JPRS ID: 10135 CHINA REPORT POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070050-5
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• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 50
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10135
_ 23 ho~vember 1981
Chona Re ort
p
= P~LITICAI, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILItARY AFFAIRS
CFOUO 19/81)
FBIS FOREfG~I BROADCAST INFQ~RMATiON SERO/ICE
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JPRS L/T0135
23 November 1981
~ CHINA REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
_ (FOUO 19/81)
CONTENTS
~ PEOPI,E'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
Methods af Studying Combat Tactica Discuesed
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 26 Sep 81) 1
Readers' Exchange of Ideas
Tactical Problem, by He Xingwen, Liang Tongzhan
Bridging Gap in Training Combat, by Yin Li
PLA Units Find Ways To Improve Trair~ing
- (JIEFANGJUN BAO, 30 Nov 81i 4
Drilling According to Needa, by Liu Q~.ngyan,
Shi Wenting
Flexibility in Training, by Jiang Yong, Zheng Jian
Combined Arms Battal.lon Conducta Trial Training
(Yang Songlin; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 4 Sep 81) 7
Status of Combined Arms Training Program Discusaed ~
(Wang Yuzhen, Li Qike; JIEF~NGJUN BAO, $ Dec 81) 11
Demohilized Soldiera Receive Security Briefing ~
(Sun Xuanquan; JIEFAIvGJUN BAO, 7 Dec 81) 15
Guided Missile Unit Compilea New Training Material
(Xu Bin, Ouyang Shigao; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 8 Dec 81) 16
- - a- [ III - CC - 80 FC~UO]
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECUR?TY
METHODS OF STUDYING COMBAT TACTICS DISCUSSED
~ Readexs' Exchange of Ideas
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 26 Sep 80 p 3
- [Artirle by the editarial group of "Studying Military Affairs: "~eryone. Talks About
Com.bat Methods"] .
[Text) In response to readers' demands, with this iseue we have startecl to publish
a broad exchange of academic thought and research achievements according to the
- guideline of "a hundred schools eontend" and ~.~sing the method of letting the masses
- think of plans and letting everyone talk about combat wzthods aimed at problems in
- tactical training of the troops aYid in the military schools that are debated in order
- to enliven academic research, improve the revel of tactinal thinking and adapt better
- to the needs of war against aggression under modern conditions.
`The concrete method is: 1) to selectively publish articles on combat methods which
represent several d~fferent opinions on a situation which has been thought out,
_ 2) to publish a representative article giving a brief summary of the trends after a
definiate period of discussion; 3) to invite the broad number of readers to evaluate
and select the best plan for each situation thought out and.to give encouragement.
We sincerely welcome all readers to reveal their thoughts on each situation and to
participate in the discussion. The situations brought up should reflect a relatively
important and concrete problem that is being debated in the tactical realm; they
should be simple and clear, and diagrams showing ttxe situation st~ould accompany the
articles. Articles of discussion will not be limited in length, personal opinions
can be expressed and a contentiQn regarding a certain viewpoint and a certain article
can be expressed. The viewpoints should be clear and arguments and reasons should
be presented to explore the problems patiently. Articles submitted should inc~ude
the cod~e name of the units and the writer's duty and should be mailed directly to
the editorial grc~up of "Studing Military Affairs.
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= Tactical Problem
~ Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 26 Sep 80 p 3
[Article by He Xingwen [63 20 5281 2429J and Liang Tong~han [2733 0681 2069] of the
infantry school of the Beij ing units: "In This Situation, Should the Firing Positions
Be Occupied?"]
[Text] The lst Company of the Red Army infantry has attach.ed to it th~ 85-mm cannon,
the 82-mm mortar and heavy machineguns. As established by the higher authorities, it
" occupies a fortified defens e position. The lst Company has constructed ~n antitank
netwozk position of trenche s over 200 meters deep in front of the No 1 and No 3
positions, and it has set up several antitank groups. In front of the forward defense
. position are a mixture of minefields, iron wire mesh, cliffs and antitank trenches,
_ forming an obstacle zone wi th a depth reaching 400 meters. The topography in front
of the forward position is f lat and open, favorable for the m4bil.ization of tanks and
armored vehicles of the tslue Army.
The attacking force of the Blue Army is a strengthened motorized infantry battalicn.
After 30 minutes of firing preparation, two openings 8 meters wide have been opened
up in the Red Army's obsta c le zone. Tanks and infantry combat vehicles of the first
combat front begin to pass through the opening and launch an assault on the Red Army.
_ The tanks, infantry combat vehicles and self-propelled artillery of the second and
third frontlines fcllow 20"J meters and 400 meters behind the first co~bat front
respectively and fire at th e Red Army during the course ~f foward advance. At this
time, the artillery continues to fire at the forward positions of the Red Army.
In this situation, should t he Red Army hiding in the fortifications occupy the firing
positions?
- Bridging Gap in Training Combat
Beijing JIEFANGJJN BAO in Chinese 26 Sep 80 p 3
[Article by Yin Li [1438 4 S 39], instructor of the military academy: "How To Study
Academic Problems in Planne d Training";
[Text] Planned training i s a good method used to train and itaprove the organizational
and commanding capabilitie s and tactical skills of the cotmnan~er. Of course, people
also often call it "paper war," indicating that planned training is different from
- real war. How can we less en this gap in the academic research of planned training?
I will talk about my personal experience.
tde must conscientiously st udy the enemy. At present in planned training, because
of insufficient study of the enemy, we fr~quently assume victory in every battle
~ while the enemy can never shake us. Even the atomic bomb seems to be as easily handled
as a hand grenade. In the futuxe, our main war opponent will be a highly modernized
- and fierce enemy whose eeap ans and equipment, establishment, system and tactical
thinking will all be diffe rent from past enemies. This requires us to adapt to this
new situation so that the assumptions in the imagined situation coincide with the
combat characteristics and the tactical thinking of the war oppo~ent and so that
everything starts out from the actual situatian of the enemy. Only in this way can
we. start out from the diff i cult and follow the strict situation, so that the strict
situation is rational and the difficulties are feasible.
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We must start out from our present equipment. The study of tactical problems in
planned training is inseparable from the weapons and equipment of the two sides. At
~ present, the tactical principles of the armies of the advanced capitalist countries
of the West are determined by their weapons, technology and equipment. If we follow
~ the West, mainly using antitank guided missiles and surf.ace-to-air $uid~d missiles
to attack tanks and airplanes, then no matter how good the tactics are, i.t will still
be "empt~ talk versus empty talk." For a relatively long period in the future, in
weapons and equipmen~t we will still be inferior to the superior enemy. We must never
improperly belittle ourselves; we must fu11y develop man's subjective mobility, start
out from the presently available equipment our armed forces possess, consider the
possible developments within the near future, and develop a set of practical, feasible,
flexible and mobile ~actics. Only in this way can our planned training be established
on a reliable material foundation and the tactical thinking thus developed adapt to
the needs o.f future war against agressior..
We must solve tr.e problem of combination in a key way. Improving the commanding
capabilities and the tactical level of the co~ander of combined for~es to organize
joint combat of various troops and special troops under modern ~onditions is the
fundamental goal of planned training. Therefore, in the course of developing academic
study, we must grasp this key from beginning to end.
We must pay attention to allowing the facts to speak for tremselves. When studying
and exploring tactical problems in planned training, we must emphasize utilization
of the expex�ience gained in exercises, experimental data and related combat cases
and allow them to speak for themselves. We must talk rationally according to facts;
we must not start out fro~ and discuss empty concepts. Yet, planned training means
the study of a certain academic problem under specific and concrete conditions; the
experience of exercises, experimental data and related combat cases drawn upon when
exploring the problem are all unavoidably limited. This requires that in our thinking
we strictly follow the method of going from the specific to the general and from the
concrete to the ahstract when studying acaciemic problems in planned training, thus
elevating sensory understanding to rational understanding.
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MILITARY AN,~ PUBLIC SEC~JRITY
PLA UNiTS FIND WAYS TO IMPROVE TRAINING
Drilling According to Needs
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Nov 80 p 1.
[Article by Liu C~ingyan j0491 1987 1750] and Shi Wenting [0670 2429 0080]: "Ideology
Is Not Relaxed, Energy Is Not Low, The Spirit of Work Is Not Reduced.; a Certain Tank
_ Regiment Grasped the End of TraininE Like It Grasped the Beginning"J
[Text] It is the end of the year; on the exercise field of a certain tank regiment
of the Fuzhou units, the scene is one of acxivity.
By now, most of the companies of this regiment have completed all of the annual
training courses, and exams in tactical techniques and specialization have ended.
But the leading organ of this regiment has gone down to study each company, and the
energy has not lessened, the spirit of work has not dropped, and the end of training
is being grasped like the beginning of training at the start o~ the year.
When training began, the cor~anding, political and logistical organs of the regiment
separately organized and dispatched four working groups to help the companies solve
the difficulties in training. After each company completed the annual training
tasks, none withdrew and none relaxed the work assigned. Several ma3or leaders of
the regiment took the responsibility of teaching the training subjects separately
and obtained good results, and they are now continuing to carry out inspection of
- each s~.lbj ect .
The entire regiment, from top to bottom, analyzed the trend in training, and separately
liandled the following three situations: Subjects in which training had been good
and in which experience had been gained were summarized one by one. Over 10 training
methods, including the training method of "one continuous line" of tactical techniques
and the combined teaching method of the three levels of the regiment, the battalion
and the company, were summarized one after the other, the coordinated training of the
various arms of the services was emphasized. Activities were launched to seek the
cause of failures in subjects that had been found during inspection and examination
on a mass basis in order to think of ways to solve the problems together. The ,
subjects which were taught in a hurry in order to catch up with the annual schedule
were repeated in training. The 2d Tank Campany, which was in charge of this year's
exercises and construction tasks, began training 2 months later than other units.
- Some training subj~cts were rushed through. Recently, "files" were established on
the training r_ontent that was rushed through, and subjects are now being "reprocessed"
to eliminate the obstacles in the specialized communications units, theory of tank.
" maneuvPrs arid ranging by the first gunner.
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This regiment has also organized forces to strengtheu the special technical backbone
teams of over 10 companies by reaching out and lining up the technical backbone and
instructor teams of the cor~pany, and is holding military technical training classes
for various special troops and personnel and is organizing centralized training for
the backbone menbers.
Flexibility in Training
_ Eeijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Nov 80 p 1
[Article by Jiang Yong j5592 0516] and Zheng Jian j6774 0256]: "Not `Rehashing'
Because of. Regul~tions, Not Rushing Through To Catch Up With the Schedule: the 9th
Company in Charge of Production Tasks Uses Initiative in Training and Obtains Best
Achievements in the Regiment"]
- [Text] 'I'he only company of a certain tank regiment of the Kunming units involved
_ in production, the 9th Company, achieved the beat scores in the yearend, training
- exams in single-gun live-ammunition d3rect-aim firing in fixed and mobile targ~t
practice and single soldier exam~. This unexpected situation benefited the leaders
of this regiment and taught the leaders that training should not be carried out by
"arbitrary uniformity," but that the companies and units should be given a d~finite
framework.
- Last September, the ~arty committee of this regiment ordered the 9th Company to take
- up the task of production, proposing that the 9th Company's training time be half
- that of companies receiving full training. Starting at the beginning of this year,
the regimental leaders and offices did not control the training of the 9th Company
very tightly; the training schedule established by the battalion was not issued to
the 9th Company, allowing the 9th Company to organize and implement training on its
own an the basis of the general training sub~ects. The cadres of the 9th Company
concentrared on training. Starting aut from the actual situation, training was
- arranged in a flexible manner. When it was seen that training in certain sub~ects
had met the requirements,~ the time was reduced and the company turned to new training
subjects, Training that did not satisfy the requirements was given more time. In
past year, inc'ividual gunnery training generally required 2 months. This year, after
20 days of training, the requirements of the training guidelines were completely
satisfied, and the company turned to new training subjects. After the pointers completed
the course of corrections in firing, they were examined in marksmanship using rifles
as a substitute for cannons, and this showed that many comrades did not completelq
_ grasp the main points. Th~ company rearranged the time in order to provide for
_ supplementary classes. The cadres of the company units organized training, emphasized
qual.ity, and did not take the training time as the main criteria. They urged that
cadres and so~diers be trained strictly, and nobody was seen standin~ around in the
- fi~lds, The soldiers did not "rehash" old exercises because of the training schedule
- and the:y did not walk through the exercises in order to catch up with the schedule;
the s~hole company carried out training concretely.
The willow becomes a shade tree without any intention of becoming so when planted.
- The situation of the 9th Company brought some profound realizations to the leaders
of the regiment, and regimentai commander Li Defu j7812 1779 1381_] said: This case
fully shows that the initiative in training should definitely be given to the companies
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- and uriits. The general training content, training standards, and training period
must be uniformly established, but the training in individual sub~ects generally can
start out from the actual situation of the companies and units and be organized and
imptemented in a flexible manner. Controlling training too tightly is unfavorable
to mobilizing the enthusiasm of the companies and units. The leaders of this
regiment plan to utilize this experience in the future training of the whole regimen..
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
COMBINED ARMS BATTALION CONDUCTS TRIAL TRAINING
3eijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 4 Sep 79 p 1
_ [Article by Yang Songlin [2799 2646 2651]: "Change the Situation in Which the
'Vehicles, Horses, and Artillery' Do Not Meet; E~plore Problems in Coordinated
Training of Variou~ Arms of the Services; A Certain Armed Force Begins Training
for the Trial 'Combined Battalion'; Cadres and Soldiers Say Happily: This is Truly
Like Studying Combat Under Modern Conditions"]
[Text] Editor's Note: The n~ws about a certain armed force
that has established a trial "combined battalion" to gain
experience in coordinated training of various arms of the
services is enc:,uraging. This type of "combined battalion"
cannot be found in the current list of established units and
it has not been seen in documents of the higher authorities.
But custom has been broken and such a unit has appeared in
the mighty Taihangshanfoothills. It vividly shows the extreme
importance of implementing th~ spirit of the party Third
Plenum, insisting on liberating thinking, and insisting on
seeking truth from facts. It can be concluded that if there
had been no departure from inflexible thiriking, if we had not
possessed a spirit of brave practice and daring to create new
things, if we had not had the energy to do things in a big
way and been responsihle for winning future wars, if we had
insisted on "book worship" in doing everything and had
maintained the spiritual attitude of not doing anything that
was not documented and apecified, this type of "combined
battalion" would never have emerged.
Our armed forces, from top to bottom, lack experience in
coordinated training of various arms o~ the serviceE. This
requires us to be brave in practice and to explore daringly.
This type of "combined battalion" is a kind of brave test
of coordinated training of various arms of the sezvices.
Although the experiment has just begun, the spirit of
creativity manifested by the leaders of this certain arr~~d
force and the officers and men of the "combined battalion"
_ during the course of taking the first step is worth learning.
It is believed that the leaders of this certain armed force
and the officers and men of the "combined battalion" will
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surely create a new road in coordinated training
of various arms of the services through continuous
practice and continuous su~arizing of the experience.
- We look forward to new information about this "comhined
battalion."
One day during the first 10 day~ of August, flocks of wild chickens fle~ out of a
certain valley in the foothills of 'Taihangshan as if frightened. From their normally
quiet habitat began the sounds of moving tanks, artillery, radio commun~cations, and
- soldiers drilling. This was the "combined battalion," which inc3udes six arms of
the services and special squads created on a trial basis by a certain arm of the
military service.
For a long time, the coordinated training of military units h~s been a weak link.
Because of the limitations of the establishment, equipment and ffe.~ds, each arm of
the service trained on its own, and at most, a combined trainirag ~ession was conducted
by the military division at yearend, and the combined training for the year would be
completed. Soldiers said: "The 'vehicles, horses and artillery' do not meet all
year, but a~ yearend they come for a'reunion dinner', and .afte~ New Year, each
'does its own thing' again!"
How can we change this situation and improve coordinated training of the various arms
of tt-,e military service? After the Third Plenum of the llth Party Congress, during
the course of shifting the emphasis of work, the leading comrades of this military
force continued to think about this problem. The war of self-defense and retaliation
againsc Vietnam made them see more clearly the extreme importance of coordinated
combat by various arms of the services in modern warfare. They went to the divisions
and the regiments and conscientiously studied togeth~r with the cadres and soldiers.
After conducting surveys, in July, the military and party committees developed a
daring idea: organize and establish a"combined battalion" including ar. infaatry
battalion, a tank campany, a 122-mm howi~zer r_ompany, an 82-mm recoilless cannon
company, an antiaircraft machinegun company, an engineer piatoon, a communications
platoon, an anti-chemical-warfare platoon, a flamethrower platoon and corresponding
logistics squards. Through this battalion, cadres and soldiers of various arms and
_ special squads lived together, trained together, studied the various difficulties
encountered in coordinated training of the battalion and company, explored various
questions related to the organization and command of the combined army in combat
to find ways and gain experience in coordinated training for the large units. The
training period was 4 months. This idea was approved and enthusiastically supported
by the higher leading offices.
'To find a training ground for this "cor~bined battalion" where thF topographical
characteristics of areas of future war could be found ard which was suitabie for
studying the needs of the various anna of the service in coordinated training, troop
commander Cao Puchi [2180 2975 1062] took a map and led his general staff to the
heartland of Taihangshan to conduct surveys and select relatively ideal training
grounds for each separate unit of the "combined battalion." During the first 10 days
of August, each unit was deployed and stationed at the training grounds, and the
"combined battalion" officially began training.
During the first stage of training, they mainly engaged in theoretical study to lay
a technical and tactical foundation for coordinated training. The leaders of the
"combined battalion" organized cadres abcve the ~latoon level and concentrated studies
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- on the general principles of combat of the combined army, studied the basic pr{nciples
of combined combat by units of the Soviet, American and Japanese armies, analyzed
- three typical combat cases of coordiaiated combat of our infantry, artillery and tanks
in the war of self-defense and retaliation againat Vietnam, studied the technical and
tactical functions of the weapons an3 equipment of the specialized units of each arm
of the services and the principle of using each arm of the services. Tlte cadres stood
around cannons, climbed into tanks and knelt beside antiaircraft machineguns; they
listened to the "experts" of each arm of the service explaining the p~rformance of
each type of weapon and personally drove and operated the we~pons. In the past, these
cadres had gained their knowledge of each arm of the services by going from book to
book, from figure to figure; now they learn by going from books to the real abjects,
from theory to practice. Everyone listened and observed, touched the reai objects
- anci carried out real practice, and they learned with great interest. After more than
10 days of study, they generally understood the performance three to five kinds of
weapons other than those used in their own arm of militar~? servi.ce; they knew how to
operate and how to utilize them in combat.
During this stage, the infantry completed tactical training from single solider attack
to platoon attack. The artillery and armored troops carried out tactical training
on a single cannon and a single tank. Each special squad carried out applied training
in a tactical background.
"The combined battal.ion" alsa arranged three later training stages: The second stage
was to study and solve problems in coordination during each combat phase and each
combat period in battalion and company attack and defense, mainly by seeking a
concrete method of coordinating the infantry, arti~lery and tanks. The third stage
was to carry out continuous exercises in attack and defense tactics and to solve the
problems of coordinated maneuvers under various complex conditions. The fourth
stage was to conduct combined exercises with live ammunition and xeal people in order
to examine the results of combined training. The comtnanders of each level abcve
the regiment were organized to c:ome to the exercise fields to study and solve the
major difficulties in organizing and commanding coordinated combat by combinin~ theory
with act~al progress and to summarize experience and lessons.
The emergence of the "combined battalion" has caused strong reactions in this military
force. Battalion commander Xie Aifeng j6200 1947 1496] said happily: "In the past,
each year at yearend there was combined training, but because of the short period
of only a few days, the various arms of the services met superficially and 'did not
care about the three aspects': they did not care about ideolog;�, they did not care
about life, and they did tiot care about tbe usual training. Combined training always
seemed like the men were being 'forced' together. Now it is very different: the
_ infantry and many special troops and aquads live and eat together for a longer period,
they work aiid en~oy r~acreation togert~er, they become familiar with each other; I think
= of how to cooperate with you wholeheartedly and you think of how to cooperate with me
- wholeheartedly; this is true 'combination'." This time the 7th p~rtillery Company and
the 3d Tnfantry Company lived in the same villagp, they "hung ar~~und" together every
day, they helped each other learn, and carried out mental e:~ercises in "how the
tanks should coordinated with the infantry in combat, how th~ infantry should coordinate
with the tanks in combat" beforehand, and preliminarily explored how tanks should
coordinate with the infantry and how the infantry should open roads for the tanks,
how the tanks should lead the infantry in an assault, how the infantry shnuld cover
the tanks' assault, how the tanks should support the infantry's assault at their
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original positions, how the single tank and the infantry platoon should coordinate ~
when the infantry and tanks are at the same frontline in an assault, and similar
problems. They thought about the questions and went to the driving grounds to carry
o~it actual practice. Many problems that were thought at first to be very difficult
werP quickly solvecl in practice in the field. Soldiers said happily: The coordinated
training of the various arms of the service has changed from "talking ab out it" to
"grasping it in the hand"; we have changed from "storytelling accompanied by music"
to "playing the piano." This is truly like studying combat under modern conditions!
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC S~CURITY
STATUS OF COMBINED ARMS TRAINING PROGRAM DISCUSSED
_ Beijing JIEFANGJtJN BAO in Ch{.nese 8 Dec 80 p 2
[Article by correspondent Wang Yuzhen [3769 1342 2182] and reporter Li Qike
[2621 0796 4430]: "The Present and Future of the Combined Training Pro gram--Notes
on Investigative Studies by a Certain Division of the Wuhan Troops"]
~ [Text] This year, under the guidance of the higher leadership organs of a certain
division of the Wuhan troops, a trial training program involving combined
branches of the armed services in coordinated combat was carried out. What was
the most profound experience of this year's combined training? It was cuncluded
that without reforming the training plan, combined training could not be carried
- out.
The Start Was Not Kicked Off Well
In March of this year, the higher leadership organs assigned this division the
, task of conducting coardinated combat training on a trial basis under the subject
_ of strengthening assault combat in th~ army division. The whole divis3on was
enthusiastic. But when they began the annual training plans for each service arm,
they became worried. The annual training plan for each service branch was
- separately established, the progress was mixed and not uniform, so combined
training could not be considered. For example, the armored troops training plan
called for basic training from March to June, applications training from July
to September, ~actical training in October and November (nat specif~-:ng whether
this included the participation of other aervice bnanches in combined training),
and examination and retraining in December. Slightly different from the armored
troops was the fact that some service branches did iriclude some time for combined
training with other service branches in the plans, but it was like the saying,
"n~t meeting for a whole year, and at year end, everyone gathers for a big meal."
_ In addition, with the training stages drawn ug by each service branch, they were
not suitable for combined training. For example, in September, the infantry
began offensive and defensive tactical training of the battalion, and according
to t'ne demands flf combined training, the regimental artillery squad, the
communications squad and the engineer platoon should be attached. But at that
time the specialized technical, training of the artillery squad had not been
- completed, the communications squad was still studying basic techniques and some
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applied sub~ects, and the engineer squad was busy with its ~wn specialized training.
As a result, the desire to carry out combined training on a trial basis faced
difficulties from the start. So h~w should the first efforts begin?
There Was a Key To Open the Lock
The current training plan became the "lock" that affected combined training.
Having this lock, a key to open it should be found. This division carried out
major readjustment of the training plan under the guidance of the higher leadership
organs.
Readjustment of the training plan involved reforming the time of training, the
content of training, the method of training, and the examination syste~c. Leading
comrades b elieved that as it is b eneificia2 to combined training, readjustment
should be carried out with a free hand. They followed the principle of favoring
combined training and considering the characteristics of each service branch and
- carried out the ~ollowing workt
The proportions of time alloted for military, political and cultural training of
- all branches of the armed services were unified. According to the original plan,
the proportion of time alloted for military, political~and cultural training of
the infantry squads and the squads of special troops was not uniform; the former
was 5.5:3.5:1, the latter was 7:2:1. They decided that the political caliber of
the cadres and soldiers of the various branches of the service was generally
similar, so the time for political education could be standardized. Thus, they
- unified the pro portion of time alloted for military, political and cultural
training of the various arms of the service to become 7:2:1.
The division of training stages was unified. Whil~ r.aking into consideration the
progress af training of each service branch as a prerequisite, training was
provided first for small units and then for large units in a developing order of
combining training gradually. Training ~f the various service branches for the
whole year was uniformly divided into three stages: The first stage was from
March to July, mainly completing the technical and tactical subjects for units
below the squad. The second stage was from August to the first 10 days of
October, mainly completing the tactical training for the platoon, company and
battalion and f i eld operations of communications equipment led by commanders and
commanding offic ers of divisions and regiments. The third period was from the
middle 10 days of October to the middle 10 days of November for combined training
of the regiments and divisions. During the course of implementation b;~ each
service branch; "arhitrary uniformity" was not carried out and a definite leeway
was allowed.
The content of t raining was read~ usted and time was utilized scientifically. To
suit the needs o f combined training, some subjects were added in the basic training
of each service b ranch: The infantry's motorized squad mainly added general
knowledge and general principles of coordinated maneuvers in coordinated combat
with the various service branches mutually suitable at the same level. The
special squads ma inly added sub~ects of coordinatzd basic training of the service
branches related to the special squads. Each service branch also enlarged ~
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the proportion of special tactical training: the infantry added 10 to 15 percent, .
the special squads added 10 percent. With such additional suUjects added, where
would the time come from? This division used the method of "accounting and
digging for potential" to solve the problem of tim~, and the rest could all be
included in the time for morning drill and afterclass hours. There were also some
subjects such as military topography, point location and squad and group
installations of wired equipment of the co~mnunications squad which were closely
related., and t.hey could be completely combined for alternate training.
- Plan Approved by Practice
What was the result of impiementing such training plans after readjustment? After
1 yea.r of combined training practice, looking back over the plan established at
the beginning of the year, they found that the first step-was the most difficult,
but after taking the first .step, "the road" was opened up.
The greatest benefit of this plan was ~hat it "l~gally" established combined
training so that each service branch had a basis and a criteria for grasping
combined training. Because the plan provided time for combined training and
subjects of combined training from beginning to end, this prompted the various
service branches to consciously do a good ~ob of their own training and to study
for the goal of combining with others. Because combined training started from
the small units and progressed to the larger units, from the lower echelons to
the higher echelons, and was carried out in stages, the foundation was establishe~l
more solidly, so that when carrying out a higher level of combined maneuvers,
things fell into place and everythin g was kept ~n step.
Will the readju~tment of the training plan lower the caliber of training of the
special troops? At the beginning of the year, the special squads had some doubts,
but atyear end, they reviewed the specialized technical. and tactical training scores
of the various service branches ~nd found the scores generally were higher than in
pasr. years. The comprehensive grades for the whole year showed the following
statistically:
Infantry (including all infantry companies of the whole division; the same in the
following): The f~nal scores for the light weapons and the 40 mm rocket launcher
- and the 60 mm cannon live ammunition practice were all superior.
Artillery: Single cannon live ammunition practice and company and battalion live
ammunition practice all scored well.
Armored troops (army tank regiment): Total score of the examination on theoretical
subjects was good. Total scores of trainers marksmanship, combat shootj.ng and
driving examinations were all superior.
Scores of engineering squads, communications squads and anti-chemical warfare
squads were all. bet[er than good. Common subjects of the vaiious armed forces
such as military physical education and formation all met the standards estab-
lished by the higher authorities.
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Looking at the tratning achievements of the entire division, people said happily:
this combined training plan has already been approved by practice.
A Few Words in Addition to the "Plan"
This division started out readjusting the traini:~g plan and comvleted the task of
combined training on a trial basis as ordAred by the higher authorities. ReviewYng
this practice, they believe that there is something more to say.
- 1. Reforming the training plan was the key in carrying out combined training.
Yet this would not have come about if we had relied only upon the lower echelon
troops. The main reason this division could readjust the training plan according
to the needs of combined training was that the higher echelon leading organs
grasped thesituation, and there were people who provided support. Without this,
no onA would have dared to "do anything." No doubt some comrades who have seen
the exercise by this division have said: "Their experience is good, but we cannot
learn it." This shows that strengthening combined training requires that the
leadership organs at each level first uniformly readjust the training plan to
create conditions for the troops to carry out combined training.
2. When talking about combined training, s~me comrades have said: we have
"innate deficiencies and acquired imbalances." What is meant by "innate
- deficiencies" is that the establishment and the system of our army now do not fit
- the demands ~f a combined army in many aspects. The military training department
and the departments of the other branches of the service have a parallel
~ relationship, not a su~ordinate relationship, the military training department is
even further related to the services. As rPflected in the training plan, these
departments cannot be "combined" even from the top. What is meant by "acquired
- imbalances" is that under the current establishment and system, the various
- branches of the armed services has not taken active measures to strengthen their
mutual relationship. Whether in establishing training plans or in doing ordinatry
- work, all orders are passed on from top to bottom, there is only a"vertical"
~ relatioaship, L-here is no "horizontal" relationship. It is very diffic.ult to
- carry out combined training in this situation. Therefore, reform of the
establishment and the system must be carried out. Before the reform of the
- establishment and the system has been accomplished, the ~eading organs should
quickly carry out measures ta solve the problems of having "acquired imbalances."
If each branch of the armed services starts out from the goal of carrying out
combine~ training of units well and uniformly arranges training, a relatively
- perfect combined training plat~ can be realized. After the leading organs have
been "combined," then the business of combining the troops will be easy.
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CSO: 4005/ 21.09
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= MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECUFITY
~
DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS RECEIVE SECURITY BRIEFING ,
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in ChinesQ 7 Dec 80 p 2
[Article by Sun Xuanquan [1327 6693 0356]: "Old Veterans of the Sixth Company .
Receive Security Education"]
[Text] On the afternoon of 19 November, the Sixth Company of a certain anti-
aircraft artillery regiment ~f the Shenyang troops conducted a security education
class for old soldiers about to be discharged and become veterans. Political
- instructor Cui Dejun [1508 1795 0193] instructed those present to learn [security
rules] in order to improve understanding of guarding secrets. Then he asked the
old veteran soldiers to observe three requests: 1) Everyone must check his
personal belongings to erase and destroy documents an~i diaries showing tr~op
designations ~nd involving secrets of the units. 2) All materials and military
books that carry a secrecy classification must be returned to the company and
units. 3) After returning home, there must be no talk about the secrets of
- the units. Witii such work, chance of any secrets being leaked has been solved
in time.
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i
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1 V~~ V~ ? 1Val~~J V?V V~~L?
; MILITARY AND PLIBLIC SECURITY
' GUIDED MISSILE UNIT COMPILES NEW TRAINING MATERIAL
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 8 Dec 80 p 2
[Article by Xu Bin [1775] and Ouyang Shigao [2962-7122 ~514 7559]: "Guided
Missile Unit Headquarters Compiles New Training Ma.terial; 23 Comrades Participating
in the Compilation and Writing Receive Awards"]
[TextJ The guided missile unit headquarters recently compiled a set of new
technical training materia.ls of over 1,400,000 words.
So that the units would ha�ve a whole set of training materials to carry out drill
and training, at the beginning of the year the guided missile unit headquarters
- assigned 60 special technical backbone members to organize a training materials
compilation and writing group. For the training materials to be syster.~atic and
complete and to have a definite scientific and technical standard and also to be
- easily understood, many times they sent people to the units that designed and
manufactured this type of guided missiles to learn and to szek opinions on the
compilation and writing of the training materials. During compilati.on and
writing, there was a shortage of technical data. They contacted concerned units
- and gathered, copied, arranged, compiled and wrote down the data. They also paid
attention to including scientific and research achievements of the research and
- development and experimental units and the past training experience of the troops
in the new training materials. The new training materials emphasized operation
and use as well as basic theory. Among the comrades participating in the
_ compilation and writing work, there were 23 comrades who made outstanding
achievements who were given awards by the leading organs.
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CSO: 4005/2109 END
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