JPRS ID: 9835 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070016-3
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• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 16
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS LI10101
- 6 November 1981
- ar East North Africa Re ort
Ne ~
CFOUO 41 /81)
Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST IMFORMATION SERVICE
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~ JPRS L/10101
6 November 1981
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 41/81)
~ CONTENTS
~ ALC'7ERIA
Socialist Vanguard Party Threaten~ To Withdraw Support From
Bendjedid
~(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERftANEENS, 25 Sep 81) 1
No Agreement Reached on Gas Negotiations With ~ance, Italy
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 Sep 81) 2
Equipment, Consumer Goo3s Dominate Imports FY~om EEC
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEAITERRANEENS, 25 Sep 81) 4
Briefs
Argentine Wheat 5
Soviets To Build Dams 5
European Financing for Fishermen 5
IRAN
Iran Arrests Prominent Intellectuals
(Liz Thurgood; THE GUARDIAN, 20 Oct 81) 6
, LEBANON
Arab Assistar~e Sought for Settling Country~s Cris~s
(AI,-TriATAN AL-'ARABI, 28 Aug-3 Sep 81) 8
Syrians Blamed for French Ambassador's Ass~.ssination
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 11-17 Sep 81) 11
- a- ~III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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_ ALGERIA
SOCIALIST VANGUARD PARTY THREATENS TO WITHURAW 3~aF~ORT FRCM BENDJEDID
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French Nn 187?y 25 Sep 81 p 2431
L'I'ex] The "Socialist.Vanguard Party" (a clandestine but tolerated oommunist ~arty"
has let it be known that it may witkidraw its support for President Chadli Bendjedid.
Cne reason for the party's position may be the Algerian Government's supposed intention
of undertaking a long-term effort to diversify its arms suppliers. ~tit present the
USSR supplies 90 percent of Algeria's military materiel.
Discussions between Algiers and sane Western oountries are reportedly already under
way. The first items on the agenda are believed to be replacing the Algerian army's
5oviet "Antonov" aircraft with Western transport planes and the aoquisition of troop
transport helicopters in Europe.
Over the longer term the plan would be to replace most of the Algerian fighter armada,
which largely consists of MiG's of various types, with American or European fighters.
Another reason for the dissatisfaction of the Socialist Vanguard Party is that in
recent months several of its militants were exbluded from holding responsible positions
in mass organizations, including the UNJA ~ational Union of Algerian YouthJ and UGTA
~eneral Union of Algerian WorkersJ.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
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ALGERIA
NO AGREEMENT R.~ACHED ON GAS NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE, ITAI~Y
Paris MARCF~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1872~ ~5 Sep 81 p 2431
_ /Text7 Two negotiators for the Italian state oil group, ENI LRational Hydra~arbons
Agenc.~7 have returned to Rome without ccming to an agreement on the price nf the
Algerian natural ~as that was supposed to be delivered to Italy starting )ate this
year (see :lTM of 11' September 1981 p 2375) . The initial contrar,t provide.d that Algeria
- would gradually increase its deliveries to 12.5 billion cub~c r~~eters of natural gas
per year over a period of 25 year.s. ,
Problems over the sale price.appeared last year and, accarding t~ ItaLian observers,
have bec ane more serious since khe change of gavernment in France last May.
Algeria has formally asked Italy to agree to index the price c.. the gas to the price
of oil, in accordance with a formula like the one found in the agreement reached last
winter by SONATRACH LPational Canpany for the Transpart and Marketing of Hydrocarbon)
_ and the Belgaan company., Dist.rigaz. That agreement pravided for indexing the deliverX
- price of 5 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year over a 25-year period.
According to the Italian newspaper, REPUBBLICA (socialist), Alc~eria held firmly t~
its original offer to sell its gas at a base price of $5 per n~illion BTU's (British
Thermal Units), to de augmented in accordance with an indexir,g provision that would
gradually bring the price up to about $7.
These very figures, obtained from well-inf ormed sources ear.ly last summer and reported
- by AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, were termed "inaccurate" by the Algerian Ambassador to Rane,
Mr Oman Oussedik. Observ~ers maintain, haaever, that they are close to the Algerian
proposals. If such were the case, ENI would have to pay a yearly bill of $3.5
billion for purchases of Algerian natural gas.
REPUBBLICA explains Algeria's intransigence by the proximity of President Francois
Mitterrand's upcoaning visit t~ Algiers. "Algeria is playing ~or time and betting on
an agreement with Paris," was the paper's headline.
The Italian newspaper believes France will be for~ed to yield, at least in part, to
the Algerian request, arid thus to acce~t an increase in the price of inethane.
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France sees khe problem of Algerian gas prices in the much more general context ot
its overall relations with Algeria, as P4r Michel Jolbert~ the minister of f oreign trade,
has underlined. Mr Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, the French president's persenal repre-
sentative, met with Mr Yala, the Algerian minister of financial affairs, on 15
September in Algiers. According to the Algerian minister of foreign affairs, the two
"wise men" charged by their respective governments to find a solutior. to the problem
of gas prices, met i.n a working session and "proceeded to an initial appraisal of the
guestion, within the general framework of Algerian-French relations." This first
meeting was described as "cordial and useful" by the Algerian ~ninister of f'oreign
' affairs.
No indication was given as to the date on which Jeanneney and Yala have agreed to
meet again, this time in Paris. But it is reasonable to suppose that negotiati~ns on
the price of the gas will be concluded before Francois Mitterrand's official visit to
Algeria in November. Resolution of this problem, according t~ sources in Algiers,
"will doubtless open up new prospects for overall cooperation between Algiers and
Paris."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
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ALGERIA
EQUIPNIENT, CONSUMER GOODS DOMINATE IMPORTS FtZOM EEC
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1872 25 Sep 81 p 2432
~ext7 Mr ~dgar Pisani, commissioner of development f~r the European Econo~nic Community,
met with Algerian leaders during an o~ficial visit 13 September to examine the trends
- in econo~nic relations between Algeria and the EEC. Those relations have been defined,
, since 1978, in an agreement covering trade and development. The financial portion of
the agreement provides for the Community to contribute financially to various Algerian
projects in the field of agriculture and vocational training.
In th~ trade sector, Algeria remains the EEC's bigg~st custaner in Africa and the
fourth largest supplier. The balance of trade.favors the FEC (by more than 1 billion
UCE ~uropean Currency Units Q~ in 1979). Fuels acoount for 97 percent of Algeria's
exports to the EEC, while EEC sales to Algeria are doQninated by equipment goods and
consumer products.
~ In a statement to EL MOUDJAHID, Mr Pisani stated that the EEC would not try to solve
groblems that exist "without taking into account those of Africa, especially those of
North Africa." Discussing the consequeaces for the Maghreb countries of the expansion
of the EEC to include Spain and Greece, Mr Pisani conceded that this enlargement "might
force us to take a fresh look at aur relations with the countries of the Maghreb in
particular, with the Mediterranean countries in general. Faced with the political
necessity of enlarging, we must have an economic policy that does not require one group
ta pay for the benefits we would confer on others."
He said that he would examine with his Algerian interlocutors the question of "how the
Algerian ec~nomy will find a way to evolve in tandem with the European economies within
the new European dimensions in such a way that everyone profits," noting the fact that
Algeria continues to maintain, as it has done for several years now, that the country's
sales to the EEC must not be dominated exclusively by hydrocarbons.
Mr Pisani also noted that the EEC was obliged, over the long term, to "rethink its
relations with Africa, the ACP LAfrican-Caribbean-Pacific7 countries and Algeria in
the overall context of the great North-South dialogue, in which Europe must play a
- quite unique role, since it is not only a power on th~ world scene but also an econamic
and political force."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
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ALGERIA
BRIEFS
ARGENTINE WHEAT--A $47 million contract for Argentina to supply Algeria with wheat and
corn was just signed by the two count~ies, according to Argentine diplanatic souroes in
Algiers, who disclos~d the information on 14 September. The contract calls for
Argentina to deiiver 200,000 tons of wheat, 60,000 tons of aorn and 5,000 tons of
kidney beans to Algeria in the first half of 1982. ~he contract is an integral part of
a 5-year framework agreement which also calls for further deliveries of wheat and corn
to Algeria, the same source said. Meanwhile, technica.l negotiations betk~een the two
countries began on Algeria's purchase of 10-12,000 tons of ineat and the installation
in Algeria of refrigeration units, slaughterhouses and cold storage facilities with
technical assistance fran Argentine industry. LTex) ~aris MARCI~S TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1872~ 25 Sep 81 p 243) [~OPYRYGYiT: Rene Moreux et Cie
Paris 1~~1/ 9516
SOVIETS TO BUILD DAMS--On 10 September, follawing a 4-day meeting of the Algerian-
Sovi~et subcommission on hydraulic works, an agreement was signed giving the Soviet
Union responsibility for construction of Dam No. 3 at Draa A1 Mizan. The Algerian
and Saviet experks also reviewed progress on vompletion of four other big dams called
for by the 5-year plan (1980-1984). In other matters, the experts examined progress
being made on s~udies related to the master plans for hydraulic improvements in the
Annaba region, the eastern part of the country and South Atlas. They also agreed on
a new well-drilling program on the scale of several thaisand linear meters, with the
aim of increasing potable water supply capacity in southern Algeria. ~ext7 ~aris
MARCI~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1872~ 25 Sep 81 p 243~ ~OPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Par~.s 198~ 9516
EUROPEAN FINANCING FOR FISI~RMEN--The European Ccmmission decided '15 September to
provi~e Algeria a grant of 600,000 ecus tQ help finance the expansion of two training
centers for marine fishermen, one located at Annaba, the other at Beni-Saf. Algerian
auth~rities have decidEd, in effect, to correct intersectoral imbalances brought about
by the concentration of investmPnt in the past in the fields of heavy industry and
_ hydrocarbons. The 1980-1984 ,[;-year] plan calls for developnent of the primary and
social sectors as part of the eff ort to restore balance. In the fishing sector, the
catch currently amounts to 400,.000 tons per year, and the goal is to double that figure
by 1984. This presupposes the training of additional personnel, along with the
acc~uisition of boats and building of infrastructure such as canneries and repair shops.
There will be training at different levels. The Carununity's project involves the
training of basic technicians, thanks to the provision of equipment f or the facilities
(technology, fishery, seamanship, sheet-metal works, machinery, refrigeration, etc.)
and the sending of two teachers. The capacity of th~ two schools will thus be increased
fran 130 to 200 students. ~extJ LParis i~IARCIiES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French
No 1872, 25 Sep 81 p 243] LCOPYRIGFIP: Rene Moreua~ et Cie Paris 19817 9516
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IRAN
~
IRAN ARRESTS PROMINENT INTELLECTfTALS
PM201427 London THE GUARDIAN in English 20 Oct 81 p 9
[Report by Liz Thurgood: "Khomeyni Gaols Writers Who Opposed the Shah"]
[Text) Among the thousands of Iranians caught up in the continuing wave of mass
arrests and persecution is a small but highly vocal group of int~llectuals. Many
were among the more active of the shah's opponents, were imprisoned in the royals
gaols, and were tortured for their opposition.
UnlikP their less illustrious cell~mates, several of the writers and poets now held
- by Ayatollah Khomeyni's gaolers have become well known to human rights groups in the
a West. Earlier tYYis month, Ammesty International asked the Iranian prime minister
to receive a delegation seeking to halt the executions in Iran.
Because af a dearth of reliable news reporting frmr, T.ran, it is now known how poli-
tically active the intellectuals have bean against the regime in recent months.
Most were members of the highly-politicised writers association, whose headquarters
were seized in Jtme.
Neither is ir kno:an what, if any, charges have bee;~ made against them, or where they
are being held. Evin Prison in north Tehran, is a possibility.
Among the most prominent is Homa Nategh, a historian and former professor at Tehran
University's faculty of letters, who suffered badly at the hands of the shah's
regime. In one incident during the gnti-shah student upheavals late in 1977, she was
kidnapped and badly beaten by police within half-an-~hour of being released from
questions.
Unconfirmed reports say that her husband, Nasser Pakne~ad, who made co~non cause
with many of Iran's intellegentsia. A founder m~mber of the leftwing Palestine
group--a guerrilla organisation set up in the late 1960's to fight the shah--he
served 10 years in gaol, where he was sub3ected to 18 days of torture that reportedly
included a mock execution, floggings, and finger-nail pulling.
- Paknejad emerged from the ordeal six months before the revolution. An incurable
optimist, he threw his energies into new democratic front politics.
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The latest arrival in gaol is Reza Baraheni, who was seized last we~k as he was
leaving Tehran University. A well-known writer, he gave a vivid account of his
time~.n the shah's gaols, anci accompanying torture, in the crowned cannibals. Soon
after his release, he went to the U.S. to found CAIFI (Committee for Artistic:~and
Intellectual Freedom in Iran). CAIFI's patrons included Kate Millett, Arthur Mil-
ler, and Ramsey :.lark, a former attorney-general.
Other writers and poets now languishing in the Islamic Republic's gaols reportedly
include Aiedhi Parham, Shanoush Parsipour, and Akbar Malekian, Dozens of others
have gone underground.
The only known execution is that of Sa!id Sultanpour, who was shot by firing squad
four months ago. The playwright had been charged with armed uprising.
The writers and poets now in gaol make up only a tiny fraction of the total arres~s
made since the end of June, when imgeachment proceedings were started against the
ayatollah's first president, Mr Bani-S~dr. The.~nfluence of human rights activists
is not what it used to be. The latest amnesty proposal to send a delegation for
talks has been turned down by Ayatollah Khomeyni. Amaesty "only wanted to condemn
Iran and crush the Islamic Republic," he was quoted as saying.
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LEBANON
AR.AB ASSISTANCE SOUGHT FOR SETTLING COUNTRY' S CRISIS
Paris AL-WATAN A,L-'ARABI in Arabic No 237, 28 Aug-3 Sep 81 pp 27-2$
[Article: "Ball of South Lebanon Returns to Arab Court; Sark~s Wagexs o~n Final
Months"]
[Text] Beirut--Is Lebanon, which is moving in tlze direction of the Arab family in
sear.ch of aid to dress its wounds, seeking a se.curity or a political umbrella ox
financial aid? Why has thi~ particular time b~aen chosen for the visit of Lebanese
Prime Minister Shafiq a1~Wazzan to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and for the mesaages
carried by the ministers dispatched to the Arab kings and president? Is there an
Arab consensus for the Lebanese security to r_ontinue in its present condition in
~ accordance with the Riyadh and Cairo swnmit reso?utions?
A foreign corr.espondent in Beirut asked a ~;outhern Lebanese ofEficial last week:
Why this sudden Lebanese enthusiasm for an. Arab summit? Tt~e official answered:
"The definite fact that stands b ehind all. that is occurring in Lebanon is the
'catastrophe of southern Lebanon.' There is no way to finding a solution to the
Lebanese crisYS without recognizing the dimensiuns and seriousness of this fact
within whose framework fails all that has happened and that is hagpening in the
South. In Lebanon, there is one problem. By solving this problem, all the other
problems will be solved. This problem is called the South. Unless an end is put
to Israel's ambitions in the South and imless the sovereignty of the Lebanese state
_ is spread over the southern territories, we will be futilely seeking a way out of
- our crisis. It seems as if the Lebanese government has realized that all the cur-
rent efforts and movements will be futile unless the solution starts from the South.
I am not stressing tne South because I am tied to it t?y emotion or relationship
but because I know for certain that the parties fighting in Lebanon and aroun3 it
have used and are still using the South and its t~ragedy like " Uthman's rhi~*' to
justify their intransigent and convulsive positions on the Lebanese arena and to
cover up their strange intervention in some purely domestic affairs. The South is
a constant pretext for tr~ese parties and the south's complex situation gives the
combatants and those seeking power the ~ustificationsto persist 3n their trans-
gression and their recklessness."
This politician's statements confirm the contents of an official report submitted
~ to the higher authorities and stating verb^tim: "The continued presence of southern
Lebanon as a sole arena for the Arab-Israeli conflict, as a testing ground for the
disputing parties and as a field for power display will foil every endeavor to save
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Lebanon and will obstruct any sc~lution proposed for ending the crisis, not to men-
tion the danger of failing to deal with the situation there because it is not un-
1=kely that the South will tum into a thunderbolt that will touch off an explo-
sion in the area whose consequences will go beyond the geographic and political
sphere of Lebanon." ~
The tr.ue nature of the current official Lebanese movement can be concluded from a
careful study of some of the details of this report. The r_eal dimensions of the
developments and events in southern Lebanon can be concluded through examiniag the
positions of the disputing parties in Lebanon. The South is the main and thQ only
~ battlefield with Israel at present. It is the main pretext which Syria is using to
keep and increase its forces in Lebanon. The South has become the "barometer" of
domestic security and from the south the days of calm and the days of explosion ~an
be predicted.
Transformation, not Development
Because ehe Lebanese governmetit is aware of the true dimensions of the problem of
_ the south, it has viewed the r_ecent cease-fire declared indirectZy between Israel
and the Palestinian re.sistance as an important transforniation and as a qualitative
leap. If what has recently happened in southern Lebanon is considered a significant
development by the political observers, then the Lebanese goverx~ment sees j.t as a
major transtorma~ion in the course of the current conflict between the Arabs and
Israel and as a point at which one must pause to read the implications.
Though observation of the cease-fire has restored th~ Lebanese government ~o its
senses and has drawn its attention to the need to proceed from Southern Lebanon to
urge the Arabs to formulate a unified strategy, regardless of whether it is a pea.ce
or a war strategy, and though Israel has for the first tim~ resorted to cutting
off the means of communication between the capital, Beirut, and the South and has
blown up bridges, stxuck al-Zahrani refinery and focused its shelling on vital
facilities, Israel has also accepted for the first time a cease-fire conditional
upon P~lestinian approval.
This political situation emanating from the recent events and the militaxy situation
created by the aggressior.. have both made the Lebanese government initiate a compre-
hensive Arab movement rising to the level. of the developmenrs. If Israel, with its
aggressions, has caused the meetings of the followup cott~ittee to be unable to
keep up with the crisis, then it behooves Lebanon to go beyond the conventional
methods of dealing with crises and to initiate a qualitative movement relying on the
ele.~nents that have emerged, the most important being southern Lebanon's exposure
- to a real war, whether in terms of losses in lives and property or in terms of the
dimensions of this war, and Israel's an~ the Palestinian~' acceptance of the cease-
fire. This acceptance gives Lebe~n the right to make some gains in turn, beginning
with a national reconciliation protected by the umbrella of an Arab consensus.
Ra.ce With Explosion
Prime Minister al-Wazzan has returned from his visit and sources close to the prime
minister assert that he has succeeded in persuading Saudi Arabia ~nd Kuwait of the
need to hold an Arab summit--a su~it whose date is expected to be moved closer--so
that it may be possible to deal with the developments in the Lebanese situation
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before it is too late aud before the Lebanese arena encounters a new explosion that
may jumble =he card~, upturn the roles and make it extremely difficult to find firm
solutions by way of dialogue.
It is worth noting here that the government decided on its movement only after it had
become certain of numerous facts that have made it more strongly convinced of the
need to return to the Arab solution emanating from the highest Arab authority [Arab
summit]. This is why the call for the summit has emerged. The most important facts
that have motivated the recent movement, are the following:
First, the discovery by off icials that the United States doesn't forcus its efforts
on dealing with the heart of the Lebanese crisis and that the U.S.'s sole concern is
to cool off the heated front in the area so that it may b e able to set a f ixed
policy toward the Middle East crisis and implement the last part of the Camp David
accords.
Second, L ebanon's disappointment insofar as expansion of the area in which the UN
emergency forces are deployed is concerned. In addition to requir~ng a new resolu-
tion by the Security Council, such expansion also requires Palestinian and Arab
approval, especially in the wake of Israel's demand that the Palestinians be moved
away from i~s borders. This demand creates new problems and leads to further obstruc-
tion of the state's authorit}r internally.
Third, the fear of postponenent cf thc meeting of the Arab Followup Committee. Such
postponement leads to creating a state of vacuum insofar as the state's exercising
of its responsibilities is concerned and encourages a new flareup in the situation,
- especially since great hope has been attached to the Followup Commnittee's activities.
Fourth, taking advantage of the situation arising in the South as a result of the
cease-fire, and exerting efforts conducive to entrenching this situation and to
preventing Israel from resuming its aggressions.
Fifth, securing a political cover capable of bringing success to the endeavors of
the Followup Committee or of giving this co~ittee additional Arab momentum and
support.
But admidst a number of local, Arab and international concerns and even though the
various circles are convinced that no miracles will take place during President
Ilyas Sarkis' term and that nobody will offer anything during the remaining parti of
_ President Sarkis' tenn, political circles famous for being well-informed have been
propagating s~umours for sometime to the effect that the Lebanese situation is c~n the
threshold of numerous positive aspects and that the reports circulated by some
sources that there will be an imminent new explosion in the situation are no more
than a well-studied scheme aimed at restoring the atmosphere of fear, intimidation
- and confusion. The long truce has begun an3 all that remains is to prepare the solu-
tions to save Lebanon and to tra.nsform its truce into lasting peace.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
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- LEBANON ~
SYRIANS BLAMED FOR FRENCH A1~IBASSADOR'9 ASSASSINATION
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 239, 11-17 Sep 81 pp 24-25
[Article: "Delamare Assassinated in Zahlah 5 Months Ago"]
[Text] Exclusive Report by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI--When Louis Delamare, the French
ambassador to Lebanon, rested from his trouble, when a French aircraft car~ied his
body to his home in a village near the French city of D~auville and when investi-
gation~,of the circumstances of his death started, AL-Wl~TAN AL-'A~QABI was gathering
the first threads of the incident, which was not published in the daily press, from
political and diplomatic sources and is now publishing this information here ex-
clusively.
The story begins with the events in the city of 2ahlah and with the violent Syrian
sheLling to which the city ~aas exposed S months ago.
At the time, the French diplomacy, on the strength of the special instructions and
interest of~.ex-President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, exerted concerted efforts to put
an end to the siege struck around 7.ahlah by the Syrian deterrence forces and to
persuade Damascus to stop shelling the civilians. Francois Poncet, the former
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, hinted at the time in various statements to the
need for an international initiative and for a European movement to put an end to
the bloody events in Zahlah.
- In light of this French diplomatic interest, Fre.nch Ambassador Delamare moved at
more than one level in an endeavor to find common grounds among the various parties
involved to end the c:risis.
This French interest and movement on the Lebanese arena did not plea.se the Syrian
regime, especially since Delamare had succeeded in bc~lstering his connections with
the various parties involved and in gaining greater friendship and appreciation in
the various Lebanese circles, which is something that gave him the ability to move
freely and to maneuver quickly. Col Muhammad Ghanim, the head of the Syrian intelli-
gence in Lebanon, resented Delamare's movements in particular, considering them an
unacceptable intervention in domestic affairs and an intervention undermining the
Syrian re;im~'s authority and schemes in Lebanon and so he hastened to Damascus to
discuss his concerns.
= Relying on well-informed and indisputable sources, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI asserts that
Ghanim met in the Syrian capital with President Hafiz al-Asad in the presence of the
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intelli~ence chiefs of sta�f, including 'Ali Dub1 and Muhammad al-Khuli, and of
Rif'at al-Asad. Muhammad Ghanim said to President al-Asad: "The matter of the
French ambassador has become a source of annoyance for us. He moves and maneuvers
at more than one level and he has initiated a dialogue with various national and
Palestinian leaderships, especially with Walid Junblat. He has also opened other
lines with the leaderships ofthe eastern area, thus obstructing our work."
Ghanim then told those present: "I have come here to review this serious matter
before posing this question: "How do we deal with ~he ambassador? One of those
present suggested assassination as a fundamental solution capable not only of
bringing about the end of an active ambassador who understands the Lebanese game
but also capable of making France understand that it is not easy to maneuver bQhind
Damascus' back. But Muhammad al-Khuli object~d to this solution, saying: 'Let us
intimidate him first.' President al-Asad nodded his head in approval."
It is thus that the intiimidation of Ambassador Delamare started: Threats from here
- and ~here, shelling his residence, mining a car belonging to the embassy and so
forth.
But Belamare was not intimidated and did not back down on his consultations and
his efforts to put an end to the fighting in Lebanon. Delamare realized important
accomplishmsnts, such as arranging a meeting between leaders from Beirut's eastern
and ~aestern areas. This annoyed the Syrians greatly and intensified their wrath
at the ambassador. They considered his movement an intervention in their internal
affairs. The story did nat end here. Sometime afterwards, to be speci�ic, a few
d~ys after the hijacking of the Iranian (French-made) boat which was heading from
the French port of Cherbourg to Tehran, the I~anian. ambassador in Damascus met with
a prominent Syrian security official and voiced his complaints and observations
regarding France, saying: "Paris has received Bani-Sadr and Rajavi and has granted
the boat hijackers the right to political asylimm. So, how should we deal with the
socialist French government?"
The Syrian security official did not hestiate in offering his advice to his
interlocutor--advice which took the form of the question:
"What do you think of kidnapping the French ambassador in Beirut? Ask your govern-
ment and then contact me."
_ The Syrian official then reviewed to his visitor the merits of t:~is act:
~ "We will do to Uelamare what we did to Jordanian Amba,sador Hisham al-Muhaysin.
This act will create an uproar admidst French public opinion. Bani-Sadr and
Rajavi will consequently find themselves compelled, especially from a moral stand-
point, t~ leave France.
Ultimately, the French government may find itself compelled, under the pr~.ssure of
domestic public opinion, to hand over the boat hijackers.. But wha.t is certain is
- that France will think twice before receiving (an opponent of the Iranian regime)
after the ambassador is kidnapped. Moreover, France will curtail activities of
- the opponents present in its territories."
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The Iranian ambassador in Damascus congratulated the Syrian security official for
this "advice" and promised to convey it to Tehran immediately. The Iranian res-
ponse came quickly: '~Yes to the kidnapping."
The same Syrian security official was informed of the Iranian response and the
off icial proceeded to tell his superiore i~mmediately: "We have killed two birds
with one stone. We will get rid of Delamare and please Iran at the same time."
~This official added: "There is no doubt that s~:spicions and accusations will be
directed at Iran because of the tense Iranian-French relations in this particular
phase." Thus, a secret decision was issued to carry out the kidnapping or liquida-
tion operation should it be impossible for the kidnapping to succeed for one reason
or another.
Thus, the operation was carried out at a distance of just 30 meters from a road-
block set up by the Syrian deterren~e forces in a crowded area where the offices of
the [Palestinian] organizations are located. Nobody from these organizations inter-
fered when the shots were heard and neither did the elements of the deterrence forces
roadblock interfere to pursue the perpetrators. 'I'he in~tructions were strict:
"No intervention due to higher considerations."
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
84 94
CSO: 4404/22 END
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