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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500430003-4 rvtc vrr~~u~~, u~r. VI\L~ JPRS L/ 10295 ~ 2 February 1982 Ja an R~ ort p p (FOUO 7/82) ~ FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500030003-0 ~ ~ rroTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency trans~issions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retain~d. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Prucessing indicators such as jText] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- � tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the ' originai but have been supplied as appropriate in context. - Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 APPR~VED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500030003-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/I0295 2 February 1982 JAPAN REPORT (FOUO 7/82) CONTENTS POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL lnternal F'robl~ms of' Forei~n Mir?isi,r,y Analyzed (CHUO KORON, Ocl, 81) 1 Su~uki~:~ Basir, Po~ition Re-Examined (Taro Kamakura; SEIKEIJIN, Dec 81) 18 ~ IILITARY LDP Plan To Launch ~Securit;r Satellite' Discussed (Saneyuki Kodachi; 5ANKEI SHZMBUN, 1 Jar. 82) 23 ECONOMIC Natian's 'I'rade rrictions Discussed - (Editorial; NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 8 Jan 82) 26 of Japanese Market Advocated (Edi~;orial; T~IE DATLY Y~4IURI, Jan f32) 29 Nati_on's Rale .i_n World I:conomy Viewed (; MAINICrII DAILY NrWS, 5 Jan 82) ~1 ~a Lur~~ Cours~ of Trade Probl~ms Witt~ U. S. , EEC Viewed (BUNUFI SHUNJU, Oct 81) 33 Ni~san Motor President Interv~ewed on Company Plans (Shun I~tiitiar. a In tervi ~ra; NIHON KEIZAI ~HIMBUN,17 Dec 81 j ~3 Government Decides on External Economic Measures (NIIION KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 17 Dec 81) Lt7 - a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO] FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 FOP. OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~CIENCE AND TECIWOLOGY Increasingly Large I~oyalties Received for High Technology (SHUKAN DAIY~',MONDO, 7 Nov 81) ~l Results of Investigation - Tvaluation of Technological Standards, by Hiroo Wakai f Lowerin~ of Tariff on Electronic Computers Termed Unavoidable (NIHON KO(',YO SH~2BUN, 17 D~c 81) 71 Nissan To Fxpand Production oP Defense Equipment (NIKK~,I SANGYO SHIMBUN, 17 Dec 81) 72 - - b - FOR O~rFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 F'~ 'i:~~. ;t~: utit.~' PULITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL I;ITERNAL PROBL~T~IS OF FOKEIGN MINISTRY ANALYZED Tokyo CHUU KORUN in Japanese Oct 81 pp 294-309 ~'1'ext) The l~orei~n Ministry "sickness" continues: the terrible fear of being trans- i~~rred tc~ a less devcloped country, the fee.ling of extreme clistrust of the Suzuki, the breakduwn in the abiliLy Lo gaL-her information, and the stra~in c~1- over- wc,rk clue to a shurtagc uf personnel. Is Japan's diplomacy of the e:i~;hCi.e.; ~11 r~i.ght - l ike tfii s? Unable To Voice a Sincere "Congratulations" I.n the place, let us look at the position tlie Foreign Ministr.y is in riow by 5tarting with "the bitter tale of the Foreign riiiiistry." Creat changes are made in the Foreign Ministry every sunnner. 7:7?is y~~~~r: as wc~l.l, beginning w:ith the decision to trar.ster Deputy Vice rlinister Kator.i as ambassador to China, quite a few people in the ministry proper were transferred uver.seas. I:n the case of domestic oFf.icials, every changa is a step up the ladcler of. succes~. Thus, farewell parties are joyous occasions. However, in the c:ase of the Foreign ~Linistry, it is difficul.t to voice a sincere "congratulations" to someone appointed to a post overseas. Why? Ttie reason is that among ~:he approximately 150 foieign I,c~stings, 30 at most are in develaped countries; the rest are i_n _less devc~l.o.Ped ~,untr. ies. ( i ni~c ~;c~e~ to a devclo}?ing nat:i on, l conditions are bad compared with Japan. U~~e is apt to ~;et siclc due tu uiC[ in ~~limat.e. Ancl i.f one does get sick, ~.ieatli otten resulCs c?ue tu a 1~?cl: of comple~e medical facilities such as are avail- :,~l.e in �_Japan. One ufficial whose transfer Lo Africa was decided showed us i.nstruc- ~ic~ns that car.r.ied the Citle "To everyone Lraveling on officia]. bt~siness to unhealrhy ~~~~~ntries." It iJ:~s lianded to him by the I'oreign Min:istry's Bureau oI Ilenltli. It L~~~;i n5 : . '�I'I~c~ tcrri_Cc~ry ~u whi~�h yc-~u tiave heeu assigned is an t~nhealttiy country, wiiere ;;,;ric,; of Iic~alCli rind nutritiona]_ }i,ygiene are poor. You must be very caref.u.l of ,;rr~i l~epatitis, haclerial gastr~intestinal sickness, amoebic diseases, paras~t:i.c ;~__~~~~_s, cholera, intestinal typhus, dysentery, and so fort}l. T11us, you must, rld thar he is dea].in~; ser3.ously witl? diplomatic problems. FOR OF'F'ICIAL USE UNLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500030003-0 h'OR O1~1~1('IA1. Util~: ONi,Y lioti~ever, according to the newspapers at least, I'rime Plinister Suzuki gave over his sunmier vacation to golf. Of cour~e, Prime riinister Kichida and even Prime Minister Uhira--when they secluded themselves in the mountains at a summer resort--read books aud thought abo~t the future of the country, givxng the Foreign Niinistry a pile of paperwork that needed to be done. Prime Minister Suzuki wanted to appear to be making an. effort, and he summoned Foreign Ministry officials to Karuizawa every day. The - l~orei~n Ministry, with extreme lack of faith in the Suzuki cabinet, thinks that "the - sayin~, 'work first play ].ater,' no longer holds true for politicians," SympLoms of the Sinking of the Base of the War Group When Poreign rlinistry officials who criticize politicians look at what is going on around tliem, they get more and more gloomy. That is because signs of the i~inent destruction of ttie foundations of the Foreign Ministry war group (those who came into the ministry during World War II~--which should be the highest group--are clear. Plinistry officials had complex reactions regarding vice fore~gn ministerial personnel at the time former Ambassador to Korea Sunobe Ryoji was chosen, following Takashima Masajiro. In the first place, they thumbed their noses at personnel choices whereby, in many cases, the rules of seniority were ignored. Thus, it was said: "It may ' be more typical of Suaobe than the wa~r group of the Foreign Ministry." After all, they became pacified under Vice Minister Sunobe. Wtiy would it be more typical of Sunobe'? Mr Sunobe was a prewar group diplomat. After - joining the ministry, hP had language training in England, then America. He received strict training from his senior colleagues and served in China. By comparison, war- - period diplomats, on joining the minis try, were ~mmediately drafted into the military. Even after the war, ttiere was no opportunity to be assigned abroad until the overseas ~ offic~ was set up in 1950. Moreover, after 1941, the language training prog-am was = phased out and there was no adequate language instruction. The 1942 group w,.s _ selected from those who took the standard high school examination; the diplomat test had been abolished. With the 1944 group, even the high school test was eliminated, _ thougti there was some testing in special cases, In terms of language ability, diplo- matic education, and techniques of diplomacy, there is a noticeable difference be- tween the prewar and later groups. 'i'l~us, signs have appeared in t.he Foreign Ministry that give cause for anxiety. A1- tliough we have reached the point when the wartime group of diplom,ats occupies the mini.stry and tlie ambassadorships of major foreign countries, it is obvious tliat tlie nuniber e~f capable personnel is decreasing~ There are almost no car.didates for vi cc mi niti l~r, T f tiii ngs were as they used ro be, Vice NLinis ter. Takashiraa would have l~ec~n :succeecl~cl hy lle~~uty Vice Minister Katorl, ror a long time it was the practice i n c li~~ rurc~ i};n M1 n:i s try L-c+ raisc~ the cleputy vice minis ter up to vice minister. Be-- _ cc~use an nmzl~ur ~~c,.l.i.tician becomes furcign minister with each change of cabinet, it l~~s ~~~eil esCal>.Lished that the hifihest r~inkinF; person irom the ministry itsel.C becomes - furei~;n u~inister--out of the necessity for maintaining an unbroken line of diplomatic responsibility. If a person were to assist vice foreign minister for 2 years as - del~uty vice foreign minister, and then serves as vice foreign minister for 2 years, - thc rhytlun of Japan's diplomacy would not be interrupted. Moreover, ambassadors from various cou?itries in Tolcyo have sai~?: "This [continuity] is what we want f.or the [ Ministry to keep in mind. 6 FOR OI~FICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 lluwever, liaving Deputy Vice Foreign riinister Katori accompany Prim~ rlinister Suzuki on his visit to the United States, after the most recent change in vice minister, raised questions--the issue of raising the status was e~~aded. The responsibility for the confusion surrounding the Japan-U.S. joint agreement is attributed ta Prime Minister Suzuki'~ lack of diplomatic co~nonsense. To put the bXame for the ctr;t~ f usion on the Foreign Ministry is exceedingly far from the mark. But the power of a~~ointing the vice minis ter rests with the cabinet. If the Prime rf3nister's Office was dissatisfied wi~h Mr Katori, even the Foreign Ministry would n~t have the power to oppose the appointment. Ttie pr.oblem arose afterward. At present there are 12 people from the 1942 group. ^'t,e 1943 group has 22, the 1944 group 11. Despit~ that, no names from among the 45 ;aere proposed to succee~3 Mr Katori as candidate for vice minister. It was said that there was only one--Okawara Yoshio, ambassador to the United States (from the 1942 group)--an ace. However, he took up his present post only a year ago and has a _ 2-year assignment to fi].1. It has been said in the Foreign Mini~t.ry, which gives top priority to diplomatic relations with the United States, that the post ~f ambassador should not be reassigned after a mere 2 years. If tha wishes of the For.eign Ministry should be ignored and Ambassador Ukawara should be called back to the ministry, no one will be found fro:.~ the war group to xenlace him. Personnel Unable To Act F.ven the ambassador to the Soviet Union is in the same situation. The Soviet Union _ i_s a superpower whose institutions are different from aurs. Although the Soviet Union is r>ur ~eographic neighbor, it is particularly important to keep an eye on txends there. F'or ttiat purpose the Foreign Ministry has invested niuch efFort in di.p]_omaCic channeis in the Sovi_et Union since the war. Former Vice Ministe.r Hogen Sh~nsaku, former Ambassador to Wes t Germany Sono Akira, former Ambassadcr to the Soviet Union Shi~emitsu Akira--all were capable diplosat~ from this group. Diplomats in the Soviet section are required to b e able to observe night and day the goings-on in ti~~e Soviet ~ Union, to gleari keenly what is happen~::d politicallyy inilitarily and econonu ca11y. It is not something that can be done in a single day. r~ :~:L~1()II12I: assigned to the Soviet Union must learn Russian, he must live in Moscow, ~_n an environment where it is difficult to c~llect information. He must carefully - search through PRAVDA, IZVESTIA, and the Red Army organs, and draw from them mi.nute ch~ir.~es in the Sovic~t Ifnion. He must check his information by making contacl- with diplomats in the party. llip.lomats in the Russian section undery;o rigorous ini.n~;. llc~wever, 5incc. the time of Ambassador Shigemitsu, diplomats in the Russ:tan .;~~~~t i,~n, tc, a surprising degree, tiavF: not amounted to anything. t,~?ien Ambass~cl~r ShigE~mitsu retired from the service, Ile lef[-. a bad situati~n betiind. ~~�.~~mt~r Ambassador to ~gypt Uomoto Tor.akichiro was tlien recruited. [linbassaclor Uomolo crzined in Lnglish, and he did not know, He had nev~r worked in Moscow. ~~ke up for his weak poirits, the Foreign Ministr.y go~ the num}~er one person of the ' :t~.-:~~ ~roup in the Russian section to help Ambassador. tlomoto adj~.xs*_ to tf?e Soviet -~.,~'__i~n, 'Ctius, the weakening of the embassy was averetd. !~m}.~as:~ldor Uom~~zo hc~, 5c~c~n in the service a].on~ time, and there are indications he wi11 retire at tlie enci r~t" the year. .j i~OR OI~I~It'!AL t~S~; ~(?~1~,1' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500034443-0 F'OR OFF7('IAi, !)tii~: ONI.Y H~wever, we cannot find, among ttie wartime group of diplomats, any who can speak P.ussian, to say nothing of people who can run an embassy, "fence" with the powerful Soviet rureign rlinistry, and find out the Soviet attitude toward Japan. According to the press, former Vice Minister Takashima's name is being mentioned as the next ambassador to the Soviet Union--indicating tne fear within the ministry of going ~Jith someone f.rom ttie midwar group who has not demonstrated his ability as ambassador. i�ir 'i'akasiiima, as well, ci~es not have Russian experience. I3ut he handled the arduous ne~;otiati.ons .Ec>r thc Japan-China normalization and for the Japan-China friendship and peace treaty, and knows the technique of negotiating with a socialist country. - When hc was cleputy foreibn nunister he participated in Japanese and Soviet Foreign rtinistry-level discussions and in periodic Japanese-Soviet foreign ministerial dis- cussions. He was also part of the off and on discussio~s with the Soviet Foreign rtinistry If rir Takashima is chosen, the feeling of hope will be the basis of iiis ambassadorship--hope that he can tie together Japan-Soviet relations in the increasingly harsh eightie~s. j~'itat abour ttie ambassadorship of that other communist country, China? The former minister, Yosl~ida Ker~zo, of the 1939 group, was in. the China service. Howetier, Deputy Vice Foreign Mi.nister Kat;ori, wha has been assigned there next, has G2rman, not Chinese, Iie has never served as .Asia section chief, nor has he exPerience i.n China. His being assigned to China stemmed from concern about some- thing outside the ministry--he was not chosen because he is the most suitable person for ehe post of ambassador to China. In terms of suitability, the ambassadorship to l~est Germany would seem more appropriate for a person trained in German. This shows that aside from Mr Yatori, there was no one else from the war group suitable for the ambassadorship to China. 'Cfius the Forcit;n Ministry vice minister and the ambassadorial personnel of major countries are in a situation where all doors are closed. The Foreign Ministry cannot Eorever turn back time. Diplomat~ from the war group will be made vice mi.nister and ambassadors to major countries in a year or two. Can we weather the stormy eighties with these peoPle? It's not just the dismal feeling of the postwar group in looking up to the war group as their superiors, but also for the Japanese people it raises serious questions. - The Higher Cost of llef2nse Ra.ises the Cost of the Insurance Premium In the I'oreign Ministry, the postwar group of diplomats are at the center of the debate on how to survive in the eighties. The major topics are Japan's security and ~he pc>li~y ~~f stren~thening the information network. Japan is a nation committed to _ ~~eace, but arounc'. i.t are countries with strong military establishments. In an c~mer~e~cy, a counLr.y witYi military power will be able to defend itself. Even when t=l~er.e is no emer~;ency, a c~untry with military might will be able to assert its in t~ res Ls . ~\m~~r:Lca ~.ntcevened in Vic~tnam. 'i11e Soviet Union is engaged in an invasion of ~Cy;latc i~i UN peacelcf~epin~; ricr_ivities; 4) incr.c,^sed Foreign aid; ~i) contribut:ions to _ r ~ cn~;then.~nh refu~;ee camps; 6) stren~t!~ened cooperation wi lh respect to Lhe pua_irical -.~nd economic aspects of support to Korea and the ASL'AN countries. TI,~ Fur.ei~;n T[inistry's Peace pol.icies for tlie first haLt oL i~he ei.ghties are based ~~n rllis ty~e of thinlcing. A look at the Japanese-American joint agreemenc cemon- r, t rn tes th i.s rhl.nkinfi in several zreas. _ ~ 1'nR OF'FI('InL [I~T: fDN1,Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500030003-0 FOR OFFI('IA1. USF. ONLY - 'l'l~iti tiu~t;est5 LhaL ltie l~or~:[.~;n rtin:tstry and t.he lle.Ce~isr A~;ency ~rc taking the same line with respect to ltie yuestion of security. Actually, however, they see things differently. '1'he Defense Agency leans toward the implementation of the latest weapons when the question of defense preparedness arises. On the other hand, the Foreign Ministry seems to believe that it is almost impossible to resist a Soviet - attack while spending the present 1 percent of the CNP on the defense establishment, without increasing it to 5-6 percent. Thus, the Foreign Ministry's idea of the best way to protect Japan is to maintain - the militarv ba.lance between America and the Soviet Union. The Foreign Ministry - stresses that at the present time, when America is declining in military strength, Japan as a Western nation must pay for part of its own def ense. If the American-Soviet balance should break down and Japan should be threatened with atta~~k, what would it do? 1fie Foreign Ministry thinks it important that Japan strengthen harmonious ties with America and make sure that America would definitely be able to come to Japan's aid in an emergency. ] P[~n~~rica were Co come to Japan's rescue, tlie blood of American people would be shed. ir is wrnn~ for Tapan to be saying "Yankee go home" and "1Ci11 the peace treaty" when i t e:cpec ts ?,merica to def end i t. I`rom the moment asked that Japan pay more f.or il:s own defense, tt fias been important tliat we show a spirit of cooperation. The F::,~~ei~n rlinistry views America's demand that Japan increase its defense spending _ as con~parable ta raising the insurance premiiim of a wealthy person. However, the Japar.ese people, to whom the peace treaty is as insubstantial as air, do not under- ~ stznd this. IL the Foreign Ministry were to say anything, right away people would ~ call it "diplomacy that blindly obeys the United States" and "weak~-kneed diplomacy." Press reports exacerbate the melancholy of Foreign Ministry bureaucrats. The Ever-Changing Forecast I)o you know that collectively the Foreign Ministry reports reveal signs of a de- terioration in analytic capabilities? - Diplomacy can be described as a war of information. We find out what another country F~as Eound out about us. If it is not good for us, we must fix i.t so that we reverse pc~_l.icy derisions ahead of time. If a dictator, from a desire to make himself famous, rliink~ h~ wants eo upset the economic superp~wer, Japan, it is necessary to invite l?im as a st~~tc~ guest to Japan, welcome him, ancl 3.n some way appease his delus~ons c~f ~;rzncleur. t1t a]_l events, people capable of gathering information are crucial. ~very country invest:s great amounts of motiey and people in information gathering and analysis. liowev~~r, althougl~ Japan is economically number two in the world, it puts almost no money ol- manpower into obtalning and analyzing information. That Japan is behind in the information race is less the blame of the Foreign Ministry than of the govern- ment as a whol~--which up to now has done little to st~~ngthen information facili- . 1G f~OR OFFICIAL USE ONL,Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500030003-0 i'11 ~; you an ex:inip7.c ot how weak Japan's information gathering and analyLic " powers are. Every Uecember the Foreign Ministxy published "Next year's ~.iltcrnationa7_ forecast." The use of the past ten~.~ is deliberate; last December it stopped pub- lishing the forecast. Why did it stop? The head of the investigative bureau eV~-- plained: "It is because we are living in unstable times when things happ~n that can-~ not be predicted." Unc would expect that we should put all our strength into avoiding situations that would mean loss of prolit for ocr country and that the more the world changes, the more necessary it is tiiat we immediately learn of changing conditions. tilat, the investi~;ativc l~ureau, ~ohose job it is to carry out r.esearch and ana:tys:i.s, will. not publish tti~ Corecasl- in December--and that is clue to nothing otl~er than l.oss of confidence in research and analysis. tt is understandable. If we look at the forecasts the Foreign iti.nistry puvli_sll~d :iIl the seventies, they were off-base on all major worl.d events. SLartin~ ia~_th ' President Nixc~n's big turnaround on China in 1971--the so-called Nihon shock; the dollar shock that clme a month later, tlie outbreak of tiie fourth P~fiddle F.ast war in 1973 :lI1C~ the L1rab oil embargo; the 1979 revolution in Tran; the VieL-namcse invas:ion of Cambodia; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan--a11 thesc rnajor evexils were inis- ,j udged , t~hy do the Lorecasts miss the mark? One reason is that the Foreign Mi.nistry has neglected its research facilities. But, as I said before, it is not only the Fore:ign Aii.nistry tt~at is to blame. lnadequate allocaCions of money and oi peop.i.e f~r strenf;thening the facilities are also to blame. The prime mizlister is 11so P~irrly tc~ b.lamc. ~ At :iny rcite, thc Foreifin Ministry's information faci.liCies are relatively we~ilc when ~:ompareci witli Liiose of utiier developed counrries. We don't matcli the 1.1.5, CI[1, Clle - Soviet Unic.,n's KCL-', or I:ngland, France, Italy, Israel, Egypt, or Korea. West Germany - hati ~5,OU0 people in inte.lligenr_e coork, 700 in analysis alone. Thus, each coia.ntiy protects its security and ~athers information abroad to be used for its ovm profi_t.; ancl l~oks for any danger to itself. Such efforts pa.y off; for exlmp_le, Tsrael :Traq was buildin~; a nuclc~ar react.or. ln Ja~~an's c~sc, incLudin~ ~lic~ wornen d~~in~ ~ffice work, all Lo};ether tl~ere 37 {~e,uPle i? tli~~ l~~~rui};n hlini5try's investigat~i_ve of.Cice. O.C course, tiiis clcres not. i nc.l ~.idc~ .in t~~ l..l. i~;~~nc~_~-~;.~thering personnel lbroad. The inves tigative personne]. are r~ssigned etst~wh~r.e atter 2 years. The flow of investigation and ana]_ysis is in~ terrupted. 'ilius thcy cannot profit from lessons ].earned irom past misrakes, ~1r ;~r~.�senC, Jnj>nn's inEormation g~ithering is left to eil~assies around tl~~ ~r~~r~lda lic~w~vc~r, ~vcry c3i_plomat:ir_ establishment is short ot personnel. In the l_e.r;s c3eveloped ~_~~unCric~s, c~si~ecially, lanF;uak;e ex~erts abo~e all ar.e in short sttp~~ly~ th~ e>:~.~~~ptic~n c~i 1>Z ititernat ional stir. !'r~�sently, wlienevpr. .Japa.n wants to know something about Soviet military develop- mc>>ts sucfi as t}ie develoPment of. troops on the four northern islands, Japan asks the Un:ited States Eor i.nformation. However, as a defense a~ency official -,, "T(~e [Ini.ted States makes information available to us only when it thinks t:h:it dc~.i.rxg so Ls all rifiht; it seldom provides us with photographs." ~~ivil ian ofFicial oE the defense agency said, "Although no commitmex~t has been ' ~yade betcaeen Japan and the United Stales on providing information to each other, we believe that, in case of an emergency directly affecting Japan's security, 23 FOR OI~FICIAL USE Oi~lLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500430003-4 FOR U~FICIAI, USF. ONLY the U.~. side wi11 provide us with information." However, uniformed members of the agency believe that "now that the situation changes from moment to moment, we cannot meet our objectives by only relying on the United States for information." Against this background, the talk of launching a Japanese security satellite has gained momentum. In connection with these moves, Makoto Genda, chairman of the LDP Defense Affairs Council, ~s eager to promote the satellite launching plan in earnest. He said: "To possess a security satellite means to prevent war. With its science and technology Japan can develop by itself both the satellite and the rocket necessazy for its launching, This is a matter of political decision." Asao Mihara, chairman of the Security Affairs Research Council, made it clear that h is council should begin studying the plan immediately. He said: "Since other members of the research council have made similar recommendations and since I believe that this is an important idea, I would like to put the matter to a study, with the Foreign Ministry also participating in it." Wheth er Japan should develop the security satellite domestically, ask the United States for technical cooperation, or purchase the necessary rocket and - even c.he satellite itself from the United States remains a question. Regarding the rocket necessary for the launching, this requirement can be met by using the N-II type rocket used by the National Space Development Ag.ency to iaunch th e meteorological. satellite "Hima.wari-II" to an altitude of 36,000 km last August. However, this rocket contains only 56 percent of domestically ~ pro.luced parts; the balance is either purchased from the United States or ~ produced under a licensed prodiiction system. _ As a result, it apPears to be the quickest and simplest way to seek technical cooperat ion from ttle United States; th is will also be a way of reducing Japan's trade surplus vi.s-a-vis the United States. - Form.:r prime minister's office director general Nakayama plans to visi.t the United States in ?nid-February and meet congressional leaders in the scientific, foreign relations and defense areas--including his friend, Don Fuqua, chairman of th e House Science and Technology Committee--and officials of the National Aer.onautics and Space Administration. He will try to f ind out what the U.S. side thinks about the plan and also seek the understanding of the U.S. side in the interpretation of the notes exchanged (in 1969) on cooperation between Japan and the United States in space development. After seeing the U.S, reaction, the defense agency, the science and technology agency and other pertinent government agencies caill establish a committee for rh e study of the security satellite to formally start the necessary survey and research work. Thus, the LDP wants to make the security satellite one of the pillars of Japan's security in the period of the post-1981 mid-term defense e5timate. FOR OFf ICIAL USF. ~ilNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500030003-0 FOR OF1~1C'lAL USF. ONI.Y Stressing the significance of the satellite, Nakayama said: "The AWAC's which the defense agency purchases cost 1' b illion yen apiece but a security satellite can be launched at a cost of 20 billion yen. So, it wi11 lessen the defense burden of the nation. Besides, if and when Japan possesses a satellite, the Soviet Union will not easily carry out any rash actions. COPYRIGHT: Sangyo Keizai Shimbun Tukyo Honsha 1982 CSO: 4120/126 25 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE (1~NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500030003-0 HOR nFFt(.'IA1. USF. ONI,Y ECONOMIC NATION'S TRADE FRICTIONS DISCUSSID U[d092346 Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 8 Jan 82 p 2 [Editorial: "Pi�esent Stage of Trade Friction and Japan's Response"] - fText] Given the present vitality of the Japanese economy, the trend toward an cver increasin~ tr.ade su.rplus is unlikely to die down unless it hits some wal.l. So, as in ttie past, trade friction is bound to increase. Judging from all indicaLions at hand, it appears that the trend toward a greater surplus - will. encounter Lhe wa11 of protectionism which underlies trade f riction. In predicting how our trade problems will develop this year, we can safely say ttiat Japan has come to a critical crossroads of having to decide whether _ it sho uld take the initiative on its own to curb the growing trend or let things - take their own course until they hit a wall. ~uropean countries and the United States are criticizing Japan ruore bitterly than ever before because Japan alone recorded a huge trade surplus while they suffered economic difficulties in the past year. At times, they made ominous statements that smacked of a threat of retaliation. In the case of the United States, these statements may have come in view of the coming off-year elections in the fall. Many voices warn that this will be a year of more acute trade friction. Various moves at home and abroad certainly point to that possibility. U.S. Ambassador Mansfield sounded a warning at the Foreign Press Club on 6 January, and his warning was couched in a stern tone no one imagined to hear from the pro-Japanese envoy. Senator John Danforth, chairman of the Inter- national Trade Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee that is studying a bill to restrict imports from Japan, arrived on 7 January. His arrival also suggests something ominous. It is certain that the U.S. congressional hearing on Japan, that will resume late this month, will b ecome a forum for a chorus of cr.iticism against Japan. The hearing will coincide with the release of statistics on U.S. trade with .Tapan. 'Chere are many important international conferences scheduled for this year, behinning with a four-nation conference in Miami on 15-16 January, a summit - r,~eeting of leading industrial nations in France in July and GATT ministerial 26 FOR OFFIC(AL USF: ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500030003-0 ~ Y conference in November. It appears inevitable that Japan's trade surplus will be a major topic at each of these meetings. In this sense, 1982 will be a year of suffering for Japanese trade. Qt~alitative Change of Trade Friction Of course we do not have to be nervous about each tough stat-ement made against Japan from abroad, but we must note that the present trade friction has changed considerably in quality from that of before. Take the Japan-U.S. fr~.ction, for. example. Owin~; to the industrial slump in the United States, the autoriobile isstie still remains a source of U.S. complaints toward Japan even though Japan has imposed voluntary regulations on its automobile exports. However, tt~e object of. the friction has now spread to the area of ultramodern [sentantelc:t] tectinulogy--in general involving electronics technology--without being l.imited to individual items. Due partl.y to national defense reasons, the rapid narrowing of Lhe technological gap in the area. of ultramodern technology ~.s prompting the United States to be more vigilant against Japan. An important thing to note is that the United States, putting the pr.inciple ol reciprocity to th e fore as a means c~f correcting the trade imbalance, is exert- ing more efforts on opening up the Japanese market than on quantitatively controlling imports of controversial goods. The lowering of tariffs on ultramodern technological goods, Lhe r.emoval of non- tariff barriers, a review of the import quota system for beef and ci_trus Yruits ~ an1 the liberalizatian of banks, the stock exchange and other service trades ar~ the immediate targets. It is evident that the United SL-ates :is ~ec:k:i.n}; a r.oll.back in areas where it is highly competitive. In view of the tenac.ity of the U.S, demands, it may be safe to say that, after experiencing lon~, fricL-ions over textiles to automobiles, the trade relationship between Japan and the United States is about to reach its final stage at long last. .~t tlte same rime, as criLicism of Japan over its closed market now extends L-o !'s imPort ~;rocedures, commercial practices, tradi_tions and other. cu.ltura]. tr~~it:s, ttie trade friction is now taking on the look of a cultural. friction. is might he r_alled a remarkable characteristic of the J.atest Ericticn. 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N IC .r1 Y d 7 Q-0 N 7 N O W Lrl d' U fn V] I 1~ c~1 N N 00 O~ C~1 ~t 0p N N ~ 1 t~ N ~ p ~ erl ~i' ~O 00 00 O rn O o~ ~-I ~n w ~ ^ tf1 .t rl ~O N u"1 ri ~t ~I N N N O o0 ~O ~"1 O o0 O O~ ~1 00 O ~t f~ u1 r-I u'1 1~ M ~ ~1C ~D rl r~-I r-1 ~ ~ w N a, ~ y~ L N ~ ] Cv ~ ~ C "_7 Q1 H C C ~ H - U ~ ~ rU ..r R1 T .-a a~ L 7 ..1 O > y~ ~ f0 ~ O U C U N Oi ~ ~ U G) N C U' 2 (1 L - i.+ ~ 'fl Z (n ..r CT O C W (n L H W . ri r C J-+ ~ p y 7 J O ~I L N�~ O U N O Y ~1 1-1 1~ L ~ ~ ~ m a~ a~ ~n o ~ ~o �i ~ o t~ s a~ cv .1-~ N 4- ~ m E ~ U C d~ ~ ai .~r 7 O 0. O V1 t0 ..y O ~O _O E ~V C 1~ H F- 01 T o a E l0 7 2~ � r+ C O u X N Q E Y fn 4 ~ 2 W 1-- 61 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500030003-0 HOR OFFICIAL l1SE ONLY ~ ~ L 3 ~ ~ N O O d ~ L ~ L ~ ~ ~ N ~p V = .,y > C7 I L I L y 7 O O C1 O~-+ U ~ N � T t!1 CI C C J-~ O L O C N C~ G/ C > N .--I /C L. L C Y C L d Y ~C 47 W ~ C l0 N G1 i--~ T ~ U 1n +i N O N Q. L..y fn IO E Z.~ 10 Q7 C..~ C o L U C E 41 T d 01 O C O N C1 ~ y y.~ O d N L L U C C N N 2 A U.--1 . ~ O ..r f0 d N..~ . 10 ..a 6/ G G N O L l0 Q~ O E E C t7 O � N 7 2 3 C C~ �r+ L�.~ N E d C N a O u7 ..y ~ ~ fA U Q J~ O 7 L i~ . O Uf t~ C C1 tn C'J1 N 7 N T N IV L O /C Y+~ ~ U N U L E.L C C /0 N O ~ 01 N~ Y~~ U C ~ N O7 O O U C N..-1 4- O L~ O 'C O U(n 1-1 ld 7 H IA "O ~~V U L N /V U G.~ ~ L C.r O~ E N 4- O ~ N N y N 4- d ..y O Q U Q1 d N O O 7.-+ Y O 7 U C1 Y d~ L E J ~ N C N C N U+~ C 'G L lq .-1 N N E O y O 01 N N T. L O t .rr f0 O C U..~ f0 ~ Cl O U ~.~J 'G d.~ C U d L U C J-~ ~ 3 ~ E M N C r+ Vl C d L N rtf ..y C..-1 N N . t.N L~ C . ..ti .r+ 61 IC C 4- al f/1 ~ L.--1 Q1 10 L C.1-~ N U J d L N i~ O t/1 ~ ~ T~ L~ N ~ 1~ L N N L f6 ..1 L N t IC 6 U ~ 10 F- T~ Q1 A T C L O N L O L~ 01 iJ � V S Ol ~ Ol ~ Q1 A O C. G1 J-~ .L~ N O n -O 4- d~ c.l U 7 W+~ ~"O uf O .1..~ C N f0 y~ c~ ~c ul 0. .rr ~O O O 'C C7 C W O N L- O~ E O E++ O N r+ f0 a) N+~ ~ Id N E C1 C. N L~ N J.+ O O C O N L N d T > C C ~ . L ~ C U U G.r~l > C L .L L N L ~ T 10 N f0 N 7 Vl T 7 ro ro W..~ .~-1 > O ~ L~ U 4- tA 6/ Q1 C Q1 L E N C.-~ m ~ C1 ~ L J-~ U O C7 V N 10 ..r L O p..+ O 10 N O O~L~+ N.rl 01 GJ d .ed L 1A .N N N Y C U E J~ ~ ~.7 N ~ . ~n d O~ L N ..y C C L L ~0 6 C L d N ta ..ti 1~ E O~ Y C l0 J~ C) 10 N W 4 Q1 .r~l ~ C 10 O ~t 'D d C N C 4- T N 10 U U Q1 E 10 Cl UI C Ol 01 J-~ C~ ~ f~ C U V1 ~ t ~ a7 O y ~ N J N.�+ C Q C O fi N ~0 L C A C 'O d U'D J-~ ~n .r~ L .r~ 1' L ..ti 19 O d ..y N W~ . c0 .-a C N 10 R1 T 1C L 07 C N 2 O U L . G7 E N L~ ~ 01 N r-1 � J~ O U d-+ G. U ~0 ~ 7 E O J-+ ~n 1~ Q 01 O E 7 O .--i L~ ~ N Vl t..y O C E O E � Q ~ L L U . a~ O U O+~ d A A b d�'~ Vf y u1 N~ E U d O v d E~ U U aQ L�-~ ~ N y.i y 7~ .-r ~ C L O O~+ O O 2 E O~--~ � O O J C ~0 O ~ N 4- A ~ ~-r ~O Q a. IC d C.~ W~+ lL N Q~ N N 2 G f7 r-~ ~ 1~ N IC L O N 10 I W I W U C.) d ~ V O~ N O~ 00 u'1 M O I M I ~7 N N I~ N N O 00 N r-I ~fl M N ~O c~'1 f~ M 1~ u1 N ~t N O ~O O 1~ O r-~ N M N 1!'1 rl w w w w w w w ~p I~ f~ Ul ~O 01 Vl r"~ 00 ~D r-I ~t tr1 ~ N ~O M r-i ~ O o0 O N f~ ~O u'1 - O n ~O N rl ~ ~ - ~O iC ~Y O~ 00 Q~ M I~ _ ~ w ~ic ~t r-1 M ~t ~ . u y. O ..r ~ L V C 6') ro 0 2 U U u a ~ a, w a u _ c. o L U ~ W ~ W V C o � c u � ~ x ~ o d ro.~ ~ ~ s . J~ T ~ f U N W ..-1 .e~ V ..r fC L L ~ C K L ~ L C N~+ 1p 1- U 7 O O 7 N d W N U IC N d G 1q 7 L T IV N W L a i~ ~ b C 3 Y ..a J ..-1 O ..r 10 C t O ..r ~ Z W 2 ~ U 2 N N Q ~ 62 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500030003-0 N C ~ ~ L �N ~ ~ t{- N N ~ ~ . 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L C A X 7 C N.--~ 7 ~�N A C G1 rl t~ ]c O N P fC s�.~ X N F- d 10 d Uf G. ~ N.N H r1 fO m t d-> U R1 T 4- 1- Z 1- C..~1 .1= u H ~ N E O N _ ~ Q,' C!~ C/] f/1 (n t~ ri c*1 M f~ N M ~ N '-I ~ ~O r~ O ~7 u1 u'~ ~ M O M O ~ r1 00 v1 ~t I~ N w w w w ^ " _ N N N N ~ ~ N j M p ~ cr1 O O ,--I M O O u1 ~ 00 N f~ C'~ vl M ~ w N M ~ ` w N o ~ W U ~ J ~ C H N C 1-1 ti �.1 ~ _ X L w ro A F- N V ~ Y ~ ~ y E z c ~ _ 4 ~.y O N t m .r+ U tn O O ~ ~ ~ .n O T 7 "ti W O fC t0 N L Q] T L . L ~ ~ O 7 .r+ O ..i N I..~ 1- Y Z F- E Q 66 FOR OFFICIA~. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 C ro ~ ~ U ~ C T t v L U O ~ O I I ~ �'a N J-+ L 1 L J..~ J-,+ ~ G1 7 L ~ L,-y ~ C Ol > N L 7 N C J-~ O C++ O ~n i0 _G E N ~Q G Q U~ aJ d N C ul . 1] C C 4- L .,ti C~ RS L ..a T C C O ~ Q C E C d d ti b n. C) C C. (d N C N d c9 ..r N N 10 O N ~ J-+ U- r~ U 4- O 61 O L O..ti O C l.l T N C.-+ Q1 N..~i Q a1 Q1 4~- X L f~ L 7 C L .4+ O N..i C I 'C .N ~ O .~-1 4- G7 C- O^ O R7 L N Q1 .J.+ L 10 J-+ .O .C C C In L L ~ CJ (n E ~ U c~ "O U O N f4 Vl C O d O ~~N o � N C N IC N'D N Q~ 'D .rti t~ N O C U J~+ 7 J-.~ C d..+ N~ R1 � C. O 61 ~ ~ C C O E.-+ C ~ C U~ C O~ O G L � A C d C..r ~ Vl .r~ N.1~ L r--~ 10 C.r1 C~ fU N C (n 61 U Ll ~i-~ rt1 rt'i L L C .a > ~ Cl ..y ~ GJ E (O d ~ 01 ..ti ~V N~-~ H r Y N u ~O N ~q 7 O A N N .ry E ~ 7'~ 'O ~'J J-~ J ^ ~ N..~ E u M L.-y ~-N I 7 N~ IA 3 C: C1 C. 7'L7 L 'O G N 7 L+~ tD Oi U ~O (O E Q~ d r-+ �Y C- a~ u~ a~ O - w d J-+ C L ~ O X �.y O U O� C E Q) �(n .ti ~ td 1n ~ Q 61 d Q~ L N L r+ Q~ C rt1 Q1 L fi Q1 N N U O C~ ~ N�.a X C t ~C C W Cl 4- N C�ti �r-1 O O rt1 w L F_ U..~ 7 O U V1 1~ f- N J-~ U..+ ~ ? N U.'+ U1 U ~N O C C In O fC d T..-~ ~ N . L f0 L G1 OD ~ E C ln C s~ C U O O ~ O.r~ O C N~ C~ G1 .r-i C N y . �y 1 d O E t A= N�r~ O C C.-y L�.r E N O O 7 6/ N{~ T c0 C7 L e-+ V�'~ E 6 J-+ L.C ~ N T Q~ ~ O E f0 L ~ N N ~p ~ c~ ~ c~ y.'1 C N Gl ~ N G. U O > C L.-i U O N O .O V1 d .r~ N Ql ~C 4- N Q7 O L W N L G7 (C 07 .ri C L N 10 W C C L..r L+~ Q 4- T 10 O..~ Vf R7 E L.1-~ 07 'C G'CJ 7 t-1 ~F L t G. .L ..y 1~ 6/ V fl1 t0 C1 r+ T'~ L.--1 J~ L T O. O N L E C.f] d U O U A /C >.~y E.-~ O Q C f0 C 07 O ~ C7 N G7 ~ G1 N O 7 T> N~-'i N L t O y N.1~ L IC C L C ~ ld C ~ f0 U 41 ..-ti O E N.L~ 'O C L L ~ N I O.C O L Q7 E 3 v C 3 C N C C > Y C N A a C C E X C+~ U d A C Q1 O G~ ~ d�~ �N O O E ~O N J-~ U O N T O ~C O d L N�.-~ C L O ~ ~ t L. �N O 'D C ~0 �.1 tn Q1 ..r In r+ T 1- O ..1 4- ~ ~ O+~ T I J.~ ~ L w GJ d d-~ L 1!1 .ry O++ r-. ..y U C l0 L O~ fn L ~ t fd d 4- T C E f0 ~.'1 .-y 7. f0 IC ..1 ..r N t/1 N C ~ ��N 01 .~r C N N . L C N O In C N U E L.L~ U f0 G N..1 G7 ..1 N G7 T L..~I rti L N N >~-F~ 7 G1 , E C O N E�.~ L f0 N�.ti E C .-1 G7 E ~ O L N ld E C ~ O O N O L O t d E O~ O E�~ ~ N..1 N lV .C L J~ L ~ O N L t�rI U 7 U V E L U G) 4- �r~ 0~ N 01 E~.0 t G1 C~ L N U U N G~V 01 C d O N C E G L O ~ t N C O d 7 1- C N 7 O C U1 C N N E N d O ~ r~ ~ c.1 U' r+ G N d F- W U L L ~ L tE ~.r+ ..i ?r ~ t..~ E L N 4- ~q d, U U ~ r-I O ~D ~O ~''1 M a0 ,--I O N ~ 00 f~ O~ d' O~ N ch N ^ N M N ~t ~ w w ~ ~ tfl ~7 ~7 ul ~ N N ~t rl N ~ ^ N ~y' 00 ~1 O ~ M ~-1 r-~1 rl c 0 c � 0 0 c u o E p Li 7 .'1 .-a .C A ~ - ..i d L ~ V ~ Z p t/1 7 7 O d C L O Y t-~ L O ~ y O f- O C7 y p L U U C L � r+ ~ 7 O ~ t ~ .,ti N U N F- N � ~-1 ..y :.-i N N E ~ C Z ~ 7 O O A ~ 4. Y U F- fn ti 68 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030003-0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500430003-4 Evaluntioi~ uf 'l'4cl~nulu~tcal St~ind