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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/10074 26 October 1981 Ja a~n Re ort p p cFC~uo s,i8>> Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400064051-5 NOTE JPRS publications conCain information primarily from foreign ~ newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text) or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or naaies preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattriouted parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source . The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. ~ ~ COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF ~ MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSE;MINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000400060051-5 FOR OFF(CiAL USE ONLY . JPRS L/10074 . 26 October 1981 JAPAN REPORT (FOUO 61/81) CONTENTS POLITICAI~ AND SOCIOI,OGICAL Cancun Swrunit Meeting: Japan Must Speak Otit ( Takwni Mstsumoto; MAINICHI DAILY rTl~'WS, 9 Oct 81; , . . . . . . . . 1 JSP Elections Analyzed ~ (Raisu~ce Honda; THE DAIZY YONIIURS, 9 Oct 81) .....,..s....... 3 Suzuki Policy Speech to I}iet Criticized - (Editorial; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 3~J Sep 81) 5 - Di:~t Session for ~Reform~ Exaggerated Advertisement (Takuo Hayashi; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 27 Sep 81) 7 Sok3 Gakkai Applying Brake on Coalescence of Centrist Influences (Takehiko Takahashi; MAINICHI DAITLY NEWS, 1 Oct 81) 9 Komoto Switches Strategy (Raisuke Honda; THE DAILY YOMIURI, 27 Sep 81) 11 How To Cope With Government Reform (Hideo Matsuoka; MAINICHI DAII,Y NEWS, 6 oct 81) 12 ' New Polit~cal Party's Impact Appears Slim (Masao Kanazashi; THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAZ,~6 Oct 81) 15 MILITARY U.S.-Japanese Friction on Defense Issues Examined (CHUO KCRON, Sep 81) 17 - a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000400060051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SCIENCE AND TECHNOI~OGY Institute To Study Resources Using Satellites To Be Set Up (Nl~iON KOGYO SHIl~IDUN, 25 Aug 81) 28 Manufacturers To Cooperate ~t' Firms in West Germany, France (NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN, 19 Aug 81, NIHON KEIZAI SHIl~UN, 2 SeT~ $1) 30 ~ijitsu Fanuc, Siemens Toshiba, ~ench Line Group Taiyo Iron Works To Start~Robot Exports to Europe . (NIKKAN KOGYO SHIl~UN, 8 Aug 81) 33 - b - _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400460051-5 F'OR OFFICIAL USE OhLY POLITICAZ AND SOCIOLOGICAL CANCUN SUr~iIT MEETING : JAPAN MUST SPEAK OUT , Tokyo MAINICHI DAZLY NEWS in English 9 Oct 81 p 5 - [Article by Takumi Mstsumoto, Sataff Writer: "Cancun--Japan Must Speak Out--A - Test for 'Peace Diplomacy1�'] ~ nesday. ' ~ ~e question then arises as ta [ Text ] '~e participarits in. ~the just-~ T6e event, which was par- what strategy Japan should- ended international symposium ticipated ia by a� number of ~e at the Cancun summlt un N~*th�South relatioas held in distinguis6ed persons and m~ting. Osaka reached experts from both Japan ~nd ~e most appropriate answer a consensvs on other countries. �was a joint ~ms to bb thaC Japan should - three areas to undertaking of the Asian for espanding industrial facilitate fu- Development Bank, fhe Osaka countries' aid to developing ture interna- Junior Chamber Inc., the ~~ntries by reducing their tional coopera- yiainichi Newspapers and the m~;tary spending, and for � tion between MainichiBroadcastingSystem. making such aid more ef- the industrial countries.of the The framework of discussian f~tively implemented in the North and the developing in the symposium covered wide developing conntries. - countries of the South. ~ areas for future international Dr. Fasihnddin Mahtab, The three areas agreed upon cooperation. includi~g energy, p 1 a n n i n g m i n i s t e r o f were l 1) utdustrial countcies food security and ageicultural gangladesh, said in the Osaka ~ should seek higher efrciency deve lopmen t, tra de, tec ha o lo g y Sy~p~ium that if even a sma l l for their aid to developing transfer, industrialIzation, and ~rtion of industrial countries' countries with a full un�� monetaryandfinanciallssues. m~litary spending, which derstanding of the basic The ~Osaka symposium was amounts to S~ billion, is requirements of the latter also geared to work out shifted to development aid, it coun{ries; 12) to attaia this proposals�aimed at t6e Oct. 22- would significantly improve the goal, bott~ developed and 23 Cancun. Hexico, summit North-Southproblem. _ developing countries should meeting of the leaders a~f 22 rich He also said "It is obviously increase the flow of accurate and poor countries. The summit ~~poral to alluw millions of information eoncerning their meeting aims at facilitating ~op~e to live In poverty in an respective stands; and l3) to global negotiations to bridge the a~e that has seen man conquer _ step up personnel exchanges economic gap between in- S~ace, to be indifferent to 270 - . and maintain dialogue based on dus~rial and devetoping miAion� people~ v~ dhd� ~~DCs mutual trust and goodwill countrles. ' (least develaped covu?tries) a~t - between the weaithy counMes Teiichiro Yokoi, president of 780 miliion= paec ~}a--.tha~ and poorer countries. � the Osaka Junior Chamber developiag world." The two-day lnternatIonal jnc.. expressed 'hope that all The curreat Japanese ap- countries, irrespective of proach to the summit meeting Symposium on the "North� ~�~Qir differences in politIcal, consists of three stages. South Dialogue - Energyc economic and soeial structures, Fi~tly, it wiU make an effort Challenge and Development ~U make every possible effort to have the global negotiations Perspective in Asia" came to a, qo r.^ ~ke the Cancun summlt _ the forum of which will be the successful � conclusion Wed- m~tinea truitftil oae. 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY , linited vations - take up the This fact saggests another North-South issue as one of the aspect of the Ndrth�South issue: = major issues. the developing countries, _ Secondly, if the attc:~npt fails Whether they like it or not, because of opposition from th~ have become ihvolved in the United States, which is said to~ "military expansion" game i~ be reluctant to hold such talks line with= - the superpowers' along with some other in- ~ 1 o b a 1 s t r a t e g I e s f o r dustrial nations, Japan should strengthening thelr political� at least win an assurance that and military inIluence. This another North-South summit certainly tninimizes the effect meeting will be held next year. of aid provided to them by the Thirdly, Ii this attempt also industrial count~ies. fails, then Japan should propose Japan's . philosophy in thi~ that~ the esisting intemational respect has been that it should institutions seek a resolntion of not export arms. various impending issnes in- If Japan reaUy believes that volved in the North-South Progress in North-South problem -"food security and ~e global stability~, ot polttical, agricultural developmeat" at economic and~social situations. the U.N.'s Fead and Agriculture ~t will be calle~ upon to make an Organization; "energy and persuade other ~n- monetary and financial issues" effort to . at the World Bank: and "trade� dusMal coimtries~ ta take a: issues" at the General ~ore positive approach In Agreement on Tariffs and Providing assistaace ta the. Trade. ~ - developin~ aations. However; the Third ~1'orld Japan will also be called on to~ countries, including LDCs, ~ake a strong� appeal to botC~ whose people are sufferin~ ~ superpowers and other from rock-bottom livin~ ~~~~CO~M~ standards, have become the their-� arms expacts to - target of the ~ two tnilltaryr dev,elo~ing.countries: superpowers, the U.S. and the Without this, no really ef; Soviet UnIon, in , the' race t~ fective result of aid to increase their ~lobal influence. developing countries can be, In last year alone, both hoped for. If Japan wants it~ Moscow and Washington were Peace diplomacy to win global; reported to have sold 514.9 a p p r e c i a t i o a a n d u r.:~ billion ~~orth and Si4.2 billion derstandiag, it shotild make an - worth of military hardware to ~~st effort to achieve this those developing countries. Boal at the summit meeting in respectively. . , Mexlco. . As a copsequente, Jordan The UnItBd Nations is to� was reported to have spent 19 SPonsor a sp~cial general, percent ot its gross domestic assembly on disarmament next., product on the putchase of Year. The summit meeting im weapons; Chile 9.4 peccent ot its ~is regard will be a valuable ~ GDP; Zambia 9.2 percent of its forum for Japan to promote its; ~ GDP; Singapore 6.1 percent of campaign to get the industrial; its GDP; and l~ialaysia also 6.l coiuTtnes to increase aid to help' percent of its GDP. ~lleviate the agonizing plight of ~ people in the developing nations through restraining their: military expenditure. ; COPYRIGHT: MAINICHI DAILY NEWS 1981 CSO: 4120/27 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400460051-5 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY � JSP ELECTIONS ANALYZED Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 9 Oct 81 p 3 [Article from POLITICAL BEAT column by Raisuke Honda: "JSP Elections Draw Near"] [Text] gociallst Partq (J3P) is astir 'avith, prolonged downward trend oi the party's activitY and apeculation as elecZions of the strength. party chalrman and other executive poata launche~d~ a drlve efor~expanding theu JSP approach. � An election oi the JSP leader is sched- membership to tlie 1,000,000 mark. but the ~ nled for late November or early December partq membership has shown almost no with pariicipation oi all pazty members. � increase and remains about 59,~'?00. A new secretafy-general and other Hesides, ~ the J3P has� continaed losing meinbers oi the JSP Exec~stive Committee Diet as well as .ncal elections even atter are to be elected in the forthcomtng partY ~e inauguratiun of the Asukata leader- convention in February. ship. ~ It seems that lncumbent JSP Chairman ~~e layt Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly Ichio Asukata may have a fair chance of ~lection, the JSP suSered another crush- ~ winning reelectlon for a third oonaecutive ~g deleat, so that its strength in the ' two-year ter~n. ~ assembly of the capital is now~ the lowest However,, there is no telling how the a~ng all poiitical parties. ~ Snal results oi the electlon of JSP presl-. Heside, the Tokyo chapter o! ~he JSP dent will turn out, since an increasin6 has recently been split into two groups in number of party members are noW critical a aerce lnternal struggle, thus further of Asukata s lack of leadership Sn runnin~ ~a~ing the 2ame oi Asukata. _ the No 1 opposition partY. In additios~, the Tokyo chapter of the - ia the next party convetttion, on the Jgp has recentlq been split intc two other hand, 8hinnen Tagaya, currenCly the ~upa in. a Serce internai struggle, thus secretary-general, is certaln to step down, ~rther marring the fame of Asukata. because he is without a Diet poat aiter Desplte the aaning popularlty of Asu- his defeat ia the last Fiou~e of Repre- kata, there is no oEher JSP member in- ~entative~ election. 4uential enough to replace him. ~ ~ However, no "tavorite" ~s Tagaya'a ~uc- guch JSP Sgures as former eecretary- cessor has emerged, so that the '-'ace 1or general Masashi Ishibashi, V1ce-3peaker the No 2 poat moat likely will become a oi the House o! Representatives Haruo mixed Sght. ' pkada, and Vlce-Chairman oi the party Asukata, former mayor � of Yokohama, $~ic;~.l Shimodaira have been in tact was installed in the JSP chairmanship in ~entioned as possible rival candidates 1977 as the aavior !or the partY battered $g~~t ~ukata in the forthcoming elec- in the ~a1ce o! divisive quarrGls between tion oi JSP chairman. the party's Marxis~Leninist faction, the gut any o! them, should they run in the Shakaishugi Kyokai (socialist association), ~lection, could hardly win enough support _ and it rivals within the JSP. ~ deteat Asukata, according to JSP _ Much hope was placed .n Asukata as a ~urces. leader of the JSP, since he had won high ~~~~ons are thue that Asukata will populurity with Yokohama citi2ens during probably secure reelection in t2~e party his mayoral days to the extent oi earning - fame 3s a"star among the nation's re- ~l~y~ether he wine an easy victory !n the formist heads ot municlpallties." election, however, will hinge for the most Tne JSP chairma~n, however, has had little success since then in stemming the 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 ~ FOR OFFiC[AL USE ONLY part on how well he can dlsplay hts lead- ership !n pressing the JSP demand on the. government for a complete enforcement of� wage boosts for government employes in accordance with Ehe recommendations by the. Nationai Personnei Autriority and the PLblic Corporation and National Enter- . prise Labor Etelatlons CommLision. ~ Ftegarding election oi secretary-general, there is no strong candidate at all. However, such politicians as Makoto Tane,be and Yuzuru Bhimazaki are show- ' ing readiness to take the post, and their behind-the-scenes egorts to w!n support . - are certain to inteasiiq right np to the February party convention. COPYRIGHT: THE DAILY YOMIURI 1981 CSO: 4120/27 ~ 4 FOR OFFtCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400460051-5 FOR OFFICI,~L (,?SE ONLY POLITICAL AND SUCIOLOGICAL � SUZUKI POLICY SPEECH TO DIET CRITICIZED Tokyo MAI~IICHI DAILY NEWS in English 30 Sep 81 p 2 [Editorial: "Prime Minister's Speech"] [Text] Prime iVlinister Zenko Suzuki delivered a policy speech on 1~Tonday, first before a plenary session of the House of Representatives and . later before a similar session of the House of Councillors, but to our great regret it lacked both vigor and quality. As a matter of ceremony, he merely read a very monotonous speech written by bureaucrats. The prime minister failed to tnuch on whatever political ~ ideals he ha~ and did not display any determination to carry out his respon~ibility as = premier, deliberately_ avoiding the pressmg issues � with which the nation is faced today. His.speech was, in fact; rnost symbolic of the general posture of the Liberal-Democratic Party which has forgotten the - ~natian while enjoying its absolute majority in the Diet. His manner of "reciting his speech" reflects t~e inactive domestic political situation. The prime minister said a lot of things which amounted to nothing but words. For instance, he stressed the need to ca:ry out administrative and fiscal reform to cope with the troubled state financial situation, and expressed his determination to r~alize the passage of bills necessary for such reform at the 95th Extraordinary Diet which convened for a;:~-day session last week. The prime eninister added' that whether or not the bills were passed by the Diet would - influence administrative and fiscal reform designed to hold down government spending.. He should realize that he sounded very hollow to the entire nation. The government~earlier designated fiscal 1982 as the first year of fiscal reconstruction and established a Secand Ad Hoc Counc~ on Administrative Reform. In July, the government rsceived the first recom- mendation, whicr had been hurriedly mapped out by ~ the council to be in time for the start of budget - compilation. ~?t that time Prime Minister Suzuki, 5 FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000400060051-5 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY declaring that he would stake his political career on bringing a~bout reform, pledged th~t he would honor the recommendation of the council. " A package of bills relating to administrative and ~ fiscal reform, drawn up by khe government on the basis of the recommendation, was submitted to the Diet for deliberation, but the contents of these bills were far fron! the original `.`spirit of administrative reform." Under such circumstances, how can the prime minister seek the understanding and cooperation of the nation? The bills are aimed at temporarily shelving the burden of the state and shifting it to the shoulders of local autonomies and the private sector in order to make~ the prnposed cut in expenditures sound con- sistent. The government convened the Diet session _ with fanfare, but the package bills submitted to the Diet without any effort on the part of the government, hardly deserve our special attention. ~ What the nation wants to hear from him now is ~ whether or not drastic reform plans are in store. What _ changes are needed in aur concept to create a new administration matching the march of the times? . Now that the nation is being compelled to share this . heavy burden, we would like to ask the government to what extent it is determined to reform the ad- ministrative system and sacrifice public servants. In short}. the government should unveil its determination Yo introduce drastic measures im- . mediately after the impl~ementation of the steps designed to cut expenditures. The government should - also tell the ~ation directly in seeking the cooperation and understanding of the people. Except for its resolute posture, the government caU for reforrn is no more than another empty slogan. ~ . The prime minister's speech was very abstract with regard to the "equality of taxes." . He said nothing about ttie controversial question of increasing . Japan's d~fense capability, or the discordant note be- tween Japarr and the Republic of Korea over Japan's economic assistance to that country, or Japan~Soviet relations concerning the northern territory now held by the Soviets. . ~ It appears that the prime minister avoided touching on these delicate issues out of consideration _ for parliamentary management. Perhaps he wanted to avoid possible friction with the opposition parties in the course of deliberations in the Diet: - His Iow-key speech has discouraged the nation which ~expected him to take the drastic step of reforming the administration. , COPYRIGHT: MAINICHI DAILY NEW~ 1981 CSO: 4120/24 - 6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 t. POLiTICAL ~~ID SOCIOLOGICAL DIET SESSION FOR 'REFORM' EXAGGERATED ADVERTISEMEIv"T Tokyo MAINICHI DAIL~.' :1EWS in English 27 Sep 81 p 2 (Article from "Political Peri,scope" column by Takuo Hayashi] [Te:ct] It's the Liberal-Democratic largescaleconsumptiontaxisa favor of restrainIng ad- Party that holds the reins of prerequisite to fiscal recon- ministrative expenditures. The government in Japan. And it's struction. reason they thought of in- the LDP cabinet that maps out Their wish to realize It in the troducing a large-scale eon- and promotes the various 1981 budget was frustrated, sumption tax at an early stage policies of the state. This is true however, in the tace of stronQ was based on their bei[ei that It " only on the surface, say as a resistance staged by the would ba difficult to zest~ain matter of principle, but the real politicians who were then en� ~ administrative spe.nding. po~ver to plan and push through couraged by salid ~public It w~as a stroke of good luck the policies is in ihe hands of tl,e opinion. Not�~ithstanding, they that , the issue became the bureaucrats. were still confident at first that paramount goal for the Firiance - Of all the bureacrais in the fitroduction af a consump- ~Iiniskry bureaucrats to J'apan, the Finance 1~inistrv tion tax should be realized in the achieve. They promptly sw~itch� officials are ~y tar the most 1982 budget and that it would be ~ W~~ ~ eye to playing a powerful holding the purse realized without fafl thls ttme, leading policy role in the work strings of the government. As Determination of "strictly restraining che cream of the bureaucrats is ' government expenditures in the found in the Finance biinistry. Al] their expectations were next fiscal budget." And they their voices carry extremely again completely overw~helmed dId !t quite w~ell, for they suc- strong .weight. Japanese by the determination of Prime ceeded in setting the zero- politics ts, as a matter of blinister Zenko Suzuki to "stake eeiling frame, so to speak,. a princ:ple, carried on by ~~the ~ his political career on fiscal framework that "the total . LDP cabinet," but in substance recortstruction by restraining budget of various minlstries for - it tends to be politics '~with the administrative spending, not by fiscal 1982, with ~ome ex- Finance ~finistry afficials lntroducing a large�scale ceptlonssuchasdefense,should ta{?ing the lead." consumption tax." His decision not exceed that of the 1981 Viewed from such a stand- was prompted by Toshio Doko budget." point, the policy of the Suzuki who assumed the presidency of In order to reallze fiscal cabinet to "realize fiscal a special councii newly reconstruction without in- reconstruct[on without in- established this spring to carry creasing taxes, the total creased taxes in the 1982 out admirtistrative reform. in government spending for tiscal budget, by restraining govern- return for the post. Doko asked 1982 has to be pegged at the ment expenditures through the prime minister to make 49,700-billion-yen level, up some administrative reform" is such a decision. 3 trillion yen over this year's unprecedented in history. Were the Finance :ltinistry 46,780 billion yen. Compared Because the Finance 3tinistry bureaucrats discouraged a~ith an estimated figure if the ~ never thought ot such a thing:' because of their original restraining step K~ere not . On the contrary, they ha~e disappointment? T~e answ�er is adopted, it is a trimming of maintained for several }�ears no. They are in high spirits as ?,i00 or 2,300 billion yen. A that the introduction of a before, because they were in cabinet decision on the budget 7 FOR OFFICI.~L uSE OvLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 FOR OF'FICIAL U~E ONLY tor next fiscal yeaic will be made~ ~of 2:700 or 2,800 tiillion yen. The ~ toward the end ot tbts year. but : rest will be trimme~ in moSt it Is believed almost certa~a: ~ cases without revisiug related�, that the proposed restraint wiU' 1 a w s. T h a t's w h y t h e~ be~ realized as a result ot tbe t deliberations at. the Diet con- : settiag of the "zero-ceiling." vened t4 disru~s administrative ~ In this sense. ~ t6e Ex- reform are confined to "10 . traordinary Dtet sessioa to pereent ot t6e total." ~ begin deltberations on An old Chirtese saying ~ administrative reform t6is cry wine, and sell vlnegar. It is.,, week can be looked upon as . an eaaggerated advertisemenC not too ~nportant. The amouat witb poor rnntents for aU iCs' ot � restraint oe government ~ showy dlsplay, and it Cts in ~ spending for fiscal 1982 uader , perfectly with the current Dtet the government-sponsored ' session oa admtnistrative administrative retorm b111 to be J reform. It ~S not the Diet butthe submitted to the Diet is about Finance Ministry bureaucrats . . '250 billion yea. This is less than who are steadlly carrying out 10 percent ot the estimated cut "flscal reconstructioa with an inerease in taxes:' . ~ COPYRIGHT: r(AINICHI DAILY NEWS 1981 ~ CSO: 4120/24 - 8 ~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440400060051-5 FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL SOKA GAKKAI APPLYING BRAKE ON COALESCENCE OF CENTRIST INFLUENCES Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 1 Oct 81 p 2 [Article from "Nagatacho Doings" column by Takehiko Takahashi] [ Tex t] ~e Vew Liberal Club and the Democratic Party. At the act." This is what made him linited Social Democratic beginning, a"New Liberal Club move toward an intra�Diet - Party have formed a new intra- boom" occurred. This did not alliance with the liSDP. Diet alliance under the ~~ame of last long. Its number of Diet The YLC has formed an - '~Vew Liberal Club-Democratic seats fel! at one time to four. alliance with the DSP in the League." Its representati~~e is . That was the period when Tokyo l~Ietropolitan Assembly. Toshio Famaguchi, fo~mer 14lasayoshi Ohira and Takeo ~?ccordingly, it would not be \LC secretary;eneral. Fukuda were in confrontation strange at all if a similar _ Yamaguchi considers thts aver the election of the prime alliance were to be formed in ~ new alliaace to be strictly an minlster in the Diet. The NLC ' the Diet. The surface reason intra�Diet entity and he supported Ohira. If the Komeito why thls cannot be done Is that preferred being called "intra- and DSP had acted in the same "the DSP's defen~e policy has Diet executive chairman." kut way then as the NLC, the gone too far to the right." This because such a designation is political situation might have ' is not the entire reason. unfamiliar, he accepted being underg+~ne a bi~ change. As far as the coalescence of . called the new group's . . the middle~of-the-road parties Coalition is concerned, the DSP is actin _ ~~representative secretary g general." . This is because Ohira. - in in concert with the Komeito. - The Komeito, the Democratic asking for the cooperation of the When the course of talks up to Socialist Party, the New Komeito: DSP and ~~'LC, had to now between DSP Chairman Liberal Club and the United accept a coalition government Sasaki and ~the Komeilo is Social Democratic Party have as the condition. The `ew considered, it will not be been regarded as the four Liberal Club, having only four possible for the DSP to exclude middle-of-the-road political Di'et seats at that time, sup- the Komeito in allying with the parties. Their coalescence has ported Ohira. But the Komeito NLC and the USDP. been strongly urged by DSP and Democratic Socialist Party On their part, the NLC and Chairman Ryosaku Sasaki and did not do so. USDP are opposed to an Adviser Ikko Kasuga. From this expenence, the alliance w�ith the Komeita This At such a time, for only two of then Secretary General Is not only because the Komeito the tour centrist parties to form Yamaguchi of the NLC had the has a religious body called the an intra-Diet alliance gives the thought that '~the Komeito and Soka Gakkai as its supporting impression ot cold water having the Democratic Socialist Party organization. The big reason b e e n p o u r e d o n t h e talk about a conversion of the seems to be that the Komeito - coalescence ot the four middle- political world but they do not does not like to see fhe ~'LC and of�the-road parties." take action at a crucial others approach the Soka The 'Ve~~~ Liberal Ctub ~vas moment.. There is little sense Gakkai. established by persons w�ho dealing with political parties The Democratic Socialist seceded from the Liberal- that cannot be depended upon to !'arty has a labor body called 9 FOR OFFICI.~L L'SE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE Oti'LY D o m e i ( J a p a n e s e C o n- ; through such meetings that t�o' ; federation of Labor~ as~ its parties can gain mutual un- supporting organization. The derstanding but the I~omeito l~ e w L i b e r a 1 C 1 u b' s dces not seem to be doing this. brganization is also open and In particular, it is difiicult to . can be approached by anyone. know about the Soka Gakkai. In the case of Soka Gakkai, The NLC and USDP state that however, people of other even if the centrist influences political part:e~ cannot even coalesce, it will be 4mpossible to approach it. work together ~vith such an a n o s u k e N a r a z a k i. ��untouchable" organiaation secretary generai of the United existing in the background. Social Democratic Party, For ihe DSP to form an declares, "they talk about the alliance with the NLC and coalescence of the centrist USDP, an "O.K." from the parties but I've ne~�er dined Komeito will be necessary. But together even once with the . the DSP can hardly ask for such executives of the Komeito." an "" Esecutives Meet The "1~`ew Liberal Club- Formal meetings have been Democratic League" has been held on more than ten occasions formed. But it will be difficult by the executives of the ~LC for it to become the starting and the USDP. It is only pQint of a new development in t~e political situation. COPYRIGHT: MAINICHI DAILY NEWS 1981 CSO: 4120/24 10 FOR OFFICI.4L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400460051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAI, KOMOTO SWITCHES STRATEGY Tokyo THE DAZLY YOMIURI in English 27 ~ep 81 p 2 [Article from "Political Beat" column by Raisuke Honda) Memt~ership ~ in the ~ Litieial-Democratic 'the~ autumn of 1980. ~ � . - . ~ , (Text] party (LDp) has drastically decreased, Of the 3,100,000 I.DP members,^a little mainiy* because oi doubts that the primarY ~more than 1,000,000, or one third of the electiom will flgure ia the electton oi the total, were said to be supporters oi Ko- party president !n the autumn oi ,next ~moto. � year.,:, ' ~ - � The eSorts of the Komoto faction to Every ma~or faction within the party has , recruit �pro-Komoto members, however, . lost enthusiasm for recsuitfng f~eW party went ior nothing, because Suzuki aas~ se- members. lected as party president through~ con- E1?en the factlon led by Economic Plan- sultations among LDP leuders after the ning Agency Di:~~tor-C~eneral Toahio Ko- unexpected death in Jun~ 1980, of then - moto, which used to have nearly one thlyd p~ ~ant megaKomoto ast summer . o! the partY membership on its side up Was on record as telling a lecture meeting - until last year, appears in no mood Lo embark on a new recruitmenti campal~. in his c~nstltueacy? in HYogo-ken that ~ A rumor is circulating among political there would be "more th~~n four candi- pundits: that the Komoto faction has abgn- dates" ruaning in the next year's party doned its strategy o! trying to elect Ko- Presidentlal election. moto on the strength oi his winnin8 next He also expressed his dr,termir_ation at ~ year's pre ,idential primary election, if it is the meeting to seek the party presidential held. � � � � ~ � post, thus virtually making a"declara- The rumor says that the ~Komoto Saction ~~on" o! his caadidacr for the. 1982 LDP may hsve decided,.in fact, that it is ad- election. � ~ ~ � vlsable to iavor choosing a LaP-president ' T~ Komoto iactioa; 11ke its,rival fac- neat autumn ihrnugh negotiations among tions, thereafter made no ma~or e8ort to iaction leaders rather . than ia.. an, eYec- , 8et, new ~ pro-Komoto party members. ~o~ Therefore; it is obvious that Komoto him- According to the LDP secretarlat, the ~li has glven up the idea o! placing flrst party membership, the "registration o! p~0~~' on a victory in a primary election which is renewed every year, is now about in competition with all' eligible LDP mem- 400,000, although the secretariat o~cials ~g' ~ say the number oi this year's total .LDP Komoto has recently been .inte~t on members will not be available before the strengthening friendly ties with . the in- end of October, ~he deadline for registra-� $u~ntial taction headed by former primE ~on. , , minlster Kakuei Tanaka, while at the same time going all-out to seek support from The Sgure oi 400,000 represents . a mas- another former premier Takeo Fukuda and - sive decllne from last year's LDP member- ~3 ta~~~, ~ ' ship ot 1,420,000 and 1979's 3,300,000, Apparently emulating Administrative The drastic decrease in the party mem- Management Agency Director-General Ya- bership is primarily attributs~ble to the suhiro Nakasone, his arch rival in the race strong signs that the next LDP presiden- to succeed Premier Suzukt, Komoto had tial election at the expiration of Prime a tete-a-tete with Tanaka while he was _ Minister Suzuki's term of office as LDP on vacatton in Karuizawa, Nagano-ken, head in November 1982, will be carried out. . last summer. ' without a primary' election. Toward the end oi November, Premier The raising ot the LDP mem~+ership an- Suzuki most likely will reshu~le his cabinet nual fee to ~3,000 this year compared to and party executive Hneup. ~2,ppp a]so maY have something to do with What will be interesting to watch in the the decline ia party members. ~ cabinet. reshu8le will be whether Komoto In 1979, the I.DP membership: increased stays in the cabinet thus maintaining his sharply hitting the 3,100,000� mark, . thanks stance oi remaining not too close nor not to the strong drives that partq lactions too distant irom Suzuki or bolts irom the staged to recruit new members belore the cabinet to launch his drive to capture the party presidentlal election scheduled for toP LDP pos~ ~ COPYRIGHT: THE DAILY YOMIURI 1981 11 C~O: 4120/24 FOR OFF~ICIaL US~ ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY . POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL - HOW TO COPE WITH GOVERNMENT REFORM Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 6 Oct 81 p 2 [Article from "Zooming In" column by flideo Matsuoka] [ Text ] --,l,he~ bie~ ~~sessioa ~ for ad- ~ ~iuiable~ to draw ~up a definitlve ' �~for the part tt played~in inviting ' - ministrative reform is on. The~; schedule to have~ them un- ' today's fiscal chaos. highllght is the package of so- denvritten by a syndicate of ~ Says he: ~'Ia my'days at the called "adminislrative reform banks and secvrfties coc~- miaistry, bureaucrats would bills" deslgned to save 248,200 ' .panies. ~ ~ � stake their, jobs in opposing ; milljoa yen in goyernment ` At the end ot the present ~ politicaas who wanted . the ' spending. fis~al Year, the outstanding government to issue bonds jnst Of the six opposition parties, . balance of bonda issued will be to cover the ' budget deflcits. four are for the package, . 82 trlriion yen, which will incur T6at is why we were able to although~ not without ieser- ~ acu?ual interest ot~ 5,600 ~ keepthebudgetbalanced: vations. ~doreover, the Liberal� billion yea The interest puts. a .~~The ministry's bureaucrats Democrats ~ are determined to heavy blte on the budget~ Hence ' today. go out of their way to ram ~ the package through the government flnance cr[sis. , please the flscall~ undisiplined shoWd negotiakions; fail with - ~Ys ~ ' ' ~ po~iticians by agreeing to ~loat . holdout oppositions. It sure is a crisis. But'wtw is ~ huge issues of government So the final ~u~ ~~e ot the tesponsib~e tor the ~ present bonds so that these politicians ~ package ~is a foregone'coa� ~ mes.s''Nobady but the Libera!- caie have~.enough money. ~This - clusion.. The mam poi~~t� ot. Ia-..~ Democratic Party to which has ~~led to the cnrrent ~mess. � terest. therefore::~ is~: the . S~~anP~.~agovernment '.-Shame on these feckless and ~ strategies the . socialists ~ and of aaothec party had wrecked, irresponsible guys , at the: communists w?ill employ . t~ ~ state finances before it was mlaistry tod~y.?". . fightlhe package.=~';' . . ~ - . ~ thrown ~ out, Suwld,s' speech . . Will they carry the [i~Y~ht to tbe ~ j Wou1~ bave drawn moce serious _Guts And Mettle - bitter end by staging a free-tor; ~dsympathetic atteAti6n. . The fiscal ~~situation would ~lE on the tloor? I don't think a As the mess todaY is the have been different today if the show of machismo will endear, , comeuppance naturally to be Finance Ministry bureaucrats them evea to the spectators. from years ot ~scal had the- guts and mettle of The two oppositioa parties, it ~ indlscipiine by successive Masuo Takashima, who appears, are being forced on the , governments ~ ot the ~ Libecal- ~~gned in a spat with Prime Ilemocratic Patty Suzukl 1n Mlnister Suzuki dra in defensive. ~ ' gg g In hls opening po~icy spe2ch, h~ oP~jng ~ at the Diet, Foreign M~nister;~fasayoshl Ito Prime Minister ZeNco Suzuki . shauld have apologl~ed to tl~e ~~to resi~ation. - referred to t~e~unteaable tiscal ~ nation tor the wantoa past, if , Such .spirit ot resistance situation which is the result of only tor lhe sake ot beIng cannot even remotely be hoped the massive _issuance ot consistent in taking political for in today's Finance Ministry government bonds. . . ~ respoc~ibility. bureaucrats who pride them� The government plans to float A frlend of mine who Is a selves On being quick on the 12-trillion�yen's worth ot bonds Finance Mlnistry retlree, is uptake `in `matters thaC aftecr - ~ this f'iscal year,, . but is still bitterly critical of the ministry thelr careers. 12 - FOR OFFICIAL liSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000400060051-5 POR OFFICIAL IJS~ ONLY They believe in~~ the LDP's The net iesult is the nafional ' affairs in his speeeh: staying power, and know ihat debt of 80 trillioa yen.. It ex- .~e fact . oi defense ap- ~ kowtowing to LDP politicians , p(ains how the LDP f.easted on propriations being mulched pays, especially whea, upon the national budget to preserve from the storm of. reform is retiren~eni, they look for new itslegislativemajority. ~ largely .~due to Americ~h jobs or Shemselv~ turn to Now talking about ~ p~~ure. But ttie very America politics. ' the,tiscal crisis as If .it just . N o F i n a n c e bt i n i s t r y' happend along without any LDP ~ Which is pressuring Japan into bureaucrat will risk a fallout invol~ em ent. Wh o e v e r i s ~ ~creased defense s~,ending is a with LDP politicfans tor tear ot ~ responsible, the fiscal crisis is a, ~ now cuttingback.on its ovm~1982. ~i job security. None ot these reality that cries out for ad- ' defense budget by S2. billion ~ ofGcials is prepared to cut it oa ~ ministcativereform. . (~ughly 450 billion yen) for a., the outside w6en they think they The problem is how. to otfset tota~ three-year cutback of S12 ' j can no -longer seroe con- the ~ bud~ft shortfall. The ~ bUlion in defense. Japan should scientiously at thetr. job In the ~�~ists and communists~are. frankly show its bewilderment ~ over this matter. miNstry. attacking~ the government s ~ But putting the blame~ on reform plan for singling out � One way of looking at this Fi~ance Ministry bureaucrats , welfare aad" education ~ for situation is that America has � is only secondary. It should go major spendl~g 'cuts. ~What , been so strapped for the - primarily to the LDP ahich ~ must be made the biggest is.sue Wherewithal that other coun- forced them [ntu agreeing to put 's the fact that detense is a field tries of the Wesf should kick in to meet the needs of the free the budget i~to the red. immune ~to ~dministrative~ ~ World's defense. The other way The party s politicians turned reform. public works budgets and round. why should any country subsidies into a. political grab Reform All Phases ' of the Westera camp spare : bag to pMase ~ their con- . Ttae reform should touch all ~ more for defense whea America : stituents, and this has worked phases of administratton, in- ~ ~s cutting back . ' to preserve the I.DP majority in, ~ � Which argument sounds more _ cludIng,., of , course,. defense convincing? ~I think it is the ,.theD1'ek..........,~� . spending. . . . . Thraugh , publ(c.. works But the whole ot the ad- ~atter. spend(ng. ~and. subsidie~ LDP .t ministiation is not fair game in ' The Japanese, among other politicians have poured golden ' people, have a,traditiona~ mora~ : [ertilizer to the grassroots vote. . the reform play. The govern� ~ ~at the leader himself should ment . has decreed a reform ~ set an exam le of what ~he ' A loss oi fertilizer endangers ; freeze oa defense. ~ ' P their next election chances. So " Instead. it is sald that it will preaches to his followers. A ihey insist on getting ~nough ~ ~crease the defedse budget 7.5 commander cannot order his golden fertilizer. even if lt troops into battie while he means incw~ring debts on the Percentovertheprecedingyear - retreats. . overnmeat. 'As a result, th~ When almost all other items ara Sometimes America conducts g under the falling axe of reform. dipiomacy over its allies' head government is more than 80 The - government's retorm � or pulls surpise policy changes trillion yen into the nation. draft forces bloodletting in ' at a crucial moment. For such It is to be noted, moreover. ' maAy budgetary fields, and the behavior. America is both loved that this 80 trillion yen in out- blood thus let is being sucked ~d hated by its allies. More standirrg ~ government bonds into defense. Th(s is a Dracula� often than not, this behavior was built up af the cost of 2ax~ type defensebuildup. detracts from America's relief that ot6env~se woWd have In his policy speech af the trustworthiness. ~ been possible.'; ~ Diet, Suzuki said nothing about Many an ally has been For several � years .now. we . the relationship between ad- disappointed or even fett have ha d no income tar cu t, minis t r a tiv e r e f o r r, i a n d , ~trayed at the last moment which the government owes to defense. Althaugh he preached after taithfully following the people by as much as prices the need tor �~all ,to share America's lead. .This has go up. Far from cutting income , equally la these trials," defense happend in military affairs, too. tax, the government has en- apparently is not sharing the America ts now 1QUdly talking forced and is contemplating pains~ai alI:~Yet Suzukihad the about a Soviet threat. _ new indirect taxes. nen?e to ~efer. to th~s, state of, 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE Oh'LY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY Tomorrow it coul~ be e:ctolling ' the~ ~government `is ~nclined to' ~ friendship with the Soviets. ' even reinforce the ministry's One big envy I have con- functions so that it wiII see to it cerning Presideat Reagan's ' that school textbooks do pot fail administrative capabilities is to whip up patriotism in the about h'ts decision to scrap the little ones. � E n e r g y a n d E d u c a t i o n Meanwhile, the American departments. In Japan, that govermnent, now in need of would amount to abolishing the insp'sring its people �with Education Ministry and the . patriotism as never befcre. is � Energy Bureau of the Ministry confidently quashing the _ of. International Trade~ and Education Department. My hat lndustry. , is off to Artrerica. � - Mr. Reagan is.showing us up .Iapanese administrative on administrat9ve retorm. .To organs ditfer in nature from the Japanese, abolition of the those af America, and - Education bIinistry is least ~ therefore, Japan caqnot import imaginable ia acry government ~ American reform as such. But - reform: ' ' � � it can definitely learn from the . ~1t this moment, moreover,. . Americap move, _ COPYRIGHT: MAINICHI DAILY NEWS 1981 CSO: 4120/24 7~ FOR OFFICIAL L�SE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY POLITICAL AN~J SOCIOLOGICAL NEW POLITICAL PARTY'S IMPACT APPEARS SLIM - T~kyo THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English 6 Oct 81 p 2 [Article from "Political Scene" column by Masao Kanazashi] [Text] In late September, two minor parties - the Buddhist "bka Gakkai ( Value C~eation conservative New Liberal Club (NLC) and Society) and the DSP is what NLC officials termed "more hawkish than the culing the reformist Socialist Democratic I,iberal Democratic Pazty" in defense policy Federation ~SDF) - formed a new political and its posture toward South Korea. group called the "New Liberal Club-Demo- A typical example of the gro~lp's disgust cratic Alliance in the House of Rep- toward the policy of the Komeito and the resentatives. It has stirred ripples among DSP on defense and Korea was shown when ~ otherwise very quiet. political circles Yohei Kono of the NLC said recently, "We do recently. not need two LDPs.'~' Thus, the cleavage be- . - The fust and biggest concern is whether tween the conflicting groups steins less from this new group, whose political activities are ~olicy differences than political distrust. limited only to Diet affairs, could lead to the Especially since the NLC is a splinter from formation or realignment of new political the LDP, it completely distrusts Kasuga and forces in the future, involving the Komeito ~ other DSP leader,s who aze on good friendly (Clean Government Party) and the Demo- terms with LDP leaders, while haranguing cratic Socialist Party cDSP). But, judging for the unification of anti-LDP forces. from the conflict of interests and policy - p~~~e other hand, the NLC and the SDF _ di[ferences among those parties, a new have much in common. Firstly, though the political formation i~ very difficult to come by NLC is conservative and the SDF reformist, ~ The formation of this new group was, from both are splinters from big pazties, the LDP the beginning, contrary to the objectives of and the Japan Socialist Party, and depend Chairman , Ryosaku Sakaki and Senior for most of thsir support on floating and Adviser Ikko Kasuga of the DSP who at- whimsical voters dissatisfied with long- tempted unsuccessfully to form the new scanding parties and not well-organized. group made Lp of four centrist parties (DSP, Secondly, leaders of both parties are popular the Komeito, NLC and SDF). Furthermore, personalities and hold liberal views on To~hio Yamaguchi, who was picked as defense and forei~ policy. representative of the new group, said "There Furthermore, it goes without saying that - has no4' been a complete Wst and policy both parties judged it politically advantage- consensus among the new group and the o~s that they form the new ~oup since not a Komeito and the DSP," indicating that the bright prospect is in sight for the expansion group had no other choice but to excl~de the of their party strength. Komeito and the DSP. If such a fora:-~ation of such a conservative- In other worcl~, the new group cannot get reformist group had taken place a generation along with the Komeito and the DSP because ago, sharp criticisms would have been in the Komeito's supporting organization is the order, such as "parties of no principles and 15 FQR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400460051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . faith" and "illicit marriage." But no such sharp rebukes have been heard of the forma- tion this time. The biggest reason for this might be that a merger of such mini-parties~ has no direct effect on Japan's domestic poli- tics, but other reasons might have been the aforementioned similarity of ct+.aracters and - policies of both pazties, an increasing ten- dency among voters for non-partisanship and the whimsical nature of voters who do not - ~ differentiate between conservative and reformist. But khe future of the new group is not that b~ ight at all as one member' bolted on the very day the group was formed. Things will not go easy when thase "moody" parties have to deci3e on issues in black and white terms in the coming Diet sessions. The biggest policy difference between the NLC aj~d the DSP lay in the field of defense and security. Commenting on this difference, the group's representative Yamaguchi said, "In theory, an individual Dietman should be given a free hand on policy matters, but we should not givE liie impression that the group is in complete disarray. We would like to - hammer ouk the differences throuah discussion and reach some kind of con- sensus on policy matters." The problem is whether this discussion will do the trick for the group in the coming years. COPYRIGHT: 1981, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. CSO: 4120/26 16 FOR OFFICiaL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400064051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MILITARY li.S.-JAPANESE FRICTION ON DEFENSE ISSUES EXAMINED Tokyo CHUO KORON in Japanese Sep 81 pp 86-98 [Special Report: National Defense at a Turning Point"; roundtable discussion on "The Facts About the U.S.-Japanese Conflict on Defense Issues"; discussants: Jo~ i Omura, Japan Defense A~~ncy Director General; Michita Sakata, Chairman of the Lower House Special Committee on National Security; chaired by Tomohisa Sakanaka, ASAHI SHIMBUN Editor] [Text] The United States' Stern Posture Sakanaka: With the inception of the Reagan administration's call for a"strong America," the United States has been asking Japan steadily and sharply to bolster its defense capabilitq. It see~s that Japan~s defense policy is now at a turning point. Director General Omura, with us taday, is in the position of formulating and implementing defense policy, while Mr Sakata, as chairman of the Lower House Special Committee on l~ational Security, has the task of coming up with a national consensus on defense and taking a critical look at and study of defense policy from the peaple's point of view. From your respective standpoints, I wish to hear each of your opiniqns. ~ Director General Omura has just returned from a trip, first to the United States and then to Europe, while Mr Sakata followed the reverse course. Bc~th conferred with key officials on defense. Let's start with Director General Omura an what = the UnitPd States seeks of Japan. Omura: During my visit to the United States in late June, I met with Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Secretary of State Haig, Presidential Adviser (on national - security) Allen, and the chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Commit- tees. It was shortly after both Houses had passed the new fisca]. year budget for sharply increased defense spending, on the basis of the Reagan administration's stand on restoring overall military strength relative to the USSR, and while the - nuances differed, they all expressed their hope for cooperation from their allies. After being exposed to the most recent data at the headquarters of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Pacific and at the Department of Defense, I was able to appreciate the efforts being exerted by U.S. leaders on the contention that the East-West balance of power would become upset if nothing was done. I also under- stood better why the United States, allied with about 40 countries, was seeking 17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000400060051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY our co~,peration. Nevertheless, given Japan's constitutional restrictions and the premisQ of defending Japan through the use of its own Self-Defense Forc~es, it is onl;~ no~mal for thQre to be a limit to our capabilities, despite all the requests for cooFeration. Sakanaka: What was the U.S. perception on that point? Omura: They said they understood this point well. However, the United States feels that the Japanese Government's present efforts are insufficient, and that it should move faster and on a bigger scale, in light of Japan~s present status and economic strength. For instance, Senate Armed Forces Committee Chairman Tower = stressed that greater efforts by Japan would be desirable because it would promote trust between the two countries. Sakanaka: From the Japanese point of view, that is where the gap is. Mr Sakata, how do you feel about it? Sakata: Before my recent visit to Europe and the United States, I visited Washing- ton from the end of November to early December last year and conferred with then Secretary of Defense Brown, with Mr Allen, who was working on ?~he transition from the Carter administration, and with Chairman Price 4f the flous~ Armed Services Committee. And during my last trip to Washington in June, I met with Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Senatie Armed Services Committee Chairman Tower, and other key Congressmen. Their contenCions were ~ust as the director general has de- scribed. The U.S. view is: "The 'Defense Program Outline' drawn up during Mr Sakata's ten- ure as Defense Agency director general in 1975-76 was appropriate for the interna- tional situation then prevailing. But today, it has changed dramatically. To cope, we are hoping for greater defense efforts." Senator Tower clearly stated, "The 7.5-percent ceiling on increas~:s in th~ next fiscal defense budget came as a _ disappointment." Although he spoke in general terms, I felt that he was directing his statement at Japan. What he was saying was, "The United States is merely seeking from its Western European and Japanese allies what they should do in defense efforts as members of the free society in order to cc~pe with the Soviet threat." [He was saying] that if such efforts were inadequate, the American people, in case of an - emergency, probably could not help but assume a negative stance in giving support. Sakanaka: When the Defense Program Outline" was drafted, the international situa- tion was that of detente. 'Poday, however, there is the Soviet naval buildup in the Far East as well as the deployment of SS20's, intermediate-range missiles, and Backfire strategic bombers. More recently, there is the added Froblem of the Mid- dle East. The United States wants to be in a position to confront the USSR on three fronts--in the NATO area, in East Asia, and in the Middle East. The conten- - tion of the United States is that, despite the relative economic decline and its consequent relative weakness of miiitary power, i*_ still assumes the responsi- bility for protecting the sealanes for oil shipments, and that Japan, as a bene- ficiary, hence ought to exert greater efforts. Considering the sentiments of the American people, such a way of thinking cannot be helped. 18 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-40850R040400064051-5 FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY Sakanaka: In Director General Omura's meetings with key officials in the White House, in the Department of State and Department of Defense, and in Faoth Houses, were there any differences of opinion among them? . Omura: The methods of expression varied, but there were no differences. During a 4-hour discussion over lunch with Defense Secretary Weinberger, he explained the recent dramatic increase in Soviet weapons production capabilities, the two- _ fold increase in the number of strategic aircraft, and the 3.7-fold increase in submarines as compared with the United States. Secretary of State Haig spoke in broad terms. He stated that as a young second ~ lieutenant in General MacArthur's headquarters, he wae familiar with the course of enactment of the Japanese constitution and the trend of Japanese public opinion. And he ~xpressed hope, from the standpoint of Japan~s ec~nomic recovery as well, that [Japan] will assume a balance3 effort for ~defense. Presidential aide Allen comanented that while he was not asking for the impossible, he would like to see Japan take up the challenge against difficulties. Sakata: Mr Allen, during a meeting last yeary expressed hope for a full discus- sion on what each country should do for the national interests of both. Defense Secretary Weinberger also expressed a wish for talks on each country's share of defense in spite of some differences. He added, "For America, it would be help- ful to conduct talks with the USSR on arms ~imitation or reduction, but at the same time, I believe that success can be achieved only through increased military power. That, indeed, is the perception against th~ threat common to sll freedom- and peace-loving countries." Are Japan and the United States Really Full Partners? Sakanaka; We have discussed what the United States seeks of Japan. But to what extent have Japan's thinking and c~ontentions been conveyed to the United States? Sakata: During a conversation with a young man named ('Wolhobittsu}, chief of the Policy and Planning ~epartment, who had moved frum the Defense Dep~rtment to the State Department, he stated, "As I said during the Hawaii conference, the present- day Self-Defense Forces lack rear ~upport capability and sustained warfare capa- bility. Under such circumstances, a readiness capability cannot be acquired. A combination of three capabilities�--frontal, rear supportr and sustained warfare-- is required." Whereupon I stated *_o him and Assistant Deputy Secretary of State Holdrige: "Un- - der the 'Defense Program Outline,' the ob~ective was to combine these three ele- ments and create a unit, albeit small, with a readiness capability. Unfortunately, that still remains unachieved. It is important, therefore, that the 'Defense Pro- gram Outline' be achieved by fiscal 1987. When it is complete, there should be a defense capability that is small but has a high-quality readiness capability. If the United States asks for a bigger scale and a speedup, it will end up with only the front without a sustained warfare or rear support capability, resulting in a distortion with no readiness capability. This would be undesirable for Japan's security and U.S, national interests." 19 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 FOR OFFIClAL USE ONLY Further, the Japanese people are beginning to develop a consensus on the security ~ issue. The Democratic Socialist Party has come around to recognizing the Self- De�ense Forces and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Ttie Komeito also is about to shift to a realistic policy. And the opposition forces have participated in the latest visit to Europe and the United States. If the United States seeks an un- due speedup in defense buildup, despite such a favorable change, the consensus that is developing could crumble. I explained that it was essential for the United States to understand this point. Omura: As Mr Sakata has said, our side expressed our minds quite openly. The U.S. side did likewise, and whilP there were differences, we agreed to have con- tinued meetings at every opportunity. In the fall, Defense Secretary Weinberger will visit Asia and stop over in Tokyo. The regular conferences on equipment and interchange of technology are also scheduled for this fall. Further, this will be followed by studies, including the subject of assistance to U.S. forces in time of emergency in the ~'ar East. Sakata: Because of the brevity of the meeting with Def ense Secretary Weinberger, _ I presented hisn with a text of my speecti last year at George Washington Univer- sity. In it, I mentioned that alliances in the communist countries run vertically. That is, the USSR maintains a command/obedience ielationship with East European nations, backed by military power, while the cooperative relationship in the free society runs horizontally. Depending on the national situation and the ~~trength of each country, it is an alliance based on faithful cooperation for the attain- ment of a single goal. Cooperation among the free society [nations] takes time and requires ad~ustments. Yet, an alliance based on each nation~s voiuntary ac- tion is more secure and effective than one based on the com~and/obedience rela- tionship. That, indeed, symbolizes full partnership. Sakanaka: It means that a cooperative relationship must be constructed on sub- stantive talks. Sakata: Yes. For example, we allies were nnt consulted when the Carter adminis- tration altered its policy to withdraw U.S. ground forces from the Knrean Penin- sula. Even the Reagan administration arbitrarily lifted the grain embargo without consulting us, though we cooperated in the grain embargo againrt the USSR in the form of economic retribution. I told Defense Secretary Weinberger that this did not represent full partnership, and that more talks should have been held. Omura: In the United States, I made a visit to four military installations. At one, the Jacksonville Naval Air Station, I uttered words of encouragement to about 100 men of the Maritime Self-Defense Force who were there to take delivery of P-3C antisubmarine-warfare planes. My purpose was to inspect one of the three aircraf t to be delivered. Thus, Japan-U.S. cooperation was steadily being proanoted even in this aspect. The P-3Cs will greatly improve antisubmarine-warfare capabil- ities. Though it depends on the forthcoming budgetary measures, if more can be assured under the next program, the controversial issue of greater antisubmarine- warfare capabilities on the seaianes should be resolved for the time being. Sakata: In other words, there has been a gradual buildup of defense capabilities. Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense West described the Soviet threat in the Ear 20 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY East, showing me data, also pr~bahly shown to Director General Omura, on the in- crease of SS-20's and Backfires, and he noted the inadequacy of Japan's defense efforts. Whereupon I presented a chart comparing U.S. and Soviet defense spending and aired my views. In other words, ~he USSR steadily increased its defense spend- ing in the 1970's, while the United States trimmed defense spending owing to its withdrawal from Vietnam, and in part because of the domestic situation, including the Watergate incident, unempioyment, and inflation. During this period, while total defense spending was s~nall, Japan's real increase was 7 per~cent from 19?0 through 1979. This time, it plans a 7.5-percent increase, in spite of the harsh environment of financial restructure and administrative reform. This means 3 per- cent in real terms after adjustment for inflation, and is close ta the 3 percent for NATO nations. I asked for U.S. understanding and declared that charges of = Japan's not doing anything are un~ustified. Scratching his head, West stated, "In the 1970's, the United States was not a model allied power." Cu~-rent Situation in Europe Sakanaka: The other major pillar of the Weatern alliance is Europe. In the eyes of the Eurapean countries, there seems to be a growing feeling nf late that Japan is not doing enough in defense efforts. In the Ottaw~. summit, Western Europe took a hard line vis-a-vis the USSR. What is Director General Q~ura's opinion after conferring with top leaders of NATO? Omura: I met with Secretary General (Luns) at NATO headquarters and with West Germ~n Defense Minister Apel. T'nougfi the character of alliance differs between Japan-U.S. and U.S.-Europe, there was a consensus on the question of defending _ fraedom. Opinions were exchanged with Secretary General (Luns) on four points: First, the defense efforts of NATO member nations, on financial efforts in particular; second, the status of the so-called "double decision" pertaining to battlefield nuclear weapons; third, the outlook on the Polish crisis; and fourth, the new French gow ernment of Mitterrand, relative to its foreign affairs and defenae policies. On the first point, many nations are beset by difficulties such as inflation and unemployment, but except for a couple of nations, all are in virtual agreement on a 3-percent hike. ~ Second point. To cope with the Soviet SS-20's, NATO countries have decided to - deploy Pershing II's and cruise missiles in their countries. Today, 3 years after the adoption of a resolution to hold negotiations with the USSR in parallel, those countries are preparing to deploy them. The secretary general noted that because in a couple of countries parliamentary approval cannot be obtained unless negotia- tions are conducted with the USSR, he intends to ask the United States to open negotiations on strategic arms litnitation with~n this year. Third point. On the Polish situation, the USSR probably wants to involve the Warsaw Pact nations in order to avert any turmoil and to somehow maintain the status quo. The possibility of military intervention is considered remote. 21 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404060051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ Fourth point. As for the policies of the new Mitterrand government, they are in- clined to have confidence in the official statement saying there would be no change from the pravious government's stance on foreign relations and defense. Sakata: The perception of Western Europe and the United States on the Soviet threat is the same, but measures to deal with it differ. The Reagan administra- tion, apparently feeling that negotiating leverage cannot be had without strength, places priority on the deployment of Pershing II's and cruise missiles in Western Europe. On the other hand, although Western Europe considers the deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons and defense efforts to be essential, it also hopes for U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation negotiations or arms control, in parallel or in advance. Military buildup and arms control are considered the "two wheels" of the security policy. Sakanaka: Director General Omura, how did the conference with Defense Minister Apel go? Umusa: He stated that he would like to see a 3-percent real increase in the fiscal 1982 budget, or 8 percent nominally. This does not digfer much from Japan's 7.5 percent. Further, Social Democratic Party head Brandt told of his impression after meeting with Seeretary General Brezhnev that the latter was willing to enter into arms control negotiations, and that Brandt would discuss this with the United States in order to get the talks undexway as early as this fall. Sakanaka: Did you inspect the West German forces? Omura: I made an inspection of a tank division and an air unit. The frontline equipment, including tanks and aircraft, was on a par with Japan~s. The only dif- ference, for example, was the mobility of the armored personnel carriers accompany- ing the tanks, the transport vehicles for missiles and ~unition, and operations vehicles. There were shelters even at airbases. Terrain conditions may differ, hut Japan must da more to achieve a state of readiness. Another point is that West Germany maintains a canscriptinn system. With~500,000 men on active status, it is up to 93 percent of full strength. The reserve man- power is about the same. It has been said that 700,000 men could be called ug within 72 hours. It is difficult for Japan to emulate this, but it should give serious consideration to the issues of Self-Defense Force reserves and the attain- ment of a full complement. Sakata: A person named (Merutesu) of the CDU (Christian Democratic Alliance), a leading member of the German Federal Parliamen~.t, said to me: "It is doubtful that the USSR wiil launch a nuclear war. The reason is that the USSR has desert-like lands to the north and east. The nuclear destruction of Europe, with its rich culture and industrial capacity, would transform Europe into another Siberia. Hence, West Germany does not feel that the USSR would launch a nuclear attack against Europe. Historically, the USSR's basic policy has been to exert polit- ical and psychological pressure on neighboring countries by ~neans of its tremen- dous military strength." 22 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400460051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Japan-U.S. Differences in Perception of Soviet Threat Sakanaka: The major problem between Japan and the United States in perceiving the international situation has to do with the assessment of the USSR. While there is little difference in perception of the Soviet military buildup, there is a wide difference of views on Soviet intentions. Omura: The United States appears concerned not over the imminent use of military power but with political pressure, backed by formidable military power capable of fighting on two fronts. Sakata: You mean pol.itical intimidation, with military power in the background. Omura: Since irreparable harm could come from weakness or a vacuum, the United States and its allies want to defend various regions together. Sakanaka: Do you mean there isn't a wide difference of views between Japan and the U~ited States? Omura: Japan is concerned over the Soviet military buildup centered around North- East Asia, while the United States takes a aerious view of the Middle East from a global viewpoint. Sakata: From a global scale, the military power between the United States and the USSR is in balance. ThougY~ the USSR may have the advantage in some regions, the United States does not feel the balance has been upset as a whole. In the Far East, the USSR has strengthened its military power in the Northern Territories and has reinforced its naval power by such things as deploying the carrier Minsk. But looking at the balance of power between East and West, [we see that] one- fourth of Soviet military power has been nailed down along the Sino-Soviet border as a result of China's alignment with the United States and Japan. This has served to lighten the burden on the NATO front. From the Soviet point of view, it fears a passible encirclement led by the United States and including Japan, Western Europe, and China. Overall, the situation in the Far East is not neces- sarily adverse for the West, there being no Asian nation friendly to the USSB except for Vietnam. But because of the Soviet deployment of SS-20's and Backfires, the U.S. Seventh Fleet or the Third Fleet will be under constraint and unable to assume a free hand as before. This is of some concern from the standpoint of the United States and Japan. Omura: An immediate danger of large-scale war in which nucZear weapons are used can be clearly ruled out. But Pacific Commander in Chief Long regards an attack using conventional weapons as likely and Is focusing on that point. In the event of an attack using conventional weapons, the war, in all probability, will not be a short, decisive one, but a prolonged one. The U.S. Department of Befense has not ruled this out. Sakata: Highly destructive, accurate nuclear weapons have been developed and are increasingly difficult to operate. Moreover, the mass use of conventional weapons 23 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY is not so simple because of their linkage to nuclear warfare. As a result, dis- _ putes are acquiring a limited character. The differences in the streng*_h of small nations, with their conventional forces, and the superpowers have never been so greaz as today. Yet the United States was unable to defeat Vietnam, and the USSR is bogged down in Af ghanistan. And the Iran-Iraq war has not flared into an gll- out war. In the present situation., the use of military power in the nuclear era has been restrained in many forms. Thus, at the time the "Defense Program Outline" was drawn up, my thinking was that, against a limited attack, Japan would have its own capability for fighting, without counting on the United States; on tep of this, there would be the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the spirit and determ3.nation of each citizen to rise up in Japan's defense. I agree that conventional power has never had so much impact as today. But its employment can be very limited. The reason, first of all, is nuclear deterrent and such other factors as the U.~.-Soviet talks on strategic arms limitation, detente, mutually degendent economies, technology, and open availability of in- formation. All of these deterrents are helping to safeguard peace. Basic to it is the balance of power between East and West. The preservation of peace, therefore, is difficult without the strict maintenan~e of the balance of power. Since Japan pursues the three nonnuclear principles" and is under constitutional restraints, it must strive to work in the direction of reducing, not expanding, the global military power while upholding a power balance. To preserve peace, this should be Japan's role hereafter. Conventional Forces Required of Japan Sakanaka: With reference to your comment on Che significance of modern-day con- ventional forces, the Unlted States has expressed fear that the conventional forces provided for in the "Defense Pro gram Outline" would be unable to meet the demands of a changing era. I would like to�ask Director General Omura this question. Do you plan to revise the defense capability provided in the "Defense Program Out- line" or make step-by-step improvements based thereon? What are your thoughts on the future direction of dQfense preparations? - Omura: The government has no immediate plans to r2vise the "outline." To realize the standards set forth in the "outline," it sees a need for acceleration. This is because the standards provided in the "outline" do not conform to the present- day situation. For example, the appended chart in the "outline" provides for about 60 surface ships, but the actual figure is about 50, or a shortfall of 10. Further, against some 430 operat ional fight~ers contemplated for the Air Self- Defense Force, we only have about 320, or more than 100 shy. The urgent task is to make up these shortages. Also, since the "outline" has received cabinet ap- proval, and the basic thinking regarding the preparation of the next midterm pro- gram estimate necessary for its implementation was approved by the National De- - fense Council this April, it would be unrealistic and unwise to effect a total revision. Sakanaka: I understand. 21~ FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Omura: The "outline" was completed in 1976 in the era of detente. Tiie U.S. posi- tion is that the thinking should be changed in li,gFit of today~s changed i.nterna- tional situation, but, putt~ng such abstract arguments aside, I stated that as a pr~ctical matter, realizatio~l of the line pr~vided in the "outline" could virtually resolve the issue raised at tl:e Hawaii conference. ~ At the administrative-level meeting in Hawaii, some wild opinions were made by ' specialists. It was agreed not to let this out, but it leaked (laughter). Eor example, it was claimed that a wide discrepancy existed between U.S. figures on antisub~arine-warfare planes and the 45 aircraft provided in the current program. The fact was that under the "outline," about 100 antisubmarine-warfare planes were under consideration. Though the old program called for 45, the number would have come closer to U.S. figures if the obsolescent P-2J's were to be replaced in the future by P-3C's. As this example shows, there is not much discrepancy. The issue, rather, has to do with rear support and sustained capability. Deep consideration should te given not only to matters dealing with the front or increasing the quantity of amslunition and missiles but also in parallel with them. Sakana'ca: Mr Sakata, you were the individual responsible for prepaxing the "De- fense Program Outline." Within the Liberal-Democratic Party there are critics calling for a much larger expansion. How do you feel? Sakata: As viewed from the national consensus, I basically feel that the pa~e described by Director General Omura is proper. Even though the "outline" was ap- proved by the cabinet, I myself feel that I failed to do my best during the past 5 years. If I had wor.ked haxder, perhaps we could have responded better to U.S. requests. Therefore, I feel that the ~mmediate problem is to achieve the stan- dards set forth in the "outline." This is not generally known, but the original draft of the Defense Agency's "out- line" called for an increase from four to five in the escort flotilla of the Mari- time Self-Defense Force. But because of financial considerations and anticipated future i~provement of the draft, the National Defense Council decided to keep the current number unchanged. Sakanaka: You mean that the Defense Agency had plans to build up the Maritime Self-Defense Force even before the U.S. request was received? Salc~ta: Yes. Of the four escort flotillas, one was to be kept in a state of readiness. The Defense Agency felt that five flotill~s would be required for the increase to two. Omura: That's true. Sakata: But now I feel that outfitting the four.escort flotillas with modern ~ weapons such as antiair and antiship missiles, antisubmarine helicopters, and anti- ' submarine torpedoes should take priority. In this connection, I wish to make a ~ request of Director General Omura. As the Prime Minister also ~.s anxious to see 25 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000400060051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY this accomplished by 1987, I hope the National Defense Council will hand down a decision a~d, as the cabinet's position, achieve the standards set forth in the "outline." If that can be done, we may be a61e to convince the United States of dur position on such things as the issue o� next fiscal year's 7.5-percent in- crease, Amid Financial Restructure and Administrative Reform Sakanaka: Under the present pace of increase in defense funds, difficulties couZd arise in achieving the standards of the "outline" by fiscal 1987. What is your opinion? Another problem is that, since a financial restructuring is underway, strong resistance could occur even within the Liberal-Democratic Party, as well as from the opposition forces, to the sacred treatment of only defense funds. What is Director General Omura's thinking on this point? Omura: With respect to the opinion against the sacred treatment of defense funds, I feel, because of administrative reform as well, that there should be rationaliza- tion through the elimination of waste. Effectiva use of funds is only natural. But changes in the interna~.ional ~ituation need to be considered, and Japan has not done its part in defense efforts. Moreover, if we are to reach within a few years the level of standards set forth in the "outline," some increases must be made. After this point was appealed, the fiscal 1982 ceiling was raised to 7.5 percent. It was reached after negotiations with the finance minister and with the Prime Minister's support of that figure. Some have taken a dim view that last year's request for 9.7 percent had been whit- tled down to 7.6 percent, but what counts is the substance in order to avoid sub- sequent criticism. I have sternly told the Ground, Maritime, and Air staffs to take positive steps for rationalization, and have warned against any indiscriminate increase. Sakanaka: Mr Sakata, I know there is strong criticism within the opposition forces toward increased defense funds. What is the reaction in the Lower House Special Committee on Security to the 7.5-percent increase? Sakata: The Democratic Socialist Party will probably go along. As reflected in the mass media's poll, the public supports a somewhat stronger defense, rather than the status quo. Another point is that while I was Defense Agency director general in 1976, the defense share of the general budgetary outlays was 6.~ per- cent, but it gradually declined each year unt~l it reached 5.2 percent in 1980. Thus, at the time of the budget formulation for fisca1~1981, I felt that, apart - from the U.S. request amid the serious international situation, the government's responsibility, in view of the cabinet's approval of the move to achieve the stan- dards set forth in the "Defense Program Outline," was to the people for its acco~ _ plishment. The share of defense funds had kept on falling fram 6.2 percent. With 5.2 percent as the hottom figure, I figured that a gradual increase was in order. And when the defense fundts share was set at last fiscal year's 5.22 percent, it turned out to be exactly a 9.7-percent increase over the preceding fiscal year. Last year, the argument was over an increase of 40 or 50 billion yen, hut I feel we should put in at least that much in order to truly ensure Japan's security and 26 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400060051-5 FOR OFF[CIAL USE; ONLY the survival and freedom of each individual. Some contend that the smaller the defense fund, the better. But when one considers the dramatic changes in the in- ternational situation or the cooperative relationsfiip witfi Western countries with th~ same sense of values, an effort to such an extent can be said to be unrelated to any massive buildup but wiZl help Japan gain persuasiveness in it~ voice.. It is not anything like major militarization. Precautions against being called "an odd fellow" within international society contribute to the safeguarding of peace in Asia. Omura: Amid the no-tax-hike administrative reform and budgetary formulation, the probl.em is how to increase defense capabilitie~--a point ~f concern and obscurity for the people. Of the natural tax increase on which the latest ceiling is based, the surplus funds exgendable as general administrative costs after deduction of national bonds or ordinary increases in local finances amount to nearly 600 bil- liQn yen. In the latest negotiations, we asked for 30 percent of that for in- J creased defense funds, and we actually received 180 billion yen. Defense Secretary Weinberger cited that the Un~.ted States will use its entire natu- ral increase for defense and hopes for greater defense efforts by Japan. But in - order to increase defense capabilities while striving to gain the people's under- standing, there is no alternative but to increase efforts step by step. Being unduly impetuous may lead to problems later. Sakanaka: After talking ~aith you two, I am beginning to understand the framework ' of the U.S. request to Japan on defense. The United States, in light of the rela- tive decline of its strength, reflects an "urgency" on the question of its allies sharing responsibility, whereas Japan assumes a weaker view regarding the "ur- gency." On the other hand, I feel that the United States lacks a full understand- ing of Japan's domestic situation and public opinion. Moreover, there is an "ur- gent need" for more profound arguments on a national level regarding Japan's de- fense policy, along with the question of the Japanese-U.S. alliance. COPYRIGHT: Chuo Koronsha 1981 9097 CSO: 4105/250 27 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000400060051-5 POR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SCIENCE AND fiECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE TO STUDY RESOURCES USING SATELLITES TO BE SET UP Tokyo NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 25 Aug 81 p 11 [Text] According to a report by informed sources on the 24th, the first Japanese "Earth Resour~es Observation and Analysis Center" (tenta~ive designation), whose purpose will be the study of natural resources using satellites, will be established at the end of September. The center will be built with the full support of MITI, , which has established an earth resources investigation promotion policy using satellites. The basic structure of the center is that 1) it will be a foundation; ~ 2) it will have some 3Q participating enterprises from petroleum, mining, heavy electric, and finance industries, including Petrole~ Resources Development, Mitsui Mining and Smelting Co Ltd, Toshiba, the Industrial Bank of Japan, and others. It has been informally arranged that Seio Mori, an adviser to the Petroleum Resources Development, will be appointed the first chairman of the center. With the establish- ment of the center, there are plans to entrust the National Space Development Agency to launch "Earth Resources Satellite No 1" by 1987 and to begin an extensive survey - of resources in Southeast Asia and other areas. As for satellite surveys of the earth's resources, such as petroleum, natural gas, and minerals sLCh as uranium, iron, and c~pper, the United States plans to launcti ~ Landsat No 4 in 1982, and France will launch a similar satellite by 1984. At present, various countries are showing strong interest in satellite surveys. Japan's survey of resources, despite its heavy dependence on overseas mineral supplies, has been conducted case-by-case, either purchasing data collected by the ma~or powers or surveying ~ointly with the major powers or various other foreign governments. Most promising future sources of minerals are found in Southedst Asia and Africa, so that in terms of securing a sCable supply of resources, it is urgent for Japan to conduct surveys in these areas. But since surveq data on these areas are extremely poor and maps are inadequate, there are many areas which remain unexplored. Because of this,.MITI, in cooperation with the Petroleum Development and the mining i.ndustry, had been studying the possibility of establishing an agency whicfi will promote resources survey by satellite. The conslidation of the opinions of the participants in the pro~ect is nearly complete, and a general meeting for the establishment of the center will take place at the end of September. 28 FOR OFFI~IAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400460051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY For the time being, 29 companies participating in the center k*ill include five petroleum development companies such as Petroleinn Resources Development and Teikoku Oil Co Ltd; eight from the metal, mining, and coal industries such as Mitsui Mining and Smelting Co Ltd and Nippon Mining Co Ltd; six principally heavy electric companies - such as Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, and Tokyo Electric Power Co Ltd; and nine from the finance industry, including the Industrial Bank of Japan. Ultimately the total number of participants is expected to reach 30. In addition to the approximately 100 million yen fund, the center will receive MITI's project subsidy of about 1 billion yen for the first year. The center will entrust the National Space Development Agency to build Earth Resources Satellite No 1, which will be capable of detecting and analyzing earth objects 20 meters in size from an altitude of about 560 kilometers. It will be launched by 1987. Using the eatellite, the center will conduct Japan's owm surveys and analysis of resources for 2 years and will cooperate with European and American agencies by exchanging the data. ~ COPYRIGHT: Nihon Kogyo Shimbunsha Tokyo Honsha 1981 9711 CSO: 4105/238 . ~ 29 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY MAN(JFACTURERS TO COOPERATE WITH FIRMS IN WEST GERMANY, F~.~NCE _ Fujitsu Fanuc, Siemens Tokyo NIKKAN Kc~GYO SHIN~UN in Japanese 19 Aug 81 p 13 ' L'i'extJ Fujitsu Fanuc (president, Seizaemon Inaba) has c~isclosed the firm's strategic policies regarding its chief product--numerical c~trol (NC) system--and its leading - commodit.y for the next period--industrial robo*s. In the industrial robot category: 1) it will develop an intelligent robot--"I-series"--said to be the robot f or tne next generation, in conjunction with Siemens of West Germany by 1984. 2) It is currently developing two types of assembly robots ("A-robot") and one of these--the O-type--is to be _ exhibited at the Fourth EMO (European International Manufacturing Machinery Fair) to be held in September in Hannover, West Germany. The I-type robot will be completed before the end of this year. 3) Monthly robot prod~ction volume will be increasPd fram the current 50 units to 100 units as early as October. 4) As a result of augmentation of the robot category, 30 to 40 billion yen of the Fuji plant's 1986 annual production figure (50 billion yen) will be supQlied 6y the robot sector. Mon~hly Production To increase to 100 Units Per Month This Fall Meanwhile, the NC device being manufacturered at the head office plant: 1) has demonstrated over 10 percent annual growth (monetary basel. Soon annual production - volume of 100 billion yen per year will be accomplished. 2) But dcmestic production of the NC device will be held down to 3r000 units.per month and the surplus production will be met by Fanuc USA, a joint concern with Korea and the knock down (KD) pro- ~ duction by Siemens. 3) In order to develop NC for the next generation, technical experts from West Germany's Siemens are r,oming to Fanuc in October for a l~ar's ~~aj in order to implement joint research. 4) The basic machine type for the NC device to be developed 5 years hence will have two "bases"--size and capability. Regarding the strengthening of the industrial robot sector, President Inaba states the company policy clearly: "We are doing it because there is a market t~ut there; and the situatial is vastly different from the mid-50's NC device era when research development preceded market needs." The company's policy regarding the market for industrial robots is equally specific. "Painting and welding operations c7o not interest us; our efforts are focusec3 on mechanized plants." 30 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400460051-5 FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY - Fujitsu Fanuc's robots, developed and produce~ in response to the above described market trends an~ company policy can be divided in three grou ps. The first ~ategory is the manufacturing robot, M-series. Under this heading, there are four types: 00, 0, 1 and 3. The type 00 is scheduled to be announced rn 4 September. Next, there are two types of assembly robots (A-series): 0 and 1. The 0-type is smaller than the 1-type; both, however, have an identiaal controller. Third, the intelligent robot--I-series--is beinc~ developed jointly with Si~mens. Completion is scheduled for 1984, and it will be displayed at the Int~rnational Manufacturing Machinery Fair in Tokyo. This joint development was suggested by Siemens and "we (Fujitsu Fanuc) responded in the affirmative because it would mean double the research development funds." (Inaba) Behind this move is the recognition that the Problem in I-series development is the selling price. "In intelligent robot development, sensor and pattern recognition ys crucial. If cost is no object, intelligent robot production is easy, but the crux of the matter is to make it cheaply," President Inaba explains. Fujitsu Fanuc claims that competition with other firms producing industrial robots is not a problem because Fujitsu ~'anuc's focusing on mechanized plants. In particular, the firm's plan is to sell the A-series, which will be incorporated into ~,n assembly cell, to ~.arge busine~ses and a processing cell based on the M-series is to be marketed to joint enterprises. _ At present, the firm's Fuji plant is maintaining 1.5 billion yen monthly production of wire-cut/discharge processing machine and industrial robots. Once the assembly robot production begins, the montnly production volume will become 2 billion yen. The annual figure will be 24 billion yen for 1981, and by 1986 the annual production volume is slated to be 50 billion yen. In kzeping with this trend, the monthly production of industrial robots will become l00 units per month as early as October. In this i~nstance, the selling ratio would be 60 domestic, 20 General Numeric Corgoration of the United States (at present, 15) and 20 Siemens. COPY RIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha 1981 Toshiba, French Line Group Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japan~se 2 Sep S.1 p 1 LText7 The Government of France has requested the (Jaganese) Ministry of International Trade and Industry LPIITi~ to bring about the Japanese manufacturing machinery industry's capital participation and technical assistance to the Line Group (a large machinery manufacturer hea~quartered in Paris) that is having serious econanic problems. MITI has unofficially sought cooperation from the industry's leader--Toshiba Machine Co Ltd. Toshiba's response at present is this: "We have not as yet decided to cooperate." But President Akinobu Kuno of Toshi6a is scheduled to meet with French Ministry of industry executive members in Paris to attend to the matter in concrete terms. The French manuf actusing machine ry industry is suffering entre- preneurial difficulties as a result of a sudden increase in Japanese imports. If the Toshiba and Line Group coalition does come about, it is expected to neutnalize the tr~de fr~.ction between Japan and France. 31 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Recently the export of Japanese manufacturing machinery has increased suddenly along with autanobile, hane electric appliance and semiconductor exports. The trade involving manufacturing machinery between the tw~ countries in 1980 resulted in Japan t~chieving a 985-million-franc favorabZe balance of trade. This is approximately 30 times the 29-million-f ranc favorable balance for 1979. Coupled with the depressed econ anic situation in the East European countiies--France's chief export outlets--this sudden upsurge in Japanese manufactured goo~s is causing an all-round slum~ for the French manufacturing machinery industry. The.Mitterrand government is attempting to revitalize the manufacturing machinery industry in oonjunction with its nationalization of the aircraft, chemical and textile industries. It is par- ticularly concerned with the rebuilding of the industry's second. ranking Ling Group-- which is in extreme ~]ifficulty as a result of mai:ing a belated start in computerizing Ldenshika7 the manufacturing machines. According to MITI, the current request for cooperation is an aspect of the (French Government's) reconstruction plan. It was addressed to Japan through the French Embassy in Japan. The gist of the request was "a desiLe for capital participation and technical cooperation by a leading Japanese firm which possesses a high technical - standard for large-scale aircraft, shipbuilding and nuclear power reactor oriented manufacturing machineries." In responding to this request and with view to pr anoting industrial cooperation with - France, which would in turn neutralize trade friction between the two countries, MITI selected Toshiba Machine Co Ltd, which is a~;eader in the Japanese machine tool , industry and whose chief products are large manufacturinq machines. Toshiba's President Kuno will attend the International Sample Fair at Hannover in midmonth and then he intends to stop in Paris to unofficially meet with the French - Ministry of Industry executive members and the Line Group leaders to negotiate the possibility of capital and technical cooperation. Toshiba's present attitude taward this proposal is cautious because: 1) there has not been a clear statement regarding the connection between the French Goverrunent's Line Group reconstruction plon and its policy of nationalizing the leading industries and 2) Toshiba already has a technicaZ cooperation tie with the Line Group's competitor, TMI Corporation ~f France. In the meantime, however, Toshiba is w~rried about the lack of growth in exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe--the company's mainstay--as a result of economic recession and lack of f oreign currency in those countries. Moreover, it is extremely aware of the agreement of Toyota Machine Works Ltd with the SOMARCO of France, which has given the latter firm a foothold in the European mark2t. MITI anticipates that "the likelihood of a coalition becoming a reality is fairly good." COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1981 11460 CSO: 4105/230 32 FOR OFFICIAL iJSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000400060051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TAIYO IRCN WORKS TO START ROBOT EXP~2TS TO EUROPE Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 8 Aug 81 p 1 _ [~`ex) The Taiy o Iron Works (1-1-1 Kita-Eguchi, Higashi Yokogawa-ku, Osaka; president: Kazuo Kitaura; ?'elephone: 06-340-1111) has decided to f ormalize industrial robot exports to Europe. It will display its robot at three consecutively held internatienal sample fairs: Moscow, USSR; Paris, France; and Leipzig, East Germany. Already there has been a direct negotiation with the Soviet People's Autanobile Corgoration and there is official anticipation that the first robot talks will be concluded on the occasion of introduction of the sample robot at the ~osco) fair. Among the display items at the fairs will be the firm's most recent canmidity--the Sealing robot. Many of the Taiyo Iron Works' robots are systems based on oil/air pressure products and tecnnology--the company's main business. Recently electrical control technology such as D.C. Serbo has in part been adapted. Domestically, the firm is currently supplying various types of robots--such as automated assembly machines, loading devices--mainly to aut anotive manufacturers. The averseas market is a new f rontier. This is not the first time that the company has exhibited its robots at averseas sample fairs. This last spring, it pattici~ated in West Germany's Hannaver Messe. But the Moscow Sample Fair (October) participation is a new venture. It is embarking on a direct export strategy with the Paris Fair in December and the Leipzig Fair in March next year. In particular, the USSR has put robotics induction and development as a first item on its agenda in its industrial 5-Year Plan, and there is a possi- bility of the conclusion of an export agreement between the Taiyo Iron W~rks and the People's Aut anobile Corporation through the trade fair. As far as robot exports are concerned, loading robots (for vehicle wheel assemblyline) have been sent to Korea's Greater Korea Heavy Machinery Canpany. Robots for vehicle testing have been exported to Mitsubishi Autanobile's Australian Plant. Self-assembly units have gone to Cannon's IJ.S, production canpany--CBM Corporation (California). During the past year, there has been a steady stream of export negotiations and agreements. 33 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY c APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY But the European market, where a lasge-scale demand is expected in the future, is still unclaimed territory. A full-scale push is being planned toward the end of this year and the beginning of next year. Now,. with regard to production, as a result of building additions to the company's system machinery, a SU-percent increase in the production format has been established. However~ in anticipation of a future increase in demand both at h~ne and abroad, a set-up whereby subsidiary companies and coo~rative venture plants will directly manufacture and distribute the robots will be instituted as well. COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha 1981 11460 CSO: 4105/233 ~D 34 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060051-5