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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040026-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY , JPRS L/ 10380 12 March 1982 E ast E u ro e R e o r~ p p POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS (FOUn 5/82)~ ~ Fg f~ FOREIGN SROAD~CAST INF~RMATION SERVICE FOR OF~ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040026-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040026-4 NOTE ~ JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from n.ews agency transmissions and broadc3sts. Materials from foreign-language sources ~re translated; those from English-language saurces are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other charac;:eristics ret~~ned. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processin~ indicators sur_h as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a~rief, indir_ate how the original information was , processed. Where no process~ng indi~ator is oiven, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parenttieses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item ori,7inate with the source. Ti~es within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government. COPYFcIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATEI~IALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION = OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040026-4 APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500040026-4 FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY JPRS L/10380 12 March 1982 FgST EURO~E REPORT ~ POLITICAL, $OCIOLO~iGAL AND MILITARY 'AF~AIRS : (FOUO 5/82) ~ CONTENTS POLAND 'TIMES' Correspondent Describes Conditions in Warsaw (THE TIMES, 8 Jan 82) 1 'GUARDIAN' Prints Partial Text of Gornicki Copenhagen Statement - (THE GUARDIAN, 11 Jan 82) 3 YUGOS LAVIA . . Italian Paper Interviews Milovan Djilas (Milovan D3ilas Interview; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 1 Feb ~2)..... 6 - - a - [III - EE - 63 FOUOJ L'(1~ l1CCT!`T A T T TCC (1ATT V APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040026-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500040026-4 F~;R OFFICIAL USE ONLY POLAND 'TIMES' CORRESPONDENT DESCRIBES CONDITIONS IN WARSAW PM081319 London THE TIMES in English 8 Jan 82 p 20 ~ [Roger Boyes "Letter From Warsaw:': "The Miseries of Living Each Uneasy Day as it Comes"] ~ [Excerpt] Two weeks into martial law and, according to official accounts, local opposition to military rule had ended. The thousand miners occupying the Piast mine in Silesia have ended their sit-in strike, alt~hough it is not really clear how the army achie~�ed this "pacif ication." Earlier pacification of the Wujec mine involved the shootiug miners out of self-defense, according to the govern- ment spokesman. We have, the government s~Qokesman t~ell.s us (foreign correspondents, not the nation), - entered the second phase of m~artial law: the thaw. That is certainly true enough of Warsaw, but Radom, Gdansk and other towns appear still to be at the heavy snow- ~ fall stage of the cycle. And nobody knows how long Warsaw will remain quiet when the telephones are restored. ~ Solidarity, the independent union, needs telephone contact to regroup, so the ~ military solution dictates there will be no telep.hone system. Unfortunately, the ~ economy also needs telephones and enterprise managers, already afraid of making too independent-sounding decisions, are simply not functioning. The workers sense the mood and partly in sympathy with Solidarity, partly out of~post-Christmas doziness, produce only token amounts.. Two weeks into martial law and the stunz~ed shock has given way to national lassi- tude and a barely concealed cynicism. At Szczecin shipyards, fork-lif~t truck drivers ferry meaningless loads from one end to another, repeating the process endlessly until it is time to go home. Home is where.most people go after work nowadays; cafe society has dwindled to a hardy gaggle of students, unsu~e whether they will be called up or whether they will have to repeat the winter semester. Big ideas, once the small change of cafe conversation, are no longer so~.ial currency. Informers are back in fashion; when asked, people laugh and say, of course they were asked to cooperate and of course they refused. But the un~asiness lingers and excuses are made: the last bus before curfew has to be caught at 8.30. The soldiers no longer know why they are there, manning the roadbiocks, acting as auxiliary policemen. The army newspaper gives warning daily of the Solidarity 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040026-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500040026-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY "extremists" but most soldiers would not recognize the gross caricatures fed to them in their political education lessons. The conscripts have schoolfriends in the union, while the professionals seem to have been expecting some form of partisan attack, car bombs and shootings. Instead, day by day they see quite normal Poles, commuting f rom queue to queue, some of them openly contemptuous of the rifles and uniforms, mast of them sullenly compliant. The troops are moved regularly, rotated with units outside Warsaw, to - reduce the tedium and the sense of futility. Even the dullest trooper has now realized that there is no ~mminent prospect of a parachute atta^k on the bridge that he is guarding. Meanwhile, it is impossible for anyone to cross a bridge by foot in Warsaw. A Pole who lives on the wrong side - of the Vistula will have to wait for the notoriously self-willed trams to take him the 100 yards to his home. Solidarity still exists, both officially and unoff icially. Officially, because unions are permitted provided that they engage in no union activities. Unoffi- cially, because after dusk small knots of Solidarity sympathizers meet in churches, the only really safe havea. Priests have bE~en instructed by their _ bishops to take rio part in political activity, but the meetings happen anyway, sometimes in the vestry by candlelight. The Warsaw chapter of Solidarity, ance nine hundred thousand-strong, can still pro- duce a regular bulletin of information, mainly about the condition of the detained union leadership. It bears the hal.lmarks of hurried printing and is a sobering testimony to what happens when a sophisticated organization with ten million inem- bers has to go underground at a moment's notice. - Two weeks into martial law and everything that matters is in a state of suspension. Marriages are put off, coupl~s defer having children for another year, school- leavers stop worrying about careers. Before 13 December, th~re was an obsession with buying consumer durables--everything fron~ washing machines to abstract paintings--before the zloty lost its value completely. Now, the obsession is less pronounced. Sest travel light is the philosophy, spend ~ on food, the daily needs, forget the long-term planning. A journalist on ZYCIE _ WARSZAWY, the now suspended, once lively regional newspaper, says he has nothing - to do but there is no point in starting a book he has been planning because it invol~~es political judgments. It is no time, with a wife and family to support, to become: an instant dissident. COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1982 CSO: 2020/33 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040026-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500040026-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY POLAND 'GUARD?AN' PRIIQTS PARTIAL TERT OF GORNICRI COPENHAGEN STATEMENT PM111205 London THE GUARDIAN in English ll Jan 82 p 5 [Unattributed report,: "'Solidarity Declared War.Against the State "'--f irst ~ paragraph is editoriaZ introduction] [TextJ The a partial text of a stateT~ent made by Captain Wieslaw Gornicki, a senior advisor to GenEYal Jaruzelski, a~` a meeting of the World Peace Council in Copenhagen last week. It is the fullest ~ublic explanation of its case to come from the Polish martial law authorities since the EEC foreign ministers f irst raised the possibility of sanctions against Poland. . In this crucial moment of Polish history we ~csk all oux friends in the peace move- ment, not only for understanding, but also for moral and political assistance. Armed forces are s~ldom associated with peace activities, yet there are moments whei~ the armed forces become the last resart of safe-guarding peace before it~is too late. This is precisely the ~ase in Poland: Public opinioa asks what happened in Poland. To our minds, tne relevant quPStion is ~ust the opposite: what did not happen in Poland. A bloody prolon~ed civil war did not take place in Poland, although we were on the verge of it. . A military dictatorship has not been estadlished in Poland. Martial law is a temporary measure, and it will be lifted as soon as possible. Civil ~iberties will be restored. Finaliy, European pea:e and stability were not put into ~eopardy.. This had been a very real imminent.prospe~;. That is the starting point. Now let me be more specific. Nobody can blame the Polish authorities for lack of goodwill. They did their. best to prevent the confrontation. Since last March I participated in all negotia- tions with Solidarity as a member of the government. For about 14 months the Polish government was willing tc? reach a compromise. We did see--perhaps wrongly-- a chaiice of widening tl.e structure of political life by including an independent trade ~nion in the pattern of our state. The sad truth is, however, that it simply did not work. Solidarity ceased to be a trade union almost as soon as .it was born. It became an opposition political: , party. The name of an opposition party may not sound very repulsive to many of 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE O1~LY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040026-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500040026-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY you, but let me make it quite clear: Solidarity was never intended by its extremist leaders to be an opposition party in the.Western meaning of the word. Gradually it became a conglomerate of ~ust about everything right-of-centre, from conservative, openly pro-capitalist tendencies to the brink of fascism. , On 30 October General Jaruzelski offered from the rostrum of the Polish Parliament an entirely new formula for a front of national conciliation. It was meant as a way of sharing exP~+~*_;~e power with nonparty groups and organisations. All mean- ingful groups Polish society, including the Roman Catholic Church, expressed their desire to participate in the front. There was one single exception: Solidarity. ~ During November, the government undertook several initiatives aimed at national conciliation. General Jaruzelski met the primate of Poland,~Archbishop Glemp, and the~chairman of Solidarity, Mr Lech Walesa. On 12 November, ~in the town of Trzehlatow [as published; probably TrzebiatowJ the vice-president of Solidarity, Mr Marian Jurczyk, delivered his famous speech. Mr Jurczyk said, among other things: "What we need are gallows... Those p~~~;~le who run Poland are not Polish, they are either Russians or Jews with changzd names... No talk with a government of traitors," Is that a trade union activity? Where in the world does a trade union call f or the death ar.d extermination of fellow workers? . On 4 December, the Presidium of Solidarity met in ltadom. ~his was an open declaration of war against the Polish state. There is ample evidence that, between 4 December and 11 December, preparat:Lons were being made for a regular counter- revolutionary coup d'etat, patterned after tlie classical CIA style. In the night of 12 December, after the Central Commission of Solidarity openly proclaimed a declaration of war against the state, no other o;~tion was left for Poland except � extraordinary measures in order to res~ore law and order. This is not the place to refure all lies spread about Poland. I will confine myself to nine most evident distortions. 1. The total number of persons detained was approximately 5,050 at the beginning, now it does not exceed 4,400. An exact number cannot be given because people are constantly being released.~ The talk of "several tens of thousands of detainees" is plain nonsense. ~ 2. The total numb~er of casualties is ~ight nersons. I repeat.eight. We all regret it. 3. Not a single detained person was sub~ected to cruel treatment, torture, beat- ing, or exposure to the freezing outdoor air. A11 those persons will be eventu~lly released, and they will give testimony as to how they were treated. 4. While martial law was obviously not greeted with enttiusiasm by everyone in Poland, it was not rrue that the Polish nation as a whole resented it. On.the 4 ~ FOR nFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040026-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500040026-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ contrary, the Polish "silent majority" met it with a sigh of relief, irrespective of actual political leanings. 5. The intr.oduction of martial law was a strictly Polish, sovereign, domestic . ~ issue. There is no.t a single proof or evidence of any foreign involvement. 6. Emergency measures undertaken on 13 December are not aimed at the restoration of what brought Poland to ~he crisis of 1980. 7. It is not true that the preparations for martial law had been made many months in advance... There were no plans f~r direct military action until virtually the very last moment. ~ 8. It is not true that Polish clergy have been subjected to persecution or reprisals. I know of only two or three cases ~.ri which priests were detained, but martial law is mar.datory for everyone. 9. It is not true that all Polish trade unions, including Solidarity, were banned - or prohibited or disbanded. Their activities were temporarily suspended and will be pex7nitted to operate again as soon as possible. However, there will be no place for an anti-communist oppnsition political party. That is over--once and forever. COPYRIGHT: Guardian Newspapers Limited, 11 January, 1982 I CSO: 2020/34 5 FOit OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040026-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040026-4 FOR OFF[CIAL U~E ONLY ~ YUGOSLAVIA ~ ~ ITALIAN PAPER INTERVIEWS MILOVAN DJILAS Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA i.n Italian 1 Feb 82 p 9 [Interview with Milovan Djilas by Ettore Petta: "The Italian Communist Party accord- ing to Djilas: 'It Foilows the Footsteps of the Yugoslavia of 1948 but Its Third Way Is Not Clear ~ ~ . [Text] After the meeting with Moscow--Criticisms of the.Soviet Union in the interview with the "great heretic" of Belgrade's communism who is an exile in his own homeland. Belgrade ._Milovan Dj ilas, the great heretic of Yugoslav communism, is also wondering where the PCI [Italian Communist Party] is going: he can already see it mov,ing "on - the road which we opened in 1948" and he thinks thafi~ it will go much further. Djilas is interested in finding out whether the PCI will find a specific position on the Italian political scene as a"reformist" party. Finding that place without 1'osiag its image as a communist party however will be a difficult undertaking: the party of Craxi and the party of Longo as a ma.tter of fact will not much room to maneuver. On the ~ther hand, the PCI "at tllis moment" no longer has a Leninist cast to it; it has come out in favor of political pluralism which as a matter of ' fact is contrary to the spirit of Leninism. Hence the "break" with the Kremlin ' which will receive the final official stamp of approval the moment the Soviets es- tablish that the Cossutta group is not able to create trouble for the Berlinguer and Napolitano leadership "with its maneuvers." In spite of his 70 years, Milovan Djilas still has a youthful face, almost like a calm little boy. His permanently half-closed eyes are live~.y, attentive, loolcing at the conversation partner like the eyes of an examiner. The half-lit room, in which he received me with a little cu~ of Turkish coffee, is full of huge pieces of furnitu~e, such as a big desk, a bookshelf, a sm~.~ll table.with chairs, and.a bed. The window faces on tree-lined Palmoticeva Stree~, a silent little street although it is in a vexy central location, behind the Federal Parliament. This is his king- dom as a"domestic exile" where he however can receive anybody he wants to receive, apparently without any controls. He says that an evolution of "modest liberaliza- tion" is taking shape in Serbia and more gQnerally in Yugoslavia; he is certainly ; less pessimistic about his counr.ry's future than he was a few years ago. He does not rule out the possibility that the PCI's pol3cy "might influence or shake the ~ awareness of the Yugoslav Communist Party and I believe that the current modest liberalization in Yugoslavia will continue. The alternative would lie anarchy." 6 . FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040026-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040026-4 FOR OFFICIAL iJSE ONLY But our conversation turned toward the conflict tha~t b.roke out hetween two big com- munist parties, an argument which fascinates.him: "Our hreak with Moscow certainly took place in a situati.on tfiat a~as ~more difficult for us tfian the situation faced by the PCI today." ~or Yugoslavia tfiis was really "a question of life or deaCh" and this is why, Djilas says-, it was not even possible to listen to the argu- ments of the Yugoslav pro-Soviet group; Serlinguer today can a11ow Cossutta to speak without having to fear being overconie by the clout of the Soviet Communist Party. ~ Now--says Djilas, talking about 1948--the crux of the issue is obviously political. Today, the problem that divides Berlinguer from ~rezhnev is essentially ideological; they fit:~ themselves facing a reformist party and a Marxist-Leninist party. After the conflicts between Moscaw and Belgrade and later on with Peking, the current conflict with Rome "is the most important and also the most original because it is a conflict on the major questions of Leninism." The PCI however is not in an easy situation. According to Djilas, "it is not clear" what Berlinguer means when he talks about *he "third way": the PCI's present policy "is not y~~t the third way" and the dilemma is this: a communist part~ ~s that only if it is a Leninist party and if it is not Leninist, it is no longer even communist. The "third way?" "I believe that Western Europe as a already living in a form of democratic socialism, not perfect, not ideal, but there it is. The third way~should be a new form of social and economic existence and this point is not, clear in. the PCT. The problem of nationalization is complex: if nationalization is productive, it goes well, otherwise it only produces red tape." The Eurocom- munists, that is to say, the Italian and Spanish communists, according to Djilas are "'the reformists of modern capitalism, a capita].ism different from the one considered by Marx and Lenin and naw also,by the Kremlin. "Capitalism has changed in terms of inentality and in essence" and can no longer be judged t~irough the eyes of Marx and Lenin. What is to be done, then? Is it necessary to invent a new Marx? Djilas answers that real socialism is no longer capable of producing a new Marx and thus revitalizing his theory. Marx' place in the modern world has been taken by Karl Popper and by Leszek Kolakowski. He also mentioned the names of Zakharov and Zinovev, the Russian exile in Paris, and thei: added that Leninist ideology is "sclerosed; I would not say that it is dead, as Zakharov maintains, because it can still be used and the Kremlin makes abundant use of it." But when it comes to so-ca1 led real socialism "nothing positive can come out of it anymore and that is what Poland tells every day." As far as the Soviet Union is concerr.~d, Djilas says that he is pessimistic because "I am afraid that some day it might cause a big war." He says: "Look at Helsinki; after that conference, the Soviets stepped up the pace of their arms drive, causing an imbalance in East-West military relations." D~ilas added that "only a strong West can save the peace." Betwaen the Soviet policy of President Reagan and that of Chancellor Schmidt, Djilas opts for the one of the White House although he observes that he can very well under- stand Bonn's attitude since the Germans would be the first victims of a war. But with the USSR "we cannot entertain any illusions: it is a military empire, like the state of Ottom~n Turkey." COPYRIGHT: 1982 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.a. 5058 END CSO: 3104/109 7 FOR aFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040026-4