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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ JPRS L/ 10381 ~ ~ 12 March 1982 ~est E u ro. e R e o rt W . p p ~FOUO 15/82)~ I . . FBIS FOREIrN BROADCAST INFORMATIOIV SERVICE ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL�Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-Ianguage sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Hea~lines, editorial reports, and material er~closed in brackets ' are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the ~ast line of a brief, indicate how the original infoimation was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfami:.iar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times ~iith in items are as _ given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Covernment. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500044027-3 ~ ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . � , . ~ JPRS L/10381 12 March 1.982 WE~i EUROPE REPORT ~ - . (~ouo 15/s21 ~ CON~~~NTS ~ ~ THEATER FORCES UNIT~~D KCNGDOM , . Discussions on Trident, Chemical Weapons (Various sources; vaxious dates) 1 . Pro-Tri~7.E~nt MP, by Julian Critchley . ~ Anti-Trid~nt Former Defense Cnief, by Field Marshal Lord Carver Nott Seeks Trident 1'arts Dea1, by Eenry Stanhope Natt, MP's on Chemical Weapons ENERGY ECONOMICS � � - FIDERAL REPUBLIC OF. GERMANY . ' ~ New Heating System Reduces Costs by 50 Percent~ ~ (Karl-Heinz Seyfried; CAPITAL, Feb 82) 10 ITALY . ~ Algerian Gas Pipeline Ac~:ord at Impasse ~ ~ ' (Lorenzo Scheggi; IL MONDU, 22 Jan 82) 13 ECONOI~C FRANCE " Industry Minister, Credit Bank Chief Discuss Nationalization (Pierre Dreyfus, Jean Maxime Leveque Interview; PARIS MATCH, 29 Jan 82) 16 POLITICAT, ~ ICELAND . . Presnier Thoroddsen Reaffirms Position on NATO ~ (D~nis Taylor; T~ TIMES, 17 Feb 82) 21 - a - [IIS - WE - 150 FOUO] F(1R f~FFIf7sT. TiCF. (1Ni.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540040027-3 rux urrtt,iew u~~ udLz ITAI,Y ' USSR Accuaed of Having Supported PSIUP (Filippo Ceccaxelli; PANORAMA, 1 Feb 82) 22 " Reorganization of CGJ.L Secr~taxiat (TL MONDO, 22 Jan 82) 25 . SPAIN Carrillo Strongly Criticizes CPSU's Stance Toward PCE, PCI (Santiago Carrillo Intervferyr; PANORAMA, 15 Feb 82)...�. 26 GII~JERAL ITALY . Restricted 'White Paper' on P2 Masonic Trial (Gianni Rossi; IL MONDQ, 22 Jan 82) 30 ~ - b - . ~ FQ~t OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ THEATER FORCES UNITED KIIJGDOM DISCUSSIONS ON TRIDENT, CHEMICAL WEA'ONS Pro-Trident MP , PM161551 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 16 Feb 82 p 18 [Article by Julian Critchley: "Is Gi~~ing Brezhnev a Rocket the Best Way ta Use Trident?"] [Text] Poor John Nott. He is.beaet with troubles. The treasury won't le.t h~m pay his b ills, his backbenchers are becoming disenchanted and Trident may cost twice as much as he told Parliament it would less than a.year ago. "I told you so" is the inevitable comment of those of us who are familiar with the dynamism of American arms production. Oace co~n3.tted to ."corrnonality" with the American nuclear submarine missile programme, we cannot avoid being caught up in the rhythm of its production lines. What is now the intention of the l~inistry of Defence--though I believe the Creasury ~ is yet to be won over--is to go for the new, larger vers3.on of the Trident, the D5. This is because President Reagan has decided to deploy it in 1989 in place of the C4, which was to be the model for the new British flotilla of four submarines, costing about 5,000 million pounds at 1980 prices, to replace our aging Polaris vessels. As the production of the C4 missile is likel~? to be phased out before the new British submarines are built, it would be sensible to order or earmark now the Royal Navy's requireme~its from the DS prodc~tion line. The size and capability of the D5 .commend it to those who believa that the Soviet military threat calls for the most formidable'weapon of deterrence available. It will have a range cf 6,000 miles, double that of~ the C4, and the multiple warheads of its missiles sYe said to be more accurate. The submarines will have a displacement of 18,000 tonnes and '~6 misaile tubes. I believe that the cost--whatever the preaent government line may be--is likely to be about 10,000 million potmds, double the original estimate. This would buy us only three of these great submarines, which would mean oniy one would be likely to be on station at a time. 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500044027-3 FOR OFFICtAL USE ONLY It is not only the aize which accounta for the greater coat; there ie also the fall in the exchange rate from $2.40 to the pouad in 1980 to about $1.80, and the bigger contribution (at least 12 percent) to research and development compared with the 5 percent charged for tl~e C4. Total expenditure would be spread over 15 years and would amotmt to some 6 percent.of the defence budget. Most of tiYle cost would be incurred in the late '80s, and it is estimated that 70 percent of it would be sp2nt in Britain. The problem of the extra expense, whiah is yet to be resolved in cabinet, is complicated by the news that we are to spend some hundreds of millions on renewing the motors of the Polaris missiles. If the life of Polaria is to be prolonged, why not build four. new Polaris submarines? This view, which the Ministry of Defence should consider, is reinforced by the news that the expensi.v~a Chevaline warheads, ordered by the Wilson government for the extirpation of the Muscovites, should need arise, have just been test fired from renown. Anoth~r alternative could be cruise miasiles, which would be cheaper a~~d more accurate. President Reagan's decision to mount a large number of them in submarines is evidence of American confidence in their sea-launched efficiency. The cost in money is, of course, the one traditional aspect of national armaments on which parliamentarians concentrate. But there are a lot of political, moral ~ and psychological considerat.ions, belonging to quite a differeat order of ideas, which this decision summons from the deep: and I have a feeling that it is from this source, aa well as from the military and financial arguments, that British Governments will encounter obstacles to the fulfillment of a new Trident programme. � To begin with, the political consensus which has supported nuclear deterrence is no more. Michael Foot and Tony Benn, who were members of the Labour cabinet which 3uthorised the Chevaline system for the purpose of penetrating the anti-ballistic defences of Moscaw, are now pillara of unilateral disarmament. The Labour Party would repudiate th~ Trident agreement with America were it to win the election. That is not very probable, but we now learn that Dr Owen is also in favour of dropping Trident, unless it was too far advanced financially (which is unlikely to be the case)., if the Alliance comes to power. That also may now seem very unlikely, but the possibility of some kind of foreign policy agreement '=:~tween a numerically-reduced Conservative Party and the Alliance is not unreal. What is more, there are evidently a great many people who haa~ticularl ronaworldr - the parties nowadays and foxm their opinion independently, p Y affairs. For them, television is probably the moat forinative influence. Not long ago the nuclear disarmament campaign held the centre of the stage, but events in Poland have served to blunt its appeal and there has been recently a reaction against the special pleading and emotional excess of CND. Yet is would be a mistake to imderestimate the rational core of the campaign and the a~.~.xiety about the rivalry in nuclear armaments which it has aroused in the minds of many thoughtful people. If we cannot count on the consensus of the political party leaders for a British deterrent, it is more than ever necessary to carry the moderate centre. 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R000500040027-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY It is the target of ~he deterrent which sticks in the gullet of the moderates. This may mean nothing to those concerned with the technical capability of a strategic nuclear missile; but it is not without psychological importance. According to NATO "the UK Government has stated that the Trident force will be assigned to NATO and dedicated to saceur targets." Yet throughout the eivdence given on the sub~ect to the.Defence Co~nittee of Parliament, one target and one target only was mentioned, the Moscow conurbation. "Because of its gymbolic value to the Soviet Union and to the world co~~mist movement. "It follows that to be able to hold Moscow hostage may have a very powerful deterrent effect and therefore that, on b~lance, the British deterrent ahould be ab le to penetrate Soviet ABM defences"--which is, of course, the purpose of Che~aline. Is that a target chosen by the supreme allied commander? In fact, I believe it was the target always intended by the British Government ever since we possessed a atrategic nuclear missile, the threat to massacre the population of Moscow being only contemplated, of course, in retaliation. It may be that this "city busting" abomination is the purpose of the Russian SS20s, which the Pershing IIs and Tomahawks are designed to counter, but which it is the aim of the Geneva negotiations to eliminate. - In the past 4 years the doctrine of both the super powers seems to have moved away from the destruction of cities in favour of missile silos and other mil3.tary objectives. It is, at any rate, a more rational form of warfarp. The British mass destruction ob~ective appears to be a relic of the early post- Hiroshima days. If British missiles, like the American, raere known to be primarily d3rected, for~instance, at some of tlie manq targets in the great military complex of the Soviet Union's "norhtern theatre of operations, of which the Kola Peninsula is the centre, and which is the most concentrated eource of potential nuclear aggression, it would be much less.difficult to "sel.l" Trident, or any other system, to the British people today. Anti-Trident Former Defense Chief ~ PM231123 London THE SUNDAY TIMES in English 21 Feb 82 p 16 [Article by Field Marshal Lord Carver, chief of Defense Staff 1973-1976: "Why Britain Should Reject Trident"] [Text] The issue over Trident is whether or not the government should spend a considerable sumn of money--figures varying from 6 to 10 billion pounds at 1981 prices are bandied about--on replacing the existing force of four ballistic ~ missile submarines with a force of four or five new British-built nuclear-powered submarines, equipped with either the current or the improved Trident missile, for which Britain would design and produce new nuclear warheads. If not, should Britain attempt to maintain an independent strategic nuclear deterrent strike force with some other, cheaper zzystem, or give up the struggle to keep up with the nuclear Joneses? ' There are three questions that need to be answered before one can approach the answers. Should we continue to design and manufacture our own nuclear warheads? 3 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500044027-3 F'OR OFFICIAL USE ON1LY Whether or not we do, should we man nuclear delivery systems? If thQ aaswer to both thosQ is yes, should we COA~~ALIF: to maintain a force �ahich is called inde- ~ pendent and sCrategic? Let me answer the easiest question, the seeond, first. I have no doubt that, ~s long as NATO's policy is that ther~ should be nuclear delivery systems based in Europe and its surrounding waters, we should play our part in manning delivery systems. 'I'he more that Eurogean ~.nembera of NATO demonstrate that'they accept ~ a policy of.nuclear deterrence, t:he stronger~the cohesion c� the Alliance will - be. To refuse to do so, or to refuse to allaw bases for d~livery systems in one's territory, seems to me hypocritical and incons:'stent with membership of the Alliance, although it cain be explained away as he.lpiiig auclear deterrence by defusing local ob3ections. ~ How Many Bombs Were Needed? As to whether or not we should continue to design and manufacture our own warheads. That depends a good deal on tie answer to the third question. How important, therefore, is it that we shmul3 have our own independent strategic syatem, that is one which can inflict such unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union that, b~ itself, it deters her from ~omething which we regard as unacceptabls to us? The criterion for this is generally thought to be the ability t:o inflict coasi- _ derable damage on Moscow, which is protected by an $nti-ballistic missile eystem, on the efficacy of which som~ people now cast doubt; and the ability to do this when nobody else is attacking the Soviet Union, with the capacity to maintain that threat 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, although the U.S. established the criter3on of its "countervalue" deterrent as the.destruction of 50 percent of the ~ Soviet Union's industrial capacity and 25 percent of her popul.ation. The arguments for having an indepe.ndent nuclear force have varied down the years, the military~ones invariably h~ving been evolved to rationalise the political decision already taken. The or~.ginal decision, finally c~~nfirmed by Attlee's administration in the bleak January of 1947, has been described by Pro�essor Margaret Gowing in her masterly official history as emerging from a body of getieral assiunptions; not a response to aii immediate military threat but rather - something f~damentalist and almost instinctive.,..a symbol of independence. When the air staff came to calculate how many bombs were needed for the deterrent purposes they were meant to serve, ahe described the ~nethodology se so ridiculous that its conclusions seemed worthless. Things have not greatly changed since then. Churchill and ]3ter Mac-Millan in the earZy 1950's ~ustified the force, then the RAF's V-bomber;s, on the grounds that there were targets which were vital to us, but which the U.S. might not regard as auch, and that our possession of nuclear weapons enabled us to make certain that these targets were attacked, and also gave us influence over U.S. policy generally, a claim thaC so~ded hollow in the Suez affair the year after Mac-Millan had made it. At tha start of the sixties, when the strategic nuclear balance between the U.S. and the USSR was casting doubt as to whether the former preparsd to initiate the use of~ nuclear weapons in the event of Russian invasion of Western . ~ ~OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500044427-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Europe, and the Kennedy administration, particularly its Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, became very coacerned that nuclear war should not be sparked off for causes or in conditions which did not warrant national suicide, other arguments were heard. France had exploded her first device, and the U.S. feared that the contagion might even spread covertly to West Germany, McNamara described independent forces of lesser powers as �1dangerous, ineffective and prone to obsolescence." Henry Kissinger, who in his 1957 book "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" had favoured - proliferation of this kind, as he had also the concept of limited nuclear war, recanted on both 3 years later in necessity for choice, describing independent retaliatory forces in Europe as "in danger of producing an illusory feel3ng of security which in some respects magnifies the danger." The arguments put forward by Britain and France at that time were somewhat self- contradictory: That their forces tied the Americans to one's side and committed them to engage their nulcear amroury, and that they were an insuranc~ against. either the depar.ture of the Americans from Europe or their unwillingness to become involved in a nuclear war on its account. Proliferation and Blackmail The French general, Andre Beaufre, produced the clearest concept of.this. He argued that the m~nor nuclear power's force was protected by that of its ma~or nuclear ally, because the opponent could not afford to strike it, for fear of _ retaliation by the major, unless lt had the capability, and exereised it, to destroy the major power's force at the same time. The Soviet Union would recogniee this and therefore be much more cautious about takiag action which directly threatened the.minor power, but might not be regarded as a stake worth risking nuclear war by the ma~or. The situation also had the advantage that the minor power was free to pursue an independent foreign policy, even one opposed to the ~ interests of its major ally, because the inextricable linkage of their nuclear forces in the overall nuclear equation compelled the ma~or gower to consider the interests of the minor power as its own. Beaufre, in common with Kissinger, Herman Kahn and others, ridiculed the idea of a minor nuclear power, partieularly one whose population was concentrated in - cities, threatening nuclear retaliation on its own against a major nuclear power, if it had been.abandoned by its ma3or nuclear ally. It would be tantamount to suicide. He therefore favoured proliferation nations as atrengthening the alliance. ~ He glossed over two aspects of his concept: The implications o.f its application to West Germany and the poasiblity that pursuit of such a courae might drive the major ally to abandon the alliance, which, by his definition, would undermine the value of tb.Q independent force. Britain had never been quite so blataatly cynical in its ~ustification as that, but it has used the same argument in dffferent forms. The pure and simple "trigger" argument has been employed, but to auggest that we or France should, - 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY by firing off a nuclear weapon ourselves, which the Russians would not be able to distinguish from an American one, the alliance into nuclear war against the wishes.of the U.S. is so patent:ly irresponsible and c'iearly unpalatable to our great ally that it has been supp:~essed. The more subtle form that has been used, and is now the one on which the govem- ~ ment publicly relies, is that, although we have full confidence that the United States will be prepared to initiate nuclear war if conventional aggression in F.urope could not be held, or to retaliate if the Warsaw Pact initiatea their use, the Russians might think that they would not be prepared to do so for fear of escalation to retal3ation against American cities; but they could have no doubt that we (or France) would be prepared to take that risk because we are in Europe, although the risk to us would be total and to them only partial. ~ There are two questions to be answered here. Firat, if the "second centre of decision" argument is valid, the Beaufre's version of it seems to me to `~ave more substance to it, is it in our interesta to encourage the Americans to be prepared to initiate nuclear war in Europe? Second, is it worth paying the price for it at the expense of conventional forces, as, with a limit to defence expenditure, it is bound to be? My answer to both questions is no. My reason is that, as hae been the case ever since the nuclear arms race started in 1945, the West's thinking has constantly lagged behind the realities of the race. _ A concept based on nuclear superiority in one field has quickly been invalidated . by the Soviet Union following suit with a capability to retaliate in k~nd at every level, producing a nuclear stalemate that has now descended�from the strategic to the tactical level. At the theatre of tactical level any nuclear exchange, however limited it m3.ght be, is bound to leave NATO worse off in comparison to the Warsaw Pact, in terms.both of military and c3vilian casualties , ' and destruction. That is a factor of geography and of the overall balance of conventional forces. The only exception would be if the Soviet Union were to ~ respond to NATO's uge of nuclear weapons either with a much more limited response or not at all. To. initiate the use of nuclear weapons on that assumption seems to me to be criminally irresponsible. This overall nuclear stalemate, which is not a matter of balan.cing exact numbers of nuclear delivery systems at different levels, but of the ability to retaliate in sufficient strength at the same or a higher level, makea it imperative to improve the strength and flexibility of NATO's conventional forces. It also makes a good deal of NATO's nuclear armoury not only superfluous but positivel~ dangerous, as encouraging its politicians and military staffs to think that the . use of nuclear weapons could redress the effect of a conventional defeat and therefore that.nuclear forces can compensate for inadequacy in conventional ones; would actually be used for that purpose and are therefore, as the defence secretary claims, good value for money. A further argument for an independent strategic force is that, if a nuclear . exchange were to take place in Europe, our ability to retaliate would at least - ensure that targets in Britain were not attacked by nuclear weapons (some would - 6 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540040027-3 FOR 01 FICIAL USE ONLY even claim even by conventional weapons), oae that cannot be flatm,ted in front of aur non-nuclear allies. Mor~ than one American critic has pointed out zhat that concept means that Britain ,3nd France would be likely to hold back their nuclear weapons, and perhaps not be as wholehear-ted in their conventional efforts, if NATO were attacked. Far from being~a contribution to NATO's nu:lear deterrent, it tends to undermine it, and the ldgical application.of .the concept is to promote proliferation. ~ I therefore believe that to spend money on Trident shows a wrong appreciation of priorities. We should accept that our nuclear strike forces are part of NATO's "forward based systems," and we should encourage the Americans to widen the Geneva talks, as the Russians have demanded, to embrace all such systems in the hope that they ca~ be reduced on both sides. An Addition to the Arsenal ~ If the result of that is that NATO continues to wish to maintain intermediate range (or long-range theatre) aucl.ear delivery systems, we should of�er to man all or.a proportion of those based in the UK or its surrounding waters. When Polaris fades out, this could be the American cruise miss3les, if they are part of the armoury, or just a3rcraft as we do today. But it would not matter whose the warheads were, and we could save a significant sum by shutting down our capability to produce and maintain them. The knowledge of how to do so would remain, if, for some curious reason, we wanted to resuscitate it. However, cruise missiles would not be suitable as an independent strategic force. If Britain insists on maintaining the latter, the only s2nsible form it can take is a second-strike retaliatory force that is as invulnerable as possible, and Trident is~undoubtedly the best syetem for that. But I believe it to be an unnecessary addition to the American nuclear arsenal, which is more than suffi- act as a deterrent to the only things that it is now~capable of covering: war between the U.S. and Russia, and if that fails, the usa of nuclear weapons by both sides. The essential feature which links that deterrent to Europe is not Britain's independent deterrent, but the preaence of adequate U.S. conven- tional forces in Europe, to the maintenance of which the strengthening of the conventional capability of her European allies is an essential contribution. - COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1982 ~ . Nott Seeks Trident Parts Deal ~ PM221621 London THE TIMES in English 22 Feb 82 p.22 [Report by Henry Stanhope: "Jobs Deal Sought in Trident Talks"] [Text] Britain is trying to negotiate a deal with the United States under which firms in Britain might be able to~make parts for the Trident-2 nuclear missile. The implications for jobs.of auch an agreemant would make it easier for Mr John Nott, secretary of state for defence, to convince his gove~rnment and paxty colleages of the wisdom of r~eplacing Polaris with Trident-2 as Britain's strategic deterrent in the 1990's. 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The most likely date for a cabinet decision on whether to change from the Trident-1, or C4. to the bigger, longer-range but more expensive Trident-2, or D5, is now thought likely to be in the week after Sir Geoffrey Howe's bL3get on 9 March. That would enable Mr Nott to attend the next meeting of NATO's t~uclear planning group with the decision behind him. _ An arrangement under which British industry would be allowed to compete for contracts in respect of those missiles, which are being made for the 13nited States Navy as well as for Britain, would pacify companies like British Aerospace which has been complaining that it stands to get nothing out of the Trident purchase. Negotiations are not yet complete, but the latest reports largely confirm the impression that the United States has been more agreeable to a Trident-2 deal than government officials had feared. The United States is also said to be agreeable to asking Britain for a fixed payment towards the research and development coats instead of the more expensive and more risky percentage deal worked out in the existing Trident-1 contract, which was announced in July 1980. . Sources are talking of a total package coeting around 7,500 million pounds. A shifting exchange rate makes it difficult to talk in terms of o~ne fixed s~um. Although it will be more expensive than Trident-1, the treasury prefers the prospect of Trident-2 because, being a later programme, it will cost less over . the next few years. The Ministry of Defence is also planning to spread the cost over 20 y.ears instead of 15, and making the present Polaris force serve for about 5 more years before being phased out. COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1982 Nott, MP's on Chemical Weapons PM241755 London THE TIMES in English 24 ~eb182 p 4 [Unattributed report of 23 Februar~ House of Commons session: "Chemicals From Behind Closed Russian Doors"] . [Text] It was time for MP's to concentrate on the threat from Soviet chemical weapons instead of criticizing Britain's Ameriean allies, Mr John Nott, secretary of state for defence, said. Pressed by the opposition on deployment of chemical . weapons, he said there was no proposal to deploy them on British soil. We have taken the lead (he said) in trying to get a ban on the manufacture of chemical weapons but the Soviet Union, because it has a massive lead in these weapons, deployed forward in Europe, and has 60,000 troops trained to use them while NATO possesses none, refuse~ to agree to verification measures. He was answering Mr Denzil Davies, an opposition spokesman on defence who had accused him of prevaricating on chemical weapons. . ~ 8 ~ FOR OFFICTAL ~JSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R000500040027-3 FOR OFFICIAL iJSE ONLY Mr Davies had said: We all know there is a Rusaian stockpile and thQre is going to be an American stockpile, and I hope for negotiations to reduce them. Will he make clear that the government has no intention to manufacture chemical weapons or to allow them to be located on British soil whether they are British or American? . . . Mr Michael :~IcTTair-Wilson: Has any European member of NATO yet asked for chemical weapons to be stationed in their count~y? Mr Nott: There is no proposal at present to deploy the new Americ~n binary weapon forward in Europe and the A~ricane~ have agreed to consult their European ~ allies before any such forward deployment arises. Mr Frank Haynes asked if the stationing of chemical weapons in Europe was discussed at the last meeting of NATO defence ministers. Mr Nott: No. Mr Haynes: Many people do not believe Mr Nott's statements on chemical weapons. When will he come clean and 1et the.people know what is going on behind closed doors? Mr Nott: Russia has 60,000 troops trained in and specially designated to fight in chemical warfare. Their training is carried out in live chemical grounds and we know there are fatal casualties among the soldiers involved in Russia. Russia holds over 300,000 tons of chemical weapons and much of this is deployed forward into Europe, with the means of delivering it. That is what is happening behind closed Russian doors. COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1982 CSO: 3120/44 9 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540040027-3 I_ FOR ~FFICIAL USE ONLY ~ . ENERGY ECONOMICS i?EDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY NEW HEATING SYSTII~1 REDUCES COSTS BY 50 PERCENT Hamburg CAPITAL in German Feb 82 pp 86, 88 _ [Article by Karl-Heinz Seyfried:~ "Storage in Concrete"] [Text] A newly developed technique off ers amazingly low heating costs. Heat is extracted from the environment and used for domestic heating. Experts declare that the new procedure, applicable in any new construction, has out-~ standing features. . - - - - - - - - _ BAU-ZENTRALBLATT waxes ecstatic over the new heating system: "The stuff the heat comes out of--it's ccncrete." And the "Baumarkt Tip" information service exhorts its readere--primarily construction entrepreneurs--in bold type: "My urgent rec- ~ ommendation: climb aboard this train!" ' The cause of the enthus.Lasm of these two trade ~ournals and of many others is~a new heating syste.m which helps to reduce energy costs by more than 50 percent. It was developed by the.medium-sized Seemann Concrete Works in Villingen (Schwarzwald). In prefabricated exterior walls, balcony parapets or garden walls concrete workers have laid in plastic pipes in which ~ heat-exchanging fluid cir- culates. The trick: the fluid is always a few degrees colder than the concrete wa11s and hence ex~racts heat from them. The heated material flows into a heat pump which cools it and uses the acquired energy to warm the heating water. This procedure called by its Schwarzwald inventors a massive absorber system has been tested by the technicians of the reputable Fraunhofer Society at ita Institute of Structural Physics in Holzkirchen and has been found to be good.� In the raw cli- mate of the lower ATps the massive abaorber has now for the third winter been heating an experimental house monovalently with the heat pump--that is,~without ~ an additional heating boiler. ~ ~ a Professor Bernhard Schwarz, chief of the Fraunhofer testing program, has estab- lished that the massive absorber system yields �or each kilowatt-hour of current used 2.7-fold heat output--distinctly more, for example, than energy roofs or fences made of inetal which also extract heat from the air. The reason: concrete stores more heat than does any other building material and is capable of exploit- ing the daytime heat at night. ~ Traditional heat pumps which extract energy directly from the air provide in mo- novalent operation only 2.2 timea the conaumed electric current as heat energy. 10 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 FOR OEFICIAL USE ONLY It is true that the efficiency of inetallations which extract heat from groundwa- ter or from the ground is greater than in the case of the massive absorber, but their field of possible application is restricted: groundwater is not everywhere accessible and heating from the ground requires extensive excavation. On the other hand with the concrete system it is possible to heat the building even on the coldest days with pipes in only half as much wall area as the square footage of the dwelling. ~ For especially low exterior temperatures the inventors of the system have intro- duced a safety feature: the foundation plate of the house serves as energy stor- age. Yet even in the cold winter of 1980/81 this reserve was not needed. Meas- urements made at the administrative offices of the Seemann firm (with 5,000 square meters of office space, the largest building thus far which has been - heated entirely from concrete) confirm the fact that even at 780 meters above sea level the exterior walls were always abl.e to store enough environmental heat for heating the building. Heat From Concrete ~ . ~ ~ ~ - �~ao~ ~ ~~ou' ~ ~ ~ Ii ~ ~ : I I : ~j ~ - - - I~ . . - ~ - - - - - Cold brine, a mixture of water and if the exterior wall is warmer than antifreeze is warmed at the exterior the foundation plate and if the do- wall. It flows back to the heat pump mestic heating system requires no ad- which extracts its absorbed energy ditional energy the brine flows from and uses it to heat the house. the wall into the foundation plate and heats it. 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500044027-3 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USF ONLY _ Heat From Concrete (continued) ~ �~oo � ~ . ~ . v On especially cold days the heat pump extracts the etored envir~nmental 2nergy not from the exterior wa11 but from the foundation~plate and uses it to provide comfortable temperatures in the house. As always in the case of Lhere were skeptics who had their say. Testing chief Schwarz was able to meet their ob~ection that the use of environ- mental heut would also permit moiature to penetrate into.the pipes, free~e there and burst t';ie concrete. ~The professor states that massive absorbers manufactured industrially from high-quality ~concrete and laminated for optical and energetic reasons~so as to be water repellant have as long a working life as normal con- cret~ elements: "Otherwise we could absolutely not give the system the Fraun- ho�er Institute's endorsement." Also the heating expert of the Technical University of Berlin Professor Horst Esdorn, who has tested new energy ideas for the German Federal Ministry of.Con- struction has no doubts about the reliability of the massive absorber. He con- siders it to be "certainly one of the cleverest solutions." In.addition, the system is already economically viable today. While for an individual home it costs about 14,000 marks more than a conventional oil-heating system, neverthe- less it saves about 1,600 marks in energy costs annually. Because installations of this type can be completely written off in 10 years the tax advantage even for middle-income users is so great that it even outweighs the high interest rates. COPYRIGHT: 1982 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co. . 8008 CSO: 3103/254 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 _ FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY. ~ ENERGY ECONOMICS ITALY ~ ALGERIAN GAS PIPELINE ACCORD AT II~IPASSE Milan IL MONDO in Italian 22, Jan 82 pp 18, 19 - [Article by Lorenzo Scheggi: "Eni Likes a Slow Fire"] [Text] The last ones to try were Luciano Lama, Pierre Carniti and Giorgio Benvenuto. On an of'�icial visit to Algiera as guests of the Algerian trade J unions, starting on 10 January, in fact they spent most of their time talking about methane and the Italy-Algerian methane pipeline, trying to overcome the problems that may make a once-in-a-lifetime deal founder in red tape and regrets.. The umbelical cord which links Italy to Africa, running below the Sicily canal and the Straits of Messina, has been ready for months. More than a thousand kilometers of pipeline have already been laid from the Hassi R'Mel methane f ields to Calabria. This pipeline is to be 2,500 kilometers long by 1984, ex- tending to the Padana valley to connect--at Minerbio, near Bologna--with the ~ northern Italian methane network. The completed methane pipeline should carry . more than 12 b311ion cubic meters,of inethane per year. About 4 billion cubic meters of gas could be pumped through it already. But the pro~ect has ground to a halt, and so far all efforts to get it going again have been in vain, from the official efforts of Eni and the Italian Government to the more discreet at- tempts made by various Italian political leaders, including Enrico Berlinguer, secretary of the Italian Communist Party. And why lias the deal been grounded? What are the obstacles standing in the way of an agree~ment? The official reason,~and certainly the moat important one, is the price. The agreement between Italy and Algeria was concluded in 1977. But, for over a year, the Algerians have been saying that they want to revise it. Their ob~ec- tive is basically to equate the price of gas to that of petroleum and, above all, to permanently link the two prices so that the price of gas will rise every time the price of petroleum does. Snam [National Gas Pipeline Company], the branch of Eni which signed the agree~nent, disputes thia reasoning because, as the government has ~ epeatedly explained as well, the price of transporting gas is three to five times higher than that of transporting crude oil and because the gas market has~its own rules which can be ignored only at the risk of ren- dering methane noncompetitive. "There ought to be some relationahip between the two prices," Giacomo Luciani, director of research at the Institute of In- ternational Affairs and one of Italy's most brillian experts on energy problems, told IL MONDO.. "But Algeria's ~emand,for an automatic link ia unacceptable. That policy could gradually mak~ *hat country lose its entir.e market to other gas-producing countries and to petrc.~leum." ~ 13 FOIt OFFICUL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY No exact f igures are being mentaoned by either the Italians or the Algerians. But, according to information leaked to IL MONDO, the Algerians seem to be ask- ing about $6 per million B.t.u. (a special unit of ineasurement equal to about 27 cubic~meters); but, according to *_he calcLlat.ions of Italian e~:perts, gas ~ can be competitive on the Italian market only ~?t a price under $5. It is a fact that the Algerians are now billing France $6.11, ~ut France ia only paying $4.30, accumulating a dispute of gigantic proportions which was supposed to j�G solved by the French president's recent trip to Algeria. �According to infor~la- tian leaked about the matter, Fran~,ois Mitterrand aquared the circle by givir.a the i~lgerians the difference in the forni of special aid to development. Some say this formula could find support in Italy, too. It is also a fact that, ac- cording to experts close to Confindustria, Algerian gas priced as the Algerian government wishes would cost consumers about 340/~50 per cubic meter, as opposed to 240 lire for the gas Italy is supp~sed to import from the Soviet Union via the trans-Siberian gas pipeline. For the trade unions, however, this argument is only half valid. Donatella Turtura, secretary of the CGIL, told IL MONDO: "It's true that there are pric- ing problems. But this is only because Italy has no meaningful policy towards developing countries. The solution of the methane price should be found in the context of broad cooperation agreements in the interests of both countr~es. Obviously,, without such a policy purely ccmmercial considerations prevail." But some people think there is a third reason which explains the halt in the agreement with Algeria. According to this theory, Eni is not doing everything in its power to bring th~e contract to a successful conclusion, "Becauae",�the proponents of this theory say, "Italy is not really ready to use Algerian gas". Industrialists admit this ope~ly: "The hypothesis of a broad, large-scale in- - dustrialization of the South dr~`.ven by the advent of mathane doesn't seem to have become a reality, at least for now. And not much has been done in the area of nonindustrial consumption either.' According to the methanization plan. 374 soui.iern communities met the requirements for financial facilitations de~ signed to help create urban distribution networks. But the~deadline for sub- mitting requests has passed and only one-third of them have done so. Says Donatella Turture, "The goveriiment is to blame because it did not implement the necessary pro~ecrs, so a big opportunity for development and economic renewal Chat could have aff ected the whole South has been lost. But maybe we can still catch this train if we run." Walter Galbusera, secretary of the UIL [Italian Union of Labor], add~: "We are probably thrown off balance because for once the cime-table for the implementa- tion of a large-scale public pro~ect has been adhered to." At Snam, however, they say that "The truth is that it is madness to think of widespread and cap- illary methanization of the South within a year or two; mushrooms spring up overnight, not industries, and not even the use of inethane by households--that would take years and years for people to get used to." But then, what would become of the 4 bil'lion cubic meters of gas that could al- ready be carried by the pipeline in 1982 if the agreement were to be f inalized? i , 11+ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Would it be burned like a torch, the way it once was? We needn't worry; for once someone has been foresighted: Enel, which has already converted the Rossano Calabro power station and three others in Sicily to gas. E~en though many exgerts consider it wasteful to burn imported methane in termal electric power stations. They could burn up to 3 billiun cubic meters per year. 45 ~ 1)Chi ~sa il ~ers notM~ai~ 35 ~n Italia 30 - 25 - ~ Z ~ Tmnod~tt?kt 20 - ~i,~ ~ Dom~stiei 16/ � l 4 ~ Autotntion~ ' ~o- ~C~~~ ~ ~~Y l~~~ ~ 6 - , ; f� ' 0 y , - 1860 1~80 1Y70 1lAO '!0 . Key: 1. Who uses natural gas in Italy 2. Thermal power plants 3, Households ~ ' 4. Vehicles ~ ~ 5. Chemical . 6. Industrial . . COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1982 9855 CSO: 3104/103 . 15 ~ . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ECONOMIC FRANCE - INDUSTRY MINISTER, CREDIT BANR C$IEF DISCUSS NATIONALIZATION Paris PARIS MATCH in French 29 .]'an 82 pp 36-37 [Interview with I~inister of Industry Pierre Dreyfus and Jean Ma.xime Leveque, president of Cammercial Credit of ~Yance, by Marc Ullmann: "Nationalization? Yes, But Why?"] [Text~ The constitutional council is asking the parliament to review the methods of compensating stockholders in companies sub~ect to nationalizatiori, but it has not challenged the principle of nationalization.~~Thus theae actions will become fact. They will be even more expensive, costing almost a dozen billion more, making a total of 40, excluding interest. Are these nationalizations truly useful? The following are the answers obtained from Pierre Dreyfus, minister of industry, a defender of nationalization, and Jean Maxime Leveque, president of the Credit Com- mercial de FYance, an equally vehement opponent thereof. _ Pierre Dreyfus ~ [Question] For more than 20 years, you headed the Renault administration. Today you are minister of industry. In this capacity, you have something to say about the way in which the new national enterprises will be managed and in the choice of their claief administrators. What are your hopes? [Answer] I hope that the leaders o~ the new national enterprisea will be capable of a long-range view. A long-range view is very important, and the mistake made by certain private enterprises--not all of them, fortunatelyl--iR myopia, keeping their eyes riveted on this year's prof its without realizing that the development of a working tool is the only true ~gauge for the future. I was very surprised to f ind that some private enterprises--ance again, not all of them--did not tak,e the trouble to foresee, several years in advance, the development of capacities and the need for modernization~ as well as the effects of all of this on the personnel and on costs. [Question] When the situation is difficultn ian't long-term forecasting particularly risky? [Answer] It is more difficult and less certain, but nonetheles~ indispensable. And since you mention risk, I will tell you that a business manager, and in particular an administrator of a national enterpr ise, should be capable of taking risks. . [Question] ~i'he pr~sident and the managing director of an enterprise has a simple duty: he j.s supposed to make a profit for his stockholders. Might not the managing 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 rva~ vrri~.iew uu~ Vl\LL director of a national enterp�rise be torn between what he regards as the interests of the enterprise and what the government believes are those of the nation? [An swer] The split should not occur, because each national enterprise will sign a contract for several years with the which it will cammit itself to certain goals. These will obv iously not be established without the agreement of the president and managing director. Quite the contrary--it is he~who will compose them. [Question] And who will pay? ~ , [Answer] An enterprise, whether owned by the state or private, has its own self- f inancing and loan capacity. The special aspect of national enterprises is that the state is the only stockholder. It should act purposefully and underwrite capital increases if it believes that such are necessary for the development of the enter- prise. . [Question] Did you yourself, at Renault, ever clash with the government? ' [Answer] I do not recall having been in disagreement on goals of a general nature. ~ I dealt with several governments. They were all in agreement that Renault should pursue an investment palicy capable of keepin~ it in the top rank of European pro- ducers. The result of this policy was to bring about a substantial increase in the value of that working tool known as Renault. It is true that the intensiEy ; of the effort was such that not very great dividends were distributed to the state. i ~his is normal, because the more investment there .'.s, the more limited the obvious ~ prof its. The fact nonetheless remains that in th~ f inal account, you have a stronger i enterprise betr:~r able to survive a crisis. ~ [+~uestionJ Do you mean that a national enterprise can afford to sacr ifice the present i for the future, or profit for investment? [An swer] I mean that certain enterprises have patrimonial management which leads them to give priority to the div idends distributed. The fact is that this policy w~rks against investment. [Question] What is your mental pictur~ of the ideal president and managing di~rector? [Answer] He is a man who knows how to accept his responsibilities, a man of character who does not hesitate to make dec:tsions. He is also a man capable of choosing suitable assistants and creating a team. In some cases, as in the electronics ~sector, where technological changes are extremely frequent, auch a man must also have scientific competence. [Question] What about bankers? [An swer] Jacques Delors should answer that queszion. ~I will tell you only that in France, the bankers have not always been able to keep up with the industrial effort in terms of taking medium- or long-term technological risks. We have not had bankers play as active a role as those in Germany, the United States and, naturally. Japan. It is possible that things will change with the nationalizations. I am not sure. There is a problem of customs and patterns of thinking in our country. 17 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE QNLY =I . [Question] Will the state behave, then, like an ordinary stockholder? ~ [Answer] Abaolutely. The o.ily difference is that it will be less greedy for imanediate -i dividends . ' [Question] What about the social level? . [Answer] Any technological change has consequences on the personnel level, both in terms of quantity and quality. The duty of a national enterprise is to foresee these consequences long enough in advance to take the human factor into account. - I have always noticed that the trade union representatives want to be involved in _ these future planning tasks. This increases their confidence in the enterprise - and its management. . � [Question] Is it easy~ to inform wage earners that they may have to change employment because of the development of~techniques? . ' [Answer] No, it is not, easy. However, it is less difficult to the extent that it has been advance. I would add that I have never had any complaints about the representatives of the wage earners on boards of directors. They are always ready for discussions in depth on the strategy of the enterprise and they ~ have never been guilty of any,leaks of company secrets. [Question] What is the relationship between a president and managing director of ~ . a state enterprise with his board of ~directors? ~ � [Answer] What is the relation in a private business? ~ [Quest ion] That varies with the case. [Answer] That is an excellent response! I would add in conclusion that the imple- mentation .of the nationalization, of which the principle ha.s been accepted by the constitutional council, should now proceed without a delay which would be harmful to. the enterprises'themselves and to the economy of the~couritry as a whole. It should also be carried out at a cost which does not deprive the nation,of a means of getting the economy going again through the needed investments. Jean-Maxime Leveque � : [Question] You have headed a prieate bank, the Credit Commercial de France, for 18 years. This bank is about to be nationalized, and you 'have never concEaled your hostility toward such a step,~as well as toward nationalization in general. What is it ;~that you fear? ~ [Answer] I fear that the weight of the state may become too heavy in our country. In France, the state already controls many activities: the army and the police, that goes without saying, but also education, numerous communications media, the ma3ority of public services and a goodly number of enterprises in thP campetitive sector--Renault, ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France], Havas, etc. The . stage on which we are embarking will substantially aggravate this state of affairs and ra ise the risk of taking us from a free economy to a state economy. 18 FGR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY [Question] Do you think that state contro? wi11 be imposed on the national enter- prises in the sense that they will be deprived of any autono~y of managempnt? [Answer] In fact, I fear that na~ionalization wi].1 become state control. [Question] Why? ~ [Answer] Look at what is happening today where the appointment of the~managers of the enterprises to be natio.nalized is concerned. We are told that the president of the republic himself will have the f inal say on the appointment of these managers. Now, what is the president of the republic if not the head of the political authority? Thus there is a danger of dependence, and this subordination will not stop in the off ice of the managing director himself. It will spread throughout all of the nationalized enterprises with all that means in terms of conformity, accommodation and even obsequiousness. [Question] Mr Dreyfus and his successors at Renault and Mr Chalandon at ELF never . needed to be obsequious. Why should that change? ~[Answer] I do not question the competence of those men who are capab le in tact, to a certain extent, of resisting the wave inherent in the system. But there is at,the very least a contradiction between the very nationalization of enterprises and the entirely theoretical statement that they should remain independent and separated from the state. My concern is that the state is increasingly taking charge of the - French citizen, from birth Lo death, that is to say from the school to the hospiCal, including his professional life. Soon more than one out of every three wage earners will have the state as his employer. In my view this~is very dangerous, and sooner or later, the political authority will tend to abuse its enormous power. Obviously, I am not claiming that we are living under a communist regime today, but I fear that the merging of the political authority and the economic authority will inevitably push�us in that direction. [Question] Do you really believe that the socialists want to suppress freedom? [Answer] I only believe that it is more fragile than they think. I also believe that it,is unhealthy to place too many powers in the 'same hands: this leads to temptation. I believe, f inally, that the avowed purposes of the nationalization, those which have to do with industrial policy, could have been achieved without this step. No~hing could hav~ been easier for the government than to conclude con- trac�ts with the private companies. The state can engage in activity without, how- ever, having to become an owner. I would add that on the strictly economic and - financial levels, I am concerned at seeing so many investment programs dependent on tlie state budget. It is absurd to deprive ourselves of capital contributions ~the stockl:olders might mak:2. R~ght here, at the Credit Commercial de France, I have seen that my stockhulders have always gone along with me when I asked them for money for development programe. [Question] Were the funds they entrusted to you greater than tliose you had distributed to them in the form of share prof its, i.e., dividends? [Answer] Yes. 19 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540040027-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY [Question] By much? , [Answer] I do not hav~ the exact figures at hand but I would say approximately twice as much. In any case, what does it matter? It was a continuous trend and - I never had difficulty persuading my stockholders of the need to move forward. [Question] The f act nonetheless remains that in the past 10 years, the public sector has invested much more than the private sector. [Answer] That is a simplistic description of the situation. The fact is tha.t the major infrastructure programs and funds are administered by the public enterprises. The nuclear program, t:ne telecommunications program and the TGV necessarily require heavy capital. But this means nothing. We are now entering into an era in which more and more enterprises in the competitive sector will fall into the lap of the state. You cannot persuade me that the management of these enterprises is not in danger of becoming less r igorous. Then they will invest unwisely and in the wrong directions and the weight of their extravagance will have to be borne by the tax- payers. [Questior.] And will there be such a difference in management? You yourself are an inspector of f inance, have worked for the government, and your characteristics do not seem to be basically different from those of a national enterprise manager. [Answer] You forget that bef ore becoming president of the Credit Commercial de France, I worked in an organization for 12 years, and thus.there was plenty of time for me to be drawn in gradually.. In addition, I am responsible to a board of direc- tors and not to the government. This is, after all, different. I hope that my successor will be no more tempted than I have been to court political power, and _ I hope that he will show equal dedication to his business. [Question] Where the banks are,concerned, the advocates of nationalization believe - that they have not done their ~ob and have not shared sufficiently in industrial risks, particularly where the young enterprises are concerned. [Answerl It is true that in a country liice France, risk capital is not abundant, and a bank reflects the thinking of the ma~ority of its depositors. To overcome " this handicap, we would not have needed nationalization. We could have utilized _ flexible mechanism.s involving guaranteed funds as incentives for innovation. COPYRIGHT: 19E1 par Cogedi~resse SA 5157 ~ CSO: 3100/312 20 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540040027-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY POLITICAL I~~~ PREMIER THORODDSEN REAFFIRMS POSITION ON NATO PM171545 London TAE TIl~iES in English 17 Feb 82 supplement on Icel~nd p 1 [Article by Deni~ Taylor: "A Big Little Country"] [Excerpt] Icelandic politicians have developed tt~.e habit of being able to ride out contradictory policies. This is not the first time the PA [People's Alliance] has taken part in a goverinnent not committed to closing down the,NATO base at Keflavik, near Reyk~avik, which is operated by the United States. Dr Thoroddsen told TIiE TIMES:~ "The People's Alliance has always been against our membership of NATO and ag~inst the Keflavik base. But this government will follow the same foreign and defence policies as before. In Parliament the great maj~ority are for this policy. Our main ob3ectives in this.govermnent are fighting inflation and ensuring fuTl employment.~ We have had success with both these objectives." The prime minister discussed his reasons for ~aking a rump of his party govermne~t not just with the politically compatible progressives but with the previnusly un- � acceptable PA. Referring to the 2 months delay, he said that if Parliament was ~ unable to form a majority goverrnnent, this could have led to the president appoint- . ~ ing a non-parliamentary administration. This would have been "a very great dishonour to Parliament. I thought it my duty . to form this goverriment so that the country could~have a parliamentary government, but my party re~ected my proposal." He said this had been a cause of great dis- appointment to h3m. ' Outside, the,cynical ~argument is �heard that after~a lifetime in politics, Dr Thoroddsen, an unsuccessful candidate for the presidency in 1968, was set on becom- ing prime minister,.with this probably the last chnace. Nevertheless, the exper- ience of the break wirh most of his colleagues~for someone who has been in,the Independence Party for 50 years, seems to have saddened him. . COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1982 CSO: '3120/43 ~ ~ 21 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500044427-3 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY POLITICAL ~ ITALY USSR ACCUSID OF HAVING SUPPORTED PSIUP Milan PANORAMA in Italian 1 Feb 82 p 43 [Articl~ by.Filippo Ceccarelli: "Moscow Sent Us the Rubles, and We..."] [Text] And now? "Now I am afraid that a book written 6 months ago for the pur- pose of making people think will, instead, give rise to controversy and exploi- tations on one side or the other. But I cannot do.anything about it. I don't like the fact that it is coming out while there is so much talk about interna- tional interrelationships among~terrorists. But let us,discuss it quietly, all the same." Silvano Miniati, a Tuscan trade unionist who once was a member of the PSIUP [Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity] and then of the PDUP [Proletarian Unity Party] and now is a member of the national executive body of the UIL [Italian Union of Labor], is worried about the eff ect the 272 pages of his "PSNP, 1964-1972,�Vita e Morte di un Partito" [.The PSNP, 1964-1972, the Life and Death of a Party] (published by Edimez) might have. The book is a small history of the political group founded by'Lelio Basso and Vittorio Foa, Tullio Vecchietti and Dario Valori (the last two are PCI members of Parliament now). In his book, and not only in the chapter entitled "The Decisive Question of Fi- nancing", Miniati wrote, in so many words, that the PSNP--the socialist leftist ~ party which emerged from the PSI of Pietro Nenni in 1964 in a dispute with the center left--was assisted f inancially at first and then almost held prisoner by Moscow. Miniati maintains that the experiment with a new party wae aiso destined to fail in an abrupt manner because, in h~s words, "Financing was of decisive importance in influencing the formation of the group of national leaders and determining the relationahip between them and the rest of the PSIUP, and especially thoae on the periphery of the party. And then, at.least starting with the spring of 1968, it was of decisive importance in exerting a great deal o� influence on the party's political line," he says. PANORAMA said: "In short, Mr. Miniati, you are saying that the USSR had a party of its own in Italy for 8 years." . ~ Miniati replied: "In 1964�, the CPSU--that is, the USSR--simply took note of the fact~that, whereas it had always had extremely close relations with the left 2~ ~ FOR OFFiCU1L USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY wing of the PSI, there was not going to be any left wing in Nenni's party. The - PSIUP was born as an independent choice by the socialist left. But the new party had such a need f or financial aid that it almost automattcally threw it- - self into the arms of those who provided it: the USSR and the satellite natidna. But it was not a case of unselfish political solidarity with the~n, as many peo- ple thought." "But where were you then?" he~was asked. "In the PSIUP," he answered, "as a leader in Tuscany, and then a member of the board af directors." "And you didn't notice anything?" he was asked. "Those were other timas," he replied. "Struggles were increasing in the factor- ies and there was a very strong drive against the center left. I was not against the idea of international solidarity, perhaps because I was motivated, like many young people, by the naive idea that who gives you the money is not as important as how you spend it." ~ "But was it talked about in the party?" he was asked. ~ "Especially in the corridors," he answered. "Right from the start,.in fact, the - group of national leaders of the PSNP decided unanimously that problems of fi- nancing should not be subjected to group discussion. While one group.of leaders was in power, an absolute fiduciary mandate was given to the secretary, Vecchi- etti, for obtaining money. No genuine collective check was every~made on who was responsible for how it was used." "Any nobody said anything?" he was asked. ~ "Pccasionally, some leader would show concern over the loss of independence which might result for the PSIUP from international solidarity with the USSR and its satellite nations," he said. "I recall that Lelio Basso of ten asserted - that some comrades were being maneuvered by Moscow." "But did the PSIUP cost a good deal?" he was asked. ~ "The new party began to function immediately. There were 120,000 members, 101 confederations, 2,900 sections and approximately 500 functionaries. The basic expenses involved~in getting started as a new party exceeded 500 million of the lire of that time. Between electoral campaigns and contributions to people on the periphery and to newspapers; the PSIUP's expenses were more than 2 billion lire in the first year of its existence. Fuads the party raised itself did not exceed 150 million lire," he replied. - "And was influence exerted?" he was asked. . "It was," he answered, "but the party retained a certain amount of independence _ until 1968. Indeed, the PSIUP assumed critical positions toward the CPSO on . Chinese developments and on the various~struggling movements in Africa and South America." ~ ~ 23 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R000500040027-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY "And then?" "The turning point, or the moment when the infernal mechanism which moved the PSIUP toward the outright loss of its independence went off, arrived after the in~~asion of Czechoslovakia. On that occasion, the to,~ leadership of the party approved a resolution which was almost ridiculous. Fram that moment on, anyone ~ who took a critical attitude (almost 40 percent of the membership) was immedi- ately accused of antisovietism and trying to wreck the party. In private, the members of the secretariat were very harsh in their 3udgments of rhe *J~SR, but they changed their tone radically in public meetings and official resolutions. _ Not only that, but, in the following weeks, the PSIUP's position was used to blacl~ail the PCI, which had condemned Moscow's 'blitz."' "Blaclanail in what sense?" he was asked. "There was quiet but insistent talk of the possibility that a group consisting of PCI cadres would join the PSIUP, to put pressure on the Communists in one way or another. However, it is certain that the subjection of the PSIUP began ~ to assume~a grotesque quality, beginning in 1968, and that situation continued until 1972," he said. "That is, until the PSIUP did not succeed in obtaining a minimum number of par- liamentary deputies," PANORAMA remarked. . "Yes," he replied. "That spring a congress was .convoked which conf irmed the end of the PSIUP experiment. Many people entered the PCI, some entered the PSI and others, like me, were left behind. Enrico Berlinguer spoke at that con- gress, and I still remember a singular lapse which occurred in his speeeh. 'This breakup and this merger which we desired and you accepted,' he said. A f ew seconds passed, and then Berlinguer corrected himself: 'Pardon me,' he said, 'which you desired and we accepted."' ~ COPYRIGHT: 1982 Arnoldo Mondaclori Editore S.p.A. Milano 9258 . - cso : 3io~+/i12 - ~ 24 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - ITALY POLITICAL . ~ REORGANIZATION OF CGIL SECRETARIAT Milan IL MONDO in Italian 22 Jan 82 p 23 ' [Article: "Geography Cuts the Carnatione"] [Text] There are 12 CGIL secretaries, but six�of them are more so than the others. For two of them, Luciano Lama and Agostino Marianetti, this is not news. Valued above the other directors of the conf ederation, they have always seen their actions confirmed by the secretariat� ~l~Yl@ new element, therefore, liea elaewhere: these two generals have been assigned troops and operational powers they have not hitherto had. Consequently, they now exercise direct control over the confederat~.on's inter- national policies (previously entrusted to Giacinto Militello), the IREA center of studies (formerly under the political direction of Bruno Trentin), the press off ice, and the office of the secretariat, until the last congress the responsibility of . Confederal Secretary Aldo Giunti. The future investiture for the remaining four supersecretaries has apparently not yet beenthecCGlL~secretariat8s new atructures they have been harboring are well founded: is separated into departments for the purpose of guaranteeing them, so it is being said, maximum participation in decisionmaking. There is no doubt, however, that, to take an example~ GaraviniepGiacintooMilitello,tand Fausto~Vigevani8eno~important ~ entrusted to Sergio ~ decision can be taken without the approval of Garavini, who thus becomes virtually its chief . ~ . ~ ~ ~ _ Silvano Verzelli is the most prestigious unionist~~nalolaeGeiro atand Donatella and Social Problems, which he leads together with Turtura. Lastly, Enzo Ceremigna cannot fail to val~idate his experience, which aurpasses that of neo-Secretary Gianfranco Raetrelli, with whom he shares resgonsi-~ bility f or the organizational sector. But the most complicated problem is the matter of naming the executive committee: This is a new organism which is meant to stand above the secretariat but below the committee of directors and the general council--in short, a sort of political = off ice consisting of 40 persons selected from among the outstanding exponents in the categories and regional structures, who would, in effect, direct the confedera- tion. But the question is this: since desigzationa are made on the basis of categories and territorial structures, the socialists would be under-represented in ratio to their quota establiahed in the congress (33 percent), giving the advantage to the communists, with a quota of 60 percent higher than their representation. COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1982' 9653 25 ' ~ CSO: 3104/100 FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500044027-3 FOR OFF7CIAL USE ONLY POLITICAL SPAIN CARRILLO STRONGLY CRITICIZES CPSU'S STANCE TOWARD PCE, PCI . Milan PANORAMA in Italian 15 Feb 82 pp 34, 36 [Interview of Santiago Carrillo, secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party, by Bruno Crimi. Date and place not specified] [Text] It must be docile and tow the line. No matter if it is ~ very small. Thus, according to the secretary of the Spaaish Com- munist Party, a Soviet-line splitoff in Italy is certain. ~ [Text] The Spanish Communist Party, of all the com~unist parties that have criti- cized the Kremlin's political line, was the first to be counterattacked by the So- viets; in concrete terms, this brought about a secession by elements sympathetic ~o the USSR. PANORAMA interviewed Saritiago Carillo, secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party. . � Question: What is your opinion about the reaction of PRAVDA to~the pos3tion taken on Poland by the PCI? Answer: It appears that the USSR is trying to bring about in Italy what is has at- tempted to bring about in Spain--tliat is, a splitup and the creation of a Soviet- line Communist Party. Question: But why didn't the PCE take a stand on the Soviet attitude towards the ~ PCI? ~ _ Answer:~ I don't think that the PCE leadership needed to take an officially criti- cal position. In this, we followe~d the lead of the PCI, which expressed its opin- ions through the coluums of L'UNITA. Our party organ, "Mundo Obrero," published an editorial condemning the Soviet method. This editorial, which was widely discussed by the party leadership, represents, in some way, an official stand. Question: Aside from the editozial in "Mondo Obrero," what is your opinion on the excommunication of the PCI? . Answer: I would like to make two observations: 1) PRAVDA limited itself to con- - demning the PCI without publishing the stand taken by this party concerning the events in Poland, 2).PRAVDA did not evaluate these events. ~ - Question: Simple observations on method? ~ 26 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 FOR 6FFICIAL USE ONLY - Answer: No, the substance is elsewhere. PRAVDA excommunicated the PCI because it could not admit that a communist party would analyze the reasons that have brought about a military coup in a country, like Poland, where power, at leasC theoretically, is in the hands of a MarxisC party. _ (~uestion: Aren't~there other fundamental problems which brought about the Soviet reaction? . ~ Answer: Yes--the fact of having questioned the political and economic system of the USSR and the countries which imitated it or on which its power structure was imposed. The fact, moreover, of having brought to light the necessity for a demo- cratic renewal of the structures in these cities. To say it clearly: the so-called _ "democracy of and for the people" does not exist in the Soviet Union or in East Europe. ~ Question: In your opinion, is PRAVDA's a real excommunication7 ~ Answer: If you think ~hat the international communist movement is considered by _ the USSR as a sort of church, it seems to me that the position taken by PRAVDA can . be interpreted only as an irrevocable excom~unication. Certainly, if the PCI back- ed down, the excomQnunication would take on the significance of a warning. Question: Do you think that the PCI is willing to back down? ~ Answer: I think not. I hope not. Question: Is the position taken by Che PCE on the Polish events, in your opinion, very similar to that of the PCI? . Answer: The differences, in any case, are not significant. Perhaps we have placed . greater emphasis on the abyss existing between the hopes brought about by the Octo- ~ ber Revolution and the present reality in the Soviet Union and in the East European � countries. Question: Do you think that the experience of 1917 was a positive one?~ Answer: Yes, because it set off a phase of great changes in the capitalistic struc- tures of the world. Question: And what do you think $bout the behaviour of the French Communist Party? Answer: Quite simply, I think that the PCF, on the ideological and political plane, didn't want to follow to conclusion the obvious consequences that came about after Jaruzelski's coup. Question: All considered, very little is left o� Eurocommunism. Answer: I believe that the so--called Euroco~nunism was the logical P~volution of the ideas defended by some European Communist parties: autonomy, iridependence, democracy, internal debate, unification of progressive forces, the necessity for a . ~7 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ~JNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY ~ new international interrelationship. Certainly, few of us remain to defend this type of ideology, at least in Europe. I think it is important to remember', how- ever, that other communist parties, in Japan, for example, and in some Latin Ameri- can countries, have followed the lead marked out by the PCE and.the PCI. Question: What common elements do you see in the choices of these parties? Answer: Essentially, the fact that they operate in developed countries. Question: The PCE is going through~ a very serious crisis. What are tlie reasons for this situation? Answer: At present, as far as the results are concerned, one sees, as I have al- ready mentioned, the attempt to cre~ate, here, a Soviet-line communist party. Question: And the origins af the criFis? Answer: They lie in the 40 years of clandestineness of the PCE. In the image that ~ in these 40 years, Spanish culture has created of the USSR. ~ Question: But the party has also been abandoned by many intellectuals of the so- called "renovadora" current, which up to the recent past have sustained the line you represent. Answer: I acknowledge that some of these "renovadores" have worked with me, have elaborated upon the theoretical principles that now.characterize the PCE. But this does not justify their ~fractionalist behaviour. ~ Question: In any case, the "renovadores" are not the originators of the attempt to create a Soviet=line PCE. . - Answer: Their sympathies, rather, tend towards elements to the right of the PCE.. � Question: At present, what are the possibilities for the USSR to promote the cre- ation of a Soviet-line Communist Party in Spain? Answer: They're fairly realistic, if this attempt comes about in the sectors con- ditioned, as stated, by 40 years of clandestineness, and which have not been able to adapt to the new sociological and political realities. Perhaps because the PCE has not been able to explain these new realities clearly enough. Question: If the attempts by the USSR to create Soviet-line communist parties in Spain, Italy and perhaps elsewhere actually take form, won't a situation comparable ~ to that of the Third Internationale be created, in which the PCUS dictated its law to all the communist parties.of the "church"? _ Answer: The USSR cannot allow itself to return to a situation like that of the Third Internationale, if only because the world situation is completely different from those times. What the Soviet Union wants instead, is a situation comparable to 1946-48, when the Western communist parties were under its sphere of influence, even if they were not part of a real internationale. . 2a FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ Question: With what aim? Answer: These.communist parties should in all cases~and at all times sustain Soviet positions. ~ ~ Question: But in countries like Spain and Italy, the attempts by the USSR ris~c. re- sulting'in the creation of communist parties which are certainly Soviet-line but have little influence. Answer: It'~s time to understand that the Soviet Union doesn't care about strong ' conununist parties in the Western countries. Moskow wants, above all, the communist parties to be docile and obedient. COPYRIGHT: 1982, Arnaldo Mondadore Editore S.g.A. Milano . 9941 ~ CSO: 3104/122 ~ ' 29 . . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500044427-3 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY � GENERAL ITALY RESTRICTID 'WHITE PAPER' ON P2 MASONIC TRIAL Milan IL MONDO in Italian 22 Jan 82 p 20 � [Article by Gianni Rossi: "Gelli Votes with a White Paper"] [Text] It's Gelli's first white paper. It was sent, anonymously and in a pack- age marked "personal", like a Christmas present, to the almoat 550 venerab~e ~ masters, or lodge heada, of the Great Orient of Italy. It is a dossier on tlie Masonic trial of Licio Gelli, head of the P2, held at Giustiniani Palace in Rome on 31 October 1981. The verdict was expulsion from the Italian and international Masonic order of t~he much sought-after venerable Master of Arezzo. The white paper contains 12.pages and 2 photocopies, all nicely bound. One of the photo- copies is of an article from the weekly magazine L.'EUROPEO of 14 December 1981 about a probable agreement between Gelli's supportexs and the head of the Masonic tribunal, the republican Armando Corona. The other is,the long exhortation of the brother writer Rudyard.Ripling entitled "If...". The wh~.te paper was sent ~ by a phantom "Coordination" of the constituent groups; "Alliance, Masonic re- newal", Giustiniani Palace Defense Group", "Democratic Masonry". Most of the packages were sent from the province of Novara, from the central railroad ata- tion of Bologna, and from Sicily. But within the Masonic order, there are no doubts. Various historians opposed to Gelli told IL MONDO that "T'1e copies of the dossier were printed and mailed ~ by the friends Gelli still has within the order, so as to prepare the already overheated atmosphere for the internal election campaign." The maneuver resem- bles Gelli's of the spring and winter of 1974/75, when hia lodge was dissolved and he was disgraced. But, at that time, Gelli and.his "Coordination of ven- erable masters" (that is how he signed the dossier) had the support and ampli-~. fication of the Op agency of Mino Pecorelli (who is also on the P2 lists). What is in the white papar on the Masonic trial of brother Licio Ge11i? IL MONDE is in a position to reveal its contents. Ba~ically, it is an accusation, full of veiled threats, against the republican Armando Corona and eneryone who "dared" 3udge and expell Gelli. Furthermore, for the f irst time, it reveals what went on behind the scenes of the trial and implicates people at the top of Giustiniani Pal~ace (including General Ennio Battelli, presently great master of the~Great Oxient of Italy) as guilty along with Gelli. According to the anony- mous author of the white paper, "Gelli was condemned to expulsion while the real guilty parties went free. We must agree, at leaet for the moment, on a funda- mental point: this trial was and is too serious a matter, given its ob~ectives . , 30 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY _ and content, to be dropped after hurridly expel~ing brother Licio Gelli, with- . out considering and understanding ths reasons for the acts he ia accused of, if he ever committed t~tem!!!". The questiqn is ralsed in the Ge].li dosaier as to why the great master Ennio Battelli w&s not accnsed by the Maso~}ic Ordex too, eince Gel~i continued with his intriguea under Battelli. After'listitig all the procedural ob3ections made by t~e defense on behalf of the head of the P2 (5, plus 17 failures to crnnply with the proper procedure, to the detriment of the def ense), the author claims � the right to "Enter the ~'omna of :he Palace to find out how Masonic authority was administered". Before "The conte~por$xies of Gelli" prove themselves free of all resgonsibili~y. Finally, there is a plea to brother Ar~aando Co~o~a, president of the Central Masonic Co~}rt, "To have the juridical and Maeonic courage to send the sentence � back to the court wh~ch condemned Gelli, aakit1g it to carry out a supplementary ~ investigation and reopen the trial now, in Decanber 1981, not in April 1982", ~ when the new great master o� the 15,000 I~a~ian Masons will have been~elected. . The Gelli white paper has come out at a delica~e time for the protagonists of the intern~l :;lection campaign (so far thx~e slates of candidates have been drawn up, headed by Armando Coxona, Augusto Ae Magni--a sma11 indistrialist from Perugia with neo-fascie.t ideas--and (~iu11o Mazz4n, a socialist, aecretary general of Anpi, the associatia~} of Ital~n pa~tigians) . At Glustiniani Palace, - they are apprehensively~further awaiting even mare alarming forms of blaclanail from the head of the P2. Thsre is already tal~C of a aecond, more explosive dossier correlated a list o~ 300 names, so far kept secret. . COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1982 ~ ~ 9855' CSO:~ 3104/103 ~ ~ 31 FOR OFFiCIAL USL ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040027-3