JPRS ID: 10223 SOUTH AND EAST ASIA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10223
30 December 1981
Sovtl~ and Ee ast Asia R~ ?ort
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(F OUO 7/81)
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JP~tS L/10223
- 30 December 1981
SOUTH AND EAST ASIA REPORT
(FOUO ~/si)
CONTENTS ~
KAMPUCHEA
Sihanouk Describea Differences Among Coalition Forces
(Norodom Sihanouk; PARAJ)ORES, Autumn 81~ 1
Correspondent Describes Intexnational Aid, PRK Infrastructure
DevElopment
(Christian Scasso; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Nov-6 Dec 81) 7
- a - [III - ASIA - 107 FOUO]
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KAMPUCHEA
SIHANOUK DESCRIBES DIFFERENCES AMONG COALITION FORCES
Paris�PARADOXES in French Autumn 81 pp 66-72 .
~Article by Norodom Sihanouk: "The 'Problem of Cambodia
[Text] Who is still concerned with Cambodia at a time when
attention is focused on F~oland, on the Near East, on Iran, or
on Mexicc which is promoting an attempt at reviving the North-
South dialogue? It is now a good 3 years that the Vietnamese
army entered Phnom Penh. Today, Vietnam and its protegees in
the Peop~e's Republic of Kampuchea may be in control of "use-
ful Cambodia" but are still being viewed askance by the inter-
, national community--with the exception of the Soviet bloc and
India--while the "democratic Kampuchea" of Mr Pol Pot, having
withdrawn to the area along the border with Thailand, con-
tinues to represent the country legally. In democratic and
military terms, the situation has hardly changed any since tY:s
international conference which was held last summer but the
problem of Cambodia must be raised once again during the next
session of the UN General Assembly which is to opeia in New
York within several days. Prince Noroaom Sihanouk, who today
lives in the south of France but who continues every day to
- keep track of the situation in the reg3on with the idea of pre-
paring for the future, has been kind enough to communicate to
the readers of PARADOXES his t.hinkings on the conditions under
which, wheii~the moment comes, Cambadia could resume its place
in the ranks of sovereign countries. ~
What is called "the problem of Cambodia" as a matter of fact involves only the
Cambodian people who, in their vast majority, only want peace, independence, and
excellent relations with all powers, in the East and in tfie West.
"The problem" is due to the death struggle taking place on my country's territory
between two hostile communisms, the communism of Peking whose "spearhead" is the
kY~mer Rouge army of Pol Pot and the communism of Hanoi, supported by Moscow, which
seeks to impose the "puppet" government of Heng Samrin.
These two branches of Asian cemmunism which are hostile to each other at this time
are fightir~g over power in Cambodia after the United States was forced to ab~andon
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wuK ~rr~~iwL u~~ ~utvLY
the "Khmer Republic" of LonNol in April 1975 to its sad fate along, furthermcre,
with nationalist South Vietnam and Laos.
The fight against the United States, in the course of th.e second war in Indochina,
was conducted by the Indochinese resistance fighters supported in every possible
way by the two big red powers, that is, the PRC and the Soviet Union.
These powers had barely completed the American defeat when each of them undertuok
to reach for Cambodia which occupies an important strategic position.
Neither the Khmer Rouge, nor China, nor the USSR wanted to turn my country into a
"Luffer state"--a neutralized state which would have contributed to the stabiliza-
tion of Southeast A~ia.
Of course, with their hypocrisy which we are so familiar wi*_h, most of the big
powers (and some medium and small powers) accepted the fiction according to which
the "Democratic Republic of Kampuchea" of Pol Pot was a"nonaligned" state.
In fact, the Chinese, with the approval of the K.hmer Rouge, turned Gambodi3 into
the Indochinese "bastion" of anti-Soviet commanism. The Soviets and the Vietnamese
in turn decided to do everything to make sure that my country would not fall "from
the American Charybdis into the Peking Scylla."
Starting in 1977, the Red Khmer and the Red Vietnamese began to clash militarily
in initially secret battles and later on, starting at the end of December 1977,
in open fighting in the border areas between Cambodia and South Vietnam.
I would like to introduce a parenthetical remark here to point out that, after
their victory in 1975, the Khmer Rouge of Pol Pot never ceased to kick out the
"enemy agents" from their o~wn ranks, that is to say, those who were not in agree-
ment with the team of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan in order to tie
Cambodia ideologically to China and to fight against "Vietnamese expansionism" and
"Soviet hegemonism."
Between April 1975 and the end of 1977, the Khmer Rouge liquidated several tens of
thousands of their own comrades. To escape this physical liquidation, the current
head of state of the new regime in Phnom Penh, Mr Heng Samrin, with many other .
' "anti-Chinese" and"anti-Pol Pot" Khmer Rouge cadres, was forced to flee to Vietnam
in 1977. We know that in the wake of the military victory of the Hanoi army, early
~ in January 1979, over the army of Pol Pot, Mr Heng Samrin and his supporters, chased
out by the Polpotians in 1977, returned to the country in the "wagons of the
forpigner" to found what is now called the "People's RepubZic of Kampuchea"--the
other Cambodian communist state, the state of Pol Pot, being called "Democratic
Kampuchea."
_ The main phases of the big-power struggle over possession of Cambodia can be sum-
marized in the following manner:
(a) First phase: struggle against the United States, on the one hand, and the
communist powers (PRC, USSR, and Vietnam~ on the other hand.
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(b) Second phase: after the American defeat, ~truggle against China and the Khmer
Rouge, on the one hand, and the USSR and Vietnam on the other hand, with the
Chinese and the Khmer Rouge taking control of Gambodia from 17 Apri]. 1975 unt~l
6 January 1979; the Vietnamese and Soviets mana.ged t~ sPize my country on 7
~ January 1979.
(c) This brings us to the third phase, the phase in which China and Khmer R.ouge
received (and this only very logical) backing--which does not surprise me--from
the United States, from ASEAN (Association of Nonco~unist Countries of Southeast
Asia: Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines), Japan, and
- some other powers in the free world (the FRG, in particular).
The United States wanted revenge against Vie~nam who defeated it in 1975 and natural-
ly is interested in "stopping" the advance of the Soviets and the Vietnamese towaid
noncommunist Sou~heast Asia. The United States and China consequently agreed to
support (in the UIv, etc.) and to aid (materially) "democratic Kampuchea" (Khmer
Rouge) whose very tough guerrilla fighters serve as cannon fodder for the anti-
Soviet and anti-Vietnamese camp.
Directly threatened by the danger from Vietnamese expansionism and Soviet imperial-
ism (Thailand in particular now has a very long common border with Vietnamized and

~ Sovietized Ch~na), the ASEAN countries are naturally getting together with China
and the United States in helping and (very strongly) supporting the Khme~ Rouge in
their fight to keep "democratic Kampuchea" in the United Nations and to drive the
Vietnamese out of Cambodia. The FRG, Italy, and some other Western powers have
also joined the anti-Vietnamese, anti-Soviet, and pzo-Chinese camp for reasonG that
are easy to understand. These are the same reasons that guided Japan which, with
China and the United States, is the most dynamic in the militantism in support of
"democratic" and anti-Vietnam "Kampuchea" (Japan went so far as to cut food sup-
plies off to the Vietnamese people as punishment inflicted upon ~'ietnam for~oc-
cupying Cambodia). The United States, Japan, the ASEAN, the FRG, etc., find this
policy very easy to pursue as they are all in the same boat especially since China,
for them, is a vast potential market capable of absorbing a large part of their
industrial and agricultural products.
- The Khmer Rouge have an extremely bad r.eputation due to the odious crimes which they
committed against tt?eir own people in 1975-1979; the anti-Vietnam camp desperately
seeks to impcove this very bad image of "democratic Kampuchea" both in the eyes of
the Cambodia~n people and in the eyes of the international community, urging
Norodom Sinanouk and the former_ premier of Cambodia, Soh Sann to agree to join the
state and government of that "democratic Kampuchea" which is still considered the
legal state and government of the people, the natjon, and the country of Cambodia
by the LTN, by UNESCO, etc.
On 4 September 1981, ASEAN managed to obtain the signature, at Singapore, of a
- "joint declaration" by the president of the Khmer Rouge state (Khieu Samphan) and
the two principal leaders of the natioaalist "patriotic forces" (Son Sann and my-
self). This declaration states that three Khmer leaders desire to unite their
patriotic forces in the struggle against the enemy of the fatherland, Vietnam,
who must be driver out of Cambodia. An "ad-hoc committee"--made up of nine members
(three Khmer Rouge, three followers of Son Sann, and three followers of Sihanouk),
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was estahlished and is now working in B~.angkok (Thailand) in an effort to put to-
gether, not a united front, but a"tripartite government," a so-called "coalition"
- government.
A real coalition among the thrse movements, the Khmer Rouge (extreme left-wing)~
the Sonsannians (extreme right-wing), and the Sihanoukists (center~, could not
be put together any time soon because the following obstacles fiave always been and
always will exist on the road toward the materialization of this coalition which is
so desired by ASEAN:
(a) Insurmountable animosity,not to say hostility, between the three movements for
reasons of an ideological nature (confrontation between three incompatible ideo-
logies: atheistic and murderous communism, reactionary, republican, and anti-
monarchist right wing, and more or less royalist Sihanoukism) and for reasons of
a personal nature (it is impossible to deny that the Khmer have a predilection for
hating each other and even tearing each other to pieces and that explains why they
- lost Cambodia in the end).
(b) Serious difference between the various approaches, that is to say, the concept
for the solutions to the~"Cambodian" problem. The Khmer Rouge and the Sonsannians
believe that they can in the long run defeat the Vietnamese army and kick it out
of Cambodia. I think that a political solution is more reasonable than the search
~for a military sol.ution which I consider to be impossible. For me, the only chance
for Cambodia to get Vietnam to ~ive it back its independence resides in the com-
plete neutralization of the Khmer country which would prevent its slippin~ toward
China or any other power, the disarmament of all Khmer factions and their replace-
~ ment in Cambodia with an "inte.rnational Peace maintenance force"--in English:
"International Peace Keeping Force"--and the promise of general elections under
international control in which even the pro-Vietnamese and pro-Soviet Khmer could
- participate (the Khmer Rouge do not agree that the pro-Vietnamese and pro-Soviet
Khmer should have any place in the Khmer society of tomorrow).
(c) The widely differing treatment given to the armed forces of the possible tri-
partite coalition by the powers which say they are in favor of this coalition. The
Khmer Rouge are getting massive aid from China. China ~ives aid in many ways to
Sor_ Sann and his f.ront and on the other hand gives only significant aid (3,000
small arms) to the fighting Sihanoukist groups; this Chinese aid furthermore is
currently "blocked" by Thailand. The United States and Japan give considerable
"humanitarian" aid to the Khmer Rouge and to the Sonsannians and give nothing to
the Sihanoukists. ASEAN supports the Khmer Rouge and Son Sann much more than
~ Sihanouk. The Sihanoukist. movement in Thail3nd cannot grow liecause Thailand much
prefers ~o aid the Khmer Rouge and the Sonsannians. In short, China, the ASE9N,
and the United States, witnout real.ly.aiding him, are trying to get Sihanouk into
the "coalition" for the simple reason that, according to surveys and frequent
investigations oii the spot, it appears that Sihanouk remains very popular among
the little people of Cambodia.
(d) Conflicts of interest between the Khmer Rouge and the Sonsannians, both of
whom are very ambitious and demand "full powers" (sic) for their own movements in
a so-called "tripartite" coalition goverrnnent. Tfie Khmer Rouge are ready to let
~ Son S~ann and Sihanouk into the state or~goverrnnent machine of their "democratic
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Kampuchea" only if the latter two agree to play th.e role of "puppets," good enough
only to lend respectahility and popularity to their regime whicfi is so hated in
our country. Mr Son Sann on tfie other liand demands almost dictatorial powers
for hi*nself, while Sihan~uk refuses to cooperate in fact witfi tfie K~imer Rouge and
(symbolically) will stay in the possible coalition only if fiis supporters.get more
- substantial aid from Chiiia, the United States, and the ASEAN.
I want to emphasize that I agree to participate in the anti-Vietnamese guerrilla
movement in Cambodia or~ the condition that this will not be a war that is "fought
for the sake of war" but rather a war for peace and for honorable compromise with
Vietnam, that .is to say, that we must cause the foreign occupier in our country to
face such difficulties that Vietnam and the USSR will agree to go to the conference
table in order peacefully to resolve the "Cambodian problem" with us.
- (e) Stiffenfng of the position of the Khmer Rouge following their very brilliant
political and diplomatic successes in the UN (they got 77 votes in September 1981
against 71 votes "for" in :L480). The Khmer Rouge thus are not at all interestEd
in getting together with Son Sann. It will therefore be up to him to make a choice
between refusing to jo~n the coalition government and joining it with his supporters
while agreeing that the Khmer Rouge should continue to 3e the real and only masters
of "democratic Kampuchea."
The prospects regarding the future of an independent Cambodia are not encouraging.
- ~ Here is why:
(1) Unless the Chinese and Americans decide to intervene physically in Cambodia,
by sanding "volunteers" to help the Cambodians get rid of the Vietnamese (and the
Russians)--as far as the Chinese are concerned, such an eventuality is a priori ~
_ improbable and as far as the United States is concerned, it is inconceivable--
bne cannot see how the Khmer Rouge (who are fighting) and the Sonsannians ~who are
a~L~ned and uniformed but who do not dare face the Vietnamese army) could, in short-
- range, medium-range, and even long-range terms, drive out the very numerous and
very well-equipped Vietnamesz soldiers.
(2) Here is something that is extremely important: the vast majority of the Cam-
~odian people, humiliated though they may be by the fact that their country is no
~ longer independent, but has become a Vietnamese "protectorate," very clearly pre-
fers to remain--until the new order is established--under Vietnamzse armed pro-
- tection rather than ~etting the Khmer Rouge back in powe~' in Phnom Penh. The vast
majority of the Cambodian people strongly disapproves the "joint declaration" of
the three Cambodian leaders in Singapore on 4 September because it states that a
tripa~tite coalition will only give the Khmer Rouge m~re of an opportunity to
seize power in Cambodia. Because he signed that declaration with Khieu Samphan,
the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk himself is in the process of losing his popularity among
- the little people in the interior.
(3) The Vietnamese, supported by the USSR, are serious when they definitely re-
- ~ect all attempts by the UN ro get them to abide by the UN resolutions and other
resolutions urging them to evacuate Cambodia. They have a good reason to retnain
stubborn in this respect: they know that, while tfiey do not love tfiem, the Rhmer
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inside Cambodia are so afraid of the Khmer Rouge that they gladly agree to have
them stay with them to give them vital protection. The ~ituation thus will not
change inside Cambodia and this is true regardless of the maneuvers of China, the
ASEAN, the United States, Japan, and otfier powers, sQ long as the Kfimer Rouge
mortgage has not been lifted once and for all.
In canclusion I must render sincere homage to France who refused tc part�~cipate
in the troublesome games of both opposing camps that are fighting over my un-
fortunate country. On tfie fiumanitarian and economic level, France is generously
' and constantly aiding my fellow citizens--without any political afterthoughts--
who need to be assisted (I am talking here of the refugees and also the Khmer
people in the counery's interior). On the political level, France is absolutely
. ribht in abstaining from voting, in tlie UN and elsewhere, for "democratic Kampuchea"
which. is the assassin of its own people or for the "People's Republic of Kampuchea"
~ which only represents Vietnamese-Soviet colonialism. France's abstention in the
UN is a gesture of respect toward the Cambodian people. It means that France
demands that this nation should have the right to hzve its own governr,~ent which will
really be worthy of symbolizing its legitimate aspirations for peace, liberty,
. independence, and a life without fear, poverty, and humiliation.
~COPY'RIGHT: 1981 Compagnie Europeenne d'Editions et Publications Periodiques, Paris
5058
cso:4200/10
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' KAMPUCHEA
CORRESPONDENT DESCRIBES INTERNATIONAL AID, PItK INFRA5TRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 253, 23 Nov=6 Dec 81 pp 34-35
- [Article by Christian Scasso: "Living Again in Cambodia"]
[Text] Three million. Three million martyrs out of a nation of seven million.
That is the sad heritage bequeathed by the bloody Pol Pot. Nearly half of the
population of Cambodia eliminated in the name of independence without anyone being
able to justify the blind thoroughn~ss, the destructive madness. Today, in a coun-
try just returning frc?m the hell of the dead, the survivors of the genocide are
beginning to lift their heads, to look a little beyond the ground covering so many
hidden graveyards, to live again, to create a present mad~ of hope and fear. It
is difficult to lezrn what freedom is again when that freedom was emptied of inean-
ing.
Hope also means believing that the world, which closed its eyes to rhe massacre,
will not again refuse to look at the reality of the survivors. Words cannot wipe
_ away the horror. Beyond the expression of good will, international aid must be
developed and expanded. For the time being, a few associations are working on the .
spot, trying to build a future for the country. Among them is ADRAC (Association
for the Development of Relations With Cambodia). ADRAC1 is above all one man, one
- will: Father Yves Buannic, solidly built, a kind but firm expression, a handshake
that car~not leave one indifferent.. Totally distinct from the stereotype of the mis-
sionary fathers on a quest for religious expansion, Father Buannic is above all a
humanist, of the kind that does not dream. The reality of Cambodian life is there
to put things back into their proper perspective.
Horror of Cenocide .
It all began in July-August 1979. Liberated Cambodia gave the'world the spectacle
of an unspeaka~~le genocide. The world watched, dumbfounded, bewildered. Al.most
everywhere, people of good will banded together to try to do something. Thus, ADRAC
was formed around Father Buannic, who was joined by doctor~, lawyers, Journalists.
France was not yet ready to respond to Cambodia's needs because of obscure political
reasons, because of an international diplomatic ballet staged around the interests
of peoples.
Extending the action of the Red Cross, UNICEF and.the People's Aid Society, ADRAC
set two objectives for itself: reconstruction of the Pasteur Institute in Phnom
Penh and aid to Cambodian children, two gigantic tasks, judging by the existing
1 Box 410, 75025 Paris, Cedex, CCP, ;To 1326-31, Paris 5.
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- need. For Father Buannic, "200,000 orphans out of a population of 4 million is
an ezormous total. They represent that country's future, its live forces whic~
absolutely must be helped."
There could be no question of having them adopted by Western families, as requested
- by dozens of letters frrm well-inter~ding families. Uprooted, cut off from their
brothers and far from their homeland, these young people would have to endure more
trauma. No, their place was in their own country. T~he future of Cambodia depended
on them. There was a solution, howEVer: individual or group sponsorship of chil-
dren or orphanages, a practice that is noW spreading. For its part, the Cambodian
Government is doing everything possible for the orphans. Structures are gradually
being set up. PeopSe trained on the spot are helping others, providing medical
care, but also working in education. The older ones are learning trades, acquiring
~ professional training. The others are the responsibility of the community."
Nothing is left of the Pasteur Institute in Phnom Penh. What was once an imposing
building is now tumble-down, abandoned ruins, bearing witness to the wi'tless obstin-
acy that destroyed everything dc,wn to the last test tube. Five floors of labora-
tories were completely leoted, Everything must therefore be rebuilt from scratch.
The Pasteur Institute.in Paris has confirmed its wish to participate in the effort,
particularly by sending doctors,'teams of officials. The only problem, an exceed-
ingly complicated one at that, is finding the funds needed to rebuild the build3_ngs
and obtain new equipment for the laboratories. The importance of the existence of
the Pasteur Institute is cardinal for Father Buannic, "because this country now~
risks experiencing the endemic epidemics characteristic ~f Asia. Every effort made
in the past 2 years could be wip.ed out overnight if a majQr epidemic were to occur.
There are no vaccines available at present. If they are needed, they are sent for
from France or elsewhere. It is consequently necessary, indispensable, to promote
local productior.. While it is impossible to rebuild everything at once, we shall
start up a few laboratories in order to meet the most urgent needs: cholera, dysen-
tery, and other diseases." ' ~
Living Web .
The medical infrastructure is taking shape little by little. The school of ined=-
cine is open once again. Some 50 doctors are already practicing, unable, no matter
= what they do, to meet the demand. Students who survived the Pol Pot regime are
resuming their studies, more intensive, more practical now. Here again, the French
presence is very noticeabTe. "It is the French who helped get the medical school
going again. Instructian is in French, the documents are in French and even the
school supplies come from.France," Yves Buannic emphasizes.
France, always France. People talk only of France, without completely understanding
its political positiar. or its scarce eagerness to participate in the effort to re-
build the country. And yet, everything bears the stamp of the close tonds that
link France and Cambodia: the.railroad, destroyed by Pol Pot but whose infrastruc-
ture and equipment are of French origin; the culture, which, through the use of the
- French language, continues to weave a tenuous but living web of mutual understanding
between two peoples joined by history. ~
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For the time being, the French presence is semi-official, discreet but effective,
because doctors, surgeons and pediatricians come one after the other to spend
several months in Cambodia.
And yet, ~n the Cambodian governmental team, one constantly hears the same com-~
plaint: "We cannot understand why you would drop us like that in the United Nations.
_ We thought that you were friends, when in fact, you are still following behind the
United States."
Thing~ do not seem quite mature between the.two governments, which Father Buannic
bitterly noCes: "I do not believe that France is ready to racognize the current
government of Cambodia. Natura~ly, cooperation between the two countries will grow,
particularly in the cultural field, with aid to restoration of the Angkor Vat site,
but caution remains the prime rule of French politics."
If that caution continues, it will cause France to iose, in the long run, the privi-
leged place it now enjoys in this region of Southeast Asia.
At the ~resent time, ariy change in the situation seems to run up against t?ie Viet--
namese presence in Cambodia. The argument goes as foll.ows: "If the Vietnamese
leave Canbodia, our recognition of the current government will be immediate and
~ur aid to reconstruction subsrantial."
~ Cooperation of Vietnam
Here again, the response of a high Cambodian official is not long in coming. It
reflects all the suffering of a people seeking its future: "We are the survivor~
of genocide,.of an unspeakable nightmare. We are'all going to die. The notion
of 'nation' had no more meaning because there was no more future for us. There ,
- was a single question: Who will save us? You did not come. They, the Vietnamese,
came. We said 'thank you'." How can they a~'c those men to leave, when 40,000
Khmers Rouges are waiting for nothing more to invade Cambodia? "We are in a hurry
to do just one thing," continues that same official. "Rebuild our army, our admin-
istr3tion, in order to handle things by ourselves."
The army, nonexistent only a few months ago, is being rebuilt. The administration
at all levels no long~r requires the physical presence of Vietnamese advisers.
The Cainbodian minister of foreign affairs, far from excusing that Vietnamese pre-
sence, justifies and explains it: "Naturally, we coopErate closely with the Viet-
namese, our neighbors. We want only one thing: to be independent one day. We
will. be. But we cannor move too hastily. Look at the situation our country is in.
~ We need money to rebuild a minimum infrastructure, hospitals, schools. If you
_ French would help us, we could go much faster."
In Cambodia, the survivors of the living he1Z are learning what life is again, its
rhythms, the gestures and words of every day. They bear witness to our past si-
lence and appeal with all their migh~ for the hiimanitarian aid which, on the excuse
of politics, is so long in coming. "Big ~olitics determines many things," Father
~ Buannic cbserves. But this time, one can no longer refuse to see th~ truth or
close one's eyes to the burial grounds uncovered every day, the schools whose class-
rooms were turned into torture chambers by Pol Pot.
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Every Cambodian has seen death up close. It is right that they now know that a
future exists. And the future depends on us, on our will to make everything
available to this nation being reborn.
"The country is being born again; it is almost miraculous. At thE time of my
- first visit to Cambodia in July-August 1979, Phnom Penh was empty. Not a cat, not .
a single person could be seen. The streets~were deserted, the furniture on the
sidewalks, the buildings gutted. There was no water or electricity. Six months
- later, at Christmastime in 1979, everything had changed. The city was once again
inhabited. There were a few scooters in the streets. By June 1980, life in Phnom
Penh had resumed: motorscooters, motorcycles, merchants and a little traffic
could be seen. By August 1981, the Phnom Penh market was busier than the one ~
in Ho Chi Minh City. The birth rate is growing. Children play in the streets,"
Father Buannic says.
Relations must be normalized between France and Cambodia. Exchanges must be deve?.- ,
oped and people must remember that Cambodia has a great deal to offer the world,
at every level.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie
_ 11,464 ,
CSO: 4200/12 E~
_ 10
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