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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400500030002-1 ruK vrri~.~AL u~a u~vLr - JPRS L/ 10294 ~ 1 February 1982 - West E u ro e Re ort p p - CFOUO 5/82~ Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCA~T INFORMATION ~ERVICE _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-40850R040500034002-1 NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [ExcerptJ in the first line of each item, or following the la~t line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE O~I.Y. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500034442-1 FOR OFFI~IAL USE ONLY JPRS L/10294 1 February 1982 WEST EUROPE REPQRT (FOUO 5/82) CONTENTS ~iEATER FORGES - FRANCE General Gallois Interviewed, Says Nuclear War Possib'_e ~ (Gallois Interview; LATITUDE AUJOURD'HUI, Nov Qi1........... 1 ECONOMI C BE LG IUM Troubles Continse for Cockerill-Sambre Steel Firm (Paul Colson; POURQUOI PAS?, 10 Dec $1) 9 ~ POLITICAL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIkS . ERRATUM: Soviet Peace Movement Ties; Msinformation Ac tivi ties - (Philippe Krasnopolski; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 1:~-25 Oct 81).... 13 ~ - a - [III - ~ - 150 FOUO] ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500430002-1 - N()R ()MFI('IAI, IISF: ON1.Y THEATER FORCES FRANCE GENERAL GALLOIS INTERVIEWID, SAYS NUCLEAR WAR POSSIBLE Paris LATITU~E AUJOURD'HUI in French Nov 81 pp 19-22 [Interview with General Gallois, by Patrice Galand; date and place not given] [Text] We wanted to have a talk with a world-famous specialist on the development of the nuclear era techniques and strategies. We reached the conclusion that today a nuclear war is within the realm of possibility. General Gallois, disputed at +times, expounds in the most prestigious hemicycles. Author of about ten works, of several hundred articles translated into a number of l~nguages, including Russian, he gave u~ +~he results of 30 years of reflection. - ~Question] What great changes have taken place during this centurv? ~ [Answer] At least two in the field of my professional br.~anch. The f irst one is political and social: the 1917 Revolution. The second revolution is the advent of weapons of massive destruction~ [QuestionJ Before discussing the strategic aspects, can you explain to us what weapons of massive de5truction are, in fact? [Answer] It is a question of weapons that have a great destruction power per "unit of fire." Possibilitiesthat th~y do not alway~ have have been attributed to them and the dividends that they may bring in are often overlooked. There can be no thought of having recoursa to them except in extr~me situations. They have si;;nifi- _ cance only for protecting the territory of the country holding them and if that country were as if held by the throat. On the other hand, it has not been sufficiently realized that the atom could turn ~ war into an absurd act, at least between countries equipped with them, even in unequal amounts. f [Question] That idea is based on the principle that the final objective of war for an aggressor is to profit from it. If everything is destroyed, there is no longer any advantage in w~ging war: How have we reached this status quo of forced nonwar? ~ ~ 1 FOR OFFTCIAT, USF, ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY [Answer] Over the ages, men have confronted each other under different conditions. In a first phast, combat took place hand-to-hand, usually at some distance from cities and, when one party won over the other, he took possession of the human and material goods remaining intact. A second period entered with bombards ' at first and then heavy artillery. The combatants not only exterminated each other, but they also partially destroyed their respective property. During World War II, ~e entered a third period with the combination of the bombing plane and the atom bomb. At that time, they sought r~ot only to destroy the combatant, but they also razed material property in the interior. Thus, a period was reached in which war had become so absurd (because what was supposed to be conquered was destroyed) that the status quo of forced nonwar became imperative. [Question] Does not the de~~elopment of techniques throw that status quo open to question? [Answer] Unfortunately, it seems that it does. For several years now., we have been in a fourth period characterized by the a~curacy of long�-range missiles. These weapons can destroy traditional armed forces at their stations without having the civilian population and the material goods of the attacked country suffer from them. We have returned to a period in which nuclear war is again becoming con- cEivable, because the coveted goods would be spared. [Questlon] You present the Soviet Union as an expanding social system. What ma- terial means has that country given itself? [Answer] The Soviets have realized what the political and military implications of the two revolutionary changes w~ere. They were the instigators of the first - one. i?~ey were going to strive to master the second one rapi~ly. In 1949, they - tested their first nuclear explosive. From 1949 to 1960, they modernized the ve- hiclQS. During the decade of the 1960's., they deployed those weapons, and, st4rt- ing in 1965, contrary to what is said everywhere, "parity" was achieved between Russia and America, becauce, with nuclear weapons, "parity" is not numerical. The - Soviets had "parity" as soon as they were potentially capable of making the terri- tory of the United States undergo intulerable devastation; that is to say, capable of wiping a number of cities from the map and of causing human losses that would be counted by the millions. Starting at that time, with regard to America, the USSR knew that it was unattackable on its territory and this resulted in a great freedom of action for it. _ [Question] Aow does SoviQt expansion occur? [Answerj. It is the result of two processes: by means of territorial contiguity and by means of discontinuity. When the Soviets expand ~y means of territorial co~xtiguity, the Red Armiy usually goes into action after a polit~cal preparation _ ada.pted to local circumstances. Thus, that was the case in Eastern Eur~pe between 1935 and 1947. That was the case in Hungary in 1956, i.n Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Afghanistan in 1980. It ~aas a 12-year cycle. Political prepar~tion enables the Red Army to intervene without encountering organized military forces in oppo- sition. Th~ 'rliing~rian Army stayed in its barracks. The Czech Army did lik,ewise and the Afghan Army was on the side of the invader. . 2. i ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 raR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY At the time of the dispute between Vietnam--allie~ with Moscow--and China, the ;~d Army, which occupies a 6,00~-~k.ilometer border with China in the north, could have created a diversion to alleviate the Chinese on the Vietnamese. The Red Army did not move, becaus2 it would have had to go as far as Peiping. This was not conceivable. Therefore, there was no diversion. [Question] Why such precaution~s? (Answer] Because the Soviets cannot allow a defeat of theix Red Army. It has a reputation of invincibili~y. It is the guarantor of the regime and if it should suffer a serious setback, it is not sure that the system would hold aut. the large number of non-Russian ethnic groups peopling that ~^~me.nse ~mpire might make it brAak up. Some seven centuries of patient imperialist buildup would disappear. Tha Soviet Zeaders are very aware of the value of the heritage given to them and also what they have done themselves to expand still more the space under Rvasian control. Th~y will not engage the Red Army, if they are not sure of winning. [Question] Do you think that as soon as the Soviet~ invade a country by means of contiguity they no longer abandon it that is why the~ do not take that risk , before being certain of winning? [Answer~ The irreversible nature of the operations engaged in by the Rusaians by means of territorial contiguity is not understood by many Western leadera. In Europe, for example, it is not conceivable that the Sovieta will bring their gi-- gantic armament into action and that, in the face of a miraculous resistance, they will do an about-face. Consequently, strategies consisting in resisting with purely traditional means in the belief~that, in the face of that resistance, Moscow would not use its weapons of massive destruction, seem to me illusory and dangerous. [Question] Zs not the asymmetry of intiative ~f the conflict a determining factor in case of a conflict? [Answer] The East has the initiative. The corollary of initiative is aurprise. If the accuracy of the long-range missiles that it has is added to this, the USSR has the means of disarming Western countries,provided only with traditional wea- pons, at a distan~~ by means of a preventive attack. For the Soviets, war initia- tive is in itself sufficien*_ to create a total situation. asycmnetry, because,~witih _ today's weapons, the one who strikes first wins. Therefore, let us not talk of numerical "balance." That makes no sense. [Question] What means do the Westerners have to prevent all their armament from. being destroyed by a surprise attack? [AnSwer] In order to avoid the ~,rushing eftects of surprise aggression, there is hardiy anything but constant mobility of the counterattack armament. But the geographical situation asymmetry, added to the preceding ones, comes into play here. If the Soviets can deploy SS-20 missiles on their territory whose population density is, at times, from two to three inhabitants per square kilometer, the same is not true for the Dutch and their 404 inhabitants per square kilometer. If Lhe Soviets can deploy nuclear weapons with their warheads installed in the empty - spaces east of Moscow, where there can be no protesters, the same does not apply to the urban or rural complex in Western Europe. - 3 F(1R f1FFTf T ~ t r rc~ nNi v APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 FOR OFF[CIAL L1SE ONLY - [Question] Are not strategic nuclear submarines the last deterrence factor for ~ the We~terners? [Answer] As a matter of fact, one of the means of avoiding destruction of the - 6~est's defense weapons is to put them in constant mobility. But, when there is ~ not much territc,rial space, when the urban complex is very dense and also when it is a question of deroocracies in which each one expresses his opinions and in ~ which each one puts up with protest, 'the sea offers a large-sized sure refuge with- out protesters. In the West, this solution is not generally agreed to. It is ~ true that it is not practicable for countries that have only traditional forceso They can merely deplore the vulnerability of their military apparatus to the op- posing accurate weapons. It is true that, since 195Q, France has succeeded in building five n~iclear sub- marines (the Sovi~~ts launch as many every year) and the Defense budget has not favored the nuclear forces, with expenditures on the order of 15 percent of the total military appropriations. [Questionl Are you not defeatist? President Carter wanted to meet the Soviet SS-20 missiles with Pershing missiles or "cruise missiles." [Answer] Whea President Carter tried to meet the SS-20 missiles with Pershing missiles and "cruise missiles," he did not take into account the situation asym- metry existing between the two opposing blocs. This asymm~etry is political, social, military, stratEgic, geographic. Until the West realizes all the implications of this asynunetry, it will put itself in a situation of inferiority and will pay tribute to expressions like "detente," "balance of forces," "parity," and so an, which have little signifi.cance in the end of the 20th century, if they had any 30 years ago. Carter, by proposing his new weapons, and European poZiticians~by accepting them, did no~ realize the political risks that they were running. To take an extreme example, they forgot that it is not easy to shift cruise missiles on Dutch terri- tory with their warheads installed. [Questian] What is the advantage for the Soviets to have SS-20 missiles? [Answer] Those SS-20 missiles will, perhaps one day, be combat weapons, but they are already formidable political weapons. They work to the benefit of the Soviets owing to the d.ivisions that they are creating within the Alliance. The deployment of ~S-20 missiles led Carter to propose "cruise missiles" and Persining niissiles to the European allies. This is already mobilizing Dutch and Ge,rman public opinion against installation of the American missiles in Europe. Why would the Soviets abandon an armament that gives them that great a political advantage? Militarily speaking, the SS-20 is said to have, at present, an accuracy on the order of 250 meters at a range of 4,400 kilometers. Therefore, it might carry only extremely small explosive charges. _ [Question~ Can Che neutron weapon be ~~ffecLive against those w~eapons? - ~Ar.swer] There is no obvious connectir~n betrae:en enha~ced radiation warheads and missiles of the SS-20, 21 and 22 series. Of. ~~urse, if we had had the ~eutron - 4... FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 FUR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY weapon against Hitlei's Panzers, it might have worked wonders. Hitler invaded Europe with tanks. That was 40 years ago. Today, according to the doctrine that it f launts, the Red Army still thinks of the tank more as an occupation weapon than as a front-breaking weapor~, as ~aas true of it 40 yearv ago. It might be gos-- sible that, in our age, the breaking weapon is also and even more so the ballistic - missile used with the benefit of aurprise. Once the enemy has been disarmed, the tanks in~ervene to occupy the terrain. [Qt~.estion] Are our politicians aware of the evolution of these techniquea? - [Answer] Not all. The error--normal, moreover--is to proceed by analogy with the past. ~,or centuries, war was the opposition of chests to chests, cannons to cannons, tanks to tanks, aircraft to aircraft, ships to ships. Today, and all the more so tomorrow, technology is making other instruments available to staffs and those new weapons are fashioning new strategies. When we talk of establishing a strategic balance bet~~een the East and the West, in Europe, which is something current, we disregard the present-day strategic situa- tion. Because the West can only be on the defensive, it must have weapons capable a~" being kept out of reach of an initial attack by the enemy. Those weapons may - be very different from the opposing weapons. That is why there can be no numerical or even qual3tative equivaler~ce between the two bodies of opposing forces. [Question] Does your whoi~. theory re~ect a traditional war in Europe? [Answerj A traditional war implies a large :~umber of personnel. In assembling thpm, th? Soviets would lose the surprise effect. A salvo of SS-20 missiles can be fire3 withov.t any indication of aggression. The Soviets know what the effect of surprise is. They were victims of it in 1941. And then, they would be en- gaged in a war of attrition, prolonged in time, that would enable NATO's mechanism to operate. This is not to their advantage. Finally, if some 15,000 Russian tanks were to facE 7,000 or 8,000 NATO tanks with their corresponding artillEry in Che - Central European sector, in 48 hours no stone o~f the German habitat would be left standing. The conqueror would reign over a desert and over traumatized and rebel- ` lious populations. They are too shrewd in the East not to take such prospects into account. [Question] What weapons can t:~ey use against Europe? (AnswerJ You can best be answered by a quotation from Soviet works on~~strategy: "The principle of simultaneous action on the entire depth of the enemy's disposition and on the most distant targets in the rear is now, owing to nuclear weapons, esta- blished on realistic, solid bases." ("Tactical and Operational Art"). In a book entitled "The Offensive," the following is read: "...Because nuclear weapons are the principal means of destruction, they should be used in every case to annihilate the most important targets. There targets are, primaril}~, the enemy's means for nuclear attack, his troop concentrations and especiall~ his armored vehicles, his reserves, particularly Cank reserves and depots, artiZlery on firing position, bridges, points of ~assage, communication ~ 5~ FOR nF'FTf TAT. iJ,CF nNT.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . centers, control and command posts, in short every target in the rear zona, defensive structures and still other targets." [Question] In your assumption, you see~m to forget our American allies. [Answer] In view of the fact that the American defense forces in Europe are de- ployed in veryi~ieslofctheeother NATO countriesVwithoutuheavyslosseshsufferedaby military fac~l the American forces in Europe. [Question] If such a selective nuclear attack were conceivable, how do you view negoti.ation? [Answ~er] It is conceivable, if not politically capable of being carried out. If negotiation took place, which is hardly likely, the Soviets would negotiate directl.y on the preventive di~hat~would f~obablyrspare theoUoitedrStatesAcontingentsng selec- tivity of an action P [Question] With what means have the Soviets provided themselves for their expansion by means of discontinuity? [Answer] That form of intervention required the addition of two new components to their imposing armed forces. They were left a powerful land army by the 1945 ~ war. It support~dttre~.cha:~ge v~ political regimes in Central Europe. Then, at the - end of the decade of the 1950's, Admiral Gorshchkov was made responsible for setting un a high seas fleet. A quarter of a century later, Admiral Gorshc~hkov finished his work, because he is still in service today. He was sble to design and imple- ment an imposing, modern fleet. The semilitarmptransPort andacommercialrtransport, . It consists itself of two componen'ts: Y Aeroflot, which is taela~reenumberlofethe sameWaircrafthas~the5militarygairstransis - civilian fleet r~ses g port. Moreav~r, it is comma~tded by an air marshal. [Question] Is ti~ere not a basic di�ference in strategy between expansiar. by means of contiguity and expansion by means of discontinuity? [Answerl When the Soviet Union expands by means of territorial disccntinuity, The ground is the Red Atmy never intervenes in combat:with its compolnent units. prepared by a political action. T'..e "sister" parties are mobilized. Organized revolt or rebellion movements create internal agitation and, if it ia necessary to support those movements by force, Czer_h, Cuban or other volunteers are the ones who intervene. DeP~eainbu~nnohSoviet division, brigade orVairrsquadronVgoesminto staffs are contribu , action. Why? Undoubtedly, because the success of those di~tant operations cannct be gu~nntbut. The Soviet leaders know that those undertakings ar~e r~s~'Thehahaveewithdrawn from that they may also lose. They lost in Sudan, in ~gyp Y Somalia. Well before the Indonesia affair turned out badly. On the other hand, for the present, they have the upper hand in Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and even indirectly in Libya, Rho~tesia and still elsewhere in Africa. 6~ FOR OFFICI4L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . [Question] In view of what you hace just told us, is no~ the defense of the West malad~usted to the circumstances? [Answ~er] Not entirely adjusted, it seems. For over 30 years now, within the frame- w~ork of NATO, the European countries have been invtted to stand guard with trad~- tional armed forces, especiaily vulnerable, on the places where they are stationed, to the new ballistic weapons deployed by the Soviet Arny. The NATO countries al- locate consj.derable amounts of money to this form of traditiv~ial defense, very similar to what it was a quarter of a century ago. At the same time, these Western European countries, which depend on the outside world in matters of energy and raw materials, are politically, economically and militarily absent from tl~ose regions of the world in which, however, their destiny is at stake every day. Moreover, it is likely that if the Soviet U~ion had not taken on, since 1917, the imposing stature recognized in it today, the Western countries that depend on Middle East oil would not have accepted so easily the increase in the price of oil. It is true that they now know that, if they rose up against the behavior of the oil- producing countries, the Soviet Union would immediately reap the benefit of that way of acting and the producing countries would turn toward the Soviat Union to ask it for protection. [Question] What do you adivse for the i~e~ens~e~of France? - [Answer] It has already adopted, since 1959, a more sensible military policy than the military policies of most of its neighbors. First of all, it has to immunize itself against war, turn its territory into ~ sanctuary, {.n order to have, more- over, a certain degree of freedom of action. That was General de Gaulle's idea. Th~n it would have to mobilize its friends, its allies--with similar interests-- in the practice of a policy of presence outside Europe, in order to contend there politically, financially, technically and, in the last reaort, nuc~early with the countries of Asia and Africa that have not yet aligned themselves in the Soviet camp. Or even, in the manner of what has been done by the East, "destabilize" the political and social systems that prove to be hostile. [Question] Are you opposed to military service as it is at present? [Answer~ The country seems to be attached to it--if not the young persons who perform. it--and, therefore, it is a holdover in a military world in which the number of personnel no longer plays the same part as formerly. Of course, it ~ustifies ' a structure to which the Command is attached. I note that Great Eritain, which hasmore inhabitants than France, has given it up and that, instead of maintaining 550,000 men, it now keeps less than 350,000 men. The new weapons, without which there r_an be no territorial immunity, do not need large battalions. With regard to operations abroad, which can be carried out only with traditional forces, the draftees cannot participate in them. Thosp operations can be conducted only by career ~nen. It is agreed that a professional army costs less than a conscripr army. This would be~true with an equal number of pe.rsonnel. It is certainly less true with, like Great Britain, a smaller total personnel force. Neither n~:~lear protection, nor possible distant operations require more than half a million men under the colors. ;7, F(1R (1FFIf�r ~ T I iCF ~1NT.V APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500430002-1 - FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY [C~uestion] Can France's nuclear power rival. with the nuclear power of the two great powers. [Answer] The term rival is not appropriate. What is involved is the amount of damage that we would b~ capable of inrlicting in case of a total threat againet us. What is needed is for thts "amount of damage " to be consistent with the value of France's stake. At least, as estimated by an aggressor. It is true that, dif- ferently fror~ what is often stated by politicians, France's reprisal weapons do not apply only to their threat to large Soviet cities, but also to a number of military and economic targets. That is true of the Kola Peninsula, a USSR critical military bastion, and also of a number of industrial zones, like, naturally, force transportation networks and energy irrigation [sic; possibly should read distribu- ~ tion] networks (oil and natural gas). In comparison with an intact America, it is obvious that loss of those facilities would be a severe punishment, a punishment to which a medium-sized power like France is, undoubtedly, not "entitled." [Ques*.ion] We have a credible nuclear force that must, of c~urse, be modernized constantly. Did we not demonstrate our capability of operating at a distance with the Kolwezi og~eration? [Answer] It is true that the desire to intervene was evident. But, in spite of our sizable personnel force, and without doubt because of it, it was necessary to "borrow" American and Zairian transport aircraft (the Zairian aircraft of American origin) and that operation was successful only owing to the spirit of initiative, to the courage and to the training of our men. But it is a question of a very _ sma.ll nucnber of personnel, with no common measurement with the forces that we main- tain for similar operations. Actually, we lacked, and still lack, the technical means: long-range transport and support aircraft. [Question] In conclusion, what future do you see for the West? [Answer] It is rather gloomy, for lack of a great plan and the common will to carry it out. That is necessarily true of a political body with a large number of decision-making centers and with a number of internal rivalries and opposition ' kept alive by divergent interests. That is not the case confronting us, w�here a lasting government authority, a complete independence fron~ a public opinion that has no expression, enable the leaders to move their pawns on the world chessboard without being hindered by the contingencies making up the normal activity of truly democratic countries. We need an overall reflection, if an analysis of Soviet behavior, especially since the end of World War II, shows that, on the contrary, Moscow is devoting its activity abroad to the imp?.ementation of a great pol:Ltical and social plan. And not without considerable success, it seems. COPYRIGHT: LATITUDE SARL, DEPOT LEGAL, 4e trimestre 1981 10,042 ~ CSO: 3100/204 8 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ~NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500430002-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ECONOMIC BELGIUM TROL'BLES CONTIiJUE FOR COCI~RILL-SAMBRE STEII, FIRM Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 10 Dec 81 pp 19-20 [Article by Paul Celson: "Headed for Bankruptcy?"~ [Text] As a case of decomposition, Cockerill-Sambre is axousing a great deal of anxiety these da.ys. Some of it is justified, somz less so. A not very encouraging example of what awaits a Wallonia given over to its demons and its own forces. Long live public ma- nagement and the politicization of the economic dossiers! Catastrophe: A few months following the marriage of conver_ience between Liege and Charleroi, there is a running battle going on. Catastrophe: Under pressure of one or the other of our partners of the Ten, the European Community is frowning upon it more. And what if it were to cut off our resources? Catastrophe: The Cockerill- Sambre mammoth is losing 1 billion francs a mon+~h~ which means that an uncontrol- lable outflow is being added to the permanent deficiency of the enterFrise. And~ lacking any settlemen~, time presses. Package of Billions And yet, everything in the dossier is not equally black. At the beginning of the week, the Depaxtment of Finance auth~rized the Steel Industry Financing Company and Belfin to borrow sums which should provide several breaths o#' fresh air to Cockerill-Sambre. Thus, it is not only a question of covering the losses of the compa.ny's accounts d?partment, but also of ineeting the needs for investments or the repayment of advances for the first 3 months of 1982. This is good news inasmuch as, alas, the Walloon steel men are living from reprieve to reprieve~ but it cannot under any circumstances feed longer term hopes. This week, Willy Claes, who deals with day to day matters at the Square de Meeus in Brussels (Ministry of Economic Affairs), was to convey the Belgian government's response to the questions from the Commission of the European Communities. The _ granting of a package of billions of francs, of which the Walloon ste:~l industry has the most vital need, depends on it. Citizen Claes has sometimes been ~.ccused of a certain slowness in hurrying, and this has led to all kinds of suppositions of a political nature. It is true that community distrust has poisoned the sim- ' plest relationships in Belgium between the people in the North and the peaple in the South. 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY � Whatever the case, the European mort.gage co~ald be temporasily l:.fted. But nothing would be settled for a11 -that. It is fro~n the inside that the dossier is most sure ~ to rot. In the two just mergea basins~ there axe rumors of "urunerging~" a neolo- gism in the form of a euphemism which saves the paxtners from openly talking about divorce. But, isn't that what it is a11 about? Cordial Disagreement ~ - Between Liege and Charleroi, distrust has taken a firm hold at all the levels of - responsibility and management. Nothing works any longer~ not even axound ths union table, and the most recent figures do not help ma.tters. - As a matter of fact, the October results show much heavier losses in Liege than in - Chasleroi: 4~65 million francs, before depreciation and financial costs~ for Cockerill and only 8 million francs for the people of Chaxleroi. For Novemb~:r, the Triangle triumphantly showe3 a profit of about 10 million fra.ncs while the ~nonthly - balance sheet for the people of Liege dragged in the red. Liege has taken advan- tage of this to accuse the people of Charleroi of being too numerous in managemen'c positi_ons, which would explain why the Triangl.a comes out ahead in the confronta- tion. Because henceforth it is a question of confrontation~ and no longer simply one of cordial disagreement. , - Once the idea of a possible unmerging has been launched, there will be no lack of fuel for the fir.e. They are sure to recall in Chaxleroi tha.t even the .~xperts of Nippon Steel expressed the strongest reservations about the very short tez~m chances of an operation like the one being considered between Cockerill and the Triangle. "In our country, a merger takes years," they axe supposed to have stated. And to add immediately t~.~,t~ in addition~ the matter had been handled contrary to all good sense~ as the legal act of inerging preceded the clarification of the ar- - rangements in the technical area. Henceforth~ some people ~tated aloud what had only been whispered in the fall: tha.t the act of inerging was first and foremost a political operation intended to drain money more easily from the treasury to enterprises where the social (and = electoral~ axgument carries weight. And Andre Cools wasn't he one of the "god- - fathers" of the merger? will not contradict us. Political Creature Anotl-ier remask from those who advocate divorce is directed at the administration and management of the business. It is no longer a secret that Jarques Vandebosch, the president of the new entity, is being challenged within the Liege clan itself. And by the representatives of the rank and file, which is the last straw for a man _ of whom it is said straight out that he is first of a11 a political creature in ctiaxge of implemex~ting "the socialist peace" at Cockerill-Samhre. Isn't it trua that last Monday he had to cancel a meeting between the executive committee and union representatives from Liege and Charleroi, because the latter had, without - further ado,�refused to accept the invitation? It is also true that the merged enterprise still does not a full time managing ~ director and could in the near future no longer even have an acting managing direc- tor. 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400504030042-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - As a matter of fact, last week Thursday, during a meeting of the Sociallat Party~ , A1 ber~t Prere, who has been filling this position until the appointment of a perma- nent replacement, announced that he would like to resign as soon as possible. No- body is unaware of the fact ~ihat the former boss of the Triangle and President Va.ndebosch are not on the best of terms~ that tbe latter has on occasion ancroached ~ upon the prerogatives of the acting managing director, and that the incompatibility of temperament between the two men is not simply superficial, or even ideological. - In short, they are not two of a kind. Why is it taking so long to appoint a permanent incumbent to the position which Albert Frere agreed to hold on a temp~rasy basis? The question ha.s been asked and could get a rapid response. Appaxently Willy Claes has three candidates up his sleeve, but cannot make up his mind to make a decision. Which.once again seems to prove th~,t, through an ~xcess of caution, the little socialist man is dela,ying the ~ final solution to the difficulties of the Walloon steel industry. From there~ it - only takes one step to see it as a political-community maneuver, a step which was quickly taken. Al1 of this tends to prove that the state of decomposition of the dossier is much more advanced than is sometim~s ima.gined. It is lj.kely that the idea of urunerging, or of divorce if prEfers~ will make more headway in the days ~,head. Management in Fublic Getting to the overall cond.itions of the operation, certain people do not he- sitate to criticize one or more provisions of the merger. Was it reasonable~ for example, to include the mechanical engineering division in the overall package? Was it wox�thwhile to include "Cockerill Engineering" in the merger? Wouldn't it have been better to hold aside the cold-roll sector as a unit separate from the group, as was done for Phoenix Works, or as Carlam and the Ruau rolling mills were left in Charleroi? On the other hand, there sho~,~ld be no question of turning Seraing and Chertal into subsidiaries. As the situation has deteriorat~d over the last few months~ it is no longer fas from being admitted that the pc~lit~cization of the dossier has devilishly complica- ted matters to the point of making certain solutions difficult, if not impossible. Well placed accusers have cha.llenged "the management in public" from which the whole business is suffering. There is not a single decision w~ich can remain se- cret long enough to be implemented, but is passed ~n to the party headquarters where it becomes integrated into a tactic. For which the survival of the unit~ with its tens of thousands of workers, is not the main objPCtive. Collapse These days, the word "ba,nkruptcy" has been used, and it is true that the climate between the two Walloon ba.sins has become more difficult. If, ultima~ely, this bankruptcy does take place~ it will not be for several months, maybe a year, or a year and a half ~ enough time so tha.t the responsibility for the collapse cannot bc attributed to politics. Wouldn't it be better :Lf only the management were to blame? 11 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400504030042-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The fact remains that a collapse of the steel industry wnuld be a tra,~edy for Wallonia, a tragedy the scope of which would exceed the figure of job losses above. And yet~ an additional 30~000 people unemployed~ that is quite something: Before the irreparable happens in Liege and in Charleroi~ shouldn't those respon- sihle as they should be called by na,me meditate on Nietzsche's words: "Do not acctzse the other~ the defeat is in you." Evidently, the father of "Zarathustra" is certainly not well read by our steelworkers COPYRIGHT: 1981 POURQUOI PAS? ~3 cso: 3100/187 a 12 . - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500430002-1 FOR OF FICIAL US~: ONLI' POLITICAL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS " ERRATUM: 7he following is a corrected version of an article originally published in JPRS L/10158 0= 3 December 1981, (FOUO 63/81) pp 7-9 - of this series. SOVIET PEACE MOVEMENT TIES; DISINFORMATION ACTIVITIES - Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 19-25 Oct 81 pp 54-55 [Article by Philippe Krasnopolski: "The KGB's Doves. How the Soviets Are Operat- ing in Disguise in Euraae. By Manipulating the Aespectable Peace Movements Ani- mated by Christian or Youth Organizations"] [Text] "The pacifist regaining strength and spreading especially in the countries of Western Europe. What are the reasons for this? On one hand, peo- ple are greatly preoccupied with American policy; on the other hand, the pacifist initiatives of the socialist countries have had their effect. Diverse pQlitical forces have joined the pacifist movement: communist parties, major sectors of so- cial democracy and of the ecology movement." Mr Boris Ponomarev, member of the Soviet Communist Party Politburo and head of the - "international relations" section, makes this observation in Che October issue of ' the "New International Review," one of the communist movement's theoretical publi- ; cations. It is also a balance sheet. A year ago, on 28 September 1980, tk:e World Peace Council decided to organize a widespread campaign against rearmament of NATO member.s and against the emplacement of the American Pershing 2 missiles in Europe. This World Council has its headquarters i.n Sofia, Bulgaria. It is an organization of obedience to the Soviet Union. In France, it is represented by the Movement ! for Peace, whose secretary general, :Ir Michel Langignon, is a member of the Commu- nist Party. rir Ponomarev can appreciate the work it has accomplished: Three hundred thousand demonstrators "for peace and disarmament in Bonn on 10 October. Last April, there had been only 25,000 protesting against the NATO sessions in the capital of - the Federal Republic. Other demonstrations are planned: in London on 24 October; in Brussels and Paris on the 25th; a month later at the Hague. oi _ "The struggles waged by the pacifist forces of Western Europe are converging, affirms the daily L`HUMANITE. The culmination of the campaign will be a great international demonstration in Brussel.s on 6 December, the eve of the NATO council meeting. ~ 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-40850R040500034002-1 l'Vn V~'P~t.~ML l.Jl`G VI~ILI In Germany, the agents of the Soviet Union are moving forward in disguise. At the origin of the rally are two pacifist organizations with Christi?n tendencies: the "Action for Expiation" and the "Movement for Action in the Service of Peace." In reality, the idea for this demonstration belongs to a Dutch organization, "End the N Bomb," created in 1977 at the Netherlands CP's initiative and directed by the International Relations office of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee. The decision for this was, nevertheless, made in Hamburg on 20 June during the Church Conference, the synod of the German Evangelical Church, aft�.er an initial demonstration had brought together 80,000 people in the city streets. On 24 August, the plan received Che blessing of the central committee of the World - Council of Churches, which met in Dresden in the GDR, and that of Mr Erich Honecker, East Germany's head of state. The small communist party [DKP] of the Federal Republic of Germany thus placed its men. One of the organizers of the 10 October demonstration is a certain Fritz Teppich. He had already been at the forefront of the disturbances against General Haig's - visit to Berlin on 13 September. In the sixties, Mr Teppich was a militant within the APO, extra-parliamentary opposition, the German leftist movement. Previously, he lfved in East Berlin, where he was working for the wesCern section of the central committee of thP SED, the Communist Party of East Germany, before becoming correspondent for ADN, the GDR's news agency, in the city's western sector. - There he joined SEW, the SED's western branch. But he soon left this movement (after a falling out with its head) to join the pacifists. Another communist infiltrator is Mr Achim Maske, presently the secretary general of the Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Detente. .He is a former leader of the communist group, Spartakus. A report of the Bundesverfassungsschutz, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (the FRG DST [Directorate of Territorial Surveillance]), was for- warded to Mr Schmidt. It reveals this communist infiltration of the pacifist move- ments. According to this report, the European communists are supposed to have drawn up a 3-year plan.of action against NATO rearmament, with 1981 being the first phase. For the first 6 months of 1982, this plan is said to provide for direct action - against military installations in the NATO countries, such as taking over barracks. On S August 1982 (the eve of the anniversary of Hiroshima), demonstrations are to take place in all of Western Europe, accompanied by hunger strikes. At Christmas, the churches are to be occupied. In January 1983, the pacifists are to call. for civil disobedience (refusal to pay taxes, etc.); strikes against industry are to be launched. Finally, again in August, on the 6th, there are to be new mass demonstrationa. The Pershing missiles are due to be installed in Europe in 1983. 14 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1 FOR OFF[CIAL l1SI: UN1,1' The report likewise sheds new light on last February's publication in the weekly STERN of a map showing the site of American nuclear missile installations in the Federal Republic of Germany. This document had been furnished to tfie ~ournal by the BBU (Citizen Initiative for Environmental Protection Federal ~4ssociation)~ an ecology movement, which in turn obtained it from the Communist Party of the FRG. These documents were furnished by Section A of the KGB, the famous "di~information" department. Thus, in June 1980, a"Pentagon document" began circulating in Great Britain, showing the American atomic weapon targets in the Sovi~t Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. But it also included the ones in the neuiral countries and even NATO members (in the case of Russian occupation). This document arrived in - the Netherlands the following December. Today it is being circulated among the Scandinavian countries. A"pacifist" majority was ele~ted to the Hague last May. PHOTO CAPTIONS l. p 54. Mr Egon Bahr. One of the only German political figures, along with Mr Willy Brandt, to receive praise from PRAVDA. 2. p 55. The ar;uments of German pacifism are summarized in the text of this poster: "Bill fnr the FRG. Items delivered: packages of food, Marshall Plan, Starfighters. Paid to date: loyalty to the alliance, military bases. Balance due: battlefield." COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeurs actuelles" 9475 ~ ~SO: 3100/67 END 15 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030002-1