JPRS ID: 10132 USSR REPORT POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/10132
- 20 No'vember 1981
~ USSR Re ~ ort
_ I~
- POLITICAL AND SOCIOIOGICAL A~FAIRS
(FOUO 28/81)
F~~~ FOREIGN BROADCAST iNFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/10132
20 November 1981
- USSR REPORT
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(~OUO 28/81)
CONTENTS
INTERNATTONAL
Lasting Effects of Maoism in CCP, Anti-Soviet Courae of PRC Analyzed
(Viktor Borisovich Laptev; VOPROSY ISTOKII, Ju1 81) 1
REGIONAL
F
~ Ideological-Mora1 Education Problems in Estonia
(F1sa Grechkina; NOUKOGUDE KOOL, No 7, 1981) 15
- a - [III - USSR - 35 FOUO]
nl~f? ~rrsn~ � w inr, na.rR v ~
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- INTERNATIONAL
LASTING EFFECTS OF MAOISM IN CCP, ANTI-SOVIET COURSE OF PRC AN~I.YZID
Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian.No 7, Jul 81 pp 59-73
[Article by Viktor Borisovich Laptev, graduate student at the Diplomatic Academy of
the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specializing in the history of international
relations in the Far East: "Petty-Bourgeois Tendencies in the CCP and the Shaping
_ of Bei~ing's Anti-Soviet Policy"]
[Excerpts] For many years now, anti-Sovietism has fieem elevated to the rank of
state policy in China. Bei~ing leaders, while mouthing their adherence to the ideals
of communism, have in practice conducted a policy prodoundly hostile to the cause of
socialism, both within the country and in the world arena, and have aimed the cutting
edge of their subaersive policy at the primary force of the world socialist system,
the Soviet Union. This cfrcumstance ha~ necesaitated thorough atudy of the history
. of the Chinese Cotmnunist Party (CCP) and ita shift from revolutionary, progressive
positions to cooperation with the imperialiat atates and to conducting a great-power,
hegemonistic, anti-Soviet poliey.l Marxist researchers are introducing into scienti-
fic circulation ever more material and facts on the events which hav~ been of great
importance to the destinies of the Chinese Co~nunist Party, to ~hgp3ng its political
course. Their attention continues to be drawn to the personality of Mao Zedong and
his acti~rity in the CCP which was destructive to the cause of socialism in China.
Considerable factual material is contained in 0. Brgun's book "Ritayskiye zapiski"
[Notes From China], (1~Ioscow, 1974), in Wang Ming's work "Polveka KPK i predatel'stvo
- Mao Tszeduna" [Half A Century of the CCP and the Treacher}? of Mao Zedong], (Moscow,
1979) and in the book "Osobyy rayon K~taya" [A Special Region of China], (Moscow,
1974), by P. P. Vladimirov, Comintern liaison to the CCP Central Committee and TASS
1iOpasnyy kura" [Dangerous Course), collection of articles, Nos 1-10, Moscow, 1969-
1980; A. Ye. Bovin and L. P. L~elyuain, "Polit~cheskiy krizis v Kitaye. Sobytiya
prichiz~y" [Political Crisis in China. Events and Causes], Moscow, 196d; 0. Bori~ov,
"Sovetskiy Soyuz i Man'chzhurskaya revolyutaionnaya baza (1945-1949)" [The Soviet
Union and the Manchurian Revolutionary B~se (1945-1949)], Moscow, 1975; S. L. Ti-
khvinskiy, "Istoriya Kitaya i sovremennost [History of China and the Present],
- Moscow, 1976; V. A. Krivtsov, "Maoizm: istoki i sushchnost [Maoism: Sources and
- Essence], Moacow, 1976; 0. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, "Soveteko-kitayskiye ot-
nosheniya, 1945-1977" [Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-1977], 2nd edition, expanded,
Moscow, 1977; M. I. Sladkovskiy, "Kitay: osnovnyye problemy istorii, ekonomiki,
ideologii" [China: Basic Problems of History, Economq, Ideology], Moscow, 1978;
M. S. Kapitsa, "KNR: tri desyatiletiya tri politiki" [The PRC: Three Decades,
Three Policies), Moscow, 1979.
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military corre3pondent in Yanang (from May 1942 through November 1945). Books by F.
Burlatskiy, "Mao Tszedun" [Mao Zedong~, (Moecow, 1970), "Mao Tszedun i ego nasledni-
ki" [Mao Zedong and His Successors], (Moscow, 1979) and a work by 0. Ye. Vladimirov
and V. I. Ryazantsev, "Stranitsy politicheskoy biografii Mao Tszedun" [Pages Frota the
Political Biography of Mao Zedong], (Moscow, 1980), made a substantial contribution
- to unmasking the antiparty and anti-Soviet activity of Mao Zedong and his allies by
demonstrating that, throughout his CCp activity, Mao Zedong always, secretly or open-
- ly, a3vocated nationalistic positiona, waged a persistent atruggle against the inter-
nationalist wing of the party, propagatsd his own suthority in every waq possible and
was an intransigent enemy of Marxist-Leninist teachings. This article examines the
re2sons for the development of petty-bourgeois, national~stic tendencies in the Chin-
ese Communist P3rty and the spread of Maoism in it.
The overall sociaeconomic backwardneas of China predetermined in considerable measure
- the difficulties and con�licts in establishing the CCP. The very conditions under
which the Chinese Communist Party was formed favored the activity within its ranks of
elements alienated by class to the cause ~f proletarian revoluCion vnd the spread in
the party of their petty-bourgeois~ nationalistic concepts. This kind of theory could
have arisen and existed only under conditiona of isolation of the broad masses o� the
party from the experience of building socialism in the US5R and other socialist coun-
tries, as a result of shameless falsification of Marxist-Leninist teachings and the
substitution of home-grown, petty-bourg~ois, nationalistic ideas for them. Hence,
the enmity of Mao Zedong to the Soviet Union and the CPSU. The fruitlessness of Mao-
ist theoxies and their failure on contacz with real life were also predetermined by
the methods Mao Zedong used to propagate his views. Inside th~ country, they in-
cluded the pursuit of all manner of heterodoxies and slander against the Soviet Un-
ion, ~the CPSU and other communist Farties. In foreign policy, they meant a bitter
struggle against the USSR and a policy of hegetnony in relations with ather states.
At the start of this centux'y, China was a backward, agrarian country. In spi.te of
the fact that the development of a capitalist method of production had been acceler-
ating the breakdown of feudali~m in the country aince the lats 19th Century, its sur-
vivals were very strong, especially in rural areas. Machine industry, belonging gen-
erally to foreign capital, was concentrated i.~ a few large cities. Small, primitive
enterpriaes predominated in industry, by and large. The class structure of Chinese
sociEty reflected *he undeveloped, backward nature of the country's productive forces.
The classes and.social strata of a precapitalist and transition-to-capitalism type
comprised the overwhelming ma~ority of the Chinese population, at least 90 percent of
whom lived in rural areas. The peasantry, the bulk of whom were landless and forced
to rent land on cabalistic terms from landownera and kulaks, was doomed to poverty.
The working class had ~ust begun taking ahape. A ma~ority of the workers, recently
arrived from the countryside, were employed at unskilled manual labor.
- In view of this concrete-historiral circumatance, V. I. Lenin thought China needed
first of all to eliminate feudal survivals, at that stage of its development. Lenin
wrote that the working class of China was not yet a force capable of leading a revo-
lutionary movement in the country.
The overthrow of the feudal-monarchic aociety as a result of the 1911-1913 Xinhai re-
volution helped strengthen the pos3tions of the Chinese national bourgeoisie. In the
first stage of the revolution, the bourgeoisie promoted general democratic slogans
and, in an alliance with other anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces, dominated the
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nationsl-liberation and revoluti~*+~ry movement of China. Lenin stressed the progres-
sive role of the leading portion of the Chinese bourgeois and ite ability to facili-
~ate the process of democratic transformations in the country~
2'he victorious October Revolution and the successful actualization of Marxist-Lenin-
ist teachings in the course of the three Russian revolutions made a profound impres-
= sion on the democratic forces of China, which immediately attempted to establish
ties with Soviet Russia.
Lenin viewed the national-liberation movement in the colonial and dependent countries
as an ally of the world proletariat.
Soviet Russia and the Comintern, in performance of their international duty, r~ndered
the Chinese revolutionary and national-liberation movement broad, comprehensive as-
sistance. The 1919 RSFSR Council of People's Commissariats appeal "To the Chinese
People and the Governments of South and North China," in which the Soviet government
rescinded all the agreements of Tsarist Russia which infringed on China's interests
and proposed the establishment of equal, friendly relations between Soviet Russia and
China,l was an action of great political importance, which strengthened ttre faith of
the Chinese people in the revolutionary ideals of a socialist revolution in Russia.
In the 1920's, China was able to obtain the political, economic and military assist-
- ance it needed in the struggle against imperialism and its proteges only from the So-
viet state. The establishment of tiea between Soviet Russia and the Chinese revolu-
tionary movement and the activity of the first Chinese Marxists, Li Dazhao, Qu Qiubo,
Zhang Tailei and others, helped familiarize Chinese revolutionaries with Marxist-
Leninist teachings and the experience of the October Revolution. The lst (constitu-
_ ent) CCP Congress was held on the outskirts of Shanghai in the summer of 1921. Party
strategy and tactics were worked out at subsequent congreases, the 2nd (1922) and 3rd
(1923). Direct, active assistance on the part of the Comintern played a most import-
an~ role in the theflretical establishmeat of the CCP.
The close contacts between Chinese co~nunists and the Comintern and studying the ex-
perience of the international working class were esp~cially needed in connection with
the fact that the Chine~e Communist Party was born in a country with weak, newly
_ evolving proletarian traditions. The gr~at enthusiasm for Marxism generated by the
October Revolution carried with it a danger of simplified understanding of the funda-
mental concepts of Marxist-I~eninist teachings, emasculation of its class content, ac-
comodation and an eclectic combination of them and the petty-bourgeois views of a ma-
- jority of the leaders of and participants fn Che national-liberation movement in
China. The use by representafiives of nonpraletarian strata of society of Marxist
phraseology to conceal their own goals, remote from the interests of the working
class, seriously damanged the revolutioaary atruggle of the working class as w~ell.
The unification of the working class in the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revo-
lution, with all its anti-feudal, anti-imperialist.forces, did not signify th~t the
special, c'ass interests af the proletariat diasoYved in that movement.
Relying on the international support of the intemational cummunist and workers'
movement and using the favorable factors of Chinese domestic-policy development, the
1'rpokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR" [Documents of USSR Foreign Po].icy], Vol 2, Mos-
cow, 1958, p 223.
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CCP grew into a significant force in the initial years of its existence. By the
start of 1927, its ranks numbered about 58,000 people, including 50.8 percent work-
ers, 18.7 percent peasants, 19.1 percent representatives of the intelligentsia, 3.1
percent soldiers and officers and 0.5 percent petty trades~nen.l The counter-
revolutionary overturn of 1927 by the reactfonary forces of Chin~ and the defeat of
the 1925-1927 revolution had a serious effect on the destinies of the communist party.
A majority of the best-prepared CCP activists most dedicated to the cause of social-
ist revolution, among them Li Dazhao, Qu Qiubo and Zhang Tailei, perished as a resul~
of strikes by that reaction. The proletariat suffered heavy losses, especially in
the two largest revolutionary centers of China. Guangzhou and Shanghai. The commun-
ist party shifted its activity from the cities to remote rural regions and operated
isolated from the working class and the international communist and workers' movement
over the next two decades.
Under these complex conditions, the oroanizational, political and ideological miscal-
culations of the young communist party were manif~sted with particular sharpness.
from the raoment of its formation, features were inherent to it which, in the absence
of systematic work by the leadership for ideolo~ical and class purity in its ranks,
threatened to grow into a serious danger to the ideological-political integrity of
the party and.be transformed�into a factor operating along the line of converCing the
CCP into a petty-bourgeois party defending positions having nothing in common with
Marxism-Leninism. This ~aas stated, in particular, in the resolution by the CCP Cen-
tral Committee Plenum convened in November 1927: "Nearly the entire leadershi~ of
our party consists not of workers, or even of the poorest peasants, but of represen-
tatives of the petty~bourgeois intelligentsia." The reasons, as was pointed out in
the resolution, were that the "CCP began evolving as a political current and as a
party back when the Chinese proletariat was not yet self-determining as a class and
when the class movement of workers and peasants was quite embryonic. Development of
- the national-liberation movement, in which the bourgeoisie, and especially the petty-
bourgeois intelligentsia, initially played an enormous role, long determined growth
in the class consciousness and class atruggle of the exploited masses in China. In
this period, the most radical elements of the petty bourgeois~ie sought to ,~oin the"
ranks of our party, occupying the left-most wing of the national-liberation movement
front. These elements also comprised the initial nucleus of the Chinese Communist
Party.2
The plenum resolution directly stated the dangerous consequences of such a situation:
"Due to this, the leadership role in the CCP has remain~ci with those from the petty-
bourgeois strata. Uplifted by the wave of revolutionary upsurge and et~thusiasm of
the initial period, not having passed through the theoretical school of Marxism and
Leninism, unfamiliar with the experience of the international proletarian movement,
not linked to the lower, exploited classea of the Chinese people and outside the
- class struggle of the workers and peasants, a significant portion of these revolu-
tionary petty-bourgeois elements have not only not been digested in the CCP, have
not been remade into consistent proletAxian revolutionaries, but have themselves
1iNoveyshaya istoriya Kitaya. 1917-1970 gg." [Newest History of China. 1917-1970J,
Moscow, 1972, p 108.
2Quoted from: 0. Vladimirov and V. Ryazantsev, Op. cit., p 20.
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introduced into the CCP all the politic~l instability, inconsistency, indecisiveness,
inability to organize, nonproletarian customs and traditions, pre~udices and illus-
ions of which only a pettq-bourgeois revolutionarq is capable."1
The negative phenomena in CCP activity indicated in the resolution were not overcome,
and intensified even more in sLbsequent years. In the 1930's and 1940's, party ranks
were reinforced almost exclusively bq people leaving rural areas. CCP Ieaders' re-
~ection of Leninist demands in question of partq development, including admissions to
the party, had far-reaching consequences. Campaigns to enlist in it representatives
of the most diverse social strata, including those from the exploiter classes, on a
broad scale were widespread. In rural areas, where the downtroddenness and backward-
_ ness of the peasants represented aerious difficulties in broadening the mass base of
the party, admission to the party was often combined with the distribution of land
among the peasants. The unprincipTed, forced increase in CCP membership led t~ a
situation in which it increased from 40,000 in 1931 to 800,000 in 1940. Up to 90
percent of the party members were naw peasants, and only 4-6 percent were workers,
primarily in small trade or handicraft shopa.2 In the cities, the CCP generally ad-
mitted representatives of the intelligentaia and petty-bourgeois strata during that
- period.
Thus, the CCP was transf~rmed into a peasant, petty-bourgeois party in terms of its
social composition. This could not but cause the spread of petty-bourgeois ideology
reflecting the interests of the bu1.k of the nonpreletarian elements comprising the
main contingent of party membez~s within its ranks.
The activity of Mao Zedong in the ranks of the Chinese Co~unist Party was destruc-
tive to its cause. From a kulak family and, 'uy his own admission, without any sort
of int~grated revolutionary vision, he viewed revalution,-~as did many leaders of
peasant movements in feudal China, as a c~?ance to gain the highest power and fully
- subordinated his activity in the CCP to this goal. Mao Zedong revealed himself to
- be a very experienced politician for whom an irrepressible thirst for power, inordi-
nate ambition, lack of principle and stubbornness in actualizing his schemes were
characteristic. In the 1930's and 1940's, when the Chineae Communist Party operated
in the remote, obscure regions of the country, Mao Zedong was able, through in.trigue
and unprincipled inCraparty maneuvering, not stopping at the destruction of his poli-
~ical enemies, to grasp a leaderehip poeition in the CCP.
The CCP social composition which evulved during that period suited Mao Z edong fully,
as it was close to his own views on the tasks and goals of the Chinese revolution.
The interests and g~ala for which the Chinese working class was fighting were for-
eign to petty-bourgeois revoZutionary Mao Zedong. Hence the indifference to social
criteria for admission to the party. The primary th3ng was the unquestioning adher-
ence of party members to his ins~ructions. Mao ~Zedong even encouraged strengthen-
ing the CCP by adding various nonproletarian elements.
- In his struggle for power, Mao Zedong viewed Marxism-Leninism from the very start
as the primary obstacle to actualizing his own plans. He saw binding the party to
his own ideological concepts and substituting Maoism for Marxism-Leninism as the
llbid. , pp 20-21.
2iNoveyshaya istoriya Kitaya. 1917-1970 gg.," p 192.
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theoretical foundation of the party as an indispensable condition for securing hfs
own power in the CCP. Mao Zedong's views were reflected in the New Democratic Re-
volution theory he advanced in 1940, which was presented in expanded form at the 7th
CCP Congress. Mao Zedong advanced as a minimum program the idea that it was neces-
sary to have an "alliance of several democratic classes," the development of a pri-
vate-capital economy "we have too little capitalism" over a long historical
period, tt~us granting a broad field of activity to the bourgeoisie. The "new demo-
cratic state" concept essentially denied the possibility of changing over to build-
ing socialism after the victory of a popular revolution.l
In 1941-1945, Mao Zedong managed to or~anize and wage a campaign for "proper style"
("zhengfeng"), in the course of which he discredited the experience of building so-
cialism in the USSR and the activity and recommendations of the Comintern and the
All-Russian Communist Party (bol'shevik). At the same time, Maoists defamed and re-
pressed internationalists. Mao Zedong's assistants destroyed thousands of Chinese
communists. As a result, Mao Zedong succeeded in breaking the resistance of the
international wing of the party to his own political course, to crush other party
leaders and work in his own ideological-political aims.
,
To his own ends, Mao Zedong inculcated the party ranks with the most reactionary
pre~udices, especially those characteristic of the backward cauutry China was. At
one time, Lenin warned ttiat "the more backward a country is, the stronger small-
scale farming, patriarchy and provinciality are in it, inevit~bly leading to special
strength and persistence of the most deep-seated of the petty-bourgeois ~re~udices,
to be precise, those of national egoism and national narrow-mindedness." In 1944,
in a conversation with Wang Ming, one of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party
during those years, Mao Zedong declared directly that the purpose of the "proper
style" campaign was t~ make it possible to record the history of the Chinese Com-
munist Party as his personal history.3 The historical facts were known to many, how-
ever, so Mao Zedong did everything he could to propagate his own interpretation of
the history af the Chinese revolution.
Thus, even in those years, Mao Zedong was working actively to incite anti-Sovietism
in party ranks, to divorce and isolate the CCP from the international communist and
- workers' movement. In so doing, the party was deprived of life-giving sources of in-
- ternational experience and assistance on the part of the fraternal parties, which is
so necessary for its correct development. The most important Leninist principle,
that the young parties of the East must maintain the very closest ties with the world
communist and ~aorkers' movement, "merging with the proletariats of other countries in
common struggle,i4 was violated. The 7th CCP Congress was held in this atmosphere in
April-June 1945. It summed up many years of intraparty struggle. Maoists succeeded
_ in gaining the upper hand over the internationalist wing of the party and propagating
their own right-opportunistic, nationalistic platform.
1Mao Zedong, "Izbr. proizv." [Selected Works], Vol 4, Moscow, 1953, pp SO1-513.
2V. I. Lenin, "PSS" [Complete Collected Works], Vol 41, p 168.
3Wang Ming, Op, cit., p 63.
~`V. I. Lenin, "PSS," Vol 39, p 330.
l
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The Soviet Union's entry into the war in the Far East and the defeat bq Soviet troops
of the millions-strong Japanese Kwangtung axmy fundamentally altered the military-
political situation in China. Thanks to Soviet assistance, the CCP was able to or-
ganixe a revolutionary base in the countrq's northeast where well-anned units of the
people's army were formed, later to play an important role ~n the defeat of the Kuo-
mindang armies. The extensive palitical, military and economic assistance on the
part of the USSR during the popular-liberation war facilitated the victory of the
Chinese revolution. The People's Republic of China (PRC) was forcned on 1 October
1949.
The Soviet-Chinese "Agreement on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid" sigaed in Mos-
cow on 14 February 1950 was of $reat importance to the further development of rela-
tions between the USSR and the PRC. The enormous contribution bq the Soviet Union
to the cause of victory and continued development of the Chinese revolution and its
assistance in building the new society ob~ectively facilitated growth in the pres-
tige and influence of Soviet experience in party and economic development among the
broad masses in the party and PRC cadre workers. Concrete experience in building
socialism, which developed in China in spite of the schemes and theoretical con-
structs of Mao Zedong and his all~es, naturally led Chinese communists to an under-
standing of the hostility of Maoist concepts on developing the country to the inter-
ests of the Chinese people and the cause of socialism. The positions of interna-
tionalists in the CCP began to be strengtheued.
On~ reflection of these processes wae certainly the 8th CCP Congress, held in Sep-
tember 1956. Several negative factors of intraparty life and mietakes permitted in
_ the course of building socialism were criticized at the congress. However, thQ new
central committee included practically all the central committee members elected by
the 7th Party Congress, which could not but have an effect on implementation of the
resolutions worked out at the 8th Congress.
The inconsistency of the struggle against the theory and practice of Maoism is tQ be
explained in consid~rable measure by the fact that, after the victory of the revolu-
tion, the social composition of the CCP facilitated disse~ination af the petty-
bourgeois concepts of Mao Zedong. In spite of some growth in the worker stratum
of the party (from 6.5 percent i.n May 1953 to 14 percent by 1956), it remained es-
sentially peasant: by 1956, some 69 percent of its members were peasants and 12
percent were of the intelligentsia.l
'rhe successes in building socialism in China in the early 1950's generated in Mao
Ze4ong and his allies the revolutionary illusion inherent to the petty bourgeois
that it would be possible to accelerate the development of China along a path of
transforming it into a powerful state with a modern military-iudustrial potential.
Not understanding thp pa~terns af economic devalopment.under socialism, Mao Zedong
completely ignored the law of planned, proportional development. Due to the ideolo-
gical and political immaturity of the broad party masses, Mao Zedong succeeded in
foisting on the party the aims of forcing socialist transformations initially in-
tended to take three f ive-year plans. The villages were made cooperative and pri-
vate-ca~ital industry and trade were transformed i:. 1955-1956. However, after the
congress which affirmed the aim of planned development of the Chinese economy, Mao-
ists succeeded in diverting the party from that course and undertaking on a nation-
1iNoveyshaya istoriya Kitaya. 1917-1970 gg.," pp 256, 286.
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wid~ scale an attempt to achieve in a very brief period a sharp increase in the level
of industrial and agricultural production. The total ~ack of conformity of forms
and methods and rates of development of the Chinese economy as thrust upon it by Mao
Zedong to the objective socioeconomi~ conditions o.f China led to the collapse of
the "Great Leap" policy and to a serious cris~s in ~the Chia~e~e economy. Mao Ze-
dong's ambitious plans to make China one of the stro~gest worYd powers in a single
spurt were crushed.
Having suffered defeat in the economic sphere, Mao Zedong embarked on implementa-
tion of his gr.eat-powe~ plans in the area of foreign policy. "We must subjugate the
whole globe" was how Mao foxmulated the goal of Maoists tn the world areria'at a meet-
ing of the CCP Central Committee Military Council in 1959.1 Making out his hegemon-
ist strivings to be a manifestation of clasa struggle in international relations,
they counted on foisting their adventuristic policy on the world communist and work-
ers' movement, Rnd foremost on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, in
order to use their military and economic potential. At a Conference of Representa-
tives of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957, Mao Zedong proposed: "Let's first
test our strength, and then return to building."2 However, the attempt to subordi-
nate the soeialist countries and the world commu~ist movement to the aims of the Mao-
ists was not successful. In this regard, the actions of the Maoists revealed their
theoretical helplessness, reactionariness aad the adventuristic nature of the PRC
foreign policy cours~. Subsequentlq, Maoist policy simed at splitting the interna-
tiQnal communist and workers' movement and exteading their influence to the national
liberation movement unavoidably led them to international isolation, to undermining
trust in the PRC, inasmuch as it was completely contradictory to the interests of
peoples desiring peace and to ensuring conditions for cr.eative labor.
Intensified anti-Sovietism became a characteristic feature of the Maoist foreign po-
licy course after the 8th CCP Congresa. The activizy of Mao Zedong end his allies
- was always accompanied by attacks on Marxiem-Leninism under the banner of its sup-
posed "obsoleteness" and "nonconformity to Chinese conditiona." Maoist theories of
"Chinicized Marxism" were proposed to replace them. Since the late 1950's, the Soviet
experience in building socialism has been subjected to increasingly harsh attacks.
The campaign of refuting everything Soviet took on especially broad scope during the
"Great Leap" period. Under slogans of combatting "dogmatism" aad "blind worship of
authorities," "local," "Chinese" methods conflicting with the objective trends of
social development were propagate3. Such methods could be used only under condi-
tions of a premeditated distortion of the esaence of Marxlst-Leninist teachings, of
isolation of the broad masses of the party from the experience of party and state de-
velopment in the USSR and other sociali~st cauntries. In the case of China, continued
cooperation with the Soviet Union signified the dissemination of Marxist--Leninist
teachings in the party and among the working masses, strengthening the influence of
- the internationalist wing of the CCP and a gradual eradication of Maoist ideology
from the social life of the country. In pursuit of their u~tt hegemonistic, great-
power goals, which differed profoundly from the intereats of the Chinese people,
the Maoists were allied to the Soviet Union by force and only due to the circum-
stances which had evolved and counting on assistarcce ne~ded to strengthen their own
regime.
1Quoted from: V. F. Feoktistov, "Maoism and the Fate of Socialism in China," PROB-
~ LEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, No 3, 1979, p 145.
2Quoted from: "Vneshnyaya politika KNR" [PRC Foreign Policy], Moscow, 1971, p 31.
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The defeats in PRC domestic and foreign policy which followed after Mao Zedong had
succeeded in fnisting on the C~P his recipes for socioeconomic development of the
country and his foreign-policy aims occurred on a background of successful develop-
ment of the world socialist system, foremost in the Soviet Union. This turn of
events posed a mortaldanger to Maoism as an ideological current and cast doubt on.
the authority of Mao Zedong, leading to the uaavoidable losa of the leading posi-
tions at his disposal in the partq and state. As a consequence, Mao's retention and
solidification of his personal power and implementation of the goals set resulted in
his irreconcilable struggle. against the primary ally of healthy forces within the
CCP, the CPSU and foreign Marxist-Leniniat parties and the world socialist ~qstem,
and foremost against the Soviet Union.
This struggle was made easier for Maoists by the fact that for many years, Chinese
cornmunists had been subjected to ideological development in a spirit of the ideas
of Mao. The cult of his personality fettered creative forces in the party and
braked the spread of Marxism-Leniniem among CCP members. The party and state lea-
dership was comprised basically of people put forward by Mso himself, people sharing
his views or subordinaCe to his diktat. The slandering, intimidation and inciting
of some members of the leadershi~: againe*_ othera was widelq practiced by Mao Zedong
for the purpose of strengthening his poa*er and discrediting political opponents. Un-
der these conditions, Mao succeeded in systematically and effectively attacking Marx-
ist-Leninist forces in the party, in eliminsting the most prominent CCP activists
and consisten~ internationalists, blaming them .for "anti-party" activitq and pinning
various labels on them. Thus, CCP Central Committee Politburo me.ffibers Gao Gang and
Pien Diehuai and Politburo candidate nember Zhang Wentian and ^~the*_'e were removed
from the CCP leadership and repressed in the 195Q's.
- The inability of Maoism to ensure the syetematic development of Chinese society, and
especially the scandalous economic dafeats when the party followed Mao Zedong's re-
commendations, the dissatisfaction of the broad masses of people with the deteriora-
ti.on in their material situation caused an exacerbation of the CCP intraparty
struggle in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Quite a broad, but diverse, opposi-
tion developed in the party, including such officials as PRC Chairman Liu Shao~i and
others. The oppositian condemned the mo~t adventuristic actions of Ma~ Zedong and
his allies within the country and abroad, in fear of deadly consequences for the
Chinese state. Neither did it approve the complete break in CPR xelations with the
socialist countries. However, the inability of the opposition ta overcome the cult
of Mao and to fully reject the ideology of Maoism hampered the unification of anti-
Maoist forces and did not per~it an open~ principled struggle to eliminate Mao from
the political scene.
The inconsistency of and conflict within the ogpoaition enabled Mao Zedong and his
allies to prepare to shift to the counterattack. During the ao-called "cultural re-
volution" d~veloped by Maoists in 1966~1969, which relied on army support and used
as a strike force young studenta and backward strata of the working clasa, Mao's
group broke the resistance of his opponents in the party and state spparatus and ac-
tually accomplished a atate revolution. Party and atate organs were l~roken up and
a majority of the cadre workere were repressed. Zhou Enlai admitted in a conversa-
tion with E. Snow that 70-80 percent of the party-state cadres "lost their posts in
the 'cultural revalution' and were sent to 7 May schools.i1
1iKitay posle "kul'turnoy revolyuteii" (politicheskaya sistema, vnutripoliticheskoye
polozheniye)" [China After the "Cultural Revolution" (Political System, Domestic
Policy Situation)), Moscow, 1979, p 25.
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Maoists now had an opportunity to carry out their own domestic and foreign policies
by creating their own party.
On ttie whole, although Maoists did succeed in eliminating their political opponenta
and achieving undivided dominion in China, the "cultural revolution" demonstrated
the growing conflict between the objective demands of developing Chinese society and
Maoist domestic and foreign policy. The conflict essentially between the antisocial-
ist superstructure and the socialist base of Chinesa society resulted in political
_ instability in the country, instability of the Maoiat regime, and predetermined the
rise of new crisis situations in the economy and in the social and political life of
China. After the 9th CCP Congress held in April 1969, Maoists attempted by socio-
political maneuvering to neutralize the moat negative consequences of implementing
Mao Zedong's ideae within the country and abroad. However, palliative resolutions
could not soften in any substantial way the development of crisis trends in Chinese
society. The inability of Maoists to propose to their people a constructive program
for transforming the�country resulted from their lack of a political platform on
which to base the unification of Chinese society.
This situation led to the riae within the Maoist bloc of groupings reflecting vari-
ous trends in the sociopolitical development of China within the framework of an
_ eclectic, internally contradictory Maoist teaching. By supporting particular group-
ings, Mao Zedong availed himself of a definite opportunity to direct the policies
of the country.
The strongest grouping was that of PRC Minister of Defense Lin Biao, which is to be
explained by the role the army had acquired as a result of the "cultural revolution."
At the 9th CCP Congress, Lin Biao became the sole Deputy Chairman of the CCP and
Mao's off icial successor. The vezy existence of ruch a grouping represented a
threat to Mao Zedong. In this regard, by expressing the specific interests of
- his own grouping, Lin Biao was ne.gatively incliaed towards normalizing relations
with the USA and continued to ins isC on a policy of "equal-standing" relative to
the USSR and USA. While a dangerous contestant for other pretenders to the highest
power in Beijing, Lin Biao was at the same time an obstacle to reorienting the PRC
towards cooperation with Western countries, and foremost tke United States.
Another influential grouping which evolved dur.ing the "cultural revolufion" period
were the leaders of the hongweib in and zaofang, the so-called leftista, who carried
out Mao's policies and who were his most conaistent allies. They gained especially
solid positions in the CCP propaganda apparatus and the mass media. Howeaver, the
primary advantage of this grouping was that it was under Che patronage of Mao him-
self, that in time~ it would come to replace..him. This grouping, whose most promi-
nent representatives were Jian Q ing, Kang Sheng, Zhang Zhongqiao, Yao Wenyuan and
Wang Hongwen, was especially susp icioua of the military, viewing it as ite main
competitors in Che struggle for power.
The complete failure of Maoist aims to conform to the needs of China's socioeconomic
development, by generating a permanent criais situation in the economy and in soci-
- ety, forced several officials in the Bei~ing upper echelons to seek oufi more effi-
cient methods of managing the country. Theae searches were to a certain extent a
r.eturn to the forms and methods used in the 1950's, when China made extensive use
of Soviet experience in building socialism, and they reflected an effort to soften
the im~~act on the economy of promoters of the "cultural revolution," who completely
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ignored the ob~ec:tive laws of development of the national economic comp~ex and had ~
_ pinned their hopes entirely on voluntaristic method of management. At the same
time. the "pragmatists" did not go beyond Maoist concepts of transforming China in-
to a powerful militarized state and fully shared the anti-Soviet, great-power, hege-
monistic policy established in PRC foreign policy.
~ Recognizing the impossibility of the ieolated development of the Chinese economy,
the "pragmatists" attempted to e~tablish broad trade and economic ties with the ca-
pitalist world. The process of reorienting China's foreign economic ties towards
capitalist countries which occurred beginning in the early 1960's also underpinned
to a certain extent the economic basis of and change in the foreign policy course
of the PRC. The right-opportunistic, petty-bourgeois tendencies which had always
been strong in the CCP and which had been advanced by Mao Zedong back in the 1940's
as part of his "new democratism" found further development in the activity of the
"pragaiatists," represented in Che highest e~helcn of the Chinese hierarchy by Zhou
, Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and other officials.
The direction in which China's politics evolved is clearly revealed in the policy
of rapprochement with the USA. It was divulged at the 2nd Plenum of the Ninth Con-
vocation of the CCP Central Committee in August 1970 that secret talks had been held
- with the USA under the leadership of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai beginning back in
1955. Rapprochement with the USA signified essentially a re~ection of one of the
basic Maoist doctrines, that of struggle "against American imperialism and Soviet
revisionism." Lin Biao's speeches before and after the 2nd Plenum testified to the
fact that he insisted on the necesaity of waging the struggle on two fronts, consi-
dering the struggle against American imperialiam to have priority. This position
put Lin Biao's grouping in conflict with all the main factions in the Bei~ing lea-
dership and predestined its fa~l. The elimination of Lin Biao as a result of the
1971 "September events" did much to open up the way �or rapprochement between the
PRC and USA, which ob~ectively facilitated an intenaification of anti-Sovietism in
China's policies.
As a result of the elimination of Lian [aic] Bit~p's grouping in the CCP, the posi-
tions of the "pragynatists" were strengthened, ha~ving graduallq established their
views on solutions of the economic and foreign-policy problems of the Chinese state.
In the subsequent period, the struggle far power developed betweea this grouping and
the "left-Maoist" faction supporting Mao and stand:Lug for continuing the implementa-
- r.ian of the obsolete Maoist domestic and foreign policy directives. The outcome of -
e~is struggle was in the end de~ided by the fact that among the Chinese people and
in the party and state cadre apparatus, the calamities which befell China as a re-
sult of the "cultural revolution" were directly associated in the public conscious-
ness with the activity of the "left-Maoist" grouping. The death of Ma.o in Septem-
- ber 1976 led to the rapid fall of the "Gang of Four" (Jiang Qing, Wang Hnngwen,
Zhang Chongqiao and Yao Wenyuan), thus considerably weakening ~the positions of
other proponents of the "cultural revolution" as well.
The struggle between those who advanced the "cultural revolution" and those many
- CCP cadre workers who su�fered f rom the Maoiat purges was exacerbated in the new
CCP leadership led by Hua Guofeng, one of those closest to Mao. As a result of the
stubborn struggle within the Bei,jing heirarchy, the 5th CCP Central Committee Plenum
of the llth Convocation, which was held in February 1980,.another foursome of "cul-
tural revolution" proponents was relieved of party and government leadership posts
CCP Central Committee Deputy Chairanan Wang Dongxing and Politburo members Chen
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Xiliang, Wu De and Ji Dengkui. Hu Yaob~ng and Zhao Ziyang, allies of Deng Xiaoping,
were installed in the CCP Central Cammittee Poli~buro Permanent Committee at that
same plenum. In this regard, Hu Yaobang was designated CCP Central Com~ittee Gen-
eral Secretary. The positions of CCP Central Committee Chairman Hua Guofeng con-
- tinued to weaken and, at the 3rd Sesaion of the VSNP [All-China Assembly of Nat3ot?gl
Representatives], held in September 1980, he was forced to abandon the post c': �RC
State Soviet Premier, which was assumed by Zhao Ziyang. TEie "Gang of Four" trial .
held in Bei~ing led to a further weakening of Aua Guofeng's positions. The shake-
ups in the Chinese leadership have not, however, signified fundamental changes in
Beijing policies. As before, Maoist conc.epts determine the nature of PRC domestic
and, especially, foreign policy.
- Colossal military expenditures and its departure from socialist methods of managing
the economy have not enabled China to make up the loss to iCs economy caused by Mao-
ist experiments and the "cultural revolutioa." It was for precisely thi~ reason
that nothing was said at the 3rd VSNP Session about the scheduled completion of the
- "read~ustment period" proclaimed in 1979. According to the 1981 plan, there is to
be a reduction in the rates of growth, and the levela of production of a number of
very important types of output coal. steel, petroleum, txactors, automobiles
are to be reduced or frozen. Under these conditiona, China's ieaders are aktempting
to strengthen the economy by attracting foreign capital and stimulating private-
entrepreneurial activity. A favorable investment climate is being created to do
this. Survivors of the Chinese bourgeoisie have been returned bank deposits con-
fiscated during the "cultural revolution" and back interest has been paid on them.
Preferential terms have been granted for foreign capital investment. The 3rd VSNP
Session adopted a law that taxes on mixed enterprises (in which both Chinese and
foreign capital participate) will be 20 percent less than in capitalist countries.
The bourgeoisie has been permitted political activity, all manner of "meetings" and
"encounters" with various "democratic parties and groups."1
~'he attempt to solve China's economic problems by attracting foreign capital and re-
viving the private sector correspond fully to the petty-bourgeois essence of the
contemporary Chinese leadership and flow naturally from the petty-bourgeois tenden--
cies which have won in the CCP. However, recent events in the.area of economic re-
lations with western states have shown that this path is by no means as promising
as has been depicted by Bei~ing�leaders. In view of the fi~.ancial bankruptcy of
the PRC, it has had to cancel many large orders by Western companies.
The foreign policy goals of Bei~ing leaders remain unchanged. The idea of world~do-
mination, of tranaforming China into a power capable of dictating its will to the
world, has dominated the whole of PRC foreign policy and all the country's resources.
Chinese hegemonists understand that strengthening the world socialist system, the po-
licy of detente and strengthening the political and economic independence of the li-
berated states are obstacles to the actualization of their plans. Bei~ing is there-
fore attempting to brake, undermine and weaken these processea. To this end, it is
conducting a hostile, subversive policy against the countries of the socialist com-
munity and their allies and is doing everything it can to exacerbate the interna-
- tional situation and to weaken progressive forces throughout the world.
The socialist community, led by the Soviet Union, is ob~ectively the primary obstacle
to actualization of the plans of Bei~ing lead~rs, inasmuch as these countries are
- 1PRAVDA, il September 1980, 28 Jaauary 1979.
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fighting most consistenCly againet the expansionist etrivings of the current Chi-
nese leaders and are unmasking the reactionary character of any modifications of
Maoism. Anti-Sovietism and anticommunism are therefore integral parts of the domes-
tic and foreign political propaganda of the Beijimg leadership. The PRC relies in
iCs foreign policy on the most reactionary forces in the world, on those states con-
~ ducting policies hostile to the cause of peace and social progress. The policy of
rapprochement with capitalist countries, foremost the USA, and developing relations
with various reactionary regimes also serves the foreign policy goals of Chinese
leaders.
Chinese leaders are attempting to substantiate their forming a bloc wiCh the capi-
talist countries, and foremost the USA, by relying on the myth of a"Soviet threat."
The documents of the 9th (April 1969), lOth (August 1973) and llth (August 1977) CCP
Congresses evidence a clear trend towards shifting the direction of the main strike
from the United States to the Soviet Union. The USSR is depicted as the more dan-
gerous enemy, and the USA is made out to be more on the defensive. Chinese leaders
attempt by this thesis to justify their own struggle, together with the imperialist
countries, against the Soviet Union and their own policy of increasing their mili-
tary might.
The 26th CPSU Congress confirmed the principles by which the CPSU and Soviet state
are governed in relations with China in the current five-year period. As concerns
_ the status and prospects of Soviet-Chinese relations, the Congress expressed a readi-
ness to improve them on a base of proposals made previously. "If Soviet-Chinese re-
latin:~s remain frozen, the reason will not lie with us," declared L. I. Brezhnev at
the congress. "The Soviet Union has not sought and is not seeking a confrontation
with the People's Republic of China. We are following the course determined by the
24th and 25~h CPSU Congresses and would like to build ties with it on a good-neighbor
basis. Our prdposals ained at normalizing relations with China remain, as do our
= feelings of respect and friendship for ~he Chinese people.t1 ~
The main obstacle on the path of Chinese development remains Maoism. In spite of
- ad~ustments in individual postulates of it a�n~ criticism of certain "mistakes" per-
mitted in actualizing the "thoughts of Mao Zedong," especially during the "cultural
revolution," Maoism remains today the ideological-theoretical platfo~.rm of the CCP.
This situation is natural. For decades, Maoists wag~d a bitter stru~gle with Marx-
ist-Leninist teaching and distorted it by limiting its spread among CCP members by
every means available to them. For the bulk of its history, the CCP selected its
members on the principle of their personal devotion to Mao Zedong and his ideas.
- As a result, the Maoists succeeded, by devastating the CCP during the "cultural rs-
volution," in creating under that pretext their own party, which had nothing what-
ever in common with the ideals of communism. The existence of that party, uniting
millions of people reared in a spirit of Maoist ideology, certainly ensured the ma-
terialization of the "thought of Mao Zedong" and their contemporarq modifications
in practical politics.
There exists a danger that the many yeare of Maoist speculation about Marxist-
Leninist teachings and exploitation of the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Chinese
people has undermined the fa~th of working people in the fdeas of socialism. The
fact that the Chinese people's understanding of socialism was associated for more
1iMaterialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 11.
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than 20 years with Maoiat practice in the area of domestic and foreign policy will
have a great impact on the fate of China. As a result, there aroae in Chinese so-
ciety an atmosphere favorable to the disaemination of illusions concerning the pos-
_ sibility of solving China's problems on a basis of concessions to the private sec-
tor of the economy and deals with capitalist states. The presence of strong petty-
bourgeois and nationalistic tendencies in the CCP in the end created conditions fa-
vorable to reviving bourgeois ideology. Once again, the correctness of Lenin's
warnings about the danger o~ petty-bourgeois elements has been confirmed: "Either
we subordinate this petty bourgeoisie to our contral and accounting (which we can
do if we co-organize the poor, that is, the majority of the population of semipro-
letariat, around a conscious proletarian vanguard) or it will unaeoidably and in-
evitably throw off our, worker, power, as the revolution of Napoleon and Cavaignac
floundered an precisely this small property-holder soil and vegetation.i1 Maoism
was unable ~o work out a positive program for develaping the country and unifying
the Chinese people to solve the problems facing them. Hence, the state of permanent
crisis and the struggle of various factions in the CCP and PRC leadership.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda","Voprosy istorii", 1981
11052 ~
CSO: 1807/168
1V. I. Lenin, "PSS," Vol 43, p 208.
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REGIONAL
- IDEOLUGICAL-MORAL EDUCATION PROBLEMS IN ESTONIA
Tallinn NOUKOGUDE KOOL in Estonian No 7, 1981 pp 4-10
[Article by Elsa Grechkina: "Problems of Ideological-Moral Education in Light of
Directives of the 26th Congress of the CPSU"]
[Text] As late as the 1950s the Soviet comprehensive educational school was pri-
marily deaigned to prepare.students for entry into higher and specialized mid-level
schools. With this in mind~the curricula had been composed, as had the number of
hours for instruction of this or that sub~ect, this characterized the content and
character of work inside the school and outside it. In recent years, in connection
with a change to mandatory mid-level education, the function of the school has
_ changed considerably. The ma~ority of graduates of the general school (consider-
ably more than half in our republic) goes to work in the national economy--in
industry, agriculture, services. For this reason it is necessary to improve even
more the preparation of the youth for life and work in the interest of educating a
comprehensively developed builder of communism, and to assure that all students
acquire basic specialized skills and moral convictions. According to the new re-
quireme~ts the educating and training function of the schools will expand, as will
the ideological function.
For the educators of the Estonian SSR and our entire country the last five-year
plan period was a period of intensive work in fulfilling the requirements of the
school-related documents of the 25th Contress of the CPSU as well as subsequent
decisions of Farty and government. The most important of these consisted in
establishing universal mandatory mid-level education, preparing students for real
life, for work, and shaping.a morally active attitude in each of them. From these
perspectives we have to evaluate the results of our work.
As L. I. Brezhnev pointed out at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, the transfer to a
universal mandatory mid-level education has been accomplished throughout the USSR.
This important milepost has been passed in our republic as well. At the end of the
last school year 97.6 percent of the graduatea of the 8th grade entered secondary
schools. The acquisition of secondary education in the proper time frame increased
(currently 99.1 percent as compared to 9I.2 percent in 1976). The number of general
education day school students increased by 7500 during the five-year period. More
than ~0,000 new student spaces were acquired. The schools implemented completely
the departmental system, another 2000 ittstructional departments were established
during the five-year period, the funds devoted to education increased compared to
those of the Ninth Five-Year period. A large part of the funds came from sponsoring
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institutions. The materi-.~1 basis of polytechnical instruction improved somewiiat.
A remarkable achievement in our republic consisted in the establishment of 5 inter-
- school study-productive facilities (we had none in the Ninth Five-Year Plan).
In the Estonian SSR great attention is paid to a further democratization and himman-
ization of the contents of education. This is exemplified by the establishment of
favorable conditions for children with mental and physical deficiencies. The
number of schools for the handicapped is 46, sufficient for the needs.
The participation in all-day groups and classes increased by more than 10,000 .
= students, reaching a total of 40,000. This is a contribution of the Soviet state
toward the social education of the children. Great attention was paid to the need
to completely adapt the new contents of education to the forms, means and methods
of schoolwork, i.e. to buttress the pedagogical pr,ocess scientifically-methodogically
- and ideologically. The first summaries of the current school year, the results of
the first final examinations indicate that our schools, our teachers are training
educated, morally active youths. We must appreciate t~,at the most immediate aid to
the schools in their task of preparing the rising generation for life comes from
the Central Committee of the Estonian CP, and the party's town and rayon committees.
_ At practically every rneeting of~the Central Committee of the Estonian CP, regardless
of the problems under discussion, great attention is paid to the various activities
of the schools, to their ties with life, to the concrete socio-economic and
ideological-educational training. A persuasive example is the recent 2d Plenary
Meeting of the CPEs Central Committee, where personnel questions were discussed.
The First Secretary of the CPEs, K. Vayno, devoted great attention to school pro-
- blems, the realistic possibilities of social practice, and outl3ned the tasks of
party committees and educational institutions in light of the decisions of the 26th
CPSU Congress. Similarly, the party's town and rayon committees, taking into account
the serious attention of the CPEs Central Committee to school problems, have
focused their attention on educational problems. During the last 3-4 years many
party committees at their plenary meetings and in their bureaus have taken a look
at the substantive problems of schoolwork, the complex and promising plans for
educational development proven in our practice as well as the caurse of fulfilling
these plans. The party and soviet organs concentrate on sponsorship agreements
between schools and enterprises. The structure and contents of the agreements
were compiled by the Ministry of Education of the Estonian SSR. They were based
on a comprehensive approach to education (a common front of school, home, work col-
lective and the general public to organize a common unified pedagogical process to
prepare children for life). ,
During the last school year the Estoniari SSR's Ministry of Education made compre-
nensive observations about the educational work of each rayon and town during the
lOth Five-Year Plan. Party co~nittee secretaries and deputy chairmen of the
executive committees concerned with educational questions participated in the dis-
cussions. The main aim of this task was to specify the 3oint distribution of plans
according to governmental tasks, taking into account the conerete tasks of the town
or rayon in directing graduates of the Sth grade to further training and for estab-
lishing a network of secondary schools, for expanding the network of schools and
preschool institutions; to identify problems~regarding a better utilization of
educational personnel and for their comprehensive training; to discuss problems of
school and extra-school activity, to identify precisely common educational require-
ments in each sector of work; to identify precisely concrete facts that prevent
the successful fulfillment of teaching tasks.
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After such a common analysis there was (and in places still is) a similar inspection
of each school and sponsoring enterprise. Such work permits raising the standard of
educational management in each segment, working out mutual understanding and a joint
approach for solving concrete tasks, and formulating the party and state directions
for the comprehensive development of the young generation:
As a parallel measure and in cooperation with personnel of VOT (Institute for Con-
tinuing Education of the Republic's Teachers) and PTUI (Institute for Scientific
Research into Education) the activity of the educational department of each town
and rayon was inspected with attention paid to the establishment of universal
secondary education, establishment of a school network, and raising the qualifi-
cations of the professional personnel. The results were compiled at the ministerial
meeting and they will be published in pamphlet form, t4 enable the educational
- departments and schools to take necessary directive steps at the August meetings
for a decisive and more positive direction of work.
We are convinced that during the llth Five-Year Plan our republic, ~ust as the
entire USSR, has taken steps to assure a marked improvement in the level of educa-
tional work. The tasks facing the schools are not simple ones. Let us quote L. I.
Brezhnev's repart: "The main task is now to raise the quality of teaching and pro-
fessional and moral education in th~ school, to eradicate formalism in evaluating
the results of the work of teachers and students, to strengthen in fact the Cies
between teaching and life, and to improve the student's preparation for socially
useful work. The teacher, of course, plays a decisive part in this. We must not
be stingy with attention to his work, living conditions and raising his qualifica-
tions. But at the same time requirements for his work increase. The quality of
curricula and texts also must be improved. It is sta*ed correctly that they are
too complicated. This makes teaching more difficult and leads to an unjustified
overburdening ~f the children. The Ministry of Education and the Academy of
Pedagogics must immediately improve the situation.
The materials of the 26th Congress of the CPSU stress that education mirrors the
comprehensive development of a society and develops itself intensively as part of
a common process, of a unified social organism. From here, as with all other ex-
- pressions of life, /in boldface/ emanate the socially c6ordinated requirements
levied on educational organs. pedsgogical collectives, every teacher, every school,
every social institution thuc in some way deals with the training of the you�g
generation.~~ /end boldfacei
Let us outline some problems that arise from this thesis.
First. Let the discussion of the first cycle of the problem be based on the method~-
~logical approach of the 26th Congress-formalism must be decisively eradicated in
evaluating the results of the work of the teacher, student, and school. An entire
complex of quantitative (statistical) indicators has been compiled for evaluating
the work of school and teacher, and we must continue to rely on it. The inclusion
of the student body, the number of students graduating at the proper time from the
8th grade and the secondary school, even the qualitative indicators of success in
studies mirror the work of the school, teacher, and student. Our task is to find
organic ties between quantitative and qualitative aspects. nbviously, the key to
the secret of this machinery is the concrete analysis of the practice, each numer-
ical indicator has to express an emotional, social indicator. For example, in spite
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of many achievements the general educational achool still does not teach each of
its students well. This fact in turn resulta in an inadequate quality of the
student's achievement, which in turn is an important reason for dropping out. Each
~e~Y 1.4 percent of the students in grades 1-11, some 2500 total, drop out.
_ An evaluation of the results of an activity is always connected with the moral and
emotional experiences of the evaluated. Many have tried their luck in evaluating
the activity of schools and teachers. Iiere we experience concretely that the spec-
trum of the social expression of schools and education is exceptionally broad. We
still cannot imagine it a11--education as a factor of socio-economic progress,
education as a factor in progressive personnel policy, etc, etc. As a result of
this spectrum there is a natural interest in education and schools, there is a wish
- to evaluate their activity. That is good. But we cannot remain deaf to the ever-
increasing negativism in these evaluations that influence the shaping of concepts
of schools, teachers, and students. Here, we hold, we must eliminate the once-
forged stereotypical concepts of education that have developed into a linear con-
nection--a student`s shortcomings are the fault of the teacher of the school. This
is stated without a deeper analysis of the causes of the shortcomings, without
taking into account the f inal tasks of the training and educational process as well
as the factors and means of the entire educational comples--family, work collective,
micro-environment. In other words, the decisions of the 26th congress require
cor.rections to be made according to the social functions of the schools, taking
intn account the real contribution of the schools to the society, and offering
effective aid to this contribution. Let us once again quote from the report of
L. I. Brezhnev: "We must not be stingy with attention to his work, living conditions,
and raising his (the teacher's.Ed.) qualifications. But at the same time require-
ments of his work increase." The above shows that the preparation of the young
generation for work is the business of the school as well as the society as a whole.
Perhaps one shouldn`t talk of this in such a great detail, but facts indicate other-
wise.
Our republic lags considerably behind the planned tasks and the level of the USSR
- even in the proper dissemination of 8-grade education. That figure was 95.2 percent
of the Estonian SSR at the end of the Five Year Plan, being at the same time more ~
than 97 percent in the USSR. Each percentage means the fate of hundreds and hundreds
of students. This fa~t considerably impedes the integration of youths into this or
that segment of the educational system, causes comp~etition among them, makes the
rejuvenation of the society's social structure more difficult._. A.nother fact
connected with this problem--in spite of improvement in training students for pro-
fessions or vocations the number of graduates commencing work in fields they were
- trained for in school is 12-16 percent in our republic.
Thus the deficiencies in cooperation between schools and enterpri.ses is beginning
- to exert a negative effect on the socio-professional self-determination of the
young, on their preparation in finding their place in life. This problem is
especially acute with rural 8-grade schools. There is an intensive urbanization
of 8th grade graduates, in spite of incentives offered in the country. The econo-
- mists and sociologists of our republic are currently busy investigating the compli-
cated streams of migration inside and outside the republics. Directing migration
according to the planned shifts in the national e~onomy is largely dependent on the
socio-professional attitude of the young, on their training for life. We, the
educational personnel, are fully aware that the requirement of the 26th Congress of
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the CYSU regarding the development of the proEeasional training and career manage-
ment of the student body requires that we, together with work collectives arrange
for a more skilled and better transition of youths into the national economy, paying
p~rticular attention to the need of the young to have the correct professional and
ideological-moral sense of value and orientation.
Of course, an important and decisive part in this task is played by the school, the
teacher. The republic's Interdepartmental Council on Vo~ational Selection of the
Youth, approved by the Central Committee of the ECP, the Council of Ministers of
the Estonian SSR, and the Council of Labor Unions has been attached to the Ministry
of Education for the actual work. The ministry has developed many measure~ to enable
- the educational organs and the schools to successfully implement the governmental
educational policy. The observation of the co~on efforts of the school, home,
_ public, and enterprises to assure a sympathetic attitude, a correct party-line
activity ~n the professional training and ideological-moral education of the youths
is of particular importance.
We must come to the point that all interested systems abandon a consutnerist attitude
in the preparation of the youths for a socio-moral task and life. Unfortunately,
there are still a few chiefs of production who express their attitude toward the
- schools literally in these terms: "We have free education, the state provides the
- necessary resa.~rces and workers, why am I needed?" But you are needed for the reason
that the concent~~*ed influence of all systems is needed in the harmonious develop-
- ment of a young person.
It is apparently a mistake to imagine that a young person could obtain everything
that there is to know in a classroom. For his development he needs the rich
spectrum of relationships of the entire society, where each system connected with
the school has a specific function that must be realized by a direct relationship
and contact with the young. We have some good experiences in this.
The task of further improving the ideological-moral training of the student body was
served at a discussion of the school libraries and school museums held jointly with
- the Ministry of Culture of the Estonian SSR. There is re~son to expect that as a
result of such com*.non efforts the respective work in all of o~xr g~neral educational
schools will improve. We have traditional, good and meaningful contacts with the
Minister of Culture, the cultural personnel of the republic, as well as with the
creative leagues and their representatives. Within the framework of the theatre
month, the children's music week, at the art weelc staged in many towns and rayons
of the republic there have always been warm and useful meeting~ of the school
students and the representatives of the arts and culture. Of course, all opportun-
ities have not been realized wi th the optimal success and extent. Our joint efforts
must be increased in the future, their extent must be expanded, so that a larger
number of students would find their way to art, would appreciate the importance of
the arts in filling leisure time and in shaping the personality.
Last November the Students' S~ientific Society was founded. The institutes of the
Academy of Sciences of the Estonian SSR and the schools of higher education of our
T- republic have extended an understanding and helping hand to it, and we can expect
that within the next years this cotmnon venture will shape in the young people clear
understandings of scientific work, and increase their interest in a d~aeper investi-
gation of one or another branch of science. The social idea of this work is the
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early development of scientific prerequisites in the young. A considerable and
meaningful assistance to the schools is rendered by the children's programs of
Estonian radio and television, as well as by its programs dealing with many other
aspects of educational work. The newspapers of our republic have increased their
attention to the problems of teaching the students communistically. It must be
stated in appreciation that these articles are competent, they do not smooth over
school problems; to the contrary, many of them raise very serious, still unresolved
problems, drawing the attention of the concerned collectives, including the schools,
to the solution of these problems. These materials clearly echo an attempt to for-
mulate an objective and positive attitude in the evaluation of the schools' activ-
ities.
The management of the students' free time through the activity of the Young Pioneers
and the Komsomol, the education of youth in the spirit of citizenship, international
friendship and patriotism has always been the basis for cooperation between our min-
istry and the Central Committee of the Estonian Young Communist League.
The above has not been said to make our work easier. Our youth must experience the
richness of cultural life and the experiences of the.productive and social life of
the older generation. In other, words, it grows to social maturity in direct contacts
with real l.ife. Attempts to bring everything within school walls show a simplified
picture of the school. In the conditions at hand schools together with other
- agencies must also be more skilled and imaginative in forming in the students social
maturity.
The second complex of problems is directly concerned with the school itself, with
its ideological-moral activity.
The ministry, together with the educational organs and the teaching staffs of the
schools considers its moral obligation to be the shaping of a comprehensively
developed personality in harmony with the requirements of the society by its train-
ing and educational work. Today, in the condition of developed socialism, the pre-
parations of each young person's entry into the national economy calls for great
expenditures by society. For example, almQSt 400.vocations in our country already
call for secondary education or special~zed vocational schooling. Consequently the
schools, taking into account the expenses incurred by society, have to understand
that in the preparation of a young person fc~r~life and work the idea expressed at
the 26th Congress of the CPSU stating that:.'~management must be economical" is very
expressive and clear, being expressed here especially in a moral sense.
The above is closely connected with the content and extent of the general secondary
educational program. These ideas reecho in the complex plans of our educational
development and in the sponsorship agreements between schools, collectives and
enterprises. It is appropriate for us to stress here that the understanding of a
preparation for work and life must in turn derive from an approach free of formal-
ism. In places one can detect a simplified approach, in that the students are
given more and more concrete study and work assignments, without their mental and
- moral characteristics or emotions being developed to a higher level.
The requirement to imporve the preparations for work and real life does not at all
mean a weakening of the requirements imposed on the content and extent of education.
Currently a reorganization of school management is underway to achieve a comprehen-
sive development of the student in light of a perfected content and extent of teach-
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ing. This presupposes that the teachers but also the students develop an appropriate
state of mind, tie it organically to the daily educational activity; it presupposes
a unity of word and deed, this being the guiding principle of moral education. There
is no reason to doubt that the 14,000 members of the teaching body of our republic's
general schools work in the interest of achieving ideological-moral maturity in the
youth. Remarkable work is done at the lst s~econdary school of Voru, at the Poltsamaa
and Marjamaa secondary schools.
The work of the teachers of the 15th Tallinn and the 42d Tallinn im. L. Parn
secondary schools in the implementation of a system of moral education in the
curriculum are especially worthy of imitation.
The experiences of these and many other teachers show that /in boldface/ the mere
offering of education and knowledge does not in itself result in moral convictions
in the youth nor in an ability to behave morally in real life. The teacher's own
moral activity and demanding attitude, as well as sensitivity is necessary to make
- the process of teaching the basics of knowledge a process of shaping the moral
perfection of each student. /end boldface/ The 15th plenary meeting of the CC CPEs,
' discussing the situation of the ideological-political work in our republic, requested
- that party and school organs incorporate into the educational life of our republic
the experiences made by the Belorussian party organization in the moral education
of the youth and in preparing the teachers accordingly.
Meeting the requests of the plenary meeting, a theoretical seminar for chiefs of
the education departments and the school instructors of the town and rayon com-
mittees of the CPF was organized to discuss the questions of the students'
ideological-moral education. The aims of the seminar were: The theoretical and
methodological training of school and party nersonnel for directing this kind of
work and for organizing it locally;
The study of work done in our republic in that field, the dissemination and imple-
mentation of the better results such work.
The ultimate aim of the republic's semin~:: is the founding of similarly oriented
theoretical and practical seminars for the chief educators and the secretaries of
- basic party units in all towns and rayons of the republic; at the same time it is
important that methodological centers be established in every rayon and town.
What are the results of the f irst school year?
The following could be shown on the positive side:
Establishment of a firm conviction of a need for a system of moral education in the
shaping of a young person in each participant of the seminar;
Directing the attention of the participants to the final aims of moral education
and to the practical steps necessary to achieve it;
Establishment of a conviction that moral edur_ation is a key ingredient in the
complex of communist education;
Internationalization of the experiences of fraternal republics and their incorpor-
ation into our educational praxis.
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During the seminar it also became apparent that:
our republic lacks a sufficient number of trained personnel;
the~ is a lack of germane Estonian literature, not only scholarly but also dirprted
at the young, fathers and mothers;
the young teachers are insufficiently trained in directing the solving of moral
, education problems in schools according to the demands of the cont~mporary times;
because of years of neglect of such work our educational personnel is generally
poorly prepared to carry out successful moral education in the schools, there is a
lack of abi.?,ity to see and formulate, consequently al.so to use the aims and methods
and means necessary for moral education. For this reason the functional contacts
between all the components of the educational process have been violated, there is
no consistency in the shaping of the student's moral perfection in the educational
process. In this condition it is hardly possible to talk of ineeting the task
_ assigned to the schools by.V. I. Lenin at.the 3d Congress of the Russian Young
Communist League, that: "It is necessary that the training, educating and teaching
of the entire contemporary youth be at the same time an education in communist
morality." We still have a lot of fields to till.
Solying many of these problems does no't depend on us alone. The directing and
_ decisive activity of the leading organs of the republic is necessary. At the same
time we can state with conviction that an increase in activity dealing with problems
of moral education shows that there is obviously an opportunity to deal with them
successfully. Our activity is pointed in that very direction.
Third. The buttressing of the ideological-moral education in a scientific-
methodological way; activity in recruiting instructional staff.
Within the progress of modern science and technology the Soviet school system con-
tributes markedly in paving the road to the development of society. The social
_ function of the school has increased tremendously, as has its ideological role.
The increase of the ideologi~al conflict between two social systems has in turn
raised ser~ous demands regarding the training of the educational personnel and re-
freshing its training.
The decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the further improvement of
ideological work and political education" required th~.t our teachers-educators
- achieve an organic unity in education-training work, and perfect the shaping _in the
students of the high political-moral attributes of the communist world view.
To be able to master the socialist demands ex~ected of him the teacher has to do
mor.e than ever before ~o retrain himself in every way. The teacher's helper in
this task is the Institute for Continuing Education of the Republic's Teachers
together with the methodological departments of the education departments. The
principle of organic unity of teaching and education that has been the basis of
the teacher's daily praxis has become the basis for working out the contents and
methods of teachers' refresher courses. The training o� the teacher for ideological-
moral education begir~s in college, but research in all the pedagogical institutes
of the USSR has shown that the level of knowledge of the basis of education (~he
pedagogical-psychological preparation) is lower than competency iri sub~ect fields
and methodological areas.
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The atages of educational refzesher training in cur republic take this lnto account,
and the theory and methodology of educational questions are the largest subject areas
- in the courses. The problems of communist education are especially dominant in the
first, educational stages of the course. The courses of this stage include moetly
problems of Marxist-Leninist theory, the theory and methodology of education,~edu- ~
cation in the teaching process, the party and Komsomol activity in the school, work
in and out of class, questions of education within the family, problems of the class
director's work, etc. The main topic of the second state courses involves psycholog-
ical problems. Thus in the course of continuing education the young specialist
acquires sufficient knowledge of ideological-moral teaching.
The third level for imparting training in ideological-moral education consists of
organizers and school directors.. They attend regional and all-republican seminars,
they are shown the experiences made in our republic and in other federal republics.
The teacher is generally receptive to help, direction and teaching, but there is
still enough conservatism and routin~e in implementing the knowledge gained. Too
often the student is regarded as an ob3ect of training in ideological-moral educa-
Lion. He is uaed in testing all kinds of possible and impossible ideas. The part of
the student in thinking and carrying out this educational attempt has remained
scanty. Our t~achers sometimes do not even think of the person to whom the lesson
or event is directed. In other words--the student is not regarded as the subject
of educational work.
Modern education demands that colleges prepare young specialists who have been
trained to the highest possible level in organizing the initiative and self-training
of the student. The moral deviations of the students show clearly that there are
serious deficiencies in that work. An analysis of school practice shows that these
phenomena are to a large degree connected to a one-sided, i.e. authoritarian in-
fluence shown by the teacher. We cannot agree with such a formalistic interpre-
tation of the teacher's role. Again and again we are directed to correct methodolog-
ical positions by the most valuable achievements of Soviet education. First of all,
let us pay attention to the method of parallel pedagogical activity, described by
A. Makarenko and proven in his educational work. The teacher-educator and the
children belong to the same collective. By living together with the students, by
st4ari.ng their ~oys, sorrows 3nd concerns the teacher brings his students up to
so~iali~t maturity. Such activity is designed to meet the task posed by the 26th
- Congress of the CPSi1 regarding fulfillment of ti:~ Jciioos.'s moral mission, i.e. to
increase the ties between teaching and actual life and to improve the preparation
of the students for a socially useful role. The ideological decisions of the Central
~ Committee of the CPSU and the decisions of the 26th Congress re~uire that we switch
from an informative training of the teaching body to a methodological one. The task
is not easy, but life with its demands has put it before us in total focus. This,
however, means that the continuing edueation of teachers must adopt more active
methods. We are hoping for assistance~from the Academy of Sciences of the Estonian
SSR and the institutes of higher education. No other institution can open the
methodological and cnoral aspects of the various branches of learning to the teacher,
cf cau~e him to adopt a new, investigative way of thinking.
In the interest of raising the teachers' level of ideological-nor.al knowledge it
must be seriously investigated how the teacher's political and subject matter re-
taining can be united in a competent, organic, and successful way. We are convinced
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that the comprehensive and competent solution of this problem helps us overcome
those difficulties and shortcomings that occur in our schools in the field of
ideological-moral training and in j oining teaching and educating. Here an inten-
sive and creative self-perfection of each teacher and educational worker is necessary
so as to be able to deeply comprehend and fathom the ideological-moral content of
the tasks posed by the 26th Congress of the CPSU and to find ways to meet them.
- A wait-and-see attitude is completely counterindicated.
= Let us here try to fathom just one of these tasks--to raise the quality of teaching.
- The easiest way, to interpret this task formalistically would be to compile another
program of events. In the correct approach we are required to perceive the dia-
lectical connections between real problems and the practical application of inethod-
ological expressions.
Let us then repeat the posed task of raiaing the quality of education. In our
- opinion the following processes become involved in the pursuit of that aim:
to formulate general and specific tasks of education on the basis of curricula;
to train students to acquire knowledge independently;
to shape the practical ability to apply knowledge (in school work, in socially
useful work);
to organize a qualitative evaluation of the student's work.
Each of these real processes is inf luenced by a complex of factors. The first
process listed by us is influenced by such factors as:
_ the teacher's qualification, his zbility to comprehend and describe the concept
of quality of knowledge (the depth, completeness, system, flexibility, adaptability,
- etc of his training) ;
the teacher's abil3ty to formulate assignments and to evaluate the quality of their
fulfillment;
the knowledge of the student body and its motivational sphere;
the condition of the material basis of education, etc.
From such factors we can derive concrete tasks for the teacher, the student, the
- school, and other areas; this is vital to implement the listed factors. From this
approach we guarantee a uniform content and extent of each student's education, con-
sequently also the acquisition and correct evaluation of the moral values of our
society. The forms, methods and means for solving the tasks facing Soviet schools
are varied, depending on the creative activity of the teacher, and also depending
on the basic task we have--to educate a comprehensively developed personality.
During the last five-year plan the Institute for Scientific Study of Education
also took marked interest in investigating the question of ideological-moral edu-
cation, and the incorporation of these findings into practical schoolwork. One
topic of the institute's research program concerns "the communist education of the
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students." The institute has paid great attention to effecting ideological educa-
tion through some concrete sub~ect or cluster of subjects. No sub3ect has been
exempted from research into the student's ideological education. This is necessi-
tated by the fact that one important requirement in compiling any program o.f stud~es
is its impact on ideological education.
- Topics concerned with the students' communist education cannot be exhausted'by the
PTUI nor even by all the efforts of the researchers of our republic. We ther~fore
hold that the rich experiences made across the country be adopted. The following
topics are currently being adapted by the PTUI: The student's moral education in
the comprehensive school; principles of internationalist education in teaching
basic subjects; the students' ideological-aesthetical education. The list of topics
is to be expanded in the future.
The communist education of inembers of the future society cannot be successful
_ if the home does not participate. The PTUI scholars have therefore, in addition
to other projects, attempted to investigate moral education in the family. During
the last f ive-year plan PTUI scholars put together 4 compilations and one brochure
for use by parents.
It is important that the existi:~g, still relatively scarce ideological-methodologi-
cal literature dealing with a student's moral education reach every teach~r and be
_ applied in his daily work at school.
The main task for the immediate future facing the Ministry of Education of the
Estonian SSR and the organs of education is an application of the comprehensive
education system and of each of its components in such a way that the educational
- requirements of the 26th Congress of the CPSU will be successfully met.
~ COPYRIGHT: Kir~astus "Periodika," "Noukogude Kool," 1981
9240
CSO: 1815/23
END
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