JPRS ID: 10182 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080036-0
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• Sequence Number: 36
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10182
14 December 1981
~ub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 753
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/10182
14 December 1981
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 753
CQNTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Summit Meeting Examines France~s Role on Continent
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 11 Nov 81) 1
Mitterrand's Policies for Africa, Jean-I,ouis Buchet
Socialist Administration, Party Misunderstandings
Mitterrand Speaks ~african Language~
ANGOLA
Shortfall in Coffee Production Points to Mounting Difficulties
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 6 Nov 81) 10
Analy~is of Main State Marketing Company
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Oct 81) 12
Briefs
French Cooperation Prospects 14
Luanda Master Plan 1~
CAPE VERDE
Briefs
Japanese Rice Donation i5
CHAD
Article Sees ~etting Up Inter-African Force More Urgent Than
Ever
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 6 Nov 81) 16
- - a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO]
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Background of Withdrawal of Libyan Forces FY~om Chad
(JEUNE AFRIQLE, 11 Nov 81) 19
Reported Libyan Coup, by Francois Soudan
Chad a Burden for Libya, by Mohamed Selhami
- Intervention Not Totally Negative, by Amin Maalouf
Defense, Foreign Ministers on Current Situation
(Patrick Forestier, PARIS MATCH, 27 Nov 81)...........~...~.~ 2C
~OTlGO
Ways France Can Aid Nation Face Sudder., Oil Wealth Noted
(Jacques Latremoliere; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR.ANEENS,
6 Nov 81) 28
GUINEA
New Agreement Gives Impetus to Iron Ore Project
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITFR~'ZA~'VEFNS, 6 Nov 31) 36
i~UINEA-BISSAU
Briefs
ADF Food Ass~stance 38
IVORY COAST
Briefs
Fishing Catch Still Insufficient 39
MADAGASCAR
Briefs
Experts Meet Malagasy Officials
MOZAMBIQUE
Briefs
Swedish Wheat, Italian Trucks 41
SENEGAL
Opposition Leader Plays Down Party Split
(Ginette Cot; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 9-22 Nov 81) 42
Bri_ ef s
Mauritanian Relations ~
Wade Seeks Diouf~s Mediation ~
SIERRA LEONE
Possibility of Major Government Upheaval Seen
(Brendan Nicholson; THE STAft, 16 Nov 81) 45
- b -
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; T.NTER~AP'RICAN AF~AIRS
~
~
~
~
' SUl~1IT MEETING EXAMINES FRANCE'S ROLE ON CONTINENT
~ Mitterrand's Policies for Africa
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1088, 11 Nov 81 pp 18, 19
[Article by Jean-Louis Buchet: "What Mitterrand Contributes to Africa"]
[Text] A certain sensitivity and a political determination to
promote "real" development.
"The French have ideas and they are often good ideas. But when it comes to putting
them into practice, that is an entirely different matter!" The irony of this state-
ment by an American diplomat is not without foundatinn. Last month, at Cancun,
I saw Francois Mitterrand plead sincerely f or the Third World. He made credible
proposals in the matter of North-South solidarity. But without any great results
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1087). Before that, in Mexico, I had heard the French presi-
dent issue an appeal for liberty in Latin America. That was not without importance
either. But, considering France's influence in this region, one may doubt the
effectiveness of such remarks.
In short, in less than a week, the weakness of new French diplomacy came to light.
What good is an innovative policy if the means for implementing it are insuff icient?
- But this skepticism perhaps is out of place when it comes to Africa.
- If there is one region where the generous but just the same re~listic ideas of
socialist France have a good chance of being translated into action, that is Africa.
History, common language (in a part of Africa), and economic interests, to be sure,
give French diplomacy here a significance entirely different from what it is else-
where. But that is not enough. After all, Giscard also had ideas. His 7-year
*_erm nevertheless ended with not much in the way of results.
~ The thing that strengthens France's position today is a certain African "sensiti-
vity" on the part of the socialist administration. Pierre Meussa, a man who had
been rather badly treated by those same socialists, recalled that rather deservedly
in these columns several weeks ago in connection with Gaston Defferre, Claude
Cheyssnn, and Francois Mitterrand (JEUNE AFRIOUE, No 1086). This sensitivity by
the way was expressed on 3 NovemSer at the opening of the Paris conference: "By
identifying a phase of my life with that of your continent, I learned that Africa
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was not really known and understood except hy the Africans themselves." It was
not the arrogant Giscard who said that! Mitterrand himself was talking about the
"great humility" deriving from fiis interest in Africa. But these are just worda.
This time hawever they strike home because they are true.
Giscard; we remember, was on bad terms with Houphouet. Mitterrand l~imself, hail-
ing those of his peers "who were (his) colleagues in the French parliamentary as-
semblies," paid "friendly homage" to the Ivorian head of state, "your dean, my
friend,(who) is quite familiar with what all of these memories can bring out in
the way of. communion of ideas, com~on struggle, solidarity, and friendship." In
the meantime, while the French president reviewed priority taaics, a religion and
a crusade against the "international speculators," was undnubtedly launched upon
the instigation of Houphouet.
J It is not by chance that the French Socialists, af~,er 6 months in power, managed
to restore a climate of confidence with the majoriyo uf the Africans. With these
"progressives" who bothered Giscard so much, with certain "moderates" whom he had
bothered, with all those, finally, who not without worry were wondering sometime
about the consequences of the victory of the left. From Jean-Pierre Cot to Guy
Penne, numerous French diplomats traveled al.l over the continent (see the article
by Sennen Andriamirado, below). Mitterrand received many Afr.ican chiefs of state
_ at Elysee Palace; Houphouet was the first and Mobutu was the last. France was
there when a friendly country seemed threatened, such as Cameroon, by its powerful
Nigerian neighbor. In short, the socialist president reassured everyone. And,
in receiving his guests in Paris, he wanted the conference to reassure those who
were still unsure.
With confidence restored, Mitterrand took the initiative. However, he preferred
a more subtle and cautious approach over the interventionism of Qiscard, a kind
of double or nothing which succeeded (Shaba) or failed (Chad). He was more res-
pectful of appearances if not principles, he was more legalistic in any case, and
he relied heavily on the OAU. Regarding the Sahara, for example, France supports
the Nairobi II resolution. Even more so regarding Chad. Was the OAU powerless
to dislodge the Libyans? Mitterrand's action, shielded h~ the pan-African organi-
zation, today seems capable of putting an end to the designs of Qadhdhafi (see
the article by Sennen Andria~irado and Francois Soudan, below). At other times,
people would have been shouting "interference." But the way it is done means much
here. And also the fact that the new-look socialists a priori are cleansed of any
suspicion of neocolonialism.
In the beginning, the attitude o.f Paris, a powerful idea shared by a number of
African capitals, was this: Regiona.l conflicts and local power appetites open the
door to an East-West confrontation which is not gaod for the p~or countries. The
latter primarily were concerned with pressing problems of development.
On that level, socialist France proposed to act by stepping up its aid most of which
goes to Africa. Cocrnnitments were made: The total amount of development aid would
be increased from 0.35 percent to 0.7 percent of the GNP between now and 1988 and
thz share reserved for the least advanced countries would be increased to 0.15
_ percent between now and 1985.
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The Socialists want to promote a cextain type of development. Mittexrand was very
clear on that in Paris; If France commits itsel~ to the job of consid~rably step-
ping up its aid, it also wants to guide its logic along~~these lines. The ~olution
to the drama of underdevelopment does not involve the establishment of export
crops or industries based on inadequate technologies oriented exclusively toward
the market of the developing countries. To this kind of inerchant capitalism we
must prefer a kind of agricultural and industrial development that will utilize
t:~z human and natural resources, seeking to satisfy the essential needs of the
population on a priority basis." Does this kind of approach indicate a desire to
interfere in affairs of othei countries? It is essentially a matter of good com-
mon sense and reca].ls the spirit of the Lagos plan adopted by the OAU in 1980.
Doe~ this mean that the daddy-style of cooperation has been buried? One can only
hope so. "I am minister of cooperation and development, Jean-Pierre Cot emphasized
on the eve of the Paris sumanit in his office on Monsieur Str~et. It is the second
term (development) in my demand which justifies my action." "Self"centered" de-
velopment, with priority going to rural areas, plus "integrated" programs. Cot
seems to believe in that, quite happy to be addressing himself to his task "without
so far having received any guidance from Elysee Palace, telling me to do this or.
that or the other thing." Of course, for the time being, he must finance aid pro-
jects which fit in rather poorly with his philosophy and he must give emergency
aici. But he intends to go into "real" development soon.
The French are not wrong in emphasizing this point which is essentially in Africa
today. Just as they were not wrong to insist on freedoms in Latin America where
the economy is already more structured. To each his own priority. Having made
this point, the zight for democracy is no less urgent in Africa. Now, in spite
of the new reference to the "people,"' it seems to hav e been tragically forgotten
in France's African diplomacy. It would be a shame if realism were to prevail over
_ generosity here. Unless this generosity is preserved for those who can only ex-
pect words from France. Realism is good for the others, that is, the Africans.
Socialist Administration, Party Misunderstandings
Pari~. JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1088, 11 Nov 81 pp 20-22
[Art~cle by Sennen Andriamirado: "The ~ao Sides"]
[Text] The socialist administration has its reasons which the
- Socialist Party does not understand.
In Africa, the Trench administration and the French PS [Socialist Party] have four
categories of "common friends": The leaders of Benin, of the Congo, of Niger, and
of Senegal. And that is all. This at least is what emerges from a comparison
among the guests invited by Mr Francois Mitterrand to the so-called French-African
summit in Paris (3-5 November) and those invited by the party--from which the
French president came--to the Congress of Valence (23-25 October, see JEUNE AFRIQUE,
No 1087).
The other invited guests on either side are not the same. It just so happens that
the PS admin~_sters its friendships in a manner different from the administration.
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In summary, the ~rench axe applying a new ax~pm; ~'The friends o~ our ~7riends are
not our friends;" The theorem even works the other way since the"enemies o� our
friends are not our enemies." Thus, African leaders ignored by the PS are among
the guests invited by the government. This i~ of course the way it had to be for
reasons of state: France maintains relations with states, not with parties.
Comorian pr.esident Ahmed Abdallah Abderrahman can consider himself the most for-
tunate: Although his regime is considered "illegal" by the PS, he was the only
African received twice in 2 days by Francois Mitterrand. Qthei- leaders who, among
the party comrades, are told that their methods of government are not appreciated,
came out of Elysee Palace, their heads held high. That is true of the Togolese
Gnassingbe Eyadema, the Zairian Mobuto Sese Seko, and above all the Gabonese Omar
Boiigo, who even managed ta turn the situation around.
It is Omar Bongo who, during S months, received the largest number of French per-
s onalities. In particular, Mr Guy Penne, presidential advisor on Af rican affairs,
in June, August, and October. More than that, the Gabonese chief of state can
claim credi.t as conciliator since it was he who, in his own Libreville, organized
the meetings between Guy Penne and the controversial leaders, such as the Chadian
Goukouni Weddeye and the Central African Gen Andre Kolingba. In French socialist
circles, Guy Penne was discreetly reproached for having manifested a certain pre-
dilection for Omar Bongo, something which Valery Giscar~ d'Estaing was hardly ever
- criticized for. The people at Elysee Palace are content with saying: "Our only
mistake in Gabon was not to have recalled ambassador Maurice Robert soon enough:"
In reality, there is a noticeable disparity between the criteria adopted by the
two power centers. The socialist militants would have preferred to enlarge the
Front Line countries to include the "French-African family" inherited from Giscard.
That u~as undoubtedly too soon. But one must not forget that the African policy
statements by candidate Francois Mitterrand quite correctly labeled unhealthy
"French aid concentrated on a limited number of countries, most of which were our
colonies." This is explained as follows at Elysee Palace today: "Mitterrand could
not suddenly break with tradition."
Another basic assertion from the PS seems to have been forgotten by the adminis-
tration. It was emphasized that French cooperation w~uld not be extended to "the
racist regimes (that is to sa~, South Africa) and those in which attacks upon
human rights in some way constitute a principle of government."
After having become minister of cooperation and development, Jean-Pierre Cot kept
saying, in an off icial brochure ("La France et le Tiers monde," Paris, Diloutre-
mer publishers, 4th quarter, 1981) that "France can no longer be an active or pas-
sive accomplice of crimes which it has tolerated far too long or a slanted concept
of noninterference." This is a logical conclusion; none of the guests invited to
Elysee Palace were ever suspected of attacking human rights.
Beyond the friendship expressed on either side, there is, on principle, a search
for coherence between the prof essions of faith and actior.. But that is not always
discovered.
What about French military bases in Africa? While in the opposition, the socialists
condemned them. But, even before Francois Mitterrand was elected, the only phrase
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taken out of the Sociaiist Party~s A~xic~n PXpgx3m cpncerned the hases in question;
"Their existence can be justified only in terms o~ extreme necessity and in a tem-
porary fashion." It would thus be necessary to consider that the military support
bases in Central Africa, in the Comoro Islands (Mayotte), in ivory Coast, at Jii,uti,
in Gabon, and in Sene~al ail depend on "dire necessity." The truth is that, while
in the opposition, it was easy to demand that they be dismantled. ~Dnce in power,
it is more difficult to close those bases down. The state has its reasons which
the party has nothing to do with.
A similar finding applies to other fields. Thus, the PS proclaimed noninterference
in the affairs of others and affirms that defense agreements must only be aimed at
tlie protection of state against foreign threats. This principle was appzrently
implemented in Central Africa; French soldiers were withdrawn f rom the personal
guard of David Dacko and allowed him to be "toppled" by General Kolingba. For
Chad, on the other hand, the party had violently criticized military aid given by
France to the successive regimes of Francois Tombalbaye and Felix Malloum. But
today Paris flies to the aid of Goukouni Weddeye.
Of course, the foreign threat does exist; with respect to Chad, it is already there;
it is the threat from Libya. Of course, the shipment of weapons to Goukouni was
deliberately ordered to prevent any attempt at a coup d'etat; according to ali
evidence, however, the coup, which Paris had been afraid of, was not carried out
by Qadhdhafi but rather by a Chadian who was one of his friends. That therefor.e
would seem to be an internal Chadian affair. And Mitterrand avoided having to
admit that.
Looking at Chad, tlie French president moreover forgot other principles of his party.
i To a certain degree, for example, strict respect which must ~overn French-African
~ relations. By sending ~ut a telegram to invite the current president of the OAU,
~ the Kenyan Daniel Arap Moi, without delay to send an inter-African force to Chad,
~ he aroused percept~.ble ill will in several capitals on the continent. The diplo-
% matic formulas, employed here and there, might rather roughly be summarized as fol-
lows: "What is Mitterrand sticking his nos2 into?" In Cameroon, Ahmadou Ahidjo,
and in Gabon, Omar Bongo, continue to maintain that this kind of inter-African
furce should be put together with the help of the UN. The meaning behind that is:
, "It is not up to France to push us!" The same tune came from Algeria where there
' is only friendship for Mitterrand.
As for OAU secretary-general Edem Kodjo, he f elt that French aid to the Pan-African
force for Chad would have to be based on bilateral agreements between France and
the countries to participate in that force,. Put less diplomatically, it sounds
like this: "Let those who want to nsk for French aid do so individually. The OAU,
- wl~ich is a continental organization, does not deal with a single country, except
France."
The injunction of Francois ~Iitterrand thus becomes a flagrant incursion in the af-
fairs of the OAU. Elysee Palace at least is guilty of lack of discretion. For
having sent his message from Cancun (Mexico, see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1087). Did he
want in this way to tell the world that he, that is to say, France, car~ directly
speak to all of Africa? "Valery Giscard d'Estaing would not have done better,"
African diplomats note with iro-~y.
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In summary, nothing has changed ~undamentally in France~s a;~r0ach ta ~ts xelati.ons
with Africa. And it is perhaps this issue on wh~ch the party and the administxa-
tion do not disagree by a single iota. The premier proclaimed quite sincerely:
"Among the three major portions of the Third World, Africa is the one where, for
historical and geograpfiical reasons, has been most present; this presence today is
essential i:or our country's international clout; it is not negligible with respect
to its eco~iomy." This is why Francois Mitterrand cannot really drop the idea of
regularly--and by himself--meeting with half of Africa.
Africa Without Tears
The grand prize for doing the most traveling goes to Guy Penne. In less than 6
days (4-lA August 1981), the French president's advisor for African affairs visited
eight countries: Niger, Benin, Gabon, the Congo, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, and
Jibuti.
Another award, for the largest number of African countries visited, also goes to
Guy Penne: 17, total, between June and October.
The third award, the award for loyalty, must be given to Guy Penne: In 4 months,
he was received in Gabon by President Omar Bongo on three occasions. That of
course was part of his duty because the successor--although he does not like the
co~nparison--of Jacques Foccart, Rene Journiac, and Martin Kirsch, in Africa, is
both the most mysterious and the most visible French official. Believed to know
everything and to be able to do everything, Guy Penne does not go unnoticed any-
where ?~ecause his conversation partners are happy to report his presence.
Less mythical, Cooperation and Development Minister Jean-Pierre Cot did not put
in the same performance as his comrade in the Socialist Party. He was only able
to "make" five countries in Af rica: Cameroon, Ghana, Senegal (3-16 August), the
Congo, Nigeria (15-22 August). It is also noted that this balance was carefully
worked out between West Africa and Central Africa, between the French-speaking
countries and the English-speaking countries.
This dosage did not inspire Regis Debray, a mission chief at Elysee Palace. Loyal
to his guerrilla past, the companion of Che Guevara in Bolivia above all visited
the "revolutionary" countries in Africa, such as Angola and Mozambique, and his
presence at other airporLS ~as only due to necessary stopovers.
French personalities carefully avoided certain countries. That was true of Michel
_ Jobert, minister of foreign trade, and Gaston Defferre, minister of interior,
who only went to Algiers to settle some very specific issues. Foreign relations
minister Claude Cheysson did better although he did limit his trips to the Maghreb:
Tunis (S-6 July), Algiers and Rabat (8-10 August), and once again Rabat, during
the meeting of the French-African Commission. The chief diplomat however :iid not
neglect Africa south of the Sahara since he very discreetly dispatched the rot*ing
ambassador Jean-Pierre Campredon to Kenya and to the Sudan and even more discreetly
to certain hot spots in Central Africa.
This discretion only helped the African trips of the ninth French personality,
Edwige Avice, minister of youth and sports, who, between 17 and 22 October, made a
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"sporting" trip to Senegalr Gabon~ Ivo~cy Coast~ Uppex Volta~ and Mali~ All the
way to Mopti, Sangha~ and Tomhouctou, towns whexe sppxts activities as we know axe
conf ined to tourist antics. (S.A.~
How Much Does Africa Cost
Modesty? Perfidy toward the Giscard regime? The French ministers of foreign rela-
tions and of cooperation, on the occasion of the eighth French-Af ricaa summit,
published a nice little booklet of about 30 pages entitled "La France et le Tiers
monde" (Paris, Diloutremer Publishers, 4th Quarter, 1981). The principal statis-
tics of French aid in 1980 are contained in that publication.
These are statistics of dazzling modesty. Last year, France devoted barely 0.36
percent of its GNP (in other words, $2,358,000,000) for public international aid
to the Third World. The portion allocated to the 30 least advanced countries
(the PMA [Least Advanced CountriesJ which met in Paris between 1 and 14 September)
did not exceed 0.06 percent ($243 million). In terms of the ratio bet~ween aid and
GNP, France is thus in ninth place among OECD countries and it is in seventh place
in Europe, f ar behind Hol?and (0.99 percent), Norway (0.82 percent~, Sweden (0.76
percent), and Denmark (0.72 percent). In terms of absolute value, the situation
is not as bad with France holding fourth place after the United States ($7,091,000,
000), West Germany ($3,518,000,000), and Japan ($3,304,A00,000).
What is usually called aid to the DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments and Overseas Ter-
ritories] being excluded here ($1,687,000,000), we distinguish between bilateral
, aid ($1,645,000,000 or 70 percent of the total) and multilateral aid ($713,000,000).
, The former f igure is broken dawn into $903 million for technical and cultural cooper-
I ation (55 percent), $611 million f or investments (37 perr_ent), and $13i million in
the economic and f inancial area.
Concerning the second item, $428 million are channeled through the EEC, especially
the FED (European Development Fund with $268 million), the BEI (European Investment
Bank), food aid, with $167 million f or the group of the World Bank (AID, IFC);
$62 million for the regional banks and $56 million for the institutions of the UN
(UNDP, FAD, etc.).
France's position is better in the matter of technical cooperation. It has 27,000
citizens working in Africa, including 15,000 in the three countries of the Maghreb
and 12,000 ir. the area south of the Sahara. Moreover, two-thirds of them are
teachers and county agents. France also finances about 23,000 scholarships for
study and training courses either in the countries themselves or in the old home
country.
Several delegations to the summit in Paris carefully kept that little pamphlet.
Who knows? Some day it might be useful. fA.D.)
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Mitterrand Speaks 'African Language'
Pazis JEUNE AFRIQUE in ~rench No 1088, 11 Nvv 81 p 23
[Letter by Sennen Andriamirado; "Letter to My Brother"]
[Text] "Did ;ou know that our president was also a socialist?"
I have some big news f or you: French president Francois Mitterrand speaks African!
Of course, neither Lingala, nor Bambara, nor even Inorian French--you know, where
they drop all the articles--but his speech was well understood by our owcY president.
He passed his f inal exam the moment he said at the opening of their su~nit: "I
have learned that Africa was not really known and iinderstood except by the Africans
themselv~s."
With your usual bad mood, you are going to tell me that this is demagogy. Still,
it w~rks: We, the Africans, are ready to listen to the whites who tell us things
like that.
This is perhaps why so many of our leaders went to Paris to attend this summit
wnich is no longer called "French-Afr.ican" but rather "conference of the chiefs of
state of Africa and France." There were almost 20 presidents plus their vice
presidents and ministers.
Overall, about 30 countries were represented, the newspapers tell me. So you know
what that means! Half of Africa ~athQred around a single non-African: Francois
Mitterrand. That gives me an idea: If you want a taxi license, a scholarship,
or a passport, instead of going to see all those bureaucrats who take your money
(which you do not have anyway), without taking you to the president, all you have
to do is write to this fellow Mitterrand. They say he is very kind because he is
a socialist.
By the way, did you know that our president was also a socialist? I did not know
that. Mitterrand did not know it either! Perhaps you, the young people, you
understand this, but I was astonished to hear our boss say that he always had ideas
like those of the French socialists. Why should he say that iow? In the old days,
with Giscard, we were an "advanced liberal" country. With Mitterrand, we became
"socialists." Of course, nobody sang the International but thP tone of most of the
speeches was socialist. While all of this bothers me in terms of my dignity as
an African (changing opinions like changing a partner is not very glorious), this
conversion of our presidents to socialism is good for us: Perhaps human rights
will now be respected among us. At least Mitterrand will have rendered us a ser-
vice.
You will ask me whether I have seen all of our presidents. No, because that is
difficult and, because to keep up with them, you are not traveling in the forest
or in the prairie. They rode in fancy cars with many cops around and you, in Paris,
can only take the subway. That is normal. And besides, they were not all ir. the
same place. Houphouet lived in his own place, in a suburb of Paris. Mobutu lived
in his apartment on Foch Avenue. Eyadema stayed in his residence on Maz~echal-Monory
Avenue. The others stayed at the Crillon, a palace. It cost very much but France
paid the bill.
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tis I know you Qnly too well, yau axe go~.ng to say; "~y a~a pux pxesi.dent$ la.ye
- in hotels as luxurious as those?" I wi~ll rep].Y to y9u i-x~ adyance; Where would
you have them stay instead? Would you have wanted them to stay ~ a c~p at the
f oot oP the Ei~.~el Tower and to get around Paris on ~oot or on the Fiack o~ a camel7
I tell you, my dear friends, you have to go along with the trends; let us not be
nasty to our chiefs of state. After all, when otTier presidents come to visit us,
to our countries, we do not have tTiem sleep out in the streets. [de offer them
dignified residences. Just like at hor~e: ~ You give the passing stranger the
biggest room and the cleanest bed.
On the other hand, I want you to note one thing: Send me the text of the statement
of the president upon his return to the country. There will certainly be comments
on the radio or in the newspapers on the Paris summit. Send me that. I will tell
you whetlier he said what really happened here.
With that, I leave you. Take care, my friends. Translate my letter to your mother.
Tell her that France has changed, perhaps, but only for the French. Because between
France and us, there is always the same ocean, the same desert, the same forest.
Tell her also that, if al.l of this is to change, it is not because Mitterrand will
do the job. Our president will do it.
Tell your mother that, for the moment, we are still the hand that is held out and
received. In other words, the hand that is beneath the hand that gives.
As ever yours,
Sennen
PS. Also tell your mother that I will send her a little money order at the end of
the month. But I do not know whether the post office will be able to pay her; they
say that there is no more money. Is that true?
COPYRTGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
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ANGOLA
SHORTFALI, IN COFFEE P RODUCTION POINTS TO MOUNTING DIFFICUL~IES
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1878, 6 Nov 81 p 2841
[Excerpt] Following independence, the large coffee plantations were seized and
integrated into national holdings, but the inexperience of those to whom they were
entrusted and the lack of organization caused a vertical drop in production reported
not long ago by the director of the company in charge of the coffee sector, ENCAFE
[National Coffee Company].
The sixth coffee harvest since independence, beginning in June, did not enjoy good
conditions: scarcity of food products for workers since February, delays in the
- payment of wages and transport difficulties.
Provincial ENCAFE officials in Cuanza-North supervise 409 plantations, spread out
over 11 cantons, whose harvest was far from meeting planned production objectives.
Some 29,000 persons work on these coffee plantations, including 12,000 permanent
laborers and the rest seasonal workers who are not employed six days a week. The
rate of absen~.eeism is high: Poorly nourished and badly paid, workers prefer to
devote their time to their own plots of land that enable them to achieve a subsis-
tence living for themselves and their families.
! Workers are taken to their work areas by ENCAFE transportation, but the company's
vehicle pool is only half us~d because of constant breakdowns. As for the.firm's
60 tractors, many have been paralyzed because of the lack of spare parts. Shipping
the coffee out after the harvest was difficult because of the lack of trucks and
the poor condition of access roads, which should t~ave been maintained by the pro-
vincial delegation of the Ministry of Construction (the only organization that has
gradersj. However, it demanded previous payment~for work and ENCAFE did not have
the necessary funds.
After the drying of the coffee berries, it became apparent that there were not
enough shellers, again because of the shortage of spare parts needed to repair
existing equipment. The coffee therefore piled up in the warehouses in August.
In addition to government plantations, there are many small production units in
Cuanza-North belonging to private parties or cooperatives. Poorly organized, this
production sector is no more motivated and tends to give up coffee growing for
- other crops, especially because delays in payment are frequent. Coffee from the
1980-1981 harvest did not begin to be marketed domestically until between December
1980 and February 1981, and its shipping required much longer.
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Finally, nature was merciless. Because of inadequate rainfall, coffee trees are
dying out in the cantons of Cazengo, Bolongongo, Golungo-Alto, Gonguembo and Pango-
Aluquem. Foreign experts have come to study the situation to see whether it is
possible to remedy it.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
11,464
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ANGOLA
ANALYSIS OF MAIN STATE MARKETING COMPANY
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1877, 30 Oct 81 p 2779
[Text] The National Company for the Purchase and Distribution of Agricultural
Products, more widely known as ENCODIPA, marketed nearly 194,000 tons of proc'.~icts
last year and 150 million kwanzas wortii of miscellaneous goods.
Its activity covers all of Angola. The enterprise has branches in the country's
18 provinces. It is established in 143 cantons and 408 communes. It is also in-
volved in traveling sales in rural areas based on a previously set schedule, which
is not without problems because ENCODIPAts visits to rural markets are awaited by
the people, even if it has few or no industrial goods ta offer them.
The deliveries of these industrial goods are often a problemfor enterpri::~~ offi-
cials when the.y do not come at the proper time that is, harvest time: June to
October for dry products (corn, beans, and so on) and May to August for vegetables
from the Wako-Kungo and Benguele regioz?. '
i
i Despite its broad decentralization, ENCODIPA's warehouses are located in Luanda:
~ for cotton, grain (in the facilities of the former Gremio.do Milho) and goods, as
; well as for spare parts and accessories needed for the activities of the enterprise.
i
These activities involve the purchase and distribution of agricultural products
~ and cover various sector~;, one of which is the primary processing of certain pro-
; ducts before consumption: rice husking and polishing, milling, baling and classi-
fication of cotton, preparation of tobacco.
Another important activity of ENCODIPA is that linked to seed. One department is
in fact specifically assigned to the task: purchasing of imported seed, selection
of lots marketed that should be grown again, separation and processing of such ~
lots.
Regarding produce and fruits, ENCODIPA uses the services of firms in the private
sector and a number of government domestic trade establishments. It also handles
marketing, preservation, handling and the distribution of these products and has an
establishment for their direct sale to the people. This is a store located in the
facilities of the old COFA [expansion unknown], open from Thursday to Sunday and
able to serve 1,500 persons a day during the week (including members of the party,
the government and the diplomatic corps accredited in Angola) and 200 persons on
Sunday.
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Special attention is given to the cashew sector. This is a crop grown in several
areas of Angola. There are plans for construction of a small plant to produce
juice from the false fruit of the cashew tree, juice that would be kept in barrels
and shipped to a bottling facility. Cashew nuts would be shipped to airport shops
exempt from customs duties.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
11,464
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ANGOLA
BRIEFS
FRENCH COOPERATION PROSPECTS--The problem that was at the heart of French-Angolan
discussions was the strengthening of relations between Yaris and Luanda. These
relations have been improving steadily, Luis de Al~neida, Angolan ambassador to
Paris, said recently, while Guy Penne, adviser to Francois Mitterrand, stated, on
a visit to Angola in August, that the "French leftist union government wanted to
have even more privileged relat~ons with Marxist-Leninist Angola. The French
Government intends to further the cooperation begun several years ago, particularly
in the areas of oil, machinery, coffee and f ishing. Economic relations are clearly
better. The French company ELF-Aquitaine [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of
France], which has been doing exploratory drilling since May off the coast of
northern Angola, last week announced the discovery of oil, adding that the first
tests point to remarkable productivity. Total also began last month to explore for
oil in an offshore sector entrusted to it further south, A contract for over 150
million francs for construction of a textile plant in Luanda should soon be signed
with a consortium headed by Creusot-Loire, which has already built such a complex
in Benguele in southwestern Angola. Finally, the French Electric Company is to
participate in the establishment of an electricity institute near Luanda. Commer-
cial trade between France and Angola, totaling 400 million French francs in 1980,
' should show an increase in 1981, with contracrs for some 1 billion francs signed
last year between Angola and French companies. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
! ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1876, 23 Oct 81 p 2711] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1981J 11,464
LUANDA MASTER PLAN--A long-term master plan for the city of Luanda is going to be
carried out. The matter, which has been studied by the Ministry of Planning, will
be the subject of a project whose drafting will take 3 years becauQe of its complex-
ity and the anarchic growth of the city because of population growth. Various
foreign firms have been asked for bids from the following countries: Portugal,
Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Brazil, the German Democratic Republic, Sweden and Denmark.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Fren~ch No 1876, 23 Oct 81
p 2711] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464
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CAPE VERDE
BRIEFS
JAPANESE RICE DONATION--Japan has given Cape Verde a gift worth 2b0 million yen
(about 5 million French francs) for the purchase of 1,250 tons of rice, it was
learned on 15 October. Last year, the Japanese Government gave Cape Verde food
aid for the purchase of 2,600 tons of American wheat. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1877, 30 Oct 81 p 2755] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464
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CHAD
ARTICL~ SEES SETTING UP INTER-AFRICAN FORCE MORE URGENT THAN EVER
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1878, 6 Nov 81 p 2797
[Text] The announcement by the Libyans of the withdrawal of their troops from Chad
at a very time when the president of France was meeting in Paris with the represen-
tatives of some 30 African countries, including some 20 chiefs of state, is the
crowning of intense diplomatic activity accompanied by a series of rumors of a
coup d'etat against President Go~skouni Oueddei, rumors immediately denied but which
coul.d look like the elements of a maneuver whose purpose seems uncertain, depending
on whether one attributes responsibility for it to elements inside or outside Chad.
The event that set off the tumult was the telegram sent from Cancun by the president
of France to the president of the OAU, asking him to speed up the sending of the
inter-African force to Chad. The presence in Cancun of the President of the United
States and of hundreds of representatives of the world press naturaliy gave a spe-
cial edge to this initiative, which reminded the international community of the
existence of the Chadian problem and all its projections, in Africa itself as well
as in the Near East, where the situation created by the disappearance of President
Sadat does not leave the great powers indifferent. The telegram was motivated by
information, deemed to be alarming, from Ndjamena, where President Goukouni Oueddei
was being pressured by Colonel Qadhdhafi to hasten the merger between Libya and
Chad.
Francois Mitterrand's telegram was one more confirmation of the French policy on
Chad: supporting OAU decisions made in Nairobi with all his strength, and conse-
quently, supporting the legitimate government of Chad and helping the establishment
of the inter-African force, which was to make the withdrawal of Libyan troops possi-
ble. The only limitation that the Paris government placed on its assistance was
the sending of French troops.
France's affirmed support and the warning sent to Colonel Qadhdhafi, represented by
the sending of 25 tons of munitions and light weapons to the Chadian Army, strength-
ened the authority of President Goukouni Oueddei and encouraged him in his decision
to call upon Colonel Qadhdhafi, in a message dated 29 October, to immediately with-
draw his troops from Ndjamena and from Chari-Baguirmi Province and from the entire.
Chadian territory by 31 December.
President Goukouni Oueddei's personal position was not in fact as assured as it
may have at first appeared. Within the Transitional National Union Gowernment
(GiJNT), Oueddei's policy was disputed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmat Acyl,
whose ethnic base in northern Chad, far more substantial than that of the head of
GUNT, might cause him to try to take over the leadership of the country.
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Oueddei's very legitimacy is questioned by some African chiefs oi state. At a
press :.onference in Paris, the Togolese president, General Eyadema, gave decisions
uf the Nairobi OAU summit conference an interpretation differeat from that of Paris.
According to Eyadema, the OAU's support for the principles of settlement worked out
by Chad's neighbors at the Lagos and Lome conferences, including the establishment
of an inter-African force and the withdrawal of Libyan troops, in no way constitutes
an extension or renewal of Oueddei's mandate, a mandste that expired in February.
Consequently, the latter allegedly has no justification for trying to continue to
remain at the head of GUNT and it should only be up tu the OAU "committee of the
12) to make a ruling on the point.
In requiring thaX Tripoli withdraw its troops, Oueddei thereby accepted a challenge
on which his political survival depended. However, he seems to have first carefully
weighed all his trump cards. �
The inter-African force now seems on the way to being effectively set up. 7tuo coun-
tries have pledged to send contingents: Nigeria, 2,000 men, and Senegal, 500 to
600 men. Others, like Algeria and Egypt, have promised logistical support and the
president of the OAU says he is sure that thP replacement of Libyan troops by the
inter-African force throughout the Chadian territory could be assured before the
end of the year.
Furthermore, Oueddei could speculate on Qadhdhafi's desire to have the next OAU
summit conference in Tripoli and become president. The Libyan colonel, who sees -
himself as the successor to Nasser and the liberator of peoples, could hardly allow
his troops to look like an army of occupation on 31 December, or go back on his
word to withdraw them whenever the legitimate government of Chad asked him to do so.
i~i~ presence in Paris of over half of the African nations, including a number of
Arab countries, may have made him fear the consequences of his diplomatic isolation
when he would have to confront the hostility of the United States, which supports
the French position on the question. Moreover, it is likely that Qadhdhafi, who
considers Chad, where he has been able to rally supporters, as a natural extension
of his country, might hope to maintain his influence there, even continue to control
it by means other than military.
Finally, Hissein Habre, spontaneously or following pressure put upon him by the
countries that support him particularly Sudan, into whose territory he withdrew
his army said that he had suspended all military activity until Tripoli's re-
sponse were known to the request for the withdrawal of its troops. The essential
condition for the departure of the troops that is, the maintenance of security
throughout Libyan [si~J territory now seems to have been fulfilled.
Qadhdhafi appears to have yielded to all these reasons. The commanding officer of
the Libyan troops in Chad told newsmen in Nd3amena on 3 November that he had re-
ceived a telephone call from Qadhdhafi ordering him to send his contingents home
within 2 or 3 days, without stating that it was a total withdrawal from Chadian
territory or merely from Ndjamena. He used the pretext of military secrecy to re-
fuse to say how many troops were involved Westerners put the number at 10,000,
which would seem to preclude their evacuation with equipment in such a short atnount
of time. It did not appear at that time that GUNT had been officially informed of
Qadhdhafi's decision.
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If this is not a mere tactical maneuver on the part of Qadhdhafi, an important
step will have been taken toward the normalization of Chad and Oueddei's authority
will emerge considerably strengthened. But serious problems will have to be solved,
the least of which is not the reconciliation of all Chadian factions.
Before leaving Ndjamena to joint Oueddei in Paris, Ahmat Acyl confirmed his total
opposition to the withdrawal of Libyan troops, which he views as premature inasmuch
as the composition, date of arrival and mission of the inter-African force have not
been determined. He believes that "the seeds of civil war" are still present in
Chad and that "the domestic situation (there) is more fragile than generally ad-
mitted."
The pitched battles in Mongo and Dourboli in mid October between the troaps of
*linister of Interior Mahama Abba and those of the minister of foreign affairs seem
to justify these remarks. Oueddei has understood the danger and his government has
just announced the creation of a special commission in charge of determining respon-
sibilities in confrontations between the various Chadian military factions. Those
responsible will be brought before a tqilitary court.
If foreign aid for the reconstruction of Chad, especially that of France,
:is r~ot arranged, nothing can still be done as long as there is not a national union
of a11 fac~ions, and the deployment of the inter-African force appears more urgent
than ever if the withdrawal of Libyan troops is effective.
~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moretix et Cie Paris 198I.
~ 11 464
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C~3AD
BACKGROUND OF WITHDRAWAL OF LIBYAN FORCES FROM CHAD
Reported Libyan Coup
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1088, 11 Nov 81 pp 12-14
[Article by Francois Soudan: "The Story of an Imagined Coup d'Etat"]
[Text] Why Paris believed for 24 hours that there had been a
changing of the guard in Ndjamena.
About half a score of lines in a speech covering 13 sheets, barely 40 seconds--that
is rather little for Chad. Even though the speech was delivered slowly by Francois
Mitterrand on Tuesday, 3 November, at the opening of the French-African summit in
Paris before a score of attentive heads of gtate, this was after all nothing but a
rather scholarly presentation. It was about the gravel at Tibesti and the cotton
fields of Logone, about Hissein Habre, about Goukouni Weddeye, and about Qadhdhafi:
There was hardly any more talk about that on Kleber Avenue. In any case, nothing
more than the prices of cocoa or the Namibian issue. Off icially at least. In the
well-appointed hallways of the Conference Center, e~ven before the announcement of
the Libyan withdrawal, nabody had forgotten that a week ago a crazy rumor was mak-
ing the rounds in Paris, coming from press agencies and newspaper editorial offices:
A Coup d'Etat in Ndjamena.
This deliberate desire to play the Chadian affair down, to reducing it to the pro-
portions of a simple incident, is an accurate reflection of the atmosphere of
drama which prevailed for a month in a square whose corners are called Kousseri,
Tripoli, Paris, and Cancun. Is this the story of a manipulation or is it history?
Both of them, it seems. It all began on 17 and 18 September, during the visit of
Goukouni Weddeye to Francois Mittarrand. With his puny adolescent voice, his salt-
and-pepper goatee, the Chadian president was complaining of "pressing pressure"
(sic) to which he is exposed from Qadhdhafi.
Goukouni is worried; in a rather funereal position for several months, between the
"southerners" of Kamougue, viscerally anti-Libyan, and the men in his foreign min-
istry, with Acyl Ahmat, very close to Tripoli, not at all sure of his own forces--
the FAP (People's Armed Forces), with their rather relative discipline, he is
simply afraid that it might all collapse. He was listened to and understood at
Elysc:e Palace; economic aid would be stepped up and the establishment of an inter-
African force would be encouraged.
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Saturday, 17 October: While Goukouni returned to Ndjamena after a month, Francois
Mitterrand went to the United States, as the first stage of a long journey which
is to bring him to Mexico for the Cancun summit. Upon his return he undoubtedly
expects once again to take up the Chadian issue. Jean-Pierre Cot, minister of
cooperation, who was in charge of the Chad affair, and Claude Cheysson, minister
of foreign relations, were included in his delegation. That was when quite
abruptly everything went the other way. One telegram and then two more arrived
in Paris, at Quai d'Orsay [foreign office], starting on the next day, Tuesday, 20
October. They were signed by Pierre Ricard, head of the diplomatic mission in
Kousseri. Located opposite Ndjamena, on the Cameroon bank of the Chari river,
Kousseri--where there are still hundreds of refugees--is marking time, awaitin~
the reconstruction of Ndjamena and its telecom~nunications network from the half-
way capital of Chad. And Pierre Ricard, ambassador of France.
"Things are going badly," the chief of missions wrote in his three messages "strict-
ly for office use only." He added in substance: The men of Goukouni are in the
process of being eliminated; Acyl Ahmat wants power; Goukouni himself could be
overthrown before the French-African summit. Big confusion in Paris. As a matter
of fact, in addition to his own personal analysis of the situation, Pierre Ricard
in his telegrams transmitted the proposals of Goukouni Weddeye, ~ahom he met the
day before, on 19 October.
Knowing that his words would be passed on, did the Chadian president push things
and force Paris into clearly supporting him by dramatizing a situation that had
already been defused? Was he "bluffing" when he mentioned to his conversation
partner the imminence of a Libyan coup d'etat?
In the absence of any effective way to check on events in Ndjamena, the alarmist
telegrams from Pierre Ricard were received with much worry. Especially since
Goukouni took care to send a small delegation rather discreetly to Paris to con-
firm the messages of the Fr.ench ambassador.
Several thousand kilometers away, on the other side of the Atlantic, there was
f everish activity among the French officials who came with President Mitterrand to
Cancun. Forwarded to the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, the telegrams from Kousseri
had the effect of a bomb: It was necessary to act quickly. On Thursday, 2'L Octo-
ber, early in the afternoon (in other words, in the evening as far as Paris and
Ndjamena are concerned), Mitterrand published a statement as to the "urgency" of
dispatching the inter-African force to Chad (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1087). Pressed with
questions, Jean-Pierre Cot wound up saying that the situation was serious. On
Saturday, 24 October, in the morning, Mitterrand, Cheysson, and Cot and the others
returned to Paris.
In Tripoli, what is now called the "Cancun declaration" was received in total
silence: Not a line in the press, not a word on radio, not a picture on television.
As if it had not been a surprise. On 26 October, Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi summoned
French ambassador Charles Malo to whom he gave a message of surprising moderation
for Francois Mitterrand: No, he said, we do not want to overthrow Goukouni; yes,
the moment the authorities in Ndjamena ask us, we will leave Chad. In short, he
explained, there had been a misunderstan~ing.
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Qadhdhafi already knew since that same morning that French air force aircraft, DC-8
and Hercules C-130, were taking off from Bordeaux and Ajaccio, with their cargo
compartments full of a~unition. Unloaded at the Garoua airport in Northern Cameroon,
the cases were shipped by truck to Ndjamena while light arms, taken from the stocks
of Kalashnikov assault rifles, stored at the ?~rench base at Bouar, in Central Africa,
went in the same direction. Objective: To reinforce the Chadian ANI (Integrated
National Army) which needed the items.
A rather motley assortment of diverse factions, the ANI, in 5 months of existence,
as a matter of fact only managed to organize 200 men. Hardly enough to guard the
Chagoua bridge. Tripoli decided to let things go. The decision to withdraw its
troops probably had already been made.
Suddenly there was drama on Wednesday, 28 October. At least there was tragi-comedy.
On Place de la Bourse, in Paris, at the headquarters taken over from the French
Press Agency, somebody i.ntroduced a report which was quickly picked up by a journa-
list on a video screen and transmitted to the teletype of thc newspapers. Quoting
"witnesses coming from the Chadian capital," the message mentioned rumors of a coup
d'etat, an airlift, a pro-Libyan column marching on Ndjamena, the disappearance of
. President Goukouni--in short, without saying so, a coup d'etat.
There was some panic among official circles; reading the message from Qadhdhafi to
- Mitterrand, it was thought that Libya had resigned itself to a retreat. But here
there was another coup d'etat in progress. Published that same morning a weekly
confidential bulletin, LA LETTRE D'AFRIQUE, also stated that there was a Libyan
plan aimed at "legally replacing Goukouni with Acyl."
Now, the AFP [French Press Agency] dispatch to say the least was rather full of
fantasy and on the next day was contradicted by a journalist who had been sent by
that agency to Ndjamena. He never saw any coup d'etat, not even a failed attempt.
But the information had the advantage of being credible and on 29 October several
newspapers came out with their stories on the presumed coup d'etat on the front
page.
Manipulation, intoxication, or disi.nformation? Yes. It remains for us to figure
out who is behind it all. One can certainly accuse the French authorities of
having orchestrated this campaign to exert pressure on Libya to speed up its
retreat, especially since they themselves were wrong in the beginning regarding a
situation which undoubtedly was less tense than indicated in the telegrams from
Pierre Ricard. One might a15u think of a fantastic poker game between Paris and
Tripoli with each side trying to bluff and, as the case may be, scare the other.
But there is a third assumption, strengthened by the brief and at least suspecti
"alert" of 1,200 paratroopers in Bouar on 28 October; large sectors of the French
intelligence services--particularly the military ones--are hostile to the socialist
administration who they hesitate to inform (we saw that at the time of the coup
d'etat which overthrew David Dacko in Central Africa) and there are strong links
in Paris with the Gaullist opposition. Their intent might very well have been to
force the French administration to intervene once again directly in Chad in order
to counter an imaginary but after all very imaginable coup d'etat. That would get
Francois Mitterrand bo~ged down in the Chadian mess.
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- On Wednesday, 2~' October, at the end of a S~hour cabinet meeting, Goukouni Weddeye
officially deman~ied the total evacuation of all Libyan troops from Chad "before
31 December." Just 3 days later, Hissein Habre, the rebel, announced the suspengion
of his guerrilla activities. And on 3 November Tripoli announced its retreat.
Like the French in 1980. Was the French-African summit of Paris the summit of the
rebirth of Chad?
Chad a Burden for Libya
Paris JEUI~IE AFRIQUE in French No 1088, 11 Nov 81 p 15
[Article by Mohamed Selhami: "See Ndjamena and Leave"]
[Text] "For us, Chad is of vital strategic interest. By helping it become stabi-
lized, we will at the same time assure our own stability." This is how Colonel
Qadhdhafi justified the intervention of tfie Libyan Army in Chad in December 1980.
And speculations went along rather nicely: Was this a case of privileged coopera-
tion between two neighboring countries or a real occupation? The Libyans always
declared themselves ready to withdraw from Chad "if the government of Ndjamena
so demanded." Goukouni Weddeye wanted that and Qadhdhafi on 3 November decided to
pull his troops back.
People in Tripoli undoubtedly were relieved and that included high officials who,
without saying so, were hoping to divest themselves of the entire Chadian affair,
for several reasons. First of all the economic difficulties caused by the drop
in petroleum sales which the Jamahiriya tried to counteract through austerity
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1082). Certain development projects in the 1981-1985 5-year
plan were suspended or even dropped; Libya f loated a loan of $200 million on the
internation.al market through the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company.
The Jamahiriya is beginning to be in financial trouble to the point where it is
finding it difficult to pay the salaries of its officials. Chad became a burden
which Libya was having trouble sustaining. Likewise, it can no longer spread its
bounty to the numerous liberation movements in as generous a fashion as so far.
For tiie Libyans, withdrawing from Chad also means calmly preparing for the OAU
summit which is to be held in June 1982 in Tripoli. Qadhdhafi knew that certain
heads of African states--Egyptian, Sudanese, and Somali among others--would not
agree to have him take over the chairmanship of their organization if he kept his
army in Ndjamena.
"The OAU summit will take place and our country will be honored to receive it and
to preside over it. The high Libyan official who made this statement to us did
not conceal his worry about the future of Chad which "risks another blowup." The
Libyans do not care for that. For them it is enough that they are no longer chal-
lenged over the issue of Libyan ownership of the Aouzou strip, a regioa in which
the army is now solidly established, building bases and barracks. With this ram-
part, Chad is no longer of. any "vital strategic interest." Why then stay there
"except to become bogged down and make trouble for oneself."
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Libya cannot allow itself to malce war outside its territory. It has neither the
means for it--especially manpoa~er~-nor perhaps even the desire. Its soldiers
certainly fought in the eastern part of Chad against the men of Hissein Habre,
supported by the Sudan. A score of them died there. The Libyans would have pre--
ferred these "martyrs" to die in Palestine. "There, at least, we have a noble
cause, our cause," we were told by a writer who added: "Since the union between
Libya and Chad could not be accomplished."
Colonel Qadhdhafi felt that a number of his fellow citizens were tired of the
Chadian mess. And, since he is their chief, he followed them! It seems that he
took the first steps by sending Major Jallud to Ndjamena; he has the position of
chief of government. He met president Goukouni on Wednesday, 28 October. He ex-
pressed the wish that the withdrawal should be made "in a gentle fashion" so as
not to rub Qadhdhafi the wrong way and Goukouni played the game.
In the morning of 3 November, during the opening of the conference of the heads of
state of Fran~e and Africa, there was only one watchword: No pressure on Libya,
it will withdrdw by itself. In the afternoon of the same day, Qadhdhaf i dropped
his political bomb: The announcement of the withdrawal of his troops.
Intervention Not Totally Negative
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1088, 11 Nov 81 pp 16, 17
[Article by Amin Maalouf: "Controlled Skid in Chad"~
[Text] Just a f ew days ago it seemed that the Chadian affair would drag out in-
definitely, like quite a few other crises throughout the world. But then quite
abruptly, with a few dramatic moves, the situation was defused. A brilliant
French-Chadian maneuver, a rapid and wise response from Tripoli, and the solution
was there, before our unbelieving eyes.
At the center of this development above all there was the decision of one man.
Until this summer, Colonel Qadhdhafi had maneuvered admirably well. The triumphal
entry of his troops in Ndjamena in December 1980 may have irritated certain circles
but was accomplished within the rules, in response to an appeal from the only in-
ternationally recognized Chadian authority.
Moreover, the behavior of the Libyan troops in the field had not given rise to any
massive abuses which are generally connected with foreign armies. Relations with
the "southerners" remained correct and the country's institutions, in spite of thPir
frailty--or because of it?--were not too badly shaken. Moreover, the main resource
in this long battle, that is to say, the French--this was during the administration
of Mr Valery Giscard d'Estaing--seemed to accept their defeat with a serenity
which sometimes bordered on unawareness.
After his victory, the Libyan leader naturally wanted to strengthen his bonds with
his "neighbor-protege" in the south. Essentially, the agreement signed with pre-
sident Goukouni Weddeye called for and still calls for a contribution to solving
~had's serious economic problems.
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In recent weeks however there has heen a x'eal tuxnabout. In the beginning, it was
hardly perceptible. Tn the beginning, Goukouni gave the impression that he had a
. freer hand. He used this opportunity to try to counterbalance his special realtions
i with Libya through a reconciliation with Fran�~e. That was made possible when the
socialists came to power in Paris. Since this troubling situation was known only
, in diplomatic circles, Qadhdhafi was able to pick one of the following solutions:
, Either he himself could take the initiative and withdraw his troops from Chad, with-
i out waiting for anybody to ask him to do so--by encouraging their replacement with
i an inter-African force which Libya had never opposed and in which it of course
-j would also have participated. He did not do that;
Or he could intervene even more directly in Chadian affairs and try to put his own
; liegeman in place at the time, foreign minister Acyl Ahmat, in order to proclaim
~ Chadian-Libyan unity. The leader in Tripoli, perhaps not without reason, was sus-
; pected of wanting to do that but, in the end, he decided to uphold Chadian legality.
i Between these two solutions there was a third one which was neither the wisest nor
the most foolish: Wait for the dust to settle. That is the easiest solution for
~ any leader and Qadhdhafi adopted it.
The result of this choice--or rather this non-choice--was to bring the problem of.
the Libyan presence in Chad out into the open. Goukouni went to Paris on 17 Sep-
tember and asked president Mitterrand for help. Not only in military and logistic
terms, which woul.d ch ange nothing in the balance of forces out in the field, but
also and above all in political and diplomatic terms, as we saw several weeks
later. For the Chadian leader, that was more important because the publicity made
around his semi-rupture with Tripoli is a form of protection. The turning point
was reached in 3 days. And while the observer might use the term "admirable" in
referring to the maneuver that enabled the Libyan troops to enter Ndjamena in
December 1980, the same adjective is not too strong to describe the French-Chadian
maneuver on 28-30 October 1981.
First of a11, there was "fool's day," when everybody was made to believe that
Qadhdhafi was trying to overthrow the legitimate government in Ndjamena and that
Goukouni had disappeared, while the Libyan number two man, Major Jallud, was
talking naively with Goukouni himself. Then, protected by the noise created in
this fashion, the Chadian leader dared take the decisive and almost irreversible
step: He solemnly demanded the withdrawal of the Libyan troops.
For the sake of completeness we must add that this "controlled skid" toak place
behind the smokescreen made up of the debate on the inter-African force. Tripoli
undoubtedly thought that the diplomatic discussion on this subject would drag on
for several weeks, perhaps even until the OAU summit in June 1982, whereas the
big show had been carefully prepared for the end of this October.
The undeniable success of the maneuver, on the eve of the French-African summit,
had created an entirely new situation. Before that, a coup d'etat against Goukouni
could have had a semblance of ~ustification, regardless how disastrous the con-
sequences of that may have been in long-range terms. After the "days of October,"
a coup d'etat would have been nothing but a suicidal plunge. The chafrmanship of
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,--i
the OAU, which Qadhdhafi wants very much~ would undoubtedly have eluded him. Even
more seriously, the United States, which does not conceal its militant hostility
toward the Libyan leader, would have had a golden opportunity to get him bogged
down in the sand of Chad once and for all. And the French would have been obli~
gated to participate in such an operation.
Did Tripoli envisage this option? There is little likelihood of that. Libyan
officials at no time Went beyond the point of no return, even when their actions
had a cover of legitimacy.
Another attitude which had become untenable was the wait-and-see attitude. That
could have been justified before the whole thing came out into the open. After
Goukouni's demand for withdrawal, libya could no longer stand by and wait because
it had been put in the position of the accused and because the pressure exerted
- against it could only grow day after day. The stronger the pressure, the less
conciliatory could Tripoli's decision be because any conciliation would have looked
like a defeat.
The only reasonable development was for the Libyan leader to make the best of a bad
- situation and without ambiguity to announce his intention to withdraw--he never
said that he would not--and that he would take c~gnizance of the withdrawal re-
quests from the Chadian government and that, like the French a year ago, he would
disengage even faster than Goukouni wanted.
By making the "good choice," Qadhdhafi saved the essential aspects of the whole
situation. While the disengagement took place urithout any big show, the bottom
line after the Libyan intervention was not entirely negative. There was a certain
stabilization and the civil war did no longer rage in the capital.
But let us forget the past even if it is quite recent because what is even more
important in current developments is the acceleration of events. llay after day,
hour after hour, the Chadian situation is changing and if that solves certain
problems, it also creates others. The inter-African force will iiave to be assem-
bled, not in a few weeks, but in a few days. It would be disastrous not to fill
the vacuum left by the departure of the Libyans without delaq. And national re-
conciliation must be accomplished briskly if one wishes to keep the specter of
civil war away once and for all. Let us repeat: The Chadian affair was never as
close to a solution, the principal interested parties never proved to be as wise,
the antagonisms never seemed as surmountable. And never before have we seen the
light at the end of the tunnel this close. Is this a mirage?
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.
5058
CSO: 4719/255
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- CHAD
DEFENSE, FOREIGN MINISTERS ON CURRENT SITUATION
Phi271043 Paris PARIS MATCN in French 27 Nov 81 pp 70-71
[Patrick Forestier, Bendit Gysembergh report: "The Libyans Are Burning Any hing
They Cannot Take Home"]
[Excerpt] Mr Adoum Togoi is now Chad defense minister. This brilliant man, a
skilled tactician, lost a leg during the civil war. He is regarded as President
Coukouni's eminence grise and has been the strong man of Chad since the Libyans'
departure. He still leads tl-ie popular forces, which are loyal to the head of state
and have not yet been integrated into the national army. These partisan units were
severely affected by the war, and it is not unusual to see in their ranks youths
aged 14 or 15 armed with kalashnikovs. In the ravaged country it is still the armed
groups which are able to feed their men best. The defense minister also directs
the military police and the integrated national army, which at present only has
three batallions of 1,200 men and one in the process of formation. The rest of
~ the Chad armed forces (12,000 men under Colonel Kamougue's command) refuse to go and
fight Hissein Habre's supporters in the East. In face of this complex situation in
the lawful armed forces, the number of fighters under the banners of the various
faction leaders is estimated to be 30,000. "We are having difficulties in training
our army," Adoum Togoi explained to me, "mainly because of lack of equipment. If
the inter-African force, which I prefer to describe as a peace-keeping rather than
a neutral force, were willing to give us its equipment, we would be able to put
' down Hissein Habre's rebellion."
' After a few days of calm Hissein Habre's forces have in fact resumed fighting in
Eastern Chad. The cities of Guereda, Iriba and Adre have apparently fallen into
their hands. "The Libyans' departure is forcing us to rethink our logistics
entirely," Togoi willingly confided.
Foreign Minister Acyl Ahmat, who is regarded as pro-Libyan, is now under the greatest
threat. It is his troops, those of the revolutionary democratic council, which have
been fighting Hissein Habre in the east for almost a year. Now that the Libyans
have gone they are more exposed than anybody.
After a short visit to Paris Mr Acyl Ahmat chose to return to Ndjamena. He is sick
and rarely leaves his villa on the banks of the Chari, which is guarded by two
Toyotas armed with Stalin organs and positioned in his garden. He received me
wearing a neck support which made it difficult for him to speak. In addition to a
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spinzl problem he i5 sufferin~; from a stomach ulcer. "I am a Chadian, not a Libyan,"
l~e told me. "I want the I.ibyans to go, but not so abruptly. I obey the head of
state but I think that we have taken an unwise decision. Before asking the Libyans
to withdraw we should have obtained assurances from Egypt and Sudan that they would
stop helping Hissein Habre. Since we have no equipment and are waiting for aid
which is a long time in coming, we are now in a difficult situation, as far as France
is concerned, I hope that it will play its roYe in Chad fully. I have been accused
of being anti-French. This is not true. I was raised by a Frenchman. From 1964 to
1968 I was a student at the Bordeaux Infantry School and the Marseilles Naval School.
At that time there was even some talk of my taking French nationality."
COPYRIGHT: 1981 par Cogedipresse S.A.
CS~: 4719/275
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CONGU
WAYS FRANCE CAN AID NATION FACE SUDDEN OIL WEALTH NOTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 187$, 6 Nov 81 pp 2800-2802,
2803
[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "Brazzaville: How To Master an Oil Economy"]
[Excerpt] What the Congolese president's official visit to Francois Mitterrand in
July 1981 undoubtedly brought about in relations between the two countries was a
total relaxation of tension, whose effects were visible only recently at meetings of
the French-Congolese commission. Jean-Pierre Cot was anxious to participate in the
meetings himself at the head of the French delegation, thereb~~ gaining an opportunity
to better define the scope of the previously mentioned affinities [ideological] con-
cerning the "self-centered" development of the People's Republic of the Congo and
the aid that France can offer in the undertaking.
One dare not forget, however, that the Congo's cooperation with France on the govern-
mental level was accompanied, well before 10 May, by parallel relations with the
French private sector. At the time of his last visit, President Sassou Nguesso
himsclf was the guesr ~f T:~::.: c:aployers and manag�me^*. On 24 September- ~ Congo-
lese delegation, made up of Pierre Moussa, minister of planning, Minister of Indus-
try Itady and Minister of Mines and Energy Adada, was received at the CNPF [National
Council of French Employers] by 250 executives and private meetings with a number of
them were subse~,uently held.
Several prominent French businessmen then went to Brazzaville and a delegation of
P'rench industrialistsy led by the CNPF, will go to Brazzaville in the early months
of 1982. The companies represented have no local base and constitute a new and �
~ receptive milieu for operations that will be proposed to them, operations that are
! a part of the 1982-1986 Five-Year Plan, advance notice of which was given to the
CNPF by Mousssa in the form of a list of priority projects (see MARCHES TROPICAUX
of 25 September, p 2452, and 2 October, p 2510).
This direct appeal to French capital and technology demonstrates, first of all, the
realism of the Congolese leaders, who have understood that one of the greatest
merits of "offic~al" cooperation is to provide a favorable milieu for private coop-
eration, outside of which it r.emains formal and incomplete. But the fact that the
move comes at a time of economic recovery for the Congo, giving its leaders real
lati~ude in the choice of partners, constitutes a pledge of confidence to which they
are all the more sensitive because it promotes their lnterests.
1 Formula familiar to the minister of cooperation and to President Sassou Nguesso.
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Financial Situation
In a world in crisis, only oil could bring about this recovery, just as it is
indirectly responsible for the mess that preceded it. Not only did the overestima-
tion of national oil prospects in 1972 cause the reduction in investments under the
1976-1978 Plan, while public spending increased dangerously, but it delayed the
working of deposits that that are now the most productive, at a very time when
a decline in or disappearance of other mineral resources such as potash began to
occur.
Oil production fortunately began to rise again in 1978~ after the low point of 1977
with.its total tonnage of 1.8 million. For the time being, it is the task of two
companies: ELF-Congo [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France] and AG7P-Congo
[Italian Petroleum Enterprise], both of which have a 20-percent share of the capital.
Along with the Congolese Government, they carry out research and operations. Divi-
dends the first will be paid in 1981 are based on the proportion of invest-
ments after taxes are deducted. Except for the small land deposit of Pointe-
Indienne, whose 10,000 tons are now only of symbolic value and which is ELF-Congo's
exclusive province, extraction is done in partnership with the two companies (65 per-
cent ELF and 35 percent AGIP). AGIP is an operator only for Loango, where the per-
centages are reversed. Everywhere elsewhere, for Emeraude, Likouala, Yanga and,
beginning in 1982, Senji, rPSponsibility for ~xtraction belongs to ELF. Qverall
Congolese production rose to 4 million tons in 1981, compared with 2.4 million in
1978, 2.7 million in 1979 and 3.5 million in 1980. Progress registered at Kilouala
and Yanga and the entry into production of Senji allow one to figure 5 million tons
in 1982 and from 8 to 9 million tons in 1985.
Growth of Oil Production in the Congo (in 1,000 tans)
Year Amount
1965 70.9 Pointe-Indienne deposit only
1970 19 Pointe-Indienne deposit only
1971 14 Pointe-Indienne deposit only
1972 335 15 Pointe-Indienne; 320 Emeraude
1973 2,049 8 Pointe-Indienne; 2,041 Emeraude
1974 2,454 13 Pointe-Indienne; 2,441 Emeraude
1975 1,789 13 Pointe-Indienne; 1,776 Emeraude
1976 2,001 12 Pointe-Indienne; 1,989 Emeraude
i977 1,801 13 Pointe-Indienne; 1,636 Emeraude;
152 Loango
1978 2,430 11 Pointe-Indienne; 1,427 Emeraude;
992 Loango
1979 2,751 10 Pointe-Indienne; 1,417 Emeraude;
1,324 Loango
1980 ~ 3,310 10 Pointe-Indienne; 1,300 Emeraude;
1,400 Loango; 600 Likouala
1981 3,910 10 Pointe-Indienne; 1,200 Emeraude;
1,300 Loango; 1,100 Likouala; 300 Yanga
These are figures that are very nearly definitiv2. An increase in them could result
only from new discoveries, which would still be balanced by the gradual exhaustion
of deposits after several years of working. In the Congo, techniques involving the
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injection of steam: steam drive or puff and roof, have not yet gone beyond the
experimental stage. It is certain that at deposits such as Emeraude, where operat-
ing conditions do not permit the recovery of over 8 percent of the known reserves,
their application would be of the greatest interest.
Another cause for optimism is the development of land and offshore research which,
although there are not yet any pasitive results, have the aid of American, Canadian,
Brazilian and Swiss companies on the basis of sharing production �tith the government.
Within about two years, oil production will be joined by gas production. Reserves
are now estimated at some 50 billion cubic meters. A company has been set up by
the government and the two operators in order to complete the inventory of r~
sources in this domain. If conclusions are positive, work could lead to the con-
struction, as early as 1982, of a liquefaction plant with an annual capacity of
6 million cubic meters.
Consequently, hydrocarbons represent the backbone of Congolese development, as the
rising dollar solidifies the compensation of oil contracts month after month. A1-
ready helped by the consolidation in 1980 of the Congo's debts, the financial situa-
tion shows a foreign debt of 265 billion CFA francs, service on which represented
some 20 percent of budget receipts in 1981 and 28 percent of all export receipts,
which sets the ratio at a rather high level. Moreover, the internal debt amounts
to 225 billion CFA francs and its payment does pose problems for enterprise trea-
suries.
On the whole, however, and despite inflation of about 15 percent, linked to a 40-
percent rate of monetary expansion and a 17-percent growth in the volume of short-
term loans, the economic situation is quite satisfactory: a surplus in the trade
balance and balan~e of payments, a substantial increase in foreign assets; a gross
national product that rose 30 percent between 1977 and 1980. While the share of
oil receipts in the overall budget (70 percent in 1981 compared with 41 percent in
1979) does express a structural imbalance common to all economies of this type,
their stability now seems beyond question. At any rate, they enable the government
to redeem substantial public savings (20 percent of the 1981 budget) and to meet
its foreign debt commitments. The Congo will have no difficulty in gaining aid on
_ the international financial market. The danger would lie in letting itself be
carried too far by such ease.
Self-Centered Development
Meeting the prime needs of the people, defined by their nature and volume rather
than value, takes precedence here, as a strategy, over the search for industrial
and commercial profits, for which the climate, soil and geographic features would
supply the means, and constitutes one of the simplest definitions of this type of
development. In fact, the volume of oil extracted turns the terms of the proposi-
tion around in the Congo. Priority needs remain to be defined, but they tend to
be met only by revenue derived from such extraction.
- A few years ago, then Minister of Finance Lopes identified these prime needs as
those that would be met by aRriculture primarily based on food crops, the goal
being to lead the Congo, thanks to its oil income, to an "after-oil" period charac-
terized by self-sufficiency. Agriculture still holds a place of honor in the
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1982-1986 Plan, although the absence of figures for the projects does not yet
allow one to judge its precise role. It justifies a large percentage of the FAC
[Aid and Cooperation Fund] program, estimates for the fifth EDF [European Develop-
ment Fund] program and a loan of 2.16 billion CFA francs from the African Develop-
ment Bank. However, one observes a certain slippage of grojects, from production
to consumption and from primary to construction, transport and services. The govern-
ment is led into this by political considerations. It is a question of making the
equipping of the territory uniform so as to quell regional and ethnic rivalries
_ that since independence have contributed to the instabiiity of national life. Tha
entire population must be interested in improving the standard of living, affecting
interest in work, technical training and creative initiative.
As a result, Sassou Nguesso undertook an experiment in May of which few African
chiefs of state can boast: a 24-day survey, village to village, on foot, accom-
panied by the ministers of agriculture, health and social affairs. He returned
from it convinced that meeting prime needs can be obtained only through agriculture,
- even if based on food crops, but a true takeoff, including in this production sec-
tor, is linked to what we call quality of life, whence the importance attached to
often ne~;lected accomplishments: housing, naturally, but rural roads a~ well,
telephone booths, out-patient clinics and ambulances within reach of the peasants.
Opening �p the interior and the completion of building materials units will therefore
have a~~hoice place among the projects presented to French investors. For example,
~ vill~~~~-center project was submitted to the F'rench delegation at the meeting of
~he j~~i