JPRS ID: 10204 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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- JPRS L! 10204
22 December 1981
Near East/North Africa Report
(FOUO 47/81)
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JPRS L/10204
22 December 1981
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 47/81)
CONTENTS
fNTER-ARAB AFF111IRS
Pan-Arab Support for Libya Expxessed
(Editorial, Walid Abu Zahar= AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
_ 28 Aug-3 Sep 81)
~ ALGERIA
Kabyle Question Examined
(Hugh Roberts; THE MAGHREB REVIEW, Sep-Dec 1980)............
= Content, Potentia,lity of Household Census Data
(Keith Siitton; TFTE MAGHRES REVIEW, May-Aug 1981)
Agreements in Economic, Industrial Areas Signed With Soviets
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Oct 81)............
Official Says No Plans To Regain Country's Archives From France
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 6 NoV 81)
Cooperation With France in Automotive Industry Fossible
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITE.RANEFNS, 6 NOV 81)
- Ocean Transport Dispute With French Shipowners Clarified
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEnITERRANEENS, 30 Oct 81)............
LTI3Y1\
_ Election to Popular Committees Described
(J. Davis; THE MAGHREB REVIh'W, Sep-Dec 81)
Manaqement of Agricultural Resources in Coastal Area
(THE MAGIiREB REVIIW, Sep-Dec 81)
f,10FtGCCO
- Formation, Functioning of Moroccan State; Related Developmental
Topics
(Paulo de Mas; THE MAGHREB REVIFW, Sep-Dev 1980)............
- - a -
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3
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25
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28
29
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35
46
(III - NE & A - 121 FOUO]
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Effect of Various Variables on the 1981-85 Plan Reviewe9
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 OCt 81)............ 05
SUDAN
Darfur Agiicultural Project To Inciude Saudi, British Financing
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET NIEDITERRANEENS, 23 Oct 8I)............ 67
Briefs
Old Suakin Port Study 68
Czech Cooperatio7 Accord 68
International Catering Firm 68
Pr.esidential P14ne From France 68
TUNISIA
. Port Expansion Agreements Signed With FRG
(MARCfiES TROPICAUX FT NIEDITERRANEENS, 6 Nov 81) 69
~ Vegetable Oil Production Outlined
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET NIEDITERRANEENS, 30 Oct 81) 71
WESTERN SAHARA
United Kingdom's Heath Advises West on Sahara Conflict
(Edward Heath; THE TIMES, 4 Dec 81) 73
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
PAN-ARAB SUPPORT FOK LIBYA EXPRESSID
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 237, 28 Aug-3 Sep 6IL p 17
[Editorial by Walid Abu Zahar: "Arabism Lies With Libya"]
[Text] The position taken by the Iraqi leadership on the American attack against
the two Libyan planes represents anothPr stage along the pan-Arab course. It is
profitable to make a few observations about this position, although it is not a
natural and expected extension of this course in the face of current issues.
An official Iraqi spokesman stated that Iraq, based on its established and funda-
mental pan-Arab positions, affirmed its support for Libya against the American
attack to which the Li.byan planes were subjected. He added that Baghdad always
supports the Arab side, whatever its political hue, when it is subjected to for-
eign aggression.
The fact is that this position is not a new one but sanctions for the thousandth
time a deeFly rooted position held by the Iraqi leadership. This position can
be summed up in a few ;aords: Always on the Arub's side withaut the least hesi-
tation or criticism in his struggle with the foreigner, whoever he may be.
Ttierefore, the position was expected, despite the fact that the inci.dent itself
w3s riot devoi.d of a certain amount of showmanship, especially since observers'
reports subsequently proved that Libyan off icials did not believe for a moment
that the American planes would oppose the Libyan planes. Aside from this, other
inEormation says that the Soviet Union wished to sound out Reagan through this
manufactured incident to determine the seriousness of his recent warnings on dif-
ferent occasions and thus requested that the Libyans send their planes on an in-
tercept mission over units of the American fleet in the ME:diterranean.
Anc; so what happened, happened.
We are not prim.rily concerned with the background cf the incident, or its jus-
ti_!7icati011s, or the scenario employ_d by Qadhdhafi or Brezhnev in relation to
it. P.ar.her, we are more interested in shedding light on the various dimensions
of the commanding pan-Arab position maintained by the leadership in Iraq with
r2spect to the incident despite the fact that the Libyan regime is providing
financial support and weapons to the Iranian regime which is killing Iraqi Arab
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soldiers, as everyone knows. Perhaps someone may say that Colonel Qadhdhafi
adopted a similar position when the Iraqi nuclear reactor came under attack. He
contacted President Saddam Husayn and expressed his sorrow at the Israeli raid.
He also dispatched 'Abd-al-Salam Jalud to Baghdad to conf irm the pronouncement.
This observation may be appropriate, but it requires some additional commento
The Libyan regime generally says one thing and does the opposite. Drawi.ng paral-
lels is ane thing, but actual practice is something else. Similarly, a show pos-
itioi, hased on a circumstantial reaction is one thing, but an established pan-
Arab pc+sition that remains indiviaible is quite another action. When ,Ialud
arrived in Baghdad, he heard an important theory the gist of which is that the
"pan-Arab conflicts" are an indivisible whole and it ia imposaible to separate
the component parts of this whole. Jusr as it is impoasible for you to be at
one and the same time on my side against Israel and an ally of my enemy, tha
Iranian regime, it is unacceptable for you to declare in an elegantly worded
staterent your support for Iraq against the nuclear reactor atrike at the same
time that you secretly ar.d openly resume weapons shipments to Tehran to strike
at the land and people of Iraq.
This is a policy that is incompatible with the basic principles of the sound pan-
Arab course. This course rejects "fragmentation" of positions on major issues
and demonstrates the vast distance that aeparates the rostrum talks and resound-
ing radio spe;:ches, which are appropriate on any public occasion, and honorable
pan-Arab practice, which views eventa from a comprehensive parspective that aims
only at the greater Arab welfare apart from any disagreementa--especially when
there is a confrontazion between '.-ab and foreigner.
r-,
On this basis, and 'uased on the principles of pan-Arabism and the honor of de-
fending them, we must stand with Libya in its confrontation with the foreigner--
Libya of the people and Arabism.
Sa we have learned, and so we will remain.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8591
CSO: 4504/7
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ALGERIA
KABYLE QUESTION EXAMINED
Londan THE MAGHREB REVIEW in English Vol 5, Nos 5-6, Sep-Dec 1980 pp 115-124
[Article by itugh Roberts, University of East Anglia: "Tawards an Understandxng of
- the Kabyle Question in Contemporary Algeria"]
(Text ] InlroduMion
~ For a number of reasons, it is particularly opportune
to hold a scminar with the comprehensive tiile of `Con-
teniporary Maghreb' at the beginning of the 1980s. For
one, it is usefuZ to direct the spotlight to a region which is
characterized by active processes of fermentation in the
socio-political and cultural arenas. Both within and
between the diRerent countries of the region, moreover,
there is political and military friction and even open
- conflict. At the same time, the Maghreb is struggling
with the guestion of what its place ought to be within a
broader pan-Arab and pan-Islamic perspective. lndeed
simply recognizing and describing these tensions would
be ample justification for organizing this gathering, in
which pcoplc with diflerent backgrour.ds and interests
can prescnt their views on problems aitid developments
- in the individual Maghreb states or in the region as a
wholc.
ln my opinion, it may prove especially profitable to
focus on the Maghrcb since this rc;gion can serve both
as an examplc and a testing ground for a large number of
contemporary topics and theories in different disciplines.
The purpose of our contribution, which is intentionally
provocative, is to stress the nomothetic approach, and
~ we bcleeve that the spatial and functional unity in diversity
---which is true of h;aghreb--constitutes a fertile context
in which to anaiyse various socio-economic and political
proctsses. This belief, indecd, is inherent in the way
humnn geographers tend to think. Positioned about
hUlf-way hctwcen abstract theorizing at the one extreme
and spatinl reality at the ather, the geographer dcliber-
atcly nttcmp�s to link these opposite ends by empirically
vrriiying opcratimalited theories and concepts.
Thc chiei purpose of this paper is to advocate a specific
wuy of looking at the Maghreb-a way in which one
c;+n romhine elements of rolitical and developmcnt
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geography as thcy arc being practised today in the
Nethcrlands. In this approa.ch, elements of theories on
development are gratted on to the concept of the state,
which forms the focal point for politico-geographical
research.
T'o iliustrate our approach, we will confine ourselves
to only one of the Maghreb countries, namely Morocco,
a cr,oice based on the fact that we have several years of
:esearch experience iia tliis country. Nevertheless, oppor-
tunities will be prov:ded for making comparisons with
the other Maghreb states, and our topic-the formation
and functioning of the state of Morocco-ofrers nuints of
contact not only with other topics relating to this country
touched upon during this seminar, but also with similar
processes in the other Maghreb countries.
The Scope of Potiticsil Geographyl
Polit;cs has nevcr been tht exc!usive domain of any
_ une particular group oP pcople. Philosophers, jurists,
historians, journalists end economists havo continually
_ put forward their respective claims end, more recently,
political scientista have joincd thea: as well. G.;ographers,
too have lang been interested in pelitical phenomena. In
this regard, Dutch political geographers are particularly
concerned with (1) the processes cf the integration and
distintegi�ation of political systems, (2) the relations ;hat
exist between political systems at the national level and
those at the interrtational level, and (3) the spatial
aspects of the functioning of polisical systems at the
intra-state level. ?his being the case, it is not surprising
that the state has become the cer.tral focus of attention
and the most fundamental theoretical concept in political
geography.
- The geographers' emphasis on the spatiat influence on,
and spatial eH'ects of, the iunctiuning of the state and its
- constituent parts allows for a classification consisting of
four major fields of interest, each of which may be
subdividcd into smeller themes. These }'our major ficlds
arc:
1. Statt formation;
_ 2. StatG functioning;
.i. Statc control; and
4. Extcrnul rclutions.�
- T'his clearly indicates ihat there are numerous facets to
the concept of state, but for the purpose of this paper we
will limit ourselves dcliberately to only a few aspects of
state formation and the functaoning of the state.
The choice of the state as the basic frame of reference
and integration results from several considorations. First,
during the period of decolonization many new states
_ came into cxistence, although in this respect the term
'decolonization' is rar,her ambiguoua. While this does not
imply a return to pre-colonial political systems, ncither
_ Joes it mean that new poiidcal systems came into
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existence. On the concrary, it was usuaUy the state-idea
introduced by Europeans which was ad4pted.
Clearly, most of the newly indc-pxndent statts of the
African contineni-including thm,~ of the Maghreb-
are a legacy of the c,olenial past. As a consequence, the
process of state formation is somewhat artific;al in
- nature, and this artificiality is often cited as the cause of
the `awkward' locatidn of iaternational boundaries, the
lack of internal stability and the friction which exists
between neighbouring states (for example, between Mor-
occo and Algeria, or betwan Tunisia and Libya). Such
observations spring from an implied proposition, i.e.
that the process of atate formation in Europe itself was a
'natural' ane. In fact, aothing cauld be further from the
M
- trut6, and it is only bscause state formation in Europe
began so long ago and took place so alowly tbat we
tend to perceive the resulting states as natural entities.
In Europe, the process of natinn-building generally
followed-rather than preceded--the process of state
formation, and the i-numerous ethnic minorities and
separatist aentiments that can still be found in present-
day Europe (Williams, 1580) serve as reminders o; this
process. It wauld seem, iadeed, that in this respect the
_ circum-Mediterr$nean countries have more in common
with each other than they have ditTerenoes.
However this may be, in a relatively short period of
time there eme�rqed lrameworks for integration baaeci on
colonial (and in the case of the Maghreb partly also on
pre-colonial) systems, which appear more stable than
' one might have presumed at first. Although the authority
of the state may be weak within particular atatea or may
even 'be largely juridical and theoretical in natun, there
is no other institution that can supplant its role. It is
thereforc not surprising that the Organization of African
Unity recognius the Afrisan states as sovereign eatities
and accepts their boundaries as legitimate and inviolable.
Even though the form may be of recent origin, and in
many cases artificial, this does not mean that some other
construct would be any lass problematical, 'j'or the prob-
lems associa4ed with the recent process of state formation
are of a myriad nature.
Many young states, for examgle, face the problem of
- having to integrate thoir population into a single cohe-
- sive national unit, and expressions such as `from tribe to
nation' (Gellner and Micaud, 1972) or 'tribe and state'
~ (Seddon, 1977) clearly reveal the crux of the probDem.
_ Kinship relations and the like mast be rtplactd by a
, sense of nationhood which dominates public life and
which mediatas, or even regulates, when the intere;sts of
one group within the state clash with those of snother
group.
Elias (1974) introduces the concept of iategration
- levcl, according to which it is possible to distinguish
diflerent levels of integratien, all of which have their
own spatial base, such as the national state, provina,
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district, etc. However, it is also possible to havc intcgra-
tion Icvcls which do not nccesserily havt to coincidc
with thc spatial entities mcntioncd sbove. lt is possiblc,
for examplc, to have integrattou trameworks on the
basis of functional criteria (modal regions), or others
based on real or perceived cornman c;arac:e.*istics.
'Communities' are examples of such local integratiar,
levels. Eiias further posits that the process of state
formstion involves integration at xhe higher level of the
national state, which gas hand in hand with a relative
loss of sutonomy, for the lower levels lose functions and
power and become dependent on the higher levels, where
decisions are made and where the distribution of resour-
ces takes glace. This loss of funetion, powrr, sutonomy
and identity, however, is often not accepted without
resistancc, and history provides many examples of this
form of resistance, eithcr oa linguistic, rtlibious or
ethni: I-ounds against centraiization at the sta.te level.
Summarizing, one may conclude that focusing on the
state as she frame of integration entails cersain internal
as well as external aspects. The internal aspects refer to
to the formation of the state with all the problems
associated with that, while ihe externa) aspects involve the
recognition by other states ot the sovereignty of the
bounded space. T'his recagnition, which constitutcs a
prerequisit, may itself present problems. As noted above,
the former colonies have not only inherited-with more
or less difl5culty-their present form and style ot govern-
ment, but their ideological foundations as well. This
inctudes bott; the ideal of the integrated nation-state,
and that of the welfare state, and state and development
have become synonymous. This, indeed entails the con-
sideraticn of some ideas from development geography,
wnich will be discussed in the following section.
Recent ldeas io Development Geograpby
In the mid-1960s new currents of thought appeared
which were to challenge the so-called traditional theories
of development, such as the economic-technologicai
theory, or those of dualism, growth and modernization.
This criticism came mainly from what we; will call, for
the sake of convenience, the 'dopendencia' theorists and,
during the protracted trench warfan that ensued a
sustaincd theoretical bombardment expoaed the weak-
nesses of the iraditional theoriea.
The earlier overly monistic acd a historical approaches
were not considered adequate tn oR'er an explanation for
the problems of underdevelopmeat 'I'he starting-point
tor the dependencia theorists is the consideration thst
causes of difTerences in the degree of ecoaomic develop-
ment hnvc to be sought in eatecnal aad supra-national
factors. Within this perspective, developmeat is not the
produrt of en independent impulse within a given eco-
nomic structure, nor of the removal of social difTerences
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within urban-industrial (capitalistic) societies. Neither
does underdcvelopment rcpresent a lower stage to be
traverscd, following which a spontaneaus process of
growth can bcgin, and culminating in a`modern' or
- 'devcloped' society.
Rather the circumstances of development and under-
dcvelopment must be sought in a worid economy of a
capitalistic character. The centraY thesis of the dependen-
cia theory is that developed countries grow autonomously,
while the Icsser developed ones show a growth-pattern
that is a derivation from the latter, a deduction derived
_ t'rom the dassical Marxist theory on imperialism,
which is interwoven into the thinking on deptndency.
This is new, in so far as one seeks to attribute tbe tendeii-
cies in thc davelopment of dependent economies to the
functioring oP the world economy, and thie emphasis
on the eftects which capitalistic expansion has on peri-
pheral cconomies (the impact of external factors on
internal conJitions) indeed, forms the essential r,ontribu-
tiun in the discussion on developmental issuGS.
While this theory has proved its initial utility, there is a
danger of stagnation in thinking, due to an over-emphasis
on some (capitalistic) elements of the external aspects,
- combined with an under-estimation of internal eRects.
Indeed, the contradictions and dualistic p5enomena
within the less developed countries themselves have been
pushed into the background, while the problem of
dcvclopmcnt has been shifted to the level of the world
economy, thereby igaoring the developments within
individual states aad often stressing the negative eRects
af external dcpendena.
Studies on individual dependencx relationa are also
usually limited to tfu analysis of modes of production
and their rclations to social fortnadons in geaetal and
to the penetration of capitalistic modes of production
into large areas ot the world. Vellings (1979, p. 108),
for exarnple, notes an 'empirical anaemia' in these
studies, whereby attention is :imitod to gcneral economic
- problems on an aggregated level, the accuanulation of
capital, its distribution and use.
Recently one has wimessGd gradual counter-attacks
from diftF'crent sources, in the form of criticism of the
rather weak definitions, operatioaalization and veri-
fication found in the bulk of dependencia theory (Ettama,
, 1979a.b; Reitsma, 1980; Sedc+-n, 1977; Wolters, 1979).
This has led to s timid ragprochement between the
formerly conflicting parties, and to a beginning of the
onerous task of operationalization and testing and,
perhaps, avowed empirists aad ualous theoretists-if on
speaking terms with sacti other-conld form a workable
_ combination and bring about a breakthrough in the
ac!ual deadlock.
No doubt we do have at the moment an impasse in
_ research on developrr.eat. One has lost his bearings and
it is neccssary to orientate oneself while, in the meantime,
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discussions are going on about the dircction to take.
' Obviously, the thcorctical signs wc thought of as valuablt
and reliable prove to point to nowhere or, at best, to a
dead-end strcet. A good example a, confusion is a
recent seminar held in Rabat, Mo*occo,9 in wh'^_h n;iriy
al the Moroccans working in the field o!' deve;opn.:~t
research as well as a considerable numbec of foreign
experts, participated. The theme of the seminar was the
dependencc ot Morocco and the quasiion uf transition.
Elsewhere (De Mas, 1978, pp. 93-192) we have already
noYed that a larg: majority of the younger generation
of Moroccan scholars exhibits a atarked disposition
towards dependencia theories. It is surprising, however,
that those who stress the impoetance of all types of
dependency as the explanatory conapt for underdevelop
ment, should thcm4elves exhibit such a surprisingly
dependent attitude by uncritically embracing such
- theories.
The overrall stagnation in Morocco and indeed con�
' siderable dependence on foreign capital and the world
economy in general, are explained by `dependencistas'
only in terms of the dependence on foreign capital,
loans, products and raw materials. The eaplanation,
:aerefom, is put forward that the economic and military
: panetration of the Eurepean colonizing states, whicF had
cuIminated in the French; Spanish protoctorate, has con-
tinued even after the acquisition of political independence
by Morocco.4
In brief, since the end of the eighteenth century
. Morocco has becn integrated in the world economy,
rtsulting in a dependent periph.-rsl mode of production
with the -ocial formation inherent in that. So far s:) good.
According to this theory, the economic and railitary
penetration by France and Spain and the creation of two
protectoraces appear as eventa, setting in motion the
madernization of traditional Morocx;o whsch, however,
was to prove that the Marxist model of abrupt transition
- from traditional to modern society is hardly applicable
to Morocco. At the end of the srminar, it was obvious
_ that therc was a tbeoredcal standstill, 'blocage de !a
pense', and confusion as to the beginniag, the end aad
the various stages of the tranaition. The general Snding
was that the actual ideas on dependena cxntre�periphery,
change in the modes of production and social formations
-including the functiuning of the atata-has little
' ezplanatory value when held against the light of the
Moroccan experience. In this aituation, where the futute
transition towards capitalism or aocialism seems blacked
iiq wcll, the confusion is substantial.
~ Fortunately, some people did proposE a digereat
diroction and a few others have indad already chosen
that direction and turned their attentioa Srmiy to it.
- This paper is an iavitatian to thase who flnd themselves
confused to follow this dirxtion. Perhapa one of Mao's
less-quoted c:tations ruay serve as guidance in this
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F(
In~~~nce : 'If chcory does not agree with reality, change
th: thcoh''.
1c* Approscbes in Rescarch on Morocco
Wc havc puinted out in the above that a concsntration
on cxicrnal factors has mea�Y a dxreased interest in the
- in�mal hioroccan context. This has two causes. ThP
fini is the understandable reaction to the preceding
ptpicctonte, expressed in tenns uf accusations for the
condition of dependence it has brought about. The othcr
factor has bc:.n the neglect of Morocco's pre-colonial
history. Given the faci, as we srsid beforc, all new states
- hs%c inhcrited the ideology of a united naiion-s:ate, and
that the colonial historians deliberately stressed the
difTrrcnca along the urban-rural, Arab-Derber and
- Makhzen-Siba lines for the French and Spanish benefit,
it is pcrhaps understandable that in the first years after
` ,ndcprndena Moroccans did not feel the need to
conccntrate on the internal aspeets of their situation.
Thic tendency to stress external factars became even
- Frcater in later years, bccause-which is indted the
second reason-attention to internal aspects would
sooner or later have cntailed an inevitable indictment of
the stanis guo in Morocco.
But the time now seems right for a change. Recentiy,
in analysing the structure, functioning and ideology of
~ the hloroccan administration, we drew the conclusion
that the present Moroccan state is a cumulative and
ncgative result of a long process covering all the pre-
ccding pcriods af the sultanate, protectorate and the
presen ~ monarchy. The arabesque intertwining the present
and the past, external factors and the whole of religious,
social o.nd economic factors of intemal order, have led
us to the conclusion that a purely abstract approach
which fniis to take account of the historical and apa.tial
cansext of Morocco has litde explanatory value. 3imilar
idcas huvc becn expressed during the seminar held in
Rabat and have been illustrated by a growing number of
stuclics. lt is not by chance that Guessous (a geographer
himsetf) stated that'we all suffer from excessive globaliTa-
tion and macroconcepts, while reality is heterogentous
- in time nnd space'. He and Pascon stress tather the
nced for a concrete approach instead of unfruitful and
stcrilc epistimologic quarrels and debates or a literal
and ritual repeticion of the classics.
Here, it is necessary to remark that regarding the often,
but wrongly, quoted theory on imperialism, Lenin
- himsclf made cloar that definitions and concepts are
historically detecmined, and that therefore we need to
observe concrete realities of the world economy in a
- given historical and contextual situation, thereby
including specific timefspace conSiderations (Arrighi,
1978, Chap. 1; Blusse et a!., 1980). "There are signs,
however, that a period of empirical groping in Morocco's
historical dark has begun, and rtcent studies by El
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Malki (1980), Bcn Ali (1977, 1980), BouFhassoul (1980)
_ and Pascon exemplify this new approach.a
Having said this we hasten, our�_-'.ves, to dcclare that a
historical approach alone is aiso not sufficient. If this were
t}:e case, the often excellent descriptive works from the
colonial period could already be considered adeyuate.
In our opinion, howev:,r, tvyo further aspects should be
- added; a new theoretical framework and the spatial
element. As far as the new historical approach is con-
cerned, there is a clear tendency in Morocco to condemn
the colonial historians (Ayache, 1979a; Morsy, 1979),
especially their view concerning the role of the state
= and aspects connected to the Makhzen-Siba relations.
- The danger is apparent that, simply as a reaction to the
colonial points of view on that matter, one can take
- diametricalty opposed atandpoints. Ayache states, for
instance, that thcre was indced a Moroccan nation and
that the Siba (including the Rif) did not mean a complete
- rupture with the Makhzen, but haci more the cbaracter of
_ peripheral integration, aspects of which we shall return
to later.
The issue as stake here is whether or not this historical
approach is subjcct to the same flaws wt mentioned in
regard to research on developrr,ent in general: bcing
overly global and empirically weak. ln our opinion,
this historical revival is related to the growing interest in
- one's own Berber/Moroocan culture, after that had been
sligh,ted for so many years, a revival tbat by the looks of
it cannot be detached from recent pan-Islamic develop-
ments. However, it is to be hoped that this significant
self-discovery does not lead to mere introspection and a
defensive attitude to all foreign influences. Indeed,
Moroccan and, more rccently, Iranian history ofTcr ex-
amples of curious coalitionr, bctween traditional elements
and ultra-progressive and np-tionalistic forces against per-
_ cetved external dangers, whether of religious, economic
or military nature, and recent events in Fes should be
setn in this perspective.a
Historically or;ented research therefore, should be of
a clear theoretical and thoroughly empirical conception.
As an example of such an approach one can cite the
work of Seddon (1979) describing the complex prceess
_ of articulation between (European) capitalist and
- (Maghreb) pre-capitalist modes of production. 1n it, he
- clearly demonstrates, on the basis of the differences
between Morocco and Algeria, that the attempt to
, character?u the particular social formation of the whole
Maghreb, ur even that ia the difl'ennt countries, with
one single modp. of production is bound to be urifcuitful
and inadequate. Ne argues that the history af the trans-
formatian of the Moroccan and hiaghrebian political
economy can be conceptualized as taking place st
several difTerent levels and in a number of distinctive
_ modes of production, stressing that `beyond this general
rule [Marxist `law of motion'-PDMj lies the need for an
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investigation, in cach instance, of the specificity of the
articulation in a series of conjectures to identify the
dctcrminants of the individual history of a particular
social formation' (Sneddon, p. 37).
. We agree with this point of view concerning future
empirical research and, as we said earlier, it is the first
step on a long and winding road, paved with many
contributions from diflero-nt discipl;nes and at different
spatial and analytical levels. A great number of issues,
research fields, as well as current and past research, fit
_ surprisingly in this framework, among which ono can
- mention the formation and fuACtioning of the pre-
colonial state and its internal and external relations;
the relations between rural and urban, between Makhun
and Siba and the diRercnt social clessea and categories.
Even the external relatians between the sultanate of
- Morocco and the outside world in their brosdest mean-
ings have to bc taken into account. Thia aocessitates a
massive number of new studies, but also a re-interprata-
tion of the abundant literature and material inherited
from the colonial era.
Our own contribution limits itaelf to the political-
geographic aspects of the formstion and functioning of
- the Moroccan state and related developmental topics,
as indicated before, and in doing so we hope to add two
elemenis to Seddon's approach.
Firstly, and a direct result of our stated interest in the
concept of state, we have the conviction that research
on peripheral regions should not limit itself to external
economic relations, but should also include attention
to the way in which z region is integrated into a state.7
Therefore, we have concentratcd on the Rif, which
- according to Galtung's (1971, p. 84) theory could be
considered part of `the periphery of the periphery'.
- The history of the Rif shows how wrong it is to consider
this a given and timeless situation. First of all, what is
peripheral and who, what and whcre ia the centre?
?hese questions touch on the supposedly timeless Siba/
Makhzen stereotype, as well as on the position of
Morocco as periphery.
The hislory of Morocco and the Rif shows how diffi-
cult it is to generaliu about Galtung's theory in a situa-
tion where both the centre itself (divided into cenve
and pcriphery) and the periphery itself (also widi its
awn core and margins) change constantly. Braudel
(1979, II), for example, presents an historical proc,ess,
whereby core and dependent region change constantly
- because of the rise and fall of important cities acting as
centres. Recent discussion revolves around whether or
not the Rif can be considered peripheral and, if so,
whether this has always been the case. Ayache, for onc,
claims that this was not the case during the sultanate,
~ but that it became pcripheral bocause of European
penetra+ion and the consequent protectorates. Seddon
(1974, p. 156), on the contrary, maintains that it was not
- 11
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pcripticral during the sultanatc, and riot cven during
the protcctorate (becausa it was integrated completely
intQ the Spanish colonial economy and the Sranish
coloniat poiitical and adminisirouve system), but
became peripheral wnen integrated into the more
dcvcloped sccYors of the southem zone in 1L%e pnst-
Golonial economy and nevi:y formed state of Marocco.
Heinemeijer and De Mas (1980) leave the quastion open
regarding the pre-colonial period, because ef the contra-
dictory nature of the evidence presented se far 8 but
they do declare that although the conditions for regional
secession were present in two peripheral regions, the RiP
and the Sous, this in fact never happened. 7hough the
scars of the past may still bo seen in the present state of
Morocco, the state wilt not break up along the former
lines of division. However, ample evidence rs available
to suggcst that the p4litical and ecanomic integration of
the southern periphery (the Sous) is far mon progressed
than that of the northern periphery.
Even cor,centrating on the relation between one specific
part of the Moroccaa periphery and the centre indicatea
the necd for detailed regional historical research to
supply the scncral body of theory with hard empirical
evidence. Studies on othcr Moroccan regions like those
on the Haouz (Pascon, 1977), Seksawa (&rque, 1978)
and the Eastern frontier (Dunn, 1977) prove thia
convincingly.
7'he second point we wish to add is that of the need
to study the manner in which the procesa of integration
and functioning of the Rif took placx under the Spanish
protectorate and is taking plact today in the independent
Moroccan state. We have already claimed that there is a
contiauity from protectorate to the present state, and
from the poin: of view of the Rifflans ane could perhaps
look upon both forms of iategration as being quite
similar. The reaction to the Spanish penetration was
ambiguous, ranging from outright violent resistance
(1921-1926, Mohammed Ben Abd-el Krim) to an open
leaguc with the enemy, often by one and the aame
persons or group of persons.o T'he reaction to the pet-
ceived 'internal colonization' (a term introduced by
Hechter, 1975) by the new Makhzen in 1956 was similar.
lt is becoming mion and moee clear also that, oa a
national scalc, the same ambiguitp existed as resistana
and the protEg6 system both marked the period of
European penetration and the ensuing protectoratc.
lt is striking, that an exact duplicate of the protfgE
system, in which influential Muslim aad Jewish Moroccan
families played important roles, is found in the coastal
areas of the Rif, as well as in the High Atlas and the
Oriental plains (9rown, 1976, 1979; Schaar, 1966;
Bowie, 1970; Dunn, 1977).
By means of :esearch on this paradox of resistance aad
cooperation, as well as of the whole problem of the
traditional and modem economic penetradon and domin-
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_ :ncc and the traditional and modern 'protige' bclonging
to it, too much emphasis is laid on structural anal,ysis
= of the so calied 'elite', 'bourgeoisie' or `comparadorc
bourgeoisie'. This is a result of the classical theory
whereby society is presented as a class model and where
_ thc state is pcrceived as an instrumcnt of the �ruling class'.
- The problem is that it is difi'icult to delineatt the exact
relation betweer! society and state, or even to provide
- adequate operational definitions of these two concepts.
Furthermore, the formation or disintegration of states
on the onc hand, and that of classes on the other, are
only partly inter-connected, both having their ow;i
- dynamics (Wolters, pp. 198-201).
~ This sxructural approach to Moroccan classes in the
past and present hampers considerabDy current research
on social formations and the structuring and functioning
of th:state adminjstration. Social classes and institutions
_ are too schematic, rigid and simplified analytical tools
to tackle Moroccan society and stete. T'hey leave out of
consideratian the highly personal and flexible patterns
of patronage and clientale, existing alongside and
often within or opposed to the institutions and structures
belonging to the realm of the state snd to diBerent
social and economical sectors. We have mentioned that
these institutions and structure may be comparable, at
first glance, to those we know in the Weatern world (in
= fact mostly inherited frora it), but their working is
yuite diRerent and can only be fully understood by
superimposing the patror.age and clientele s4tucture
upon them.
Ample evidence is given for Morocco (De Mas, 1980)
. to prove Boissevain's (1971) thesis that procedures and
institutions which operate well in certuin systems cannot
always be implemented in other contexta in which
diRerent structures operete. If this implementation is
done, procedures and institudons may lead to con-
ditions in which scarce resources an misused for sectional
or personal interests. The phenomenon of patronage
forms the really crucial, if unackaowledged, politicril
and social reality behind the nominal constitutional and
social facade. This is certainly the ease in Morocco,
other Msditerranean countries and, to a lesser degroe,
also in countries elsewhere in the world (Gellner and
Waterbury, 1977).
We therefore strongly plead for the incorporation of
this aspect into research on the Maghreb, especially in
regard to the role it plays in hamperiug or obstructing
the furjctioning of the state and its iastitutions, the pro-
cess of integration, and so on. Furthermore, it should be
esta.blished to what degree the network8 ot patroaage
and clientele coincide with ethnic and/or raciel cont,a-
distinctions.
Suggested Approaches to Resesrch on the Maghreb
]t will by now be clear that the 'contemporary
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Maghrcb' cannot bc understood propcrly without thc
= kind of empirical research presented above for the specific
Moroccan situation, the only difterPn-e being that the
scale of the research is considerably greatcr, oflering at
. the same time greater possibilities for cc:lparative,
longitudinal studies. In our introduct:an we r,.;^e
already pointed out that the uniqueness of the Maghreb
- as a research field lies in the fact that phenomena and
processes do not occur there ia the same way or with
the same intensity as elsewhere, but still do so with such
rcgularity that it is useful to atudy them. 7"he diversiiy in
homogeneity is the surplus valus we ascribe to the
_ Maghrcb and it is this characteristic which makes this
area pre-eminently suited for testing various aspects of
political-geographical and development geography we
think relevant.
There arc already a substantial number of detailed
- studies on practically every domain for the ditlorent
' Maghreb countries. Unfortunately, this research tends
to follow a more ideogtaphic (singularizing/descriptive),
than a nomothetic (generalizing/explanatory) approach.
While both approaches have description as wsll as
explanation as their goal, the propositions in the ideo-
graphic approach are about limited and eontiguous time/
space regions, whereas the propositions in the nomo-
thctic approach deal with phenomena that (at least in
principle) can be found over a wide field of non-con-
tiguous spacc/time regions (see figure below).
.
o ~ 0
e ~
.a.e. .~.e ~a..
rwinetM~~c M.WNhk ONdweM[
IOrtuM, oy. 23-141
The relation betwan nomothetic, ideoaraphic, aynctu-onic and
dkchronic approacha.
Thus, the propositi, s in the ideographic spproach
_ are programmadcally limited to a contiguous rGgion
(usually one interval in the history of one nation or
region, or of some selected aspects of is), whereas the
vroposition in the nomothstic approach lmow no guch
boundaries. Cbviously, the bordeelines between thc two
approaches are by no means sharp, and as is usual with
dichotomies, they have a tendeacy to polarize not only
thinking but also people.
This is particularly important in connection with the
other disputed relationship betwan the synchronic
_ approach (dealing with phenomena thet take place
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anywhcrc in apacc, but within a retativcly narrow time
mtrrval) end thc drachronic approach (dcaling with
nccnomcna that take placc anywhere in time but within
a limitcd spac; region) (see Galtung (1967, p. 24) claims
that: 'What is missing wauld be iLeographic, synr,hronic
science: the really good set of treatises about a given
region in spacc Correspondingly, the total set of
- historical and much socio-economic viork may fill both
time and space by joining works about adjacent and
coritiguous space/regions. Wnat is missing here would be
nomothe:ic, diachronic science connecting all this
knowledge in theoretical frameworks that know no limita-
tions ir space and time, operating at the level of indivi-
duals and of social structure.'
' He stresses the need to tear dowa the artificial barriers
- between the four approaches mcntioned above, by an
approach which, theoretically, explores relations both in
time and spacc, in contiguous and non-contiguous
regions at the explanatory and descriptive levels. 7'his
. means that keeping, }'or instance, a spatial unit (e.g. a
state) constant would yield a diachronic analysis, while
keeping time constant would yield a synchronic analysis.
Giving both dimensions of time and space frec play,
would give a kind of anslysie (nomothetic variety)
towards which research should be directed. In connection
with this, the wholc Maghreb ehould be cansidered
_ divided int4 a multitude of time:/space units (not ncxes-
sarily corresponding to states o* other administrative
units) according to a division into the .respective :ime
and space dimensions. 7'6e way a researcher studies
- the Maghrcb as a contiguous apace/time region would
_ depend on thc problem definitior.s of the respectivc
disciplines.
Tn this paper we have indicated various 8elds of interest
in political geography and development geograpriy. We
hope that during the seminar more topics will be touched
which could be integrated into the above-mentioaed
" approach tn the study of the Maghreb which, due to
its distinctiveness and variety, forms un excellent area
of study.
NOTES
- ~ This paper is based on the conceptual work of Van Amersfoort
and Vun der Wusten, both tenior Ixlurera in Qeograpby, Univenity
of Amxterdam, and editore of a forthcoming introduction to
political Qeogrsphy.
I Theu four mejor 6elds form the ccmtent of the publication
mentioned above.
' Colloque 'Mpendana et problbmatique de la transition',
10-12 April 1980, Facultd dea Scienas Juridiqua, Economiqua
et Sociales, Universitb Mohammed V, Rabat.
4 Soe Oualalou's article in .fr-.Wachra, No. l, where ha divida
the proces.s of penetratian into thra periods: 1834-1912,1912-1935.
an-I aftcr 1956, thercby IeavinQ the pcnod before 1830 sside.
a St.minar in Rebat. Bcnali on the role of the Fasai-commercial
elite aftcr 1850 and Boughassout on chenaes in moda c+f production
in the Maghreb from 1830 till 1930.
� Clashes betwan the police and so-called 'inftristes musiI-
mans' in the religious capital of Morocco. ,Already in the 1930s
the resistona ageinst the Prench protectorate was a coalitian
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txtwan traditional religious elements and youngcr, madern
educated nntion.ilists (EI Kohen, 1977a, b). For the revivai of
ir.tcrest in the Muroccan culwral patrimony, sx Lomalij Nu.
IIS; Al-Atns, No. 19 an~es,xcially AmiziBh. Rrvue 1Naroeuine
d'hirroire e/ dr eivilisoliuri, o. 1, SYRG.
7Ettema (1960) chims .that the interaction be;-ecn 'endogenic'
charaeteristics and extemat integration dxides the +rtcome of the
process ot periphcralizatiun. '!t is the prooess of pcnphc.:--ition
which must be studied in its actual and its historical dimensioos'
(p. 144).
� Pascon will publish en historical czse-study on the valley of
Heni Boufrah (province of AI Hoceima) in a forthcoming French
publication of the REDRA project; a research projxt of the
Departmcnts of Geography, Unrversity of Amstsrdam and L'Institut
Agronomiquc et Vtterinaire Hassan il in Rabat.
olbid., Pascon.
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dr Du�hom, BESM, No. 138-134, 121-144. RBbat.
Oushlou, F. (1980). Propos d'Eennomle Maroeoine. SMER, Rabat.
Pascon, P. (1977), Lc Xaouz de Morrakrch, 2 tomes. Rabat.
Reitsma, H. J. (1980). 'Development geogrephy, dependency
relations, and the capualistic scapegoat. Department of Geo-
~taphy, Univeisity of Amsicrdam (mimeographed).
Schaar, S. H. (1966). 'Conllict and change in ninetoenth-century
Morocco, Thesis, Ann Harbor. Michigan.
Seddon, D. (1974). 'Aspccts of underdevelopment and develop-
ment in North-East Morocco', Cholce and Chonge, ed, J. Davis,
Athene Press, London, pp. 134160.
Seddon, D. (1977). 'Tribe and state: approaches to Maahreb
history, The .NvBhreb Revlrw, Vol. 2, No. 3, 23-.70.
Vellinga, M. (1979). 'T'er.ds in ontwikkelingstheorie', Sorlo%glacbe
Gtds Nos. ~3 101-113.
Williams, IM. j19801. 'L�thnic separatism in Watem Europe'
Tijdschrljr voor Economische en Soclale Ceopraje, Vol. 71. No. 3:
142-158.
Vk'olten, W. G. (1919) 'StaatsvorminQ, klasuvorminQ en patronage
in Zuid-Oost Azie, tStala formation, class formation and patron-
age in South-East Asia). Soclo/oglsche Clds, Noe. 2-3, 191-208.
CSO: 4500/70
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ALGERIA
CONTENT, POTENTIALITY OF HOUSEHOLD CENSUS DATA
London THE MAGHREB REVIEW in English Vol 6, Nos 3-4, May-Auq 1981 pp 45-48
- [Article by iceith Sutton: "Household Cenaua Data From Algeria: Its Content and
Potentiality"]
- [Text) Abstracl
TFe 1977 Population Census of Algeria oRers rc-
scarchcrs a rather unique colic:tion of data because the
results are available at the levels of each household and
individual. Thus, thc researcher can make a precise study
of a single viilage or oC an urban quarter, or he can
extract largc samples without the problems of generaliza-
tion which result from the use o1' data aggregated to the
level of communes or arrondissemen.,s. The range of
information available from the Algerian ansus is
described a.nd demonstrated for two villages, a centre de
regroupe,�ent and an agrarian reform village. The object
is to show the possibilities oflered by :::ese census
documents for T'hird World studies.
The analysis of spatial and social pattems as revealed
by population census data is invaniably hindered by the
aggregated nature of data supplied b; census authorities
who are anxious or required to maintain a degra of
confidentiality about individuals and heuseholds. Where-
as much sophisticated statistical analysis of census data
by tracts or communes is possible, the researcher remains
one short but tantalizing step removed from his subject
_ matter.l Sample questionnaire surveys an possible but
these pose organizational problems linked to tbe time
and money available for field work and often sufTer from
inadequate response rates which can bias the nsults.
These data problems were obstacles for the author
- enquiring into the 1980s situatiou of regroupad settlement
centres established in Algeria by the French acmy,
1957-1961. Over 2,300 of these centrea dt regroupement
existed by 1961 and contained upwards of 2,350,000
pec,ple, or one in three of the rural population.= Much
evidence existed that many of these supposedlv temporary
centres remained in existena during the 1960s and were
evolving into pormanent additions to the Algerian rural
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settlement system.a However, published census data for
1966, and those planned for 1977, were at the geograPhicai
- scale of the commune, too Iarge an areal unit for studies
of the populations of individual rural setdements. A
partial Folution was to use some 1973 preparatory census
- documentation, the Enquete dicoupage districts 1973,
- which alldwed localities to be idenufied and a rough
estimate of their siu to be made from the numbers of
uccupied dwellings listed as a wide for the later use of
= the census.enumerator.4 Some functional characteristics
_ of the surviving centres de regroupement could also be
ascertained from this 1973 data source.
On the basis of personal assuranccs from ctnsus officials that the results of the 1977 census would ulti-
mately be available to researChers at the very basic ccale
of each household end each individual, e b:ief reconnais-
sance exercise was undectaken at the Centre National de
DEpou!/lemenl of the Commissarfat 1Vovonol aux Re-
censemenls et Enqueles -Statistiques (C.N.R.fi.S.) in Oran.b
Samples were sought from the comPlcted household
census forms (jeuilles de menage) for two villages tor
1977, the centre de regroupemrnt of Djebabra and the
agrarian reform village of Aurts el Mcida. A turthcr
sample from the 1966 census was ebtained for Djcbabra.
The census of~'icials in Oran were most cooperative in
providing the files of hotrsehold census forms as re-
quested, and it was an ezhilarating experience handling
data which in Britain and elsewherc would remain
confidential under the 100-ysar rule or similar restrictions
on access. In view of thiE quite diR'erent attitude on the
_ part of the Algerian census autharities towards the con-
fidential nature of household Icvel census data, it is
proposcd to illustrate the nature of the information
contained in the hope thaf others working on Maghreb
and Third World problems may perceivc the rotential of
this data source for analytical work at a scale rarely
possible wichout considerable field work.
The Contents of the 1977 Censas Form
The basic jeui!!e de minage, or houschold form,
amounts to a large single shcet folded into four pages,
the last of which is an Arabic translation of the questions,
which together with instructions to the enumerator, are
in French. All the manuscript responses in the samples
taken were also in French. After details of the address,
geographical code, date, and the names of the enumerator
and controlter, the census form is dividcd into sections
on the construction, the dwelling and househdld, and the
demographic and socio-economic characteristics ot each
individual. Constructioa quGStions ascertain whether the
building pre- or post-datea 1966, the tyrc of building, the
state of repair, the number of atoreys, and the nature of
the walls and roof.
The aecond sxtion, entitled Logcment e 1lfenage,
ranges widely enquiring after the follou7ng:
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whcther the dweiling is inhabited and whcther it has a
non-r;.siaential function
an interior courtyard, inde}rndent or communal
a kitchen and a bathr3om in the .....;ding
_ the numbcr ot rooms and thosc uscd io- dwell:ng
rurposcs
~hcthcr there is an insidc or outside toilet and the
t).rc thc*cof
the %%ater source: pipcd, wcll, spring, etc.
ciecericity and gas suPply, and whether piped or bottle
g35
- ;hc ownership of the building: local autho:ity, private,
- ctc.
%%hcther the household rents or owns the dwei(ing or
�hcther it is accommodated there tree of charge
%%hcthcr the bousehold receives any money from
- rclatives dwelling elsewhere in Aigerip or abroad, or
from state or other pensions.
( inalk, the membership of the househoid is divided into
iour c:itcgories: residents present; residents absent for
I:�� tnan six months; emigrants abroed; and visitors
1;:1%1nc stayed for less than six months.
Thc third section gives the following details for each
,nkfi%idual member of the household, with several
yucseions obviously not being answered on behalf of
rhildrcn:
,,a-ne, sex, and relationship to the head or other
member of the household
dstc of birth or, if a birth certificate is not possessed,
the vear of birth
the place of birth. The commune only is asked for,
Nith a request not to add the douar or district
matrimonial situation, including separated and divorced
the place of residence of absentces and visitors
the rlacc of residence in April 1966, the date of the
previous census
%car whcn cach individual moved into the eommune.
Obviously many had lived there }'rom birth
prc%ious place of residcnce
natianality
thc cducation section covtred languages which could
hc rcad and written, the final class attended at school
or college, and the highest academic diploma
achicved
tlic cconomic situation encompassed those in work, out
of work, studying, housewife, rctired, invalid, and
un 'other non-active' category which would include
children not in education
for thosc unemployed, data were sought on their
previous job and on the length of rime without work
the kind of employment. A precise job description was
a5kcd of each individual as well as a crude indication
of whethcr skilled or not
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(urilticr employmcnt dctails zov:red the aituation, i.e.
rmployer, cooperator, permanent or seasonal em-
piuy:e, apprenticx, etc., and the length of time in
thc present job
for the place of work of each individual, data wc;e
sought on its main economic activity, its lozation by
commune or urban dislrict, and its scctor, i.c.
administration, public, sutogesdon, coopcrative, or
private.
A similar range of sociaecoucmic data had been
sought in the 1966 census, although slighYly less detailed,
and the previous residence information was restricted to
place of residence on 1 July 1962, that is on lndependence
Day, rather than at birth and at the time of the previous
census.
Case Studics: Djebabra and Auris et Metda in 1977
To illustratc the na;ure of the iniormation aRorded by
the jcurlles de nenage, two constrasdng case studies are
briefly discussed. The village of Djebabtae originated in
the late 1950s as a cenlrt de regroupement created by the
French army as part of its anti-guerriUa atrategy. Auris
el Mcida is also an ariificial crcation ss onc of th= first
agrarian rePorm villages which have, since 1973-1974,
formed part of the REvolutlon Agrafre programme. On
the basis of a 25 per cent sample DjGbabra has about
140 ho;;: eholds which contain about 628 people. From a
33 per cent sampte Aurts el Meida contains about
150 households with about 969 peaple.T The non-
residential buD:dings in Djebabra numbered Gight,
encompassing seven functions; those in Aurts el Mcida
numbered cight, as did the functions. So, the two villages
are similar in sizc, with the agrarian retorm village having
a higher averagc density per house. Being a new settle-
ment, all houses in Aur6s ei Mcida had a piped water
supply, electricity, and bottle gas. By constrast, all
houses in Djebabra obtained their water from a spring,
only half had electricity, while practically all used boitle
gas. Average family size was slightly iarger in Aurts el
Mcida (4�75 persons compared with 4�49), whi;r its
balanced sex r$tio contrasied with Djebabra's higher
proportien of females (54 per cent). Households, and
often families, of ten or more were not uncommon in
both settlements. Juvenility is stronger in Djebabra, with
57�4 per cent below 21 years of age, 31 �8 per cent aged
21-50, and 10-8 per cent aged 51 or more. Givcn its
agrarian retorm origins, Aurts el Meida enjoy5 a higher
proportion of people in the active age groups, 34�5 per
cent aged 21-50, compared with 52�2 per ant below 21,
and 13�3 per cent above 50.
In view of the recent and attificial origins oC both
settlemcnts, data on the migration history of their
populations are especially interesdng. Of Djebabra's
population aged 11 and over, 95�7 per ctnt were residing
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in the same commune in 1966. Aur~s el Meida obviously
did not exist in 1965, but 84�0 per cent of its populatiol
w�tre living in the same commune then. Of the thirty-four
inclividuals elsewhere in 1966, eig;...... wcre in the same
,�ilati-a of Sidi Bei Abb6s, thiriten in the aa;^cent wiloya
of Saida to the south, aad threc in 4hat of lJ:an to the
north. The questian about the year pcople settled in ti;:.
present commune of residcnce rcvealed that 86�0 per eent
in Djcbabra and 55�7 per cent in Aur6s el Meida had
livcd locaily sincc birth. Of the 113 in-migrants recorded
in the Aurts el Meida sample, two peak period! are
detectabie, 1964-1966 and 1975, but the sample is too
small to read much into this. For the in-migrants, data
on their pcevious place of rtsidence suggested a pre-
dcminance of short-distance movement. T!u adjacent
two communes to the north of I3jebabra, Meurad and
Hadjout, accounted for most of its in-migrants, while
68�6 per cent of those who had moved to Aurts el Meida
came from the same wttaya of Sidi Fel Abbts, ihough
26�3 per cent had moved nortbwards from the steppe
wrlaya of SaYda. Several young children and babies were
listed as in-migrants, though not their mothera, suggesdng
that a temporary move to a maternity hospital or te
relatives for the birth was being recorded, so aflixting
the census results. Spatially, the in-migration data for
Aurts el Meida showed concentrations within Sidi Bel
Abbts wilaya, particularly to the south from the com-
munes of Oued Berkecbes and Sidi Ali Boussidi, and to
the south-west, from those of ATn-Temouche-at and Atn
Kihal.
The last section of the census form snpplies data on
Pmployment and economic activity. In both villages low
activity rates emerge: 15�3 per cent of the population in
Djebabra, and 19�5 per c-ent in Aurts el Meida. A further
7�1 per cent were unemployed in Aurts el Meida, and in
both places the numbera of schoolchildren equalled or
exceeded the employed total. No one regarded themselves
as 'retired', despite some slderly men being included in
the sample. Women were invariably recorded as `5ouse-
wives'. Occupations were dominated by agricultural
labourers, vineyard workers, and tractor driven. The
narrow rangc of occupations in the cenrre de regroupe-
ment coittrasted with the wider range displayred by the
largcr sample from Aur6s el Meidaf which included
teachers, social workers, and other servia sector workers.
Likewise, contrasts emerged in job situation in that the
largest group of worken in Aurts el Meida were co-
operators, the product of the agrarian reform, whereas
seasonal workers wen marginally more important than
permanent employas in Djebabra. Place of work data
revealed only one commuter in Djebabra and two in
Aurts el Meida plus a few individuals working and living
away from home els.:where in Algeria and in Francx.
Both villages were thus, as expected, self-containod
agricultural settlementa.
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For Djebabra a 25 per cent sample was also taken
from the 1966 feuilles de minage to allow some compari_
sons. The 130 households containing 589 Fsople were
only slightly fewee thaa in 1977. All the 19E6 sample
were living in the same commune in 1962. ComParcd
with 1977, a higher proportion of people were working,
ovcr half of them in viticulture, a branch of agriculture
which had disappeared from Djebabra by 1977. With this
change, the dominance of the outogestion sector had also
disappearcd, 1966-1977.
The Potentiality of the Dats for Third World Studoes
Although the previous section presented a few detailed
aspects for just two villages, it is hoped that this has
demonstrated the wider research potentiality of the data
source. The micro-scale at which the Algerian population
can be sampled and studied should be re-emphasiud.
Individual villages, hamlets, and dispersed dwellings can
be isolated for study, as can blocks, stroets and individual
constructions in urban localities. Auth detailed local
studies and wider sample studies can be made using this
census dorumentation. Thcse can use individual or
household level information and so avoid having to
infer relationships from generaliud data at various
aggregatcd levels from communes upwards. For example,
hypotheses of relationships bctween the educational level
of individusls and their socio-economic status can be
tested, and the social and spatial detnils of the large but
poorly documented unemployed sector of the population
can be studied, without bcing blunted by the use of
aggregated data. Population migration in patticular can
be examined through thret items of information contained
in the ccnsus: firstly, an individual's place of binh;
secondly, his residcnce in 1966; and thirdly, his place of
residence prior to his present address. Many migrant
path; weuld be amply covered by these three items, and
samples of the populations of shanty-towns, inner city
slums, or agrarian reform villagss would yield interesting
results. Evidence, put forward by Viutin,e of the continued
occupution of accommodation on autogestion estates by
former workers who have movtd on to urban industrial
jobs, could bc substantiated, though some such illegal
occupants may well ha.ve evaded the census or, at least,
some of its questions. The details of housing condit' i on s
and of services, could be escertained for areal samples of
urbnn slums or rural centres de regroupement, samples
which would requin a major organizational cffort in
terms of questionnaire eurveys in the field. Further, the
availability oC the 1966 census, with a similar range of
questions, allows the dme dimension to be added.
tn short, ti ie quite diEerent attitude taken by the
Algerian authorities towards the secrxy of census dacs
allows researchers to investigate probloms at whatever
scale of aggregation is appropriate, rather� than to make
do with more generalized data sets. Regional and
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national samples can be employed which would be quite
impracticable on the basis of peraonal or even team 5eld
work. It is to be hoped that Algeria's example as followed
by other Third World census authunties and so encour-
agcs the maximum usc of the immcnse and valuable
collections ot data embodied in their national censuses.
NOTES
~ l. M. L. Rotxrtson, 'The census and rssearch: ideais and reali.
- ~ies'. Institrue ojBritish Gcographers, Troxsactrona, Vo1, qg, 1969~
173-187.
= M. Cornaton, Les regrouptmcnts de la dicolonlsarion en.ligdrle,
(l.es Editions OuvriPres, Paris, 1967), pp. 122-123� K. Sutton and R. I. L,awless,'Population regrouping in Algeria-
_ traumatic change and the raral settlement pattern', Ixstlrure of
' Brirish Gsographcrs, Transaclions, New Scries, Vol. 3, 3, 1978,
331-350.
' K. Sutton, "A note on the use of preparatory census documenta-
tion in the study of rural settlement in Algeria, Ptuples Mfdller�
rnnfens (Mcdiirrrunean Peoplts), Vol. S, 1978, 137-146.
� Z'lu author wisha to rocord his thanks to M. Bouisri und h!s
staPf at the Centre National de Dbpouillement oC the C.N.R.E.S. lts
address is: 16, rue Aspirant Maoued Ahmed (ex-rue Mirauchaux),
Oran.
� Djebabra lies in the commune of Bou Medfa, in ihe dalro of
Miliana, in the w!loya of EI Asnnm. Aurts ei Meide is aituatcd in the
_ commune and daira of Hammam Bou Hadjar, in the w!/ayw of Sidi
Bel Abtxs.
7 The validity of thesc samples is confirmed by a prxise figure of
638 inhabitants for Djcbabra given in the Toblenu Recapiru/arlj
Communal which is a document summarizing the numbers of
households and individuals in each scttlement or census tract in the
commune. A 1979 newspaper report on Aurts el Meida noted that
it contained 150 dwellings end slightly more than 1,000 inhabi2ants
(Bl Moud)abid, S April 1979).
_ � G. Mutin, 'Dbveloppement et maltrise de 1'espaa en Mitidjn'),
Revur de GEoBraphle de Lyon, Vol. 52, No. 1, 1977, 6-33.
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ALGERIA
AGREEMENTS IN ECONO1KiC, INDUSTRIAL AREAS SIGNED WITH SOVIETS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1877, 30 Oct 81 p 2746
[Text] The seventh meeting of the Algerian-Soviet cammission on economic, scientific
and cultural cooperation, at the vice-presidential level, held in Moscow, ended 20
October. The two sides at that time sigited several documents elaborating new areas
of Algerian-Soviet cooperation and initialed a protocol. that will serve as a basis
for the work of the seventh meeting at the ministerial level, to be held in November
in Algiers.
Various documents approved at this preparatory session show the intention of both
sides to deepen cooperation by taking account of the priori.ties established by Alberia's
f ifth S-year economic development plan. The Algerians and Soviets agreed to work
jointly to ca.rry out a major hydraulies and land improvPment program, involving four
big dams, and examined the possibility of joint participation in building a series
of other dams in Algeria.
In ttie industrial sector, the two sides agrsed, among other things, to construct a
spare parts workshop at E1 Hadjar, a 500,000-ton cement works at Djel.fa, tio expand
the plate-glass unit at Oran, and examined the possibility of increasing the current
level of cooperation in the metal industries, mining and construction materials sector.
In the field of vocational training and national cadres, the twn delegations decided
on the modalities of construction oi 20 vocational training centers and announced
the decision to build 40 others together. Still on the sub,ject of training, several
advancEd institutes will be establlsYied in Algeria as p.art of the Algerian-Soviet
cooperation agreements. = The experts on the two delegations also examined the possibility of cooperation in
the field of housing, railroad infrastructure and transfer of skille and technology,
and in a general way means of expanding cooperation between the trao countries.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
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ALGETcIA
OFFICIAL SAYS NO PLANS TO REGAIN COUNTRY'S ARCHIVES FROM FRANCE
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEAlS in French I3o 1878, 6 Nov 81 p 2811
/'Text7 At a press conference which he gave on 29 October, Raymond Courriere,
secratary of state responsible foe former residents of Algeria, said that there
are no plans for an immediate transfer of the Algerian archives. The French
secretary of state said: "If anybody thinks that tomorrow we are going to ship
out the 400 tons of Algerian archives. I can tell you that they are mistaken. I
know that our repatriates are worried over this matter which was raised by the
Algerian Government. 20 years ago but I do not want it to overshadow our efforts
of the last 5 months to improve and finally settle the situation di the repatri-
ates."
= The problem of these archives is a case where "you cannot see the wood for the
trees," Courriere reckons and he expressed his surprise to see it being raised
"just when the government is working to improve the conditions of the former resi-
dents of Algeria." "Everybody knows that since 1962 the Algerian Goverrnnent has
been calling for the return of the archives kept by France and covering the
colonial period from beginning to end, but we are not prepared to let anybody
down," Courriere :aid, pointing out that the Algerians, "as a matter of fact, had
never asked for all the archives, I think that it is normal for the French Govern-
ment to defend its inCerests and for the Algerian Government tia do the.same," he
added. Cou.rriere explayned that the Secretariat for Former Residents of Algeria
had taken part in the discussion which are in progress between Paris and Algiers.
"The problem of the archives," he said, "is one of the itema under discussion."
- It is also reported that some 30 asaociattons of French residents in North Africa
have asked the government to abandon the idea of turning over to Algeria the
archives, now being kept in Aix-en-Provence, covering the period of colonial rule
in that country. According to a commun3que published by the "Algerian Circle,"
those associations have decided "to remain vigilant and to jointly take all the
necessary measures" to prevent any future transfer to Algeria oi the archives
brought from that country to France in 1962.
On 20 October, the Overseas Academy of Sciences already spoke against the possi-
bility of France handing over to Algeria the archives of the former Gcwernor
General Administration of Algiers. In a reeolutinn, the Academy stated that the
archives "belong to the French nation, they are aovereign archives which cannot
be turned over to a foreign government," and added that "premature disclosure"
of the political archives could rake up past events which fell under the statute
of limitations but only in France.
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The Overseas Academy of Sciences has propoaed that A].gerian hietorians be given
access to the overseas archives kept in Aix-en-Provence and it has put forward
the idea of creating a French-Algerian Joint Commission entrusted with the task
of reproducing in microfilm documents which do not jeopardize peopl.e still alive
and to hand over these documents to Algeria.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
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ALGERIA
COOPERATION WITH FRANCE IN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY POSSIBLE
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITEP.KANEE'dS in French No 1$78, 6 Nov 81 p 2811
/Text] Mitterrand's forthcoming trip te Algiers could be an opportunity to dis-
cuss several projects of French-Algerian cooperation. This ia all the more
liicely to happen if it turns out that an agreement is reached before then on *_hp
price of gas and if OPEC finds again a certain measu.re of unity among its ranks.
The outcome of the negotiations on hydrocarbons will really boost Algeria's
earnings.
In this connection, the present report circulated by the AGEFI /expansion unknown]
, adds that in the industrial sphere the main development exF:cted is the signing of
contracts involving the automotive industry (passenger cars and industry vehicles).
But French car manufacturers, with Renault at the top cf the list, are going to
face a strong competition. Right now, Algeria has several projects on the drawing
board. These projects involve the purchase of finished vehicles and the building
of an automotive plant.
ACCOr(ilrig t0 {l1fOTP.:aLiu! Piuv1d2d by t::e Liau8 ayeuc:y, tt'1B LliSt :.::bJL1~1.1Q. ~
will deal with the purchase of between 20,000 and 30,000 passenger cars and with
the purchaz~e of cuimnercial vehicles for a reported total value of between:700 and
1,000 million francs. Regarding the sale of passenger cars, the two French
ma:iufacturers are contending wi[h a Japanese competitor as well as with Volkowagen
and Fiat. L3tely, these last two companies have been supplying the Algerian mar-
ket, the first through its Brazilian subsidiary and the second by the intermediary
of its Spanish associate SEAT (a partnerahip which has now been dissolved).
As for the car plant, it is said that the project has been given prominence again.
But the Algerians are reported to have introduced some changes in their plans
_ lvwering the amount of local integration. Let us recall, the AGEFI goes on to say,
that the plant being envisaged should be capable of making 100,000 cars a year
while, right now, Chere is an estimated market of 70,000 cars a year. But the
demand could be higher. Renault, which already signed a contract in 1970 only to
see i.t canceled, seems to stand a good chance of getting the business if the
project comes to fruition.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Mareux et Cie Paria 1981.
8796
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ALGERIA
OCEAN TRANSPORT DISPiTTE WITH FRENCH SHIPOWNERS CLARIFIED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR.ANEENS in French No 1877, 30 Oct 81 p 2746
[Text] Early this month we published a notice from the Nord-Msnche-Atlantique French
Shipowners Group, dealing with practical implementation of the inter-governmental
agreement governir.g trade between France and Algeria and calling for an equitable
sharin- of the traffic--50 percent for French ow-nera and 50 percent for Algerian
owners. Noting that this distribution has not been put rigorously into effect in
every field, but only in a general and intermitCent way, in accordance with the deci-
sions of the Conference, the notice said: "In the context of the above, the French
shipowners group asserts that merchandise may be carried on ships of either of the
two flags indiscriminately, without regard whatsc,ever to destination. Any special
convention giving preference to one flag over the other is contrary to the apirit
and the letter of the France-Algerian governmental maritime accords." (MTM of 9
October 1981).
While not disputing the facts as stated in the notice, CNAN (Algerian National Navi-
gation Company) underlines the fact that the Algerian-French maritime accord states
that traffic will be shared between the two merchant fleets propcrtionally on the
basis of the amount of transport resources each fleet has avgilable. The Algerian
cemmercial shipping industry asseits that if more of the businese in 1981 between
the Nord-Manche-Atlantique region and Algeri.a tias gone to the Algeriatt fleet than
- to its French partner, the reason lies in the fact that the former offered shippers
more reliable se*-vice, by maintaining regular service to French ports, while tha
French shipowners interrupted the cfrculation of their vesaels.
Our readers will recall that we publiahed in early July a notice from the French
Expositions Committee (CFE), calling on French exporters, especiglly thoae exhibiting
- at the Algiers Internatianal Fair, to ship their goods via Atlantic ar.d Mediterranean
parts, because of a temporary interruption of maritime service between Algeria and
_ ports in northern France. They will also recall that CNAN issued a"correction"
noting that the interruption of service between the ports of thp Manche and Algeria
- was not in any way the fault of Algerian ships, which planned to continue serving
Caen, Rouen arid Dunkerque with the same frequency as in the pagt (MTM of 3 July,
- p 1760 and 24 July, p 1931).
CNAN hopes that shippers will understand that an intergovernmental maritime accord
dividing up the cargo business must take into consideration the legitimate interests
of the users of maritime transport, who should not bear the cost of a voluntary decrease
in transport service.
COPYRIGHT: P.ene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
9516
CSO: 4519/41.
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LIBYA
ELECTION TO POPULAR CM4ITTEES DiSCRIBED
London THE MAGHREB REVIEW in English No 5-6, Sep-Dec 81 pp 99-103
[Arzicle by J. Davis]
[Text]
This note consists larFcly of ethnography, and it
describes the conduct of an clection in Ajdabiya in 1979.
That election was not tyrical in all respects-the vi4-
lcncc Por cxamplc was unusu.1 and it is unlikely that the
hctcroFcncous and ncwly cstablished populations o!'
Tripoli, Bcnghazi, pcrhars Sabha, express their internal
oprositions in quite the same ways as Ajdabiyans do.
Ncvcrthclcss, thc purnose and forrr of elections are
cummun to all Libya, and are related to the doctrines
of Tl,c- Grcc�n Bnok. It is likely that some fcatures of
Aidabiyan elections are found also in other small-to-
middling towns and settlements.
The elcction was to select members from the Ajdabiya
Basic PcoPle's Congress (the nearest analogy in English
would bc 'canstituency': it is the basic territorial division
of thc masscs) to scrvc on the sixteen district popular
committees which run government services for the
district-clectricity and justice, telecommunications and
health and so on. Ajdabiya is one of six settlements
which elect members to thc committees, and it is by tar
thc largest : of the total population, about 45,000, some
40,000 live in Ajdabiya; but each settlement elects two
members to each committce. The protagonists in the
clection are the main groupings of the population,
which are qaba'il `tribes'. The most numerous are
probably Zawiya who in the past have swept the board
in Ajdabiya town, although they do not dominate in the
cummittees because they do not have cnough representa-
tives to secure the chairmanships. Zawiya own Iaad to
thc south and south-east of Ajdabiya, and arc doniinant
in the southcrn oascs of Kufra, Rabbiana, Tazarbu.
Thcy are rclativcly mixed: a rrsult of their involvement
in thc sauthern tradc is thar many Zawiya, authentically
derived in the patriline, have Sudanese mothers, grand-
mothcrs, gi-andmothers, grcat-grandmothers. A result of
!
their responsibilities to their slaves after the aVandon-
ment of slavery is that three of the five sxtions have
so,*veral black lineages, co-responsible bst not intermarry-
ing with free ZAwiya lineages. Zawiya havc always
welcomed affiliating groups: their control of the rGmote
desert made their land a refuge from Turkish and Italian
government, and the Zawiya tribe contains many such
groups, assimilated in a variety of ways.
Zawiya are regardcd askance Uy the two other large
groups, who compare the relative purity o}' their descent
from the Princess Sa'ada, their much longer settlement
in the coastal sub-desert, their claim to hurr status
and their long association with Turkish government to
the rather mongrel pedigree of the rougher new Zawiya
arrivals from the desert, some of whose lineages formerly
had client status to the Sa'adi groups. 7`he Majabr are
the traditional rivals of the Zawiya, and are oucnumbered
by them. ?hey are allied with the Maiarba, landowners
of the area between Ajdabiya and Sirte, neighbours and
occasional allies with the al-Qaooaffi to the west. The
Malarba command the support of half a doun clicnt
groups living in the smalltr settlements of the district
and the shaikh of thc MaJArba in Ajdabiya, 'Abdulnabi
al Hatag, uses their votes to select the chairmen of
committees.
The aotion of election is one of the obscurer points
in The Green Book, which merely eays that basic people's
congresses eleet (yaktSru, always translated as `choose'
in the English version) members af popular congress
and of popular committees. Election is under-emphasized,
far more stress is placed on the abolition of parties, and
on the directness uf democracy. The essence nf the
Third Universal Wusc. 1"oung Zatiiya talkcd
Nsith ani-er and .1;oc{,, lip> iind handti ircmbling, ahout
the I,crtidy o( the Ntatarha. Somc oidcr mcn, middlc-
a,~cd, %%cnt into quasi-mOurning, unshavcn, hcads
~tiraprcd in ,cancs, cycs rcc3, scrious and withdrawn.
Sicii 1i.i,,ti;in, a Zamiva %tiard in the south-east of the
town. %~as .calcd o1T with a road block manncd by
t�'cnry or so puung adults armcd with pick-axe handles.
n mar.ihuut, a"L.iidani, turncd up and toured the streets
in hiti Rlcrccclcs; a deputation of Zilwiya went to Bcn-
gh:izi to protcst about the irresponsible withdrawal of
the polire. Uiscussions took place in the street behind the
harricadcs, and in private houses, about future tactics.
Ntcamwhilc ihc M;:g5rha mct ncar the Post Office to
cli,cw~, thc;r tcictic,. A number of rcinforccments from
the oullN'ing scttlcmcnts turncd up and campcd in a dump
u1' trrc, ;i fc\% kilomctres to thc wcst of the town.
l hr orieinal Z5\aiya list had includcd a numbcr of
mcn front othcr rroups: ihis, Zawiya argucd, showed
thcir vuucl f:ulh, thcir lack of obscssion with archaic
loyalties, and thcir rcluctancc to clominatc Ajdabiya.
A5 a rcsult of the unprovo{,ecl attack by hlagarba they
dccidtd to r.iisc the stakes, an(i drew up a ncw list of
candidatc5 uho tierc all 'l.a%tiiya, and all possessed of
doctoratcs. 'Uoctor' is a titlc which may bc uscd some-
Mhat frccl), whcn the hcat ol' argumcnt lcads you to
atiscrt that your tribal group is the onc ntost qualificd by
ohjcctiNc cntcria of modcrnitv tu rulc a district. A third
cutcmrt ar clcction was hcld on 14 Fcbruary. An entirc
rlcrtion comTnittec was brought in by bus from Bcn-
chari, and the locale ti�as chant!ed to the rlayground of
a,chool Mhich had aie entrance, telephones, and o~ces
whcrc any rtcressary discussions might bc held in privacy.
Troops, alsu from Hcnghazi, lincd the pcrimcter of the
plaYFround, and wcre poste(i uith machine guns on the
roofs of buildmgs overlooking the election. All voters
were searched as they entered the school gates and were
relieved of pocket-knives, heavy belts, walking-sticks
and various few more obviously offensive weapons.
They were also counted unofficially according to liow
they would vote by their own teIlers, as they went in.
What happened next is rather indeterminate, but at
some point-either after their own private count had been
completed, or after the iirst vote had been taken-the
Zawiya protested to the electoral commission that they
were outaumbered by f'oiir votes (1,261 to 1,257) because
Ma_Aarba had been allowed to infiltrate voters from the
outlying districts of Bi�r and Marada. They were over-
ruled, and left the election en bloc. The election pro-
ceeded while they sat in the streets near the school
listening ta the annourc:ements of successive unanimous
votes of Magarba: 'candidates w:;hout'-as one bank
managcr sa.id indignantly and exaggeratedly-`without
a schoo!-leaving certificate between them'.
In a Bnti`h clcction, ~vherc thcrc is a sccret ballot an(l
polling static~ns arc opcn for the voters to call at any
time during the day, the electoral contest is not reall)
a contest of votinfi: the struggle gocs on in the H�ceks
bcfore the pre-announced poll'ing day as the candiciates
pcrsuadc elcctors to votc f'or them: polling is the measure
of their success; it is not as much a direct part of the
contest as it is in Libya or as it is in Parliamentary voting
or some trades union elections. That is one reason
Libyan elections are ir, some sense a direct confrontation.
Another is that the voting itself becomes compet-itive
because in the system of direct democracy established
after the publication of The Green Book thcrc is no
secret ballot-each man has to exercise his share o!' the
sovereignty of the masses with responsibility, as a British
Parliamentarian has to. When a system precludes
counting papers, heads have to be polled; when more
than onc vote has to be cast (quite easy on a aallot
paper) the proceedings turn out quite lengthy because
in theory each head has to be counted in each vote.
Those are practical consequences of a theory of direct
dernocracy, and thcy increase tension: voting itself is a
conProntation, and it is a confrontation necessarily
lasting several hours.
If Libya has no secret ballot, still less does it have
parties. They-like `tribes, sects, classes'-attempt to
seize the government in order to dominate their oppon-
ents, which is dictatorial. ]t is because parties are un-
democratic that no political debate occurs of a kind
familiar enough in the parliamentary democracies. "1 here
are no candidates' addresses, no speeches, no attcmpt
to persuade the electors that one candidate's policies
are better than anothcr's. Yoting therefore takes place
betwecn ideologically undifi'erentiated candidates, an
thrt is anotha feature of Lih.yan elections. The point is
not to try to explain the violence in Ajdabiya (not all
32
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l.ihyan elections are violcnt; not ail parliameatary
clcctions are peaceful) but to tihow in the first instnnct
Iiow specific features of elcctians are related to the high
exotic theory of The Gree� Book. You might say that
non-ideological elections are all very well in a one-
party system, where unopposed candidates are returned
by unanimous votcs of all registered voters. But if you
have contested elections and no ideology, the law of
vacuums, which in this instance says roughly that coa-
fiicts cannot take place without an ostensible reason,
the law of vacuums allows you to predict that alignments
will occur on some principie, even if it is a principle
which neither you, nor Colonel Qaooafi'i for tha; matter,
would a^,cept as strictly speaking political. It is true that
ZS~kiya daimed greater modernity-more educated
candodates than their opponcnts, but so did the Magarba;
morcovcr, Zawiya modernity was gained at the cost in
some instances of presenting candidates who could not
or would not turn up on the election day. It is true that
Zawiya complaincd bittcrly of thc solidary tribalism of
thcir opPoncnts, which forccd thcm into a contcstatory
trihalism; but so also did thc hlagarba.
ln f:ict thc Ajdabiya elcctians on thc nadi football
ritch turncd into somcthinb vcry likc the opposition of
clcmcnts in a scgmcntary Sy.:tcr,i. Yublic voting togcthcr
with confinement in a limited space, together with the
abscncc of formal political ideological discriminators
turn the count itself into the contest, and change the
assembly of the masscs into thc massing-eH'ect of the
opposition of segmcntary elcr ents. In addition to the
formal political institutions, iaoreover, there are con-
flicts from tradition: Zbwiya and Majabr are ancient
rivals, and have killed each other ih elections since 1952;
MagSrba align thcroseives with their feliow Sa'adi,
otherwise in a minority, against the upstarts.
Some confirmation oPthis account comes from evidence
of the clections in Kufra and Jalu districts. Jn Kufra
the main political contestants are two sections of Zdwiya,
thc 'Awlad 'Amira and thc Mannai'a. In 1975 'Awlad
'Amira took ovcr office from the Mannai'a. In 1979 the
Mannai'a rcgaincd ofTice with Jlulat support, placing
various JI015t candidates in chairmanships. Voting was
said to be very closc. Again, in Jalu district the three
communities tend to vote on scgmentary lines: the oasis
of J516 itself, inhabitcd mostly by Majabr, vies with the
ZSwiya of 'Ajkarra oasis for the support of the `Aujli
(inostly of Berbcr origin) in 'Aujla oasis. However,
since each of these settlements is more or less homo-
geneous, and each is a suh-district in its own right, the
main compctition is to securc the chairmanships of the
committces, and the elections within each settlement are
uncontesled and unanimous.
T'he voting in elections, partl}� because of the practical
consequences of idcological decisions, becomes something
like a scgmcntary confrcntation in which social controls
secure solidary support for a bloe of candidates. 7"here is
no question, for lnstance, of voting for candidates trom
morc than one list Even if there were grounda for
doing so-for being convincxd that one candidate was
for :,ome practical or ideological reason better than
another, the aublicity of the ballot and the heat of the
moment would ma:;e it very difficult to cross the pitch.
Although gassions are aroused, and the elections are
keenly contested, turn-out is relatively low. No woman
has ever voted in Ajdabiya, and that excludes more than
half the electorate. If Ajdabiya's poFulation is around
40,000 that leaves about 18,000 males. Of those, about
iwo-thirds are not of voting age, giving an effective male
electorate of around 6,000-7,000; of those aUout 2,500
vote, a turn-out of 35-40 per cent. The non-voters
include residents without local aflUiation-traders from
Misurata, for example. They also include people disil-
lusioned with politics: one man, for example, thought
that his cousin, a nwiyi, should not stand for :e-election
to the education committee. But he could not go to the
elcction and vote against him, and so he staycd aw�ay.
Others thought it made n4 diflcrence who held office,
and they too stayed away. People have diverse reasons
for doing nothing, and thc abstainers undoubtedly havc
more reasons than those ]isted here: on thc other hand
it seems fair to say that the inbuilt quasi-segmentary
confrontation in the elections discourages precisely those
people who might be inclined to resist the tendency to
segmentalism.
That is not to say, by any means, that all those who
do go to elections go intending to demonstrate sectional
solidarity. The first day in Ajdabiya, for instance, many
of the younger people pointed out some of the difl''erences
between parliamentary and direct democracy, insisting
that what was about to occur was closer to the classical
Athenian raodel than anything that might occur in
Britain. 'I'hey turned out not far wrong (Athenian politics
being particularly liable to produce conflict); but their
disappointment, even shame at the failure to put the
system into proper eflect, was quite apparent. Some
people-particularly thost who plan the lists of candi-
dates and canvass support for thera among section and
lineage leadcrs-some people undoubtedly do try t(,
gain xdvantage, against Zawiya, against Maj3rba as the
case may be, by appeaiing to as wide a cross-section of
the population as they can. When they are opposed,
thcir supporters rally round, and a quasi-segment is
formed. It is in the nature of segmentary systems that a
segment is cal;ed into being by opposition; and it is
thereforo always true that `the other side started it'.
That applies also to thc electoral groupings, or quasi-
segments.
There is one final point to make, and it has to be made
very inadequately in a short note such as this. It is
possibte, not at all misleading, to understand the illogi-
calities and inconsistencies of The Green Book as arising
from the very real difliculties of combining two models
33
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both highly valucd by Libyans, each indicating coatrary
courses of action. On the one hand aa egalitarian,
acephalous, Sunni tradition in which each man struggles
to maintain his personal sovereignty; on the other, a
bureaucratic state providing education, health and
welfare services, electricity and water, telegrams and
justice, but apparently necessitating both hierarchy azd
representation. Of course. QaOOdffi's theory of popular
democracy, of government without representation does
not apply to all the state apparatus: the military, the
police, the petroleum industry and the R.C.C. itself are
not mentioned in The Green Book and do not have
popular committees and are net controlled by People's
Congress. But where the theory does apply the issue of
election is crucial: to Western eyes, and also to many
- Libyans, election and representation are inseparable,
and are closely associated too, with party and w�ith
idcology. What Thc Grccn Book proposes is thc separa-
tion of clcction and rePrescntation, and the exclusion of
rcprescntation and idcology from politics. It asserts that
Fovernment can co-exist with personal sovereignty,
that its formal institutions can be subject to the rules of
thc non-Wcstcrn egalitarian acephalous model. On the
othcr hand, somc more restricted number of persons
has to takc car of thc day-to-day running of what are
quitP complex governmental tasks: the answer is elections
which do not producc representaUves, in which popular
- dircct dcmocracy is undiminishcd. It is a difficult notion,
cven aparadoxical onc. Thc Ajdabiyans in 1979 clearly
assimilatcd elections to the traditional ebalitarian and
acephalaus model, in which rersonal sovereignty was
maintained by the mutual support and opposition of a
segmcntary systcm.
COPYRIGHT: The Maghreb Review 1981.
CSO: 4500/67-E
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LI BYA
MANAGEMENT OF AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES IN COASTA;. AREA
London THE MAGHREB REVIEW in English No 5-6, Sep-Dec 81 pp 104-114
[Text]
Abstract
The character of the rencwable natural resources oP
coastal Libya has always constrained agricultural
dcvclopment. The paper examines the cxperience of
thosc responsiblc for managing various phases of
Lihy;i's economic development of the recent past. The
rcrioci of ltalian colonization will be discussed briefly;
thc cxperience in the pre-oil phase as well as that of the
oil era bcfore and aftcr the revolution will be treated in
morc detail. The changing status of rcncwable natural
resources is described and the impact of environmental
management policies evaluated.
Agricultural Resources fa the Scmi-arid
Meditcrrnnean
Agricultural development in the Mediterranean basin
can largely he cxplained ia terms of the disposition of
water resources. The seasonal deficie:ncy in sum.mer rain-
fall cstricts agriculture to the winter season exeept in
thosc arcas where groundwater, surfaa storage or rivers
provide a source of water for irrigation. The quantity
of watcr availablz wholly to support summer farming,
and to supplcment that in the winter, varies !'rom the
substantial yuantities (50 billion m3 per year approxi-
matcly) brought to the region by major ri%,ers, such as
thc Nile, to much smaller volumes (for cxample under
I hillion m3 along 200 km coastal tracts in Libya) which
tind their way into the coastal aquiiers of the basin. The
pattcrn of thc availability of water for agriculture has
ahv,iys becn conditioned by dimatic factors and these
:rr still inescapablc in wholly rain-fed regions. The
sourccs of watcr for irrigation havc, however, bsen
subject to two complementary manaFement strategies.
First thcre has hecn a constantly upward trend in the
cicmand for irrigation water and secondly there has been
a tcndcncy to improve the efl"ectivencss of water manage-
ment at variovs levels fr th
om e individual farmer to the
governmeat agency respons'ble for water resourxs.
From an economic point of view the analysis of the
problem of how to optimize the utilization of agricul-
tural resaurcesl in the semi-arid Mediterranean lands is
straightforward. Land is rarely a constraint on activity;
water on the other hand is always a eonstraint. Labour
and capital vary in availability and examples of econa
mies with unhibited supplies of labour are jaxtaposed
with ones with unlimited supplies of capizal. 7'he factor
which is only slightly less constraining than labour on
the optimal nverall utilization of agricultural resources
is the shortage of that specialist element in the labour
force experienced in managing new technologies and
systems of water distribution. This last constraint
afi'ects the use of water at farm level but has even more
important implications in higher levels of the regional
and national institutions responsible for water manage-
ment.
The temperature regime of the Meditenanean basin
provides its farmers with many advantages over com-
petitors in Northern Europe (Amiran, 1978, p. 122).
Where water supplies can be assumed throughout the
yeat then two or thrce crops per year can be raised in
tho region. 7"he temptation to take advantage of the
favourable growing temperatures has led Snany farmers,
usually supported in their inttnt, initially at least, by
governments, to push tor high levels of production,
expanding horizonially and also intensifying irrigation,
often with serious consequences for the resources upon
which sustained agricultural production depends.
One part of the region, the coastlands of northern
Africa, have experiencrd the disorientating occupation
by colonial powers which extended unti! 1951 in Libya
and into the 1960s further west. The French and ltalian
occupations extendcd cultivation and irrigation, in the
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case of Libya doubling the total area farmed and with
that expansion more than doubling the irrigated area.
The experience gained in the nrst half of tne twentieth
century in utilizing northern Africa's natural resources
revealed the very limited nature of the watcr resources,
and strategies were developed which took into account
the need for produrtion systems with low water using
requirements. Dryland farming was an important
clement in the agricultural strategy, raising grain and
tree crops which were able to withstand the low rainfall.
Even so the irrigated farming which was implemented
did begin to aftect the coastal groundwater resources
and water levels did begin to fall in the coastal reservoirs
(Allan, 1971, p. 212). Extensive studies ensued to locate
other decper groundwater reserves but none was dis-
covered which was not unusable because of high levels
of salinitv.
Libyan Agricultural Resources (Flgures 1 and 2)
Agricultural development in Libya since the colonial
cra (i.e. since 1951) has been particularly intcresting
bccausc it was achieved through a number of phases.
In these phases the mix of the factors of production
chanecd dramatically. Libya achieved independence in
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300_3
~
'
200
$
~
s
IM
~
.o
70
60
~
�

FiQure I. Oil production and revenue. Soura: Census and
Staeistical Department 1972a and 1977.
1951 and for the first ten independent years the economy
of the country was supported by aid from outside in the
form of direct grants, mainly from the United States and
Britain and by rent for military bases also from the
Uraited States and Britain. Oil revenues, which com-
raenctd in 1961, marked the beginning of the second
phase. In the early 1960s oil revenues replaced aid :ind
by 1965 Libya was beginning to enjoy the benefits of
oil revenues. By 1968 there were many indicators that
the eccnomy had changed and new patterns emerged in
gnvernment and private spending. The agricultural
stctor was uttracting substantial investment, especially
36
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~
~oco 9
u
~
~
~g
~
~
~
~
~
m
ow

a
~
b
�
�
36
a
.
t igurc 2. Lihyan oil revcnues anJ cievclopment spending 1962-1977
Sczurce: Census and Statistic:ll Department 1972 and 1977.
_d
hy privatc individuals; thr arca cultivattd was being
extended, the irrigated ar:a increased each year and
immierant labour worked on more and more farms
(Allan cr nl., 1973). The third phase came with the
revolution of 1969 which occurred at a point when
Libya'ti oil income was rising and Libya had an especially
strong placc amongst oil cxporting countries. tn the
first two years of revolutionary government the Libyan
administration skilfully exploited its position in the world
oil market. c)il production was cut blt revenues were
maintained tlirough the higher prices achieved. lt was at
this period ttiat Libya gained its reputation as the mav-
erick amonfst the O.P.E.C. producers; a reputation
Nrh.,;h has bcen sustained through the 1970s.
l he impact on the agricultural sector of the changing
economic circumstances K�as most significant as we shalt
see in the arca of agricultural policy. ln other words
the direction and volume of investment changed with
increasing rcvenucs, and csrccially with the change of
government in 1969. Thc agricultural sector did not
prove to be responsive to the increased level of invcs.-
37
mcnt, howcvcr, because of thc two unavoidable con-
straints of limited environmcnta: resources and the
shoriage of advanced agricultural management.
Linya's coastal plains and uplands are rich in somc
resources. Solar cnergy for crop production is adequatc
for crop production throushout the year. Other natural
resources are poorly dispoced. Soils as in other arid
anci semi-arid arcas are poor, being generally sandy,
and because of the high summer temperature regimes
they are poor in orsanic matter content with negative
conscquences for thrir fertility and especially their
moisture-holding capacity. 7'here are technologies,
however, which make it poss;Ne to use such soils, but
these tcchniques can only be deployed if there is a
reliablc source of irrigation water. Libya un1'ortunately
has no flowing rivers, the potential fbr surface storage
is extremely limited and groundwater reservoirs in the
coastal regions are nowhere rich. Only in the remote
south of bhe country are there substantial groundwater
resources and these are the finiYe, fossiS resourcts of the
Ku!'rah and Sarir regions in the east and of the Fezzan
in the south-west. This paper is not concerned with these
regions, but in the Libyan context the water res3urces
of the south are important both in actual potential, so
far only realized very partially and without any economic
rationale (Allan, 1979, p. 25), and especia;ly in the
opportunity for extravagant investments which they
aPford. Awareness overtook successive regimes in Libya
!hat the agricultural resources at the coas! �were limited,
and in due course the very big spending targets of the
1970s could only be achieved by pouring money inta
the expsnsive enterprises located in remote southern
regions. It was recognized meanwhile that the absorptive
capacity of the coastal agricultural schemes was limited
by the quality 3f the environmental resources.
The coastal strip2 in the area to the south of Tripoli
and to a lesser extent near Benghazi, and the coastal
Lplands of the Jabal Nafusah in the west and the Jabal
al Akhdar in the east, have sufficient rainfall to supPort
dryland farming. The seasonal pattem of rainfall limits
rain-fed farming to regions within the 200 mm isohyet,
that is to an area which is only 2 per cent of Libya of
which Icss than balf is cultivable for reasons of terrain
,9 soil condrtions. F,ven 200 mm annual average
ru 11 is not, however, ideal for dryland farming in
rej,,wis in which high temperatures and dry winds
occur protractedly; a level of 300 mm or upwards
assures reliable yields and the area with this hiFher
expectation is approximately 0�7 per cent of the country
of which only one-third is usable because of broken
tenain and poor soil. In other words one is considering
approximateiy 17,000 km2 of cultivable land with mote
than 200 mm average annual rainfall and approximately
4,000 k m2 with 300 mm average assuming reasonable
crop yiclds. F'allas (1977, p. 2) suggests that there are
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9,400 km= in thc Gcfara and Jabal Nafusah rcgiun and
13,000 kmz in the Benghazi and Jaba) al Akhdar rcgion
with 250-300 mm ot annual rain and confirms the limited
cxtcnt of the arca which could sustain reliable rain-fed
agriculture.
A mcasure of the poor quality of the soil resourccs
and marginal rainfall arc the low wheat yiclds achieved
even in areas with over 300 mm annual rainfali. Yields
of undcr 1 tonnc pcn ccctarc wert, usual in 1980 in fav-
oured areas (compare dr}�land yields in the United States
which average 1�2 tonncs pcr hectare and in Australia
1�25 tonnes pcr hectare), and in tracts with 200 mm
average rainfall yields fell to 0�5 tonnc per hectare. The
potential of areas with favourable rains could approach
2 tonnes per hectare and the lawer rainfall areas could be
pushed towards 1 tonne pcr hectare. The main problem
in Libyan dryland farming is the need to utilize arcas of
extrcmcly low rainfall in which agricultural activity
must always be hazardous. In other countrits with
extcnsive rain-fcd agricultural areas enduring low rain-
fall of about 300 mm annually these tracts lie on the eage
of largc arcas with assurcd rains. The main burden of
production is gained from those favoured areas; the
production from the marginal areas may be desirable
but is not essential. In Libya on the other hand the main
production has to he gaincd from marginal tracts with
consequcnt hazards with respect to the achievemcnt of
consistent sclf-sufficiency in rain-fed crops. Special
management s!rategies which accommodate to crop
failure in dry ycars have to be devised and arrangcments
made at national level to balance the inter-year variations
in production. Such arrangements are obvious]y not
difficult for a Fovernment enriched by oil revznues,
but we shall see that though ail riches are useful in
cushioning a nation against cnvironmental realities, :ney
do not contribute to a good decision-making base for the
manap.ement of marginal cnvironmental resources. Oil
riches feed optimism, optimism impairs perception, and
impaired perception lcads ta damaging management
strategies. T'his sequence which has been observed in the
Libyan government'S approach to the use of coastal water
resources, will also be showr~ to have been experienced
in the management of rain-fed farnung experiments on
the Gcfara Plain and to a lcsser extent on the Jabal al
Akhdar.
Thc availability of apparcntly unlimitcd supplies of
capital has provcd to bc a poor basis for resour~e
managcment. Capital resources for agricultural develop-
mcnt liave increased in volume progressively, and the
proportion of national dev,:topment spending alloc;ated
to agriculture has been stimulated at a numbcr of stagcs
hy the ill-favoured `optijnum' referred to ahove. First
the fivc-year plan (1964-1968) suggested an allocation of
over 17 per cent of development spending to agriculture
(Parlcy, 1971). Next the revolution brought an evcn less
informrd hoost to rrorotircl acriculWral invcstmcnt. By
1969 the enthusiasm for agricultural spendinb had
slackened, at least at government levei for the very good
reason that it had been recognized that further invest-
ment in inigation of the type made an the 1960s made no
ser.se in the light of the progressive depletion of coastal
aquifers e The revolutianary regime increased allocations
to agriculture and especially to the development of water
using schemes.lt was not until 1976 that the revolutionary
regime began to recognize the need to reverse this pol'.cy.
The indicators came in the form o!'regulations constrain-
ing the planting of summer crops such as tomatoes,
melons and citrus with high water requirements, later
reinforced by measures such as the closing of tomato-
paste factories. By 1980 the Libyan goveraaient was
grappling with the extremely difficult task of attempting
to reorganize the agriculture of the coastal strip and in
this was trying in one stroke to implement a policy of
redistributing 13nd according to socialist principles,
and at the same time to create management units consis-
tent with economic production and regulated water
utilization.
Whereas the capital resources of Libya after oil
cnabled a national indulgence in an ill-founded optimistic
agricultural policy, there were other constraints which
impeded the realization of the optimistic targets. Labour
to man new enterprises was already in short supply by
1969, but with the strong relationship with Egypt in the
years immediately after the revolution farm labour
began to enter Libya from Egypt in large numbers.
!,n exact breakdown of immigrant labour is not avail-
abte but it is likely that well over 50,000 Egyptian farm
labourers were present in Libya in the early 1970s until
1975, when relations with Cairo changed (see Figure 3).
Libya imported labour steadily during the years of oil
revenues and by 1975 10 per cent of the population was
from abroad and towares 50 per cent of the working
population was from overseas. A small but significant
element of this population consisted of professional staff
knowiedgeable about land and water resources and their
r00
wo
~ too
~
100
note the ?fiect o1 the change
in the relationship with Egypt
In 1971
Weatern border
~
Eastern bordera
/
Southoin borders
e1 ez e3 er es ee e7 ee 69 70 71 n n 7A 75 7e
Figure 3. Passenger arrivals 961-1976 by region. Source: Census
and Statistical Department 1972-1477.
nrm:,gcmcnt, but though helpful these staiT and con-
siilt:ints could only amclioratc and not sulve the prob-
Icros crcatcd by the shortage of Libyan profcssional staft.
38
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I~cal titafi' wcrc esscntial for thc cffective monitoring of
.urvrys and the evaluation of plans and recommonda-
tioW. upon which sound national policy could be based.
' Tltc wircc Libyan cxPcrtitic was imrossibly ovcrstrctchcd
in thc unrrwarding task of managing a polyglot, mu'ti-
rulturcd, and oftcn incompatiblc cornmunity of cxpcrts.
!t was rccoFnizcd that thcrc was being accumula!cd
_ 'pricclcss capcricncc in thc various ficlds oP land re-
cl:nnation, sceding, planning and reconstruction '
(Jodah, 1978, p. 16) but ;n practice this experience was
hcing assimilatcd by only a small proportion of Libya's
Profrssional agronomists and agricultural enginecrs.
- This is no way of mcasuring the degree of the constraint
imroscd by thc shortage of Libyan profcssional staff on
thc direction and quality of agricultural policy and on
- the productivity of the agriculwral sector, but in the
cstimation of thc author it was evcn rnore important
than tlic paor quality of the environmenta] resources of
coastal Libya.
_ ]t is not always easy to relate to the realities of agri-
cultural chanFc midst thc titridcnt rhr.toric which attends
acricultural pc,;icy makint! and pronounccmcnts about
intcndcd invcstmcnt. National plans before and after
_ 1969 Fave agriculture a significant place in proposed
cconomic devclopment. Thc first ten years of oil revenues
- lcft thc Fovcrnment unccrtain about thc capacity of the
aericultural scctor for effective absorption of investment,
and Figure 4 shows this hcsitaney of the late 1960s.
Thc diagram also shows that agricultural investment took
ofT again in the carly 1970s at a higher rate than in the
1965- 1969 period, but not at a higher rate than in the
pcriocl 1962-1965. The period of revolutionary govern-
- mcnt has nevcrtheless been associated with a sUong
emphasis in agricultural investment. Figure 5 shows this
cmphasis very ;.lcarly.
Thc rhetoric zttending these policies, is not difficult
to find, nor arc the id.-as which have inspired and lei-iti-
mizcd thcm. Thc optimism of Libya's agricultural policy
makers has apparently bcen inspired since 1969 by
- %Nords from the Qur'an which provide the foreword for a
publication drawing attention to achievements in the
Jabal al Akhdar coastal highlands:
Vcrily in this is a Sign
For those who give tnought
(Z..,.,;,otive Authority tor Jabal al Akhdar, 1978, p. 3)
A sense tha; irr:+sm.anagement of otherwise rrch resourceS
2 C"
.
7;{
M
� w
~

b
70
w
~
40
30
~
s
i
z
t
m
-o.
'9
0

,
ev
oe
~
�'17
In thc namc of Gud Most Gracious, Most Merciful
It is hc who sends down
Rain from the sky
From it ye drink,
And out of it (grows),
The vicectation on which
Yc fccd vour cattle.
With it He produces
f ~~r y(,u cc~in. c~livcs,
!);itc-ralm~, prapcs,
_ And c~�crv I~in~3 of fruit
.o~
.o~
o~
T
~
~
~.,�P rM r��m +9x-n wnen
. iwn vrrws a,ulep
w+s
' ~ ar li. wr�cn Ktirtuiea
~ 'j n.i~~� lrens~i0~.r.i
ro
.no ,..~.~u+ BMn ve,so's
~ ro Ixvn ~rr~wn lur
cnnp~ul.rMu

i '
total at /
constant
964pricesL - ~
TOTAL
;r y
~
,i .
~commurnc~tdr ~
Apncuhun ~
E~eonu /
i pn I
!
teue.t.�,~- ~
~
N~al~h`I ~

Ko,,..ng I ~ I
Idw~iiKpN /
I
M.wlKtunrq .
~ I
curnM ~ I
- T-
)o
10
i
~
~
.
6743 Uelee6Y 61 e0lo71
.
~
I
TOTAL
~
1 7i
~

E~ee~env~~ I
T
~ `
I
r~napor~

Educ~~ ' /
r+
i
n

i

1
ll
alac x
Inlorm~liDn CurMnl
icWlur* aKy
~O n n A 74 3 74 77
TYiE O/ fXpfNDITURE
otn...,
100
90
pu~p~rnt
80
o
eo
so
const,,,L,
s�,
do
�
20
w
0
ExPfN(HTtR1E W INSTUf10N
100
LOCOi A
p
covsrnm.M
.o
70
b
so
crnt,.l
.o
Governrtiertt
30
20
io
0
UUO4 65 Ae67 010
D71
2000
too,
ioo
~
~
a ~
E
g
n
i
>
J
F;gure 4. Estimatcs of developmcnt spcnding by sxtor 1962-1971
and 1970-1977. Soura: Cer.sus and Statistical Dcpartmcnt 1972b
and Sxretariat of Planning 1978.
was thc rcason for thc poor agricultural hcritiigr cii thc
rcvolutionary govcrnment is evident in statcmcnt� m.,dc
by the Libyan lcadcr. 'Our agricultural rcvolution is
39
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now continuing in the ficlds whcre it will progress day
aftcr day, multiplying its revenucs year after ycar and,
with God's assistance, it will transform our land lcft
for too IonF ncglectcd and dcscrt, into richly fertile soil,
which shall abundantly reNvard our strugg]ing pcnplc,
who libcratcd it from our colonist intrudcrs' (Moammar
Qathafi, quoted in Exccutivc Authority for Jabal al
Akhdar, 1978, p. 5). Reinforccd by the rccognition of
the vulncrability of thosc w�ho are not sdf-sufiicient in
food-`Thcre is no indcpcndcnce for thosc who sccure
thcir food from abroad' (Moammar Qathafi in Execu-
tive Authority for Jabal al Akhdar, 1978, p. 83)-and
enthuscd by a romantic view of resources and potential
in such areas as the coastal uplands of north-east Libya
'whcre the dreams of golden crops slceping in our hills
:
OBriCUltulc
indLisVy R miner8l rr.sour[ES
- oii, mmi ,a & aes
1-,oo ~ elcrtntitY ~
trensport commi mirnitons` ~
I hnusirxn ~
1000 ~
municipnlit-es ~
I CdJCal10l1 ~
- I soo -1 '
1 heshh /
I J~ rl
~ I
iooo 3001 iloFi~ ~
iw- - - - -y-
- ~ �hn~� V -
~ ,r�
F oi nv~nw~~~
f~
(current prices)
� I,ndl 5P'Mn~
I ~k�.T~MYTI'M /
-'i--1 " T --f TT'T TT"r'T~-T-7T
e2 e3 e. es ee a en nv 70 71 n n~. ~s M �
300
xo
1Do
0
2 rio
100
0
,00
0
W
0
lM
0
,W
o ^
,X ~
~ E
1G(' c
� o 0
n E
Figure 5. Dcnartmcnt spcnding hy scxtor 1962-1977 and somc
niher indicators. Source: Census and Staustical Department, 1972h
and Secretariat Plannin� 1978.
unitc %%itli tlic diticovrry of Nc%N Ilunzuns arising from
hchincl uur hillti' (13ashir Jc,d:h, in Eaccutivc Authority
fur Jahal al Al,hclnr. ;978, p. I6), policics wcrc initiatcd
und pursuad which have proved to be inccnsistcnt with
the resource potential of Libya's semi-arid coastlands.
in the following sections the damaging eftects of the
dangerous inconsistency of perception and reality will
be examined first with respect to the intensification of
irrigated farming on the Gefara Plain and secondly to
the attempts to extend dryland farming beyond the 200
mm isohyet.
IntenSifying Irrigated Agriculture in Coastal Libya
The twentieth century has seen progressively higher
demands being made un the coasial water resources. All
summer agriculture ani9 a proportion of that in the winter
depends on groundwater. In the days of traditional tech-
nology oP animal-powered water lifting there was a limit
to the amount of water that could be raised and a limit
to the area in which irrigation could be deployed as
animals could not be expected to raise water much more
than 10 m. Irrigated farming was restricted to the strip of
land immediately adjacent to the coast where wa!er
levels were at no more than 6 m. ?he coastal irrigated
gardens rarely extended further inland than 3 km.
The arrival of ltalian colonists, with a diflereLt
technology, extended the area of potential irrigation to
points as far as 40 km from the coasts where water levels
were generally about over 30 m bclow the surface.
However there were some places where the particular
configuration of topography was such that water stood
at or close to the surface even 20 km fcom the coast in
1912 when Italian scientists and farmers first began to
make records of water resources at places such as Siwani
bin Yadim, 20 km to the south of Tripoli.
The main strategy of the Dtalian sctilers was to use
dryland farming techniques, and severe restrictions were
imposed on the extension of irrigated farming by the
regulation of the number and spacing of wells. Never-
theless the groundwater resource was afi'ected by the
ltalian pumping (Allan, 1971, p. 173). The thirty years
of Italian occupation witnessed the doubling uf total
cultivated area and to an equivalent incre2se in iniga-
tion. Such figures are difficult to establish fairly as the
utilization of land in the pre-colonial period was not
permanent in precisely that area settled by Italian farmers.
The tract they chose was the one used by Libyan graziers
in period of drocght and by farmers from the coastal
gardens in years of favourable rains. Thus the atea
occupied by the ltalians had perforrued ari essential
complementary role for both the settled and nomadic
communities of northern Libya, and the intrusion was
resisted by the Libyan people.
The ten years or so of British occupation brouRht few
innmations and I3ritish policy was markcd by rts cn-
cotiragcmcnt of the ltalian farming community to sta~
on in north-wcstcrn Libya. The ]talian colonial prcscncc
had cndcd in castern Libya during the ]iostilities of the
Second World War soon after 1939. Italian agricultural
40
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(Icvclopment made litile impact on eastern Libya as
Libyan resistance continued very sctively vntil 1931,
.ind many ltalian farms wcrc not developed and occupied
until the late 1930s in Cyrenaica. Most agriculture in the
c,istcrn province was conductcd according to dryland
~ tcchniques.
The first dccade of indcPcndencc after 1951 saw 1ule
significant intcnsification of irriFatcd farming. There
were somc small government schemes such as that at
Wadi Ki'am and Italian farms were sold to wealthy
_ Palestinian exiles who brought with them much skill
in citrus raising with related very high water using
requirements.
lt was not until the mid-1960s that the eRect of the
_ intensification of groundwater use became very evidcnt.
By 1969 the rate of decline had increased to 1 m per year
at some parts 20 km from the coast (Figure 6).
The evidence available in 1968 pointed to an increasing
rate of decline and the policies, or rathcr their absence,
in the early years of the i-evolutionary regime rcinforced
' the mainly privately instiFatcd water using ventures.
Additional public finance in thc form of grants and
subsidies increased watcr using practicr,s and graund-
watcr levels did faU even morc quiclly in the early
_ 1970s. The 1970s witnessed a grow�ing recognition of the
limitcd nawre of the groundwatcr resourcc, and by 1976
there were clear signs that the government wished to
curt:iil water use and if necessary agricultural production
in the Gefara Plain. Resistrictions were placed on the
planting of citrus, tomatoes and water melons, all crops
which use water heavily (Ailan and McLachlan, 1975,
p. 36). Dy 1976 the rapid decline of water at points 20 km
- f.rom the coast had reached 3 m per year and by 1978
- the annusl decline had reached a dramatic 5 m per year
at Bin Gashir (Wozab and Obah, 1977; Floegel, 1978).
In the summer of 1979, ine watcr table of the upper
aquifcr at Bin Gashir was pumped to below sea level for
the first time and the crossing of such cmotive thresholds
firially pcrsuaded those respansible for initiating develop-
- ment schemes that the managcment of sustained agri-
culture depended on the careful use of groundwater,
especially in coastal Libya.
That emphasis has been given to thc state of the water
resource rather than to the progress of agricultural
production may seem excessive, but as already estab-
lished, it is the water resourre 'vhich is the major constraint
on irrigatcd farming in coastal Lihya. lts dtpletion has
madc it impossible to sustain cxisting levels of production
never mind further intensification. Agricultural produc-
tion did increase in the 1960s at the rate of between
. 2 a ul 4pcr ccnt pcr ycar but this achicvcmcnt, though
con,oJrrahlc was only achicved at the expcnse of ar.
imraircd watcr resourcc. The usc of watcr was completcly
unrcgulatcd and no attcmrt was madc to introduce
watcr conscrving crapping rattcrns or irrigation prac-
tices. The rrivatc user was bcnt on maximization of his
own interests snd the government did not have the politi-
cal stomach, in the pro- or post-revolutionary years, to
iraplement the essential water legislation.
The ,:,sti!utionaliud and environmeatal impediments
to the appropriatc development of irrigated farnting in
coastal Libya had r�ached such proportions by 1979
that the Libyan adminis:ration realized that only a
drastic reorganization of irrigatcd farming could }eing
the necessary integration of the control of waler resources
and measures which would at the same time increase
agricuhrral production. An interventionist role has
never been shirked by the revolutionary govemment.
On the contrary there has been a progressive rationaliza-
tion of economic activity and property ownership
since 1969, such that by 1979 almost all commercial
and industrial activity as well as housing and services
werc controllcd by governmeat agencies. The agricultural
sector had been partiaily afTected by this trend towards
public inteetiention through capital invested in culti-
vation, irrigation and livestock, and indireat!y through
the control of the marketing of agricvltural products.
The proposals currently being contemplated are seen as
inescapable if the irrigated farming of Libya's coastal
strip is to be based on viable agricultural units capable
of supporting a Libyan family with no outside labour.
The economic, social and ideological implications are
immensc while the opportunity which the proposed
reorganization would present for the rational manage-
ment of the crucial, and much impaired, groundwater
resource may be a last chance to reverse the trends in the
`over-developcd' coastal strip.
The main stimalus to the reorganization of farming in
the ceastal strip would seem to be a political will to
give as many people access to a viable farm unit. The
intent is to increase agricultural production by amalga-
mating uneconomically small farms, to subsidizz those
larger holdings which require hired expatriate labour
and ta take over under-utilized farms, whether under-
utilizcd !'ar reasons of their leisure and residence role for
the owner or because of the part-time nature of the
owner's agricultural activity. The institutional and social
engineering involvcd in such reforms are ronsistent with
the political development of Libya i_i the past decade, with
equity in access to personal income and local participa-
tion in govcrnment (via popular committees) being the
basic domestic political issues. The proposed changes
are ulso, however, cansistent with eaining a greater
measure of control over the use of groundwater upon
which all irrigated farming in coastal Libya depends.
41
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Figurc 6. The Gefara Plain ,howing the 200 mm itiohyrt nnd
the Icication of thr wheat scheme farms.
r.x1rn4ing 1)rylnnd Farming in the Cefara Plain and
tlic Jalaal al Akhdar
Whcrcas thc dcvcloPmcnt of groundwatcr proved to
he an attractivc proposition to private sector agriculture
in thc 1960~, thc hazards af dryland farming wcre
sufficicnt to dctcr any cultivation athcr than the usual
traditional c.itch cropping. Even rnature olive and
almond grovcs ticre ofrcn ncglcctcd. Thc carly years of
the oil revenucs also saw little public sector interest in
dryland farmi:ig on thc Gefara Plain, although thc
reclamation of formcr Jtalian farms on the Jabal al
Akhdar did ergagc the National Agricultural Settle-
mcnt Authority (N.A.S.A.). Thc original ltalian hold-
ings had aiways been designed as dryland farms. How-
cver, littlc prugress was achicved by N.A.S.A. partly
because of the difficulties of terrain, partly because of
the unrealistic211y low levels of financial provision, but
mainly bccausc of the ]egal wrangles surrounding the
ownership and use of land. The in:crests of the National
Autfiority and the tribes of the Jabal al A'Khdar w�ere
in conilict and solutions did not readily ernerge in the
contcxt of distrust of central authority fc,llowing thc
colon;al experience.
Only one-third of the much Icss favourahly endowed
Gcfara Plain rcceived an annual average raintall of
more than 200 mm which is the level sufTicicnt for dry-
land cultivation of grain. Arcas with less than 200 mm
of prccipitation havc traditionally becn usc(i for grazing
and livcstock production, although the Italian colenist
did push olivc p.antations bcyond the 200 mm line and
supplemented rain-fed practices with itrigation. By
1968 thcre was much evidcnce that irrigated !'arming
was hcing extended into very low rainfall areas (Allan
er al., 1973, p. 103) cspecially south of Ajaylat, Zawiya and
Suwani bin Yadim. Since 1969 this private sector activit)
has bccn overshadowed by large government irrigation
rrojccts cuch as that at Bir 7 arfas and goN,crnmcnt
schcmes havc hecn initiatcd in arcds with lcss than 200
mm average rains. It is not with thc mcthods and success
of these echemes, however, that wc arc conccrncd hcrc.
7"he Libyan government is committea to bcing sclf-
sufl5cient in grain (wheat and barlcy) and anticipates
that a substantial 3mount of svch grain will come from
rain-fed areas in the Gcfara Plain. ]n ordcr to stimulate
Production the governmeni has bcen paying high prices
to farmcrs (Libyan Dinars 150 per ton in 1978) in order
to stinulate produclion. 7"his price is substantially
higher than the world price but probably only twice
the price of grain landed at 7'ripoli. The Secret:iriat
for Land Reclamation and Settlement has since 1973
spcnt heavily on dryland schemes to thc soutli of
Tripoli.
Farming in marginal arid areas is always hazardous
because of the years when rains are much belaw avt rage
In mountins the massive experiments on the sites in the
Gefara shown in Table ] the Libyan Secretariat for
Land Reclamation and Settlement (since Dccember 1978
part of the new Secretariat of Agriculture) has taken a
considcrablt risk and the results of the experiment to
date are interesting and salutary. All the sites have
an annual avcrage rainfall of less than 225 mm and some
have less than 150 mm. Since t',e start of the schemes in
the 1973-1974 season, rainfall has been much abcve
average in 1973-1974, 1974-1975, 1975-1976, and especi-
ally favourable in 1977-1978, but below average in
1976-1977 and especially unfavourablr, in I978-1979.
In addition to taking a risk with the environment the
agricultural suthorities took the precaution of seeking
advice from a group of agriculturalists familar with dry
conditions and associated poor soils. A team of Western
Australian farm managers, technicians and research
staft has been participating in the management of the
cereal schemes since 1973. This group has brought a
philosophy with accommodates the poor wheat yields of
low rainfall ysars, and makes provision for the build up
of soil fertility and supplementary production by the
introduction of a legume into the rotation. T'he legume
is medicago4l an annual legume native to Libya which
grows well in alkaline soils in low rainfall areas. Com-
mcrcial cultivars have been developed in Australia from
Mediterranean collections and these were growing
successfully in the Gefara area (Allen and Ewing, 1978,
p. 1). By including this well-adapted legume into the
rotation, togtther with appropriate fertilizer applications,
cereal yields should continue to improve. In the years
when the cereal crop fails it can be let out for grazing
and even in low rainfail years the medre pasturc witl
provide f5Tazing for livestock.
The main purpose of the experiments was to establish
if ceresl production could be a.chieved in marginal
arcas. Taole 1 shows lhat production was useful in the
42
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'Peble f. Gcfan Plaln ccrab 1973/74-1977178: arer, producfloa eod ykld
Wheat
73174
74/75
75176
76/77
77/78
Area (hxtara)
- Ai Hira
70
1,111
2,800
2,000
1
200
_ niBA
Abu Shaybr:h
793
3,300
4,000
6,499
2,350
5,925
1,100
5,628
,
1,4pp
3
2pp
Bir al Ghancm
973
2,000
4,850
3,800
,
3
450
Wadi Athel
4,500
6,143
12,066
7,000
,
6
4pp
Abu Ayshah
20
-
3,397
1,250
,
1
385
Ajaylat
Wadi el Hai
800
11900
4,000
4,136
4,425
-
300
-
,
3,296
Nalut
,
qgp
_
_
Tarhunah
-
2,170
3,700
2,705
3
296
A1 Qassabal
500
1,300
-
-
,
Khums-Sawfeggin
-
-
657
806
1,200
(13,056)
(31,841)
(40,170)
(27,891)
(24,827)
Production (tons)
AI Hira
16
706
673
6
410
DiBa
176
498
433
8
377
Ahu Shaybah
129
1,686
1,303
607
2,ppp
Bir al Ghanem
37
465
1,166
-
229
- Wadi Athei
45
1,093
3,393

qpp
Abu Ayshah

-
287
370
140
~ Ajaylat
22
476
1,068
-
677
Wadi el Hai
1226
893
-
-
-
Nalut
137
_
_
_
"farhunah
-
146
I
202
AI Qassabat
3
3
_
Khums Sawfeggin
-
_
11
_
_
(553)
(5,960)
(8,480)
992)
(4,435)
Yield per hxtaro (kg)
AI Hira
725
635
240
3
342
- Diga
-
2:')
125
184
7
270
Abu Shaybah
37
260
220
108
625
Bir al Ghanem
38
232
240
-
66
Wadi Athel
IQ
178
281
-
63
Abu Ayshah
-
_
gq
297
101
Ajaylat
27
119
241
-
205
Wadi el Hai
66
216
-
-
_
Nalut
-
285
-
-
-
Tarhunah
-
154
396
3
77
AI Qassabat
65
24
-
-
-
Khums-Sawfeggin

-
161
_
-
(42)
(187)
(211)
(36)
(179)
Rainfall at
Aziziyah (mean annual is 210 mm)
C)ctober-May
255
435
198
224
October-Febru:.ry
245
245
165
189
Soura: Ev.�ing (1978) and Metcrological Department, Tripoli
Nr;irS of :iho%c a%cravc raiiv,, hul vcry ,rrioNsly dcfikicnt
in 1976 1977 ;ind ti�ati al�o poor in 1978-1979. Cire;tt
ticcrUcism %%as hring capic~,rkl ahoul the %iahilit} of
W:idi Athcl, 13ir nl Ghancm a::d Ajaylat, all Iyini! in
arcas with mcan annual rainfall bclow 175 mm. Thc othcr
schcmcs arc ahlc te rroducc hch%ecn 200 and (a kE of
whcat Pcn cectarc in good rainfall ycars, which though
not a high yield showed the cereal scheme to be capable
of produciag approximately 5,000 tons of grain per
yeaT.
An important eRe^.t of the interest in medicago species
has been the promotion of the idca that extensive areas
of the Gefara with less than 200 mm but more than 150
mm could be sown with medic pastures. Such pastures
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sensitivity of the natural resources, and especially the
water resouras to their casual management. 'I'he ground-
water upon which irrigated farming depended H�as readily
accessible to tcchnology available at costs %%ell w:thin
the competcnce of most individuai farmers. Very soon
the rate of withdrawal was far in excess of recharge,
and 3CCCICfBiI'L as a resuh of the absence of regulation
on withdrawal. lt w�as a situation rcinforxd by the
traditional approach to watcr use and by the wish of
governmcnt to cncouragc the privatc sector as a bal4nce
to the othcrwise inescapable inertia which oil revenues
promotc, Icading to a public scctor monopoly of all
cconomic activity. Similar force.g aiT'ected another natural
resourcc, not dcalt with in this papcr, the scmi-natural
grazinF resources. Thesc resources too were severely
degradec?, in this case by the increase in stocking level
H hich was far bcyond the carrying capacity of the vul-
ncrable Libyan rangclands (Gintzburger and Bayoumi,
1977).
The pulitical changes of 1969 for a time brought a
very untimcly acccleration in the rate of resource utiliza-
tion and virtually a full decade passed before the revolu-
tionary government was able to escape the bondage of
its own rhetoric; it cannot, however, escape the justifi-
able criticism t}iat cnvironmental realities were discarded
hy implcmenting policies which caused irreversible
rrsource degraclation rather than via a]earning proeess
which involvrd the rational weighing of predecessors'
crrors and the consideration of the available scientific
evidence The efTect of the policies of the revolutionary
govcrnmcnt was to cause groundwater withdrawals to
average four times the rate of recharge in the Gefara
Plain as awhole by the mid-,970s, and in the areas of
serious ovcrpurnping, such as at Bin Gashir, the rate of
withdrawal was eight times rcchargc.
6y 1980 the very difficult position oi agriculture of
coastal Libya had bcen rccognizcd and the government
turned its attention to the intractable prohlems of
resource an(i institutional engincenng rcquired to re-
;trrange lan;i tcnure and create viabie farming units
raising crops wvith water-conserving irrigation systems.
Such chanees will require a revulution in the pe*ceptior
of resourccs and a revolution in attitudes to watcr use
ind espccially concerning its regulation at farm and
regional levcl. The past ttirce decades of experience in
matiiaging rcnewable natural resources in Libya has
unfortunately induced a complex of confusion which
has freyuently emerEed amongst those cvaluating such
resourccs in marginal scmi-arid areas (Amiran and Wil-
,on, 1973, p. 417). Rencwable natural resources are
cxtremcly vulnerable to misuse, but it has been demon-
strated that unconvcntional resource appraisal and
innovative projects can lead to the viable long-term use
of such resuurccs (Amiran, 1978, p. 124). Libya's oil
wealth should make possible innovation and economic
have a useful carrying capacity (up to one ewe per
hxtare) and can be generated at less than 10 per cent
of the aum requind to establish perennial shrubs as
envisaged in a number of parts of Libya (Allen and
Ewing, 1978, p. 8; Halsc, 1978, p. 6).
The al Marj Plain on the Jabal al Akhdar has attracted
settlement and agricultural activity ti:roughout history,
but has never managed to live up to tlie promise of its
apparently rich red soils and generally reliable rains.
Rains are usually above 300 mm at al Marj itself, falling
to 200 mm towards al Abyar. Some harvests have been
remarkable, for example that of 1978 when both of the
20,000 ton silos at al Abyar and al Marj were filled or
almost filled. 7'he 1977-1978 season was one of rainfall,
however, with 530 mm zt al Marj instead of the average
340 mm.
Experiments similar to those in the Gcfara are being
conducted on the al Marj Plain to improve soil fertility
through medic rotations and phosphate applications.
Evidence is being assembled that the above average
yield of 12 tons of wheat per hectare for the region
achicved in the good rainfall year in 1977-1978 should
be possible regularly. With attentive management of
sowing it might be possible to move output to over 2
tons per hecta-e. Sustained production at this level will
only be possible if soil fertility is susta;ned, and
care should be taken in applying gross incentivcs such
as the very high grain pricc subsidy (Libyan Dinars
150 per ton for wheat in 1978), which will promote
increases of production possibly zt the expense of the
soil resources. However, outputs of grain of SO,WO tons
per year are achievable from the farms on the 3abal al
Akhdar which was about 5 per cent of the Libyan annual
grain requirement in 1980.
Resource Rcalities and Politicai Fantasy
The foregoing discussion of Libya's past thirty years
of agricultural developmcnt experience is particularly
interesting in that first the economic and then the
political circumstances of the country changed. The three
decades, the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s can be con-
trasted; with the 1951-1961 period being one of economic
and political dependence on the Westem powers; the
1960s were years qf increasing economic iadependcnce
but Libya was still in those years uncier the shadoN+, of
Wcstern oil and strategic interests, finally after the rcvo-
lution in 1969, Libya took advantage of its cconomic
strength and gained the will to be cconomically and
rolitically asseriive.
The renewablc natural resource base was profoundly
aflected by the chunges in the economic circumstances
after oil revenues began to be significant in the early
1960s. The reason that the impact of the new economic
circumstances was so great was not the scale of the
burgeoning investment resources of the 1960s. but the
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A
risks not feasible for those with more limited capital
resoutces. But Libya's planners should escape from the
notioti that the country should become green like coun-
trics in hamid latitudes, and assess agricultural develop-
ment projects primarily in terms of their returns to
water.
AcknoNlcdhmcnls
1 should likc to thank the Socicty for Lihyan titudics
for providing the expcnscs fur the visit lo Libla a�hich
cnablcd me to obscrvc the devcloPmcnts described hcrc.
I am also indchtcd to sta(i of the Sccrctariat of Land
Reclamation and Settlemcnt, the Director of the Gefara
Cereals Projcct and the Western Australian stafl led by
Mr. Mike Ewing; the Director of the )abal al Akhdar
Authority, Mr. Bashir Jodali and his South Australian
advisers led hy Mr. Bcrt fvinnes. In the Secretariat of
Dams and Watcr Rcsourccs 1was gratcful for the hclp of
the Director Mr. Taher Rtifila and his stafT' especially
Mr. Fituri Dcgais and Atitiociatcd UN stafi' Dr. Phil-
lippe I'allas and Mr. H. Flocgel. For secretarial and
cartographic assistance 1 am indebted to stafl of the
School of Oriental and African Studies.
REFERENCES
Amiran, D. H. K. (1978)'Geoaraphial aspects of national planning
in Israei: the managanent of 1'united resouroes', Tiansnerions oj
rh, :._.itule ojBrlllsh Geographers (New Series), Vol. 3, No 1,
lIS-128.
Atniran, D. H. K. and Wilson (1973) Coestal Drstrts: Their
Natural cnd Nun:an Environmcnls (Tuscon, Arizona).
Allan, J. A. (1971) 'Change- in the xonomic use of land in the
vicinity of Tripoli', unpublisl,:d PhD, University of London,
302 pp.
Allan, J. A., McLachlan, K. S and Penrosc, E. T. (1973) Lihya
.4,criCuhrirr and Lronnnric Dcvclopmcnt (Frank Cass, London),
214 pp. plus maps.
Allan, J. A. (1979) 'Managing agricultural resourccs in Libya:
rcccnt cxpcricncc', Libynn Studies, Vol. X, 17-27.
Allan, J. A. and McLachlan, K. S. (1975) 'Libyan agriculcural
devclopment since independena', Ajrican A,(j4irs, Vol. 75,
No 300, 331-348.
Allen, S. M. and Ewing, M. A. (1978) Report onjour yeors experience
(1974-1978) Rrazing annnal medics in the Grfara region, Western
Australian Advisory Group, Cerea rojxt, Gefara Develapment
Authority, 7'ripoli, 10 pp.
Census and Statistical Department ( ) Slatrstical Abstroct:
1970, Ministry of Planning,'Tripoli, 323 pp.
Census and Statistical Dcpanment (1972b) Narional Accounts,
I962-1971, Ministry of lanning, Tripoli.
Census and Statistical Department (1977) SratlstrcalAbslract: 1975,
Secretariat of Planning,'Tripoli, 302 pp.
Ccnsus and Statistical Dcpartment (1979) Abslracl oj Starislics:
1476, Secretariat of Planning, 325 pp.
Ewing, M. (1978) Reporl on the exptrience winc cereals and medic
pnrru.es on he C'rreafs Pr%c1, Gejara Plain, Gcfara Develop-
ment Authority, 7'ripoli, S pp.
Exautive Autharity for Jabal al Akhdar (1978) Harvesrs in a!l
srn.sons /n the Jobal al Akhdar, Council for Land Reclamation
and Construction, Tripoli, 127 pp.
Farlcy, R. (1971) Planning jor Dcvrlopmrnt in Lrl.iu 0'racgcr,
Ncw York).
Flocgel, H. (1978) !so-picznmrtric map and isadraM�duMn nrnp fui
1976J77 for the first resrnoir in the Gtfara, Sccretariat nf Uams
and Water Rcsources, Tripoli.
Gintzburger, E. and Bayoumi, M. (1977) Survey oJ the pr<