saved from death,
consists of 22 ministers representing radi~al and conservative factions. In fact,
Prime Minister Javad Bahonar escaped ~ust in time the bombing of 28 June which took
the lives of 74 members of the I~lamic Republicaa Party (IRP), when he left the
party headquarters a few minutes before the explosion.
. Though it is advisable not to draw hasty conclusions from such a coincidence, it
does reinforce persistent rumors that attribute the attack to a settling of accounts
between rival fac~ions within the IRP. In any case, becguse of this event, Bahonar
could succeed Betieshti as leader of the IRP and Chen as head of state.
As soon as it was forriied, the new cabine~t tackled tlie problem of security. Aa
appeal was launched to st~p up the represaion and bring new measures that would
"reactivate" the police force and Islamic committeea. The people w~re asked again
to denounce the "hypocrite~" and "counter-revolutionaries." Since the exile of
Bani-Sadr, the number of ~�rictims executed reached 600, moatly Mo~ahedin,~Marxist-
Leninists, and Kurdish d~mocrgts.
In spite of the sco~e of this represeion, there were also close to 2,(~00 arrests,
and attempts on the livea of government officials, of inembers of the Islamic commit-
tees. and of Pasd~r.ana have also increased....The~e have escalated to the point
where an atmosph~re cf smbldering civil war is felt more atrongly than the war with
Iraq or the bre~lcing down of the economic situation (30 percent inflation and a
shortage of certain food products).
Diversions
"To the above were added the first sounds of alarm within the army. The flight of
Bani-Sadr and Massoud Ra~avi on an army plane, and with the help of officers, was
the first sign that the "great mute" is becoming nervous. A few days later, another
- ~
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plane, an Iranian army F 27 with 16 people on board, was diverted to Oman, whlle
three navy patrol boa.ts took off in the direction of a port in the United Arab
Emirates. No doubt the most spectacular action taken was by General Aryani, a
former officer of the Shah, who diverted three French-made patrol boats on their
way to Iran.
"Azadegan," a commando of the Aryani movement, with the help of some of the Iranian
- patrol boat crew, seized a warship off the coast of Spain. Aside from further
inflaming Franco-Iranian relations, so ,:trained since Banisadr's and Rajavi's exile
_ in Paris that the French government too~~ the precautionary measures to bring home
' almost all its nationals from Iran, this is the fi~rst striking expression by the
Shah's supporters who were believed ta have been diacredited for good.
"By Any Means"
Today hostility to the Tehran regime is so great that even the former executioners
of the Iranian people dare to present themselves as a"liberation moverlent"! In
any case, they proved that some people in the higher echelons of the army remained
loyal to them, aince there has been no serious purge within its ranks, the govern-
ment being ma.inly concerned with purging the 1eft.
In this unclear context, former President Bani-Sadr who has sympathizers in the
army and his ally Massoud Rajavi, leader of the Mo3ahedin who are also present in
the army rank and file in vigilance committees, seem to be in a delicate position.
One hopes that the appeal they broadcast on 14 August in Iran, calling on civilians
and military alike to organize /"by any possible means"/ [in italics] resistance
cells and an ar.med struggle, will really-succeed in rekindling the revolutionary
initiative of the masses against the reactionary despotism in power and will also
prevent possible attempts at returning to pwwer supporters of the old regime.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie ~
9465
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IRAN
:ROLE OF RELIGIUUS PERSONALITIES, KH~JMEYNI ANALYZED
Paris AFRIQTJE-ASIE in French No 247,31 Aug-13 Sep 81 pp 31-33
[Articie by Hedf D'houkar: "New Light Shed on Khomeyni"]
- [Text] Many events in ancient Persia clearly showed the role
played by colorful, religious personalities. This story,
still present in the country's collective memory, sheds

~ new light on~the character of the "leader.of the revolution".
~.With some apprehension, the world discovered less than 3 years ago a ma.n whose name
was wrongly (uut not without reason) af~sociated with the fall of a dictatorship
-several centuries old. The man, Ruhollah Rhomeyni, was then at the center of
' ~several events such~.as the one called the "Islami.c Awakening" (the.Mecca uprising),
the matter of the American embassy in Tehran, the Tabas military raid undertaken by
Jimmy Carter, and the war of the Gulf. For aeveral months these facts helped
divert attention:from the~increasing political asaertion.and concretization of
this ayatollah's ideas, a man now simply called "Sir" by his opponenta of all
;persuasions.
- Sub~ect To Public Condemnation
Now that the "leader" rules alone; supported by institutions he created, Iran has
begun to find, certainly at its own expense, a little-known religious man surrounded
by the theories of mullahs and ayatollahs where the influence of the old religion
is not evident. The only.dignitaries in whom one could find.that influe:~ce were
;.ruthlessly remo~red .and reduced to silence. Such was the case of Madari, the highest
~ranking ayatollah in Iran, who, moreover, had ordained Khomeyni ae ayatollah in
order to prevent his execution by the Shah. Next.to this Shiite figure, who stead-
�fastly fought all plurality of political and religioua functions, is Talegha~i,
~further to the left, for whom "the real clergy doea not accept either governmental
posts or such responeibilities," its place being among.~and "not above the people",*
and who was also removed. Thus, from the start, two different kinds of leaders,
Madari the constitutionaliat and Taleghani the spiritual father of the Mo~ahedin,
have clearly drawn the line with the fundamentalist current which seized power. Many
= others, who according to the Iranian Shiite rules are higher ranking than Khomeyni,
Taleghani interview~~ with Gilles Anquetil in "The Earth rioved In Iran", Hachette.
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were also publicly condemned and are either in prison, like Tehreani, or in the
underground movement, like Hosseini.
The real issue is not a dispute about religious doctrine, since all claim to come
from the same Islamic religion. But one part of the clergy was quite opposed to
taking over the revolution, which wae mainly one of the masses oppressed by the Shah
and who aspired to justice and economic change. Thus Massoud Rajavi could sa~ with
just cause that Khomeyni is one of "the Shah's legacies". This throws a new light
on the man now presiding over the destiny of the country that for centuries had been
subject to extremely cruel despotism.
Throughout its history, other important events have occurred in Iran, such as the
Constitutionalist Revolution or the Tobacco Tax Revolt, which brought religious
- personalities to the fore. One was espectally famous: the great reformer Jamalad
Din Assad Abadi, call.ed "al Af ghani," whose doctrine, founded on Islamic renais,,-ance
based on iuoclernism and science, was spread throughout the Islamic world at the end
of the 19th century. This movement was ao strong that the Ottoman Empire, then well
- on its way to being dismembered by the Western powers, wanted to use this doctrine
to accomplish ~n "Islamic union."* but the bnperor of the Sublime Door poisoned
Assad Abadi after one of the latter's followers, while putting an end to the despotism
of the Qa~ar kings in Persia, had assassinated Nassir ad-Din Shah in a mausoleum
where he was praying. Thi~ event, occurring tn the midst of the Constitutional
Revolution, had considerable political fallout and forced the new Shah, Muzzaffar
~ ad-Din, to promulgate the first Iranian constitution, modeled on that of the Belgian
monarchy.
Since then, the role of the clergy has become politically more important, for it is
in using hostile religious reaction to the constitution, represented by ~:~eik
Fazloullah Nouri considered today a"martyr of freedom" by IRP [Islamic Republican
Party] papers, that, a few years later, the son of Muzzaffar ad-Din, Mohammed Ali
Shah, had the parliament building bombed and established the "minor dictatorship"
(Istibdad Saghir) for a period of 3 years. During this time the resistance of the
constitutionalists was organized. The revolution then took on such dimensions that
in spite of Tsarist Russia's support Mohammed Ali Shah had to f1ee. On the other
hand, his son Ahmad Shah, who succeeded him, showed ao much respect for the constitu-
tion that the British, represented by Colonel Ironside, pushed him into permanent ~
exile in Nice, while a Cossack colonel, Reza, later Pahlavi and father of the
deposed Shah, seized power (1925). In order to be crowned Shah during his prede-
cessor's lifetime, Reza had to face fierce oppoaition in parliament led at the
time by a religious person, a former worker on his estate, Ayatollah M~odarress. It
. was during the latter's absence from the parliamentary encloaure that Reza finally
forced Parliament to crown him. A few days later, two of his henchmen strangled
Modarress. ~
With the accession of Reza Shah, who was absolute monarch for 16 years, Parliament
ceased to play any political role whatever. But when Mohammed Reza Shah came to
the th~one, the Iranian po~itical situation, marked by the existence of many
* Homa Pakdaman, "Jamal ad-Din Aasad Abadi, called 'Af$hani Maisonneuve et
Larose (Paris).
See also the excellent work by Yann Richard, "Shi'ism in Iran, Imam and Revolu-
tion" (Maisonneuve).
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political currenta and organizations, forced Parliament to become active again,
mainly after Dr Moseadegh became head of government supported by a strong popular
movement. Yet th.is nationalist had to count on the clergy, both within parliament
presided over by a religious leader, Sheik Kashani, and outside it, where an org~si-
zation of moslem brothers, Fedayir. Eslam, started to attract attention when it �
assassinated General Razmara, one of Mossadegh's predecessors to the post of prime
minister. The ideology of the Fedayine Eslam was antico~unist at a time when
Mossadegh's opponents on all sides compared him to the "red peril" and wanted "to
restore medieval rule without a prince."*
- Wrapped in Shrouds
Oil_nationalism crysta~.lized the rival tendencies, accentuatiug the special role of
the religious leaders. Tho.ugh, at the time, the official Shiite hierarchy carefully
avoided involvement in politics, Sheik KF�.shani, as leader of parliament, motivated
_ it seems by his opposition to the British (who supposedly killed his father and
sent Kashani into exile in Palestine), supported the natio~alist policy in the begin-
- ning. But Kashani soon gave his allegiance to the Fedayin Eslam, to the point of
becoming their em3ssary to Mnssadegh, giving him their letters requesting the closing
:~f bars and making the veil mandatory for women. Slowly, Kashani ~oined the opposi-
tion, depriving Mossadegh of an i~portant support at a time when attempts at coups
d'etat inspixed by the Americans increased and the blockade of Iran by Western
pnwers was being set up. Also, at that time, after learning that the Sha~ planned
to flee, the reactionaries organized a demonstration in front of the palace, and
wrapQed in shrouds they shouted that in order to leave Iran the shah would have to
walk over their bodies. Tlien for all practical purpose, Rashani and the Fedayin
Esl~am made common cause with a party vaguely populist in ideology and supposedly
financed by the United States, the Labor and Workers Party (PTL) headed by Baghai.
- 1~e PTL and the Fedayin launched a virulent anti-Mossadegh campaiga in the bazaars
where the head of state had most of hia aupport.
"Victory, the country is saved," were the headlines of PT~i, newspapers, when the fifth
coup d'etat, organized by the CIA, succeeded in unseating Mossadegh and in bringing
back the Shah from his Roman exile.
Baghai still writes, apparently in a different vein, for the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC news-
paper, founded by tHe IRP [Islamic Republican Party]. The same thing happened to
Hassan Ayat, another deserter from the PTL, who bscame the ideologist of the IRP
until his death at the hands of the Khalq Mo~ahedin. In the case of Kashani, though
this is not clearly substantiated due to a lack of historical documents on the
sub~ect, religious authorities affirm that Khomeyni ~aas one of his most ardent
followers and often wrote approving his anti-co~nunist crusade. Yet one fact remains
q.uite clear: among the candidates at the last presidential election were two former
Fedayin Eslam members: Cheibani and Owaldi.
Be that as it may, the fall of Mossadegh, immediately followed by the return of the
Shah, was the death k~ell for all opposition, including that of the Fedayin, also
destroyed as soon as the Savak got organized and stretched its tentacles. At that
time, on the advice of Kennedy, the dictator wanted to win the support of a part of
* J.-F. Cleme~t."Readings On Khomeynism" in the magazine ESPRIT (3anuary 1981).
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the population. He decided to launch the "white rey~olution," promising in the
beginning since ~t was supposed Co give property to many peasants dnd favor worker
"participation" 3.n solving ~ob-related problems in their firms.
The mullah Khomeyni ~ecame known at that time, writing very respectfully to "His
Majesty, the Light of the Aryans," not to ask that he complete liis social reforms
or to turn more seriously towards an oppressed people, but to ask him not to grant
women the vot2 an~ to take into account the role of the ulemas, the Shiite legai
experts. His action was special, and will explain the Shah's anger, in that it
placed Khomeyni on equal footing with the Shah. The mullah could quest~on with
impunity all gov.ernmental matters which could require the npinion of the clergy
for whom Khomeyni had become the spokesman from the start, in spite of his modest
standing in the hierarchy of the clergy.
When the Shah did not respond to any of the missives, Ruhollah Khomeyni raised his
voice a~cus3.ng the king of "selling the country to the Americans and the Israelis".
~ From then on, Khomeyni defiiiitQly became part of his country's legend, and in quite
troubled historical circumstances.
On 3 June 1963, the movement for the liberation of Iran, led at the time by Mehdi
Bazargan and Ayatolla~- Taleghani, called for a demonstration in Tehran which was
suppoaed to be disciplined and avoid any provocation. On the said day, corresponding
to the 15 Khordad in the Iranian Shiite calendar, huge crowds came to the demonstra-
tion, informed of it by pamphlets supposedly distributed by Savak itself. The crowds
were screened by the agents of this police force, recognizable by their shaved heads,
while at the same time there mysteriously appeared portraits of Khomeyni, and only
Khomeyni, to be distributed to the demonstrators. Then the Savak agitators began
to loot and burn everything, while the army, which lay in ambush, started to fire
into the crowd. Thousands of bodies were then piled up by dulldozers and town dump
trucks threw them into the garbage dump at night.
Using this event as a pretext, the Shah launched a massive wave of arrests among
the opposition. The latter has since understood the futi3.ity of purely political
activity, which explains why a few months later guerrilla organizations were formed:
the Kha1q Mojahedin and the Khalq Fedayin. As for Khomeyni, his life was spared
because of a fetwa (a religious decree) by Chariat Madari who ordanied him ayatollah. ,
Exiled first in Turkey, then in Na~af in Iraq, Khomeyni continued to show his
opposition to the Shah in writings he managed to amuggle into Iran. But his voice
was only heard because of intense political.activity within the ranka of the people,
men such as Taleghani, and progressive thinker3 like Dr Chatiati, two famous
personalities who had been imprisoned and tortured many times.
That is why, on his triumphant return to Tehran on 1 February 1980, the f~ce of~
Khomeyni was recognized as that of the liberator. The peoplt oniy remembered his
duel with the Shah, and were favorably disposed towards him because of ideas on
social issues and Justice, that had been patiently spread by leading progressive
clergymen. That is also why the Shah's opponents in lay and university circles
enthusiastically ~oined the people. They were all the more sincere since they
accepted in good faith statements made by Kh meyni when he was staying in Neauphles-
le-Chateau, and which had been braadcast by the Western media, thus contributing to
a great extent to turning the Imam of Qom into a legend.
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?
In his statements, Khomeyni in fact mai~tained he was for free expression by all
political factions, including the "atheis~ic" Marxists, freedom for the press and
even for women who, he said, could be "daputy, minister, and president of the
republtc". As for minorities, the ayatollah said that Islam favors ~utonomy~
emphasizing the liberating nature of religion.
Pitiless Logic
_ The incident of the air force barracks which brought about the flight of Chapour
Bakhtiar and the "liberation" of the Israeli embassy, were two events, the last ones
really, that concretized the revolutionary nature of the revolt against the Shah.
They were events that f avored the Mojahedin and the Fedayin of the people tMoslems,
progressives, and Marxist-Leninists).
Since then, one after the other, the university was closed down, the opposition
newspapers were banned, the underground movement went back underground, the army
was charged with bombing the Kurdish population. Khalkhali, who came out of a
'.psychiatric institution and who boaeted of killing cats when a boy, has become
Khomeyni's right-hand man and head of Islamic law courts; Savak.documents have
disappeared; the woman was put in a chador. Supported by new institutions, all called
Islam~c: committees, courts, guardiana of the revolution, and the party founded by
Beheshti whose ties with the CIA are known, the represaion was unleashed against the.
progressive left. The rest is history. Al1 this was, however, included as the
germ of an idea in tHe pitiless logic of the first referendum on whicl~ the Iranian
people was asked to vote, to choose between the return of the Shah and the esfablish-
ment of an Islamic republic. It could not yet perceive in the aftermath of the
victory over the Shah and his Western allies, that it was only voting for a horse of
a different color. The fact remains, however, that the episode begun with the fall
of the Pahlavi dynasty is far from over. The dynamica of the people remain untouched,
even though the present regime exerts a11 its power to stifle it, possibly putting
off for a few more years the real liberation of the Iranian people.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Aaie
9465
CSO: 4619/40
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t IRAN
BRIEFS
AMBULANCES TRANSPORT MINISTERS--Terrorized by the idea of another assassination
attempt (like thoae that have successfully eliminated Ayatollah Baheshti, President
Rad~ai and Prime Minister Bahonar), the Iranian Islamic leaders now move about only
in ambulances. This strategy is known to everyone in Tehran, and man~ doctors are
afraid that ult~mately some terroriets will fire on a vehicle transporting some
sick or wounded person (who is not a government officialJ. [Text] [Paris VALEURS
ACTUELLES in French 28 Sep 81 p 24] [COPYRIGHT: [1981] "Valeurs actuelles"]
CSO: 4619/12
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. MOROCCO
UNREST IN RURAL AREAS DESCRIBED
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE~in French 22 June-5 July 81 No 242 p 24
[Text] The Makhzens feel the winds of revolt; poverty and
monopolies of land holdings are the cause.
Last year already (in January) a wind of revolt was detected in the rural area of
Beni-Mellal, where a large number of arresta had been made, and it was learned that
a court had handed out sentences to 13 people of up to 3 years in prison.
This year it is in the regions of Taza, Marakesh, Fez, Fqih Ben Salafi (near Beni-
Mellal), and Tiznit where the incidents are following one another. Local centers
of the USFP (Socialist Union of Popular Forces) were searched and rifled, arrests
were made, trials h`eld, sentences passed, then appealed, and more arrests were made.
What is the explanation for the new rash Qf problems and repression in the provinces?
Drought .
The days when the Moroccan countryside made up the strength of the regime are long
gone. For over l0 years the penetration of capi~talist interests has done nothing ~
but accelerate, bringing on strong tendencies toward large land holdings, and impos-
ing a coexistence between "modern" and traditional agricultural sectors which is
constantly shifting. On one hand, there are very large holdings (400 of which are
" bigger than~500 hectares, according to the modest estimates of Moroccan primary
school textbooks), the export commodities (vegetables, fruits, avocados, flowers,
etc), and state-provided aid and technology. On the o.bher~hand, there is the tra-
ditional peasant's world of very small farms, thin herds, and damaging royal decrees,
like the one of last March forbidding, in the na~ie of progress, anj! farm under~the
size of 5 hectares. T~e Moroccanization of the farmland (that is, the transfer of
colonial properties to the Moroccan upper middle class), has consequently created
dangerous zones where the richest landowners have the poorest peasants as their
immediate neighbors. This is the case with the fertile plains surrounding Fez,
Marrakesh, Agudir (towards the East, in the dir.ection of tlie plain of Tadla, around
Beni-Mellal).
~tao kinds of conflict can erupt. It may be between landowners, or rather their
managers, and agricultural workers, poor peasants who have been dispossessed of
" their land and have been unable, unlike so many others, to emigrate to urban centers
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or to Europe: these workers are paid between 6 and 10 dirhams per day. Conflicts
may also arise between own~rs and poor peasants of surrounding regions. Here, the
cause of the conflict is often use of the lands, trampled by cattle belonging to
_ the big local landowners. This happened several times over recent years, and even
more often during the last several months.
This year a second factor has come up: drought. It is prolonged (lasting all last
autumn and winter), catastrophic, and a killer. Many fa ~ers have sacrificed their
wheat to feed the cattle--then attem~,ted to sell it at rcduced prices (sheep went
for 50 dirhams each on the market). When they were ultimately unable to find
buyers, the cattle were left to die on the parched land, or abandoned in market-
places to which they had been driven.
This year's agricultural balance sheet was a disaster, and, as is always the case
when poverty amongst the people is accelerated, the concentration of property is
also expedited.
The third factor is political. Those in power fear, and rightly so, f~.are ups in
the rural population, which this time has little to lose and no other alternative;
not even emigration, which for years acted as a safety valve for easing tension.
The agglomeration of the land by the Makhzen, the local authorities, and the feudal
system remains strong. But will it be enough?
The oppo~ition became aware quite late of the significance of the peasant popula-
tion: the latest elections, municipal or national, were a failure for the USFP,
which learned its lesson: a significant attempt was made to agglomerate holdings, v
to create systems that could present a viable opposition to those of the authorities,
and even to eventually form a union for agricultural workers.
Militants in the small rural centers often have a different perspective from the
urban leaders. They are not canfronted with parliamentary debates, negotiations with
the Palace, or diplomatic missions but rather with hunger, illiteracy, inequality,
and the impunitive in~ustices of the authorities and landowners. Under these cir-
cumstances rural militants become more radical.
We are currently witnessing a bid for power, aimed at bringing down the opposition:
an attempt to prevent~f irstly, a structuration of land holdings through the political
parties, and secondly, attempts to eliminate the elements most accustomed to battles,
the most demanding, who make up the hardest core of the party.
Will those in power attain their goals? Will they prevent the politization of land
holdings, and effectively carry out their policy of seizing land without causing
social unrest? Will th~y furthermore succeed in organizing an oppositior. the way
they wish, according to need, as has been so often done in the past, by murdering
and arresting the most hard-~or~, by trying to corrupt or seduce the others?
A new aspect of the problem was introduced on 10 May, which will change the inter-
action of forces in Morocco, at least as regards the king and his opponents. Cer-
tainly Mitterrand's election will not put a time limit on the process of integration
of a11~Moroccan fields into capitaliet production, much less end imperialism in
the west of Africa. Nonetheless, this election will still change many things.
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