JPRS ID: 10330 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030039-1
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• Document Page Count: 39
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• Sequence Number: 39
• Content Type: REPORTS

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FUIt UH'H'It'IAL US~ UNLY
JPRS L/ 10330
17 February 1982
Sub-~aharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. ?62
F~IS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/10330
17 February 1982
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 762
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
_ 'AFRIQUE-ASIE' Report on U.S., Angola Talka
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 1-14 Feb 82) 1
AN GOLA
Angolan Ambassador Surveys National Situation
(MAR(HES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 1 Jan 82) 8
Briefs
New Opposition Group's Claim 10
CAME ROON
Technical, Occupational Training Examined
(MARQiES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 Dec 81,
1 Jan 82) 11
! GAB ON
!
, Social Measures Included in 1982 Budget
, (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Dec 81)............ 23
Favorable Trade Balance Shown for 1980
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 Dec 81)............ 25
B rie fs
, Increased Oil Productioii Prospects 27
GUIVEA-BISSAU
B rie fs
Increased French Cooperation Discussed 28
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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FQ1R (1~F1('TA1, i 1ti~ nNl.l'
MOZAI~BIQUE
Spectrum of Cooperation With France Reviewed
(MAR~ES TROPICAUX ET 1~DII~RRANEENS, 25 Dec 81) 29
Briefs
_ Po r tugal-EE C Conne ction Viewe d 31
Steel Salvage Pro3ect Planned 31
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
BADEA Loan Will Selp Tb Double Energy Production
(MARQiES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Dec 81)............ � 32
SOUTH AFRICA
South African Foreign Minister on Mass Media lxiquiry
(Michael Hornaby; 7IiE TIMES, 5 Feb 82) 34
- b -
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
'AFRIQUE-ASIE' REPORT ON U.S., ANGOLA TALKS
PM111221 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 1-14 Feb 82 pp 7-10
[Simon Malley "exclusive" report: "The Secrets of tt?e Paris Meeting"--passages
between slantlines are print~d in italics]
[Text] Everything had been perfectly orchestrated. On 29 December, 3 days before
the leadership of the U.S. Congress [presumably, House of Representatives] decided
to examine, in its turn, the Reagan Administration's request for the lifting of the
Clark amendment--which has banned any aid to the Angolan counterrevolutiona-ry forces
since 1976--a request already approved by the Senate 30 September last year,
[National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)] Jonas Savimbi arrived
in New York at the invitation of "Freedom House" (note 1) (extreme rightwing in-
stitute financed by bodies linked tu the CIA and maintaining close ties with South
Africa). "In our view there is no doubt that Savimbi's visit is directly connected
with the campaign mounted by the White House to have that amendment suppressed...."
Howard Wolpe, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Commi~tee's African subcommittee,
immediately stated.
Indeed, as soon as he arrived in~Washington Savimbi was received at the State De-
partment, the White House, the pentagon, the CIA and Congress in turn. Over a
14-day period he met with dozens of prominent officials and private individuals,
while the media were pressed by the powerful "Freedom House" "lobby" and by South
Africa to have interviews with the UNITA le$der or to hold press conferences for him.
But the action supporting him was not isolated. As if by chance Zairian Presi-
dent Joseph Desire Mobutu [as published] was quick to foll~w him to the American
capital, accompanied by his brother-in-law Roberto Holden and his aecomplices from
the National Front for the Liberation of Angola [FNLA] who, with the blessing of
some secret services--especially the American, Moroccan, South Africar., Egyptian,
Gabonese and Zairian secret services--have formed the military committee of the
- Angolan resistance. Thus th~ Kinshasa dictator, who had vowed to the late President
Agostinho Neto and then to his successor Jose Eduardo dos Santos never to have any
further direct or indirect relations with the Angolan counterrevolutionaries,
received Jonas Savimbi and his accomplices at Blair House, where he was staying.
He met with them three times. Two of those meetings took place in the presence of
tunerican "experts and specialists." What took place in those meetings between the
Americans and their interlocutors?
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The best-informed ~ources in the American capital provided us with so~?e particularly
significant elements. Let us not dwell on the positions adopted by Jonas Savimbi,
which have been repeated by him on many occasions, especia~ly when talking with rep-
resentatives of the imperialist powers and their allies: professions of anti-
communism, anti-Sovietism and anti-Cttbanism: assertious that UNITA controls half
or even two-thirds of the Angolan population, that if free elections were held it
would win 60 percent c~f the votes, that most of its arms come from the PRC (550 tons
in 1979?), from Morocco, where hut~dreds of officers are training, from Saudi Arabia,
Egypt and some African c~untries like Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Zaire and Sudan:
claims about the size of its forces, which allegedly already amount to 15 battallions
- equipped with sophisticated weapons [AK-47 automatic weapons, SAM-7.missiles, armor-
ed vehicles and helicopters], and about the possibility of turning his guerrilla war
into a conventional ~aar, with cities being occupied....
_ However, what should be noted in the positions expressed by this self-confessed
agent of the CIA and the former International and State Defense Police [PIDE] (note
2) (Portuguese secret service in the colonial period) is the care he takes in force-
fully expounding the arguments and ideas of the Pretoria racist authorities on the
settle~ent of the Namibian question:
1--The vital need to link Namibia's independence to the wit:~drawal of Cuban troops
from Angola: "Without such a withdrawal," Savimbi stressed to Secretary of State
Haig and Chester Crocker, his assistant for African affairs, "not only would Namibia
- be turned into a Marxist-Leninist state or be forced to unite witti the People's
Republic of Angola [P:ZA] but it would also become a base for aggression from which
the securi~y and independence of the neighboring countries would be threatened and
a hotbed of agitation and constant destabilization for the whole of Southern Africa."
2--The only way of preventing "this plan by international communist strategy" is to
give UNITA a share in a national union government in Luanda, and consequently to
' insist on a"nati~nal reconcilistion" between the ~opular Movement for the Liberatidn
of Angola [MPLA] and UNITA. It is these two objectives which Ameri.can diplomacy
should try to attain.
Savimbi's line of argument coincide~.�-could this be any suprise?--with that used by
the South African leaders during their talks with Chester Crocker in Spring 1981 and
then by the latter to the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Africa subcommittee 17
June 1981. But the Angolan puppet went even further. In reply to the American
secretary of state, who asked him 9 December WilPy~h??" Yle thought it was possible that
the MPLA leaders~ip might agree to a reconciliation with UNITA, "which we recognize
as a legitimate political forc;~; which should be taken into account," Savimbi said
that, although it was true that UNITA was prepared to open expluratory ta~.ks with
the Luanda regime with a view to forming a coalition government which would not be
very different from the one now existing in Zimbabwe, he did not think that the
majority of existing MPLA leadership members would be prepared to envisage such a
solution; "that is why I think that the American Government shoul.d play for tim~,
allowing the discussions on Namibia and on a.ny normalization with the present
: Angolan regime to drag on. For I am convinced that the state of war which exists
_ today is bound sooner or later to lead to a deterioration in the internal situation
which would facilitate both the overthrow of the regime and the departure of the
Cuban troops. And if the latter leave Angola, INITA will seize power within 6
months at the most.... What I know is that the differences of opinion prevaiZing
within the MPLA leadership team on ways of reaching a settlement in the Namibian
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~~~u ~~rr:i~ ~~~R ~
Affair and on a reconciliation with our movement will ul::imately prove us right.
This is our only hope of bringing Angola bacic among the nations of the free
world...."
Of course, the Zairian president' positions were not substantially different froTn
those expressed by Savimbi. His hopes for a positive evolution in Angolan policy
after President Neto's death have largely been dashed, he said. "However," he to'_3
President Ronald Reag~in who was accompanied by the secretary cf state, the def ense
secretary, the "bosses" of the National Security Council and the CIA and by the
- chief of general stai~f [as published; presumably the joint chiefs of staff], "the
reports reaching me from Luanda are particularly worrying. The communists are
planning new attacks on Zaire's independence, using as proxies Angolans and the
- Zairians who have found refuge, support and military training in the PRA. The
Angolan military forces, the ~ngolan People's Liberation Armed For~es [FAPLA], have
huilt a whole series of military bases on their northern border in which thousands
of Zairian ~~~.positionists are trained night and day by Soviet, Cuban, East German
and Angolan c-fficers. ~'or those countries know that as long as Zaire is independent
and anticommunist it will form an insuperable barrier to Soviet penetration into
southern Africa."
"And what suggestions can you make, Mr President?" the American Government chief
asked.
[Answer] The political, economic psychological and military pressure of all tYie
free world's forces--inclL:ding those of South Africa which are, why not admit it,
our objective allies--on Angola's Marxist-Leninist Government should now be stepped
up. Granting independence ot Namibia in the present situation would be handling
Southern Africa over to the Soviet imperialists and their agents. No solution to
the Namibian affair sh~~.:l~ be envisaged before the last Cuban soldier has left
Angola. And nothing could serve that ob~ective better than to push for Angolan
national reconciliation in order to ensure the restoration of a sense of security
in all that coutry's neighbors.... [Mobutu ends]
'After painting this background picture, it is easier to understand the significance
and scope of the talks which took place in Paris Fri.day 15 and Saturday 16.December
, between PRA Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge--brilliantly supported by Angolan ambassa-
dor to Paris Luis de Almeida--and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Chester Crocker. For more than 13 hours, and virtually without interruption, the
two statesmen had a tough debate on two of Southern Africa's thorniest problems;
\ Namibia's independence and relations between the PRA and the United States in the
context of the war being waged by Pretoria against the progressive states of
Southern Africa arid the Indian Ocean.
It was the first time in the tense and explosive history of relations between the
two countries that such a frank, blunt and incisive--and long--meeting had taken
place, one in which the Angolan foreign minister's well-known coolness, calm and
sen,e of humor contrasted with the clumsy attempts at education made to the PRA
eiivoys by the "brain" of the Reagan Administration's African policy.
= Hoo~ did that come about'~ In fact everything began last September wtxen General
f1ai~, the American spcretary of state, was received, at his own request, by Paulo
Jorge at his hotel, the United Nations Plaza in New York. It was their first
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_ oft~:;ial meeting and, s~nce it was taking place on General Haig's initiative, the
two ministers spent more than 2 hours together. Although the discussions, despite
their length, did not produce any practical results, the head of American diplomacy
expressed this Angolan counterpart his government's wish to resume these bilateral
talks not only in order to review Southern Africa's problems together but also to
tackle the problems of no�rmalizing relations between the two countries. That was
a direct and apparently unambiguous appeal.
Some 3 months later, 10 December to be precise, speaking at Cabinda on the 25th
anniversary of the MPLA's formation, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos gave a
positive reply to Gene-ral Haig's appeal, while violently condemning American inter-
ference in An~ola's internal affairs and asking the currE~nt OAU chairman and secre-
tary general to lodge a vehement protest with the Americaz Government, which "is
having an official meeting with a group of Angolan puppets."
It was, the~efore, at the American Government`s initiative that the Paris meeting
was held. In keeping with normal practice the Angolan Government planned to send
to thos talks an official of the same rank as Chester Crocker. But as President
Jose Eduardo dos Santos has decided to send Paulo Jorge to hand an important
message to President Francois Mitterrand, it was decided that he would head the
Angolan ministerial delegation in person.
It was at the hotel intercontinental that the two delegations began their discus-
sions Friday, 15 December at 1400 hours. They were to be resumed Saturday and to
last all morning and evening. And to avoid having to continue them into Sunday,
the two delegations even lunched together.
Although discretion was the rule on both sides, diplomatic sources close to the two
delegations have enabled us to draw a general picture of the proposals which
Chester Crocker put to the Angolan delegation. These proposals show that the
American leaders do not seem to have changed their state of mind or behavior. Still
less their sense of the e~jective realities of the national, regional and inter-
national situation.
How does Washington envissage the normalizatiov. of its relations with Angola and
Namibia's independence? ~iow does it view the r,astoration of regional security,
an end to South African attacks on Angola and ::he other "frontline" countries?
How does it pl~n to open a new era in relatio~.,is among the Southern African coun-
tries? To discover that you just have to reread first the view expressed by its
main agents in the region, Joseph Desire Mobutu and Jonas Savimbi, which we report-
ed in the first part of this article. Second, you have to refer to all the state-
ments made by "PIK" Botha and the other members of the Pretoria Government. But
that is not all. We would not be doing full justice to the strategy of Ronald
Reagan's African policy unless we cited the substance of what Chester Crocker said
to his Angolan interlocutors. Those statements deserve the greatest attention.
/We Americans want to move quickly, very quickly, very quickly/, Chester Crocker
stressed. /If you accept our suggestions, things can be settled in a few weeks.
_ ror instance by the end of March Namibia could be well on the way to independence,
with the implementation of the process of South African withdrawal and our relations
with the PRA restored and normalized. Not rendPred commonplace, but normaJ_ized and
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tt11t l)bFll 1~1. l'~1~. IINI ~
developed. Toger.;1Fr Wasi:ington and Luanda ean upset the whole geopolitical MAP of
Soutnern Africa. We are prepared to cooperate closely on your national rebuilding,
to organize a conference of Western and other donors to guarantee you billions, no
tens of billions, [of dollars]. We are prepared to give you real guarantees of our
sincerity and our sincere desire to restore peace, and security in the region.
But/--because, of course, there is a"but" with a capital B--/for peace to be re-
stored there must first be confidence between u~ and among all the states in tre
region. Now that confidence does not exist at present. Zaire is worried because
you have bases directed against it (note 3) (Chester Crocker produced maps showing
alleged Zairian oppositionist bases in Angola). Zambia is destabilized by internal
- difficulties. The Congo is uneasy. South Africa is under attack from the South-
West African people's organization and the African national congress, which you and
other countries support(!)./
Why is there insecurity? The Angolans asked. Because South Africa is attacking,
~ assaulting, killing, massacring and violating the territorial integrity of inde-
; pendent countries, sending its commandos and mercenaries here, there and everywhere,
even to the Indian Ocean to sow terror and destruction. Because it i.s illegally
occupying Namibia despite 1,001 UN, OAU, Arab League and nonaligned movement resolu-
tions.
/No! It is quite simply,/ Chester Crocker asserted brazenly, /because there is
internal instability in Angola cau~ed by internal dissension und the presence of
UNITA, a legitimate movement, which you must take into account and with which you
must be reconsiled and must include in the government. And it is because Cuban
troops are still in Angola. You say this is to help you defend yourselves against
the South Africans? Come on, now! They are there basically to protect you against
UNITA, to ensure your internal security.... Let them withdraw and you will see how
quickly peace will be restored./
The peace of the graveyard, Mr Crocker?
But is Chester Crocker's position not at variance urtth that of the other countries
belonging to the contact group? And is it not inconsistent with the assurances
given by Secretary of State Haig to the Angolan minister of foreign affairs in
September 1981? Have President Francois Mitterrand, British Foreign Secretary
Lord Carrington and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt not stated and restated to
Paulo Jorge and Luis de Almeida that they were opposed to establishing any linkage
at all between the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and Namibia's independence?
Have they not said that even though they would like to see the Cubans withdraw from
the PRA, they rPcognized that their presence falls exclusively within the province
of the two states' sovereignty and that no state, no organization and no authority
should interfere in order to dictate to Luanda what attitude it should adopt?
/Of course,/ Chester Crocker asserts, /we do not Fri.sh to interfere in your domestic
afL-airs. But we knou that the South Africans will not withdraw from Namibia unless
Cu~an troops simultaneously withdraw in accordance with a mutually agreed timetable....
~f we want to reach the third phase of the Namibian plan--that of disengagement--
~ before the end of March, the disengagement of the Cuban troaps seems to us of funda-
mental importance..../
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~oa oFF~c'1:11. UtiF: ON1.1'
A dialogue of the deaf? An attempt to gain time with a view to continuing to de-
stabilize Angola and its allies? And making it possible to strengthen the counter-
revolutionary movements and countries subservient to imperialist powers in the
region, like Zaire, in order to perpetrate new aggressive acts and seek to overthrow
Luanda's people's regime? Undoubtedly. In any case, this is the view which now
prevails in Luanda, where the Zairian and American allegations about bases contain-
ing members of the Zairian opposition in the PRA are seen as obvious atte?!~pts to
divert the Zairian people's attention from their serious domestic problems.
The report prepared by Paulo Jorge after his return to the Angolan capital has sur-
prised neither President Jose Eduardo dos Santos nor his colleagues because they
know they can expect nothing from an American administration which sees South Africa
as its privileged ally in Africa. And the views of the Angolan Government were
clearly explained in a presidential message conveyed to French President Pranco's
Mitterrand last Thursday, 14 December:
First, the government of the People's Republic of Angola r~jects any suggestion that
any concommitant linkage be established between any settlement of the Namibian
question and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola.
Second, under no circumstances will the government of the People's Republic of
Angola agree to enter into negotiations with UNITA, a movement of traitors in the
pay of foreign powers.
Third, relations between the People's Republic of Angola and the nepublic of Cuba
fall exclusively within the competence of these two independent and sovereign
states.
Fourth, Once Namibia becomes indeoendent, aggressive acts by South Africa cease and
guarantees are given that the territorial integrity of the People`s Republic of
Angola will be respected, the Angolan Government will enter into discussions with
a veiw to determining a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from the
country~
Nothing could be more precise and clear. And even though the message from the
Angolan head of state was received "very favorably" at the Elysee, it has been
- hinted within the entourage of the French head of state that "the American obses-
sion about the Cuban troops in Angola could well lead to an unnecessary deteriora-
tion of the explosive situation which already prevails in Southern Africa." For,
as the Angolan foreign minister has so clearly explained, as soon as South Africa
ceases to support UNITA and Namibia becomes independent, that counterrevolutionary
movf~ment, which has solely been created to serve neocolonialist interests, will
collapse li'~ce all such movements before it has collapsed. Furthermore, what mental
aberration has prompted some people to d~aw at all costs a parallel between the
independence of Namibia, a territory under international mandate from which Pre-
toria refuses to withdraw, and the sovereign rights of an independent state like
the PRA? Raising the question of a timetable for a simultaneous withdrakTal of
South African and Cuban troops is tantamount to equating in a familiar manner the
ag~;ressor and the victim of aggression.
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FoR o~Frc~ni. us~: oN~,ti,
So ho~~ can you explain Chester Crocker's insistence on organizing more meetings
either in Paris or elsewhere in February and March? "This is understandable,"
they say in Paris; "the isolation from African opinion and even from some important
areas of Western opinion in which they Y~ave shut themselv~s up has induced the
Americans to test tt~e Angolans' resist3nce on the one hand and to seek to acquire
a clear conscience by showing that they are continuing their efforts, on the other.
They hope to silence their critics in this way...."
When do t:iey expect to mislead again? In any case, certainly neither the MPLA
revolutionary militant nor the FAPLA combatants. Nor is it among them that they
can hope to find gu~lible people, accomplices or traitors.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie.
CSO: 4719/537
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ANGOLA
~
ANGOLAN AMBASSADOR SURVEYS NATIONAL SITUATION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 p 44
~ [Report of press conference of Mr Luis de Almeida, Angolan ambassador to France, on
22 December 1981: "1981 was a Hard Year; 1982 Looks Better"]
[Excerpts] The year just :;~dir~g has been difficult, but the outlook is better for
1982, said Mr Luis de Almeida, Angol.an ambassador to Paris, on 22 December at a press
conference in which he surveyed broadly the economic and political situation of Angola.
"Keep on Making Friends Unexc3usively"
Naturally, Luanda would like to establish normal relati~ns with the U.S, government
on the model of its relations with American multinational companies operating in
Angola, especially in the areas of oil pxoduction--in Cabinda, where Presiaent Dos
Santos paid a visit on 10 December--banking, and aeronautics. Angola's forc:ign
policy has not changed. It was set by former President Neto and consists in contin-
ually "making friends unexclusively."
Thus, even though Angola thinks the time has come to establish bilateral relations
" with the United States, it would b~ inaccurate, Mr de Almeida explained, to speak
' of a "diplomatic offensive."
; Cl.oser Relations Desired with France
T}~e /1n~olan authorities wi'sh to welcome the French president on a state visit to
Luanda and have already invited the French minister of Foreign Relations, Mr Claude
' C}ieysson, and of Cooperation and Development, Mr Jean-Pierre Cot. The Angolan gov-
ernment wishes to "institutionalize"'its relations with Fr~.ince by signing a framework
agreem~nt for cooperation, whi~Ti is now being negotiated between the two countries.
Among other things, it expects to diminish the cost of French personnel, which seems
quite excessive. For example. Mr de Almeida explained that, qualifications being
equal, a Portuguese costs thr~e times less than a Frenchman. There are considerable
areas in which French cooperation might increase, as Angola's needs are also consider-
~ble, especially in health, industry, construction, agriculture, research, and oil
p2�oduction. Some French companies are already doing a large business in Angola,
~uch as Renault, E1-Aquitaine and the French Oil Company, as well as specialized
institutes in coffee and cotton. There is room for these businesses to grow and for
other F.rench companies to move in. Angola has already 6ecome an important custo;ner
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rutc urr~~ ~�r. ~r~v~.t
for France, whose exports reached Fr 18~ hillion as opposed to only Fr 395 million
in 1980. On the other hand, Prenc~i imports o~ Angolan products are very low, between
Fr 3-5 million in 1981.
Measured Optimism for the Economic Outlook
Economically, the soutfiern part o� Angola and other provi;ices suffered an excepLional
drought in 1981, and this seriously affected the country~s agricultural produrtion.
Angola has also had its oil prices go down, and these account for 75-80 percant of
exports. As a consequence, its imports of capital equipment and food have been
reduced.
The outlook for 1982 seems to be distinctly lietter. Better-distributed rainfall
- promises b etter harvests of co~fee, cotton, corn and manioc. The authorities have
undertaken to reorganize distribution pragmatically the better to meet tfie popula-
tion's food needs.
- The Angolan government is placing great hopes on the discovery of new oil deposits.
'I'he French Oil Company is evaluating offshore oil reserves, which may come to 50-100
million metric tons. Foreign-currency income from gas production could start in 1982.
. I;xl~orts of iron and diamonds should also show improvement in 1982, and the government
is eager to exploit the mineral deposits abounding in Angola.
_ The Angolan ambassador still did not hide the constraints that temper his optimism:
the lack of managers and technicians, the threat of the South African army, and the
difficulties inherent in tfie Luanda government's learning the ropes of administration.
After all, Mr de Almeida noted, Angola fias just celebrated its 6th birthday!
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1982
8782
CSO: 4719/439
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ANGOLA
BRIEFS
NEW OPPOSITION GROUP'S CLAIM--A new opposition group in Angola, the Center of
Democratic Independence (CID), has claimed responsibility for the sabotage of the
PETR.ANGOL [Angolan Petroleum Company] refinery in Luanda saying that this was its
"first operation" against the current regime of Luanda. Responsibility for the
sabotage of the refinery, an action attributed to South Africa by the Angolan
regime, had already been claimed by Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA [National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola], the main opposition movement in
Angola. The attack, which according to the Angolan Ministry of Petroleum, did
not damage the refining facilities, was condemned by the African-Arab Solidarity ~
Conference held in Luanda. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French No 1884, I8 Dec 81 p 3382] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.]
8796
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CAi~~ROUN
TECHNICAL, OCCUPATIONAT. TRAINING EXAMINED
Paris riARCFiLS TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAN~TS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81;
No 1886, 1 Jan 82
[25 Dec 81 pp 3435-3436J
~ext7 Sn this study which is based on several official reports and
some personal statements, we will present first the different levels
of this teaching and then we will summarize some fundamental prohlems.
1) The Different Levels
Technical ~.nd occupational trainin~ in Cameroon has four levels: the
post primary, the first stage of secondary, the second stage of secon-
dary a.nd higher education.
A) The ~ost primary level--It involves the SAl-t ~ural Craft Section7
and SM LDomestic Section] who~se aim is to contain the rural exodus
and help young people to adjust to their original environment, while
helping to improve it. In the SAR's, they teach carpentry, mas.onry,
mainten~,nce mechanics, basket making, weaving and leather ~,nd wood-
working. A general education is given,as well as an introduction to
boolc~ceeping a,nd or~anization. Studies ],ast 2 years. The SM's repre-
sent for ~irls what the SAR's do for boys.
In 1978-79, there were 70 SAR's and 4U 51~1's which had about 4,000
students. These institutions are more numerous in the provinces of
ttie Center-South (22) and North (14) than in the others, where it is .
true they are less extensive.
~ t+lhen we know the difficulties for schools and secondary schools in
- equippin~; themselves, to operate and have enough good students, we
can im~.gine the problem of the SAR's a.nd the SM's, in spite of their
insi~?nificant dema.nds. In addition, these institutions have been
blamed for not providin~ a certificate (it was desired) an~l conse-
c~uently not allowinQ a continuation of studies, ~,ncl especiall,y of not
encouraging the area's development, by only concentrating on young
people.
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It is possible from now on to omit the SAR and SrT in the CET '1'echni-
cal Training Schoo] provided you are not over 16 years old ~,nd. you
have passed an entrance exam.
B) The CET's--Their purpose is "to tr~.in the skilled workers and
employees necessary ~or the country's economic life." This training
is confirmed by the CAP ~ccupational Aptitude Certificate7.
Consequently entrance is by competitive exam for candidates 16 years
old at the most, who hold the CEPE ~`erti~icate of Basic Primary
Studies7 or recentl,y a SAR or SM certificate. Studies last 4 years,
including year of introduction anc7. 3 years of specialization. In
1977-1978, the following number of students were recorded:
Commerci~,l Industrial Domestic Total
' Public 1,235 3,684 603 5,522
Private 17,982 4,796 2,310 25,088
Tot~,l 19,217 8,480 2,913 30,610
G~owth ~.s indicated by the f~.ct that the tot~.l number of students `vere
17,400 in 1970, 19 761 ~ic7 and 21,063 in 1974-1975. The CETI
~xpansion unknownf is the schoal which is solely industrial; the
CETIC ~xpansion unknown7 also has a commercial branch; the CETIF
~xpansion unknown7 is a domestic training school for girls.
Private denominational education has played a leading role, for ex-
ample, the School of the Holy Gh~st at Douala for girls. The quali#,y
_ of its teaching is generally superior to the private secular institu-
tions. The public schools hav~ 66.7 percent.of their students in
industrial trainin~, compared with 19.1 percent only for all Private
scltoals. An o~fici~.l commentator can say: "This heavy concentration
(of private educ~.tion) in the commercial sector is explained by the
not ver.y expensive investment in equipment and in buildings in the
creation of a school o~ this type."
- In 1976-1977 there were 4~~ CET's, of which 13 were Public and 31 pri-
vate; amon~ the latter 8 Catholic, 7 protestant and 17 secular; 10
- CET's ~+.re on the coast and 10 in the Center-5outh~ that is to sa,y in
the most industrialized provinces.
The specialities tau~ht are the following: industri~,l training: me-
chanics, automobiles, building and TP ~ublic Works7, electricity,
electronics, woodworkin~, textiles, chemistry, telecommunicati~ns;
commercial ecluc~.tion: accounting, office-secretarial; domestic train-
in~;: sewing, domestic science.
On this technic~,l secondary level, a loss of students because of drop-
outs is to be deplored, especially in the first 2 years. ~iowever,
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the loss is smaller than in ~eneral secondary: 49.5 perce~it in techni-
ct~l (first stage) compa,red with 65 percent in general secondary.
The c~ua.lity of the teaching staff is thus judge~d, often with amazing
- statements sucY} as: "80 to 90 percent of the te~ching staff lacks any
teacher training" or moreover: "in one case out of two, the teacher
has no practical experience in the trade he is teaching; in one case
out of three, the teacher has a standard of training which does nat
- exceed the C~'." '!'here are frequent complaints about the teachers'
la.c)c of. motivation.
These teachers numbered 1~688 in 1977-1978 or 18.1 students per
teacher. 2'he ratio is better for public education: 13.1 students per
teacher.
~ls re~ards materi~.l facilities, it is especially the C~TI's which
lacl~ c~u~,rters, equipment and adequate grants. 1+Thether t}iere are
- enou~;h shops or not, there are too many students per shop~ besides
the Cameroonian standards are below the French standards: meclianics:
~.8 square meters per pupil, conp~,red with 9.4 in France; building:
7.5 square meters per pupil compared with 25.2 in Fr~,nce. Tloreover
these standards are not respected.
- "Un the level of investments, it appears that mechanics only has 21
percent of the necessary equipment, while for building;, they have
cnl,y 4 percent of what would be neces;sary, in adopting foreign stand-
~ ards." The defects are sometimes d:~amatic: the CET in Bangangte re-
~ portedly "operated" for 5,years without electricity. The machines,
~ahen there are any, ~,re sometimes very old: lathes 20-25 years old;
it is still necessary ~or devoted and competent teachers to maint~,in
and repair them after working hours:
Grants for operations are insufficient and late and this is true al.so
~or the technical secondar,y schools. The head of an auto mechanics
shop told us in November 1981 that he had an operation~,l credit of
600,U00 C~'A francs for 50 students, or 12,000 CFA francs per pupil;
he liad just bought 60,000 CFA fr~.ncs of soap (2 kilograms per pupil
_ for a year) and 4 batteries for 14,000 CFA francs; he must also buy
gasoline, oil, ra~s, spare parts etc. Consequently this shorta~e
limits shop ~aorlc.
Until recentl,y, technical training schools were able to enjo,y subsi-
dies from enterPrises, deductible by the latter from the apprentice-
s}~iP tax. Since these subsidies went more to some private schools,
the ~overnment elimin~.ted tliis conveniencet it collects the appren-
- ticeship tax and ttien provides subsidies, ciependin~ on the merit and
importance of. t~ie schools. .
'.l'hese schools would also h~.ve the o1~por.tunity of doing outside work,
b~~t in the case o~f public schools~ they must return the amounts
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received to the treasury. Some have gotten around the problem by
bartering: "I will make some wheelbarrows for you, you will ~ive me
some working material.'~
The percenta~e of success in 1977-1978 was 25.8 percent for the indus-
trial CAI"s and 7 percent for the commercial and administrative CAP's.
We again find the same percentage o~ 7 percent in 1981 f or the commer-
cial and administrative CAP's in the coastal examination center. Thus
the e~ficiency of the industrial CET's is higher and the percentage
of success in the public schools is better. The public school has
one passing student for three candidates, the private school, one
passing student for four. To these two sources are added the free
candidates (a third of the candidates), often the failures of previ-
ous years. Nevertheless, a private school such as the CETI de la
Salle in Douala stands out: from 1956 to 1975 out of 1,175 candidates
who took exams, 749 passed or 63.7 percent.
Lo the CET's train enou~*h skilled workers for the occupations in-
volved? In 1978, the ratio of skilled workers to the working popula-

~ tion was about 0.3 Percent for woodworking trades, textiles, sewing,
mechanics, electricity, radio repairmen, automobile and transport and
0.6 percent for buildin~ and zero for tanneries and boot and shoe
manufacture. To appreciate these percentages at their true value, we
point out that some of these branches emplo,y very little and that some
CET(s have had to close the~r building--TP section''~r ~their woodwork-
ing section. Nevertheless, a study of the riinistry of Nationr~.l Educt~.-
tion m~l=es the followin~ interestin~ observation: "With ~.n aver~.~e
annu~,l sh~,re of 0.4 ~ercent of skilled workers, the aver~ge level of
technical d.evelopment cannot rise. It would be necessary to increase
the number of skilled workers tenfold to observe a noticeable eflfect."
Another finding: companies are n~t very enthusiastic about CAP hold-
ers: "50 }?ercent of companies do not employ them and 88 percent of
those who employ them are not satisfied: the CET Araduates are re-
- proached for lack of efficiency~ poor quality o~ work, their demands
and their lack of initiative...
On ttie other han~, the students of same schools like the CETI de la
Salle in Douala ~.re in demand and have no trouble in finding a job,
at least until 1980. At the close of the 1981 examinations, out of
ttie 64 graduates of this CETI, it was possible to trace 57 of them:
~ 16 found a job; 21 are continuing in technical secondary schools and
general educational schools; 20 are not worlcing yet (5 months after
the examinations).
Consequently, we observe two innovations: the existence of a rela-
tionship between the CET's ~.nd the secondary schools, which is very
recent; a phenomenon of unemployment which corresponda, according to
- school leaders, to a decline in the labor market and coi.aequently to
slowing down of expansion.
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Preparation for the vocational license takes place mainly through
evening courses given to CAP holders, who have a job. Training is
both technical and general and it suffers from the same defects as
the rest oP technical tr~,inin~; let us add to th~,t the fact that the
Gtudents are tire~ from the day's work' that they are often absent
to continue their job and it is understandable that the results are
not very striking; in the examinations for the vocational license in
1980 on the coast, 23 candidates out of 134 passed, or 17.6 percent.
C) The purpose of the LTS's ~echnical Secondary Schools7 is dual:
"to provide for the training of skilled technical personnel and pre-
pare the best students for higher technical.~.nd industrial studies."
There now exists at least one LT per province: coast: Douala LT
founded in 1948, (industrial and commercial courses); Bonaberi
I~iultipurpose Seconda.r,y School founded in 1973 (by Canada); it includes
both general education and industrial courses: Center-South: Yaounde
LT founded in 1963; it is now a mixed secondary school with adminis-
trative and commercial and nonindustri~,1 courses; North: Garou~, LT
founded in 1977: industrial and economic courses.
Since 1978, some CET's have been converted into LT'ss in the West at
~ Bafoussam; in the Southwest at Kumba; in the Northwest at I3amenda; in
the I:ast at Bertoua; this with the assistance of the World Bank.
Students with the B~PC F.lementary Certificate for the First Stage7
are recruited by competitive examination; in fact, the best go into
gener~.l education. A LT headmaster tells us: "Our students come from
private schools of all types." Besides the low standard o~ the stu-
dents, there is a second handicap, which has now been reduced, since
the CAP holders can participate in the competitive entrance examina-
~ tion. "It is regrettable that the old rule which allowed the begin-
- ning of technical studies as early as the first form has been elimina-
ted. In fact, the 3 years at the present time do not allow compen-
sating for the laclc of technical bac~cground and acquiring sufficient
kno~aled~e," ~.n offici~,l report says. Another excuse: technolo~ica.l
tr~,inin_p, }ias become comPulsory in the first stage of ~!eneral educ~,-
tion, but since it is superimposed on many other subjects ~.nd it ex-
periences i;he s~,me Problems as technical training (equipment, teach-
ers' qualifications and motivations), its theoretic~.~ aspect is more
developed th~.n the pr~.ctic~.l applic~.tions ~~nd it is resented by many
students as a useless imposition.
- 2'here were 2,126 L`i' students in 1974-1975 compa,red with 1,502 in pri-
vnte eclucation (ma.inly commercial ~.nd administrative courses) and
2,733 for public schools in 1977-1978. One f'inds similar situations
to those on the CZ~:T level: more students in commercial and adminis-
trative courses; che industrial courses are especially represented
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in public education, ~aith a fQw exceptions like the denominational
industrial schools of Ndoungue (near Nkongsamba) a,nd Bali (near
Bamenda).
Consequently we take note of the industrial courses of the others.
The economic courses include: G1, administrative methods; G2, quanti-
tative management methods; G3, commercial methods. Studies in these
three courses are authorized by qualifying examination (end of the
sixth form) ~,nd the bachelor's degree, as in general education. ~+~e
also find here the economic course B, classi~ied here under technical
training, because bookkeeping has more of a place here than in France.
~'inatly, various levels of accounting studies: the examination for
the D~CS ~xpansion unknown7, the certificate for senior accounting
tec~inician (see below).
Then the industrial courses. Studies in the E course ~,nd the F1 and
F5 courses are also authorized by qu~,lifying examinati~n and the
b~,chelor's degree: E, mathematics and. technical (level C~or mathe-
matics); F1, technicia.n in mech~,nical construction; F2, electronic
technician; F3, technicia,n in electrotechnolo~y; F4, technician in
civil envineerin~ a.nd buildin~; F5, refrigeration technician.
In the follo~vin~ courses, the stud~es end with the qualifying exami-
nation, then a technician certificate: MA, automechanics; Mn, wood-
working trades; CH, boilermaki~ig; GT, geometry-topo~raphy.
To the credit of the leaciers in technical education, let us note the
diversity of the courses: by way of example, the examinations last
2 whole months each year in the examination centers.
As re~ards results, on the level of the secondary technical schools
alone in 1977-1978, the percentages of success ~~ere the following
(qua,lifyin~ ex~,mination and bachelor's degree): economic courses:
27.75 percent in G1, 35~6 percent in G2, 46.75 percent in G3 or an
avera,ge of 34 percent; industriaZ courses: 20.8 percent i~ E~ 10.64
percent in F1, 58.4 percent in F2, 40.9 percent in F3, 66.6 percent
in F4, 41.6 Percent in F5 or an average of 41 percent.
The results indicate ttiat, on the whole, relatively few are
called ~.nd even less ar~ selected, especi~,lly on the level of the in-
dustri~,l courses: $9 Passed out of 217 candidates (41 percent). In
Cameroon, there is a~?re~t disproportion between the bachelors of the
~eneral courses ~,nci tliose of industrial training; it is even truer in
hi~l~er education: hundreds of ~radua.tes in economy~ law, letters~come
out of the universities every year compared with a~ew dozen senior
technici~,ns. The first ~,re Pinding a job more and more difficult.
The relatively lo~a rate of success in technica.l tra.inin~ leads not a
few students to repeat, which burdensthe educational system.
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As re~~,rds the adjustment of those who passed, a study made in 1976-77
showed th~.t, out of 108 students ~�~ho passed courses G1 and G2 (conse-
uently economic): ~nly 21 went to work; 45 are continuing the BTS
- Senior Technici~,n Certificate7 (which is also an assigned ~oal of
technical training); 38 joined the faculty a,t a secondary teachers'
training college or in a business school; one went into computer tech-
nology; two are unemployed; one is not mentioned.
Consequently there exists for 39 of them (~aculty plus computer tech-
nolo~y) "a forward movement, pursuit of a university type diploma,"
and "this hemorrha~e deprives the country of the best students it had
trained in the technical field." The study referred ta sees two main
ca.uses for it: poor understandin~ of the purpose of technical
studies (they ~re considered as a roundabout way to rejoin general
educa.tion); the fe~.r of st~.rting on a job, either because of a feeling
of inadequacy or because of lack of. knowledge of vocational fields.
In or~ler to limit this hemorrhage9since 1980, these gradu~,tes c~.n no
longer join fa.culties; the measure was resented as a persecution, for
they have many large schools available after the technical ba,chelor's
de~;ree .
We d.o not have any facts for the industrial courses,but only a few
- findings.
The teclinicians (NIA, F5 etc.) do not find employment easily in their
branch, for accordin~ to Cameroon law, they should be hired first in
the eighth category, while they do not have any occupational experi-
ence~, which would place them above persons with proven experience;
under these circumstances team work would be impossible.
Second fact, technicians and bachelors in industrial courses ~,re em-
ployed by oil companies ~or specialties other than their own, and at
hi~;h salaries. A professor declares: "They are paid as much as us,
while the,y are only probationers. Unce they are confirmed in their
position, the,y are p~,id twice ~.s much, at least."
Let us sum up ttte ~osition of enterprises. Many of them tr~,in their
personnel and complain about the certificate holders hired: lack of
eFficiency, inadec~uate quality of work, too theoretic~.l knowledge,
adaptation too lon~;, exag~erated demands and lack of morality. The
enterprises prefer those leavin~ the occupational trainin~; centers,
~�,lio, unfortunately are still not very numerous.
An official document makes the followin~ observation: "'~~Then i;he enter-
prises ~,re not directl,y involved with the educational process, they
� ~
underestiinate the trainin~; ~;iven. rhis situation is the reflection
_ oi a].~clc of cooper~,tion in the country. At Yaounde, 1;hey prepa,re
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progxams in the dark without the presence of industrialists;they
attempt to z~eproduce foreign programs, without taking into account
enough the need. of the country.
COPY RIGHT: Rene Moxeau et Cie Paris 1981
jl Jan 82, pp 31-32J
- ~ext7 We are rendering below the second pe.rt of the arti.cle on tech-
nical and vocational training in Cameroon, whose first part can be
_ rea~i in NITI~i ~1AI~CH~S TROPICAUX ET M~:DITERRANEENS7 of 25 December 1981
- pages 3435 and 3436.
I) The Different Levels (continuation)
- ll) The higher level--we ~.re presenting here the institutions less
known by the public at l~,rge, namely, ~:NSET ~econdary Technical
Teachers 'rraining College7,the certificates of senior technicians and
the National School of Technology. It is no doubt unnecessary to
mention the National Higher Polytechnical Institute.
1) ENSET has been detached from the Secondary Teachers Training Col-
~ lege in Yaounde, but it still has not had its own buildings since
1971; a,t present, it is installed in one of the CETI buildings in
Bassa, where CENAFUP ~ational Vocational Training Center7, Pounded
with the help of the ILO, is also located.
~;NSET has two stages: one,which lasts 3 years,trains the CET student-
teachers; the other,which lasts 5 years,trains the LT student-
teachers. Each of these two stages includes two divisions: division
of industrial methods and division of auxiliary methods for adminis-
tration and the economy. It is recognized there that these two
divisions correspond to the two important branches of technic~,l train-
ing. The third year of the first stage includes teaching courses;
likewise, ttie third to ~i~th' years of the second stage.
This school has suffered ~.nd still suffers from a lack of suitable
space ~znd equipment of its own; it has been hampered by a lack of
teachers; thus it h~.s not been possible to create a"school spirit."
ftecruitment of CLT student-teachers, division of industrial methods
has been limited by the small number of bachelors in the F courses.
It is a f~.ct th~,t this school h~,s not attracted students from the
be~;inning, perhaps becf~.use of living conditions, which were consic~ered
inadequate by the teachin~ staff,on the whole. The number of students
enterin~; rose from 6 in 1971-1972 to 34 in 1977-1978.
Anottier objection, no doubt connected with the laclc of its own equip-
ment: i;tieoretical studies have been extended to a hi~h level and
teacher tr~,ining reportedly has been ne~lected.
2) `1'here are two types of BTS: the I3TS f or the management secretar-
iat, which is offered in the Yaounde L1` and which attracts mainly
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~irls: the IITS for accounting and enterprise management, which is
offered in the LT's in Douala and Yaounde and which attra.cts mainl,y
bo;rs . The stua.ies las.t 2 years .
In 198~~-1981, the BTS m~,nagement secretariat had 25 students in the
first yet~r and 17 in the second year; there were almost as many for
the bilingual option. As for tlie students in the BTS ~or accounting
in Yaounde, there were 24 each year. There are 16 in the second year
in 1981-1982 at Douala. We note that these two BTS are connected
with the G1 and G2 courses; there is, moreover, a question of creating
a BTS distribution which would extend the G3 cours~s. According to
the leaders, the holders o~ accounting certificates find openings in
priv~,te industry fairly easily.
3} ENAT ~ationa,l Institute of Technology7 in Yaounde is responsible'
for"the trainin~, improvement, retraininat~,nd specialization o~ the
staffs of land registration survey, rural engineering, civil engineer-
ing ~.nd city planning�" Stage B trains senior technicians who are
the direct assistants of engineers. Stage C trains technical repre-
sentatives. This school works mainly for public administration. In
1980-198Z it was in the process of reorganization and had 344 stu-
dents, including 6 girls.
After this inventory, we will summarize some problems common to the
various levels of technical training.
II ) A Few riain Problems
1) The students--They face a not very favorable opinion about tech-
nical training which is considered as inferior and reserved for the
less ~ifted; technical studies are making the~ir debut under the sign
of failure and rejection. If the openings are sufficient a.nd the
- sala,ries suitable, this image can be corrected. To tell the truth,
we h~.ve found th~.t tfie entrepreneurs distrust these certificate hold-
ers; new rejection! In a,ddition, life in the shop or factory is less
secure thr~n office ~~rork: we have observed that the certificate holder
~an fear goin~~ to work and. turn towards university teaching. Is.this
situ~.tion not the c~,use of the resignation, l~.ck of initiative and
responsibility of which the students ~,re sometimes accused? A LT
headm~,ster sees another cause for it: the young people are taken c~,re
of too long by their families, he tells me,thus a l~ck o~ responsi-
bility. It is Possible to see another cause in the students' l~,ck of
motivation: they are no~ attracted by a trade~ bu-t r~,ther by a social
status; consequentl,y they are not re~.dy for everything to master
this trade.
'i,hen the acceptance of the technical world is the result of a type of
conversion which requires several ~enerations. For not a few oP the
r~eopl.es of the Third 1+Torld, technology is more a"magic of the whites"
than the product of gre~,t e~fort. The A~rican cities and countryside
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still T~resent n, picture of technolo~;ical deterior~Ltion: t:~~ roads,
buildin~~s, vel~icl.es, m~,chines are not regul~.rly m~,intained. Repairs
- tind imProvements ~.re don~ sporadically ~.nd often come from outside
or a forei~n enterprise. This environment certainly affects the stu-
- dents. A bre~,kdown is not disastrous because it is the return to
the traditional life w~ich is, not without charm.
Similarly, the young Afric~.n does not live in an atmosphere saturated
with technology; r~,re are those ~aho have played ~aith erector sets,
Leaos or electric tra.ins; rare a.re those who have le~,rned to t~.ke
care of t}leir bicycles. Guntrary to a young European, the Cameroonian
of the same age who attends the LT does not have the money to buy
parts to build himself a quartz alarm cl~ck or a transistor device:
he does not have pocket money and the necessary parts are rare and
expensive here. This fact and the environment cause the student to be
slow in his studies: a teacher of electronics says tliat to do all the
program he would need 50 hours besides.
2) The teachers--National education is making eff orts to improve the
competence of technical education teachers; these efforts e,re not
eliminatino the dissatisfaction of the teaching sta~f ~,nd results
w}iich proceed from it: irresponsibility, absenteeism, resign~.tions.
Thus, when II~TSET still ~nly had the stage of CET student-teachers,
Canada (ACDI ~xpansion unknown]) trained 35 LT Cameroonian student
teachers, often former teachers. After 5 or 6 years, 24 of these
teachers moved into private enterPrises and only 11 remain on the
job. One of them declares: "I am still here, ~or I ha,ve been waiting
for 6 years to be reclassified in accordance with my certificates;
then I would not rem~.in, unless I am satisfied; if not, I will. seek
employment elsewhere." 'rhis situation is not unusual in Cameroon:
offici~.ls w~,it years to be reclassified and they must be absent from
their work for 15 days, several times, to go to Yaounde to speed up
their file. 1`Iany official reports mention excessive administrative
delays.
There is ~,~;rowin~; disparity in Cameroon between the standard of
living of professional workers in the private sector and tli~t of pro-
fessional worlters in administration, particul~,rly those in teaching
wliose ~zork is demar~.~in~. This disparity ~avors the c~dministration's
corruption a,nd inertia. The salary of a secondary school teacher at
tlie beginning of his career is about 120,000 CFA fr~,ncs per month
a,ncl t}i~,t of a technical teacher still at the beginnin~; of his career
is about 80,000 CFA francs; to these amounts is added a lodging allow-
ance equal to 20 percent of the salary. Just as bonuses have been
gra,rted in secondary teachin~, it has been proposed th~.t a system of
bonuses be estab].ished for technical teachin~ and, at the present
time we do not know if it }ias been approved.
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Let us emph~,size here the considerable assistance provided by French
, cooperation ~vorkers to Cameroon technical training.
3) I~la,teria,l facilities--A LT headmaster admitted tliat with the rapid
development of technical training, it is difficult to increase sig-
nificantly the credit for each school. Overall, technical training's
resources have developed faster than the number of students trained,
except for the investment budget whic}i has declined from 1971 to
1973; moreover, this budget rose to 15 million CFA francs in 1973 for
~.11 public technical training, which made it possible quite appro-
priately to buy a system of some importance. The total equipment
bud~ei; for all technical ~,nd vocational training durin~ the Fourth
Ylan (1976-1981)--including agriculture, the national civic service
for participation in development etc.--provided for 15 billion CFA
francs in buildings and equipment.
'1'wo problems often recur in reports and conversations: the ?ge and
backwardness of some installations, administrative delays in releasing
moderate credits.
Age and backwardness. The equipment is old and prevents instruc~~ion
of students in recent technologies. Thus in rIA ~uto I`techanic~,
, they do not have an electronic inspection system, so that the stud.ents
_ learn understandably to be j~.cks-of-all-trades like in the "neighbor-
hood garages." In mechanics, a milling machine with a. cubic c~�cle
~ and pneumatic controls is a labor~.tory curiosity. There is talk about
~ establishing television in Cameroon, bu~ the electronics teacher says
' he would need an addition~.I year to initiate the students. A profes-
; sor of electrotechnolo~y told me that Cameroon is 20 years behind and
he adds: "The ~ap is widening witti EuroPe; and, nevertheless, they
are buildin~ modern pla,nts here. Well, ea,ch time we are forced to
brin~ in foreign technicians." That is not quite exa,ct, for in the
case of Sonara (petroleum refinery), the future Cameroonian operators
wer~ trained in Furope for 2 years, as well as other technicians.
Administr~.tive del~.ys and lack of coordination. Here are a few facts:
"at the Dou~.la LT, four milling machines out of seven were broken
do~rn because of lack of parts, ~ahich did not cost over 200,000 CPA
francs. In June 1978, the suppliers h~,d not been paid for the raw
material used for the hachelor's degree examinations in June 1977.'~
i~x~Lr,?Ples of lack of coordination: "In coniiection wi ~h a gra.nt of
creclit: b~T the World ~3ank for the physics laboratories of the Doual~,
LT, t}ie arbitr~,r,y elimination of some items by administrative services
m~,lces some equipment delivered unusable. ~'or the Bona,beri secon.dary
school, same of the ec~tiipment delivered is not usable (60 Hertz oscil-
lof7r~tiph) or short~,~;es of equipment make all trn,inin~; impossible (no
en~;ine in the T1A section)
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h't)R t)h'N'it'IAI. l~tih: UNt.I
But tlie responsibilities are not only on the part of the central ad-
ministration; we could mention such a school where school equipment
has not been maintained (numbers of tables wnd chairs were allowed
to deteriorate in the sun and the r~.in) ~.nd where the students them-
selves are assessed to buy a padlock to prevent their Property ~rom
heing stolen.
Conclusion
This summary shows some positive aspects ~,nd indicates some solutions.
Un the government level, we find a real desi�re to encourage tectlnical
training although this desire is slow to be realized and an interest
in clarity. To go further in this field, the National Aiinistry of
Education has established a standin~ committee for the development
of technic~.l trai.ning.
Students in seconda,ry technical definitely increased, rising from
4,400 in 1960 to 57,000 in 1980, compared with 8,500 and 1$0,000 for
= secondary gen~ral on the same dates. Nevertheless, thP increase of
secondar,y gener~,l has been more rapid, since technical which ~Jas
- 51.7 percent of secondary general in 1960, was no more than 31.6 per-
cent in 1980. Certainly, the government would like for technology
to increase m.ore rapidly.
There is no simple solution in such a complex ~ield. It would even
be deceptive to believe that there where qu~,lified and valu~,ble
people are necessary, as well as considerable funds, the atmosphere
~ of technical training can be rapidly changed. The problems will con-
tinue for many ye~,rs.
It ~aill be necessary to increase expenditures for equipment,to reno- �
v~,te the schoots a.nd au~;ment their stock of tools; also necessary to
increa.se operatin~ expenses to provide more opportunity for Practical
shop trainin~; necessary finally to reev~.lu~.te the tes~cher's function.
It is desirable to improve cooperation between the teacher ~,nd the
enterprises; it has be~n discussed for years in France; in Cameroon,
the f~.ct th~,t ma,n,y enterprises ~.re still managed by foreiAners shoul.a
no lon~er be an obstacle to this cooperation, f or there are man,y
enterprises managed by nationals. If we want the enterj~rises to hire
certific~,te holders, it is advisable to interest them more in train-
ing, by consulting them about progr~.ms and goals; the employers'
associ~.tion could have some influence in the creation and development
of voc~.tion~,l schools; it would be necessar,y to moderate wa~e legis-
lation; it would be possible to expedite the tr~.nsfer o~ some equip-
ment frorn enterprises to schools; finally, if it is desired to spread
the pra,ctice of tr~,ining courses, it is necessary to consult the
enter.prises.
CUYYRIG'rIT: kene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.
8490
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GABON
SOCIAL MEASURES INCLUDED IN ].982 BUDGET
Paris MARCHES TR.OPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1884, 18 Dec 81 p 3375
_ [Text] An official communique, issued after a meeting of the Gabonese Council
of Ministers on 5 December (see MTM of 11 December 1981 p 3313), gives the following
detaila about Gabon's budget for 1982 which amounts to 453.5 billion CFA francs.
The budget, 10 percent higher than the 1981 budget, is broken down as follows:
public debt, 120 billion CFA francs; operating expenditures, 132.1 billion;
transfers and operations 18.6 billion; investments, 182.8 billion.
In the development budget, special emphasis is given to social, educational and
health expenditures as well as to agriculture and infrastructures.
The various chapters of the development budget are: vocational training: 1.71
billion CFA francs (7.9 percent increase compared to 1981); national education and
higher education: 11.24 billion (up by 7.1 gercent); health, 4.04 billion (up by
2.6 percent); social affairs, 850 million (up by 0.5 percent); subsidized housing,
7.08 billion (up by 4.5 percent); agriculture, 12.5 billion (up by 7.8 percent);
energy, 14.13 billion (up by 8.9 percent):; roads and bridges, 29.26 billion (up
by 18.6 percent).
Social Policy
Since the purpose of the government's social policy is to improve the living
standard of all social strata, in the course of the Council of Ministers' meeting
the head of state ordered the minister of economy and finance to seek additional
funds to accelerate the implementation of the national housing program.
Also, in an effort to lessen some of the social burdens of the Gabonese people,
the government has decided:
(1) Starting next year, to grant f amily subsidies to the poor; the method of pay-
ment will be announced at a future date.
(2) Star.ting on 1 January 19.82.,and applicable to.the entire national~territory,
the rates for ordinary medium voltage electricity will r.emain frozen at the
level of 31 DecembPr 1981.
.
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tuk urh~i~ i.~~ ~~yr_ ~~Nl.~
"This measure consolidates the decisj.on made by the president of the Republic
in July 1980, which is now in effect, to freeze all charges for low voltage
electricity throughout the country and the water rates in towns other than
Libreville and Port-Gentil. These measures...are mainly intended to lighten the
burden of the Gabonese people's family budget and to encourage small and medium-
size businesses."
(3) To study the possibility of having SOTRAVIL (Libreville Transport Company)
- purchase an additional batch of buses for the urb.an transport services.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
8796
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GABON
FAVORABLE TRADE BALANCE SHOWN FOR 1980
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81 p 3438
[Article: "Balance of Payments Surplus in 1980"J
[Text] Gabon's Balance of Payments Committee met recently in Libreville and noted
a surplus of 20.3 billion francs CFA [African Financial Community] for the 1980 f~scal-
year, as opposed to a deficit of 3.5 billion CFA in 1979, according to the account
given by the Gabonese daily L'UNION.
The volume of balance of payments transactions reached the recoxd level of 800 billion
francs CFA in 1980 (up 30 percent over 1979).
These quite favorable results were achieved despite large expenditures (232.5 billion
CFA for the operating budget and 102.4 billion CFA for tfie development budget), as
well as payback on the national debt. The surplus is due mainly to increased income
from oil production.
Despite a production drop of 900,000 metric tons [mt], receipts rose from 273 billion
CFA in 1979 to 413 billion CFA in 1980 because of the combined effect of an increase
in the price per barrel on the international market and the great strength of the
dollar at the end of the year �ollowing spectacular increases in value.
The amount of the paid, direct and guaranteed Gaboriese national debt on 31 December
1980 still came to 406.8 billion CFA. The 1981 budg2t allocates 270 billion CFA to
partial retirement of the national debt.
Gabonese exports other than oil (manganese, uranium and wood) had some trouble in
1980 because of the internatiional economic situation. Still, the trade surplus
reached a record level at 390 billion CFA in 1980 as opposed to 263 billion CFA in
- 1979. This increase largely made up for service expenses, which are still large,
wheareas the overall positive balance of goods and services came to 202 billion CFA
as opposed to 72 billion in 1979.
Free loans removed a deficit of 26 billion CFA caused by foreign workers' sending
their wages home. The deficit in the balance of services increased concurrently
with increased expenditures due to o~l prospecting and development.
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The deficit in long- and short-term capital was much greater (up 152 billion CFA)
mainly because of payments on foreign d'ebt and especially commercial credit to
finance increased exports.
The committee also noted that the 1981 balance of payments is expeeted to show
another large surplus.
COPYRI~tiT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1981
~ 8782 �
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GABON
BRIEFS
INCREASED OIL PRODUCTION PRO~PECTS--Gabon now produces 7.5 million metric tons [mt]
~ of oil a year and could, "with time," bring production up to 10 million mt a year,
said the 2nd vice-prime minister of Gabon, the minister of Mines a~~d Oil, Mr Etienne
- Buy Mouvagha-Tchioba, in the journal PETROLE ET GAZ ARABES. The ~abonese minister
minister expl.:Fined that recent discoveries have doubled Gabon~s (cnown oil reserves
but that the government has not yet deci.ded on the production le+vel to be reached.
Mr Mouvagha-Tchioba admitted that Gabon had had ~'some trouble" in selling its oil
at $35 a barrel. Since 1 November the price of Gabonese crude h,,3s fallen to $34,
" and Mr btouvagha-Tchioba thinks it is still too early to say whetlier this decrea~e
"has.been enough for customers to increase their orders." As for relations with
foreign oil companies operating in Gabon, the minister revealed that the Gabonese
government's objective is to increase its share in tfieir capital from 25 percent
to a 35-41 percent portion. Negotiations have been undertaken with ELF [Gasoline
and Lubricants Company of France], which accounts for most of Gabon's production,
and Shell. The Gabonese minister fiopes to reach an agreement before the end of 1982.
` ~Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDTTERRANEENS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81 p 3438]
8782
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GUINEA--SISSAU
i
' BR~EFS
INCREASED FRENCH COOPERATION DTSCUSSED--General Joao Bernardo Vieira, president of
Guinea-Bissau, discussed increased cooperation between Paris and Bissau with Mr Fran-
cois Mitterrand in a 3/4-fiour conversation in Paris on 17 December. After tfie dis-
cussion, General Vieira, wfio was meeting the president of France for the first time,
mentioned that he fiad brougfit up with Mr Fraricois P4itterrand tfie possibility of "tri-
angular cooperation" between France, Portugal and Portuguese-language African countries.
This theme had been stressed by Mr Francois Mitterrand during his visit to Portugal
last week. As concerns bilateral cooperation, tfie Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC)
~provided 13.7 million French francs in subsidies in 1980 and directs its efforts
- mainly toward restoring peanut production, wfiich is Guinea-Bissau's main source of
foreign currency. The FAC is also participating 'in developing the country's hydro-
electric resources and in taking a mineral resources inventory (especially in pros-
- pecting for pfiosphates), as well as aiding fisheries. About 40 Guinea-Bissau citizens
hold French scholarships, while about 30 French technical assistants are presently in
Guinea-Bissau. France has been giving Guinea-Bissau wheat and corn in food aid annually
since 1977. In 1980, this aid amounted to 1,~00 metric tons [~ntJ of wheat flour and
1,000 mt of corn. The Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) has been aiding ,
Guinea-Bissau with loans since 1976. Loans amounted to Fr 8.4 million in 1980. The
3rd meeting of the joint France-Guinea-Bissau commission was held in Paris in March
1981. [Excerpt~ jParis MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French ~~0 1385, 2~
Dec 81 p 3426] 8782
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MOZAMBIQUE
SPECTRUM OF COOPERATION WITH FRA~ICE REVI�WED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81 p 3449
[Article: "Franco-Mozambican Financial and Economic Relations"]
[Text] The following is a summary of France's financial and economic relations with
Mozambique as of the date of Mr Jean-Pierre Cot's visit to that country and the signing
of a general cooperation agreement.
(A) Public and private financing: On 23 April 1977 a group of French banks,including
the General Company and"IndoSuez, and the Bank of Mozambique concluded a purchasing
credit framework agreement. This agreement was made for 2 years and included a Fr 50
million credit ceiling that was later raised to Fr 75 million and Fr 125 million.
This agreement was renewed in April 1981 for a maximum of Fr 175 million in credit
usable till April 1983.
Also, financial agreements were concluded in Paris on 18 March 1980. Tfiey included
~ a Fr 117-million contract (mixed loan) for buying 15 shrimp boats from France,
opening a Fr 1Q0-million line of credit for miscellaneous purchases in France,
a Fr 50-million to buy various food and agricultural products from France, and
financing for two large contracts in the energy sector.
At present these various lines of credit have been exhausted, and the framework of
financial relations between France and hlozambique consists of the aforementioned
interbank agreement and the balance of the mixed loan.
Negotiations were undertaken taetween the governments of the two countries to set up
a new cooperation agreement, which was signed in Maputo recently on the occasion of
the visit by Mr J.-P. Cot (mentioned above).
(B) Operations and investment: The development of economic and commercial relations
between France and the People's Republic of Mozambique goes back to 1979-80. It is,
then, recent in date and has so far been implemented by large sales of semi-finished
~ ~~roducts, agricultural and food products and equipment.
(a) In engineering, nothing concrete has been achieved, but contacts and studies have
involved the energy sector, transports and communications, civil aviation, telecommu-
nications, industry and agriculture.
(b) Equipment is being supplied and installed by the group CGEE [General Electrical
Equipment Company]-Alsthom for the Cabora Bassa dam (2,250 megawatts) and, jointly
~i~c, ~talian company SAE [expansion unknown] it has been building the electric
line linking this dam with the Center and 2o~rth regions of Mozambic~ue. It has also
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been participating in buildi.ng the Mavusi fiydroelectric plant, T[ie Campenon-Bernard
Company has been taking part in constructing a bridge on the Zambezi.
(c) In industrial construction, the group Renault Industrial Vehicles has been
closely involved in repair operations on Be"rli.et fieavy vehicles. The Cifal company
has contracted to build a 15,000-metric ton [mt] capacity refrigerator warehouse in
Maputo to receive potatoes and onions.
(C~ Mining and oil production: The BRGr4 [xureau of Geological and Mining Exploration]
and the General Geophysical Company are doing geophysical and photogeological studies
_ for mineral prospecting in the North and West regions of the country. No mining is
- being done at present by French companies, as this sector is the object of close
cooperation between Mozambique and the GDR. However, some projects in this sector
have been discussed by the Mozambican coal autorities and the French. Similarly,
the national hydrocarbon authorities would like to bring France into seismic gas
- exploration. French companies fiave not done any oil exploration in Mozambique since
_ the country became independent in 1975.
(D) Trade: In 1979, France's trade with Mozambique came to Fr 137 million of exports
from France and Fr 53 million of imports to France. France was then the 8th largest
supplier to Mozambique (4.1 percent of imports to Mozambique) and its 7th largest
customer (3.1 percent of imports from Mozambique). The financial agreements concluded
on 18 March in Paris between the two countries as complemented by the credit agreement
o� 21 May 1980 on various agricultural food products, as well as excellent use made of
the framework agreement on purchase credit signed 12 April 1979 have all contributed
much toward improving the French position on the Mozambican market.
Inde~d, French sales fiad reached Fr 215 million or an increase of 56.93 percent. This
increase was due largely to capital equipment, as French purchases declined by 16.98
percent, amounting to only Fr 44 million.
At the end of the first 7 months of 1981, French exports to Mozambique are considerably
more than Fr 231 million, and imports amount to Fr 29 million.
- French exports are made up mainly of 3 main groups, which are all up: semi-finished
products and intermediate goods, 53.06 percent of the total; agricultural and food
products, 21.59 percent; capital equipment, 18.4. percent.
Mozambican exports also fall into 3 main groups: agricultural and food products, 48.42
percent; consumer goods, 30.9 percent; and raw materials, 18 percent.
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1981
8782
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MOZAMBIQUE
BRTEFS
PORTUGAL-EEC CONNECTION VIEWED--According to Mr Prakash Ratilal, vice-governor of the
Bank of Mozambique, Portugal's eventual entry into the EEC could favor increased eco-
nomic cooperation between Lisbon and Maputo. Mr Ratilal sees Portugal's access to
EEC ~inance sources as possibly helping Portuguese industrialists overcome their
investment problems, which are preventing them from putting into effect several eco-
- nomic development projects in Mozambique. Mr Ratilal says that Portugal's cooperation
should involve particularly the sectors of light and heavy industry, petrochemicals,
cattle raising, shipyards, and the pfiarmaceutical industry. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 p 43] 8782
STEEL SALVAGE PROJECT PLANNED--Some Frenchmen may remember the slogan popular in 1939-
40: "We shall forge scrap metal into the steel of victory." This is what Mozambique
intends to do now. The CIFEL [expansion unknown], in Maputo, has set up a project
that should start about the middle of tfie current decade and eventually produce about
' S0,000 metric tons of steel a year. CIFEL plans to use as .raw material old, scrap
ship hulls purchased abroad. [Text] [Paris MARCHES T~ROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
~ French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 p 43] 8782
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SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
. ~
BADEA LOAN WILL HELP TO DOUBLE ENERGY PRODUCTION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1884, 18 Dec 81 p 3373
[Text] The Arab Bank for African Economic Development (BADEA) decided, at the end
of October, to extend to the Republic of Sao Tome and Principe a$5 million loan
to help that country launch a pro~ect to increase its production of electricity.
This is the first time that the BADEA is participating in a pro~ect in that country
which, however, received assistance from the FASA (Special Arab Fund for Africa)
on 2 occasions ($10 million to finaace several small investment pro3ects and $500,000
to help with its balance of payments) and several other contributions from Arab
sources.
The power pro~ect, partly financed by the BADEA loan, represents a total invest-
ment of $12.85 million and its other financial backers are the IDA [International
~ Development Association] with $5.1 million, the Portuguese Government with $2.2
million and the Government of Sao`Tome and Principe with $550.000.
Currently the country has an installed capacity of 4,270 kilowatts generated by
public (81 percent) and prl.vate (19 percent) facilities. Out of that total, 2,358
kilowatts are produced at hydraulic power plants and the rest at thermal power
plants. The total amount of electricity needed ia estimated to be 5,600 kilowatts
which means that there is a supply deficit of 1,330 kilowatts. This deficit, caused
by a 10 percent rate of growth in the demand, will be as high as 3,5~0 kilowatts
in 1983 which is why the government urgently must rectify the situation and why it
has worked out the current plan. The various aspecte of the plan involve building,
in the industrial zone of Sao Tome and Principe, a new power atation equipped
with two diesel generators capable of generating 2,000 kilowatts each; carrying
out the necessary civil engineering works; building tanks which can hold 380 cubic
- meters of fuel and oil; training techniEal personttel for the.power statior?, supplying
various electrical equipments; giving technical assistance to and training staff
for the Electricity and Water Company.
When this project is completed, the result will be a significant inerease (almost
I00 percent) in electricity generation to meet domestic and industrial demand.
This project is the first answer to the problem of limited hydroelectrical power
generation in the islands (particularly during the dry season and when the volume
of the river flow goes down) and to the need to turn to thermal power. The ~
problem will have an indirect effect on the national economy and will enable the
government keep the same rates as in 1978 for electricity and water supplied for
household use.
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According to the construction billbook, the pro~ect which will be supervised by
the Electricity and Water Company (attached to the Ministry of Construction, Housing
and Industry), is scheduled to be completed in August 1983.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
8796
CSO: 4719/391
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SOUTH AFRICA
SOUTH AFRtCAN FOREI(~I MINISTER ON MASS MEDIA .INQUIRY
PM0512~~9 London THE TIMES in English 5 Feb 82 p 8
[Article by Michael Hornsby: "Hostility to Press Plan Rejected as Hysterical"]
~
[Text] Cape Town, 4 Feb--Mr R. F. Botha, the South African foreign minister, today
described as hysterical and premature the hotile press reaction here and abroad to
the proposaZs of the Steyn Commission of inquiry into the mass media.
In an interview with THE TIMES, Mr Botha maintained that the press coverage of the
Steyn report had been deliberately "dished up in such a fashion as to give the
impression to the reader abroad that the government intends to ki11 press freedom
in this country",
"Some papers here obviously expected the government to react immediately, and to
clamp down on the press, and the government did exactly the opposite", Mr Botha
maintained. "The present hysterical outburst is apparently based on frustration
that the government did not react as expected".
The Steyn report, accompanied by draft bills embodying its proposals, was tabled
in parliament earlier this week. If implemented, the draft laws would, among other
things, require all ~ournalists to be licensed by a statutory board of controls.
This has been widely condemned as a means of imposing political conformity.
i The prime minister's response in parliament to the Steyn report had been 'bery,
' very categorical and clearly stated", Mr Botha declared.
"He said that the government could not give a conclusive 'yes' or 'no', thaf it
, was a voluminous report, that it required study and that negotiations would take
place with the press. Now what more reasonable attiCude can any government adopt?"
It was impossible, Mr Botha insisted, for the government to indicate that its
final position might be when it was still only "at the beginning of discussion with
- the press Nor could he be able to express any personal view on the Steyn pro- ~
posals until he knew what the outcome of these negotiations were.
Mr Botha's co~ent will do little to calm the fears of editors and ~ournalists here
who question the motives of the government in commissioning the Steyn report in the
- first place and are alarmed that the government should be prepared even to consider
a measure like the compulsory registration of ~ournalists.
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The foreign minister's remarks tend to confirm the view gaining ground here that
the government's initial strategy will be to try and persuade the press to exercise
self-censorship while halding over its head the threat of legislation as a weapon
of last resort.
The government's main target is the inf luential English-language press, which is
by far the freest in Africa and ~Ceeps up a constant nagging assault on the policy
of apartheid. Pretoria would dearly love to see this criticism muffled.
In response, newspaper owners and editors have set up a committee to draw up a plan
for remodelling the existing, though largely ineffectual, South African Press
Council.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1982
CSO: 4700/664 END
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