Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 1, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9.pdf2.76 MB
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 - FOR OFF'[CIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/ 1020~8 . 23 Decerrsher 19.81 - Ja an Re ort p p (FOUO 7~~~/St~ - F~IS FOREIGN BRQADCAST INFORMATION ~ERVICE FOIt OFFICIAL USE 41~I.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 NOTE JPRS publications contain inforination primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-langL~age sources are translated; those from English-language sources are :.ranscribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristies retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material er~closed in brackets - are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text) or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following th~ last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar r.ames rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in ~arentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses wEre not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. - Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of u~i item originate with the source. Times within items are as ~ given by source. .T.he contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DTSSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE O~tLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440500010006-9 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/10208 23 December 1981 J~iPAN REPORT (FOUO 71/81) ~ONTENTS POLITICAL AND SO~IOI,OGICAZ Inside Story of Visit by PLO's 'Ara.fat Evaluated - (SHUKAN B'i1NSHIIN, 22 Oct 81) 1 Foreign Min~~try Views Soviet Officials~ Visits (ASAHI SHINiBUN, 23 Nov S1) 9 ' Suzuki I}iscusses Trade Frictions With Economists (JIJI, 25 Nov 81) 11 ~MAINICHI' Scores Suzuki Press Conference Remarks (Editorial; MAINICHI DAIZY NEWS, 3 Dec 81) 12 ' ~yOMIUR.I~ Views Tasks for New Suzuki Cabinet I (Editorial; THE DAIZY Y~'IIUR.I, 3 Dec 81) 13 'ASAHI' on 'Forgotten' Pacific Basin Concept , (Shigeo Mori; ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 3 De~ 81) i5 ' MILITARY Defense White Paper, Pentagon Paper Reniewed lo (TOKYO SHIMBUN, 30 Sep 81, 3~IAINICHI SHINIDUN, 7 Oct 81) Defense Agency's View Defense White Paper Criticized Tank Reserve Reinforcements Planned for GSDF (THE DAILY Y~iIURI, 21~ Nov 81) 20 ECOIdOMIC Japan To Establish Gold Maxket in March 1982 _ (NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN, 21 Sep 81) 21 ~ _ a _ [III ASIA - 111 FOUO] Cl1D AFL'?!`t A T T TCF (1Ni.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500010006-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i _ t Concern Expressed Over U.S. Cormnunications Import Restrictions (IJIHON KEIZAI SI~"'1MBUN, 9 Nov 81) . . . ~ 23 ~ _ C U.S. Seeks I,iberalization of Market } g (NIHON KEIZAI SHIl~UN, 12 Nov 81) 2 ~ Friction With U.S. Over Technology Expands `i (MAINICHI SHII~BUN, 13 Nov 81) 30 : EPA Clarifies Policy on ~orrection of Trade Imbala7ce ; ~ , (NIHON KEIZAI SHIl~IBUN, 8 Nov 81) ADNOC Notifies Japanese o;~ Delaying Cracking Plan (JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1 Dec 81) 35 SCIENCE AND TECHNOI~OGY , OECD Opposes Subsidies to High Technology Projects ` (Ftiimi.o Tateiwa; JAPAN ECON~IIC JOURNAI,, 1 Dec 81) 36 : NTT I'roposes Ways It Can Become Private Enterprise ~ (JAPAN ECON~IIC JOURNAI,, 1 Dec 81) 38 , ~ Japan National Oil Corp. Eyes Underground Stockpiling of Crude ~ (JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1 Dec 81) ~0 ~rench Firm Asks for Robot License of ~jitsu Fanuc 4i (JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAZ, 1 Dec 81) Nissan USA To Install 210 Robots at Pickup Factory ~2 (JAPAN ECONOMIC J4URNAL, 1 Dec 81) Fioeing Appears Likely To Be Selected as Japanese Partner in Plane ~ Project (JA.PAN ECONOMIC JOURNAS~, 1 Dec 81) 43 Japan Wants Pratt & Whitney To Join Engine Plan With UK ~ (JAPArI ECONOMIC JOURNAI,, 1 Dec 81) JAEI To Supply U.S. Firms With Flight Control Equipment ~5 . (JAPA,'~ ECONONIIC JOURNAL, 1 Dec 81) .....o...�..�.�....�.��.�� Semiconductor Equipment Makers Cutting Into American Shaxe 46 , (JAPAN ECQNOMIC JOURNAI~, 1 Dec 81) Toshiba Envisages Advancing Into CAD Equipment Maxket (JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAZ, 1 Dec 81) . - b - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i= OLIT ICAL E1ND S OC IOLOG ICAI. INSIDE STORY OF CISIT BY ?LO'S 'ARAFAT EVALUATID Tokyo SHL'KAN BUNSHUN in Japanese 22 Oct 81 p~p 32-36 [Text] Invite Chairman 'Arafat of the PalesCine Liberation Organization (PLO), a representative of the Arab rad ical faction, and then after a prop~r interval, ssk President al-Sadat, a moderate, to came to Japan. Same sny that Fc*Qign. ^tinis*_ar :.onoda was thinking of inediating between the two, something even the Un:.ted States could not do. However, al-3adat was aseaesinated. The impatient ;4ini.stry of Foreign Affairs made etrenuous efforts to have tArafat's visit to , Japan cancelled in one way or another. But, he did come.... The f~r~r ~niscalculltion by Chairman 'Araf at of the PLO, who came to Japan on ~ 12 October, was che welcome reception sponsor~d by the Japan-Palestine Friendship Diet Members League. "Although the host Japan-Palestine Friendehip Diet Members League is a nonp~rtisan ; organization with q5 members, the number of attendeea that day was about 25. ~ According to advance responses, over 50 members were supposed to attend. In addition, the absence of newspaper�~~cecutives and business leaders was conapicuous" (a journalist who covEred the event). 4t a reception held in the Hotel New Otani, approximately 230 people besieged che place, including Liberal Democratic Party Secretary-General Yoshio 5akurauchi, Piinister of the Ad~?inistrative Management Agency Yasuhiro Nakasone, Chairman of the Socialist Party Kazuo Asukata, Kamei Party Secretary-General Junya Yano, ' ~nd Japan Chamber of Commerce and Induetry President Shigeo Nagano. However, hec.:~use of the complicated interpreting process in which Arabic was first inter- ;i~t.ea into English, and Englieh was then interpreted into Japanese or for some other resson, the reception proceeded without coming to a climax. To Mr 'Arafat, the first PLO chairman invited to an advanced country, it was really a bitter c+tart. ~~riginally, Chairman 'Arafat`s visit to Japan was aupposed to become the first _ .,tep in "brilliant Japanese diplomacy" for both Prime Minister Suzuki and Foreign ;ii~~ister Sonoda. Naturally, it would have been a medal in terms of political - kill for the distinguished members of the sponsoring Japan-Paleatine Friendship li;_F~t :ternbers League. They were expected to attend the reception in large numbers. A c.~~~-~,espondent as3igned to the Foreign Ministry said: 1 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 ~ ~ ~ - FOR OFE'IC1AL US'E ONLY ~ "This 'Arafat visit to Japan, President al-Sadat's visit to Japan scheduled for ~ November, and a meeting with Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia at the North- South Summit in Mexico--if Japan had succeeded in these three important meetings, ; Japan's Middle Eastern policy would have drawn worldwide attention, freed itself from a foreign policy of in the footsteps of the United States, and, if circumstances were favorable, taken the initiative in Middle Eastern diplomacy....It was that grand a plan." In oth~r words, it was a grand Acheme that would have Japan introciuce itaelf to both the PLO, an Arab radical, a�nd Egypt, an Arab moderatie, as a mediator working - for peace in the Middle ~ast. Japa~.t would then have access to Saudi Arabia, which has the support of most Arab states. It would have been a supexb chance to develop an "omnidirectional peace diplomacy" that neither the United St~ttes~ the USSR, nor European countries could~ imitats and to remave the disgrac~ o� having "no diplomatic sense." However, with President al-Sadat's death, Zenko's grand scheme sadly collapsed. ; Moreover, the situation turned around campletely and he found himself in a pinch. i "If At-Sadat could not come, the balance would be destroyed, giving tr.e world the impression that Japan was one-sidEdly supporting the PLO. Even if that had not been so, the Reagan administration, which supports Israel, had been on the alert ~ concerning Japan's invitation to the PLO. At the meeting held between then Foreign ` Minister Masayoshi Ito and Secretary of State Hai,g fifter ~Arafat's vie-!t to Japan ' became definite, whenever the aub~ect of convareation touched oa the PLO, Haig I opnely made a sry f ace" (the previously quoted correapunde~tt). ; Furthermorz, because 'Arafat made a speech that he "welcamed A1-Sadat's i death," whi.le in Beijing just prior tc hia visit to Japan, Foreign Mini.stry ' officials feared that it would atir up pop~rlar opposition. Thus, Mr 'Arafat was reduced to being a guest who was uninvited in the true sense by a goddess of happiness. To Prime M~nister Suzulcf, it was as if a large hole had opened in ~ a large spread wrapping cloth. Scheming to Tie 'Arafat's Tongue ' I In fact, when high goverrnnent officials received. reporCs on "President al-Sadat's ~ - death," it is said they were so confused as to make other people fee~ sorry for ; them. . "On the next morning, beginlin~ with Foreign Minister Sonoda, all Foreign Ministry ' high. officials started saying: 'Since a big cha~ge is going to take glace in ; ' the Middle East, the PLJ will not come.' This was, you know, only wiehful thinking i that 'it uiould be better if he did not came.' Someone ~.uggested calling the Japanese Embassy in Bei~ing and havin~ the embassy ~ 1 contact 'Ara~fat. However, this idea wae abandoned, since it was too awkward to ~ - refuse his visit for such a~eason after Japan had on~e invited him" (a corres- pondent assigned to the Foreign Ministry). , . ~ 2 FOR OFFI~'IAL US!~ ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 FOR OFFICIA~. USE ONLY 24eanwhile, whom Japan should send to President al-Sadat's funeral was also _ another problem that troubled ZEnko. ''After learning that the United Statea was going to send 2hree form~r presidenta-- Carter, Nixon, and Ford--the high government off icials thought Japan should also send former prime ministers. So, the prime minister himself called former prime - ~ninisters on the telephon~e. tiowever, Takeo Fukuda refused, since he was waiting to visit China in addition to having a slight cold. Takeo Miki declinecl politeiy. With no other alternative, - it was decided to send Foreign Minister Sonoda" (a correspondent assigned to the p?-ime minister's official residence). There were others who requested tMasumieEzaki directlyrcalled t~herpr~imesminister International Trade and Industry on th~ telephone while on an overaeas tour and won a poaition as a apecial envoy - of the Japanese Govercm~ent. Uf course, the pressure from below within the Liberal Dem~cratic Party was heavy. At the meeting of Policy Materials Study Assoc.iation held on the 9th, approxi- mately 70 Diet members made a statement to the effect that they "opposed the 'Arafat visit to Japan." The situation was such that.there wae a movement that volunteers in the association asked the leadera of the Liberal Democratic Pa~ty "not to meet with 'Arafat." For these reasons and others, they treated the PLO chairman who came to Japan with kid gloves. When the chartered airplane arrived at Haneda Airport, Mr Toshio Kimura immediately rushed into the airplane, and thereafter he stayed very elose to 'Arafat. rir Kimura rode with him in a car from Haneda Airport to the hotel. According to Mr Kimura, the conversation between the two began with a seemingly touching exchange: "At last you have made the historic first step in Tolcyo," and in ' response, "I have beer. able to come to the most friendly SfhSBebeentChe viewtthat." In truth, however, the only thing whispered on the street 'Arafat's tongue was tied. ~ "For high government officials, it would- be annoying if 'Arafat said 'A1-Sadat's - clc~ath was good' or some such thing. Theref ore, they may have aent Mr K3mura ::u persuade 'Arafat not to say such a thing before he could meet anybody. (~tr Kimura denies this)" (a correspondent asaigned to the prime minister's = official residence). 'Arafat was not formally invited by the Japanese Government; instead, he was ~ i_nvited by the Japan-Palestine Friendship Diet Members League. Sos he was a yti~si-official guest. F~r. t:his reason, it is said that Mr Kimura, chairman of the Japan-Palestine Friend- - ~;t,i~ Diet Members League, wae asked to attend even the meeting between Prime r'C~.~_~.ster Suzuki and 'Arafat. a FOR OFF'I~CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 FOR OFFICIA;. USE ONLY i "Essentially, the Jap2n-Palestine Friendshi.p Diet Membera League is a private organization. Since the meeting of the prime minister and foreign minister with - 'Arafat was of.ficial in nature, there was no reason for Mr Kimura to attend. ~ . ~ Perhaps, the pri~ne minister intended to shirk his responeibilitq by means of h_s usual singsong manner of reading a ncfie. Then, no matter what was said there- ~ after, he intended to impose further responsibility on Mr Kimura, who had invited 'Arafat" (a correspondent~ assigned to the prime minister~s official~residenc~). It is as if we can see b~efore us how diamayed Mr Suzuki and Mr Sonoda were to unexgectedly find themselves handed a hot potato. There are many people who say this failure was not solely due to A1-Sadat's death. An unidentific.~ diplomatic critic remarked: "Basically, diplomacy is thought of as sameth~ng that can cope with a fluid situation. If the whole plan collapses with the change of one factor, it ie mere imagination and not diplamatic policy. Japanese diplomatic capabilities are not - so great as to put together a grand scheme and to de~l with situations fluidly to attain a goal. Can't a diplomatic plan based on failure to know one's place be a source of the tragedy, as in the case before World War II?" We do not lack episodes showing that with the capabilities of the Japanese Foreign Ministry it is hardly possible for Japan to take an initiative in Middle Eastern _ diplomacy. A good example is the A1-Sadat shooting in~ident. ' It was 8 pm on 6 October (Japan time) when the first news that "A1-Sadat was shot" reached Japan by cable. At that time, the Japanese Foreign Ministry sti11 had not received any information. Moreover, it could not get ~old of the Japanese Embassy in Cairo. The For.eign Ministry, impatient as might be expected, tried to call the Japanese - Embassy in Cairo many times and f inally got a first report at It was the following optimistic informa.tion. "As far as Ambassador Toshio Yamazaki, who = was also attend:ing the parade, could see from approximately 30 metere away, it appears that President al-Sadat suffered a acratch on hia hand." "Ambassador Yamazaki's chauffeur says he saw President al-Sadat get into a helicopter ui~der his own po�.~er." "High government officials are all saying there is n4 fear of his death." "Information Gathering" That Depends on the United States From around midnight all three ma3or American televiaion networks began reporting = "A1-Sadat's death." They reported a cable from Tel Aviv sayi~g that "three bullets hit A1-Sadat on one side." In spite of all this, a telephone call from ! the Japanese Embassy in Cairo at 12:30 am reported ae follows: "Ambassador to Egypt Yamazaki directly called U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Murp'hy on the telephone. ' Ambassador~Murphy said that he 'had not yet confirmed the report on Mr al-Sadat's - death'.' As an embassy, we called the office of the Egyptian president's official residence for confirmation. Their answer was that he was still under treatment." Only this kind caf altogether unspeakable report came from the Japanese Embassy in Cairo. ~ FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540010006-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE O1~IL4' . ~:n the end, the Jspanese Government could not confirm the report of A1-Sadat's death until the official announcement w~s made by the Egyptian Gover~ent on the radio. It was 4:30 am when the Japaneae Government issued Prime Minister Suzuki's off icial statement. "I felt acutely how poor the iaformation-gathering capability of the Japanese '~'oreign Ministry was. Fundamer.tal defects of the Foreign Ministry were revealed, such as the tendency of Japanese embase'as abroad to depend on U.S. embassies in :l~e host country for information, the inabi~lity of Japanese embassies ~c? acquire important information fram key government personnel of the host country, and so forth. If the Japanese ambassador happened to be only 30 meter.s away from the site where the shooting occurred, he shou]:d. have run over there and confirmed the - safety of Mr al-Sadat. If a reporter had beha.ved in the same mann~r as the ambassador, he would have been fired. It proves that the ambassau'~or does not ~onsider information-gathering his impor~ant reaponsibi`lity" (the previously quoted reporter). t`,taong 3,500 employees of the Foreign Ministry, only 43, in the upper and inter- - r.�diate levels combined, have received Arabic-language training. Even including - tnose now in training, thsy still number only 58. In this aituation, it is hardly pussible to make a good ~,nalysis of the Middle Taet situation. There is an earlier example. In 1977, when then Japanese Ambassador to Iran Ikawa returned to Japan and reported to then Prime Mini~ter Fukuda that "the Pahlavi regimz is secure, because I went there and investigated." Onlq 3 months later, the Pahlavi regime collapsed. It can be said that the Foreign Ministry's information and analysis capability conGerning Middle Eastern affairs is nat much different from that of the time when the ehah fell. Judgments made on the basis of a low capability fo~ information an,alysis naturally conta3.n many mista~,es. In regard to the grand scheme of the present, some say that the perception was fundamentally wrong. Mr Ko~ i Safshu (Tokyo Arabian . Consultants) says: "First of all, the perception that A1-Sadat`s government was secure was optimistic." "On 30 Septembar this year, a party co~aemorating the inaugural iasue of ARABIA, a journal speciali7ing in Mid.dle Eastern affaire, was held in London. At that party, experts on the Middle East, ~.ncluding Oil Miniater Yamani (Saudi Arabia) ~fere drawn into discussion on 'which goverrnnent in the Middle East ia the moat ~Iumber one was ~raq. Egypt was not even mentioned in the diecuseion. .;c, I asked abuut Egypt. The answer was 'Egypt is beyond questicci. We would - not be surprised if A1-Sadat falls tamorrow.' Due to the strains of economic ~~~olicy, the gap between the rich and the poor has widened. Conditions may be just ,_ike the night before the 26 February incident. it would be no surprise to us ~f A1-Sadat was assassinated any day. I cuuld not help but think it was crazy entrusr_ the key word in Middl.e Eastern policy to such a person." :~~~c the last year, information on plots to assassinate A1-Sadat have been reported ,,~~:e a we~~k. As a matter of fact, the U. S. CIA is said to have had information o, ~s aasassination plan 24 hours before the assassinatioii t~~ok place. 5 FOR OFFIGIAL USE OIVLY' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500010006-9 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY , ; If A1-Sadat Had Not Been Assassinated? Furthe~more, there is even the oFinion that if A1-Sadat had not been assassinated ~ and had visited J'apan safely, the result would have been the same. ; "In November 1977 A1-Sadat's nistoric visit to Jer~~salem took place. Wt~:n he arrived at Tel Aviv airport, we saw ;a touching acene in which diplomata from various countries stationed in Isrr~el came to effer greetings, h~gged k~im in an exaggerated manner, and held conversations with him. However, wh~n A1-Sadat ~ came in front of the Japanese ambaesador to Israel, he ahook hands briefly for } form's sake and immediately proceeded to the next diplotnat. In other words, ~ A1-Sadat did not take Japan into political consideration at all 3 years ago. It seems improbable that A1-Sadat would liaten to Japanese opinions on peace ~ in the Middle East 3 years later merely because he was invited to Japan. President al-Sadat's conception of Japan was not much more than that of a country which had given Egypt economic aid. At any rate, since the Egyptians received 140 billion yen in credits from Japan, they muet be grateful to Japan. However, it is only Che economic aspect" (a correspondeat atationed in Cairo). The optimistic perception applies not only to the case concerni~ng Egypt bu.t also to the case concerning the PLO. The following is a comment by an expert on the Arab situatian. "The present PLO does not have as high an international reputation as it had some time before. At the t{me of the birth of the Khotneyni goverrnnent in Iran, various European countries approached the PLO because the PLO wae said to have ; a channel to Iran. For that reason, the PLO was bullieh cancerning,a Japanese ' invi~tation and took the attitude that it wauld not accept an invitation unless ~ it was an official in vitation from the government. ~ However, as a result of the Iran-Irac~ war, it was revealed that the PLO did not - possess any arbitration capability. Moreover, the o~ly nat3on which sponsors the PLO is Syria. Therefore, many countries hold back on agproaches to the PLO. Because Japan suddenly offered its hand under auch circumstar~ces, ~Arafat ~~s naturally pleased. In the present condition of the PLO, he would have accepted the invitation even without a meeting with the prime minister." We get the strong impressic~n that, when it became an actuality, Suzuki's new Middle ~ Eastern policy was made use of by other countries at will. ~ One Arab living in Japan said the following: "The difference between Japanese and Ara.b diplomacy is like the difference between - a child and an adult. The Araba have been watching the rise and fall of nations - for ages. Moreover, they have long colonial experience. Their warineas toward other countries and other people is entirely different from that of the Japanese." At the time of the 'Arafat visit to Japan, the PLO requested a so-called "voluntary guard." 6 FOR OFFICI~L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY '~ince they felt uneasy depending on the police of another country for his securiCy, they asked us to allow them to guard 'Arafa* with the PLO's machineguns and automatic rifles. It was no laughing matter. If sameone were to bring a rifle into the Diet wlnen he met the prime minister, it would cause trouble. Cons~- quently, instead of acceding to their request, the result was a l.arge guard rorce of 17,000 policemen and the rent~ng of the whole floor on which 'Arafat~s room was located and the rooms above and below his room" (a police off~cer who was involved). "Actual State" of the Japan-Paleatine Friendeh~.p Diet Members League In comparison, our elite were totally innocent. ~,n unidentif ied correspondent in the Middle East revealed the inside story of the inv3.tation to 'Araf at. ~ "Generally speaking, although they call their group the Japan-Palestine Friendship Diet Members Leagi~e, most of the mambers do not underatand the Palestinian issue. They are grandstanders. Last December, the delegate~ of t~e Japan-Palestine Friendship Diet Members L~ague visited Damascus in order to imvite 'Arafat to visit Japan. The members of the delegation only talked about their own party and aould not listen to the PLO. T?~ey had decided to invite 'Arafat, but could not accomplish anything talking as a group. Therefore, a secret meeting begween 'Toshio Kimura, the group leader, and 'Arafat was arranged. However, Diet member a~kira Kuroyanagi of the Kor~ei Party, stubbornl~? began to insist he wou~3 return to Javan on the next day's flight if he could not participate in the secret meeting. Lower house member Tetsu Ueda of the Socialist Party butted in only fc:r the - photography session with 'Arafat. So it wen't, and I was fed up with such behavior." By the way, the chief inembers of the Japan-Palest~Lne Friendship Di~t MeID~+ers League are: chairman, Toshio Kimura; counsellor, Tokuma Utsunomiya; v3ce chairmen, Michiyuki Iwado and Tetsu Ueda; office director, Yoshiko Ot~ka. Other members include Akira Kuroyanagi, Ko~i Kakizawa, Yutaka Hata, Yukio Aoshima, Chinatsu Nakayama, Hideo Den, Eizaburo Mae~ima (Sita Yashiro).... As for these 4istinguished people, let's tell tlnem that mer.ely inviting 'Arafat to Japan does not please the Arabs at all. ~~n Arab journalist stationed in Japan~ Mr Kode IQtan Yusufzai [phonetic] (an Arab news correspondent) says: "ihe .Japanese may think they gave a warm reception to the PLO, but it does nnt look that way to the Arabs. "Wasn't it impolite to have arranged 'Arafat's meeting with Prime Minister Suzuki in the Diet? In spite of the fact that he was a guest invited by Japan, to meet t~im in the Dieti instead of the prime ministers official residence was like saying - ~you are not a f ormal guest,' and meeting him in front of the toilet rather than - ?:i~e guest roome ~ ~ 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY , "In Arabic ther~ is a saying: 'It is better not to speak ill of the dead.' ; 'Arafat also knows that much etiquette, but Japanese otficials were worried about ; , him saying something wrong.~ I cannotanese the politetpe~pleewhopmeet any guest understand the Arabs. Aren t the Jap in the guest room?"~ The Japanese lack of diplomatic sense is not likely to be corrected soon. ' COPYRIGHT: Shukan Bunshun 1981 9896 ~ CSO: 4105/22 ~ ~ 8 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R004500014006-9 FOR OFFtC1AL USE ONLY POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL - FOREIGN MINISTRY VIEWS SOVT~T OFFICIALS' VISITS 0'~J270925 Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in Jappnese 23 Nov 81 Morning Editinn p~ [Text] Government-level dialo~;:~ea betw~en Japan and the Soviet Union, whicn began in September with a foreign ministers conference, were brought to a standstill as a resuYt of the cancellation of the Soviet education minister's scheduled visit to - Japan in October. However, beginning this week, high-ranking Soviet officials are due to arrive in Japan at the invitation of the JSP and other nongovernmental organe izations. The Japanese Foreign Mini~try thinks that the purpose of these visits may - be to "probe Japan's attitude toward the Sonriet Union prior to the pending Cabinet reshuffle," accordin~ to a ministry source. Top Foreign Ministzy officials plan to exchange views part3cularly with Arbatov, director of the U.S. and Canada Institute, when he comea to Japan. I Firat, on 23 November, Q. Soviet economic mission is to arrive. Originally, Deputy ~ Minister of Foreign Trade Grishin was to head this miesion, but due to his i1lnPss, Kiaelev, chief of the Administration for Trade With Asisn Count~ies, is to replace Grishin as head of the miss3on. 5.'he main purpose of the mission is to hold talks t wit'n leaders of the f ive ma~ or buainess organizations in the Ransai area -aith a view ~ to revitalizing the Jagan-USSR trade and economic relations that been stagnant ~ since the outbreak of the Afghan problem. Second, on 25 November, a Soviet communist activist delegation led by Lomakin, first secretary of the Maritime Kray Party Committee, is due to arrive in Japan i for a visit at the invitation of the JSP. One of the delegation members is Kovalenko, _I deputy chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, who is believed to be playing a key role in formulating party policy toward Japan. Koval- v~ enko visited Japan last December to attend the talks between the CPSU and the JCP. During that visit, he held ~nergetic tallcs with LDP Secre~ary General Sakurauchi and other political f igures. During his coming atay in Japan, which will last until 2 December, he ia expected to actively seek meetings with Japaneae politicians and businessmen. Third, Arbatov, director of the U.S. and Canada Institute, is due to arrive on 28 November. Being a top Soviet specialist on U.S. affairs, he has great influence on Soviet foreign policy, including policy toward the United States. The main purpose of his coming visit is to attend a Palme Commnittee meeting opening in Tokyo on 4 December. Before and after this meeting, he wi?1 hold talks with off icials 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500014006-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY of the Society for the Study of Security Af.Eairs, a private research organization, - including Masamichi Inoki, former head ~f the Defense A~ademy. In addition, during his stay in Japan un~il 15 December, he will meet with upper houae President Tokunaga anci other key politici~ns, as well as leaders of the Japan Federation of L+conamic Organizations. Furthermore, a Japanese Foreign Miniatry official at ~he tureau = chief's level is to exchange views with him to assess ~he Soviet view of the over- - all international situation and the Soviet policy taward Japan. As for governnent-level contacts between the tw~ countries, the Japan-Soviet Fishery Committee held a meeting beginning 11 November. On 19 November negotiations began to extend the temporary agreements permit*_{.ng fishing operations in each other�s fishery zones. The Soviet Union is limiting i~s demand for catch quotas within Japan's 200-mile zones to the same level as last year's actua~ catches, apparently desiring to reach an early compromise through businesslike n~~gotia.tions. In the Japanese Foreign Ministry's opinion, the cancellation of Education Minister - Prokofyev's visit to Japan seems to have no effect on these fishery negotiations. From this, the Foreign Ministry concludes that the Soviet Union cancelled its educa- t2on minister's visit with a view to unda:rcutting Japan's freeze on pereot?nel inter- - changes in the wake of the Soviet invasic~n of ~fghanistan, but the Soviet Union made a miscalculation regarding the regponae Japan would make to the cancellation. However, the Foreign Miaistry thinks that the canc~llation has produced no serious after-effects and that ~udging from the acheduled successive visits fio Japan by high-ranking Sovi~t officials, the Soviet Union strcngly desires to reopen dialogues with Japan. In particular these visits coincide with the scheduled Cabinet reshuf- fle in Japan, a fact indicating that the Soviet Union wants to actively probe Japan's - policy toward it. For this reason, the Foreign Ministry plans to watch what moves the Soviet Union will make in the coming seri~s of Japan-Soviet exchanges ~nd assess _ the prospect of future government-level dialogue, including working-level consulta- , tions between the two countries. COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shimbun Tokyo Honsha 1981 CSO: 4105/30 - 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGTCAL - SUZUKI DISCUSSES TRADE FRICTIONS WITH ECONAMISTS - OW251441 Tokyo JIJI in English 1413 GMT 25 Nov 81 [Text] Tokyo, 25 No~ (JIJI PRESS)--Prime Miaister Zenlco Suzuki Wednesday exchanged views over breakfast with leading Japanese intellectu~ls, including former members of the Japan-United States economic relations group widely known ae the "Wisemen's - Group" on Japan's trade frictions with the United States and West Europe. Attending the meeting were Nobuhiko Ushiba, ~dviser to the foreign minister and ; former Japanese cochairman of the diasolved Wisemen's Group, Board Chairman Akio ~ Morita of Sony Corp, Board Chairman Isamu Yamashita of Mitaui Engineering and Ship- ~ building Co, President Takashi Iiosomi o� the governmental Overseas Economic Coop- eration Fund;and government representative for external economic affairs Saburo ~ Okita. Both Morita and Yamashita are former Japanese members of the Wisemen's Group, but Chairman Kiichi Saeki of the Nomura Research Institute, another Wise- ' men's Group member, wae not present at the meeting, held at the prime minister's official residence. I i The Wisemen's Group has already completed ita misa3on with the submission of a final report on Japanese-American economic relations in early October. Suzuki met with them to saek their opinions on international economic issues for r:eference in - conducting the external economic policy at a time when Japan's trade frictions with , the United Stat~s and West Europe are asauming aerious proportions. ! Referring to Washington's demand for removing Japan's tariff~ on 29 items, including -I computers and.peripheral equipment, earlier made through the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Ushiba, former ambassador to the United States, suggested that Japan tackle the ~ U.S. request in a positive manner. He said that the present tariff levels have been ~ set through the Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiatiflns sponsored by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Ae discussions on tariffs are con- ducted on the basis of certain rules, it w~nuld serve to prevent trade problems from being treated emotionally, he added. ' At the meeting, the view was also expressed that a body should be created to deal ' with foreign complaints about trade isaues. , CSO: 4120/82 ~ , l~ - FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400504010046-9 FOR OFF(C1Al. 115~: ONLY P~LITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ~ ~'MAINICHI' SCORES SUZUKI PRESS CONFERENCE REMARKS OW041424 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 3 Dec 81 p 2 [Editorial: "Incons3stent Prime Minister"] [Text] Prime Minister Zenkemocratic Partycexecutives,hreiteratedehis determination and ~ineup of the Liberal D to deal with the many urgentn D clemberwl,~cwerermostidisappointing as he8fail~dkonce made at a press conference o again to demonstrate his leadership. Ae discussed many sub~ects at length There was nothing new about his statement. from a very broad standpoint but did not go iato detailoliticisndiasopar~y3secrem is running high because of his appointment of a"grey p tary general, but Suzuki attem pted to defend l~is choice of Susumu N3ka3do, saying that he has been working sincerely for the of the nation and the party. In connection~c?ith administrative and fiscal reconst~ec~ho~n~eoplepsitr et~iSWhatde- clared that the most important task now is to resto P is truly needed of politiciana today is m~orality. We are fed up with~mconey politics and political corruption. We a~:e not at all satisfied with his ~P~~atthe~boseofaa hplutocratich~DPefaction" confiden_ce in politics when he himsel as party secretary general? In the face of his breach of faith, wl~atever he says is hardly convincin~. He also emfh~hezUdsth~eQ estcfortincreasedmi.litaryWCapability sions on defense independently o after taking into account all fac~icBO inionas With regard tocJapanasgeconomicsco- tution, budgetary matters and pub P operation with the Republic of Ko~he~stabilitqaof the people'sdlivelihooduandiecon the scope of contributing toward nomic progress of the ROK. His contention nn these issues wa~sisb ~ha~~he has often gone astray from hisnintended purusing is correct. The proble course, and he has ~e~rayed our ~Xpe~~t~~tiBSy onef th~nggand do~a othere 1He~should� We now call on the prime ministe - remember that lack of leadership and inconsiatency are fatal. COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily Newa, 1981 - CSO: 4120/82 12 FOR OFF[CTAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY POL'ITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL - 'YOMIURI' VIEWS TASKSFOR NEW SUZUKI CABINET ~W041417 Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 3 Dec 81 p 2 [~OMIURI SHIMBUN 2 December editorial: "Urgent Tasks of Cabinet"] [TextJ The urgent tasks of the reahuffled Suzuki cabinet are to compile a budget without a tax hike, generate GNP growth through domestic der~qnd and end trade f:ric-- ; tion with Western nations. ~ These objectives are closely related but at the same time contradictory in some i respects. This will create problems. And theae goels must be rea.ched againat the _i broad framework of adminiatrative and fiecal reform. -i At his first cabinet meeting after the reshuffle, Suzuki instructed his ministers ro n~t press for any tax measures incompatible with the policy to compile a budget ; without tax increases. However, the tax yield is affected by the growth rate of thc ~ ~~oa~inal GNP, and an increase in the yield is being checked by the delay in ~conomic ~ recovery and the stability of prices. ~ ~ ; It se~ms obvious that under these circumstances and Suzuki's policy the only way ~ out is to trim government expenditures. Also, the government should reexamin.e ta~ ! privileges and end tax inequalities. Cauge for Worry We are uncomfortable with Suzuki's proposal to "moderately" boc?ot taxea so that it is in line with a"no tax hike" budget. It would aeem that the premier is 3:osing interest in administrative and fiscal reform. Some labor federatione, as well as the Japan Committee for Economic Development (Keizai Doyukai), are preasing for an income tax reduction. However, they offer nu suggestions on how to find alternative revenue sources to this possible. The only way this can be accomplished it to trim government costs. To overcome trade friction with the U.S. and Western Europe, Suzuki proposes to - abolish nonta.riff barriers and advance the dates to enforce tariff reductiQns u.nd~r the Tokyo round. Since Western countries desire that Japan open its market, the _ premier is right in proposing this. 13 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 � FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - Beware of Bureaucratic Moves However, the bureaucrats again and again have claimed that Japan's market is open, and Suzuki, telieving them, has re~ected Western demands in the past. The neW cahinet must beware of wily bureaucrats and force th~n to remove trade barriers to regain the trust of the outsi3e world. - In approaching the trade p~oblem with the U.S., the gover~ament muat be aware that the U.S. links Japan's trade surplus with its dissatisfaction~with Japan's defense budget. However, we must deal with these problems separately. But one of the most difficult problems for Suzuki's new government will be to switch from exports to domestic demand for the basis of economic growth. And this can be promoted by the lowering of the official discount rate by the Bank of Japan pro- ~ viding the yen maintains its pregent s~rength. COPYRIGHT: The Daily Yomiuri 1981 CSO: 4120/82 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY =i YOLITICAL AND SOCIOI.OGTCAL 'ASAHI' ON 'FORGOTTEN' PACIFIC BASIN CONCEPT - OW041423 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 3 Dec 81 p 5 ["Weather Vane" column by Shigeo Omori, head of ASAHI SHIMBUN Analysis and Research Center: "Forgotten Issue"] [Text] After a period of inactivity on account of the expectation that Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda was bound to be removed in the reshuffle of the Suzuki cabinet , this week, the Foreign Ministry has moved into action again with the nomination of 'I his successor, Yoshio Sakurauchi. ' The mass media are now busy soliciting Sakurauchi's viewa on the host of outstanding diplomatic issues, including trade friction with the United States and Western Europe, ~ the persistent U.S. request for a substantial Japanese defense buildup, the sta~ling in the proposed resumption ef a dialogue between Japan and the Soviet Union, and ~ South Korea's request for $6 billion in ec~nomic aid. I i ~ But one thing is missing from this extensive list. The Pacif ic Basin cooperation concept, which was advocated by th2 late Prime M3nister Ma.sayoshi Ohira and left to his successor, Zenko Suzuki, to carry an, has been forgotten by newsmen. What �has become of the plan, which was made so much of as a major item in Ohira's diplo-- ~ matic agenda? ~ In a word, the proposal has been virtually shelved becauee of circumstances at t home and abroad, and it looks likely to etay off the stage of Japaneee diplomacy ~ for some time to come. I ~ To give the domest~'c reasona, the government's attitude roward the proposal has changed. Official enthusiasm rapidly cooled after Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito, coho made it his avowed miesion to continue Ohira's foreign policy, resigned in the controversy over the Japan-U.S. ~oint communique issued in May and Sonoda took over. And as Prime Minister Suzuki moved to leave behind off Ohira's legacy [as published] and strike out on his own, the proposal, a eymbol of the late leader's foreign y~olicy, was bound to lose prominence. The lack of eagerness on the part of the ASEAN countries has worked even more deci~ sively against the proposal. An interna.tional seminar held in Canberra in September last year advised the related governments to aet up a private-level forum, a 15 FOR OFFICIAL lJSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500410006-9 , FOR OFF[C1AL USE ONLY Pacific~ cooperation committee, to discuss ways of conducing cooperation in the Pacific region. But the recommendation stirred fears among the ASEAN gonernmente that the Pacific basin cooperation concept, if translated int~ reality, could weaken the unity of the ASEAN community. The Foreign Ministry was forced to change its tactice when the ASEAN failed to re- act t.o the scheme in the way that had been hoped in the meeting of their foreign - ministers in June this year. The miniBtry gave up its attempt to create a standing = body in the form of the Pacific cooperation committee and decided to take a patient and roundabout approach to the question. . "Just because the timetable we had in mind has hit a anag, the propoeal itself does not evaporate," related officials say. They point out that the proposal is long- - term scheme envisioning the 21st century, and that interdependence among the nations in the Pacific region will grow as time pasaes. - As an external liaison body on the proposal, the Foreign Ministry has set up the special committee for Eacific cooperation in the Japan Institute for International - Studies, an extra-departmental organization, installing former Foreign Minister Saburo Okita as its chairman. In the meantime, "core" research organs on Pacific cooperation have come to the fore abroad fn the past few vears, including the Panpacific Communist Asaociation of the _ United States, Australia National University, and the Centar:for Strategic and Inter- national Studies of Indonesia. In the view of Okita, as channels of communication are established with these for- eign reaearch agencies and exchanges of personnel and information increase, common perceptions and outlooks will emerge in time, and this will make it possible to hold strategy sessions to bring about the envisaged cooperation. COPYRIGHT: Asahi Evening News 1981 - CSO: 4120/82 ' 16 FOR OFFIC[AL OJSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540010006-9 FOR nFFIC1AL USE ONLY MILITARY " DEFENSE W::ITE PAPER, PENTAGON PAPER REVIEWED Defense Agency's View Tokyo TOKYO SHIl~IBUN in Japanese 30 Sep 81 p 1 _ /Article: "Seven.ty-Five Nuclear Missiles Aimed at and Within Operating Range ~ of the Far East'"7 ` [Excerpt] (Washington 29`~h, Special Correspondent Okamoto) Beginning at 9:15 am on the 29th (10:15 pm the same day Japan time), U.S. Defense Secretary F Weinberger held a news conference at the Pentagon and gave a presentation on the subject of "Soviet Military Power." In this presentation, the Secretary stated that since the Soviet Union's newest type of SS-20 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, chiefly deployed to aim at Europe, are mobile, Russia possesses -i offensive power in Japan, the Korean Peninsula, and other parts of northeast Asia. ~ In addition, when asked appro~imately how many SS-20s aimed at the Far East are in place, he did not give a clear number, but replied that the Soviet Union possesses offensive power against Japan, Korea, etc, because the S5~20s are mobile. However, based on the fact that the Secretary admits that 175 of the 250 SS-20s are deployed against Europe and other targets, one can con~ecture that the remaining 75 are deployed against Far East targets. Contents Are Common Sense The Perspective of a Defense Agency Source ~ The report on the Soviet Union~s Military Power released by the Pentagon on the ~ 29th had already been forwarded a few days earlier by U.S. Defense Secretary ` Weinberger to Defense Director General Omura, and the Defense Agency has fi2lished its analysis of the report~s contents. ~ A Defense Agency source stated on the ~vening of the 29th that, "There is ~ nothing particularly new in its contents, and it fundamentally coincides with our , perceptions." The source made clear the perspective that the report does not i go beyond the bounds of intelligence offered by and received from the U.S. Defense Intell.igence Agency, U.S. Co~anander in Chief Pacific Headquarters, etc, during a series of military 1eve1 discussions between Japan and the U.S. FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 FOR OFFICIA~. USE ONLY According to the same source, two points in this reporz pertained to the Far - East region: estimates of (1) the more than G5 divisions of the Soviet Union's military land forces on the Sino-Soviet border, and (2) the 720 ships in the - Pacific fleet. The Defense White Paper published in 1981 exceeds U.~. estimates, - with figures of 51 divisions and 800 ships, respectively. The same source explained thz reason for this: "Because U.S. estimates do not include such things as the five divisions in Mongolia and small scale auxiliary naval vessels," and - emphasized that there is not a differe~ce in perception (between the Defense Agency and the Pentagon). The source also indicated that the Agency had already received from the U.S. side a far n'�1listiciMissilesstconcerni g1IRBMs~inrtherFar~East said SS-20 Intermediate Range Ba ~ region, the particulars of the positioning of SS-20s, etc. ~ COPYRIGHT: Chunichi Shimbun Tokyo Honsha 1981 Defense White Paper Criticized Tokyo MAINICHI 5HIMBUN in Japanese 7 Oct 81 p 2 ~rticle: "The Inflated 'Soviet Tnreat'; Defense Agency White Paper on ~Estimates of Military Power in the Far East 7 . [Text~ Is the Soviet Union's army, which is supposed to be deploying its military power on the scale of divisions (10,000 men) in northern regions, a ~ phantom? A~eport presented by U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger on the ~ subject "Soviet Military Power" had considerably lower estimates of Soviet military power than those in the Defense Agency's White Paper published in 1981. Thus the Defense Agency has been taking great pains to make the figures consistent. "I have ordered an investigation into areas where differences have occurred," ~eputy Direct~r General Hara); Hara looked puzzled by the unexpectedly cool- headed analysi~ of the Soviet Union by the Pentagon, the originator of [a phrase] the "Soviet threat." The 1981 White Paper put Soviet military power at 51 divisions, and, stressing the Soviet method of augmentation of military forces, (said) that the Soviets are deploying land forces on the scale of a division" in northern terxitories. , By contrast, the iT.S. Pentagon report lists 45 divisions. Certainly, even if one looks at Military Balance" recently compiled by Britain's International Center for Strategic Studies, (one sees that) th~ Soviet Union's army in the Far East consists of 46 divisions; the Japanese White Paper estimates are quice high. In naval power, the White Paper estimate likewise was high by a long shot. Whereas the White Paper puts the Soviet Pacific fleet at 800 naval vessels, the U.S. report says 720, and "Military Balance" 527 vessels. There is considerable fear in the Diet of being caught by the opposition on ~ this point: "Daes the Defense Agency not intend to try to increase the Defense budget by exaggerated reporting of the Soviet Union's military power?" Defense Director General Qmura, who has always spoken of "the agreement between the FOR OFFICI~L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY U.S. and Japan on perceptions of the Soviet Union," is not shouldering the responsibility either. . The figures in the White Paper originally were ~he "late~t ingelligence" received by Director General Omura directly from Secretary Weir.'uerger, Commander in Chief Pacific Admiral Long, and others when Omura visited the U.S. in June. The figures were a section of the White Paper in which the Defense Agency took pride. Since the same Weinberger has reversed (tb.ese figures), the matter is troublesome. It is common knowledge that the Defense Agency, which says, The White Paper account was done with the Defense Agency's independent j.ntelligence," has neither military reconnaissance satellites nor a sg;y network, and relies upon U.S. intelligence. ~ The Defense Agency is naw explaining that the U.S. did not include in its figures - the divisions which have a 25 nercent "level of sufficiency" (effective strength is 25 percent of nominal strength), but the divisions were counted in the Japanese White Paper because they would become regular divisions whenever mobilized. 'The Agency is also explaining that the dffference in the number of naval vessels is due to the fact that small naval and other vessles besides warships were includ~d in the White Paper. By these explanations, the Agency appears to the acknowledging that the White Paper was by design trying to make the Soviet Union's military ~^~wer appear to be greater than it actually is. It appears that the Defense Agency was ambushed while it was banking on the U.S. to take a strong anti-Soviet stand to seek full budget appropriations. COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Shimbunsha 1981 9921 CSO: 4105/17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500010006-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MILITARY ~ ~ i ~ C t i ~ ~ i t i TANK RESERVE REINFORCEMEN'TS PLANNID FOR GSDF ~ _ ~ OW251131 Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 24 Nov 81 p 1 ! [Text] The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDR) has worked out a plan to radically reinforce and modernize its diviaione, iacluding the add3tion of 600 tanks to its ~ ~:urrent 890 tanks and the doubling of its reaerve forcea, it has been revealed. ~he blueprinr, which was drawn up by the GSDF chief of staff, also calla for the ; deployment of more personnel an Hokkaido. The program will 1ay the groundwork for the next mid-term program eatimate for fis- cal 1985-1989 that would set the target of defense buildup efforts during the five - years within the framework of the national defense program outline, a basic policy decided ia late 1976. In parallel with the GSDF plan, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) are drafting their own programs. These three programs will be modified into a single Defense Agency proposal to be submitted to the Na- tional Defense Counci]. next spring. GSDF officials said their proposal was aimed at boosting the strength of each ~ GSDF division to levels of at least 50 to 70 percent of the power of the U.S. and Soviet counterparts. The current divisional organization, they pointed out, is at least 20 qears old. It places too great an emphasis on infantrq and lacks in mo- bility and firepower, they said. The new GSDF program aeeks to expand the maxitmim deploqment quota of tanke from the present, 1,100 to 1,500 since lthe GSDF poaseesee only 890 tanks naw, the target will mean an increase of som e 600 units, if fully attained. As the reeult, each division would be equipped with 80 to 120 tanks, compared with no more than 60 now. Under th~ plan, the preaent peraonnel quota of either 7,000 or 9,000 for each of the three G5DF divisions deployed on Hokkaido would be raised to about 10,000. The GSDF now maiatains 30,000 reserve personnel ta be called up in emergencies mainly for logistics support. The new plan calls for about 80,000 reserves. On possi.ble stumbling block for the GSDF buildup efforts will be enormaus costs for the ac4uisition of additional �~eaponrq. Under the Defense Agencq expenditure plan for the next f~tscal year, a type-74 tank is priced at 340 million yen. Barring future price rises, the proposed addition of 600 tanks would require at least 200 billion yen. GSDF officials are pessimietic about the final approval of their pro- gram as it stands, particularly because the coming mid-term program est3mate would give priority to the MSDF and ASDF as requested by the U.S. COPYRIGHT: The Daily Yomiuri 1981 CSO: 4120/82 20 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400504010046-9 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ECONOMIC JAPAN TO ESTABLISH GOLD MARKET IN MARCH 1982 Tokyo NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japauese 21 Sep 81 p 3 [Text] Since the government announced on the 16th that it wil~. acknowledge ' gold as an object for commodities exchar~ge, the outlook is that gold markets will be established within thie year at the earliest or at the latest by - March of next year. This means that a future's market for gold wi11 officially start in this country. Not only trading firme, refineries, metal merchants, and commodities merchants but also banks and security firms are eyeing gold trading with great expectations. It is nat definite as to what i concrete form it will take, but the entry of banks and security f3rms into ~ the gold market will proceed rapidly when the New Banking Law goes into effect I in April of next year. (Taku Matsud~, Editor) Tokyo is now becoming the world's moet active money market and although it boasts that th e amount of foreign investments in etocks and bond~ is second , to the New York market, it is beyond belief that Japan had no futures market ror gold which is the largeat international co~nmodity and is closely connected with currency . M~oreover, industries dealing with electronics use a large amount of gold and are "swayed by changes in the overseas gold price, so w~hen the price of gold increases, immediately proftts decrease greatly and this becomes a matter of survival for th e bus inesses." (An aseociate) Even then, it could be lack of know-how, but, the country could not create a hedge against it on the foreign market and a great loss euffered helplesalq. Once the gold market starts functioning eteadiZy, it cannot only be a hedge against cuxrency fluctuation but can also contribute in resolving the uncertainty in the indusfirial world. Green Card System i.onn ection It cannot be denied that the great interest shawn by the banks and security companies in the gold market is related to the "green card system" which will ~ be adopted in 1984. ~ "Where will the 40 billion yen of black money (tax evasion capital) go? The gold market will be the best place to hide the money" is the consensus. This makes sense but more importance should be attached to the fact that this will contribute to enhancing the diversification of the nation's aesets. 21 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400504010046-9 FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY ~ i - At present, to the Japanese, land is the only real aes~t. "If land is the only ~ object for investment there is no way to suppress the inflation of the ' value of land no matter how the government ma~aipulates the Land Tax Law. The i gold market should not be dealt as a p1a~e for putting the black money, onlq. ; Rather, it is necessary to consider the gold market in connection with the land market." The high-powered economic growth c~f the nation caas sustained by Jaganese enthusiasm for saving. Monetary assets of the inciividuals wera bupplied ~o the industrial world through financial organs and this stimulated the growth of industry. But that high-powered grawth is gone today. It cannot be heZped that some monetary assets of individuals are headed for buying gold. _ Trading f irms, commodities merc?:axits, metal merchants and refineries are alreadq transacting in gold and since they come under the Commodity Transaction Law, - their entry into the ft~tures market for gold is naturally permitted. Hawever, as far as banks and security firms are concerned there is no offical signal from the administration as yet. , However, as far as the banks were c~ncerned in 1928, the then head of the Banking division of the Finance Ministry under the Ranking Law acknowledg~d , - the transaction of gold and recognized it ~s fi.heir ancillary activity in a ; circular. Therefore, according to theory, it is poseible for the bank to do retail selling of gold and to protect the gold Qn hand to participate in the futures transaction as a natural course of events. Where the securities world is concer~ied, under the Securities Transaction Law, ancillary act3vities are prohibited, so it is a question as to whether theq can go into futures transaction directly. One way of looking at it is that "they can funcCion through their subsidiaries. Moreover, if they issue gold securities, these will become negotiable, so in reality, transactions in gold by the securities company will be possible." Will th e gold transa:."tioas ~y banks and aecurity firms be implemented? The answer is yet to come. To Plan the Diversification of the Nation's Asaete How true is the intention of Mr Reagan's "Reinstatement of the Gold Standard - System?" When Mr Reagan es*.ab lished the Gold Committee last June, it was from the United States that one heard "reinstatement of gold at $1,500 an ounce. - It is easy to laugh off such an episode, but "when we look at it in the long run," it is definite that "the value of gold will rise." In order to spread the gold among the people we would like to see banks and th~ security firms enter the gold market in some form. COPYRIGHT: Nihon Kogyo Shimbunsha Tokyo Honsha 1981 9509 - CSO: 4105/4 22 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 FOR OFFIC[AL LJSE ONLY ECONOMIC ~ CONCERN EXPRESSED OVER U.S. C01~4SUNICATIONS II~'ORT RESTRICTIONS Tokyo ~IIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 9 Nov 81 page not given [Text ] Attaching imoortance to the point that the US Congress is strengthening = its moves to restrict substantially the imparts of Japanese-produced communications equipment and apparatuses through revision of the Communications Act, the [Japanese] Government has decided to express strong concern to the US Government , to the effect that "th~are is the fear that depending on the wa;~ the Act is operated after revision, it ' may constitute a violation of GATT or the Japan-US Commerce and Navigation ' Treaty." A formal notification will be given in a written form, in the near future. The US Communications Act Revision Bill provides i that "when US-manufact ured products axe shut out, due to the trade - barr.iers of the other countries concerned, restrictions ca,n be imposed on the imports of communications equipment and apparatuses from those ~ countries," even if there are bilateral agreements concerning the procurement ; of telegraph axid telephone equipment and apparatuses, between the US and -i Japan and other nations. It has 'recent].y been approved by the US Senate. ! The Government is showing repulsion against th e point that the US has requested the opening of the door of the Japanese market, against the ~ background of its large-scale trade deficit with Japan, while planning to take such import-restriction measures which have a strong protectionist ~ coloring. That is why it has exceptionally decided to express concern, ' with the start of de?~_berations on the Bill at the US House of Representatives - c].ose at hand. ~ In December of last year, the Government decided to open the door for Government procurement of materials for use by the Nippon Telegraph ar.d Telephone Public Corporation (NTT), also to the US and other countries. It concluded a bilateral agreement with the US Government. At the same time, it signed also the GATT Government-Procurement Code. However, with regard to Japan-US trade in communications equipment and appaxatuses, Japan h as been continuing to show a large-scale exporfi excess (x80.1 billion for the January-August period of this year and ~F81.6 billion as the.actual level for 1980) even after the conclusion of the agreemer.t. The US side is strengthening its feeling of dissatisfaction, from the stand that "the expansion of the trade imbalance is due mainly FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 F~R OFF[C[A?G USE ONLY to the Japanese side's trade barriers, including the point that the ~ specifications as to the procurement of materials are complicated." The US Communications Act Revision Bill, passed recently by the Senate, prcvides that even if there is a bilateral agreement based on mutualism, imports from that country can be restricted if a situation occurs which impedes the research and development, investments, and sales by US manufacturers and their market strategies. In concrete terms, the Department of Commerce and the Office of the USTR (US Special _ Trade Representative) shall compile a list of nations, on which such � doubts are entertained. In regard to the products manufactured by the - countries placed on the list, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) _ can take either (1) the measure of imposing special restrictions or (2) the measure of refusing to grant import approval. The Revision Bill does not particularly set its aim on the restricting of imports from Japan. However, the Government says, "It strongly - has the coloring of retaliation against our country." At.the same time, it also thinks that "the possibility is strong that the Revision Bill will be approved after being passed. b~y the US House of RepresEntatives, because it is being supported also by the US Government." It is said that if tha Revision Bill is passed by the Congress, then telephone private branch exchange equipment, terminal equipment, micro-wave de~rir_es, trans- missicn communications equipment and apparatuses, and alrnost all other types of Japanese products concerned will be covered with the net of import restrictions. It is also said that there is fear of [Japan's] - losing the greater part of the US market which accounts for one-third of the amoLnt of its exports of communications equipment and apparatuses. 'The reason why the [Japanese] Government has decided to express cancern to the US Goverr.ment, is that t:~ere is the fear that depending on the ~ray [the Revision Bill] is operated, it may violate (i) tr.e - GATT Regulat ions, ir.cluding the Government-Procurement ~ode, and (2) the Jacaa-US Co;nn;erce and ~lavigation Treaty wnich provi3es that one co~,.uztry cannot unilaterally restrict its imports of ;.~anufactured � oroducts rrom *_he other country, without justifiabls reason, ~hough "the legislative measure itself will not conflict witn any international regulations, and it is a purely domestic law" (Government source). ?.r.other reason is that the Government judged :hat it would be necessary ta exalain Japan's position, in advance. IT~ Minister TANAKA already expressed such cancern to US Secretary of Commerce BALDRIGE who visited Japan late in Octobzr. In particular, the US :~as strongl~ requested 3apan to cpen the door of its mar;cet through tne expansion of its imports of manufactured products, or through t~:e abolition of non-trade barriers. At the sar~e time, it is planning to take pm*ecticnist measur~s as to Japanese-oroduced communications - ~quipmz*~ ~ and ap~a_ratuses . This wi11 have big efFects on Japan-US _ trade as a~hole . This is why the Govsrnment has decided to give a 21~ _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 FO~t OFFICIAL USE ONLY ;~arning in a~written foz^n. ~~lorecver, in connection with the optical communicat ions ca~:._ proj ect of the A':T ( American Telei:onP and Te'_egraph Fujitsu has suffzred a defeat, though it mada ~he successful best-~rice bid in the bidding. :'hus, "iajur~~" on the part of Japanese enterprises has cor~e to the fore. This also seems to be one of the reasons. NMi COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunstla 1981 CSO: 4105/28 : , ~ I ~ i ~ , I ~ ~ i ~ I I -j I - I / FOR OFFICI~L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500010006-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ CONOMI C U.S. SEEKS LIBERALIZATION OF MARKET Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 12 Nov 81 p 1 [Textj . The US Government presented, on the llth, a package request for the - liberalization of the Japanese market, containing as many as 21 items, to tnP Japanese Governnient. Japan and the US will enter into negotiations for the liberalization of the market, holding the meetings of the Japan-US Trade Group and the Japan-US Trade Facil~tation Committee from December S. This request list makes clear the US Government's position for attending the negotiations, and against the background of the dissatisfaction in the US Congress, accompanying the expansion of US trade deficits toward Japan, it seeks not only Japan's expansion of imports of agricultural products, high technology products and se,rviee industries, but also a re-studying of the Agreement on NTT's procurement of materials, which was agreed upon one year ago. The Government intends to incorporate items, which can be realized, in the measures for the. decreasing of its surplus balance, to be formulated in th~ near future, but other than the l~wering of tariffs on manufactured ~ produc*_s, there are m.any items on which concession is difficult, and ~t is held certain that tb.e negotiations will be carried over to next yea~~. The US requests to Japan this time were formulated by the Office of the Special Trade Representative, after hearing not only the views of the Department of Commerce, the Department of State and the Department of Agriculture, but also the views of US Congressional persons concerned. These items are expected to be discussed at the meeting of the Trade Facilitation Committee to be held on December S and at the meeting of the Japan-US Tracle Group on December 9 and 10. Requests for the liberaliza- tion of the Japanese market have been presented, individually, in the past, too, but this is the first time to be presented in a package form. The Japanese side is worried that, as the date for the starting of the negotiations happens to fall on the anniversary of the outbreak of the war between Japan and the US, the "probl~m of trade friction" may be taken up on a lar~e-scale by public opinion within the US as a showdown between - Japan and the US. The US side also took this point into consideration, and it put off the compilation of a"list of requests for the abolition of Japan's 26 ~rOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY non-tariff barriers," which~~it had been planaing at first, on the grounds ~ tnat it will give too strong an impression. Also, it incorporated the requests to Japan tnis time into the '~agenda items for consultations" at . tne 3aoan-US irade Group's meeting, and it attaches the condition that co-ordination be held between Japan and the US before the starting of the negotia*_ions. ~ The items of requ~st are grouped into six fields, namely "standards and criteria for inspection," "agricsltural products," "high technology, "market competition," "lowering of tariffs," and "customs procedures," and under these headings, it further lists the items in which the US side is especially interested. In the =ield of agricultural products, it inaludes the i:nprovement of standards, so as to make possible the exports of Japanese "sake" produced in the US and exports Gf rice to Japan, ?n addition to the adva.zcin~ of the negotiaticns for the liberalization of the imports of beef and citrus fruit, wnich the US side has been requesting fram before. The US side has given uo the takir.g up of the abolition of Japan's non-tarifr barriers itself, but in its olace, it seeks the improvement of . ger.eral standards and import insoectiQn standards for 12'items of products, such as the automobile exhaust gas standard, processed foodstuffs and plywood. ~ What the US side points ~ut as a barrier to the Japanese ~narket, ~ tcgether staadards and criteria, is its view that Sapanese enterprise ' groups are thought to be giving priority to the purchase of goods, manu- ~ factured by enterprises within the group. The Japanese side takes the ~ stand tr,at this view is based on the US side's misLnderstar.di:~g, and it ~ intends ro assert that there do nct ~xist any "agreements for the shutting ' out of US products," anong Japanese entzrprises, as mentioned by the US side. _~i The US side also proposes the re-studying of the agreements~between ~ the Japanese and the US uovernments, in which the Japanese side emphasized -~i the liberalization of the market~for NTT's procurement of materials, and the lowering of tariffs on tobacco. Both these agreements went into effect ' from the start of this year. However, as exports of US products to Japan ~ have not increased noticeably, the US Congress and the US Government harbor ! dissatisfaction. The Agreement on~NTT procurement is slated to be re-studied ~ in 1983, but the US Government is aiming at its early revision. The problem of the liberalization of the market for high technology produc�cs, such as computers, semi-conductors and cotranunications equipment, will also become an agenda item for negoti.ations between Japan and the US for the fir~t time. The US side views that the Japanese Government's - granting of subsidies to the industrial circles cencerned is strengthening - the Japanese enterprises' competi~tive power, and the US side is requesting - that US enterprises, which have already advanced into Jap~n, be enabled to participate in Japan's Government-private joint projects. Toward this series of US requests to Japan, Government sources are checking into the incorporation of the lowering of tariffs on computers 27 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ (ranging from 3.9 percent to 14.6 percent), machine tools (ranging for 4.7 ~ ' percent to 7.8 percent), and automobile parts (ranging from zero percent to 5.4 percent) in the Government's measures for the decreasing of the surplus - trade balance. However, as for agricultural prodttets, high technology, - service industries and expansion of the opportunity for access into the market, to which the US side is giving priority, Government sources view that early settlement will be difficult. , - If the negotiations this time were to become protracted, there is a strong danger of the trade imbalance between Japan and the US developing into political friction. As a result, the Government has hastily decided to check into the establishment of an organ for the disposing of complaints - in the trade field (trade ombudsman system), and to promote comprehensive measures. - US Government's Items of Request to Japan for Liberalization of the Market ; , - . - _ _ ~ ; l. Improvement of Ger~eral Standards and Inspection Standards ~ (1) Agricultural products (fresh beef, chicken meat, cherries, - papaya, Japanese "sake", rice) ' (2) General standards (industrial products) ~ (3) Automobiles (exhaust gas standard, procedures for model approval, _ etc.) ~ ~ ( ~E ) Pr. ocessed foodstuffs (5) Medical macninery, health instruments,. eosmetica (6) Plywood 2. Liber~alization of Imports of Agricultural Products (1) Import quota system for beef and citrus fruit (2) Price policies regarding wheat and mixed feed (3) Administrative guidance, such as restricting the imports of ~ egg products _ 3. Improvement of Trade in High Technology Products (1) Government's subsidy policy , (2) Problem of participation of US enterprises in Government- private projects - (3) Lowering of tariffs and improvement of non-tariff barriers 4. 'I'hor.oughgoing Enforcement of Market Competit3on (1) Problem of arrangements in Japanese enterprise groups for the purchasing of materials within the groups (2) Re-studying of the Agreement concerning the procurement of NTT's materials and for Government procurement 28 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (3) Re-studying of the Japan-US Tobacco Agreement and the Japan-US Agreement on leather products (4) Liberalization of the service industries (insurance, banking, data communication, etc.) (5) The code for the liberalization of investments (6) Buy Japanese activities (7) Problem of trademark rights 5. Lowering of Tariffs Computers, machine tools, automobile parts, etc. 6. Simplification of Customs Procedures KH COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1981 CSO: 4105/28 ~ ~ ~ ~ I I I i ' . ~ i I 29 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500010006-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ECONOMIC ~ ~ ~ ~ FRICTION WITH U.S. OVER TECHIdOLOGY E7~ANDS Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 13 Nov 81 p 9 [Text] In ~onnection with negotiations on the business of optica~ communication - cable in :he US, the incident that Fujitsu was forcec~ to lose, as a result of pressure from a US Congressional source, although the company won the top bid, indicates that Japan-US economic friction is spreading from in the field of such products as automobiles and color TV sets to "fricticn as to technology" in the field of most-advanced technology. The Governr.?ent, which is concerned about the US strengthening its blunt protectionist- type posture, where the US exposes its national interests in the field of most-advanced technology, has brought the incident, this ti~ne, to the US Government's attention through the Foreign Ministry. However, because the uS is strongly alarmed by Japan's rapid advance in the most-advanced fields, it is viewed that causes for friction in terms of technology will cor.tinue to increase in the future. The iacider.t, this time, took place in connection with ATT's plan for laying optical communicat~on cable (~merican Telephone ar.d Telegraph). ATT =s a US ccnglomerate. Tr.e company is currently laying optical cable connectir.g Boston, New York and Washington, the total length of which cable is about 1,200 kilameters, with the target completion in 1984. Western Electric, ATT's 100$ subsidiary company, has won the order for the f_rst part between Washington and Boston. Fujitstt took part in the , business nz3atiations on the second part between Bostcn and New York to make a bid. Fujitsu enjoyed "overwhelming superiority in the fields of technology and cost" among the eight companies ~hich ultimately re:nained, compris?ng four Japanese companies, two US companies and two European ccmpanies. Consequently, Fujitsu "won the top bid in the public tender held in June." (Fujitsu) However, at the end of last month, ATT gave a unilateral notice to Fuji:su, wit'r:~ut clarifying any ^eason, that "The nrder will be given to ATT's subsidiary compar.y Western Electric." Consequently, Takuma YAMAMOTO, President of Fujitsu, Ltd., visited the US at the b~ginning of 30 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY this month in an attempt to ask the ATT side to explain to him the aircum- stances. I� is said that ATT replied that "We have made the decision by taking into consideration not only the interests of our own comQany but also the national environment and political environment." Fujitsu is angry about the following two points: (1) FOGARTY, a member of the Federal Communications Commission, which is viewed to hav~ _ greatly affected the ATT decision, said that "The price is improperly low," as if Fujitsu was..charged with dumping, and (2) On the premise for placing an order to Fujitsu, the ATT side inspected Fujitsu's plan': in-detail at the end of August. T?zus, ATT has had an over-all view of technology and know-how, which are essentially kept secret from outsiders. Consequently, ATT's rejecting the placing of an order after having done so violates morality in commerce. iujitsu maintains that the US side charged Fujitsu with dumpir}g desp'_*e the fact that Fujitsu has striven to improve its technology in an a:temot to reduce costs greatly, and that its snatching Fujitsu's technology is not forgivable. Fujitsu is planning to submit an open letter of inquiry to the FCC in the near future. - According to a Government source, it is said that a US Con~ressional sou:ce and the FCC aoplied pressure on ATT from the viewpoint that ''It will be ~roblematical in terms of national defense, too, to use foreign technology in the networks of communication circuits which will become the foundation. i As a:natter of fsct, awareness of the problem in such a way is on the ide^tical line with the strong assertion on the ~apanese side~ centering on vTT, concerni;,g the US demand for open bidding as to the "problem of i the m~rket of NTT," which Problem was setfi led between Japan i i and the US at the end of last year, after hard sailing. The Japanese side _ pointed out that "Communication systems are not compatible with open bidding because the contents of the systems are technically complex and advanced, and, thei~efore, standardization is vital to the systems. Also, ; there will be problems in terms of security." N~wever, the US side was ~ . ' not convinced. Under such circumstances, the Japanese side was forced i to accept an open bidding system for a fairly large part. Thus, apart from the protest from the official viewpoint that "The ~ decision violates the OKITA-ASKEW agreement which atipulates the opening ~ of the markets on a mutual basis in the field of communications equipment," ' all the more the Government has mixed feelings about the incident this time, thinking that "Even the US acts the same way when it must face the real thing." Nevertheless, it has recently become conapicuous that the US takes a blunt protectionist posture by revealing the national interests of the US in the field of most-advanced technology. For example, there ia the case where the US has approved US IBM's expor�~ of a super-large size computer to China, while until today the US rejects approving the export of Hitachi's super-large size computer to China, although the computer is - smaller in scale thar IBM's. Also, the US International Trade Commission has passed a provisional judgment of dumping on the export of Nippon 31 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~~~ectc�l~ Company's communication facilities for a satellite to Comsat. ~ In addition, there was a US Congressional move of reviaing the Cotmnunications ~ Act, which revision aims at eliminating foreign eommunications_equipment, ~ _ , and so on and so forth. ' Japan exports very little communications equipment. Its share in the ; US market is less than 1$. The US is intensifying a sense of guardedness, i although Japan is not eating into the US market arbitrarily. The US intention f th~t "We will not follow the path trodden by automobiles and color TV sets." ; is c~ear. Because the matter is concerned with not only its national interests ; but also its pride as a super-power, it will be troublesome to settle the ; friction as to technology. ~ ; KN ' - i COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Shimbunsha 1981 ` CSO: 4105/28 _ , i i ~ i ~ i i ~ I~ 32 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010006-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500010006-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ECONOMI C EPA CLARIFIES POLICY ON CORRECTION OF TRADE IMBAI~ANCE _ Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 8 Nov 81 p 1 - [Text] - - . _ . - . _ . The EPA on the 7th clarified its basic policy concerning measures for correction of the trade imbalance with the US and fihe EC, which measures will be formulated, with the last ten days of this month as the target time. According to the policy, the following three points will become the pillars: (1) Emergency imports will be promoted in a ~ positive way, as a measure to reduce the surplus balance for the present; i (2) as for measures to o~en the door of the market,as ret~n~sted strongly by Europe and the US, efforts will be made to carry out the easing of ' non-tariff barriers, including tt,e lowering of tar3ff rates and the -i re-viewing of the standards for inspection; and (3) studies will be ~ conducted on such problems as a re-view of the export structure, which is a basic problem concerning the arising of the surplus balance, the liberalization of services, and industrial co-operation. This policy was clarified in response to the fact that Prime Minis~ex SUZUKI, who heard a report by the INAYAMA Mission to Europe on that day, expressed his intent.ion, to tYle effect that he "wants to study, not only im�nediate probl~~ms but also trade problems as a whale, including a future direction." Measures for~ correction of the trade imbalance will be decided at the Economic Neasures Ministerial Conference which will be held after consultations are conducted with the Foreign Ministry, the Finance Ministry, MITI, the Agriculture-Forestry-Fish~ries Ministry, and other Ministries concez~ned, centering on the EPA. The fi.rst Conference is scheduled to be t~~ld on the 17th, at the earliest. EPA Director General _ KOMOTO says, "(The formulation of a final plan) may not be completed before tt~e end of this month, but the problem is of urgency. Therefore, I~aant 1:o formu~