JPRS ID: 10196 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS TROOP CONTROL IN AN OFFENSIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 163
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 51
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040400080051-3
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
JPRS L/ 10196
16 December 1981
USSR Re ort
p
MILITARY AFFAIRS
~FOUO 13/81) ~
Troop Control in an Offensive
Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3

APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also frora news agency
transmissions and braadcasts. Mater~als from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or repr inted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, ediiorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first lir.e of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how th~ original information was
processed. Where nc processing indicator is given, the ir~for-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
, original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or at.titude s of the U.S. Government.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PU BLICATI ON BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE QNLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/10196
16 December 1981
USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 13/ 81)
TROOP CONTROL IN AN OFFENSIVE
Moscow UPRAVLENIYE VOYSKAMI V NASTUPLENII in Russian 1981 (signed to
press 6 Feb 81) pp 1-223
IBook by Docent, Lt Gen P.P. Tovstukha and Doctor of Historical Sci-
~ ences, Col R.M. Portugal'skiy, with supervision by ~,t Gen Tank Trps
A.A. Dunin and r~1aj Gen Yu. V. Yakunin, 1~oyenizdat, i2,000 copies,
~23 pages]
CONTENTS
Annotation 1
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ 1
Chapter 1. The Most Important Functions of Control Activities. The State
of the Troop Control Syste~tt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1. The Esset~ce, Content and Conditions of Troop Control During
the War Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Control Bodies and Meana of Communications . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. The Organization of Control Posts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1N
Chapter 2. Characteristic Traits in the Activities of Control Bodies in
~
Preparing for an Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2~
1. Methods and Style of Work of Commanders and Staffs 27
2. The Plan for the Offensive--The Basis of Troop Control 37
3. Planning Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4. The Giving (Issuing) of Combat Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
S. The Organization of Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6. The Preparation of Troopa and Staffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
- a - [III - USSR - 4 FOUO]
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Chapter 3. Troop Control in ttie Course of an Offensive 84 ~
1. Organizational and Creative Activities of Commanders and Staffs 85
Achieving Coordinated Actions of the Troops in Carrying Out ~
~
Combat Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 ~
3. Maintaining Troop�Aattleworthiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4. Ensuring the Dependable Functioning of the Control System 119 ;
Chapter 4. Basic Conclusions from the 3xperi.ence of TY~oop Control in the War ~
Years and the Most Important Ways for Increasing Its Efficiency ~
Under Present-Day Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13T i
1. Characteristic Traits of Troop Control as Evidenced in the
Great Patriotic War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
2. Ways for Further Increasing Eff iciency of Troop Control 146 !
- ~
~
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . 155 ~
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
b
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400440080051-3
FOR OFF[C[AL USE ONLY
ANN Orf AT I ON
The military theoretical work examines the most important problems of troop control
which arose during the years of the Great Patriotic War. It examines the experience
of the commanders, the staffs and other headquarters bodies in preparing and con-
ducting an offensive. The basic areas are brought out for improving troop control,
and the trends and patterns of this process are disclosed. The authors focus the
reader's attentiun on those questions which are of greatest interest for the activi-
ties of officers under present-day conditions. The book is designed for generals
and officers of the Soviet Army.
= FOREWORD
~ The duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people is to securely defend the socialist
fatherland and to be ir. constant combat resdiness to guarantee an immediate rebuff
of any a~gressor, as states the USSR Constitution.l For carrying out this task,
the Communist Party and the Soviet government, in following the instructions of the
26th CPSU Congress, give constant attention to strengthening the nation's defense
capability. All the necessary conditions are created for equipping the troops with
modern technology and improving the level of their training. Military science is
developing, Lncluding that portion of it which solves the problem of achieving high
effectiveness of troop leadership on the battlefield, that is, the scien2e of con-
trol which was aptly styled by L. I. Brezhnev as the science of winning. _
The experience.of the past, particularly of World War II as well as combat~operations
in Southeast Asia and the Near East~prove that troop control as a process of crea-
tive activity by the commanders and bodies ~inder them in the area of directing the
efforts of subordinates at carrying out combat tasks is a most important factor for
success in armed combat. Troop control is rightly considered one of the basic com-
ponents in the combat readiness and capability of the Armed Forces.
I The Great Patriotic War is an inexhaustible source of creative knowledge and practi-
i cal experience as it was the largest scale, fiercest and bloodiest of all the wars
known to mankind. In the course of waging it, Soviet strategy, operational art and
; tactics were enriched by new forms and methods of troop operations. A great deal of
~ attention was given to Che search for unusual and unexpected procedures to defeat
enemy groupings. With great skill the massing of inen and equipment was carried out
~ and the problems of firing for effect and maneuvering on the battlefield were solved.
' As a result the Soviet troops achieved major successes in an offensive even when
they did not have an overall superiority over the enemy. One of the clear indica-
tors of the high level of troop control was also the ability to achieve uninterrup-
ted coQperation in c~mbined-arms combat by all the branches of the ground forces
and ':l~eir coordinated operations with aviation and, in a number of instances, the
navy, airborne landilg troops and partisans. The operations carried out required
their thorough preparation. "...Any engagement," emphasized V. I. Lenin, "includes
the abstract possibility of defeat and there i~ no other means to reduce this possi-
bility than the organized preparation for the engagement."3 This task was success-
_ fully carried out by conducting measures to organize combat operations, for complete
support and for implementing party political work.
1
' FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400080051-3
f~OR ONF[C'IAL USE ON1.Y
The designated questions comprised the basic content of the work done by the com- ;
manders, the combined-arms staffs and other control bodies [headquarters bodies] on
the offensive during the years of the GrQat Patriotic War in operating as the basic
condition for achieving victory. This is shown Uy the combat practices of the past.
There is no doubt that this experienr_e is not only of great cognitive interest but
also to a certain degree has maintained its practical significance for troop and
staff training.
The experience of troop control on the battlefields of the last war has been re-
flected in a number of military history and military theoretical works, in articles
by military journalists and in the memoirs of its active participants. This experi-
ence has been widely used in seeking out forms and methods of work helping to in-
crease the efficiency of troop control in combat. However, up to the present at-
tention still merits being given to the questions of elucidating the ways for at-
taining continuity :~nd stability of troop control and the most effective ways of
organizing and implementing cooperation on the battlefield, preparing the staffs
and the troops for the offensive and maintaining a high level of their battleworthi-
ness in the course of conducting combat operations. An analysis of these questions
on the basis of generalizing the experience oF the commanders and the combined-arms
staffs in the preparations for and in the course of an offensive during the years
of the last war comprises the chief contents of this work.
The book has been written mainly from materials of the Central Archives of the USSR
Ministry of Defense and a significant portion is published here for the first time.
We have also used Soviet and foreign military and military history literature,
captured documents and memoirs of participants in the war. The experience of the
postwar troop and staff exercises has also been used.
The authors have endeavored to focus the reader's attention on those questions
which are of the greatest theoretical and practical interest in carrying out the
tasks of training the command personnel, the staffs and the troops under present
conditions of armed combat. i:~ey have made a number of practical recommendations
on the effective organization of work in the combined-arms staffs considering the
increased demands on troop control at pr.esent and the necessity of improving this
in the future.
FOOTNOTES
15ee: "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) SSSR" [Titc ~~SR Constitution (Basic Law)],
Moscow, 1977, Article 31.
2See: L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom" [By the Leninist Course], 5peeches and
Artic~les, Moscow, 1970, Vol 2, p 43.
3V. I. Lenin, PSS [Comp~ete Collected Works], Vol 6, p 137.
2
FOR OF!FICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3
FOR OFFICIAL l1SF. ONI.Y
CHAPTER l: THE MOST IMPORTANT FUNCTIONS OF CONTROL ACTIVITIES. THE STATE OF
THE TROOP CONTROL SYSTEM
~ In defining the role and place of control in the social process, Karl Marx stressed
that the control function stems from the very nature of joint...labor...."1 Conse-
quently, armed combat is also controllable. For this redson, simultaneously with
the rise of armies the necessity arose of solving the problems of troop control. As
the troops became equipped with new weapons and under the influence of the improved
; art of their combat employment, the range of activities of the control bodies con-
tinuously broadened and changed. By the start of the Great Patriotic War, by troop
control one understood the constant effect of the commanders, staffs and other con-
, trol bodies on the organization, course and outcome of combat operations. "To
control combat means to keep the course of events firmly in one's hands and to sub-
ordinate actions to one's will and maintain the initiative," was how the control
process was interpreted in the prewar works.2
1. The Essence, Content and Conditions of Troop Control During the Wax Years
The Great Patriotic War confirmed the prewar views that troop control is a process
related to implementing a range of ineasures to maintain a high level of troop
battleworthiness and to prepare and carry out combat operations on all organization-
al levels, from the inferior tactical one up to the highest operational level. The
achieving of maximum effectiveness from the employment of the existing resources as
well as the fullest utilization of the conditions of the existing situation were
the basic taslc of troop control.
I The essence of troop control on an offensive, as�followed from the experience of
I this war, was expressed in the effective activities of the commanders, the staffs,
the po.litical and other control bodies based upon the creative employment of the
principles of military art, the laws and patterns of armed combat. The basic con-
tent of these acti.vities was the questions of acquiring, studying and an.alyzing the
situational data, decision taking, planning the forthcoming actions, the setting
and issuing of combst r,.asks, the organization and m~intaining of caoperation atid
continuous control, the complete support of the operation (engagement), supervision
and the providing oE help to the troops. The commander's decision comprised the
basis of troop control. It operated as the result of the unity of the processes of
elucidating the combat task and assessing the situation. It manifested the com-
mander's personal experiencF, his professional training, mind, will power, deci-
siveness, firmness and other qualitieS. �
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000400080051-3
FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY
Troop contrul was c:?rri4d uu[ botti in the preparations of the offensive as well as
in the course of it.
In the preparations for an offensive, the most important measures were related to
maintaining a high political-moral state among the troops and their constant Combat
readiness, tu the continuous collection, grocessing and analysis of the situational
data, ro the planning and organizing of combat operations. A significant place was
held by the work of issuing the combat missions, coord;:zating the efforts of the
various branches of forces and to thorough support for the~forthcoming engagement
~operation). The combat training of the troops and party political work were also
carried cut. A s~:~t~m of control posts, communi.cations and the commendant service
were organized. Supervision was exercised over the preparation of the troops for
the offensive and this was combined with the providing of practical aid to subordi-
nates.
In the course of an offensive, along with the designated measures, the commanders,
the combined-arms staffs and other coatrol bodies conducted work to m~aintain the
bat~leworthiness of the troops and in accord with the situational conditions make
changes in the adopted decision and combat (operational) plan as well as in the or-
ganizing of the control posts and communications. Measures were taken to promptly
set new tasks and to restore disrupted cooperation.
Experience shows that the most important demands made upon troop control on an of-
fensive were effectiveness, firmness, flexibility, continuity and secrecy. The
basic criterion for assessing effectiveness of the work was the time spent on the ~
effective carrying out by the commanders and staffs of that range of ineasures com-
prising the content of the control functions. Firmness of control was expressed
chiefly by the ability of the comwanders to steadily carry out an adopted decision ~
and under any conditions to maintain control of subordinates in their hands. Flex-
ibility of control consisted in the ability to promptly make changes in the offen-
sive's plan proceeding from the developing situation. By continuity of control one
understood the persistence and survival of the control system, its ability when nec-
essary to rapidly readjust and ensure continuous contact with the troops and the
constant handing on of operational and tactical information for proyiding the neces-
sary influence on the course of combat operations. The secrecy or concealment of
control was aimed at k.eeping the enemy uninformed of all measures carried out by
the control bodies to prepare combat operations and direct the troops in an engage-
ment (operation).
The conditions involved in the preparation and execution of an offensive had a sub-
stantial impact on the nature of troop control.
, For the first period of the Great Patriotic War (22 June 1941-18 November 1942) the
most typical were limited times for preparing combat operations. The army command- �
ers had less than a day to organize the offensive and the formation commanders had
3-5 hours in July 1941 at Smolensk and Yel'nya. The front and army operations were
prepared for in 2 or 3 days and an offensive engagement was organized in 5-6 hours
in the formations and units during the counteroffensive at Moscow (December 1941).
In those instances when up to 5-10 days were assigned to prepare for an offensive,
it was essential to carry out a number of taska requiring large expenditures of~
time, such as: receiving and readying the drafts of reinforcements, making up new
4
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040400080051-3
FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONI.Y
for~nations and organizing the field headquarters of the armies and army groups. In
addition, the control bodies had to at least generally coordinate the formatir~ns and
units arriving at the front and provide them with the obtained combat experif:nce.
Such conditions were present in the battles for Rostov and Tikhvin (November-
December 1941) and in the Barvenkovo-Lozovskiy Offensive Operation (January 1942).
The fact that the formations and units often went over to the offensive with a por-
tion of the forces conducting defensive engagements had a subctantial influence on
the sequence of work and the scope of the preparatory measures during the first
period of the war. During the summer and autumn of 1941 as well as in the winter of
1941-1942, an of�ensive in addition was carried out with a lack of an overall super-
iority in resources over the enemy and with a shortage of combat equipment and ammu-
nition. The co~nanders and staffs did not have sufficient experience in organizing
and conducting an offensive with decisive aims when the enemy was superior in equip-
ment and in the strategic initiative.
The troop control cnnditions changed significantly in the second period of the war
(19 November 1942-December 1943).
The field headquarters of the field forces began to have more time to prepare for ~
the offensive. For example, the front-level operations were prepared for almost a
month on the e~�e of the Soviet troops going over to the counteroffensive at Stalin-
grad as well as in breaking the blockade of Leningrad. The Ostrc+gozhsk-Rossoch',
Orel and Belgorod-Khar'kov operations were prepared for in from 6 to 15 days. The
for*nation commanders were now given 2 or 3 days to organize combat. Combat experi-
ence was gained and this was generalized in the directives and orders of HqSHC and
in the regulation and manuals. The corps level of control in the army was restored
on a new qualitative basis. The designated phenomena had a positive impact on the
work of the commanders and the staffs. At the same time, the conditions of control
in combat became more complex as a consequence of the fact that certain offensive
operations (the Voronezh-Kostornoye, in the Khar'kov sector in February 1943, and in
the course of the battle for the Dnepr) were carried out without lulls in operations,
and as successive ones.
Substantial changes also occurred in enemy tactics. The Nazi command in the winter
of 1942-1943 issued the Instructlons "On Creating a Particularly Strong Defense by
Improving Positions in Engineer Terms."3 Defenses became trenched. The depth of
the main area by the summer of 1943 had risen to 4-6 km (in 1941-1942 it was 2-4 km),
whi2e that of the tactical zone had increased from 8-10 to 12-15 km and more. The
operational defensive zone began to include the area which had been prepared 16-
25 km behind the forward edQe. The rear defensive zone was prepared 50-80 km back.
At it were concentrated 2 or 3 infantry divisions and sometimes tank divisions.
As can be seen from the data in Table 1, the densities of the troops and combat
equipment increased. More attention was given to all types of man-made obstacles
and to building various structures. The strength of enemy defenses rose. The de-
fense became more active and an example of this would be the numerous counterstrikes
in the course of the defensive operations conducted by the Soviet troops. There was
alsc, a desire to deceive our troops by first pulling back the units and formations
to positions and lines deep in the defenses. Sometimes the main enemy forces we�re
' disengaged in the middle of the night, as was the case in the Donets Basin in
5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400080051-3
FOR OFFIC.'iAL USE ONLY
Table 1 ~
Density of Nazi Troops on the Defensive
- Number per Kilometer
Years Kilometers per Division
of guns of tanks
1941-1942 11-35 4-15 3-5
1943 12-13 25-30 7-9
September 1943. In the course of defensive operations the enemy frequently employed
operational defens~ve centers ("hedgehogs") in the aim of tieing down and splitting
the advancing groupings and to ~ain t~me before the bringing of its deep reserves.
This was the case in the area of Poltava in the autumn of 1943. This was done to
- prevent the Soviet troops from reaching the Dnepr River.4
In a majority of instances, the offensive by the Soviet troops started with the
breaking through of enemy defenses. This necessitated a decisive massing of re-
sources and led to the necessity of carrying out a large scale undetected regrouping
of the troops and the skillful organizing of their camouflage. The choice of the
direction of the main thrust assumed particular significance. This, in turn, placed
increased demands on all types of intelligence and on the organizing of the work
~ done by the commanders and the staffs on the spot. In the course of the break-
through, the troops encountered strong enemy reserves. As a result, the commanders
had to show a quick response to changes in the situation, the combined-arms staffs
had to carry out effective work in collecting and analyzing the data, while the
troops needed great maneuverability and skill in actions on the battlefield. In or-
ganizing pursuit, the control bodies, in addition, were responsible for preparing
the forward detachments as welt as the nighttime actions of the troops. The great
depth of the offensive and the significant losses in personnel and combat equipment
forced the commanders and the staffs to be fully concerned with solving the problem
of restoring the battleworthiness of the troops.
In the third period of the war (January 1944-8 May 1945), as is seen from the data
of Table.2, more significant time was allocated to prepare for the first offensive
operations. The commanders of rifle formations began to have up to 7 days to organ-
ize combat while army commanders had up to 20. As a whole, this had a favorable
influence on improving the quality of offensive preparations. However, it is essen-
ti_al to bear in mind that the commanders and staffs of armored and mechanized forma-
tions had, as a rule, from 1 to 3 or 4 hours to organize combat, particularly in the
course of an offensive. This predetermined a number of particular features in their
work.
The coimnanders, staffs and other control bodies were also confronted by other prob-
lems. One of them was the organizing of an offensive with the crossing of a number
of intermediate defensive lines. For example, in the Vistula-Oder and East Prussian
operations, the formations and units broke through from 5 to 8 reinforced lines.
The combat operations in addition were conducted on territory abounding in water
6
FOR OFF1C[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3
FOIt OFFICIAI. US~ ONl.1'
Table 2
Time Allocated for the Preparation of an Offensive
Fronts and Combined-Arms Tank Armies ~fle Divisi~-~s
Period of War Groups of Fronts Armies (in days) (i.n days)
First 2-7 days 1-15 1-4 From 3 hrs to
a day
Second 2-3 months 4-10 From 1-2 1-5 days
to 11
Third To 3.5 months To 20 From 1-2 to To 5-7 days
8-10 and
more
obstacles, population points which had been pre~ared for all-round defense and for-
tified areas. Large amounts of diverse equipment was employed. All of this sig-
nificantly broadened the scope of ineasures comprising the content of control activi-
ties, particularly from the viewpoint of organi~ing cooperation among the differe~t
branches of troops.
The enemy continued to improve the organization of defenses. Their high level was
manifested primarily in the form of counterstrikes (particularly in the Vistula-Oder
and Berlin operations) and sometimes by a counteroffPnsive (for example, at Lake
Balaton in 1945). The command of the Nazi troops skillfully maneuvered its re-
sources both along the front and from the interior. Often ambushes wer~ organized
for the purpose of cutting off and encircling individual advancing groups as was the
case in the zone of the 28th Army in the Beloruesian Offensive (June 1944). Man-
made obstacles and destruction of all sorts were widely used. Cities were turned
into fortresses. In the operational depth, resistance was drganized along lines
which were built at different distances apart (from 3-6 to 20-25 km) with the pull-
ing back of the troops after the advancing troops had deployed opposite the next
one.
The enemy was still rather strong. IIy the beginning of 1944, on the Soviet-German
Front, it possessed a grouping which numbered more than 4 million men, 54,570 guns
and mortars, 5,400 tanks and assault guns and 3,073 aircraft.5
Thus, during all the Great Patriotic War, the conditions under which the commanders
and their subordinate control bodies worked in preparing for and in the course of an
offensive were characterized by an ever-increasing scale of combat operaticns, by a
situational complexity, by a great volume of tasks, by great demands upon the effec-
tiveness and quality of control and by the decisive significance of the time factor.
The combat tasks and the nature of combined-arais battle required a creative approach
to the employment of the resources, the search for effective methods to defeat the
enemy and a choice of the proper methods and forms of work for the commanders and
the staffs. The effectiveness of resolving the designated problems on an offensive
depended upon many factors, including upon the state of the control bodies and the
means of trQOp control and upon the professional pre~aration of the command person-
nel.
7
~OR OFFIC[AL USE ONI.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000400080051-3
FOR OFFICIAL 1lSE ON1.Y
'l. Control Bodies ~nd Mea~is of Cormnunications
The structure of. the contr.ol bodies on the operational and tactical levels on the
eve of the war were detQrmined by the TOE approved in September 1940 and April-May
1941.
At the head of a front (army) stood the military council, the chairman of which was
the coc~aander. Under him was the staff and a number of directorates (sections):
for political propaganda, artillery, motor vehicle and tank, air forces, air defense,
engineer, signal, intendant, chamical warfare troops, the airborne sErvice (on a
front), military training, personnel, fuel supply, medical, veterinary, fin3ncial as
well as the military tribunal and ~udge advocate's office. As a total a field head-
quarters of ~ front included eight directorates and ten independent sections (925
men). Ar. army f ield headquarters included 15 sections (391 men).6 A special place
was held by the combin~d-arms staff which included such sections (departments) as
operations, intelligence, military lines of communications, the organization of the
rear, supply and road services, manning, the organization and service of the troops,
the military topograpliic service, cipher (in an army the cipher department was part
of the operations sec_tion), and the administrative-housekeeping. The number of
staff personnel was 333 men on a front and 182 men in an army.
Under the commanders of the rifle corps and divisions were staffs consisting of sec-
tions (departments) as follows: operations, intelligence, rear, drill and personnel,
special (cipher), administrative-housekeeping as well as the chief of artillery, the
corps (divisional) engineer, the signal~ chief and~the chief of the chemical service.
The deputy co~nander for political affairs directed the political propaganda section
(department). In the formations of the armored and mechanized troops (mechanized
corps and tank divisions) there was a repair and supply service headed by the assist-
~nt commander for tecl~nical affairs.
The commander of a rifl~e (tank) regiment controlled his subordinates through a staff
consisting of a chief of staff, his assistants for intelligence, for logistical
service, for rear services and commun~cations, as well as through the artillery
chief, the regimental engineer and the chemical service.chief. Also under him were
the senior physician, the veterinarian and a number of service chiefs. The deputv
regimental conm?ander for political affairs directed the activities of the secre-
taries fot� the primary party and Komsomol organizatio~s and the instructor propagan-
dist.
Under the commander of a rifle (tank) battalion were a deputy for personnel and sup-
ply records and a deputy for political affairs as well as an adjutant who performed
the functians of a battalion chief of staff.
As a whole the organizational structure of the control bodies on the eve of the war
considered the demands which were then made on troop control in combined-arms combat
and an operation with the massed use of tanks, artillery, aviation and other combat
equipment. However it also embodied the traits inherited from the past of cumber-
someness, immobility and an excessive overload of personnel. The delimitation of
functions and tasks between the corresponding structural elements was also not com-
pletely clear in the interests of increasing effective troop leadership in the
course of conducting fluid combat operations. This was particularly characteristic
for the combined-arms staffs as there was a desire to make them an all-encompassing .
8
FOR OFFiC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3
1~()R OF'FICIAI. t~SE ONL1'
organizational center for the entire control system, from carrying out operational
tasks to performing functions in the area of organizing logistical support for troop
combat operations.
From the very first days of the Great Patriotic War, the question arose of the need .
to improve the structure of the control bodies. Chang~s were made in the TOE of the
field headquarters of a front (army) and the headquarters of rifle divisions.~ Here
consideration was given to the new demands made on troop control, primarily from the
viewpoint of eliminating the scattering of efforts by the staffs in the s imultaneous
performing of functions which differed in their content as we11 as for increasing
the effectiveness of the work done by the control bodies.
By December 1941, the number of personnel at the field headquarters had been reduced,
mainly due to the service personnel, by almost 2-fold, including by 2.1-fold on a
front staff and by more than 3-fold on an army staff. The main change in the struc-
ture of the staffs was that they had removed from them the sections in charge of the
orgdnization of the rear, supply and road service as well as the sections of mili-
tary lines of communications. Thus, the staffs were freed from performing tasks not
inherent to them. Now their efforts could be focused on carrying out the opera tion-
al functions oE troop control. For the leadership of the rear services an independ-
ent body was created, the headquarters for the rear services of the front (army).
In the formations and units (Diagram 1), the position of deputy commander was intro-
duced. The operations department of a division was somewhat strengthened. In a
regiment there were two positions of assistant chief of staff and the position of
_ translator was also introduced. The questions of logistical support were concen-
trated in the hands of the deputy divisional commander for the rear. All rear serv-
ices were ~,nder him. .
Cxperience showed that the adopted structure of the control bodies was effective and
viable. It existed with certain changes over the entire war. But the necessity of
alterations was caused by a number of ob3ective factors, the most important ones be-
ing: the mass delivery of military equipment and weapons to the troops; the crea-
tion of new formations and, as a consequence, the growth of the fighting strength of
the fronts and armies; the constantly increasing number of diverse resources involved
in conducting the operations and the related increase in the range of ineasures in
planning their combat operations, organizing cooperation between them and providing
continuous control in the course of the offensive; the significant increase in the
scope of the conducted operations; the increased maneuverability, rapid~ty and con-
tinuity of troop combat operations. To an enormous degree all of this influenced
not only the volume but al.so the content of the work carried out by the control
bodies. In turn,~this required a clearer delimitation of functions between the l.ead-
ing control levels and an improvement in work methods. For these reasons the TOE of
the front and army-level field headquarters were revised in March-April 1942 and in
June-July 1944.8
The amendments incorporated in the structure of the control bodies had a great im-
pact upon f.urther raising their viability, flexibility and effectiveness i.n carry-
ing out control tasks with the increased spatial scope, continuity and dynamicness
of operations.
Particular. attention was given to the combined-arms staffs as the basic troop con-
trol bodies.
9
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000400480051-3
_ IY)R Uf~I~ICIAL IISE ONI.Y
~ ~ . � .
, , , ,
l. Rif],~a corps (division) 2. Tank (mechanized) corps
. . . ~
~ - Ko~?tuN~up ~ ~ Ko~nNUup . , , ~ ,
a �
newccup
Konun r.n g 3nM. I " f 30M. JOM.
~ Nu~i. 3aM. 1194I 184~ ) \ b Hav. C 3nM (1941�1912z.1 no mb~ny
nn nia~nV ~oe~. no nrv ~ ~ ~qq ~~M
nr y~ rinr~ HnMiC7uP~ aaM nn np~. ~c 8.1941a mmnAo rnMnxJOP~~ f 9. Yzl yacmu
p i942/94,St.) ~ (1942�l995z)
, d ' � , �
� , �
. . . , , ~ . .
' ~ .1i~A�~~a.,,~,~~~~~ . ; . . ~ ~ . . MnMUCr.npmm. ' . ~ i ~ ~ . .
~ ~i,n~tl ;:+a2:J i llnnumnm3cri h 117~I1-I94p2t.) ?lonumomJcn
,nM ;u, r;/v ~ f194:i99~t)
,yJ'1:94;~r.. . ~ . .
- - - r},, nnnHO tA U epunwo ~ ~ ,
y rii : r~ :~m.n u eoe� a~ nau , . �
y~ ""1 :O ni~
~~M~~ntti~ s M~w~ ~ k oMnH y Kowi. no~.
~ i, r Qr
n n n e~u u n
i h c a n n~
p x u u I i~wicN
J~x~m P
n ~ n e O w- p w ~ u x ~
x e
x
e
p , ruMUV. � .
apmuen. ny,~0a ~
nm,u:una~ a~'�n~ a/nnunn 'nya~6n~ ~NnAxrcNrni o0mentxN~
. ~ C+' , . ~ .
~ Jr.~~nl l ; R) O Te1nA . ' - 1
L y7/14~C. ~ ~ (19901.9 ~ ~
v C~�r, u ID , Nav Nm~ npm Z BuenMU- fen,u IIl Nov. Nev. opm ,Z .
~.nadd rnndM~r.n. 7t ~~Mq~ wmo4o ~und~ex. ~
N i � odN1eNNA . . ~ .
~ ' fnu.,~r.nv,~ II fmpoeen~3 i . .
p~~ u KndDOn u MQOpM ~ ,
~ ,
~ Cnruiiu~w IICy11Q/16- ~ ~ ~ �
U G.ll. 0 � . . MNU ~ . . . ~ ` . ~ . i
N Ah,' p / . ~ . , i , ` , '
~ .
Diagram 1. Structure of Control Bodies in Formations
on Eve of and During the Years of the War
Key: a--Commander; b--Chief of Staff; c--Deputy Commander; d--Commissar !
(1.941-1942) and Deputy for Political Affairs (1942-1945); e--Deputy
for the Rear (from August 1941); f--Deputy for the Rear (from
September 1942); g--Deputy for Technical Affairs; h--Staff Commissar �
(1941-1942) and Deputy for Political Affairs (1942-1945); i--Political
section; j--Operations; k--Intelligence; ~Z--Rear; m--Signals;
n--Records and personnel; o--Special; p--Administrative-Housekeeping;
q--Topographic; r--Artillery Commander; s--Engine~r; t--Chemical
Service Chief; u--Organizational-planning; v--Intendant, supply;
w--Ration and forage supply; x--Military-technical supply; y--Corps
Engineer; z--Chief of artillery supply.
Their leading directorates (sections) were reinforced with personnel. According to
the 1944 TOE, the personnel of an operational directorate on a front had increased
by 2-2.6-fold in comparison with the 1941 TOE,9 while the operations section of an
army h formations, for example, ov thc:� commander of the 63d
G~i~~r~i:. ?titil.e Divisiun in or~;anizin~ combat f.or. `iuunt Vc~ron'ya on 17 January 1944
(th~~ hrasnoye Selc>-lte~psha Uperation).
'1'he s[aff issued 1R(~1V1Cjt131 uffr~nsive pl.anning dc~.~iments, copies of the planning
table an~ c~~oper~tiui~ r.able, tl::~ of?eratiun order arid ir:strucCi.ons. Thus, the
sGaFf of the i3hth i:ifle llivision, during the i~i~;i~~ prior to the attack (the break-
in~ ui: che blocka~e o1. Lenin~;rad, .ianuary i~'=+~j issutd ~1?e regimental cotnmanders
ex.~_erpts Erom the combat planr?inK table, planning card5 for the cooperation of the
~;roup:: ~,f brariches of troops comprising the assault detar.hments, a radio signals
tabl.e cind an order fo. chemical warf.are def~nsE. In the morning of 11 January,
63
FOR UFFICIAL USE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000400080051-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ON1.Y
the regimental staffs received an order from the division chief of staff which gave i
the signals f or linking up with the troops of the Volkhov Front and recognizing
friendly troops.36 ,
Consequently, the methods of issuing tasks to troops in preparing for an offens~.ve ~
assumed different forms depending upon the situation. Experience shows that in
terms of time, the most economic was the setting of tasks personally by the command- ~
er and their simultaneous issuing by the staff in written combat documents. This
form was employed particularly widely in the formations and units. ;
i
Experience also taught that the completeness of combat tasks depended primarily upon ~
the f orm of their setting (issuing). ~
;
In personal contacts the conmiander had an opportunity to concretize and detail indi-
vidual questions of his plan, and not only on a map but also in the field, as well
as'~o issue the necessary instructions to support combat operations and organize co-
operation. ~
In issuing combat tasks in an operation order (directive)37 they gave conclusions
from the assessment of the enemy grouping and the nature of its actions, the goal
and overall concept of the offensive, the combat tasks for subordinates (composi-
tion, reinforcements, the content of combat tasks, the tasks of adjacent units, and
boundary lines with them), the tasks for aviation and artillery, the composition ~
of reserves, the deployment areas of the command (sometimes also observation) point
and the dates f or submitting the combat operations plan by subordinates. From the
middle of 1944, an operation order also gave the procedure and t~mes for issuing '
the tasks to various levels and the time for reporting that the troops were ready
for forthcoming operations. ,
The written combat instructions more often contained brief information on the enemy
(if this information was not known to subordinates), the combat task of the field
force (formation, unit) and the time for being ready for the offensive. The pre-
liminary instructions usually gave instructions on measures which had to be carried
out by the troops for the purposes of preparing for the forthcoming offensive and
sometimes also gave the time and methods for issuing a combat task.
Practice showed that the degree of detailing the questions in the operation orders
and instructions depended upon many factors, including upon how skillfully the
combined-arms staffs had organized their work of informing the inferior levels of
the operational-tactical situation.
From the middle of 19~?2, the front, and from 1944, the army as well, began to more
regularly forward operational-tactical information to subordinates. The staffs of
the Southwesrern and Aon Fronts, during the peri.od from 10 November 1942 through
3 February 1943, each week worked out and forwarded to the troops, down to the divi-
sion commander inclusively, the so-called situational background studies. In
November 1942 alone, the staff of the Southwestern Front five times assembled the
army comnanders and chiefs of staff for issuing information on the situation in
the southern wing o!' the 5oviet-German Front. The commander of the 5th Army, 1
month before the receiving of the task for the offensive in the Belorussian Oper-
ation, three times issued to the formation commanders generalized data on the enemy
64
FOR OF'FiC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080051-3
FOR OI~NICIAL ['SE: OtiI.Y
iu t.:~~ z,,n~ u� the "Lhird Belorussiari Fr.on~. ~tie task was carried out in a similar
;,~