JPRS ID: 10395 JAPAN REPORT

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CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY - JPRS L/ 10395 16 March 1982 ~ Ja an Re ort - p p CFOUO 18/82~ ~ � F~~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R000500040041-7 NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-~anguage sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlir.es, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brd;kets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indica te how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. ~ Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- ti~n mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear i.n the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Otner unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within i.tems ar.e as given by source. The contents of this publica tion in no way represent the poli- _ c ies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government. ~ COPYRIGHT LAWS ANB REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIr',i~S REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/10395 16 March 1982 ~ _ _ JAPAN REPORT cFOUO ls/s21 CONTENTS ~ ECONUriI~ _ Global Approach to Trade Friction Urged (Edito rial; ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 26 Feb 82) 1 'MAINI(~iI DAILY NEWS' ilrges Irbre Liberal Trade Market (Edito rial; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 27 Feb 82) 3 Trade Dispute, Strained U.S. Tj_~s Discussed (Editorial; NIHON KEI;~I SHIMBUN, 2 Mar. 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Trade Friction, Esaki Mission to U.S . Viewed (Editorial; ASAHI EVENIIVG NEWS, 4 Mar 82) . . . . . . . . . . . 7 UN Report on Japan's Tariffs Critici zed . (Editorial; NIH~N KEIZAI SHIN,~UN, 3 Mar 82)........~........ 5 Independent Sanctions Against USSR Questioned (Edi to rial ; NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 25 Feb 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 'MAINICHI DAILY NEWS' Views Sanctions Against USSR, Pola.nd (Editorial; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 26 Feb 82) . . . , . . . . . . . . . 13 Cigarette Sales Liberalization Urged . ~ (Editorial; NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 4 Mar 82) 15 GATT Advice Irritates Japan . (NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 18 Feb 82)... 17 Government, LDP To Work Out Open Market Package ~ - (THE JAPAN TIMES, 3 Mar 82).....v 19 - a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO] FOR OFFICI.4L USE OIYLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 FOR OF'~ICIAL USE ONLY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGX NTT To Launch Satellite via Space Shuttle (NTHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 23 Feb 82, ASAHT EVENING NEWS,� 3 Ma.r 82) ..............................o................... 21 Lawer Costa Expected Pro~ect t~ Face Oppositinn IC Industry'~ Activities as of December 1981 Reported (N]KKAN KOGYO SHII~UN, various date~) ~ 24 ~ Toshiba's VLSI Technology , Production for 1981 JEOL Export to Bell Oki's Semicustom ISI VLSI War in Japan . Hitachi'a 256 K RAM Maas Produc.tion Sharp's 64 K RAM Pro duction _ Matsushita's 8 Bit A/D Conversion ISI ~ Mitsubishi's 64 K RAM Mass Production _ Recent Activities in Integrated Circuit Industry Reported _ (Various aourcea, vario~-~ dates) 37 New Fimction Element Research Foimdation Establishment of Fo~dation Foundation Projects Oki'a 256K RAM Hitachi's 64K RAM NEC's 256K RAM _ Big Price Drop NEC's Factory for 256K RAM TI En try Into Japanese Market NTT' a 20, 000 Ga. te Array D~iichi Seiko'4 Fully Automatic Packaging NEC's Expansi.on of 64K RAM Production NEC, Hitachi 64K, RAM Production Shortage of 32K EPROM's Hitachi's Sma~l Outline Package More on SOP . Nippon Gakki's VHSIC With SIT Mitsubishi-Westinghouse Joint Venture Fujitau's High-Speed CI~S Toshiba'a Expanded U.S. Production TI'a Expanded Producti.on in Japan Toshiba's Lxports of 64K SRAM Oki's Expanded Produc tion of 64K RAM Sensor Development for Robot's, TV Reported (NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN, vario.us dates) E1 Kawasaki Torque Sensor ` ElectroniE Induatry Aaaociation';s Pro~ect Sanyo's Color Senaor - - b - . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500040041-7 F~R OFFICIAL USE ONLY Green Czoss Bioengineer~.ng Act~iyities Descri,bed (Noritoshi Tsukada; SHUKANT BIRION, 11 Dec 81) 65 Competition Among Nuclear Manu#acturers Intensi~ies (Mastaka Nishi Interv~ew; NIKKEI SANGYO SHIMBUN, various dates) 72 Briefs Semiconductol~s Export $1 Supercomputer Plan . 81 , - c - . FOR OFFICIAL ~5~ ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500440041-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ECONOMIC GLOBAL APPROACH TO TRADE FRICTION URGED OW270955 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 26 Feb 82 p 5 [ASAHI SHIMBUN 25 February editorial: "International Economic Diplomacy [Text] There are increasing signs of friction in the economic relations between Japan and the nations af Europe and the United Srates. U.S. _ President Reagan, while pral.sing Japan's cooperative attitude toward the United States, did not fail to strike home th e message to a visiting .delegation of Liberal-Democratic party Dietmen that he hopes that U.S. goods can enter the Japanese market in the same way that Japanese goods have become widespre.ad on the U.S. market. The U.S. Congress is considering various reciprocity mea~ures to equal:ize - market openness between the United States and other countries. The European Community, on the bther hand, is investigating a plan for bringing the subject of the closed nature of the Japanese market up for discussion by GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and irade). ~ ~ince the new Suzuki cabinet was announced about three months ago, two measures have been taken toward resolving such friction with foreign countries: first, the t:Imetable for enacting the Tokyo round of tariff reductions has been advanced; second, non-tariff barriers, such as import inspection procedures, have been changed. Critics in the United States and Europe agree that while these steps represent a step in the right directior., they are styll not eno ugh . Japan intends to participate at the summit conference of advanced nations sctieduled for June and must again examine how to make progress in its economic diplomacy. Regardless of what the EC decides to do, Japan itself should make it clear that it is following the ~rules of international� trade set forth by GATT. Trade issues should not be settled politically in such a way as to disregard the existence of GATT, as happened at the time of last year's agreement to exercise self-restraint on automobile c:xports to the United States. At the same ti.me, it is useless tu try to avoid a re-examination of certain issues related to the principles of GATT, such as those on residual import restric- tions. 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 ~ FOR OFFIClAI. USE ONLY ~ ~ Of the 27 items presently restricted by Japan, 22 are agricultural, fish or forest products. In regard to agriculture, there are many cases where advanced nations have taken protectionist measures. Even the United States, which is the world's largest exporter of agricultural products, maintains an existing import restriction on one product and restrictio~.~ authorized by GATT on 13 proc~ucts. The EC nations maintain a generous system for protecting their own agricultural sectors by adding import - surcharges to offset the price advantages of imports which are cheaper - than the EC products and by providing export subsidies when the prices of EC exports are aliove international levels. Considering the poor geographical conditions of Japan, appropriate protection- ist ~olicies are unavoidable. However, efforts must b e continued to permit liberalization and lower agriculturil prices regardless of whe*:~r there is foreign pressure to do so or not:, so that constnners can nuy meat and other products less expensively. ~ A special feature of th e reciprocity measures before the U.S. Congress is - that they aim not only at Cransactions in $oods, but also at the issue of the exchange of services. This issue should be seen, ~irst of all, in relations to the irritation that the United States and European nations feel over the difficulty of penetrating the Japanese market. The Ministry of Finance, for example, recently announced that it did not discriminate between _ domestic and foreign enterprises in its adm3nistration of banks, insurance companies and security companies. Clearly, foreign complaints are off the - mark in several places. Behind this issue, however, there is another important concern, how to handle foreign dissatisfaction when it results from the fact that Japanese customs - differ from their own. Taking orders for special treatment is going too far, and such orders should be resisted. Nonetheless, we sh~uld reconsider from an international perspective whether Japan itself retains a tradition of excess administrative intervention in business. - In any case, neither GATT nor the Organization for Economir_ Cooperation and Development (OECD) have established international rules for regulating the various service industries. Japan should participate aggressively in the discussions on this issue which are being called for by the United S tat es . COPYRIGHT: Asahi Evening News 1982 CSO: 4120/179 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500040041-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I ECONOMIC ~ 'MAINICHI DAILY NEWS' URGES MORE LIBERAL TRADE MARKET OW011253 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 27 Feb 82 p 2 [Editorial: "Japan and Trade Friction"] [Text] We do n.ot deny the principle of free trade; however, on the pretext of following this principle, the Un3ted States Government and Congress are e-.~horting national i~terests. According to Masumi Esaki, chief of the Liberal-Democratic Party delegation to the U.S., the American attitude can be compared to a ball game where "American players and umpires get together and make decisions as they please." This attitude is amply reflected in draft bills shortly to be sent to Congress aimed at restricting Japanese exports to the U.S. to the sacle of U.S. exports to Japan. We believe that world trust in the American leadership will diminish if Congress passes the bill. The American measures are based on the irrigat3on they feel toward the "closed" Japanese market. In his meeting with Esaki, President Ronald Reagan, while appreciating Japan's efforts to improve the nontariff barrier 3ssues, said that American goods are not penetrating the Japanese market. We partially~agree with Reagan. Japan has improved its nontariff barrier s}~stem but still maintains complicated import procedures. The Japanese distribution system is so complicated that everi domestic dealers cannot join existing distribution routes, while the overprotection of small- and medium- sized retailers has proved an obstacle to improving their productivity. In the agricultural field, we do not see any noticeable improvement in its - structure, although the beef and orange import quotas were set temporarily = in anticipation of future liberalization. Agricultural organizations in JaFan claim that an acceptance of American liberalization requests means shifting pressure to Japanese agriculture from other industries which enjoy profitable exports . At present, we see tension between American nat3onalism, tryin~ to protect its manufacturing industry while putting up free trade signs and at the same 3 FOR QFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 FOR OFFICIAL USI: ONLY time indicating possible retaliatory measures, and Japanese nationalism, which does not want to accept further liberalization of the agricultural and distribution sectors. The clash between the two must be avoided at all costs because it will only result in intensified protectionism. In this respect, we would like to point out the lack of self-consciousness of the Japanese people about the status of Japan, which has become a leading economic power with 10 percent of world gross national product [GNP]. We call Japan an economic power but we must remem~er that free trade is the only way to enrich Japanese life. We believe that Japan must open its doors to the agricultural and distribution _ sectors. In this way, these sectors can improve their productivity. We know that changing these systems will not be enough to fully implement li.beraliza- tion; however, same sectors obstinately adhere to their characteristic traditions and customs. In other words, Japan's group-centered way of thinking is different from American indi~idualism. American criticism of such a social structure is arbitrary. The psychology of the Japanese refuses to accept "foreigners," regardless of whether they come from different Japanese groups or foreign countries. Japan must correct this isolationistic character. To avoid criticism that Japan is unfair, it must drastically increase its official development Assistance (ODA), whose racio to the gross national product is r elatively low among th e industrially developed nations. This must be raised to th e ratio of the military expenditures of ma~or European nations to their GNP. Japan must adopt reasonable policies so that there remains no room for criticism irom the United States and Europe. Moreover, we call on the government of Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki to inform the U.S. Government that President Reagan's economic policy with emphasis on military expansion has accelerated the recession and unemployment in the United States and caused - the huge Japanese trade surplus. Reagan's economic policy is preventing the American economy from restoring its competitiveness in the international market. We urge the Japanese Government to point this out to the U.S. Government. COPYRIGHT: Mainich i Daily News, 1982 CSO: 4120/179 4 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500040041-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ECONOMIC TRADE DISPUTE, STRAINID U.S. TIES DISCUSSED OW030601 Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 2 Mar 82 Morning Edition p 2 [Editorial: "Strained Japan-U.S. Relations and Japan's New Response"] . [Text] The U.S. Congress has opeaed a series o� hearings on Japan. In this cocntry, the ministerial conference on economic countermeasures is scheduZed to meet today, 2 March, to hear reports from Masumi Esaki and his LDP trade mission which returned from Washington late last week, and to begin a study of new measures to ease economic fr3ction with the United States. Japan- U.S. relations are thus entering a crucial phase in a strained atmosphere that threatens to culminate in Foreign Minister Sakurauchi's visit to Washington in late March. Judging from comp~aints heaped on the LDP mission by U.S. officials and - legislators during its visit, the atmosphere of those congressional hearings will most likely increase its harsnness. There is a strong possibility that U.S. demands on Japan will further escalate on the strength of the reciprocity bills now before th e congress. It is perhaps true, too, that Japan is'being turned into a scapegoat in connection with the deepening recession and the off-year elections scheduled for this fall in the United States. However; it can be said with certainty that, as U.S. demands continue to grow, Japan is left with less and less room for effective response. One cannot deny that the increasing gap thus created is contributing to Japan's difficult pligi?t and 2u th e intensity of frictian. However, in view of Japan's position that she must attach importance to her relations with the United States and defF~nd free trade, she is required� to go through the list of potential measures, no matter how 13mited, pick any effective ones and put them to work. She is also required to move into areas that were not touched in the past and seek out whatever can be ~~ne there. Secretary of Co~anerce Baldrige urged Japan to do "something dramatic to open ller market" without explaining what he means specifically by that. The ambiguity surrounding his comment is one of the factors adding to the diffi- culty of th e Japanese plight. Judging from the substance of the Baldrige remarks, however, there is no doubt that the U.S. demand is mainly for the . 5 FOR QFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY elimi,nation of residual restrictions on the imports of beef, citrus fruit ~ and ather farm products, expanded tobacco imports, and the opening of the banking, insurance and other service markets. U.S, complaints are not conf ined to these items. They are complex and cover a broad range, including those about Japan's meager imports of manufactured goods, the structure of her foreign trade, with excessive emphasis on raw material imports, co~pZicated exchange systems, and the nation's unique economic quality based on customs and traditions. If the disputes shoulci encompass these problems, too, it ~;ould be difficult to reach a settlement, because they are not the type of j~-~oblems wliich can be resolved overnight. The United States should also undE~rstand that it is not in her interests to generate unnecessary antagonism among the Japanese people and aggravate the situation with too hasty and too high-handed demands. For this reason, it is more important now than before that the two sides discuss problems with patience and without allowing themselves to become too eager for a settlement. Especially, it is important for Japam now to review pending Japan-U.S. issues once more from an unbiased viewpo3nt, clearly define what can be done and what cannot be done; what can be done on long- - and medium-range bases and what can be done on a short-range basis; and to express her resolve to open the market, beginning with short-range items. Farm products are one of the key items. Aside from the strong d~mestic resistance to their liberalization, it is doubtful if liberalization, as in the case of beef, will actually benefit the United States; there are other countries which are as competitive. Nevertheless, it is necessary for Japan to take another look at the possible scope of liberalization. It is true that under the present circ~stances, Japan cannot afford to leave farm products off the liberalization list in demonstrating her res~lve to open the market. More "pains" will accompany the nation's trade liberalization efforts from now on. We should be prepared to undergo them during certain phases of the process. Free trade is the way for Japan to follow. At the same time, it should be remembered ~that liberalization under foreign pressures will not necessarily - keep Japan on the losing side all the time, as we see it, in the liberaliza- tion of trade and th e capital market. COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1982 CSO: 4120/179 6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500040041-7 FOR O~F[C1AL USE ONLY ECONOMIC TRADE FRICTION, ESAKI MISSION TO U.S. VIEWED OW051237 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 4 Mar 82 p 5 [ASAHI S~~.IMBUN 3 March editorial: "Trade Friction"] - [Text] � How should we cope with the growing trade friction between Japan and the United States and Europ~? With the return to Japan of the Liberal- Democrat ic Party miss ion to the U. S., which was headed by Masumi Esaki, the government has begun studying some comprehensive measures. A series of hearings on U.S.-Japan relations have started in the U.S. Congress, and American pressure on Japan, in connection with both trade and defense, is expected to become stron~er. - We should not allow ourselves to be bemused by the vociferousness of our American and European critics; instead, we should 13sten dispassionately to their arguments. The Council of Economic Cabinet MinisCers, in its meeting on March 2, was right to agree that it was important prop~rly to comprehend American d~.*aands before deciding on the measures that should be taken. Of course, the greatest problem is how Japan should respond to the American and European demands. The government will na.turally have to take a variety of ineasures. But if the other parties to the dispute take account only of their own i:~terests, the government should be prepared to say bluntly that they should not measure everything by their own yardsticks. On the other hand, in cases where the responsibility for trade fr.iction clearlq rests with Japan, the government must seriously consider immediate steps. At the same time, a basic long-term strateg,~ is needed. Cosmetic measures like those hittierto taken will not be acceptable in the future. The situation is much more difficult. From this point of view, the results of the Esaki mission to the U.S. must be considered inadequate. . The Americans openly criticized Japan, and said that unless Jap3n quickly took some fundameneal steps, there was the danger of reciprocity resolutions being 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500040041-7 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY passed by congress . It is very doubtful that the Americans .:hangeci ;:::2ir thi.nking as a result of the rebuttals ma.de by the Esaki mission. While the mission was in the U.S., chief cabinet secretary Kiichi Miyazawa counterattacked by saying that Japan had moved up the lcwering of tariffs and removed non-tariff barriers. He even spoke in terms as strong as those used by high American off icials, as when he said, "Our feeling is, 'try taking the same steps if you think you can."' But Prime Minister Suzuki, who re- ceived a report from Esak.i after the mission's return, said, "I can definitely - understand the American position." This raises the question whether Esaki's main du:ty was to listen to the ~ American arguments. It has been said th at when the LDP established its special committee on inter- national economic measures, Esaki was made chairman and given the duty of ~ visiting the U.S. principally because of his status as a high official in the Tanaka faction. It has also been said that his visit was designed to lay the groundwork for Foreign Min3ster Sakurauchi's coming visit to the U.S. or to ensure that Sakurauchi was not held solely responsible for bilateral problems on his visit. It is a matter for great regret if such speculation at the party level had an influence on an important issue of foreign policy. But even greater - doubts should be voiced in connection with the fact that Er;aki was sent to th e U.S, at a time when the government had no clear policies or measures. Th e government must make studies of the import of individual items, such as beef and oranges, the liberalization of which the U.S. is demanding. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that the roots of the trade friction are so deep that they cannot b e resolved through measures that concern only individual items. Surel.y, some long-term measures are needed to bridge the various differences between Japanese social conditions on the one hand and American and European soc ial conditions on the other. G1e should again study steps to improve the - standard of liv~ng of the people; these would include increasing wages, - introducing a five-day workweek and long paid vacations, and constructing housing , waterworks, sewerage systesns and public parks. COPYRIGHT: Asahi Evening News 1982 CSO: 4120/179 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540040041-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ ECONOMIC UN REPORT ON JAPAN'S TARIFFS CRITICIZED OW040413 Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 3 r:ar 82 Morning Edition p 2 [Editoria.l: "Is Japan a High-Tariff I~,tion?"] [Text] A UN organization has now joined with the United States and the EC nations in criticizing Japan for the exclusivity of her~market. The or~anization in question is UNCTAD, which has made its criticism in a report to b e subm3.tted to a meeting of its trade and development board, opening in Geneva on 8 March. Stern voices demanding that Japan open its market wider are increasing in the United States and the European industrialized nations, with reciprocity bills introduced in the U.S. Congress, and the EC Counc3l in a move ta appeal to GATT against .;a~~n. � . According to KYODO Press Agency, this report, entitled "Protectionism in the World ~conomy and Structural Readjustment," warns that, as a result of mounting world protectionism, trade has become more and more discriminatory and exclusive and points to the need for each nation to readjust its econom3c and trade structures so that the international market can function more effectively. What attracts our interest most, and arouses our misgivings in the reported summary of the UNCTAD report, are f igures giving the impression that Japan is a high-tariff nation and is still trying to keep foreign goods from its domestic markets through high tariffs. The report asserts that Japan charges import tariff rates of 7 percent on a weighted average aga3nst the European Common Market's 2.9 percent and the United States' 4.3 percent. These f igures differ so widely from whar the Japanese Government used to tell its people: That is, in brief, that, particularly as a result of the 'Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations, Japan's tariff level is among the lowest of all major industrialized nations. We fear that the UNCTAD report will spur complaints against, and trade frictions with, Japan. It has already uncovered the difference between UNCTAD and the Jaranese Govern- ment over tariff figures being attributable to the difference in computation bases. To be specific, the EC, for instance, included, in the computation - of its tariff level, those preferential tariffs charged on developing nations under the Lome convention. Needless to say, giving goods from developing nations easy access to developed countries constitutes an important pillar 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540040041-7 FOR OFF1ClAL USE ONLY in North-South coopEration. That is why ~ATT introduced a general preferential tariff system, to which Japan also subscribes. Nevertheless, the regional - preferential system is, by nature, discriminatory. Therefore, it is regrett~ible that the UNCTAD report, which censures discriminatory trade, should critici2p Japan's tariff level on the basis of f igures which include preferential taiiff ra tes . The UNCTAD repc.rt is said to be harshly critical of the mounting protectionist tendencies in th e United States and EC countries. So it seems it does not necessarily echo th e chorus of criticism against Japan by the United States and the European countries. Therefore, it must contain many sugges~ions which deserve our close attention. In this connection, we want to emphasize that what is needed in curbing protectionism is, instead of finding a scapegoat and engaging in a verbal war, that we should, as the UNCTAD report points out, - promote active international cooperation in achieving a read~ustment of our economic and trade structures. COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimb unsha 1982 CSO: 4120/179 , 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ECONOMIC INDEPENDENT SANCTIONS AGAINST USSR QUESTIONED OW260633 Tokyo NIiiON KEIZAI SHIMEUN in Japanese 25 Feb 82 Morning Edition F 2 _ [Editorial: "Sanctions Against the USSR and Unstable East-West Relations"] [Excerpts] One wonders what place future historians will assign to the current sanctions.against the Soviet Union in the big tide of East-West relations. U.S.-initiated sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union began by criticiz- ` ing the imposition of martial law in Poland and the behind-the-scenes Soviet intervention. But th e disarray among Western countries over sanctions has given rise to the argument that it 3s threatening the very ex3stence of the Atlantic Alliance. As a matter of fact, conerete measures taken by each country seem to serve as a tes~ of loyalty to the Alliance. Japan has announced somewhat weak-kneed sanctions of her own, which are differen*. from those adopted by other.Western countries. But we are afraid that ?~aran seems to lack a,convincing reason why she has gotten out of step with otr.~~ Western _ countries and taken these independent measures. It is worth special mention that the U.S. sanctions against ~he Soviet Union did not come into being overnight, but are closely linked with the under- current of America's economic strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, which began to take shape slowly in the mid-1970s. True, the Reagan administra- tions Soviet strategy appears rather overbearing and seems to lack muscle. But when it comes to economic sanctions, the U.S. administration is apparently set to tackle the matter on a long-term basis from a security point of view, with the Department of Defense playing the central role. In formulating and executing foreign economic policies, the Reagan administra- - tion f.ollows the same pattern as the preceding administrations, namely unfold- ing them through coordination between the Defense, State and Commerce Depart- - ments. But the position of the Defense Department, which advocates the "criticial technology" concept from a security point of view, has gained in strength over that of the State Department, which is in charge of negotiations an matters pertaining to the Coordinating Committee for Export Control [COCOM]. Conspicuously, under th e Reagan administration, those officials in favor of restrictions against the Sdviet Union are said to have gained more ground than they did under the Carter administration. The concept of "critical technology" 11 FOR OFFICIAL ~ USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540040041-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY aims at controlling transfer of know-how useable in military high technology and equipment. European countries are strongly critical of this concept, because th e scope of its application is rather obscuXe. Nevertheless, the concept is reflected in the 1979 Export Control Act, according to some observers. At any rate, all evidenc~e strongly indicates at least that the Reagan administration has adopted sanctions against the Soviet Union apart - from COCOM restrictions. The COCOM embargo list for controlling the West's exports to the communist bloc is a icind of gentlemen's agreement and has no binding force. It lacks adaptability and propaganda effects due to its principle of no publicity and its failure to keep pace with rapid technological development. Certainly, COCOM operations face a great turning point. That is wt:y the United States may be feeling all the more keenly the need for a dynamic economic strategy toward the Soviet Union on the basis of domestic laws. But, generally speaking, European countries are skeptical of the idea of anti-Soviet sanctions themselves. On the other hand, some people in the United States conspicuously talk of a "crisis of the Atlantic Alliance," irritated by the weak stance of European countries towards economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. Occasionally, others argue, in relation to the issues of how to readjust America's European policy and how to settle the Polish issue, that the Yalta arrangement, which has reigned over postwar Europe, should be reviewed. It is an undeniable fact that the antinuclear movement and the neutralist tendency, which surged through Europe last year, are partly responsible for the advocacy, in the United States, of a review of its policy toward Europe. A review of the Yalta arrang~ment, needless to say, is easier said than done. Take the question ot reunification of Germany for instance; the difficulty of revising the agreement wi?1 becon.e clear at once. Behind the argument in favor of revamping the Yalta AgrE:ement, one may see a U.S. threat to reduce its military deployment in Western Europe. The question of sanctions against the Soviet Uni~n seems to have highlighted difficulties involving, not only East-West relations, but also relations among - Western nations. That is why Western leaders may be insisting that Western nations s hould consult with each other all the more closely. What kind of long-term economic strategy the West should formulate toward the Soviet Union is one of few themes on which Western Europe and Japan can consult on an equal footing. We cannot but admit that in this regard, Japan's position is weak compared with the United States, which can use the Helsinki Accords as a basis for sanctions, and Western Europe which can cite EC and NATO as the ground for sanctions. Therefore, it is urgent for Japan to enhance her role in the COCOM functions and take other necessary steps to consolidate her position so that she can at Ieast avoid losing ground to Soviet counterargtiunents. COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1982 , CSO: 4120/178 12 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ECONOMIC 'MAINICHI DAILY NEWS' VIEWS SANCTIONS AGAINST USSR, POLAND OW280719 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NE4~TS in F,�nglish 26 F~ib 82 p 2 [Editori.al: "Sanctions and After"] [Text] The government has announced sanctions against the Soviet Union and Poland, claiming that the situation in Poland has not been improved. The Polish military regime has been suppressing hutnan rights and the Soviet Union has been indirectly intervening in the internal affairs of Poland. - With this belief in mind, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki issued warnirgs to Moscow. The goveriunent has ta'~.en the latest step because the Sov:: �t Union and Poland had turned deaf ears to such warnings. We do not deny that the present situat3on in Poland, which has been under military control for the past 2,5 months, 3s liable to develop into a world crisis. The United States and ~~ther Western nations have imposed sanctions on the Soviet Union and Poland ;Ln some form or another and under such circumstances, Japan's action cr3n be i.nterpreted as an option which demands _ that the two cornmunist nations in question give serious thought to what has taken place in Poland. Japan's punitive measures are not necessarily strict. Sanctions against the Soviet Union comprise: 1) Japan will not agree to the opening of the Commission on Science and Technology Cooperation; 2) Japan will not accept a call for the holding of the annual Sov3.et-Japanese trade talks; 3) Japan will not study the possible expansion of the Soviet Office of Trade Repre-. sentative in Japan; and 4) Japan will carefully study the possible extension _ of the stay in Japan for the Soviet purchasing mission members, whose visas are to expire in December this year. Against Poland, two measures were added to the travel restriction imposed on Polish diplomats in Tokyo on February 18. The two measures are: 1) Japan will not agree to hold talks on the rescheduling of the $X00 million debt payment due this year; and 2) Japan will not study the extension of new credit to Poland. It may be true that we cannot expect effective results from such moderate measures. We must remember thaC a wide difference of views exists between the United States and Western nations on practical measures for sanctions. ~ ~ 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500040041-7 FOR OF~:CIAL US~. ONLY The difference of views between tile United States and Western European nations is seen most clearly in th eir policy to cooperate with the Soviet natural gas development plan. On December 29, President Ronald Reagan announced seven-point sanctions against the Soviet Union which said, among others, "Licenses will b e required for export to the Soviet Union for an expanded list of oil and gas equipment. Issuance of such licenses will be suspended. This includes pipelayers." On this specific point, the U.S. State Department, in its background briefing, _ said the same day: "The energy area, particular~ly oil production, i.s one of the sectors most dependent on outside equipment and technology. This is a field where U.S, exports are p~rticularly valuable to the Soviets." Some Western European nations reacted strongly against the U.S. policy because these nations, especially West Ge~many and France, are expecting to purchase Siberian natural gas in the future. Some U.S. officials, including those in the Defense Department, believe that Western European dependence on Soviet - ene?-gy is dangerous but as long as the United States is unable to gua.rantee the supply of energy to these na.tio~.is, the United States has no practical measures to prevent them from promoting their programs. The difference of views is based on the bas3c policy of the United States and Western Europe--the former adhering to the way of thinking that regards the East-West relations in the cold war concept and the latter having closer economic relations with the Eastern bloc which developed rapidly during the detente in the 1970s. To etfectively implement the sanctions, we believe that the Western nations must resort to a reverse measure--closer relations with the Sovi,et Union and Eastern European nations which, in t~:rn, will. increase dependence on the West. Japan and the Soviet Union will exchange new ambassadors shortly. The latest sanctions should not become obstacles for continued dialogue with the Soviet Union. COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News, 1982 CSO: 4120/178 14 FOR OFl~.rIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ECONOMIC CIGARETTE SALES LIIsERALIZATION URGED OW051225 Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 4 Mar 82 Morning Edition p 2 [Editorial: "Liberalize Cigarette Sales and Compete Face to Face!"] [Text] The issue of lib~eralizing cigarette sale~ has been rekindled as part of the controversy over trade friction between Japan and the United States. The United States is demanding that Japan open its market to U.S.-made cigarettes. on the ground that market share for U~.S. cigarettes in Japan is only 1 percent due to Japan's monopoly system, another zrade barrier. ~ The U.S.-made cigarette sale expansion measura which was agreed upon in the fall of 1980 and put into effect in April last year provides that the Japanese tariff rate will be lowe-red to 35 percent at one swoop from 90 percent which was equivalent to the EC rate. The measure also provides that the number of stores selling U.S, cigarett~s will be increased by 40 percent and that . U.S. cigarette manufacturers can spend up to 1 billion yen in adtrertisement and sales campaign outlays. When the measure was adopted, the ~apanese ~ Finance Ministry and the Japan Tobacco and Salt Corporation must have fe~lt ~ that they had take~ a bold measure. Yet in less than a year after the implementation ~f the measure, the United .States has come out with another demand by taking advantage of the current ~ wave of criticism against Japan. It is fv~ly understandable that Japan feels _ a sense of distrust of the U.S. attitude. While raising the prices of tobacco products exported to Japan by 30 percent, the United States is demand- ing that Japan keep the retail prices at their present level. Th3s amounts to demanding that the 35 percent tariff rate be abolished. Generally speaking, the U.S. .demand is too hasty and sma.cks of a poor pol�~cy. Aside from its hastiness, the U.S. demand touches the heart of the matter. This is because Japan's cigarette monopoly system hampers a free market system. From the beginning, there would have been no U.S. demands with regard . to the sales prices and the number of retail outlets but for the monopoly system. Nor would there have been such a strange thing as a limit on outlays for advertisement and sales campaigns. The Finance Ministry and the Cigarette and Salt Public Corporation are still urging the preservation of the monopoly system, but their basis of argument lacks persuasiveness. We will touch it very briefly here since we dealt with it at length in this paper's 30 November 1981 issue. . � ~ 15 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540040041-7 ~ FOR OFFICtAL USE ONLY First, as for securing a revenue source, which is cited as the foremost basi~ of their argument, it will be possible to raise as much revenue as now even if the cigarette industry is turned over to private firms. Second, the counterargument that sales campaigns by U.S. cigarette firms will most probably result in an increase in cigarette consumption is quite absurd. When this argument is stzetched to the extreme, it will negate the reason for existence of the cigarette manufacturing industry itself, whether it is run by a public corporation or by p~~ivate enterprises, if the matter is considered from a point of view of public health. Third, the argument that private firn?s manufacturing cigarettes will [be] squeezed out by foreign competitors stems from a bureaucratic view of one who does not understand the qualities of private businessmen. Fourth, if the public monopoly corporation has a high productivity, it is only Lrue with its factories. On th e whole, the corporation is inferior to private firms in productivity. Lastly, there remains a probl;em concerning dc~mestic tobacco growers. It should be a duty of the government to lead them in a desirable d3.rection while giving them an ample time to readjust. Some Dietmen's out-and-out opposition to liberalization may inevitably be viewed as stemming from a vote- getting motive just as some U.S. congressmen's unreasonable demands. The Japanese monopoly system consists of three divisions, namely, purchase of materials, manufacturing, and sales. Of the three, the sales division is the one the United States is most concerned with, The United States produces large quantities�of tobacco leaves at a cost about one-third of that in Japan. With the low cost of tobacco leaves and the latest technology, the United States is strongly convinced that the U.S. cigarettes are No 1 in the world. No wonder U.S. cigarettes have secured a between 10 and 20 percent market share, or even more in some cases, in Europea.n countries. In the U.S. opinion, it is~due to the high tariff rate and the monopoly system that the market share of U.S. cigarettes in Japan is unusually low. How ever, the Americans make light of the differences of taste among various nations. They also underestimate the level of Japan's cigarette manufacturing technology. Even if Japan liberalizes the cigarette market, it is doubtful whether things will turn out as th e United States is figuring out. For this reason, it will be in the interest of Japan, from both short and long-term points of view, for it to eliminate the tariffs on cigarettes, liberalize their sales and compete with the U.S. cigarette industry face to face. COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1982 CSO: 4120/179 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500440041-7 FOR OFFICIAL US~: ONLY ECONOMIC GATT ADVICE IRRITATES JAPAN OW191049 Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 18 Feb 82 Morning Edition p 1 (Text] It was disclosed on 17 February that Dunkel, secretary general of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), had strongly urged the Japanese Government to promptly take drastic action to open the Japanese market. It is a very exceptional case for the GATT secretariat, a neutral internationa.l organization on trade issues, to make a request to a specific country that can virtually be taken as an advice. Specifically, the GATT secretary general asked that Japan further accelerate the lower3ng of tariffs, improve the situation in nontar3.ff barriers and remove import restrictions on farm products and other remaining items at an early date. Commenting on the Dunkel statement, the government said, "We will continue our efforts to open our ma.rket," but voiced strong opposition to it, saying, "It is a statement with strong political overtones, providing lateral support for the call of the United States and the EC on Japan to open its market." The government is even considering lodging a protest to Secrerary General Dunkel, depending on circumstances. Secretary General Dunkel has met separately with Japanese Government repre- sentatives, including Deputy Vice-Minister for Foreign AffaiYs Matsunaga and Yamada, director of the MITI international economic affairs department, who recently visited Geneva to attend a meeting of 18 GATT member countries (CG-18). At the meetings, the secretary general said: "Now that the United States, which has propped up the postwar GATT system, has been weakened economi~ally, due to recess~ion and other factors, Japan should take the place of the United States and perform a central role in promoting the free trade system. This would result in checking the emergence of protectionism;" He then told them, "Japan should take tangible measures to open its closed market immediat ely . " As drastic measures, the secretary general cited the further expansion and strengthening of the lowering, ahead of schedule, of tariffs, mainly on electronic computers, which Japan decided to carry out last November, and the improvement in nontariff barriers, i,ravolving 67 items. In addition, ~ he called for an early removal of import restrictions imposed on 27 remaining items, comprising mainly farm products. ~ 17 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Noting that Dunkel placed emphasis on the removal of import restrictions still in effect, a top-level MITI off icial has said, "What he calls tangible measures is nothing but a review of import restrictions still in effect." Since Dunkel made his remarks at official meetings, the government takes them as a.virtual advice. The government said, "There is nothing particularly new about the advice, because the question of opening the Japanese market has been discussed at Japan's talks with the United States and the EC." Hawever, it voiced strong opposition to the virtual advice given by the secretary general, who should play the arbitrator's role in GATT, whose highest decision-making organ consists of its member countries, including Japan. The government is afraid that, if GATT, a neutral organization, makes its pro-U.S., pro-EC position clear and criticizes Japan, an imp~tus might be given to the moves of the United States and the EC in strongly demanding the opening of the Japanese maxket and the closed nature of the Japanese market might be ~ emphasized internationally. The government takes the Dunkel stat~cnent as international approval of the pressure on Japan to open its market. A wide section in government quarters holds the view that "the Dunkel state- ment obviously has its origin in the Euro-American pressure on Japan" and is considering taking one countermeasure or another, including a protest to be filed with Secreta.ry General Dunkel. Of late, the U.S. and European pressure on Japan has been further strengthened against the background of continued business recession. In the United States, Congress and other quarters are making all-out efforts to enact reciprocity bills and, in Europe, the EC Committee has recently announced ~ rlan to file , an action with GATT against Japan, saying that "while keepin; its market closed, Japan is unilaterally l~unch3ng an export drive, tht~s violating the GATT agreement." In either case, they both strongly demand that Japan open up its market. However, the government is holding fast to the position of defending the free - trade system of the Western nations and is pur in a situation in which it finds it inevitable to take concrete measures to open up the market. In - this case, Japan is expected to notify the Euro-American countries of its plan _ to further promote the lowering of tariff rates and the removal of nontariff barriers on one hand and take some measure with respect to a review of the import restrictions still in effect on the other hand. A ranking MITI official said, "It may be impossible to go so far as to remove the restrictions, but we will study the expansion of the framework." COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1982 CSO: 4120/180 18 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 - FOR O~FICIAL liSE ONLY ECONOMIC GOVERI~RrIENT, LDP TO L70RK OUT OPEN MARKET PACKAGE . OW040141 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 3 Mar 82 p 1 [Text] Government and ruling Liberal-Democratic Party leaders agreed on March 2 to work out another package of ineasures to open the Japanese market wider to foreign imports at the earliest possible date. The agxeement was reached at a meeting of economic affairs ministers called by Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki to hear a report on the outcome of a U.S. _ visit by an LDP missian from its leader, Masumi Esaki chairman of the party committee on external economic relations. During the mission's U.S. vi~it last week, U.S. government and congressional leaders expressed dissatisfaction wiCh two earlier Japanese packages for opening its market, and urged the mission to take further measures. Chief cabinet secretar,~ Kiichi Miyazawa said the government hopes to complete - a new program of market liberalization before an economic summit meeting of seven ma,jor industrial democracies scheduled for June in Paris. Miyazawa, however, told the press that before working out such measures, the government must "closely watch" the outcome of the current U.S. congressional hearings on Japan-American relations. ~ The government also has to "carefully listen" to the U.S. requests on i.~ilateral trade in farm and other goods at a meeting of the Japan-U.S. subcommittee on trade to be held in Tokyo on March 9-10 and learn the result of a planned Liberal-Democratic Party mission to the European communities, he explained. ~ 'The LDP mission, also to be led by former Internatianal Trade and In~iustry Minister Masumi Esaki, is due to leave Tokyo for the EC member states around March 10, and will complete its tour of Western Europe by around March 20 when the EC Council of Foreign Ministers calls a meeting to discuss Japan-EC trade prob lems. ~ Meanwhile, referring to the contents of the new package, government sources~ said the government is at a loss as to what measures should be incorporated in it because American requests fQr further Japanese market-opening measures are not necessarily clear. . ~ 19 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R400504040041-7 FOR.OFFICIAL USE ONLY The sources said the U.S. appears concerned mainly about expansion of ~ Japanese imports of agricultural products through removal of quota controls and liberalization of the service industries, such as banking and insurance. COPY$IGHT: THE JAPAN TIMES 1982 CSO: 4120/180 20 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-40850R040500044041-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONl,Y SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY NTT TO LAUNCH SATELLITE VIA SPACE SHUTTLE ~ Lower Costs Expected _ OW250517 Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIl~UN in Japanese 23 Feb 82 Morning Edition p 1 _ [Text] In view of the import~ance of co~unications satellites N3ppon Tele- graph and Telephone Public Corporation [NTT] has drawn up its own communica- tion satellite development plan by separating communication satellite development from domestic rocket development. This s~paration stems frQm the f ear that if NTT were to stick to its present course of developing satellites and r~ckets simultaneously, Japan would lag behind the rest of the world in the communications satellite field. NTT will shortly consult the Space Development Committee '~SDC], the govern- ment's space development agency, on the new plan. The SDC is headed by Ichiro Nakagawa, director general of the Science and Technology Agency. The SDC plans to launch a second-generation communications satellite for practical use in f iscal 1987. But at th~t stage, NTT will separate the combined plan of simultaneously developing rockets and satellites into two separate plans, launching a large satellite, using America's space shuttle, under its own communications satellite development plan. NTT's adoption _ of a new plan will make it imperative for the Japanese Govern~~ent t~o review its space~development program. Space development in Japan has been undertaken mainly by the space develop- ment consortium and the Education Ministry's Space Sc3.ence Research Institute under overall planning and~coordina.tion by the SDC, with the cooperation of various organizations sucn as NTT, NHK and National Research Institutes. According to the current plan, a"CS-2" communication satellite for practical use will be launched into a stationary orbit by a domestically bui~.t N-11 rocket in 1983. Th~ 350-kilogram satellite will have a transmiss3.on capacity of 4,000 circuits (in terms of telephone circuits) in 6 submillimeter bands and 2 microwave bands. Of the total, NTT will use the two microwave bands and four submillimeter bands, with the remaining two submillimeter bands to be used by the police 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y agency, the national railways and power companies. NTT plans to use th3s communications satellite for emergency communications during natural disasters and communications with remote islands. However, the cost of using this satellite is so high, compared with the existing ground circuits, that its use is not profitable unless the comm~nication distance exceeds somewhere between 6,000 to 10,000 kilometers. So it is not practicable for communications inside Japan. Under the present plan, another communications satellite, "CS-3," is to be launched by a domestically built H rocket in 1987. The weight of the satellite proper is to be 550 kilograms. The projected transmission _ capacity is 10,000 circuits. But it weighs only half as much as the world's average communications satellite. So it will still be a costly satellite. - That is why NTT has decided to separate communications satellite development from domestically built rocket development at the CS-3 stage and has firmed up a plan to launch a large satellite weighing 1 ton by using the space ~q shuttle, scrapping th e 550-kilogram satellite plan. According to NTT's pre- ~~'J li.minary estimate, when the space shuttle is used, the launching cost will be just one-sixth of the cost incurred using a 3-stage rocket. The trans- ~ mission capacity will also boost to somewhere between 20,000 and 25,000 cir- cuits. ~rthermore, twice as much fLel for attitude control can be packed into the satellite and the satellite's 13fespan will be doubled to 10 years, thereby drastically reducing connnunications costs. Compared with ground circuits, the communications satellite will cost less if the distance covered exceeds 1,000 kilometers. _ As a second generation sate ite succeeding CS-3, NTT plans to launch a 4-ton - communications satellite in 1995. Its transmission capacity will exceed 100,000 circuits and the cormnunications cost w311 be drastically reduced. Compared with ground circuits, this satel.lite will cost less if the distance exceeds 300 kilometers. NTT has no intention of putting these plans into practice separately from the government's space development plan. It will implement them only after the government's space development plan is reviewed. COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1982 Project to Face Opposition OW041215 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in En~;lish 3 Mar 82 p 3 [Text] Nippon Telegraph and Telephone [NTT] Public Corporation has decided to put two massive business communication satellites into orbit by 1992. But the plan seems likely to run into opposition from the Space Developmeni. Committee headed by Science and Technology Agency chief Ichiro Nakagawa over plans to use America's space shuttle instead of domestically produced rockets. 22 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500040041-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NT'I' will launch a one-ton satelll.te similar to America's successful Intelsat in 1988 to handle the mounting flood of international business communications. While the satellite would contain some 10,000 telephone circuits, it would be a baby compared to the second stage of the project: a four-ton giant that could simultaneously handle 100,000 circuits. It wouid be launched in 1992. NTT will debate the proposal further with the Ministry of Posts and Tele- communications and othez organizations before taking it to the space committee this summer. But the summer presentation is not likely to be a rubber-stamp affa3.r. - One of the basic goals of Japan's space program is to build up the country's technological capacity by using domestic technology. However, the H-lA, a three-s tage liquid-fuel booster that is Japan's hope for the late 1980s, will only be able to put 550 kilograms into orbit. That is far short of what would be needed for NTT's business satellites, lead- ing the communication giant to decide that the cavernous cargo bay of the U.S. space shuttle is the only place where its satellites could fly into orbit. The Space Development Committee already has plans of its own to launch two business communications satellites, the 350-kilogram CS-2, wi*_:~ 4,000 circuits, in fiscal 1982r and the 550-ton CS-3, with a 6,000-circuit ~apacity, in fiscal 1987. NTT, however, says demand will far outstrip t e limited capacity of the CS series, which it labels uneconomical. It is going ahead with its plans, and has alrea.dy established a research section for the giant satellites. "Satellite communications once had an image of being used during disasters, or for communicating with distant islands," NTT official Koji Maeda said. "Satellite communications also cost more than ground-based communications. "NTT has offered as inexpensive a service as possible, which is why we thought of using the space shuttle at less thar_ one-third the cost of domestic rockets." A spokesman at the Space Development Committee offices in the Science and - Technology Agency said recently that NTT had yet to contact the committee directly. But he warnad that any plan to use the space shuttle would run counter to the .Japanese space program's policy of using domestic ,:echnology. COPYRIGIiT: Asalii ~vening News 1982 _ CSO: 4120/174 - 23 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500440041-7 FOR OFFICIAG USE ONLY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGX ~ IC INDUSTRY'S ACTIVITIES AS OF DECEMCER 1481 REPORTED Toshiha's VLSI Technology Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 8 Dec 81 p 1 [Text] Toshiha Corporation (Shoichi SaUa, president) has developed a dynamic 4-16 megabit dynamic memory (xnemory element consisting of silicon ch ips, each a few ~ mm square, containing 4-16 million transistors) capacity revolutionary type VLSI. This technology is called the BOR method and repres~nts a new element separation technology produced by ~embedding two layers of silicon oxide f ilm within grooves d~y etched into silicon base plates, thereby separating and insulating the elements from each ot~er. Ther e are a number of technological barriers which stand in the way of development of VLSI with a minimum line width less than 1 micron and with more than 1 megabit degree of integration, and it has been said that element separation is the most important obstacle to be overcome to realize such a product. The new technology developed by Toshiba eliminates the unused section (bird's beak) which was unavoidable in past methods while making an element separation which ~ opens the way for submicron line widths of between 0.2 and 1.0 micron and associated high densif tcation. It is said that a design line width of 0.6 micron will enable the cramming of 2.38 times the pres~nt number of transistors per square centimeter. This company considers that it has established the basic technology for developing VLSI of over 1 megabit capacity, and it hopes to market this product in the latter half of Lhe 1980's. Element Separation Without Bird's Beak The memory (RAM = memory element in which read-in and write-in can be conducted freely) with the maximum capacity presently available in the world today is a 64 kilobit member (design line width, 3 microns), and present technology allows pro- duction up to 256 kilobits (.design line widttz 1.5-2 microns), but once this capacity goes up to the 1 megaliit level (.design line width 1 micron), a number of - technological obstacles loom. It is generally believed that the development of submicron class VLSI can become possible through the establishment of lithographic technology using electron beam engraving or plasma etching, but the actual situa- tion is that considerably more imgortant technology needs to be developed. This includes manufacturing technology such as: 1) element separation technology by which electrons cannot leak over into the neighboring elements, 2) gate insulating filzn forming technology of the order of SO Angstrom tfiickness, and 3) technology for installing low-resistance distribution lines. Circuit design technology 24. _ FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540040041-7 FOR OFFICIAI, ttSE ONLY problems include how to control hot carriers and the creation of new memory cir- cuit designs. Tn this manner, the 1 micron barrier seesns very formidable. This is why there is a general feeling among engineers in the IC industry tfiat "it will be - enough if a product with a line widtfi of 1 micron and a 1-megabit degiee of inte- gbation can iie mass produced." The breaking of this 1-micron barrier is the most important achievement for this element separation technology. Up to the present time, the LOCOS method developed by Phillips Company of the Netherlands has been the most widely used method for MOS type LSI element separation; this method employs silicon nitride film to form insulating film of silicon oxide by heat treatment of 7 hours duration at 1,000�C. This treatment often forms swellings on hoth side of the oxide film gas mask called a bird's beak (the cross-section resembles a bird's beak), as a result of which an 0.5-micron-wide bird's beak is formed on either side of a 1.0-micron line, and the net effect has been that an effective line width of less than 2 microns could not be attained. At the same time, the appearance of crystal defects is accelerated by the high temperature treatment. Because of this situation, Toshiba developed its element separation method called the "SEPOX method," which enablA,s finishing to 1.2-2 micron, and it had been s~tudying application to the mass prodc~ction step which fo'~lowed; however, meanwhile it developed its BO% method, which enables an even f-Lzer degree of finishing, to less than 1 micron. , ~ The BOX method involves, f irst of all, removal of silicon by a dry etching pro- ~ cedure and embedding insulating f ilm into the excavation by a two-step process. The f irst step leaves only a very thin groove around the element periphery to~ embed the insulated item, and the second step coats insulating f ilm over the first _ in a selective manner. Because both the element forming region and the separation region surfaces are flat, it is claimed that this technology can be adapted to the use of optical microprojection lighting devices (steppers) which can operate down to about 0.7 mm at shallow focal depth (large number of openings)~. Although the BOX method requires a greater number of steps, the time required is shorter (two - 30-minute intervals) and the treatment is under comparatively lower temperatures, - thereby minimizing any effects to the elements. The company claims that it has produced circuits operating properly with a line width of 0.6 mm by the application of this BOX method. Comparing the degree of integration with a product of the LOCOS method, assuming a design rule of 1 micron design width, a BOX product incorporates 4.5 million bits (transistors) per square centimeter, which is 1.8 times that of a LOCOS product. Going down to a design width of 0.6 micron, there is an increase to 2.38 times, to 12.5 million bits. It is said that a 4 megabit dynamic chip produced by the BOX method will be roughly one-third the size of a chip made by the LOCOS method, at about 70 square millimeters. These research results were announced on the 8th at the International Electronic Device Society Meeting held in San Francisco. Ideal Element Separation Professor Sho~i Tanaka, Department of Physical Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, University of Tokyo said: Submicron line width becomes a must if inemory is to 25. ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040041-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500440041-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY attain the megahit ].evel, particularly aTanve the 4 megaFi.~t leyel, and element separation technology is an important ad~unct to this tecfinology~ The HD% method proposed fiy Tosfiiba seems to fie an ideal method. Tfiere are a number of oFistacles to sutimicron widths such as 0.5 ~icron, fiut this method enables good separation, and goad transistor properties without the narrow channel effect fiave fi.een realize~l. This technology lias resolved one of the major di#ficulties. ~ocos (1) sox ,r_x � Te-~ ~ ~ ~ N ~ , ~ ~ 'u ' ~ /'/~�N ' . 4sore�r ri (i~ ~