JPRS ID: 9847 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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JPRS L/ 101 13
12 November 1981 Near East/North Africa Report
(FOUO 42/81)
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NOTE
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arE transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
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Ft)it ()FFICIAL tSE t1N1.1'
JPRS L/10113
12 November 1981
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 42/81)
CONTENTS
IRAN
- Begin Allegedly Visited Tehran in 1978 To Meet Shah
(THE JERUSAI,EM PGST, 12 Oct 81) 1
Diplomats Kidnapped in Undercover Arms Purchase Deal
- (THE SUNDAY TIA'ES, 18 4ct 81) 4
I LEBANON
- Raymond Iddih Uiscusses Political Situation
(Raymond Iddih Interview; AL-WATAN AI,-IARABI, 21-27 Aug 81).. 6
Brief s
'AL-NAFiAR' Director Ridnapped 20
LIBYA
Journalist Describes Recent Changes
- (Mohamed Selhami; JEUNE AF'R,IQUE, 30 Sep 81) ...............g. 21
Brief s
Factories Opened 26
Plastics Contracts 26
~ 4il for Goods Deal 26
' Accord With Czechoslovakia 27
_ a_ [III _ NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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IRAN
BEGIN ALLEGEDLY VISITED TEHTAN IN 1978 TO MEET SHAH
Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English, SUCCOT SUPPLEMENT 12 Oct 81 p 7
- [In an excerpt from his new
the Israeli Prime Minister's
- in February, 19781
/fxcernt7
THE FIRST HALF of 1978 was
; marked by incrcssed tension in
Israel�Iran rclations. The abrupt
' ceasation of the negotiations
~ between lsraet and Egypt in
Jerusalem, on January 16, gave a
'i renewed push to Arab opposition to
the Egyptian peace initiative, and
raued fears in Washington and
Teheraa for the safety of Sadat's
~ regime. �
{ The mounting hoatility to Sadat's
regime found acpreseion in the ter-
~ rorist taiceover of an Egyptign eir-
~ liner in Cyprus. In an attempt to
I free the hostaQes, Egypt tushed a
cornmando unit to the Laraaca eir-
; port, but the atsempt failed end 15
i Egyptian soldiers were killed.
! Cyprus cut off its relations with
Egypt in protest agninst the viola-
; tion of, iis vr-er*i~ty. 1,3 x r..tult
of ttiis ;iUca, the ho9tility alresdy
felt towarda Sadat tbroughaut the
Arab world was tinctured with con-
tempt.
Making an effort to brealc the
stalemate in tha N.ace talks, Pcesi-
dent Jimmy Cartpc invited t6e
Egyptiaa praideat wd Prernier
Manacheni Begjn to Wa+hington on
separate visi:s. Sadat went to the
U.S. on Fearuary d, a�hile Begin
was due there on 'NFfrl~ IS.
On his return from Wa-thington,
Sadat flr.w to Bucharspt on
February . i tc �e~ te Rumaniaa
President Nicolie ^eaucescu on his
talk; wlih C4NEt'. A: u�
he disr"11chr,d his vice�r.r^tidcat,
Hosri
book, "The Iranian Triangle," Shmuel Segev describes
rrip to Tehran for secret talks with the shah
the shati about the d:fficuldes in-the
negotiations with Iarael.
Meanwhiic, Carter met with
Fureign Minieter Moahe Dayan in
m id-February; while Sadat held dis-
cussions with the head of the op-
position. La'oour Party shairman
Shimoa PerEa, in SaWburg.
BUT THESE meetings failed to
mave the peace talks -forward.
Dayan's talks with Carte: failed to
achievo their sim, while Peres made
it clear to Sadat that only Begin's
govemment was authorized to con-
duct negotiatione in Ianei's name.
But Wushinaton was detetmined to
keep up the momentum, and dis-
patched Aasistant Secretsry of Staee
Alfred ("Roy") Atherton on a shut-
tle round between Cairo and
JC,T.1 19iP('Y
''his :ntens:�iE ac;.ivity ted
Teheraa to w;oader d Lmd vvu truly
mvan of the danger to 3edat and
that it was imperative to act quickly
to bo4+ter thc West's position in the
Middle East and the Fetsian Gulf
area. From this concern emerged
the idea of arranging a meeting
between Begin aad the shah in
order for them W get acquainted
and to examine the stalemate in the
peace proceu in a broad intet-
national context.
The halt in the tal+cs occurred
iog:ther with a deteria ation in the
internal security situation in lran,
c1o Onr tF-�,. ;ru:t
l~:_"L ii '.i,".i11~:~ :,~.`v t' r^,: a!; l i
the $heh. -
Iran's internal problems, even if
they stemmed from indigenous
causes, were part of a- seriea of
eveats that occurred then irt the
northwest corner of. the Indian
Ocean, an area of ccnsiderable
strategic impoRance to-the West_
At the beginning of 1978 thc
developments in the Horn of Africa
were the focus of intemational. at-
tention. But in the spring, the pro-
Saviet coup in Afghanistan occur-
red, which heighteaod the shah's
sercae d inaecurity. Even befoce the
bloodbath in Kabul at the end of
April, the ahah had warned the U.S.
of the Soviet Union's designs in
Afghanistan, but the measage fell on
deaf- ears. The new ruler of
.Afghanistan, Nur Mohammed
Taraki, changed his country's name
to the "Democratic RepubGc of
Afghanistan," and Kabul becamc a
Soviet bastion that now threatrned
the stabiliry of the entire Gulf
region. Some weeks later, in lune
1978, came the assassinations of the
rulers of both parts of Yemen.
which shook the entire Arabian
Peninsula.
SOVIET ACTIVITY in
R.fghanistan, Ethiopia, Chad, Zaire,
Angola. Libya and the Repub!ic of
South Yemen greatly intluenced the
shah's state of mind, and the
behaviour of his allies in the regiun.
The shah, King Khaled of Saudi
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Arabia, Sadat and the prcsident of
Sudan, Ja'afar Numeiri, saw these
Soviet moves az airoed at the Guif
and Red Sea areas, with the purpose
of encirclinng Saudi Arabia. Iran and
the Nile Valloy. 7'ltus in response tn
the stepped-up Soviet-Cuban aid to
Ethiopia, these f'our nations in-
creased their aid to SomaGa, and
took measures designed to preserve
ths independence of North Yemen.
Iran took parallel steps by con-
tinuing its aid to Oman. Since 1973
the shah had extended naval, air
and geound support to Sultan
Qaboos to help him put down the
rebellion which was backed by
South YEmen. but mainly by the
Soviets. Moscow, though, followed
a modetate couroe towards Iran.
The fint press report on Iran's in-
ternal instability appeared in Pravda
in April 1978, but it was written in
an objective tone. Only in
November 1978 w;:en the Soviets
suspected Pinetican interventio~, to
save the shah, did Leonid 8rezhnev
warn Carter, "that any foreign in-
tervention in Iran, a country
bordering on the Soviet Union, will
be regatded as intended to harm the
Soviet national interest."
The events in the Horn of Africa
found Israel and Iran on diffetent
sides. While Iran, Sudan, Egypt and -
the Saudis supponed Somalia agaimt Ethio* Ferad uP,"ad the
Maraist regime of Col. Mengistu
Haile Mariam. Israel waa thus
part of an unusual joint fiont with
the Soviet Union, CLba, Libya and
the RepubGc of South Yemen. Iran
had raised this matter in a number
of discussiona with Israeli otTicials.
But Israel had tried to allay the
shah's concern by arguing that the
West had an interesR in Israel keep-
ing an eye on Soviet activities in the
area.
[SRAEL'S POLI7ICAL, economic
and military ties with Ethiopia dated
from the days of FIaile Selaaiie.
Israeli experts helped to train the
various forces in his army, and other
advisers helped the army suppreu
Moslem underground groups in
Eritrea. After Haile Selassie's
overthrow, Coi. Mengistu kept up
the Israeli connection, Derhaps
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because he waated to keep aome
room for maneuver in his reladons
with the Soviets aad Culia, or
perhaps because the Ethiopian high
command valued the expertise
provided by the Israeli officers. But
in February 1978, Maahe 'Jayan
made a well-pubociud "slip d the
tongue," in which he admitted to
cooperaeion with Ethiopia io
variouu spheres. This put Mengiatu
in an awkward situation, end under
preasure from the.Sovisu and Libya
he cut off all tiea with Iarsel.
The Iraaiana s�ppocted Somalia;
but never its ambidons to grab the
Ogaden Desert from Ethiopia.
When the Somali leadet, President
Ziad Barre, visited Teheraa-early in
1978, the shah told him in no uncer-,
tain terms that he must resoive hii
dispute with Ethiopia in a peaceful
manna. Iran provided Somalia with
medical suppliea and small arms;
but explicitly opposed its eapansioR.
at Ethiopia's expense. In March
1978, Ethiopia defeated Somalia irr
the Ogaden, but-figMing continued
in Eritrea. - -
In the midst of thex internationa(
crosrcumnts, Begin artived for hia
tirst and only visit to Teheran. It
wag actually supposed to have taken
place several weeks earlier, but
because of the revelation of
Dayan's visit therc in December 26,
1977, the Iranians postponed
Begin's visit, and set the condition
that it would take place only if the
Israelis undertook to keep it a
secret.
As ori several occaaions in We
past, there was no real reason for
[sraef to keep the matter under
wrapa. But out of comideration for
the internal situation in Iraa and the
shah's own delicate position, lsrael
acceptcd the condition and
observed it scrupulously-For that
reason, only t6ree ministera -
Deputy Premier Yigael Yadin,
Defence Minister Ezer Weizman,
and Dayan - were in on the secret.
The rcst of the cabinet wes told only
when Begin hsd retumed.
THE PRIME miniater left Israel for
Teheran in a Boeiag 707 on
Wednesday Febtuary 22, 1918, and
returned home Friday morning. He
was accompanied by his chief of
bureau. Yehiel Kadishai; and his
military secratary, Tat�Aluf
Ephraim Poran. Attet the plane
came to a stop on a ruaway away
from the �terminal, Begin was
greeted by Iraa's deputy premier,
who was also in charge of the Savak.
Gen. Na'amtolla Nasiri. Under
cover of darkness. and watched
over by a heavy guard of Israeli and
[canian security mea, the convoy
made its way to the government's
officiai guest residence in one of'the
nQrthern suburbs of the city.
-The foUowing morning before his
meeting with the shah. &gin took
final counsel with his advisers
before he went to see him. in con-
trast to Yitzhak Rabin, who was
always tense before his encounters
with the shah, Degin was rclaxed
artd in high spirits, and it was clear
that ha had_prepared carefully for
the meetin=. Begin waa-of coutse
aware of lran'a internal troubles,
but had no taling of the impending,
disaater:
At the appointed 6our Gen:
Nasiri sppeared at the guest
reaidenca to accompany Begin on
jis viait to the ahah's palace. rfter
more than three houra Begin
returned wit6 a smile af satiafaction
on his fue. "It was an excellent dis-
cuaaion." he exclaimod.
Several houn latFt, on the plane,
Begin talked about hia encounter
with the shah. The ihah had made a
strong itnpresaioo on him, and
Begin waa impreaed by his broad
grasp ot affain. He had spoken
authoritatively about the inter-
aational situation, witb special
emphaaia on the Niiddle East and
the Gulf region. The ahah expressed
concern about the pro-Soviet coup
in ICabul, sod said he was sceptical
of America's capacity to block
Soviet expansion. The shah's toar
d7iorl:on also dealt witb the Horn of
Africs.
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_ . .
MOSt- OF THE coaversation. of ~
course, was devoted to the Middle East peace proceas. The :hah
lavi:hed praiw on Sadat, and dwelt
oe his atatns as a leader in the Arab
world: He believed in EgypYs-
sincere'daire for Qeace, aed urged
Begin ta be Qexibla tawarda Sadat
and not to let this chaace. for peace
slip through 6is fiagers.

Begin shared, the sha6's coocern
about Meecow's aims in the Middla
Eaat. He ncountod 6is euperiences.
duriog World.War 11, his suffering
in Soviet ptison aamps. and how he
led an undergrouad rtulitary -group-
in the struggle for independence.
= Concerning the peace process. Begin produced documents to svp-
port his argument that Israel's.
proposals were most generous. He
expressed his astonishment at the
wsy in which the Jerusalrm peace
negotiatioaa had beea halted,
described the vittues of hi:
programme for Palestinian
autonomy. and essured the shah
that even now israel would be will-
ing to rentw the talks with Eapt .
without prior conditions. Even
though Begin had not requeated the.
shah to act af an intermedisry, it
was ckar W both leaders that the
details of the discuasioa would be .
conveyed to Sad3t. , -
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Shmuel Segev.
From 'The 'Lranian
' Between Israel, I=
CSO: 4600/fi8
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AT THE meatiag. Begin prcsenxed
LM shah wiW aa ancient map of
Jauaalem aad an antique dagger.
. Prior to the meeting, the
propriety of raisiog bi-iateral issues
with the s6kh had been discuased.
But aRer Be& ooawlted his ad-
visem k was.decided rwt to raise
my sPeeial roguesG at the meeting,
but rather m kcep the nueting oa a
broadat plm. Astitdty the shah,
did noe even 6int at the possibiGty of
suspendlng coopetation betweea .
the two bonotrid at a aip of his dia-
pkasuee at the sta}tnute ia the.
pesee tallm: Latet. itr m interview
with the WatAkrox pcst on March
T, 1978, the shah said Yhat. despite
the stakmtte, he saw eo reason to
stop oil shipmenua eo Iuael. "It the
U.S. wuits lratr to hatt the flovr of.'
oil, then it must fust stop arms sup- .
plies to the Iuufi srmy; ' he said.
Begin was the !ut Israefi leader
to meet" with the adah. lntenral
developments in Iran in the corning
months did not petmit fnnher
bilatera). cvntaeis at the highess
levei; and aU of the shah's energies
were focused oa saving hu throne,
rathet thaa oe international atl'airs.
Triangle: The Secret Contacts
an and the U.S.
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IRAN
DIPLOMATS KIDNAPPED IN UNDERCOVER ARMS PURCHASE DEAL
PM180934 London THE SUNDAY TIMES in English 18 Oct 81 p 6
[Unattributed report in the "Insight" feature: "The $60m Arms Deal That
Ended in a Kidnap"]
[Text] Three Iranian diplomats, early last week, walYced into flat 37 on the
thirteenth floor of th e expensive Water Gardens Flats, close to London's
Marble Arch. They expected to put the finishing touches to a deal under
which they would pay almost $60 million for desperately needed anti-tank
missiles. Instead they found themselves kidnapped.
It was the bizarre culmination of a deal that stretched from America through
Europe to Iran and in which the government of Ayatollah Khomeyni was dealing
with a former member of the SAVAK, the late shah's secret police.
An American embargo on arms for Iran has forced the Teheran government to buy
its arms wherever it can and not ask too maxy questions. Earlier this year
arms--dealing circles in London heard that the Iranians wanted to buy a large
quantity of wire-guided anti-tank missiles. These missii:es, which can be
adapted for use on helicopter gunships, are made by the American Hughes
Corporation. The number mentioned was 10,000--and the cost almost $60 million.
The Iranians were soon told that there was a way to obtain the missiles they
wanted. As the Iranians understood it, the missiles would come from NATO
stock in Portugal. A large and reputable Spanish arma dealer was said to be
supplying them and they would be sh ipped from Portugal to Antwerp, for loading
on to an Iranian s}iip.
Arms dealers recognise this supply route as a convenient way for Spanish and
Portuguese dealers to cover their tracka: neither Spain nor Portugal will
supply arms direct to Iran at the moment. But to satisfy the Spaniards, "end
user certificates," would have to be produced to show which government was
to be the ultimate customer for the arms. The Iranians expected their supplier
to buy these certificates from one of several countries that are none too fussy
about issuing fake ones for cash.
- By the beginning of last week the Iraniana believed that the missiles were
waiting from them in Antwerp, ready for loading. It is believed that the
_ original plan was to use a ship called the Iran Shahadat, but this ran aground
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at Dunkirk. The only Iranian ship in Antwerp at the moment is the Nezhat, which
was diverted from a journey between Hamburg and Bremen to dock in Antwerp on
Tuesday of last week. Its next destination is Bandar 'Abbas in the Gulf,
but the Antwerp port authorities say that it has been dPlayed because of
engine trouble. Two people alleged to be concerned with the deal stayed.in
Antwerp last week.
Although the Iranians are not too scrupulous about whom they buy from, they have
become much less free about how they pay. In the chaos of post-revolutionary
Iran, several deals have left the government ahort of money and even shorter
of the goods they were buying.
And this was not the first time that the Khomeyni government had dealt with
former employees of the shah: about 18 months ago a$6 million deal to buy
Irish meat collapsed in mysterious circimmstances.
As a result of such experiences the Zranians decided to pay �or this shipment
of arms by letters of credit. A leading clearing bank in London was to
release payment when the arms were safely on board. So when the three Iranian
- negotiators at th e London end of the deal walked into the flat in the water
_ gardens, they were not carrying suitcases full of money.
In the early hours of Friday morning armed police stormed the flat to free
the three Iranians, who by then were being held hostage. A number of people,
; inr_luding Britons and Iranian nationals, were taken for questioning at
' Paddington Green police station.
The British police say that three other members of the negotiating team are
being held hostage in Belgiwn, but last night the Antwerp police said they knew
noth ing of any kidnapping in their city.
The police team who carried out the Lor:don raid was led by detective super intendent
John Pole, of the anti-terrorist squad. It is beli:eved that the police only
learned of the whole affair early on Thursday evening. The anti-terrorist
squad was supported by men from the Scotland Yard's D11 firearms squad and armed
special patrol group officers, who took up positions in around the flats.
However, no shots wene fired.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspaper Limited, 1981
CSO: 4600/79
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LEBANON
RAYMOND IDDIH DISCUSSES POLTTICAL SITUATION
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 236, 21-27 Aug 81 pp 22-27
[Interview with Raymond Iddih by Nabil Maghrabi: "Raymond Iddih Castigates,
Makes Suggestions, Shows His Hand; Soviet Experts Are in Lebanon"I
[Text] Ilyas Sarkis in Washington? This is ludicrous.
The Syrian army in Lebanon behaves like an enemy in an
occupied country.
If I were to stay in Lebanon, nothing would be easier
than having me kidnapped.
Hafiz al-Asad wants to keep Lebanon embroiled in war
and is therefore opposing the deployment of UN forces.
I am not thinking now about the presidential elec-
tions, but I am thinking about liberating the country.
Brig Gen Raymond Iddih has been making predictions for years: thPy want
to "Cyprusize" Lebanon; they are partitioning it; they want to settle the
Palestinians; they want to give the south Litani area to Israel and
al-Biqa', 'Akkar and Tripoli to Syria--instead of the Golan; they want to
establish a Christian ghetto on the remaining area of land.
The brigadier general continued to talk about "the conspiracy" from Beirut
and from Paris as well. The notion of "conspiracy" and conspirators became
worn out, but he did not weary of them. He accuses; he castigates; and he
casts doubts. He is shot at more than once. People bargain over the truth
with him. They urge him to keep quiet, but he continues to hold on to his
convictions.
The campaign for the presidential elections in Lebanon is approaching, and
there is some discussion about the possibility of amending the constitution
so the elections can be held sooner. Raymond Iddih is a permanent candidate
for coming to the rescue because he is the only ane among the Christian lea-
ders who did nat burn the bridges of understanding with the other Lebanese
party. He continues to denounce Israel, the Syrian regime and the Maronite
leaders, and he has also remained on good terms with all the Lebanese.
He has also stayed outside the tempestuous bloody game.
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The brigadier general has not talked with an Arab newspaper for 6 months.
~ AL-WA'I'AN AL-'ARABI went to him on the Cote d'Azur where he was on a brief
- vacation. The magazine re-evaluated with him the stages of the Lebanese
war through the rPCent new factors in Lebano