JPRS ID: 10130 JAPAN REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 45
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400074045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/ 1 0130
20 November 1981
- Ja an Re ort
p ~
(FOUO 66/81)
FBIS ~OREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in hrackets
- are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
_ or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indic~te how the original information was
processed. Where no proc2ssing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
- original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Govexnment.
COPYRIGHT LAG.'S AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OW~IERSHIP ~~F
MA'"ERIALS FcEPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTiD FOR OFFICI'AL USE ONI.Y.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/10130
20 November 1981
JAPAN REPO~T
(FOUO 66/81)
CONTENTS
- JPOi.ITICAL ANU SOCIOLOGICAL
Suzuki Plans Reshuffle in Party Lineup
(Yamato Ishigami; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 26 Oct 81) 1
Cabinet Reshuffle Expected in Late November
(Takuo Hayashi; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 25 Oct 81) 3
Reshuffling of Suzuki Cabinet, LDP Leadership Antic%pated
(Editorial; THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 27 Oct 81) 5
New Headache for Suzuki Reported
(Minoru Shimizu; Tf~ JAPA*I TIMES, 22 Oct 81) 7
~
Delicate Situation Mgkes Suzuki Cautious About Viaiting Mideast
(ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 3 Nov 81) 9
Implications of Tanaka-Fukuda Meeting Viewed
(THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 27 Oct 81) 10
U.S. Efforts To Force Increase in Defense Spending Criticized
(Editorial; THE DAILY YOMIURI, 3 Nov 81) 11
Kimuxa Predicta More Contact Among U.S,,PLO, Saudi Arabia
(THE JAPAN TIMES, 16 Oct 81) 13
Rivalry Between MIiI, Foreign Ministry Grows
(Yosl~,io Matsui; THE DAILY YOMIURI, 16 Oct 81) 15
Suzuki Inspects MSDF Review
(MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 4 Nov 81) 17
Media Reports on Zeft-Right Strife in Japan Socialiat Party
(Michisada Hiroae; ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 15 Oct 81) 18
Komeito New Security Concept Analyzed
(Takehiko Takahashi; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS~ 21 Oct 81) 20
- a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
~
FOR OFF[CIAL USE OF~1LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400074445-1
F~OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ Length of Lockheed Trial Criticized
(Hideo Matsuoka; MAINICHI DAI~.Y NEWS, 27 Oct 81) 22
Next JSP Chairman Like3y To ~e Selected by Vote
(ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 3 Nov 81) 25
Diet Deflates Government Reform
(Editorial; THE JAPAN TIMES, 3 Nov 81) 26
Japan Socialist Party Supporter's Viewe Expressed
(Editorial; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 4 Nov 81) 28
Kasuga Eager To Achieve Coalescence of ~entriet Forces
(Takehiko Takahashi; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 4 Nov 81) 30
MILITARY
- Former Generals Deplore 'Se1f Defense Forces'
(BUNGEI SHUNJU~ Jul 81) 32
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Development Statua of Robot Industry Outlined
(SHUKAN ORU TOSHI, 16 Jul 81) 42
_ Independent Academy of Technology Proposed
(YOMIURI SHIMBUN, 2 Sep 81) 46
MITI Advisory Organ Studying Future Technology Policy
(NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN, 17 Sep 81) 49
Furukawa Exports Optical Fiber Cable To Corning Glass Worka
(GEKKAN KOMPUTA DAIJESTO, 10 Oct 81) 51
- b - .
FOR OFFICIAL USF ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400074045-1
. FOR OFFICIAL US~ QNLY
POLITICAL AI~'D SO~IOLOG~CAL
SUZtTKI PLANS RESHUFFLE IN PARTY LINEUP
Tdcyo MI~INICHI DAILY NEWS in Engliah 26 Oct 81 p 1
[Article by Yamato Ishigami]
_ [TextJ Portland, Oregon--Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki told the Japane~e preas
here Saturday that he intends to carry out a ma~or reshuffle of the top officials
of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party in late November in a move to promote
younger LDP members.
The terms of party executives will expire on Nov 27 and, Suzuki said, this pro-
vides a good time to form a new party leadership.
He also said that the current Diet session will be over by that date, indicating
that he will carry out the reshufflz around Nov 27.
In th~ formation of the new party echelon, Suzuki said he will put top priority
on the promotion of youn~er members of the LDP.
This remark can be translated that the prime minister intends to give a chance to
politically young LDP leaders, such as Kiichi Miyazawa, Michio Watanabe, Noboru
Takeshita, and Ichiro Nakagawa, who have not held p4rty executive posta.
Suzuki met the press here on his way home from Cancun, Mexico, where he attended
the North-South summit conference Thursday and Friday.
On the cabinet reshuffle, which is aZso expected to come in November, Suzuki said
it does not have to be directly linked with the change in LDP executives.
"Frankly, both the party and the cabinet are doing quitP well, much bettar than
- expected, and there are few waves in the party," Suzuki told the press.
It is not clear why the prime minister wants to separate the LDP executive reshuf-
fle and that of cabinet members.
Most political observers say Suzuki believes any reference to the cabinet reshuf-
fle at this moment would irritate opposition partiea and hinder passage of the
administrative reform bills which Suzuki is pushing through the current Diet
session.
,i
FOR O~FF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FQR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
But the abservers say the reshuffle of party executives and the cabinet changes
are closely linked and that they wi11 most prnba5ly come at the same ti~e,
- Despite the prime minister's cautious wording, the observers say, his press
- remarks will accelerate the moves of the party factions toward the reshuffles.
COPYRI~HT: Mainichi Daily News 1981
CSO: 4120r46
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE Ot~ILY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
_ CABINET RESHUFFLE EXPECTED IN LATE NOVEMBER _
~ Tokyo MAiNICHI DAILY NEWS in English 25 Oct 81 p 2
["Political Periscope" column by Takuo Hayashi]
[ Text ] Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki faction, two each; Ichiro Trade and Industry Tanaka is
~vill carry out a cabinet Nakagawa group, one; and unlikely stay in the cabinet, but
reshuffle sometime late in three others aftiliated with no he may sideslip into the
November after che end of the particular f~ctions. chairmanship of the LDP's
current Diet session which was There are seven important Policy Affairs Research
convened to deliberate on ad- cabinet ministers including Council. There is no possibility
ministrative reform. . Director General Nakasone for Director General tiaka-
The prime minister of Japan o f t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e gawa of the Science and
usually reshuffles his cabinet ~Ianagement ~gency who Technology Agency to remain
after an interval of about one heads the ~Iakasone faction, in office, because he beiieves he
y~ear. In other words, the tenure Director General Komoto of the should not block the road to the
of cabinet ministers is, as a Economic Planning Agency only n~inisterial post which is
matter of principle, only a ~ear. ~vho heads the Komoto faction; the r�ested interest oi the
~Vhile the number of cabinet Chief Cabinet~Secretary Kiichi Nakagawag-oup.
posts is limited, there are all too bliyazawa and M6nister of ~ttention is then focused on
many Diet members of the Internaiionai Trade� and In� whether or not the remaining
government party pining for dustry Rokusuke Tanaka who three importaat cabinet
one. Such a bad practice has belong to the Suzuki faction; members. Duector General
_ come about just to satisfy their Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda Komoto of the Economic
desire. and Flnanee ~~[inister Hichio Pianning Agency, Foreign
� The tenures uf the Liberal- Watanabe who are nonfaction Minlster Sonoda and Flnance
Demucratic Party's executives menbers, and Director- MinIster Watanabe will remain
including the so-called "Three General h`akagawa of the in office. Of the three, It is
Party Esecutiaes." that is, the Science and Technology Agency speculated that Komoto may
party secretary general, w'ho is the head of the leave the ~abinet, The
chairman of the Executi~�e Nakagawa group. speculation is based on the
Council and chairman of the Many To Remain foUowing two qrounds: In the
Policy Aftairs Research first ptace, Komoto plans, like
Council, are to espire at the end It is most unltkely that of the Director General vakasone of
- ut ~ovember. Capitalizing on ZO cabinet members excluding the Adminlstrative Manage-
the opportunity. Prime Ninister those top secen the remaining ment Agency, to run in the next
Suzuki hopes to carry out the 13 ~�nonimportant cabinet LDP presidential election to be
rPshuifling of both the LDP members" will remain in of- held in November next ~ear.
executives and his cabinet. The 'fice. Ot the seven. it is believed While vakasone hopes to
' personnel problem centering on almost certain that Director strengthen his footing for the
the reshuffle is now the focal General ~'akasone of the Ad- next presidential election by
pointofintra-partyinterest._~ ministrative 1~ianagement remaining in the cabinet.
The number of cabinet Agency will remain in the Komoto believes it is ad-
ministers, except fur the prime reshuffled cabinet. although vantageous for him to secure
minister, is''U. The faction-wise there is a possibility that Chief his freedom of activities by
rt~ndown of the present cabinet Cabinet Secretary Niyazawa leaving the cabinet. Secondly, if
is as follow�s; Suzuki taction, may become the chairman of he remains in the office. one of
Takeo Fukuda faction, and the LDP's Policy Affairs the two ministerial posts ear-
I:akuei Tanaka faction, four Research Council. he is more marked for his faction will be
each: Yasuhiro ~akasone likely to remain in the present occupiedbyhim.
faction and Toshio fiomoto post. ~Iinister of International It appears. howe~~er. that the
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000440070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Suzuici faction led b~~ Prime finance or that of the minis[er of
3finister Suzuki is not desirous international trade and in-
of homoto quitting the cabinet. dustry while it is speculated
for his departure means the that Abe may oe offered. the
emergence of an open rival post of foreign minister or
~ influence. Perhaps Prime financeminister.Thereisalsoa
1~Iinister Suzuki wil! call on possibility that Chairmar.
Komoto to stay on. [n that case. Susumu Nikaido ot the
how ~cill Komoto react� Executive Council may~ become
There is little doubt that bo?h the party secretary general or
Foreign 1~Iinister Sonoda and may remain in the present post.
Finance 1~Iinister tiVatanabe are If not, obsen~ers say, Yikaido
hoping to stay in office. But no may take a seat in the cabinet
one can sac ior sure if their like Sakurauchi and abe and his
hope ~cill come true. It i~ a~so post will be that of ihe foreign
beliel~ed certain that oi` t~re minister.
three party erecutives. ~ [n this regard. as [ar as the
Secre~arv General 1"oshio post of the foreign minister is
Sakurauchi and Chairman concerned, we can think of
Shintaro ~be of the Policy three alternattve cases: that
.a[fairs Research Councll will ~onoda will remain in office. or
be offered important cabinet that Abe or Nikaido w�ill be
posts, probably as a token of chosen for the post. Attention is
their services. And then, thus focused on what choice
Sakurauchi may be offered tt~e Prime i~tinister Suaukt w�ill
post of either minister of make.
_ COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily N~ws 1981
CSO: 4120/46
4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE O~ILY
POLITIC~L A?VD SOCIOLOGICAL
RESHUFFLING OF SUZliKI CABINET, LDP LEADERSHIP ANTICIPATID
Tokyo THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English 27 Oct $1 p 10
(Editorial: "Maneuvers Are Set for Cabinet Reshuffle")
[Text] There have been considerable maneuvers Firstly, the fundamental strategy of the
among ruling Liberal Democratic Party fac- Suzuki Faction toward the reshuffles is to
tions recently toward the anticipated reshuf- form a framework conducive to Suzuki's re-
fle of the Suzuki Cabinet and the LDP leader- election. At present, three key LDP posts are
ship in late :Vovember. In the ruling LDP, occupied by respective members of Naka-
� three main posts of secretary-general, ex- sone, Tanaka and Fukuda Factions and the
ecutive policy chairman and policy affairs Suzuki Faction would like to grab any one of
- research council chairman occupy the three posts by all means. Under their
leadership and run day-to-day party affairs scheme, the Suzuki Faction intends to place
under the president. Thus all factions of the its se~ior member Kunildchi Saito, Chief
LDP are always vying to get any one of those Cabinet Secretary Kiichi :Vliyazawa, and
_ three posts, and LD� President and Prime Minister of International Trade and Industry
i~Iinister Zenko Suauki will worry most over Rokusuke Tanaka in any key posts of the
who to choose for those posts in an attempt to cabinet and the LDP in an attempt to main-
maintain a precarious factional balance tain the Suzuki Administrakion in the years to
within the party. Close associates of Prime come. For the Suzuki Faction, it will be trou-
~~Iinister Suzuki have revealed a scheme to blesome to decide what to do with Miyazawa
fill those key posts with members of maur and Tanaka in the coming reshuEfle because
stream Suzuki, Tanaka and Fukuda factions, the question of who to succeed Suzuki is in-
- but behind this scheme lies their shrewd cal- volved. idut for the ipost of LDP secretary-
culation for Suzuki to win reelection as LDP general, Suzuki Faction members reportedly
_ president next fall, recommended Saito or Heiji Ogawa, both
Right after the sudden death of former senior members of the faction.
Prime 1~Iinister ;1~Iasayoshi Ohira last year, Secondly, both Kakuei Tanaka and Takeo
Suzuki was elected to the premier's post for Fukuda, former prime ministers and faction
the simple reason that he belonged to the leaders, are extremely intluential with
Ohira faction and filled his Cabinet pasts Prime Minister Suzuki. The Tanaka Faction
with members for all factions within the aims at putting Executive Council Chairman
party, thereby placing himself in a very ad- Susumu Nikaido in the post of secretary-gen-
- vantageous position with no anti-mainstream eral and winning one more ministerial post
factions opposing him. Accordingly, unless in the coming reshuffle. The Tanaka Faction
he makes a serious blunder, all indications sees the coming reshuffle as a golden oppor-
are that Suxuki will be reelected to the LDP tunity to realize "Secretary-General
presidency next year. So there are two note- Nikaido" because no one else in the Suzuki
worthy points in the coming reshuffle: and Fukuda factions will b~ suited to the job.
~~hether Prime I1Sinister Suzuki can form a Behind their request for one more cabinet
Eramework conducive to his reelection as post lies the fact that the Tanaka Faction
party president and what will happen to the members now total 104 and many of their
factional balance within the LDP. senior members are on the waiting list for
ministerisl posts.
5
FOR OFFICIAL liSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFF[CIaL l.'SE ONL~'
On the other hand, the Fukuda Faction is is whether he can put a new man in a cabinet
~ying to put Policy Affairs Research Council post. If leaders of his faction occupy alloted
Shintaro ~be in the key cabinet post with party and cabinet posts, Nakasone will be
either a Eorei~ or finance portfolio, and confronted with increasing c~iticism~ from
their man in any one of three main LDP y'oun8 members, especially, of his faction.
posts. Foreign biinister Sunao Sonoda used to Furthermore, Finance l~iinister Michio
belong to th~ Fukuda Faction, but is sepa- Watanabe bolted irom the Nakasone Faction
rated from Fukuda at present. last year and formed his own faction recently.
The biggest focal point in the reshuffle wiU Meanwhile, there have been rumors that
be what will happen to Yasuhiro Nakasone, Komoto might step down from any posts be-
~irector-general of the Administrative cause he repeatedly made remarks "inde-
:~ianagement Agency and Toshio Komoto, pendently" on administrative reform and tax
director�general of the Econorr,ic Planning reduction. '.Vlair~stream faction members
Agency, both of them declared contenders estimate that Komoto will soon or later leave
for the premiership. Nakasone is ready to the Suzuki Cabinet in an attempt to launch a
stay at his own post if Prime Minister Suzuki campaign against Suzuki. But Komoto him-
asks him to do when he said "unless the self dismisses thase rumors with a laugh and
premier mentions otherw�ise, I will devote political observets say that if Komoto steps
my5elf to the work of administrative re- down at this time, his existence will be
form." For Nakasone, it will be impossible to shadowed. But some young members of
reject Suzuki's any request because he can- Komoto's faction complain that there are
- not get thr: preiniersh:p unless he gets a sup~ only two cabinet posts alloted to the faction
port from both the Suzuki and Tanaka Fac- and that if Komoto steps down, it will be
tions. But the biggest headachE~ for Nakasone easier for some other members of his faction
on the waiting list to get a cabi~t post.
COPYRIGHT: 1981, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
CSO: 4120/46
6
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL U5E UNLY
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
NEW HEADACHE FOR SUZUKI REFORTED
Tokyo THE JAPaN TIMES in English 22 Oct $1 p 2
[Politics Today--and Tomorrow column by ~iinoru Shimizu: "New Headache for Suzuki"]
[ Text ] q~~ough the Diet has yet to ~ Pr1me ;~Iinlster Suzukf, ~ wlm er words, they have taken the
reach the halfway mark in Its unexpectedly tomk over the � prime minister's words at
discussions ot the bllls related government ln July last year, thelr [ace value and are acting
to adminlstrative reform, on has substantially malntairied accoMtngly.
which Prime Niinlster Zenko the same Cabinet and party ex- However, tormer Prime Min-
Suzuki Is staking hts political ecutive li~eup slnce the start ister Kakuei Tanaka once said:
life, most members ot the ruling ot his administratlon. Accord- ~~Depending on how th~y are
party have recently siarted tng to p~st pr~ctice, a Cabinet carried out, Cabinet reshuftles
focusing ttieir aftention on a reshuffle ha.s taken place can sometimes slsurten the life
different issue. roughly once every year, ot an admintstratlon instead ot
This issue is the reshuftle ot which means that most mem- lengtheNng tt. This is because.
Cabinet members and party bers of the present Cabtnet in carrying out a reshufrie, one
executives scheduled to take 9~ave been in otfice several may make- many enemies !n-
place at the end of November months longer than usua! (al- stead ot increasing the number
fol l owing the close of t,~e ex- t h o u g h t h e r e h a v e b e e n oi ane's supporters."
. traordlnary Diet sesslon. changes 1n toreign atfalrs,
The reason why the Dlet ~ealth and weltare, and home ONy20Cabtnet.Posts
members ot the Liberal-Dem- affalrs mintsters), Excluding the prime min-
ocratic Party cLDP) have al- . StrengtheaPositton lster, thece are only 20 Cabinet
ready turned thelr attentton to As the power to appolnt mtn- p~~. Tanaka lmplied
the November reshuftle !s tha[ tsters rests with the prime tRat, although the few luCky
the administratlve re(orm de- mtnlster, past prirae mlNsters persons w(w were appolnted to
bates are proseeding smoothly have endeavored to manipu- the Cabinet could be relled
and there are good prospects late the party and thereby ~ upon to support and cooperate
that the related bills w111 pass stablllze and strengthen thelc with the prime minlster, there
the current Dlet. posltion withtn the party by wpuld probably be a tar great-
According to observers, taking advantage ot Cabinet re- er number dlsappointed in
P r I m e M t n i s c e r S u z u k 1 shutAes. Prime NIINster Suzu- thetr hopes and these might
htmselt is now confident ot kl ls no exceptlon and has told well harbor resentment toward
being able to weather the Diet . hts aides that "consideration ihe prime mlNster.
session. Howeve.r, he report- ot a person's_ merits will prob- Observers say that when the
edly toid his aldes that he !s ably depend on h1s activities in prime mintster lacks strong
extremely worried about next the current Dlet." leadership, a personnel re-
month's Cabinet reshuffle. ' One reason why the Diet de~- shuffle further exposes hLs defi-
Observers interpret the [act bates on the admWstrative re- ciency of political power. Look-
that Suzuki !s now making the form bills are progresstng ac- ing back ~n Suzuki's political
Cabinet reshuftle his main con- . cording to the government and pertormance over the past
cern as meaning that he is no I,Dp schedule ls that LDP Dlet � year and several months, one
longer worrled about the cur- members hoping tor Cabtnet cannot say that he ts a prlme
rent progress ot business in posts are actively cooperating minister possessing strong po-
the Dfet. fn the Dtet proceedings. In oth- lltlcal leadership.
7
FOR OF'FICI.~L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
F012 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Accordingty, the personnel MatterotNikaldo Europe durin~ the psst year or
reshuftle that Suzuki plans Let us consi~er, tor Instance, so and has shown strong lnter-
to carry out in November ts the matter ot how Nlkaldo est in International attairs. Ac-
traught with many dltticult shoWd be treated. The Tanaka cordingly, he~ is attracted to
problems. UNess he is able to factton wants to run one ot its the posi o[ foreign minister. If
solve these problems w�hen re- members in the party presiden- he ls given this folio, !t ~:vill
shuf[ling his Cabinet, his ad- tial election ln autumn nexi mean changing places with
ministra�fon !s likely to b~ year and is considering Ni- Forelgn Mlnister Sonoda, with
come more unstable than be- kaido, the [acUon's representa- whom Prime Mlnlster Suzuki
fore. tive, as tts candidate. Because has a close relationship. Sono-
Following is a brief rundown Ntkaido has been regarded as da wants tc~ keep hls present
on some ot these problems: one ot the "gray officials" in- pusltion or to be glven one of
i. Is the present mainstream volved in the Lockheed scan- the three top part-,~ posts.
group setup based on the Suzu- dal, both he and the Tanaka It Nikaido falls to get the sort
ki, Tanaka and Ftikuda fac� taction as a wl~;,le have been ot post he wants, the large
!ions to be maintained? doing thelr utmost .to dtspel Tanaka factlon woWd no doubt
2. what is w be done atwut this image. turn against Prime :VliNster
the top three party executive This unfavorabie image was Suzuki. Suzukl needs the
posts, especially that ot secre- said to have become much di- ~ooperation ot the Tanaka
tary-general? luted when Nikaido became tactton to ensure the stability of
�3. Should he retain Yasuhiro chairman ot the Executlve his admiNsiratlon.' but if, in
Nakasone. dtrector general ot Councll at the start ot the Suzu- order to retain its support, he
the Administratlve ~Ianage- kf administratlon: but hls sup- glves Nikaido a post whlch
ment Agency, and Tashto Ko- porters hope to erase tt alta wouid put h!m In an ad-
moto, director general ot the gether In the forthcor:Ung Cabi- vantageocis postiion he nu~s the
Economtc Planning Agency, net reshutIIe. Thus, Nlkaido ls risk of having Nika!do compete
both of whom are powertul hoptng to get the post ot party agafnst h1m tn the presidential
candldates tor the premiershtp secretary-general wlth the race next year, thereby
in succession to. Suzuki? power[ut bacldng ot the so- ieopardizing hts chances of re-
4. What should he do wlth called "Tanaka co~ps." In the election.
Foreign Minister Sunao Sono- event that.thU proves dltflcWt. The Nikafdo question is re-
da and Finance Minister he intec~ds to ask to be kept in lated to problems 1. 2, 4 and 5
!~Iichio Watanabe? his present Executive Councll lisied above.
5. Shoyld the number ot Cab- post or W be glven the positfon ~ Prime M1.nister Suzukl hopes
tnet posts allotted to the Tana- ot toretgn miNster. to carry out the November re-
ka tactton, the largest o[ the The Fukuda taction, which shuttle in such a way as to en-
LDP tacttons with 104 mem� also belongs to the main- able htm to galn re-election in
bers, be Increased Irom tour to stream group, ts not likely to � the LDP presidential race next
five? And how shoWd he deal agree to Ntkaldo's appolnt- year. On the other hand, there
wtth Susumu ;~ikaido, chair- ment to the post ot secretary- : has artsen an opinfon tn some
man ot the LDP's Executive general. The present secre- quart2rs ot the LDP that he
Council and the Tanaka tac- tary-general, Yoshto Saku- has no chance ot re-election.
tion's representative? rauchi, !s a member ot the And some members of groups
6. How should he treat Nakasone tacUon. ~+~pporting rlval candidates for
Kiichi Miyazawa, chief Cabi- Suzuki hlmself would prob~ the next premiership are plan-
- net secretary, and Rokusuke ably preter to appolnt a secre- ning moves to obstruct Suzu-
Tanaka, minlster ot Interna- tary-general tram his own fac- ki~s re-election by taking ad-
_ tional trade and industry, who, tion rather than Ntkaldo In or- vantage of the torthcomtng re-
though executtves ot che Suzu- der to see hlmselt sately shuttle. Agatnst thls
kt faction. are on bad terms through the remalnder ot his � background the Cabinet re-
with the prlme minister? term as party prestdent until shutfle ls llkely to prove a ma�
Ail these problems betng In- next autumn when he sims to jor headache for the prime
terrelated. they cannot be han� stand tor re~election. minLster. ~
dled separately. which makes ppgt of Forel~t MWster
the whole business very dck- Nikaldo has made Irequent
lish and compllcated. , trips to the UNted States and
COPYRIGHT: ThE JAPAN TIMES 1981
CSO: 4120/43-E
8
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400074445-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
DELICATE SITUATION MAKES SUZUKI CAUTIOUS ABOUT VISITING MIDEAST
Tokyo ASAHI EVENI?VG NEWS in English 3 Nov 81 p 1
[ Text ] Prime Minister Zenko Suzu- sensed that people within the
ki is now very cautious about ruling Liberal-Democratic Par-
making a visit to the Middle ty and the Government were
East early ncxt year, despite not altogether happy about his
the fact that he has been making the visi~
showing greax enthusiasm 'I'hough the Government's
about making oqe in the past acceptance of ArafaYs.
month. ' visit was praised as a new ap-
vew developments in the proach, many people in the
Middle East and domestic po- LDP and Government feel
Iitics have made him change that Japan should not try to
his mind. take the initiative in setding
Since assuming office, probiems in the ~ Middle East
' Suzuki has visited Southeast since the political situation
Asia, the United States and there is extremely complex and
- Nestern Europe and attended What Japan can do is venn
summits in Ottawa and limited.
l~fexico. and, excluding Souch p+nother factor is that it is
I:orea and China, the place difficult to predict what will
he should go to next in the bappen in the Middle East af-
current in~ternational ecooomic ter Hosni biubarak s succes-
and political circumstances is sion to the Egyptian presidency
the ~iiddle East. Aiter the and the U.S. sale of AWACS
death of Egyptian President ~daz planes to Saudi Arabia.
Anwar Ssdat and the visit to On the domestic political
Japan of Palestine Liueration scene, a Cabinet reshuffla is
C~, ~:anizacion (PLO) leader expected soon. Sonoda is un-
fasser A.rafat, a con- der increasing fire for his man-
- crete plan wa~ discussed. agement of Japan's foreign
policy wit6in the LDP. and i;
Suzuki became enthusiastic Suzuki decides on aa ear-
af!~~~ ';e was ur�ed to visit the ly Middle East trip, it may
l~tici~le tast by Foreign Min- be taken to mean that Sonoda
istcr Sunac Sonoda on his rc- will retain his present post in a
turn from a trip to Cairo to reshuffled Cabinet.
- attend Sadat's funeral, and it However, the Gaimu-
appeared almost certain that sho thinks that, when Saudi
the Prime hiinister would fly Arabia's Prince Fahd visits
to the ~fiddle East as early as here in eariy December, Su-
ncrt )anuary~. zuki will have to give a date
Nevercheless, after the for his return~ visit to Riyadh.
North-South summit in Can- The Gaimusho still hopes that.
cun, !~fexico. Suzuki changed the Prime Minister will make
his attitude. the trip in January.
One of the vi~ws current
within the Forci�n Ministrv
(Gaimusho) is tnat Suzuki
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Evening News 1981
CSO: 4120/46
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF TANAI~A-FUKUDA MEETING VIEWED
Tokyo THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English 27 Oct 81 p 10
- [Text] The news that former prime ministers Kakuei Tanaka and Takeo Fukuda
totally unexpectedly met over lunch at a restaurant in Tokyo last Friday caused
consi~ierable stirrings within the Liberal Democratic Party.
And this is no wonder for a few reasons. First, they are the two strongmen who
virtually keep the incumbent Zenko Suzuki Government afloat. But, aecond, they
have been at odds with each other and have never met in private in the past five
years since their confrontation over Tanaka's implication in the Lockheed scan-
dal. Third, in connection with the second reason, what made their meeting all
the more controversial and a target of speculation and suspicion is the impend-
ing reshuffle for the Suzuki Cabinet scheduled for next month.
Emerging from the meeting, which lasted for half an hour or so, both Tanaka and
Fukuda in a good mood stressed the casual nature of the occasion. But however
much they denied anything serious abaut it, it was enough to arouse various fac-
tions and worry particularly the fa.ction led by Suzuki himself. For Suzuki's
staying in office is based on a[word illegible] balancing act between Tanaka
and Fukuda factions, the two power centers within the ruling party. Direct
dealing between the two men could seriously affect this balancing act. For one
a thing, closer ties between the two strongmen will provide them with increased
influence over intra-party affairs and power broking.
As one parry insider put it, the f act that the Tanaka-Fukuda meeting took place
while Suzuki was away attending the North-South summit in Mexico could [words
illegible] than a coincident [words illegible].
COPYRIGHT: 1981, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
- CSO: 4120/46
- i a.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
POLIPICAL AI~ID SOCIOLOGICAL
U.S. EFFORTS 1`0 FORCE INCREASE IN DEFENSF. SPENDING CRITICTZED
Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 3 Nov 81 p 2
[Editorial]
[Text] ~vo attempts in the US Congress to force J~pan
to spend more on its defense have come to nothing
_ but to indicatP gro~ving impatience in the US toward
this country. .
~ hawkish member of the US Senate submitted a
_ resolution demanding revision of the Japan-US se-
curity treaty to pressure this nation into doing more
for its deEense. It was reported that a Japanese critic
urged the senator to submit such a resolution. The
critic denied this.
The senator was persuaded to withdraw the res-
olution and, therefore, no major problem will arise.
- But Japan must henceforth be watchful of such senti-
ments in ~%ashington. -
Last ~veek, a resolution was submitted to Congress
demanding that Japan pay 2 percent of its GNP to
the liS as a"s~curity tax." We doubt the sanity oE
= the congressman who proposed such a resolution. ~
Security Pact Ia Stabilizer-
First we would like to streas that the security
treaty ia the basis of the strong bond and friendship
_ between Japan and the US. This treaty can neither be
. scrapped nor revised in view of the situation in Asia
which would be seriously destabilized by such action.
- �'e realize that behind such a proposal was the
dissatisfaction in th~ li S with what is interpreted as
"Japan's free ride" on the treaty without its assum-
ing a gc~eater defense burden. However, the US ia re-
ceiving l~nefits from the treaty which it must keep
- in mind. The securitS� treaty helps ensure the se-
curity of the Far East and Paciflc. ~
The proposal to impose a t~x of� tvvo percent of our
GNP hardly deserves comment. Why ahould Japan
pay such a ta.Y? Japan fulfills its duties under the
. security treaty and performs an equitable defense
role. The con~ressman should reminded that Japan
, ~1
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- is not US territory and therefore the US has no
right to taa us. .
Silly Proposals Backfire
- Nevertheless, such prepoaterous proposals could act
to stimulate US dissatisfaction. We are particularly
concerned aUout any linkage between Japan's defense
budget and Japan's trade surplua with the US, which
is expected to reach $15 billion this year. The govern-
ment should take action to prevent the trade problem
from worsening relatione with the U5. �
, ~ lso, it is a questionable practice for a Japanese
to try to use the US to accomplish domestic goals. In
1962, then Liberal-Democ:~atic Party (~DP) secre-
tary-general Kakuei Tanaka proposed to thpn US at-
torney veneral Robert Kennedy that the L'S demand
that Japan amend its constitution and rearm as the
price for g~tting Okinawa back. This plot failed.
it ;a not the US which will decide whether our con-
siitution is changed or the substance of our foreign
policy. This is the sole right of the Japanese peopls.
COPYRIGHT: THE DAILX YOMIURI 19~'1
CSO: 4120/46
. 1~ 2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R004400070045-1
FOR OFFIC:AL USE ONLY
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
KI.''1"URA PREDICTS MORE CONTACT AMONG U.S., PLO, SAUDI ARABIA
_ Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 16 Oct 81 p 1
~ ~ Text ] Former Foreign Minlster ~'Ttf~ PLO leader was treated as
Toshio Klmura, who stage- a de-tacto'ot[icial guest during
m:naged PLO leader Yasser hts thre~day stay here.
Arafat's visit to Japan, believes A; afat, Klmura continued,
~ that all types ot contact amon~ dld not Insis[ that he be treated
the L'nited States, EgypG Saudf as an o[(ictal guest tn Japan.
Arabla, the PIA and other since h1s priority was ap-
pai~tles involved in the Mlddle parenUy to obtatn a better
Fasi problem wlll grow ln the understanding irom Japan
months ahead. about the PLO's cause.
"They are groping for a fresh The PLO leader was "very
course toward a comprehensive gratetul tor ihe warm Japanese
Middle East peace that woWd hospitallty" and was convinced
foilow the Israell withdrawal that his meetlngs wlth Prime
(rom the nccuple~ terrttortes Mlnister Zenko S~tzuk! and
under the Camp David ac- other Wp leaders served to '
cords," explalned Klmuraln an heighten his organizatton's
fnterview wlth The Japan status in the internattonal
Times Thursdav. ' community. the seNoc Liberal
_ "Even the U.S. !s reluctantly ~mocrat said. -
- accepting the view that np Klmura� also said that the
lasting p~3ce could be reallzed P~ ~cceeded "to some ex-
' ln that re~lon without mueual tent" tn erasing its image as
and simultaneo~:s recognttion "an internatlonal terrorist
by Israel and the Palestinlans organizatlon" by demon-
ot thelr right to exist." s~rating tts moderate polteies, .
"Under these circumstances, ~cluding Its Ilexible response
Chalrman Ara(at's vlsft to to Saudi Crown PrlnCe Fahd's ~
Tokyo was (ruf ttul to some etgl~t�polnt peace proposal.
extent because he Impressed However, it was premature
the Japanese with his realistlc tor Japan and othec Western
and tlexible attitude toward the ~tries to expect the PLO to
Mfddie Ea$t problem, whtle gccept the package proposal
Japan obtained leverage ~o completely at this ttme, wh~n
promote [urther dialogues Israel is [irmly holding its stand
among all the parties con- againsi the proposai, he said.
cerned," Kimura said. gy accepting Aratat's visit
_ Arafat lett Tokyo for Vletnam � here, Japan. which Is already
- Thursday morning. ~~severai steps ahead" of
Kimura, Ieader of the European natlons so '[ar as �
suprapart'lsan Japanese Middle East poilcles are con-
Dletmen's Assoclation (or cerned, demonstrated its
Japan-Palestine Friendshlp, willingness to contrtbute to
sponsored Aratat's vlsit here. , Middle East peace and
stablllty, Klmura stressed.
~ 13 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000440070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Japarr neec!�not and should have to be part of any peace
not revise its present policy of ~gatiatlons."
maintalning a��fatr and tm- ~mura, theretore, is incllned
partlal attiWde" toward both that Reagan may not
the Arab world and lsrael, ff lt rontlnue re~ecting their views
_ really wants to play "a blgger forever, it he takes into a~ca~nt
_ politlcal role" In the Middle ~~~itlcal instability In ~:gypt
East problem, he suggested. c a u s e d tr y S a d a t' s
Yet the Dietman ~~~ation.
acknowledges that Japan's role The Japanese legislator Is
in the reo,~on ~�!s very limlted." convinced that even a little
What the Japanese caa do best change ln the U.S. government
is to contlnue appealing to all po~~cy vfs-a-vis the PalestWans
parties concerned to take a will bear "a great tavorable
'~tair and impaztlal" stance to ~nnuence" on the minds of the
help bring peace fo the region prab peoples and will pave the
as qutckly as posslble, he said. way tor turther progress in
F o r t u n a t e 1 y, P r i m e peace negotiations.
Mlntster Suzuki is meeting with H2 takes an optimistic vlew
Prince Fahd. U.S. President that formal or lnformal con- ~
Ronald Reagan and other worid tacts among all the parties,
teaders at Cancun, Mexlco, next including the U.S. and the PLO
week, arid therefore he wW' wiU.begln in the near tuture.
have chances to make such ais "In ocder to bring out big
e appeal," Klmura said. � changes l In Mlddle East1, a
"In the Unlted States," he single effort Is not enough, and
pointed out, ~~not onty tormer concerned ectorts by all partles
presidents Ford and Carter but are c~equlred." Kimura sald ln
also Mr. Zbfgnlew Braezinski concluslon.
_ now suggest that the PLO will
COPYRIGHT: THE JAPAN TZMES 1981
CSO: 4120/43-E
~ 14
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OEFICI~.L USE ONLY
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
RIVALRY BETWEEN MITI, FOREIGN MINISTRY GROWS
Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 16 Oct 81 p S
[Article by Yoshio Ma[sui]
[Text] Nobuhiko Ushiba, former ~ It was natnral for Brock
state minister in charge of to sent the invitattoa to
external economic aPlairs Tanaka as he is considered
and Japanese representa- to be the main leader of
tive of the Japan-US Eco- Japanese economy, partic-
nomic (3roup bet,ter known ularly trading, in the capa-
as the Wisemen's Group, citq oi international trade
sa;d tha~ the latest uniqu� and iadustr^ minister.
friction over scope oP power~ But this ~.:ferly provoked
of ministeries ln both the the Foreign Ministry on the
Japanese and U3 govern- ground that it was unpre-
ments vrill hamper solution cedented that 11~ZT be plac-
to the bilatecal economlc is- ed in the upper gallery with
sues. regara to an international
He expressed h!s views at conference.
a press meeting held aiter Under such circumstances,
the Japanese slde oi the ihe Foreign Ministry con-
group last Tuesday present- tacted the US Department
- ed to Prime Minister 8uzu- of State about the conier-
ki the flnal report concern- ence. It was told that ths
ing the medium-range conference was planned
aspects o! the Japsn-U8 voluntarily by the trade
economic relations. repre..Q~ntative without con-
Friction of this kind has suItinq the State Depart-
a long history. But the lat- ment.
_ est iriction was witnessec~ Tanaka, however; had
in the trilateral minist~rlal earlier sent a letter ex-
~onierence among Japan, pressing ~.Sa w~ish to attend
the US an@ West Europe. the meeting. ,
The iact that the report To make matters worse,
refers to the conlerence MITI harbors a sentiment
means that frlction over o1 hostility against the For-
competency of the tripar- eign Ministry.
tite conference has intensi- Belleving that there is
- ~ied. nothing wrong ~f its top
This international conier- minister cvants to attend
ence came lnto eadstence an international conference,
following a proposal by the MITI says that the Foreign
EC. " Ministry ls interlering in its
The domestic dispute over activities.
the conference was tauch- In this Way the rivalry
- ed ofT by an invitation to between the two miufstries
Internatlonal Trade and In- has taken the form oi lric- �
dtastry Minlster Rokuauke tion over degree o! power.
Tanaka from US Speeial After readiusting views at
Trade Representative W!1- a high-level working meet-
liam E. Brock. ing in Washington on Sep-
~ 15
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICI~L l.'SE ONLY
tember 14 and 15, Deputy what is rlght and what is
~iinister for Foreign Alfairs wroLg. But iL is certain that
Kiyoakl Klkuchi told a Lhe struggle over power ot.
press conference that the the two ministries is deeply
projected meeting was as connected with the present
obscure as somethlr_g Itke enigmatic situa~ion.
shooting in the dark, sug- In addition, judging from
gesting that it might be the fact that the once
- canceled. planned preliminary meet-
- This natura.lly caused ired ing lailed to be held, there
- the US special trade rep- seetns to be discrep~acy
- resentative and 1VIITI. Af- aawng the White House.
ter consulting with each the Sta.te Department and
other, they announced that the special trade repre-
a preparatory , meeting 2or sentattve.
the trilateral conlerence Will the iaternational
would be held in Chicago conierence be held aiter all?
on September 24. There Ls no immediate an-
- Surprised by the news, swer� to this. One cannot
the Foreign Mi,nistry again help but be amazed.
sent Klkuchi to the U~. But Th@ trade pmbietq f..n-
he learned that the pre- deed, needs incessant dia-
paratory meeting was no log. 'Therefore, the tril~teral
more than a dlscussion coaterence, li held, will
luncheon and that what Prove fruitiul to eotne ex-
was talked at the luncheon tent. But it is silly to Sght
was a repetition of triSe over degree of power wiLh-
matters like whether the out deciding on what ~vill
conterence shauld be held be~~gsed at the meeting.
or not. Money spent from the state
Alter all, no concrete coSer !or dispatching offi-
conclusion was reached at c~als ior the coniennce
the luncheoa. . won~ be a small aum.
But, A~IITI independently 'I'he Wisemen's C~mup ea-
told a presa meEtiag th~ presaly referred to the dls-.
t' .e trllateral conference pute over this matter ap-
would be held in the T~S ~~n~Y be~~e it regard-
in Novembe~. ed the lriction of this klnd
Under t h e s e circum- ~ hsrmluL
stances, one is puzzled at ~
COPYRIGHT: THE DAILY YOMIURI 1981
,
CSO: 4120/43-E
16
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000440070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
POLITICAL ANli SOCIOLOGICAL
SUZUKI INSPECTS MSDF REVIEW
Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 4 Nov 81 p 1
[Text] yOKOHAMA - Forty-tive members of the Liberal-
~~arships of the Marltime Sel[ Democratic Party, Komeito
Defense Force sailed past and the Democratic Socialist
Prime Ministec Zenko Suzuki Party plus ambassadors and
Tuesday in Sagami Bay, Kana- military attaches from various
gawa Prefecture, ;n the first countries.
naval review conducted in eight The ships taking part in-
yeazs. cluded the missile-carryir.g
Fifty-five aircraft. including destroyer (DDG) Tachikaze
PZJ antisubmarine planes, also and the destroyer Akizuki.
took part in the review in The prime minisier later read
waters off Enoshima while a message over radio to some
some 3.000 unionists and 8,000 men who participated in
pacifist group members the review in which he stressed
demoastrated at Kugenuma the aeed to improve Japan's
beach in Fujisawa. defense capability in the face of
The naval review had been a severe intemational situation
suspeaded since 1974 after the as well~as to secure the nation's
first energy crisis in order to security through the Japan-U.S.
conserve fuel. security setup.
Prime Niinister Suzuki wit- In prewar days, grand naval
nessed the review with Director J reviews were conducted by the
~ General Joji Omura of the Imperial Navy a total of 19
Defense Agency, Adin. Tsugio times until 19~0, a year before
Yata, chairman of the joint the outbreak of the Pacific War.
staff council. and other SDF After the waz, naval reviews
officers from the 'a.290-ton were held almost annually from
helicopter-carrying destroyer 1957 until 1973.
- ~ DDH ) Shirane, one of the most
up-ta-date warships of the Officials estimated the fuel oil
N:SDF. bill for Tuesday's review at
He became the third prime some 40 million yen (about
minister to attend a naval S1i~,000). The total will come to
review after Nobusuke Kishi in about 120 million yen (about
1957 and Eisaku Sato in 1968. if oil nsed for pre-
Among the some a.o00 guests review drills conducted on Oct.
who also viewed the review 30 and on Suaday were added,
aboard seven ships were Diet they stated.
_ ~ COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News 1981
CSO: 4120/46
17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R004400070045-1
F'OR OFFICI~L USE ONLY
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
MEDIA REPORTS ON LEFT-RIGHT STRIFE IN JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY
Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 15 Oct 81 3
[article by Michisada Hirose: "Can Asukata mend the crack?--Left-right strife ~
ir. JSP" ]
[Text] About 10 days have passed remains in the c~oldnims be- The breakup of the Tokyo
since the T'okyo chapter of the cause they were able to win chapter partly stemmed from
Japan Socialisi Party split in only a halfway victory ia the differences over whether the
cwo. T~e ocher parties have intraparty strife four years ago. , JSP should join forces wich
beea watching the efforts that (Asukata was. installed as the Komeito and other cen-
Chairman Ichio Asuka~a and chairman at that time. and . trist parties or with the JCP in
Secretary - General Shionen seceders formed the United the 1983 Tokyo gubematorial
Tagaya are making to settle Social Democratic Party.) election. The nghEists aze irri-
the dispute. But thtte is no in- The basic strategy vf the ' tated because the leftists raise
dication thai they are succeed- right wingers is as follows: objections to the "go with Ko+
ing. Will a simi}ar division oc- They propose to abolish meito" line, which was for-
e cur in other JSP chapters the party's quasi - platform, mally adopted as a party
_ across the country? "The road to socialism ur Ja- policy in February last year,
7"here are roughly three pan." In accordance with a whenever there is a chance
groups within the No. 1 Op- decision to review, the docu- for them to do ~o.
position party. One is the Sa meat, which was takea ~uring ~ 3. Asukata siu astride a'
cialist Association, a left-wing tl~e strife four years ago, work balance between the leftist and .
group of Mancists. Since they is being carried out by the rightist forGe~. He is oa the
accuse the Japan Communist parry's Socialism Theory Cen- left when it comes to the na-
Partv of deviadons from ter, which is dirteted by for- tioQal sec~~rity issue, is critical
'~[arxism, it may be said that mer Chairman Seiichi Katsu� of the Komeito'~ new security
theoretically they stand to th~ mata. policy, which views tht Self-
left of the JCP. The second 1"hey intend to sweep away Defense Forces ag conscitution-
group is uiade� up of social the Marxist views and lan- al, and has saia ~e will freeze
demxrau. 1'he third group, guage in the quasi-platform at the "go with Komeito" line
which includes Asukata, the party conveation in Feb- (although he withdrew the
stands in che middle. ruary aext year. ~ don't re- statement later). The rightists
- There have been times whea cammend you to read this nave oeen growing critical of'
the broad left-right spectrum document. It w~as aeiopted at Asukata's left-leaning stanee.
helped boost t h e JSP's the 24th JSP convenuon in , and have begun cppsidcring
streagth. Ai such times, both 1964, and is a mixture of replacing him with someone
, the left and right wings were Marxist and soc9al democratic � of their own.'
generous to each other. The dogmas. It is fuU of coatradic- The growth of the right
conflict in the Tokyo chapter tions. For example, it says that wing within the JSP seems to
was started by the right wing- the JSP "respects parliainent- be apparently closely connect-
ers. ary democracy," and immedi- � ed with moves in labor circles.
The right wingers propose ately afteravards, ezpresses Within the General Council of
to put the JSP firmly on distrust in parliaments. It is so Trade Unions of Japan (So-
a social democratic course in incoherent as to be incompre- hyo), which is the JSP's big-
terms of oEficial party thea hensible even co students of gest base of'support, two mg-
ry, policy line ,and executive politics. jor unions, the All Japan Tel~;-
lineup at the party convention 2�. The rightis~s.propose to communication Worken Ui?-
tha[ is to be held early next establish a policy for the JSP ion (Zendenuu) and the Japan
- year. They feel that the JSP to join hands with the Clean Postal Worfcers Union (Zen-
Government 'Party (Komeito). tei), have ciearly endorsed
18
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400074445-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
the pro-Komeito line. Upper ihe recruitment of new party ;
House member Shogo Oki, members in large numbers
~ who heads the right-wing continues, it may increa,se the
headquarters of the Tokyo nght wing's say in the seleo-
chapter, hails from Zendentlu. tion of conventioa delegaRgs
Oki has discounted party and other tnatters at the ex-
fees to recruit a large number Pense of the left wingets,
ot Zendentsu unionists into the The leftist attack on Oki,
JSP in line with A9ukata's caU which developed into the
_ to boost che party membership breakup of the 'Tokyo chap-
to one million. Whereas ~e ter, was, in effect, in self dN
party rules set che member- fense. The leftists are counting
ship fee at 0.7 percent of in- on Asukata's leadership to
come, he has lowered it to a curb the party's tilt to the
monthly amount of ~1,000, right. but the chairman feels
including t6e cost of subscrip- that if he goes iato action to
tion to the party organ, protect the lehists, it might
_ The discount has made only encourage the rightisrt of-
ftnsive.
members of the leftist Social-
ist .?~ssociation worry that if
COPYRIGHT: ,ASAHI EVENING NEWS 1981
CSO: 4120/43-E
19
y FOR OFFICIAL ~SE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL (,'SE ONLY
POLITICAI. AND SOCTOLOGICAL
KOMEITO NEW SECURITY CONCEPT ANALYZED
Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NE~dS in English 21 Oct S1 p 2
[Nagatacho Doings column by Takehiko Takahashi: "Komeito's New Security Concept"]
[Text] The Komeito he[d an ex- the recedln ~
p g paragraph" as safegeard the national land. In'
panded central ezecutive referring to: "as a means of this respect. it is stated that
committee meeting in the af- settting international dlsputes." "the expenses tor defense will
ternoon of Oct.14 and decided a be kept within 1 percent of the ~
new security pollcy. The point New Interpretation GNP." Among the Komeito
deserving attention here is that In the Komelto's ne~~ ~,~licy, ~ executivpes, there were some�
the Self-Defense Forces have who ex ressed the view that :
been recagnized as being the interpretation is t6at the use ~is should read "within ~
constltutional. of the SDF not "as ~ means of: ~rcent~the G~'P for thetime
Up to now the Komeito's ~ttling interaational disputes being." However, the ex-
attitude was one of doubt as to but as a meaas of defense "to pressioa "for the, time being"
whether the SDF were not a~ mai~tain a peaceful existence . Was deleted.
violation ot the Constitution. ~s permissible. This is the same A Komeito executive explains
But now, in clarifying the ~~s the reason why the govem- ~is as foUows:
Komeito's position regarding m e n t a n d t h e L f b e r a 1- ~~Unless it is stated that the
Article 9 of the Constitution, it Democratic Party have con� ~st should be within 1 percent,
has accepted the Self-Detense sidered the SDF as being Df the GNP, opposition willy
constitutiohal up to now. In this
Forces as constitutional. arise ~?ithin the party,. In the.
Article 9 prescribes "the ~~nse, the Komeito now stands ~same sepse, the expcession "tor
renunciation of war." The tirst ~~e same positlon as the LDP ~e time being" should not be
paragraph states that ~`the in the interpretation ot Article ~d at present and !t was
threat or use of torce as a' 9� � therefc.eelimina2ed.
means of sett![ng international The aim of the , Kometto's ~~It is dangerous to look at
disputes" will be renounced defense policy is "preservation. detense from the cost phase ~
forever. The secdnd paragraph of the national land." For this ~one. It mlght lead to the view
states that "in order to ac- Purpuse, it proposes: (1) im- ~at nuclear arms would be
complish the aim ot the Provement of warning, and, comparatively the least ex-
- � preceding paragraph, land, sea, ~ n f o r m a t i o n c o 11 e c t i n g~ pensive. Accordingly, if it
and air torces, as well as other capabilities, c21 eqvipment to ~omes absolutely necessary
war potential, will never be ~ prevent attacks in territorial. for protection ot the. national
maintained." waters and to Interdict a coastal~ ~and, exceeding 1 pereeat of the .
Persons who regard the SDF landing, (3) equipment to in- GNP cannot be helped at ,a
as being unconstitutional say tercept attacks from the air and certair. stage."
that "the aim of the preceding to prevent a landing, and c4l The same official further
paragraph" ~ in the second e4uipment for detense ot the declared:
paragraph ) is "to renounce the nattonal land, At the same time,
threat or use ot force forever." no nuclear arms wili be Because of this new defense
On the other hand, those who Po~eS~� policy, there is criticism that
believe that the SDF are con� The problem is the cost of the Kometto has moved toward
stitutional interpret "the aim of preparing fhe capability to the right. This criticism is
20
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
unwarranted. If strengthening LDP are studyIng. The Komeito~
- military capability signifies a is also proposing the establIsh-
move toward the right, then all meat of an Overall Defease
the socialist countries inust be Council. It can be satd that the
considered as advancing~ Komelto's defense policy bas
toward the right. entered a commoa ground with .
"Rather than being described the LDP aad Democratic ,
as `moving toward the right,' Socialist ParEy. '
~ve would like to advance by This is equivalent to a
carrying out a dovish security liq~idation ot the Kometto's
policy." political course wh~ch had
hitherto kept a ~Japan Sociallst'
~nother point drawing at- partyKomeito-DSP course"
tention in ~he Komeito's new underconsideration.
security policy is that the party gecause ot the Komeito's ne~
is seeking to define the SDF's ~efense concept, the foundation
`~scale of action." Thu has ~as be~n lost tor a JSP-Komeito
something in common with the concept ot government ad-
_ "legislation for an emergency" ministratioa.
which the government and the. ~
COPYRIGHT: MAINZCHI DAILX NEWS I981
CSO: 4120/43-E
21
FOR OFFI~I~?L LSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000440070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
LENGTH OF LOCKHEF.D TRIAL CRITICIZED '
Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 27 Oct 81 p 2
["Zooming-In" coltmmr, by Hideo Matsuoka]
[Text] The Lockheed trial has Lockheed scandal, the trial duct of court proceedings.
continued witho~it letup for tive may be coming to an end in Trials move along on the joint
- years now. If this w�ere an or- No~�ember or spring next year. efiorts of the bench, prosecution
dinary trial of no particular But no end is in sight tor and detense.
significance, the nation t;y now hakuei Tanaka, ~~ho fs un- Each utilizes ~arious pio~~s.
a�ould have forgotten about it or doubtedly the central figure in One of the ploys of the defense is
have lost interest in following the trial. stalling. The bench cannot one-
the developments. A trial is not to be com- sidedly order the defense to quit
The verdict will be out after mended tor the short time it stalliag so that it can speed up
the signiticance of the case has takes. Still, five years and no the proceedings.
been completely lost. The~in- ~rospects ot an end in sight are But it was the country's
stance of forgetfulness applies far remoced from ttie reatity of judiciary tbat favored, at least
to the Lockheed trial. too-the our world. In our world,. this . once in the past, a tria! witt~out
"natu~ral erosion" of the case, state is called inefficiency. The the beneflt of legal counsel for
as it is caired in the press. natioa is not happy about thk the accused. The judiclary may
tiationai attention is retained gradual but steady and well do something to ceunter
_ mostly through the media seemingly interminable the defense stonewalling, in-
playing uF developments in spending of tax money. stead of just sitting tig6t and
court whenever something The natlon bolds the c.~ut in watchingthedelayingtactics.
happens. It may sound natural respect. The court is eomewhat The Lockheed case may be an
for the media to keep playing up sacrosanct In nature. Peopie important trial, but it should not
how the "crimes of a prime re~11Y consider it to be above be difticult. The two points of
minister" are tried. them. There is comparatively substance are whether the
But following one trial for tf~~e little criticism ot courts from contcoversial 500 million yen
or six years as meticulously as the public. actually lined Tanaka's pocket,
they do requires no small etfort But the court. on its part. and what constitutes the prime
on the part of the media. I[ this should not take advantage of minister's offtcial functions.
persistent coverage is mainly public tolerance. ls the triai Concerning the 500 million
responsible for chaining public bemg draum out because the yen, facts have been virtually
interest to the Lockheed affaic judges prefer to sit on the case established that it was
for so long, it is proot that instead ot doing the(r best to deliveced to Tanaka. The
mental health has not com- exercise prudence? Isn't the ,Narubeni executlves, who have
~ pletely left the media over here. soldieMng ot tbe judges the been charged with bribing
~Vhatever the reason. the trial cause of the lengthy delay? TaAaka, have admitted the
has been taking too much time. Judges, ot course, do not have bribery in court.
For some involved in the complete treedom in the con- They have even given
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000440070045-1
F4R OFFICIAL USE ONLY
detailed descriptions con- to answer as proof that his alibi Tanaka is only hurting himself
cerning the days, hours, places cannot stand up to the probing. irr~court.
and other circumstances The judges may reasonably be In the court battle over
relating to the deliveries of regarded as having formed Enomoto's alibi, I~~as im-
cash. Their testimony is too their own views concerning pressed by the prosecution's
' accurate for a concoction of Enomoto's alibi. 1 a c k o f h om e wo rk ' a n d
_ convenience. The defense wili If ihe prospects, as of this sPadework. The prosecution
need an unusual amount of moment, of the final autcome in even seemed to be pulling its
counterevidence to ~iisprove the the trial are likened to a balance PWChes. It should not be dif-
biarubeni officials. situation, the pan weighed with = ficult for it to hold suspected
the testimony of Marubeni P~ies, including witnesses tor
Enomoto's Alibi Enomoto, in custody for
ofticials is dropping under the ~orough questioning.
To prove the alibi of weight of the substance of the Enomoto himselt told
Enomoto, Tanaka's secretary testimony, w~hile the other pan ~,ery~thing to the prnsecutors
who is alleged to har�e taken on which Enomoto rides is ~e day after his arrest. The
delivery of. the bribes tor rising fast as testimony to his p~~cution then should have
Tanaka, the defense has alibi are disputed one after collected evideqce backing up
produced many w�itnesses who another by the prosecution. Enomoto's confessions.
said they had met Enomoto at The balance beam is tipping Instead, it simply checked
the time and place where he sQme ;0 to 80 degrees in favor of Enomoto's confessions. K~hich
w a s, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e the Marubeni mea'S testimony. w~ere legally unsubstantiated,
prosecution, and he had Kow Kakuei Tanaka appears to against khe testimony of others.
received themoney. be mobilizing his political clout When Enomoto publicly
The testimoay of one witness to put every counterweight repudiated in court ~vhat he had
after another is being quashed possible on Enomoto s pan. told investigators in the
u n d e r n e e d 1 i n g c r o s s- Such attempts, atter all, will be prosecutor's office, the whole
e x a m i n a t i o n s b y c h e to no avail. Tanaka is hereby structure of the plot along
prosecution. ~iost recentiy, advised to stop these futile Which the prosecution argued
Enomoto refused to comply efforts. appeared sometimes to be on
with a prosecution request to Some even think that the trial ~~n ice.
question him. of Tanaka is taking so much Therefore, when a suspect
Court tactics are varied, both time because the judges are makes a confession in a pretrial
for the prosecution and de(ense, somewhat reserved, apparently ~vestigation, the prosecutor
as well as the bench. As there is under the influence of the white- should take steps to legally sub-
what is called "announcement collar syndrome, in treating stantiate the confession so that
e f f e c t" i n m a k i n g a n- Tanaka in the same way they do the confessor cannot easily
nouncements, there is ''in- other plaintiffs of no particular refute his own statements later
troduction e(tect" in in- social status. ~ in court,
troducing w~itnesses in court, Therefore, it wip not be very In cases of political bribery, it
depending on when and how~ s u r p r i s i n g i t T a n a k a ~s particulariy difficult to
the~~ are introduced. maneuvers to take advantage of gather evidence. The "Shimizu
Refusal b}� the accused to his social prominence to in- note" 1 a diary kept by Shimizu,
testif~~ is also one of the tactics. tluence the trial. the drirer of Enomoto's officia!
In the past, Enomoto chose to His psychology is very~ un- car when he was the prime
ansa~er al1 questions irom both derstandable. But I hope th~ minister's secretary) came as a
the deEense and the prosecution. Japanese judiciary has not Surprise to the prnsecution
Now~, as the allegations lowered itself to the gutter When it was presented in court
establishing his alibi have level. as evidence to prove Enomoto's
begun to collapse one after Any news of Tanaka engaging ~~bi.
another under rebuttal by the in such maneuvering should
prosecution. Enomoto suddenly only help antagonize a judge, it ONy Fortune
has chosen to keep silent. [he judge is a person of normal ~e surprise on the part of the
I~obod}~ can blame the judges intellect. This means that, by p~secution shows it had not
_ if the~~ take Enomoto's refusal poiitically maneuvering,
23
FUR OFFICIAL USE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFIClAL USE ONLY
done enough home�~ork. It a�as acts are poles apart in nature.
on]}~ tortunate for the This is why Japan is called a
prosecution that the "Shimizu countr}~ of third-rate pol2tics. It
note" ~~as not good enough to means our country is being run
clear Enomoto ot the charge by third-rate politicians. W..
that he . took the money for have legitimate reason to worry
Tanaka: The prosecution should our heads off.
have learned a bitterlesson. The accused in courts cannot
Professor Kenichi Fukui of be called criminals until and
Kyoto L'ni~~ersity earned~ a unless the court pronounces
Nobe1 Chemistry Pri~e. A1en- them as such. In the case of
tion of Prof. Fukui's name here politiciaas being put on trial,
must sound most inappropriale. they should take moral
But the point I want to make responsibility even before the
is that the top clutch of the verdicts are out.
Japanese academic world is of Not a smattering of such
such a high leeel that persons in sense of responsibility exists in
the clutch earn Nobel prizes. Tanaka. Instead, he is ordering
By comparision, the top some 100 politicians in his
clutch politicians in Japan are fa~tion around as he sees fit.
mostly anxious to earn bribes. How long is the nation going to
Earning I~obel prizes and tolerate this political anomal}~?
political bribes are both acts of It's about time we gave it the
the JapanesP, although the ta~o shake.
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News 1981
CSO: 4120/46
24
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000400074445-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
NEXT JSP CHAIRMAN LIKELY TO BE SELECTED BY VOTE
Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NE[dS in English 3 Nov 81 p 1
[Text]
.The Japan Socialis[ Party's Talking to new::nen in The JSP chief was in Taka-
nexc chairman is likely to be Takamatsu, Asukata implied matsu to attend the 18th na-
chosen by r�~te for the first that he is prepared to take tioaal convention oi the Lea-
time in the party's history. up a right - wing challenge. gue to Defend the Constitu-
The No. 1 Oppositiun party Referring to the chairmanship tion. Responding to a report-
set up a chairmanship elec- electioo system, he said he er's question after paying
tion system in 1977. but thcre asked the late Chairman To- homage at the grave of Narita
has so far been no co~tesc. momi Narita tc create the sys- in the city, Asukata said he
clash is now shaping up tem. He added that the selec- renewed his pledge to do his
t,etween Chairman lchio Asu- tion of the party chief by vote best to the IaCe party leader.
= kata and one or two right- ~s important from the view- He thus indicated that he in-
- wing candid~tes. Spcaking in point of intraparty democracy. tends to stay on as chairman.
Takamatsu City, ICagawa Pre- With regard to the question Asukata will be supported
fecture, Sunday, Asukata in- of seeking re-election to a by the Socialist Association,
dicated that he is determined third term in office. Asukata a Marxist group, and other
tn seek re-election in Decem- said it is stilt not the time to ' left-wingers m his re-election
ber. discuss the matter, but he in- bid.
The right-wingers earlier dicated that he intends to con- The chairmanship election
started work to select a can- tinue pursuing the tasks for system was created ta meet a
didate to run against Asiikata. party reform he took over condition set by Asukata for
:~iasao Hori, former chair- from Narita, such as the drive accepting the top party post
man of the JSP Policy Board., to boost the JSP membership ?rt 1977. He was then Niayor
is enerall � favored as a os- to one miilion, a review of of Yokohama.
g ~ F, As it has not been tested,
sible candidate, but V~ce the party's de facto platform the s}~stem has many defici-
Chairman Shoichi Shimodaira "The Road to Socialism in Ja- eneies. For example, there is
. has indicated that he intends pan." and the dissolution of no provision as to whether one
to run. Although some peopie factions. has to get more than half of
contend that a unified candi- His reference to those tasks the votes to be a winner or
date must be put up if the was taken as indicating that needs only to get more votes
right-wingers are to defeat he is confident he will win in than on2's rival.
Asukata, no progress has been a chairmanship election.
made to that end.
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Evening News 1981
CSO: 4120/4F .
25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400074445-1
FOR OFFlCIAL USE ONLY
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
DIET DEFLATES GOVERNMENT REFORM
Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 3 Nov 81 p 2
[Editorial]
[ Text ) The Suzukl CabInet has sately ridden out the critical first halt
o[ the current e~ctraordlnary Dlet session, having disproved the
eariler fear chat it was heading for certain trouble. Once the ad
hoc committee on government retorm was set up in the Lower
House, parliamentary activities went on exactly according to
the scenario of the Liberal-Democratic Party ~ LDP). The result
is that the reform bil! already h~s been passed by the Lower
House and is now ready for Upper House action thls month.
Two main reasons may be given to explain the smooth sailing.
First, there is the fact that the reform biii itself Is but a painless
first step on the long road toward small government.
It would not be wrong to call it as nothing more than a make-
shift attempt to save some Y250 billion !n government subsldies.
For all the great publicity glven the measure initially, the truth
about the flrst admin!strative reform bill produced. by the
Suzul:i government has been better ap~reciated now than so~[zme
time ago.
5econd, the government's success in m~naging with relative
ease the first haif of the current Dtet was greatly assisted by a
dlsarray among the oppositlon parttes and, worse, thelr not
being prepared to challenge frontally the worth ot the govern-
ment-introduced reform measure.
The Japan Soclalist and Communist Parties have remalned
opposed to the present proposal from the start for ideological
reasons whereas centrist parties like Komeito and the
Uemocrattc Socialtst Party are ready to support it ft the
government accepts their suggestions for improvement.
G[ven the numerical preponderance of the LDP, the dlvided
state of the opposition camp can hardly lmpreve the chances of
effectlvely undercutting the value of the reform bill or of forcing
on the government a change In the bill's contents.
The opposttion parties have been also outmaneuvered by the
government and the LDP whlch have made maximum use ot the
pay raise issue tor p~abllc corporatton workers to btunt their
resistance to the reform bill. The conser~�atives are most ltkely
to explolt a similar pay lncrease proposal for civil servants to
!heir tacttcal advantage this [tme tn the Upper House. The op-
position parties' preoccupation a~lth pay raises for public sector
unions even had an ettect of sidetracking the main debate on
government reform.
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI.1'
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400074445-1
EOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
Long hours were spent on interpellations over. the reform bill
at the Lower House. Stlll, these tell short of mahing clear for the
beneflt of the people what government reorgaNzation this
country ultimately needs.
It the present measure fs but a humble beginning, our
legislators are obligated, toward the public, to make sure that
this modesl start will lead to a larger revamping of our govern-
ment organization and practices.
In tact, government leaders are more responslble than anyone
else for thts lallure to outline the ultfmatelv necessary retorms.
Prfine Min;ster Zenko Suzuki and Yasuhiro Nakasone, dlrector
general of the Administratfve Management Agency, both
resorted to a tactic of evasion throughout the Lower House
debate, saying that the~~ were still w~aiting tor the Doko com-
mission to produce more recommendations.
Respecting the authority ot the government reform com-
mission and its members' opinion is entlrely appropriate. But
what the Suzul:i government is doing reall~~ is to use the com-
mission as a pretext for avoiding making hard policy decisions
of its ow~n.
This abandonment by government leaders of policy-making
initiatlve has been best illustrated by thelr behavior over the
question ot a tax raise for tiscal 1983 or later. They chose to
remain vague about it [or a long time after the start ot the
current Diet. But recently they declared they had no thought ot a
new tax raise onl}~ after the Doko commisslon declared that the
_ talk ot a tax lncrease and the small government drive are in-
compatible as of no~�.
_ Actuall~~ the opposftion partfes have done little to win support
to their vlew of the LDP-proposed re(orm blll that it woWd only
� serve the purpose of fundtng more for detense at the expense of
social welfare. lf they mean what lhey say, the parties of the left
must show� !r~ the course of the Upper House debate that the
proposed cut in subsidies will tndeed hurt essentfal soclal
programs.
The Japanese people support the cause ot small government
princfpally because they fear that the growth of government will
- necessaril}~ entail high2r taxes. They are worried at the same
time how� thelr securlty will be affected by the small govern-
ment retorms especiall~� in the tield ot puqlic pensions. Both the
government and legislators must respond to popular ap-
prehensions of this kind that have re~eived oNy insufficien[
attention so tar tn the current Diet. ~
COPYRIGHT: THE JAPAN TIMES 1981
CSO: 4120/46
27
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R004400070045-1
~OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ ~
POLITICAL AND SOCI~LOGICAL
JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY SUPPORTER'S VIEWS EXPRESSED
- Tokyo ~IAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 4 Nov 81 p 2
[Editorial: "JSP and Enthusiasm"]
[Text ] ~ N~earl`y one year has passed since Japan Socialist
Party Chairman Ichio Asukata, during the JSP
- convention tov~�ard the end of last year, called for
~'burning action" by rhe largest opposition party. Has
the JSP continued "burning'"
At least the general public does not think so.
Party members, claimed to be about 50,000, may have
continued steady activities but the party as a whole
has failed to impress us. We point out that the
Asukata leadership is inadequate.
The frank view of the JSP supporters is that the
dispute between the leftist and rightisk groups on the
socialist policy line has continued too long. On Oct. 29, ,
the party central executive committee members
agreed to review the "road to socialism in Japan,"
aimed at putting an end to the dispute by 1983. We fear
that the party will put an end to the dispute with an
ambiguous compromise, judging from the ~ past
_ developments involving intra�party disputes.
w e call for JSP members to engage in effective
discussions and reach a clear-cut conclusion. A
repetition of compromises for convenience's sake,
based on the excuse of mainta�ining party unity, will
result in a further deteriorated image of the party.
Some l0 million voters for the party are not
necessarily active supporters.
To respond to such a deman@, the JSP must
remodel itself into a strong party based on actual
society. The inflexible socialist theory defined in the
"road" is no longer practical. The decision to review
- the "road" is a natural outcome. We call for both the
leftists, the supporters of the "road" theory, and the
28
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000440070045-1
FOR OFFIC(AL USE ONLY
rightists to engage in a frank exchange of views to put
an end to the dispute.
Coincidentally, various movements have sar-
. faced in the Japan Socialist Party. For example, the
JSP Tokyo branch has been split into two due to the
difference of views on the "road" between the two
rival groups. Another example is a recent demand
from a rightist wing for the resignation ot the Asukata
leadership and its support for a rival candidate who
will compete for the chairmanship with Asukata in
the December election:
We believe that the JSP must bear a heavier
responsibility in the current decade ~nd wmuld like to
see the JSP really burning with enthusiasm.
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News 1981
CSO: 4120/46
~
- 29
FOR OFFICI~L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000440070045-1
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
KASUGA EAGER TO ACHIEVE COALESCENCE OF CENTRIST FORCES
Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 4 Nov S1 p 2
["Nagatacho Doings" column by Takehiko Takahashi]
[Text] Ikko Kasuga, adviser to the road iniluences to combine and comrades." It seems that
Democratic Socialist Party, carry out brisk activities. Kasuga is referring to such
attended a�~People's Con- Together with DSP Chairman persons as Tokuma Ut-
ference to Protect Japan" on Ryosaku Sasaki, who toilows a sunomiya i member of the
Oct. ?6 and spoke in front ot similar line of thinking, Kasuga House of Councillors) who is
about 3.000 people. This con� approached the Komeito. In~the enthusiastic about the peace
ference has a strong con- past the Komeito and the DSP movement.
servative coloring but iis local have had the experience of Kasuga's aim for the time
- organizations have already cooperating in elections and being is to form a unified fac-
- been Eormed in 28 prefectures. even the concept for a centrist tion of centrist forces within the
In his speech, Kasuga forces' administration had once Diet. Nevertheless, if such a
c r i t i c i z e d t h e L i b e r a 1- been prepared. untfied factian is formed within
Democratic Party. declaring The Komeito responded tothe the Diet, the chairmen of the
that while the LDP has decided, DSP's call and went ~o far as to parties' Diet policy committees
as a party, on fhe revision of the show the attitude that i[ a will become one person-the
Constitution, the LDP govern� coalescence of centrist forces representative of the faction-
m e n t i s t a 1 k i n g a b o u t could be achieved, the Komeito and the statements to be made
safeguarding the Constitution. would be willing to dlssolve the in the plenary sessions and
In addition, although a party. In reality. however, not committee m~ciings will be
cabinet decision has been the slightest progress has been centered on " the faction's
reached to study legislation to seen. . representative. The op-
_ cope with an emergency. this portunities for the respective
has not been done as yet. The Unified Faction parties to make statements will
LDP only pays I(p-service and While the coalescence ot the decrease. 'This would be a
dces nothing-this is Kasuga's middle�of-the-road influences "minus" factor for a political
criticism, was puttering around, the New party.
Speaking in typical Kasuga Liberal Club ~ and LTnited Kasuga has therefore
style at the time, he said. "as Socialist Democratic Party retreated one step. He is
far as thinking is concerned, went a~head to form a unified thinking now of forming a joint
e~�en a universitv cced can faction�within the Diet. Both the body and of carrying out Diet
think-as far as talkina is ~'LC and C1SDP's way of activities through the decisions
concerned. even comic dia- thinking differs considerably made by the chairmen of the -
- logists can talk." from that ot the DSP. This is Diet policy committees of the
~V h a t t h i s K a s u g a i s clearly recognized by Kasuga. four midle-of-th~road political
tenaciously seeking to achie~~e Kasuga says that "eren if a parties. He would like to have
at the present time is a coalescence of centrist forces is this realized during the present
coalescence of centrist' in� realized, there are some per- extraordinarv Diet session and
fluences. He states that in order ~ons in the Vew Liberal Club to establish next a joint com-
to put a period ta the LDP's long who are likely to back out. mittee for election coun-
continuing administration, it is horeover. there are persons termeasures.
necessary tor the middle�of�the� w~hom we cannot call as If the four centrist parties
30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R004400070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USF ONLI'
cooperate and hattle in an� centering on the Komeito and
election [ogether, there is the DSP, and obtaining the par-
possibilit}� that an influence ticipation of the New Liberal
- surpassing that of the Japan Club. L'nited Socialist
- Socialist Party can be formed. Democratic Party, and a part of
ff that is achieved, the position the JSP, to secure from li0 to
of the ~o. 1 opposition can be 180 Diet seats.
obtained. This is Kasuga's strategy.
This is bound to ha~�e a big The reality is not moving in
impact on the Japan Socialist accordance with this strategy of
Party. The Shakai Shugiha and Kasuga. And yet Kasuga is
anti�Shakai Shugiha are now in confident, believing that the
confrontation w�ithin the JSP. Komeito's adoption of a
This is also an ideological realistic course has given his
conirontation on a�hether to strategy a boost.
adhere tu :lIar:cism or anti- Even the Komeito and DSP
~Iarsism. If the middle-of-the- are not moving definitely
~oad influences surpass the toward a coalescence. It is
Japan Socialist Party, there is a therefore most difficult to
- possibility of the anti-1~farsists prophesy when and if Kasuga's
separating frem the ~tar.cists concept will be realized. But
and joining the middle-ot-the� slnce Kasuga is a man of action.
ruad influences. If this occurs. he is llkely to continue along
it might be possible for the this strategy without letup.
middle-of�the-road infiuences,
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News 1981
CSO: 4120/46
31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL IJSE ONLY
MILITARY
FORMER GENERALS DEPLORE 'SELF DEFENSE FORCES'
Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Jul 81 pp 98-106
[Discussion involving the following participants: Hiroomi Kurisu, former chairman
- of the Joint Staff Council and a general in the Ground Self Defense Force; Kazuomi
Uchida, former chief of Staff, Mar itime Self Defense Force; Goro Takeda, former
- chairman of the Joint Staff Council and a general in the Air Self Defense Force]
[Text] United States and Soviet Union Preparing for Sometime in the 1980's
[Question: There is a theory in the streets that a crisis will occur in the 1980's.
People are saying that there will be a large-scale military event with the character-
- istics of World War III. At Che Hawaii conference, the United States made very
specific and strict demands for the Japanese d�efense effort. I have heard that this
was based on a scenario of trouble beginning in ~he Middle East and resulting in an
invasion of Hokkaido by the Soviet Army. What about that?
Takeda: I think it is doubtful that a f ire starting up in the Middle East would
immediately spread to Hokkaido. Before that, it could go to Europe or the Korean
Peninsula could stand in its way. In fact, it might start in Korea. Yugoslavia
is also dangerous.
Uchida: Everything is linked up.
Question: If a Middle East war occurs red, the Seventh Fleet would move into the
Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union wou ld attempt to move into the gap, and Japan would
try to close the three straits around the Japanese islands to etop them. This
would result in a local war. That's the scenario, right?
Uchida: There is the question of why it would break out in the Middle East. Also,
we must consider the preliminary conditions that would cause the Soviet Union to
go tha.t far. It would do that if it re~ched the pofnt of being put in an impossible
= position when it tried to maintain the status quo. This would happen if :Lt decided
it was necessary to f ind a way to escape from the dwindling state of its fortunes
or if it could not maintain the commnunist system any longer. At such a time, it
might make a move in the Piiddle East, if that were the easy thing to do. It could
move into Japan and cause a disturbance, and then make a frontal assault on NATO.
Or it could attack NATO first and then come to Japan or cause tr~uble on the Chinese
border. It is f irst and then come to Japan or cause trouble on the Chinese border.
It is conceivable that it would follow a pattern of making a move where it is easiest.
32
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
MOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
What America fears most is that the Soviet Union ia in a poaition to move in any
direction. And in reality, the state of Rusaian military expansion ie awesome.
- For example, in submarines, it plans to build 40 v~ssels a year. America is only
_ building 12. That is three tiznes as much. In addition, these submarines will carry
crilise missiles and they can dive to 1,300 meters. There are a large number of.
these and they are very well equipped. In addition, it is buildi~ng aircraft ~ar-
riers and cruisers. It is carrying out a military expansion beyond our imagi~nation.
When we see this happening right before our eyes, we cannot say that America is
lying to us or threatening us. We have to believe that it is serious.
Takeda: During the f irst part of the Carter administration, America thought that
if it slowed down the military expansion, Russia.would respond because it was having
economic difficulties. However, even though Russia declined economically, its mili-
tary expansion continued. Then, with the invasion of Afghanistan, even the Carter
administration realized that it had made a mistake.
Uchida: America is attempting to complete preparations to counter the Soviets by
the tentative target of 1985. So the pace of preparation in Japan will not match
that of the United States.
Question: We can cope with the period after 1985, but are we in danger before then?
In the short term, is there a chance for the Soviet Union?
Uchida: Yes, if the Soviet Union makes the decision now to resort to military power.
I do not think it has gone that far yet.
However, if a conflict were to occur in the Middle East, and oil stopped coming to
- Western Europe and Japan, there would be a big shift in the balance of power. Wes-
term Europe and Japan, there would be a big shift in the balance of power. Western
Europe depends on the Middle East for approximately 600 million tons of oil. Japan
is buying about 200 million tons. If a conflagration were to occur there, it would
be very threatening. Therefore, we are doing our best to prevent that from happen-
ing. The Soviet Union also desires to maintain the status quo. Things are all
right now because of fear and a military balance. Just the same, if reiigious or
political troubles were to blow up in the Middle East and spread over the entire
area, the Soviet Union would i~anediately have an advantage. The free countries
would not be able to use Middle Eastern oil. If Chat happened the military balance
would be u~set.
Japan Is About the Right Size for the Soviet Union
Takeda: Even if the Soviet Union doea not intend to start a world war, if some-
thing ~tarted in the Middle East, it could be drawn into it, and things could esca-
late. The.n, to restore its situation~ it is possible that it might set its sights
~ on a weak piace to make an advance.
Kurisu: In the 18th century, Russia annexed more than 1 million square kilomEters.
In the 19th century, it absorbed 500,000 square kilometers in Southeast Asia alone
and close to 1 million square kilometers in other areas.~ In the 20th century, it
d3d not gain much territory until the last war, but with the war, it gained 680,000
square kil~meters, including the three Baltic countries. It is not yet up to 1
million. Japan has about 370,000 square kilometers so it is ~ust about the right
size. (laugh) That is a ~oke. (laugh) .
33
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000440070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Uchida: Intimidation is possible as a tactic.
Takeda: It would never threaten Japan alone without thinking about a world war.
If the Soviets made a move, the Uc~.ited States would counter it. This is the fate
of a country like Japan, situated between the great powers. If Japan gave in to
Soviet intimidation, the United 5tates would try Che same thing.
Kurisu: Nixon says that World War III has already begun but that the great war
is not characterized by an exchange of nuclear attacks. It is a psychological war
carried out by threat and intimidation. A psychological war aims at getting the
opponent to give up.
However, someone spoke of America getting its military forces ready by 1985. I
- believe this has been postponed. The modernization plans for each of the three
services will take until 1987-88 for campletion. Such items as tha Trident sub-
marine, a 600-vessel fleet, and the B-1 (supersonic heavy bomber) will all take
until 1988 to be completed.
Takeda: All of them were put aside during the Carter administration.
Kurisu: And the same thing is reported of the Soviet Union. Even the Siberian
railroad will not be completed by 1985. Both the United States and the Soviet Union
have had to extend their tentative deadline beyond 1985. In brief, it seems that
they are postponing the deadline for their buildup to the late eighties or the
early nineties. This is not a target date for conf 1ict. It is a deadline for reach-
ing a position where these countries can be at peace with themselves while being
conscious of the opponent. I do not think that America's military power has declined
at all. The gap has only closed up more.
War Moves T~Tith the Momentum of the Times
Takeda: If things keep going at this rate, the United States will be completely
surpasse~ by the Soviet Union. Therefore, they are working to open up the gap.
They probably even want to speed up Reagan's 5-year plan.
Kurisu: That is why I think that both the United States and the Soviet Union will
tend to suppress any sparks of trouble. While their forces are unprepared, they
will just be bluffing each other. They are not really serious. So I think that
if something happened in Europe or the Middl.e East, it would probably move to con-
trol it.
Takeda: t3ntil it is ready, that is probably right. But war is not something that
goes that smoothly. If trouble w~re to start in Poland next month, there is no
telling how far it would spread. It would flow with the momentum of the times.
That is why we must make the minimum necessary preparations.
Question: I would like to know roughly what stages the Japanese defense guidelines
have passed through since the cr7ation of the Self Defense Forces and what pY~.ase
they are in now.
- 34
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
i~4R OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Takeda: In 1957, the Basic National Defense Plan appeared. It called for gradual
- progress in preparing for natianal defense on the basis of the U.S.-Japan Mutual
Security Treaty and within necessary ].imits~ depending on th~ national situation.
Based on this, we have increased our strength in 20 years from the f irst basic
defense plan through the fourth basic defense plan.
However, the fourth basic defense plan took effect around 1972-73, the main years
of detente. The people began to wonder why defense spending continued tc increase
- in an era of peace. Questions on this were heard from the opposition parties in
the Diet. Therefore, in 1976, the 1976 defense plan guidelines were prepared with
the idea that a new defense policy was necessary.
This rested on the view that world peace would continue for some time,`based on
five conditions: First, there would not be a large war, a nuclear war, between
the United States and the Soviet Union. Se~ond, the antagonism between the Soviet
Union and China would continue. Third, the U.S.-Japan mutual security arrangement
- would be f irmly maintained. Fourth, there might be small disturbances, but no
large ones, on the Korean Peninsula. And finally, the friendly relationship between
the United States and China would continue. The Middle East situation was not even
considered.
In other words, the conclusion was not reached by a military analysis. Zt was
reached by saying that our present defense capability is this much, so next let's
add a certain amount. The set idea of keeping it within 1 percent of the GNP derives
from this.
Uchida: A goal for preparedness was never set.
Takeda: There is no mention of when certain things mu~t be done. There is only
the bague idea of "a defense capability which can repel a limited, small-scale in-
vasion unaided." However, the government made this decision, and we might have
been all right if a certain amount of effort had been given to defense and main-
taining the rate of growth. But because of the rise in prices and other reasons,
the content of our preparedness plan has continually been reduced. In the Air
Self Defense Force, the 430 aircraft we should have had was reduced to 340.
Even then, the government at the t~me declared that thie was the minimum necessary
defense capability. In spite of that~ it seema that this will not even be achieved
by 1987, so the whole thing is ridiculous.
Fooling the People
~urisu: I have a slightly diffeTent view from Mr Takeda. Up through the fourth
basic plan we at least evaluated the ~ituation and presented the goa~s we de~ired
for 5 years. However, the subsequent defense guidelines do not include any situ-
ational judgment with reference to basic defense capability. In other words, an
order was given for a time to stop in the situation of 1975. The idea for military
preparedness was to continue what was done under the third and fourth hasic def ense
policies, in other words, to maintain the status quo. I believe it ie misleading
the people to bring this out now as if it were a real goal.
35
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USF ONLY

~ual

=1

~n. Unless the government changes this ~pproach i~mmediately, the basic defense of Japas~
cannot be secured. This is equivalent to not thinking about def ense at all. I am
severely critical on this point.

=rs Takeda: The cabinet when the fourth defense policy was adopted was the Miki cabi-
se net, wasn't it?
~n
~ith Uchida: At any rate, it seems strange tha.t the things promised in 1976 will be ful-
filled 10 years later. When they say they don't know if theq can do it by 1987,
they are double-crossing the people twice over.
i
~ Kurisu: The true feeling of the civilians is that this is nothing but a policy

aiet for coping with the Diet and the media. They puC everything in a medicinal wafer

~ent with sugar on it.

=tween Takeda: That plan started up on time even though all the chiefs of staff opposed
even it.
Kurisu: Yes, it did, didn't it?
's Takeda: I said earlier that there is no military logic in the standards of the

~erives defense guidelines. Even in the case of a limited small-scale invasion, not enough
consideration has been given to what size fource would come and what form it would
take. Even if we are to f ight together with the Americans when the Self Defense
Forces cannot repel the invasion alone, there is no understanding of how this will
be done. Everyone has hidden und~r the big shadow of America.
y
jn- 'Thinking Committee' Leaving Out the Military
1- Uchida: We have prepared many proposals. However, they are research material and
~s, have not been publicized.
Takeda: What we need to ask ourselves is whether agreement has been attained be-
tween the Ground, Air, and Maritime Self Defense Farces. The answer is no. We
=ary are divided.

~_eved
Uchida: Just the same, as long as we are restricted to 1 percent of.the GNP, no
plan can amount to much.
Takeda: The idea of 1 percent of the GNP was developed at the same time as the
h defense guidelines.
-ed
u- Kurisu: Then the "Commiittee to Think About Def ense" was formed and we presented

~n a report to thean.
~ary
ense Takeda: The Committee to Think About Def ense was formed under the sponsorship of
ng the director of the Defense Agency at the time, Sakata. I believe it wgs made up
of five or six intellectuals such as the late political analyst, Kazushige HiXOSawa,
and the writer, Fusako Tsunoda.
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Uchida: There wae also one before that during the tsrm of Mr Nakasone.
Takeda: There was a briefing on keepin,g within 1 percent of the GNP during the
Nakasone period, too, so I suppose the "thinking com~ittee" took the approach of
- supporting the Defense~ Agency's proposal. Actually, someone with experience ag
chairman of the Joint Staff Council should have been a part of the comanittee. Wtth
some miliCary advice, a new awareness of the probl~ms should have emerged.
Kurisu: To state the case in stronger terms, former chafrmen and members of the
Joint Staff Council should have been doing the "thinking."
Uchida: The miiitsry presented a number of proposals for the aecand and third basic
defense plans. The government listened to them but in the end did not have ears
to hear. The initial plans were completely revised and we had to put up with plans
reduced to the lowest possible level with nc~ne of what you referred to as military
logic. These things should have been decided on the basis of an active debate
between the government and the military. Aowever, under civilian control, we are
slapped down and ail debate is stopped.
Therefore, the people on the frontline are placed in a difficult position. The
Maritime Self Defense Force may be a special case, but since there is no standard
for what is absolutely necessary, it is possible to make an estimate by ~udging
that in xelative terms a certain task can be performed with a certain force. For
example, Prime Minister Suzuki spoke about patrolling the waters within a few
hundred miles of Japan. If the number of ships is ema11, the number of patrols is
_ simply reduced.
Takeda : At the end of each year, an Est imate ia ma.de of what can be done with the
strength availlble and a report is made. We ultim~tely come to the conclusion that
nothing can be done without revising the defense guidelines. However, the govern-
ment has resolved not to revise the defense guidelines, so we are left frustrated.
It always ends in talk.
Kurisu: ~.ro ad~ectives, "limited" and "small-scale," are used. Originally, it
was one or the other. But the two terms were used to create the meaning of "a
si.ze which we can handle one way or another." (laugh) All the chiefs of staff were
against this. ~
Takeda: Recently, discussion has finally emerged in the Diet about the number of
- divisions and the appropriate number of aircraft to go with than. Before it was
all very vague. ~
Question: While they use the word "limited," the hypothetical enemy is the Soviet
Union, isn't it?
Kurisu: That`s right.
Takeda: There is no limited scenario for it.
The Important Issue Is Determination
Uchida: There are also obstacles in the system.
37
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR O~FICi~?L USE ONLY
Takeda: Under the present system, we cannot honestly do anything, can we? Even
with the surprise attack defense proposed by Mr Kurisu, under the preser.t system,
we would be laiocked out by the first attack, in 10 minutes, wouldn't we?
Kurisu: It is not only a problem of the system, it is a problem of the government~s
determination. There are many things that are not particularly limited by law but
~ are simply not clearly specif ied.
Takeda: With respect to the emergency law system, if the ~round Self Defense Force
wanted to take up a position when the enemy landed, it could not construct an ideal
positian under the present system. Also, aircraft would have to receive detatled
instructions from t he Aviation Bureau before they could take off. This ~e ridicu-
lous. There are also restrictions on~ munitions under wtiich so many meters of open
land must surround so many tons of explosives. These kinds of things must be changed.
They are a Joke. ~
= Kurisu: Going back to the basic defense capability concept, there is something
called "warning time," the time for the government ta evaluate the crisis. This is
the problem of how long before a crisis occurs we should make preparatione. The
government says 1 year. There is no other coi:ntry like this in the whole wide
world. Usually, t his time is given in Cerms of weeks or hours. The production
of shells takes 13 months from the time the workers are collected and the materials
have been 3mported, so they think that 1 year would be enough. This is foolish.
Uchida: In Europe, they think in terms of hours.
Takeda: The U.S. m ilitary are carrying out a plan for overseas procurement of
equipment. They have placed enough for four divisions entirely in Europe. They
are planning to increase this to enough for six divisions by 1987. With this,
transport will be easy in an emergency. There is nothing like this in Japan. Even
if the United States came ta our aid, all the equipment would have to be shipped.
Japan does not have the capability far this.
Kurisu: Everythizig is theoretically prepared according to the defense guidelines.
It says that preparations are made suff icient for eacpanaion in case of emergency.
Takeda: Everything is just fine in writing.
Uchida: E~sentia.lly, it is set up so that we cannot tell that there is a cxisis
until the shooting starts.
Kurisu: It is not even clear who the commander in chief of the Self Defense Forces
is. ~ ~ ~
Question: Isn't it the chairman of the Joint Staff Council?
Kurisu: No, it's probably the prime minister or the director of the Defense Agency,
but it is not clear ly determined. ~
Takeda: It is probably the prime minister.
38
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Kurisu: That ~.s who starts a war, but it is not al all clear after that.
Takeda: Are you talking about the leader directly in charge?
Kurisu: Yes. There ~ts probably no other country like this. In most other countriee,
the secretary of state takes charge or, ultjmately, the president. This changes
once a war begins. But the system is not at all clear in Japan.
Takeda: It seems that the chairman of the Joint Staff Council wi11 not be needed
once a war starts. (laugh) Ordinarily, there are laws which designate a joint
staff council and a chairman and provide what their duties shall be. We do not
have such laws. We look here and there and pick up things from various places
until we finally f igure our what our duties are.
Kurisu: Originally the p~st of Joint Staff Council chairman was created at the
request of the United States. It was ordered to be established as a point of con-
tact for U.S. troops stationed in Japan. The position wae cxeated without thinking
about its content. It was revised once, but the revision did not amount to much.
- I interpreted the situation in the opposite way. Since there are no regulations
for the chairman's duties, I decided that I could do anything at all as long as I
had the trust of the Defense A.gency director general. I could have a say in mili-
tary administration, military command, or personnel. I actually told people above
me what to do on many occasions. ~
Uchida: Even the prime minister cannot make decisions on his own. He must present
everything to the cabinet. It is a strange situation if the cabinet is to determine
military strategy and provide military leadership.
The Military's Opinion Should Be Listened To
Takeda: We have been carrying out this defense study since Mr Kurisu's era.
We co~~ld say that the military has done everything possible. If a conflagration
were to break out in the Middle East and lead to a world war, who (the government,
~ the Defense Agency, the troops, etc) could do what and when? And what should be
done? When we try to pin this down, we find a lack of clear directives. In order
to make the necessary laws and regulations, we must work together with the govern-
ment. There are many things that muet be done. With all our efforta up until n.ow,
we have finally managed to present an interim report in this.Diet seseion.
However, things will not ga r~e].1 w~.thout the cooperation of the various ministries
and agencies. In particular, this includes the laws T mentioned for controlling ex-
plosives and for traffic, public order, and aviation. Also, what can be done about
civil defense, which is not under the 3urisdiction of any ministry or agency? Since
we are limited to defense, I believe we need to have some office in charge of air
raid warnings and evacuation of civilians.
Kurisu: The newspapers often report important meetings of the various ministries,
with cabinet ministers ~aking a leading role. This does not happen for the Defense
Agency. It did in the past, but the practice has gradually disappeared. The meet-
ings attended by the ministers are final budget report meetings and beer drinking
pd~tles tci c.elel~iiate the ~ampleti~7 c~i &vuietliirte. (laug[1)
39
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLX
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL i1SE ONLY
Takeda: Once or twice a year.
Kurisu: A long time ago, important meetings were called by ministers. ~en when
I was lower in rank, I ha.d the opportunity of attending several of those meetings.
Takeda: Now, the only time it happe~ts is at budget time and when a foreign minister
from another country is coming to Japan and we ha.ve to decide on our approach ahead
of time.
Kurisu: It is just a ceremony.
Uchida: Everything is taken care of in the councillors' meetings. t think the
director of the Defense Agency and the prime minister should listen more seriously
to the opinions of the military.
Takeda: Because it is peacetime, there are no diff iculties in evexyday administra-
tion. But if a military emergency arises, there will be a problem. Therefore,
even the defense study said that the chairman of the Joint Staff Cuuncil should be
given more authority. The emergency law system has many areas where the people's
individual rights are limited, so the Diet will k?ave to debate the extent of these
limitations. However, an actual proposal must be made to see what the reaction is.
Government Consideration Desired
Kurisu: I oncP made a report to one Defense Agency director general on the overall
views of the Joint Staff Council concerning issues which we thought were very im-
portant to national policy. He said: "I understand. I actually agree. Otherwise,
Japan cannot survive in the future." However, he said that it would be impossib].e
to say this in public and he told me to burn the papers till there was nothing left
and he would forget he had seen them. That is how it went. (laugh)
Takeda: This is changing the sub~ect a little, but in case of an invasion, it ~s
- the Self Defense Forces which have to fight, right? And if we cannot win, it is
meanin~less. I think that this major goal is being forgotten. Some civilians
think there is no reason to have jet f ighter aircraft with speeds greater the
speed of sound outside of training areas. This is a big mistake. In order to pro-:
tect Japan, we must.have fighters faster than the speed of sound and we must have
heavily armed aircraft as well.
Then what should be done? It is not necessary to have the training areas secured
by government authority? If the action ~aken by the government remains the same
so that there is no meaning in having these areas, we cannot achieve the objective.
- We see the same inadequate concepts in both the defense guidelines and the overall
system.
Uchidas Recently, there was a report of a Self Defense Force vessel Ureaking a
. fishing line. I would like to see the government take action so that such problems,
just like the training area problems, would not occur.
Kurisu: Also, we cannot f ire our largest artillery.
40
FOR OPFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFiC1AL USE ONLY
Uchida: Ever since the crash of the Self Defense Force plane at Shizukuishi, public
opinion has become.more critical. It is diff icult right now to coaduct troop
movements because of complaints about noise pollution.
Question: Let's go back to the theory of a crisis in the 1980's which we discussed
at f irst. There is a theory that as loa~g as Japan maintains unarmed neutrality,
it can avoid a war, right?
Takeda: This is ridiculous. A valuable country like Japan will be taken over if
it stays unarmed and neutral.
Uchida: There wi11 probably not be a war where only Japan is talr.ea. over. I
believe it will be a matter of how to dispose of Japan in the context of a world-
wide strategy. No one will devise a limited st=ategy whereby Japan alone is attacked
without using nuclear weapons. If it becomes necessary to take ~'apan on the basis
- of an overall strategy, we will probably be invaded.
Tragedy of Unarmed Neutrality
Kurisu: It will be a matter of getting rid of a nuisance. (laugh)
Takeda: It is a big mistake to suppose that if the Soviet Union were to take over
while we are unarmed and neutral, a war could be avoided. Even America is not.that
nice. It would not just hand over Japan's ecunomic and industrial power to the
Soviets. If a war began, Japan's geopnlitical value would become more important
than those things.
Kurisu: Even if America did not destroy us, the war would not last foxever. Even-
tually, peace would come. Then, al~hough we would not have a different constitu-
tion, ~re would have to maintain an honorable position in world society. If we had
been taken without a fight, we would be made fools of by the Soviet Union.~ America
and other countries would not recognize the existence of the Japanese.
In the previous war, Denmark was almost put in that poaition. It was a f irst in
_ world history for a country to surrender within 4 houra. When the Gern?an warships
entered tts northeastern territorial waters, not a shot was fired, even though it
had shore defense batteriea. The authoritiea gave orders not to~resiat. I suppoee
they thought that was best. Germany invaded Norway on the same day, but Norway
resisted for 2 months, so it received both material and moral support from the
Allies. Denmark was abandoned. Then Denmark realized tr.at when peace came, it
- would be erased from the world map, so it began guerrilla resistance and set up a
government in exil.e.
Uchida: Japan would disappear as a country. The young people are total cowards, so
they would have to live as a sub~ect people, without the self-respect to rebuild
their o-,an country. ~
Takeda: If Japan entered the Soviet bloc, it would not be able to trade freely.
It is questionable whether 100 million people would be able to 11ve in this small
land.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Bungei Shunju Ltd
9651
CSO: 4105/252
41
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000440070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT STATUS OF ROBOT INDUSTRY OTULINED
Tokyo SHUKAN ORU TOSHI in Japanese No 451, 16 Jul 81 pp 12-13
[Text] Japan Is the World Leader in Robot Strength
The J~apanese robot industry had its start with the introduction of technology from
~he United States about 1965. This industry has since grown to the stage that at
present it is a representative mechatronics industry which places Japan as the
world's "robot ruler."
The production volume �or 1980 was 78.4 billion yen and 19,700 units were produced,
- and the Japan Industrial Use Robot Industry Association estimates that this produc-
*_ion will amount to 290 billion yen in 1985 and to 600 billion yen in 1990, and the
possibility of breaking the 1-trillion-yen mark seems not too far away.
In the Western countr3es, as of March 1979, the number of robots on.hand amounted
to 5,850 units in West Germany and 3,255 units in the United States--an order of
magnitude lower than tne 47,000 units in use in Japan. A number of reasons can be
cited for this tardy situation on the part of the Western countries.
Strengthen "Mishmash" of Technology ~
First of all, there is the difference in the makeup of the labor unions. Japan's
labor unions are intra-industry unions, and while th~ introduction o� robots causes
changes in work assignments, it does not result in loss of ~obs. In eontrast, the
unions of the Western world are classified according to different occupations, and
the introduction of robots to welding and painting processes results directly in
loss of ,jobs for welders and painters. This is why there has been extremely great
- opposition to the introduction of robots on the part of the workers. There was a
strike lasting 3 weeks at the Rosetown plant of the American GM Company in February
1972. This is the famous incident known as "the Rosetown revolt," and the reason
it occurred was the taking over of welding operations by the "Unimaice robot,"
causing worker dissatisfaction. This clearly illustrates ~he diffarence~ in the
manner of handling labor problems between Japan and the United States.
In the second place, there is the difference in the robot development system itself.
As indicated by the statement that a robot is a model mechatronics prac3uct, it is
a wedding of high-precision mechanical finishing technology and electron technology
centered on the micon. The micons, sensors, and actuators rahich are the important
constituent elements all involve technology that is not much different in America
42
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
from that found in Japan, and there are some aspects where the Americans are decidedly
superior. The difference lies in the fact that the industrial area which encompasses
the "mishmash" of technology call~d mechatronics is greatly exploited in Japan. What
cannot be overlooked here is the presence of integrated electrical makers such as
Hitachi.
- For example, Hitachi is comprised o~;27.plants with seven research laboratories
where research and development on heavy electrical equipment, light electrical equip-
ment, semiconductors, nuclear power plants, and small production technology are under
way. This means that all the technology directly tied in with robots is held by
this cr_e cor~pany, and this is an extremely convenient setup.
In this respect, representative American companies such as Unimation and Cincinnati
Miracron are industries which belong to the machine induetry family, and their
strength in electronics is limited.
As robots of higher performance (intelligent robots) are developed, it is the quality
of the software that is the soul of the control teChnology, more than the hardware
making up the robot which becomes subject to question. When that comes to pass,
even where a Japanese integrated maker is concerned, it will fall one step behind
if its control technology is weak. On the other hand, it is rumored that the
American giants of the conpute~ industry, IBM and Texas Instruments, will enter this
_ market, and they may become a major threat in control technology just because of
their "capabilities."
Nevertheless, Japan has the stage to itself at the present time. In fact, the United
States, which has fallen behind in turning to the use of robots to man its welding
and painting lines, will be pushing its "rearmament" program for its production
lines, and the American companies headed by GM should turn out to be a good market
for robots in the future. Looking at last year's figures, there was as yet very
little export of robots, but the Robot Industry Association is pointing toward an
export rate of 20 percent in 1985 and 25 percent in 1990.
When that comes to pass, there probably will not be the frictional problems such as
those that occurred following the torrential exports of automobiles and TV sets.
This is because while robots require onsi~e service and parta supply, they are mainly
a production commodity and are directly tied to "industrial secrets" such as altera-
tion in production lines by the introduciRg industry and production tenhno~ogy.
This alone presumes a relationship of trust between companies. Hitachi has bared
~~ts plans to enter into OEM supply agreements with American automatic companies and
"gradually enter into onsite business."
Problems in Development of Intelligent Robots
The problem Japan, the "robot ruler," must face is the development of the intelligent
robot which is the next generation robot. The reason for the urgenc;* in speeding up
_ development of this intelligent robot is the need to convert at least 25-30 percent
of the assembly processes to robo~s in order to rationalize production lines,
introduce conservation of labor, and enable realization of completely unmanned
operations. Al1 assembly processes are not as uniform in their na~u=e of work as
in welding, and the number of parts and work points will be much greater.
43
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONL~'
For this purpose, the makeup of the robot need only imitate the upper limb section
of man (arms, wrists), but as the number of operations become greater and assemblies
become more involved, any number of arms and hundreds of wrists will need to be
involved in the application. In addition, the production line of the future will
handle mostly a varied array of products, and pattern recognition will head the
list of sensor technology, including recognition of sounds, voices and temperature.
At the present time, robots with assembly capability seems to be in the development
stage throughout the world. Some representiative models include the "Puma" of the
American Unimation Company, of which the GM Corporation as the ~.argest American
robot introducing industry hopes to "introduce 5,000 units" over the next 10 years.
This is a rather expansive hope, because at present there are at best 70 units in
the whole world. Even in Japan, *he present situation is that one or two units made
by Kawasaki Heavy Industries are in the testing stage at some automobile makers.
Another problem remaining is how much line speed lost through introduction of sight
and touch capabilities of the robot in order for it to ~udge and sense objects can
be restored. On the other hand, advances in robot technology are taking place every
day, and it is the general belief that the age of robots with actual assembly
capabilities will be coming in 2-3 years.
44
FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
~OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
This Is the Intelligent Robot for Welding Application
- ~ I
~II ~ , I
,I~, I ~i i~ r (2 ~ p~ 1. y.
II Ili I ~ii .
~I~ ~li ' r,
I ~ I I~ ~ .
~ I ~ . ~
~Ilt
~ ~I~ : ~ c~~~
Q
. . y .
(1)~~,~ (3) : (5� ~F-~
~r~ ,
~ s~ .
, :
~
( 6 ) ~p'~ -
.
( n ) ~
. . { ~'r
.
( 7 ) f~1~~6~
~ ~
t i~-~E~~(~'~f~7)~ . �
l~.'"''.c#1~~~ r ~ ~ ~ ~ "9~7~~' ' ~ a ~ ~ '
Z'i'~9~i~" b ~~i~~E~v) a
~
:f; �r F ~ ~ ~ < i~ ~ ~o ' . . ~
~10)
(i~)~~~~cEpl#i'~~fi7~ir~7$
T~o
_ ~ ~7".c^`
Key:
1. Power source 6. Main body
2. Wrist 7. Control section
3. Hand or hand and fingers 8. An intelligent robot is...
4. Ultrasonic s~nsor 9. Greatly different from present robots in
5. Welding torch that it operates thr4ugh "intelligence"
provided by sensor capabilities (upper
right diagram) and awareness capabilities.
10. The white arrows point to direction of movement
COPYRIGHT: Shukan Oru Toshi 1981
2267
CSO: 4105/263 ~
45
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400074045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
INDEPENDENT ACADEMY OF TECHNOLOGY PROPOSED
' Tokyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN in Japanese 2 Sep 81 p 1
- [Text] Academy of Technology to be Established Independent of Science Council;
Selection Committe Assigned by Prime Minister; LDP Prepares Bill; Government Approves
Budget
T'he conflict between Director General Nakayama of the Prime Minister's Office and the
Science Council of Japan (Yasuji Fushimi, chairman; 210 members) has become a serious
problem, In the midst of this, the LDP Science and Technology Liaison Committee
(Takashi Hashiguchi, chairman) completed drawing up a proposal for a"Japan Academy
of Technology as the central organ for Japanese researcia in science and technology by
making Department No 5(technology department) of the Science Couincil independent. The
plan is to submit this as House member legislation to the next ordinary session of the
Diet. The government has given its consent to the bill and its funding. The aim of
the academy is to promote a more active exchange between government, academia, and
industry for "original and innovative development of science and technology." The
selection committ~e in charge of recommending the chairman and members of the academy
- has been assigned by the prime minister, and financing is to be provided in equal parts
by the government and by industry. Therefore, the Science Council is already criti-
cizing this effort as "weakeMing the Science Council and threatening the independence
of science." This also relates to government educational policy and the textbook
problem, so it seems likely to cause debate. ~
"Weakening of Science Council", "Interference in Science": Science Council Protests
The LDP Science and Technology Liaison Co~nittee was formed in response to the Science
and Technology Cabinet Minister's Liaison Council organized last year. Until recently
it was divided into seven sections; it has served as a forum for exchange of opinions
about the proper role of science and technology with a view to the 21st century. It
came to the conclusion that "greater development of science and technology is necessary
to maintain and improve present economic growth in the future; Japan cannot survive
unless the country is built up on the basis of science and technology." As a specific
proposal, the committee formed the plan for tk~e Japan Academy of Technology.
_ It used the academies of technology already set up in America and Sweden as models and
also referred to the ideas of Dr Reona Ezaki, the Nobel Prize winner, for a technology
academy. The committee held two meetings of subcommittee chairmen at the end of last
month and listened to an explanation from Dr Ezaki, now back in Japan, about the
operation and performance of the American Academy. Finally, an outline for the bill
was decided upon as a subcommittee proposal.
46
FOR OFFiC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICI.AL USE ONLY
According to the proposal, the purpoae of the academy would be "to promote exchange and
mutual enlightenment of superior researchers and technicans involved in technology
and closely related scientific studies in academic, industrial, and government insti-
tutians, and to contribute to the pro~ress of original, innovative technology through
research, analysis and evaluation of the possibilities of pioneering work in original
- new technology." The bill calls for far-ranging cooperation between government,
academia, and industry in order to promote original research, said to be a weak area
of Japanese science and technology, and "establish a system for proper evaluation" of
re~earch results (according to an LDP source).
Academy members will be recommended by a selection committee (appointed by the prime
minister from people recommended by the committee chairman). They must: 1) be engaged
in technological research or work duties and 2) have published excellent research
papers related to technology or achieved superior results in technological work. The
members will be appointed but must retire at the age of 60. (Council members must be
over 55 years of age.) Total funding will be 1.5 billion yen, half to be prQVided b~
.the government and half by private industry.
The bill provides that "the academy shall m.aintain close co~unications with the Science
Council of Japan," presenting a scheme of coexistence with the Science Council. How-
ever, an LDP source who participated in the preparation of the bill emphasizes the
necessity of establishing the academy as follows: "The members of the present Science
C~tmcil are elderly and not very active. They present reports to the government only
a few tintes a year, rrom the viewpoint of promoting scientific and technical develop-
ment, they do not function effectively." He recognizes that certain features of the
academy reflect dissatisfaction with the state of the Science Council. These include:
1) the method of selection (by reconmmendation; the Science Council members are elected),
2) a retirement age of 60 (there is no age limit for the Science Council), and 3)
stricter qualifications.
In preparing this bill proposal, the LDP committee consulted unofficially with the
government and obtained a basic agreement on the establishment of the academy,
- The Science Council is strongly cautioning that "the government and the ruling party
are attempting to weaken the Science Ceuncil," earnestly renewing their attacY. in the
debate over the Science Council.
Reason for Existence of Department No S--View of Yoshinosuke Yasojima, Head of Department
No 5 in the Science Council of Japan
"I have not seen the LDP proposal so I cannot say much at this stage. However,
Department No 5 is well aware of the importance of promoting science and technology
in Japan. Even if a new organization is set up, Department No 5 itself still has a
_ reason for existence. The field of technology is important, but is it not necessary to
think about the position of technology in relation to all academic fields?"
Serious Debate; ~overnment Working Behind the Scenes
The "Japan Academy of Technology Bill," drawn up by the LDP on 1 September, has a very
strong political side.
47
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OH F(CIAL USE ONLY
- An LDP source says: "In drawing up the bill, we consulted with director generals
Komoto of the Economic Planning Agency, Nakagawa of the Science and Technolgoy Agency,
and Nakayama of the Prime Minister's Office and obtained their approval for the sub-
stance cf the bill." He admits that although this is referred to as an LDP proposal,
it is actually a government and LDP proposal prepared wi.th government approval. Speci�ic
plans for establishing the academy are already fairly well set. For example, the 750
million yen which the government will contribute to the total budget of 1.~0 billion
yen will come from the science and technology promotion coordinating expenses already
allocated to the Science and Technology Agency budget.
In spite of this, the LDP will submit the bill to the Diet in the form of House member
legislation. This is apparently an attempt to avoid criticism of government interference
in academic independence from the Science Council and some of the opposition parties.
This method of approach by the government itself indicated that the government expects
the academy problem to arouse a fierce debate.
- COPYRIGHT: Yomiuri Shimbunsha 1981
9651
CSO: 4106/6
48
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000440070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
MITI ADVISORY ORGAN STUDYING FUTURE TECHNOLOGY FOLICY
Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 17 Sep 81 p 1
[Text] Improving Basic Research; Less Total Strength than Europe and the United States;
Recommendation Expected Soon from Long-Term Policy Research Co~nittee for Industrial
Technology Development
The Long-Term Planning and Policy Research Committee for Industrial Technology Development
(private advisory organ to the chairman of the Industria~ Technology Council of MITI;
committee chairman: Yujiro Hayashi, assistant director of the Future Technology Research
Institute) is making final preparations for a recommendation report on the "ideal state
of Japanese industri.al technology development in the future," to be completed by the
first part of October, The gist of the recommendation was announced on the 16th.
According to th;L.s r.eport, Japanese industrial technology, especially manufacturing tech-
nology, has attained a high international reputation at present, but there are many
areas where funding is lacking, beginning with basic research, and our overall strength
in industrial technology still lags behind the United States and.Europe. Therefore
it advocates the following: 1) it is necessary for private industry to have an aware-
ness of its prime role in development and to expand its long-term research and develop-
ment capability in basic and general areas; and 2) the government should prepare the
environment to promote expansion of independent research and development by private
industry. The report warns that if this policy is not followed, "we cannot hope for an
improvement of the international competitiveness of Japanese industry as we look toward
the 21st century." MITI plans to accept this recommendation when it is completed and
_ use it in forming its future policy for industrial technology.
Private Development Capability Is the Key
The study committee made an interim report last year strongly urgin~ the creation of the
"next-generation basic industrial technolAgy development system" which MITI began under
a 10-year plan in 1981. It has offered timely advice on the state of. Japanese industrial
technology development, and its recouunendations ha~~e been conspicuously used in steering
industrial technology policy.
The present recommendation, as well as the interim report, considers the future of
Japanese industrial technology from an overall point of view.
Previously, the substance of recommendations referred to the relationship between
industrial research and development and economic progress, saying that improving the
capability for research and development had a role in strengthening the international
competitiveness of Japanese industry. Now it is saying that private research and
development is the key to maintaining our comparative international strength.
49
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
On this basis, it analyzes the Jspanese research and development capability and
- technological level,makin~ international comparisons, and points out that Japan is
_ still in an inferior position in comparison with the United States and E~urope,
particularly t~~e United States, in basic research and development. It also points
' to a lag in overall technological strength.
Therefore, the co~ittee holds that our industrial technology development capability
must be further expanded. In order to do this, it calls for a stronger coalition
between government and academia, with private industry taking the main role, and for
increasing private research and development spending, especially basic research
spending. Along with this it advises positive use of the universities.
The report also touches on future industrial technology, pointing to miniaturization
technology, information technology, and composite technology as three important trends.
It says that these three areas are undeniablv important as major directions in thinking
in the research and development in all industrial fields and that the nex~-generation
basic industrial technology development already started is in line with these large
trends, defining them as nationally important areas of new technological develoment.
However, the report raises doubts about coming industrial technology development
depending too heavily on the government. It emphasizes the need for private industry
to be aware of its major role, selecting new research and development issues and working
on them with increased research and development capability.
As a recommendation to the government, it asks the government to take the role of
preparing the proper environment to promote more research and develogment to be performed
- mainly by the private sector. ~
MITI emphasized the need to promote original technological development in a report
_ entitled "The Path To Building the Country on the Basis of Technology" in the "MITI
Policy Vision for the 1980's: drawn up in the spring of 1980, and raised the goal of
increasing the percentage of the GNP spent for research and develop~ent from approxi-
mately 2 percent at present to 2.5 percent in the mid-1980's and 3 percent by the end
of the 1980's. Early on, MITI emphasized the need to formulate a vision of technolog-
ical development to create a country founded on creative technology, a vision of the
path which technology should follow going into the 1980's and 1990's, and a proposal of
the technologies which should be emphasized. The present "recoammendation" attempts
to do this.
- MITI plans to accept the completed recommendation in the first part of October and use
it in formulating its industrial technology policies.
COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha 1981
9651
CSO: 4106/9
50
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000440070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL iJSE ONI.Y
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
FURUKAWA EXPORTS OPTICAL FIBER CABLE TO CORNING GLASS WORKS
Tokyo GEKKAN KOMPUTA DAIJESTO in Japanese 10 Oct 81 p 84
[Text] It was revealed on the Sth that a large quantity of: optical fiber telephone
cable has been exported to the U.S. market by Furukawa Electric ~o LTD. The buyer was
the world'slargest glass manufacturer and the developer of the optical fiber--Corning
Glass Works ~(headquarters in the state of New York). It is a large-scale business
deal involving long-distance transmission optical fiber cables, 2,500 km in total
length. Efforts to export optical fiber cable to the United States by Japan's large
cable manufacturers was previously fruitless due to the barrier set up by the Corning
Glass Works' patent. By establishin~ a supply route with the "creator" of the optical
fiber, Furukawa Electric appears to have taken a great lead over other firms in the
same business in developing the U.S. market.
The current export of optical fiber cables to Corning Glass Works by Furukawa Electric
is believed to have been concluded in August. Although deta~ls of the business deal,
such as the size of the order, have not been made clear, the optical fiber cables are
believed to be of 12-strand to 48-strand construction (cables containing 12 to 48
aptical fibers). These optical fiber cables will all be delivered to Canada's largest
communications machine manufacturer--Northern Telemco--from Corning Glass Works.
_ A large quantity of optical cables will be used by Northern Telemco in its project
involving application of optical communications technology to the pub lic communications
system, including telephone circuits, to be carried out in Saskatchewan Province in
central Canada. Furukawa Electric's optical fiber cables will supply 80 percent of the
total length of 3,200 km, or 2,500 km, of the pro~ect's cable requirement. These
_ cables will play and important role in th3s optical coimmunications network that will
interconnect the telephone stations.
Corning Glass Works is the manufac:urer which developed the ~irst practical opital fiber
11 years ago. It supplies optical fibexs to half the world's market excluding Japan.
It is considered a"giant" in the optical communications business, similar to IBM in the
- computer business. This deal is the first time Corning Glass Works has purchased
communications cable containing optical fibers from any Japanese manufacturer.
Corning Glass Works limits it production to optical fibers and is not considering the
manufacture of cabl~ itself. The reason Furukawa Electric was selected for the large
purr.hase of optical fiber cable reportedly was because of Furukawa's good reputation in
_ r.abl.e n~anufacturing method, including its protective membrane technology, the streneth
51
FOR OFFICIAL USC ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
and quality of the construction and the overall performance. Also, since February 1977
Furukawa Electric has been the exclusive licensee in Japan of Corning Glass Works'
patents concerning optical fiber construction and manufacturing method. This strong
link was no doubt another reason.
Now that Furukawa Electric has made a breakthrough in exporting optical fiber cable to
the United States via Corning Glass Works in the form of an "indirect export," it is
- believed that Furukawa Electric will be able to cultivate a U.S. market without worrying
about the patent barrier posed by Corning Glass Works'in the future.
At a time when the optical coimnunications business is ,suddeni,y taking off in the United
States, so that AT&T is sounding out the four Zarge cable manufacturers in Japan,
including Furukawa Electric and Sumitomo E'ectric, about large purchases of optical
fiber cables, it is quite probable that the Furukawa Electric may make a clean sweep of
- them all. (Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun 6 Aug 81)
COPYRIGHT: Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun 1981
9113
CSO: 8129/0157 END
52
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070045-1