JPRS ID: 10412 TRANSLATION ALWAYS IN READINESS TO DEFEND THE HOMELAND BY NIKOLOY VASIL'YEVICH OGARKOV

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JPRS L/10412
_ 2~ March 1982
~ Translati~r~
. ALWA,YS IN READINE~S TO DEFEN~ THC ~HG~4ELAND
.
- By
,
= Nikolay Vasil'yevich Ogarkov
;
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JPRS L/1d412
25 March 1982
.�r
.
ALWAYS IN READ~NESS TO DEFE~'D THE HOMELAND
M~scow VSEGDA 'V GOTOVNOSTI K ZASHCHTTE OTECHESTVA [Always in Readiness
to Defend the Hom~land] in Russian 1982 (signsd to press 26 Jan 82)
pp 1- 71
[Book by I~lar SU Ni?colay 'Vas~.l'yeyich Ogarkov, Voyenizdat, 100,000 .
copies]
CONTENTS

~
� � ~
AnnoCation
~ Introductz.on 2
Chapter One. Imperialism the Source of Military Danger 4
_ Chapter T~ao. Development of the Art of Warfare and the Organizational
! Development of the Soviet Armed Forces L9
Chapter Three. Def ense o� the Socialist Homeland the Concern of Al1
-i the People 39
Conclusion 51
~
~
1'
jIT - USSR 4 FOUO]
i - a- tII USSR - 35 FOUO]
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{
I
ALWAYS IN READINESS TO DEFEND THE HOMELAND
Nioscow VSEGDA V GOTOVNOSTI K ZASHCHITE OTECH'~STVA in Russian 1982 (signed to press
26 Jan 82) pp 1-71
[Translation of bc~~k "Always in Readiness to Defend the Nomeland", by Mar SU
Nikolay Vasil'yevi.ch Ogarkov, Voyenizdat, lOQ,000 cop3ea;, 71 pages; published in
the series: "Impl~menting the Decisions of the 26r:~ CPSU Con~ress"; passages en-
_ closed in slantlines printed in boldface or italics (if in italics, [it.] will
- precede closing slantline]
[Annotation]
[Text] On the ~asis of the theses of. Marxism-Leninism :nd the conclusions of the
26th CPSU Congress, this book presEnts an ana?.ysis of the world military-politica~
situation and demonstrates ~he g~owing agg~ess~veness of 3mperialism, the sources
and causes of i:ztensification of the mili.tary ~anger. The author examines the
character of Soviet militar; doctrine and its ruot differences from the military
doctrines of the cap;talisr nations. The author reveals the ob~ective necess~.cy
of further strengthentng the defense might of the Soviet StatE, the.principa~
dir~ctions of organizational development of the USSR Armed Forces, ways to increase
their combat readin~ss to offer an immediate rebuff to any aggressor, and dis-
cusses several im~ortant problems development of Soviet art of warfare. This
book is intended for a wide audien~:e.
I
~
-1 , . ,
1
J ~
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I~OR O~fIC1AL USI: ~JNLY
� INTRODUCTIQN
. The 26th CPSU Congress was a most important and historic event in the lif~ of our
party and the entire people. It summarized the results of the pro ductive labor
of Soviet citizens during the last decade and specified a clesr and precise general
.line of further building of communism in this country.
- The congress pxofoundly formulated and examined in a Leninist manner the vital and
- urgent economic and sociopolitical problems of developed socialism at the present
logical stagc: on the road to communism. In doing so, it has made a substantial
contribution to Marxist-Len:tnist theo:y and the practical building of communism and
has furnished rel~.able guidelines for many years into the future. .
The congress stressed that an inalterable program demand--everything in the name
of man, everything for the good of�man--has served and continues to serve as the

- point of departure for a party-minded, political approach to the economy. Hence
~ the party's economic policy is focused on decisively turning the nation's economy
Coward the diversified tasks connected wfth increasing the prosperity of the people
and emphasizes a decisive shift toward primarily intensive factors o� economic growth
and improving the efficiency and quality of all work performed.
~ The 26th CPSU Congress reaffirmed the 'steadfastness of the peace-seeking Leninist
~ foreign policy of the Soviet State which is aimed at ending the threaC of war,
deepening detente, holding the arms race in check. and ovvosinQ the forces of
aggression. / The defense of peace,"/ stated CPSU CenCral Committee General
Secretary Comrade L.I. Brezhnev at the Congress, /"is the most important task
: of the world."/1
At the same time, as was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, the state of a~fairs in
the world demands today new, additional efforts to preserve world peace. Therefore
in the interests of furEher deepening international detente, the highest forum of
Soviet Communists adopted a Peace Program for the 1980's. The proposals by the
USSR contained in it encompass a broad range: of problems.. These proposals pertain
co ~trengthening measures of confidence n.~t- only of a political but of a military
character as well. The new Soviet initi~t~ives address the most urgent problems of
international affairs and constitute a coi~tinuation and further development ef the
peace-saeking foreign policy of i:lie USSR.
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; The Soviet Union's devotion to peace, that great ideal of mankind, has been con-
~ vincingTy demonstrated time and again~ by the Appeal of the USSR. Supreme Saviet to
the Parliamer_ts and Peoples of the World (June 1981), by the new Soviet proposals
p:esented at the 36th Session of the UN General Assembly, and in speeches made by
~ Comrade L. I. Brezhnet~ during his trip to the FRG in November 1981. These neW
~ peace initiatives by the USSR, permeated by an ardent desire to preserve and
strengthen the security of all mankind and to prevent the catastrophe of a nuclear
war, have won the extensive approval and active support of the peoples of all
- countries.
In the struggle for pea~e, the Communist Party and SQViet Government realistically
assess the processes which are taking place in interna*_ional affairs and are forced
constantly to keep at the center of their attention znatters pertaining to
guaranteeing the reliable security of our country, its alZies and friends. A unity
- of communist creation, love of peace and :Padiness to offer a resolute rebuff to
aggression was bequeathed to us by the great Lenin and comprises the foundation of
the policy of the Soviet State.
FOOTNOTE
1. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow,
1981, page 31.
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Chapter One. IMFERIALISM THE SOURCE OF MILITARY DANGER ~
The 26th CPSU Cangress, analyzing the international situation, noted that in recent
years "the sphere of imperialist domination in the wor~d has narrowed, and internal
conflicts in the capitalist countries and rivalry between them have become ag-
gravated. There has been a sharp increase in tihe aggressiveness of the policies of
imperialism and particularly U.S. imperialism."1 � ~
V. I. Lenin emphasized thaC the highest and final stage of capitalism im-
_ perialism "is distinguished in its root /economic [it.]/ properties by the least
= love of peace and freedoms and by the greatest and ubiquitous development of the
military."2 "...Politically;' he stated, "imperialism j.s basically,a striving *~~-?ard
violence and reaction."3 Concentrated in these words spoken by.Lenin is one of the
~ most important characteristics of imperialism its aggresaive nature.
Th~ principal goal and content of the policy of imperialist circies, especially
the United States, is the achievement of world supremacy, and their main aspiration
, is to halt the world revolutionary process, to strangi~ the revolutionary worker
and national l~beration movement, to wipe socialism off the face of *_he earth, and
to regain for themselves the rol~ of arbiter of the destiny of peoples. In
other words, a striving to attain thp unattainable.
World War I and the Great October Soc~alist Revolution signaled the beginning of the
~ general crisis of capitali.sm, which encompassed its economic and govern~ental sys-
tem, polf.tic~ and ideology. Under imperia.lism, as a result of an intensified con-
centration and export of capital, the pursLit of maximum prof it, competition and
production anarchy, as well as the ever increasing irregularity~ of economic and
political ~evelopment, all the conflicts of an antagonistic society became sharpZy
aggravated: between the societal character of labor and the private-ownership,
- capitalist form of appropriation of its results, between the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie, between the great monopolies, between individua? imperialist nations
or groups of nations, 3nd between imperialist nations and nu~aerous colonies an3
s~emicolonies. The principal conflict of the contemporary erx the conflict be-
tween socialism and capitalism not only does not elitninat~ but deepens to an even
~ greater extent the conflicts within the capitalist society.
Enguged in a struggle for division of the world with the air~ of establishing world
hegemony and endeavoring to resolve its inherer.t contradictions by means of armed
violence, imperialism resorts to wars. They have become its constant and
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inevitat~le companion. It is precisely for these reasons that in the first half of
the 20th century imperialism imposed two world wars on the peoples of the earth,
war.s which claimed 60 million lives. Just since 1945 more than a hundred times
- local wars and military conflicts have erupted in various parts of the world
through the fault of imperialism, and today imperialism threatens to unleash a
, third world war, with the employment of nuclear missile weapons.
'Contemporary militarism," stressed V. I. Lenin, "is a result of capitalism. In
both its forms it is a'vital manifestation' of capitalism: as military force em-
ployed by capitalist nations in their foreign clashes... and as a weapoii serving
in the hands of the ruling classes to crush any and all (economic and po:Litical)
movements of the proletariat... "4
Anticommunism and anti-SovieLi~m is the main, dominant trait and feature of mili-
- tarisrn in present-day conditions. "Today all the enemies of social progress,"
notes the CPSU Program, "have united under this black banner: the financial
oligarchy and the military, fascists and reacticnary clericalists; colonialists
and landowners, all the ideological and political accomplices of imperialist
reaction."5

Tw
1 ~
' And all this is being done behind a cloak of struggle against an alleged?y con-
stantly growing "Soviet military threat." We shall state quite frankly that at-
tempts to utilize lies of_ this kind have been undertaken time and again, since the
' first da~s of existence of the young Soviet Republic. But the pntire worl.d kno~�Ts
~ full well that the Soviet Union never threatened anybody and never attacked ,ody.
This is convincingly attested by the more than 60-year history of the world's f3.:.st
Land of Soviets. Its first legislative enactment was the famou.s Leniu Peace Decree.
And speaking of military threat, it is precisely our homeland which has bEen con-
stantly threatened and continues.to be threatened by reactionary imperialist�. circle~,.
Literally immediately following th~ victory of the Great October Revolution, in-
ternational imperialism, working hand in glove with domestic counterrevolution, at-
tempted to strangle the young Soviet State while it was still in its cradl.e. In-
tervention by Germany, Great Britain, France, the United States, Japan and other im-
perialist nation~, and attacks by the White Guard hordPS merged with counter-
revolutionary insurrections and conspiracies by the Socialist Revolutionaries,
~ Mensheviks, and remnants of the bourgeois parties. Zhe overthrown exploiter
classes and international imperialism fought furiou::ly against the new societal
- system and braught incalculable calamities and suffEring to our people. It was
~precisely "world imperialism..." noted V. I. Lenin, "as a matter of fact, which
.caused our civil war and which was responsible for iGs prclongation...."6
The hopes and schemes of international imperialism, however, were not fated to come
to pass. In a fierce struggle in defense of the young Soviet Republic, our people,
led and inspired by the Great Lenin and the Commun~st Party, totally defeated the
- united forces of external and domestic foes and expelled themfrom our country.
Socialism had won the first decisive battle against the foxces of the capitalist
world.
Proceeding with peaceful, constructive labor, by the end of 1924 the Soviet Union
h~d reduced the size of its army, which had numbered more than 5 million men, to
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_ 560,000. And this decision was made by the Communist Party atild Soviet Government
in conditions of encirclement of the USSR by hostile capitalist nations. Is this
no[ evidence of the Soviet Land's genuine love of peace?
- Reactionary imperialist circles, however, were stubbornly loath' to accept the fact
of existence of the young Soviet Republic. Fabricating ttie myth of "Soviet tttreat~~~
[hey attempted time and again during that period to test our nation's strength by
force of arms. We well rememher the acts of provocat~on. perpetrated by the
Chinese militarists on the Chinese Eastern Railway ir~ 1929 and the Japanese samurai
at Lake Khasan in 1938 and on the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939. Although receiving
a crushing rebuff ~n each occasion, imperialist reaction nevertheless continued
nurturing even more perfidious schemes against the Soviet Union. .
In the 1930'sthe black clouds of another world wa.r began to gather over our planet,
a war which was born and went through a protract~ad period of maturation within the
bosom of the capitalist world, which was caught in the clutches of a severe economic
crisis and was being rent by acute political and social conf_icts. .The dangez of
war sharply intensified when power in Germariy �was seized by fascism a shameless
terroristic and chauyinistic dictatorship of t,;he most reactionary and aggressive
- forces of imperialism, which pxoclaimed its main goal to be the struggle against
communism, for world supremacy.
Ruling circles and monopolies in the United States, Great Britain and other capital-
ist countries placed high hopes on fascist Germ.any as a shock force in the struggle
against the world's first socialist state, They offer_ed it generous financial and
ecanomic assistance in rebuilding Germany's military-industrial potential and in
establishing, training and equipping a multimillion-man army.
The Soviet U:.ion, true to its Leninist foreign policy, during th,e prewar years firm-
ly and unsw~_rvingly championed the cause of pea.^e in Europe and throughout the
world. It advanced a number of constructive proposals aimed at holding the
hitl.erite agg~ressors in check and at eliminating the threat of a second world war.
All its efforta, however, wers met by stubborn, calculating opposition on the part
of the ruling circles of the Western powers, which were seeking to achieve tnter-
national isolatian of the USSR and were pursuing the notorious policy of �'appease-
ment" of claimants to world domination and a policy of "channeling" fascist
aggression ea.stward.
- Thus ruling circles of the Western powers played an important role in the rebirth
~ of German militarism and the strengthening of fascism. Blinded by hatred of so-
cialism and refusing to acknowledge that the expansionist as~irations of fascist
Germany also presented a deadly threat to their own countries and peoples, they
not only calmly sat by watching while the Hitlerite clique fanned the flames of war
- but also offered it every possible assistance.
As we know, the Muni_cl~ deal (1938), as a result of which the British and French
governments in fact betrayed Czechoslovakia and handed it over to be torn to
pieces by the fascist barbarians, was the culminating event on the eve of World
War II. The Anglo-German and Franco-German declaratir~ns of 1938, wnich essentially
were nonaggression pacts and an attempt to form an alliance between the Western
1 powers, fascist Germany and Italy and to give them to~al freedom of action against
the USSR, constituted a logical continuation of their policy of "appeasement" of
- the aggressor.
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-i Worlu War II began, however, and proceeded to develop according to a s~enario
quite different from that envi~aged by the strategist~ in London, Paris and
Washington. It was the capitalist countries of Europe, not the Soviet Union,which
became its first victim. Between September 1939 and June 1941 the Hitlerites
seized Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and GYeece.
~ They were soon occupying P'rance. England too was f.aced wi.ttl the threat of
, fascist invasion.
I
Our party foresaw the inevitability of a military clash with the forces of im-
perialism and was readying tne country and people for defense. Thanks to
gigantic achievements in building socialism in the USSR, a powerful Soviet defense
industry was created in short order. Production of *aodern arms and combat equip-
ment increased substantially. The Third Five-Year Flan, adopted in 1939 at the
18th Party Congress, ensured accomplishment of many important tasks pertaining to
further boosting the nation's economic and defense potential. Total numerical
, strength of the Soviet Armed Forces increased by 180 percent between 1939 and June
1941, with 125 new divisions formed during thi.s time. The mechanized corps which
were being deployed began taking delivery on the T-34 and KV tanks, the world's
finest at that time. New models of artillery an~ mortar weapons were developed,
inc]uding the famed multiro~lnd rocket launchers ("katyushi"). The number of avia-
tion regiments in the Air Forces increased by more than 80 percent. The combat
power of the Navy grew subsrantially; a total of 265 new warships were added in
1938-1940. Requisite measures were taken to develop air defense forces and air-
borne troops.
_ Unfortunately history gave us very little time. Not everything which had been
planned for strengthening national defense was accomplished. On 22 June 1941,
I treacherously violating the nonaggression pact, Hitlerit.e Germany launched a
massive sneak attack on our homeland. The Soviet people, led by the Communist
Party, rose as one man to the defense of their socialist homeland. The sacred
Great Patriotic War of r_he Soviet people aga:_nst the fascist invaders had begun.
?mperialism's schemes of destroying the socialist nation in the fla~ces of ~orld
War II were a total failu:~. The outcome of the war was not at all determined by
the combat operations of Anglo-American troops in North Africa and Italy, as
bosrgeois falsifiers of history today attempt to argue. Its outcome was deter-
mined on the Soviet-German front by the selfless, courageous struggle of the Soviet
~~eople, who displayed mass heroism and the power of Soviet arms. The Battle of
Moscow in 1941 buried Hitler's plan of blitzkrieg and signaled the beginning of
a turning point in the war, the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942~-1943 made a decisive
contribution toward reaching a radical turning point in the course not only of the
Great Patriotic War but of Worlci War II as whole, while the Battle of Kursk in
1943 placed fascist Germany at the brink of catastrophe.
In 1944, brilliantly executing a number of large-scale strategic operations at
Leningrad, in the Crimea, in the Right-Bank Ukraine, in Belorussia, Moldavia, in
the Baltic and the Arctic, the Soviet Armed Forces swept Soviet soil clean of
~ fascist inva3ers and, pushing the victorious offensive westward, proceeded to
liber~te the peoples of ~urope from the yoke of Hitlerite occupation.
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The grandiose Berlin Operation, in the course of which :.~oviet troops crushed almost
a million-man enemy force, was the victorious finale in the ultimate defeat of the
German-fascist forces in the Great Patriotic War. Our Victory Bar~ner flew proudly
over defeated ~erlin, while the standards of the "invincible" Hitl~rite army ended
up at the feet of the victorious Soviet people.
After this, with the objective of bringing World War II to an end in the Far East,
ensuring the security of the Soviet Unf.on and achieving the earliest possible
establishment of peace throughout the world, our Armed Forces, carrying out their
pledge as an ally in the anti-Hitler coalition, routed the Kwantung Army, the main
striking force of militarist Japan.
The results of the Great Patriotic War o~ the Soviet Unicn demonstrated in a most
convincing fashion that there are no forces in the world capable of crushing so-
cialism 2.nd bringing to their knees the Soviet geople, loyal to the ideas of
Marxism-Leninist, dedicated to the socialist homeland, and united behind the Leninist
party. These results constitute a stern warning to the imperialist aggressors, a
harsh and unforgettable lesson of history. ~
The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great P~triotic War predetermined in large
measure the entire course of postwar development in the world. Favorable conditians
were created for victorious revolutions in a number of countries in Europe and Asia,
establishment of a world socialist syszem, and a powerful upsurge in the national
liberation struggle of peoples. Tfie position of imperialism proved to be seriously
~ undermined, and the correlation of forces in the world arena had changed radically
in favor of socialism.
Weakening of the position of imperialism in the postwar period, however, not only
did not diminish but on the contrary increased its aggressiveness to an even greater
degree. Imperialism.began urgently regrouping its for~es. The United States of
America assumed a leadership position within the capitalist camp.
- In the interests of consolidating its political and military-strategic positions,
the United States, possessing a temporary monopoly in nuclear arms, pursued a policy
- of bl,ackmail and threats directed against the USSR, its recent aily in the anti-
Hitler coalition. The imperialtst countries, headed by the United States, began
openly pursuing a policy from a position of strength" vis a-vis the socialist
- nat'.ons. Virtua~Zy as soon as World War II ended, when the Soviet people were
, totally absorbed in rebuilding their war-demolished economy, U.S. and British
ruling circles, once again loudly proclaiming to the world a"Soviet military
threat," began preparing the most monstrous and perfidious plans against the USSR.
In 19~8 Churchill proposed initiating an atomic war against the USSR, while in
- 1949 th~ United States even drew up a plan of war against the Soviet Union code-
named "Dropshot," the authors of which proposed dropping no less than 300 atomic
bombs and 20,000 tons of "conventional" bombs on the USSR.
, That same year an a~gressive military bloc was formed at the initiative of and with
a leading role played by the United States, a bloc which was named the North
Atlantic Treaty t~rganization (NATO). Six years later the FRG was accepted as a
full-fledged member of PIATU. At the same time international imperialism
began establishing around the Soviet Union and the other
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- socialist countries a network of military bases, and proce~ded to hammer together
new regional military blocs in various regions of the world, such as CENTO, SEATO,
ANZUS, and others.
Attd all this was being done under the cover of slogans about the need to eliminate
the "Communist threat," slogans which were intended for the purpose of continuin~
the arms race which had been initiated by imperialism while casting the blame for
the arms race on the USSR. But reality totally reiuted these fantasies.
- The domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union always has been, is now and
= will remain directed toward strengthening peace, cooperation and international
security. The entire world knows for a fact that it is not our country which was
- initiator of the arms race and the establishment of military-political blocs. Our
courtry was forc~d to take merely requisite response measures to every new challenge
by the West. And these are not simply words, but facts, which neither the United
States nor its NATO allies can refute, no matter how much they would like to do
so. ~
The military-political alliance of Warsaw Pact member nations was established in
- 1955, that is, 6 years after creat~on of the aggressive NATO bloc. The situation is
similar as regards the arms race. We know, for example, that the United States
- built the world's first atomic bomb, in 1945, and proce2ded to use it to threaten
the Soviet Union, which did not develop a similar weapon until 4 years later. What is
- more, the United States was the first to test an even more powerfu~. hydrogen bomb,
in 1952, while the USSR followed suit in 1953. The Americans were also the first
- to build nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles, in 1960, while
the USSR followed suit in 1967. The United States was the first to develop
MIRVed warheads for land-based and sea-launched ballistic missiles, at the end of
the 1960's, while the USSR did not build such warheads until 1975-1977. This list
�of strategic weapons could go on and on.
Or take, for example, space intelligence-gathering hardware, the multipurpose
"Shuttle" space system, and the AWACS long-range radar detection system. Al1 these
items first appeared in the arsenal of the Pentagon, not of the Soviet Armed Forces.
And if we consider the development of the so-called conventianal weapons, here too
the palm of precedence has been solidly retained by the United States, with the aim
of achieving superiority over the USSR. This applies to the building of aircraft
~ carriers, t~ the development of antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), surface-to-air
' missile systems (SAMs), tanks with stabilizers and laser gunsights, hypersonic air-
craft and oth~r modern weapons and combat equipment.
Thus even a brief historical digression persuasively attests to the fact that it is
precisely the United States which always has been and continues to be the "designer"
~ of more and more new weanonry and the initiator of each new round of the unchecked
arms race.
As for the Soviet nation, it is quite understandable that it could not waive the
interests and security of its people and that in response to the military prepara-
tions of the United States and the other NATO countries it has been forced to take
the necessary measures to strengthen its defense.
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- All of postwar history also incontrovcrtibly reveals a picture of how U.S. imperial-
ism, endeavoring to assert its dictate in international rel~tions, elaborated
various strategic ideas and nurtured insidious plans against the USSR.
/At the beginning of the 1950's, for example, the United States,/ although it hgd
_ lost its nuclear weapons monopoly, still enjoyed superiority in total number of wgr-
heads and means of delivery,and remaining to some degree safely out of range of a
response attack, elaborated the /strategy of "wassive retaliation,"/ [strategiyu
~ "massirovannogo vozmezdiya"], which specified waging only an all-out nucl~ar war
against the USSR and the other socialist countries. The Americans considered that
the.main weapons at that time were the powerful strategic aircraft, capable of
delivering nuclear strikes deep in the Soviet heartland. For this reason the
- Pentagon viewed a war as the unilateral employment of strategic nuclear weapons,
which the United States could prosecute with impunity. ~
/By the beginning of the 1960's,/ in connection with the fact that the USSR had
develeped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and had built~a reliable
national air defense system, military-political leaders in Washington were forced to
acknowledge that in a war against the USSR the United States could no longer go un-
punished but would receive an appreciable response attack. Therefore the U.S.
strategy of "massive retaliation" was replaced in the 1960's by the /strategy of
"flexible response"/ [strategiya "gipkogo reagirovaniya"]. A central place in, this
strategy was once again assigned to all-out nuclear war, but in which "dosed"
["dozirovannoye"] employment of nuclear weapons was specified, commensurate with_
the "scale of military danger" and the possibility of waging limited war with con-
ventional weapons. Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles began to be
_ considered the principal offensive nuclear weapon. With this aim the United States
built 1054 Minuteman and Titan ICBM launchers and initiated a program to build sub-
marines armed with Polaris missiles.
In addition to modern strategic nuclear weapons land-based (ICBM) and sea-..
launched (SLBM) intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers, power-
ful general-purpose forces armed with conventional weapons were to be maintained.
Plans called for fighting a war against the USSR and the European socialist
countries initially with conventional weapons, with subsequent employment of
_ tactical nuclear weapons and, in a critical situation, strategic nuclear weapons as
well.
/At the beginning of the 1970's,/ as we know, a quantitative parity was reached
between the United States and the USSR in strategic arms. This forced White liouse
officials to revise their previous views and adopt a new strategy /the strategy
of "realistic deterrence"/ [strategiyu "realisticheskogo ustrasheniya"] ('realistic
restraint"), which was based ~n ensuring a qualitative superiority of the entire
strategic arms complex. Toward this end the United States began elaboration aud
implementation of numerous programs for further building up the power of all
branches of its armed forces, particularly in the area of improving strategic of-
fensive forces nuclear $ubmarines armed with ballistic missiles, and equipping
- land-based and sea-launched strategic missiles with MIRVed warheads, and in ad-
dition development began on a new strategic nuclear weapon air-launched, sea-
launched, and land-based long-range cruise missiles.
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The s[rategy of "realistic deterrence" was expressed in its most concentrated form
in 1980 in tne Carter Administration~s DirecCive No 59 as well as other directives
i which supplemented it, which presented the concept of employing U.S. strategic
nuclear forces in war again5t the Soviet Union.
1 /At the begii~ning of the 198a's/ the new Reagan Administration proceeded at the
very outset to adopt an even more dangerous reactionary policy and, in connection
, with this, began development of a/"new military strategy" a strategy of "direct
; confrontation"/ [strategii "pryamogo protivoborstva"] between the United States and
the Soviet Union on a global and regional scale. According to a statement by U.S.
Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, the main goal of this strategy is to achieve
"complete and indisputable" military superiority, reestablishment of the "U.S.
leadership role in tne world," active countermeasures against the Soviet Union in
"defense of vital U.S. interests" in various regions of the world, and
the "disintegration" [razrykhleniye] of the socialist community. This strategy
places emphasis on preparations for a protracted nuclear war.
~ao concepts are being elaborated in developing the "new military strategy" "ac-
tive countermedsures" ("aktivnogo protivodeystviya"~ and "geographic escalation"
["geograficheskoy eskalatsii"]. Ti~e concept of "active countermeasures" envisages
multivariant employment of strategie nuclear weapons from so-called limited
nuclear strikes to massive nuclear strikes against the entire aggregate of targets
[kompleksu ob"yektov] on the territory of the Soviet Union and the other nations of
the socialist community. In the opinion of the Pentagon, the fact,that the United
States possesses powerful strategic nuclear forces, as well as the creation o,f
~ large, so-called "Eurostrategic" nuclear forces allegedly enhances U.S. capatiilities
` to achieve political and military objectives in a"limited" nuclear war in the
European theater without such a war escalating into a world war. ~
Of course one can reason theoretically in this manner. But any sober-minded person
can understand without any particular difficulty that in practice it is impossible
to achieve this, that is, to hold nuclear war within a certain restricted framework.
~ "If nuclear war breaks out, be it in Europe or elsewhere," stressed Comrade L. I.
Brezhnev in his replies to questions put by the editors of the West German magazine
DER SPIEGEL, "it would inevitably and inescapat~ly assume a worldwide character."~
And military experts and political leaders in the United States and the other
leading NATO countries unquestionably are well aware of this fact. Their true aim,
however, is to dull the vigilance of the peoples of the world, to teach them to
accept the idea that "limited" nuclear war is realistic and "acceptable," and to
suppress in them any resistance to an unchecked arms race and the military prepara-
tions being conducted by the forces of imperialism.
The U.S. "new military strategy" also calls for preparing the armed forces to
wage a war with the employment of solely conventional weaponry. It is asserted
thereby, in conformity with the so-called'~eographic escalation" concept,that in
- case a conventional war begins in any theater, the United States and its allie.s
should be prepared for the spread of military operations with the employment of con-
ventional weapons also to other theaters "where the adversary is most vulnerable."
In other words, in their view such a war may embrace not only Europe, which con-
tinues to be viewed as the principal theater of war, b~at the Near, Middle and ~ar
; East, all sea and ocean theaters as well.
~
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What can be said ahout this "new" U.S. strategy? If one examines it as a whole,
peeling off the verb~l shell, one can easily see that essentially it further
develops that same notorious "nuclear strategy" which the previous U.S. administra-
tion was attempting to proclaim, but.at the same time it is of an even more openly
aggressive character and essentially cor~stitutes a return to the initial U.S.
_ strategy of "massive retaliation." In uther words, strategic thinking has come
full circle, but it has now risen to a significantly more dangerous level
dangerous for all mankind.
Even a cursory analysis of the evolution of U.S. strategic concepts indicates that
all of them essentially contain the idea of nuclear war against the IISSR and are of
a clearly-~marked aggressive character. Reflected in them, just as in a mirror,
is the predatory essence of the polic~ of U.S. imperialism, which seeks to achieve
global superiority using any means, while refusing sober.ly to assess the present
world correlation of force~s.
The 26th CPSU Congress noted that in rQcent years the aggressiveness of imperialism,
and particularly U.S. imperialism, t~as increased sharply. "Adventurism, willingness
to gamble the vital interests of marikind for the sake of their own narrow selfish
aims," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the congress, "are particularly~glaring-
ly manifested in the policy of the most aggressive imperialist circles."
Imperialism is increasingly losing ground.in the world, and the sphere of its domina-
tion is inexorably narrowing.
At the same time the mi~ht and authority [avtoritet] of the nations of
the socialist community are steadily increasing, national liberation movements are
broadening (since World War II colonial rule by imperialism has been ended in more
than 100 countries in Asia, Africa and Latir~ America), the class struggle is gaining
momentum within the capitalist countries themselves, and the forces of peoples in
the struggle for democracy and social progress are growing stronger.
Imperialism is no longer c~able, ~ it was in the past, of controlling and, partic-
ularly, of directing the course of world events as it sees fit. In conditions of
further aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism, reactionary forces are seek-
ing at all costs to impede the process of progressive changes in the world, to turn
back the wheel of history, and to regain their past world domination, utilizing any
and all means and methods to achieve this end. This so-called "global offensive"
- against socialism and the forces of progress is also presently taking place on com-
mand from Washington, for the sake of these frankly illusory goals. U.S. subversive
actions in regard to Poland are gr.aphic confirmation of this.
U.S. ruling circles do not conceal the fact that in calling for a new round in the
nuclear and conventional arms race they are essentially taking the path of milir.ariza-
tion of the entire country and utilization of U.S. military power in a broad ~ange
of military conflicts. Iti a military-political regard, one can see several trends
with a sufficient degree of definiteness.
- /Fi.rst of all,/ present U.S. leaders are stubbornly bringing things toward a break-
down of treaties previously signed with the Soviet Union, as well as of arms
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~
'i limitations and reduction talks. In 1973 the USSR and the United States signed an
! agreement on preventing nuclear war, pursuant to whicfi the two parties pledged to
I act in such a manner as to prevent the occurrence of situations capable of causing
military confrontatian. At the present time, however, Washington officials through
- the~r practical actions are pushing the peoples of the world toward the abyss of
thermonuclear war.
_ Existing agreemer.ts and understandings in the area of strategic arms limitations
- (SALT I) are not to the liking of the U,S. administration. In particular, opinions
are being exFressed which urge repudiation of the provisional agreement on certain
measures in the area of limiting strategic offensive arms. Attempts are also being
made to undermine the permanent treaty between the USSR and the United States or.
limiting antimissile defense systems, which was signed in 1972. Defense Secretary
C. Weinberger, for example, openly stated that the United States may demand revision
of this treaty, depending on the results of research being conducted by the
Americans in the area of antimissile systems.
Many top White House officials, including the Presiden:t, openly state that the SALT
II Treaty is allegedly disad~.~ntageous to the Ur.ited States and therefore should be
radically revised or even scrapped.
The United States broke off talks on limiting and subsequent reduction of military
activities in the Indian Ocean, on li~niting international trade in weapons and
deliveries of conventional arms, and is making, every effort to hinder the work of
; the U N Conference on Law of the Sea. The United States is stubbornly L�locking
~ the reaching of agreements in talks on total and universal banni~~g of nuclear
weapons testing, on banning the development, manufacture and stockpiling of
chemical weapons and destroying existing stockpiles, on mutual reduction of forces
i and arms in Central Europe, as well as on a number of other problems.
The United States and its NATO partners, disregardingtheinterests of their peoples,
are ignoring new foreign policy initiatives on the part of the USSR in the area of
arms limitations. They are also stubbornly ignoring the Soviet proposal for a
moratorium on deployment in Europe of new medium-range [sredney dal'nosti also
translates as intermediate-range] nuclear missile weapons by the NATO countries and
the USSR.
The United States has long been dragging its feet on the teatter of resumption of
talks on limiting medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Finally, under pressure
- by the world community, including in the Western European countries, the United
- States was forced to agree to the talks. It is now becoming increasingly more
; clear, however, that the United States is interested least of all in reducing
nuclear weapons on the Europea.n continent. Advancing proposals which it knows are
unacceptable to the USSR, such as President Reagan's "zero option" ["nulevogo
varianta"J, the United States in actuality is not seeking a constructive r3olution to
ttte problem of reducino nuclear arms in L;:rope on the basis of the principle of
equality and equal security for both parties, but is merely attempting to gain time
for the deployment of additional new U.S. nuclear missilea in the countries of
' Western Europe. At the same time, coming up with various fraudulent documents,
such as the pamphlet entitled "Soviet Military Power," published in September 1981,
_ official circles in Washington are clearly pursuing the aim of convincing the
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Wes~c~rn I:uropcans of an alleged SovieC military superiority and of camouflaging
tt~eir ~fforts at an ucichecked buildup of nuclear arms, both strategic and medium-
- range, and thus to guarantee in advance an impasse i.n Soviet-American talks. "T.hey
- need a breakoff of the talks," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in reply to questions
put by the editors of the magazine DER SPIEGEL, "as a kind of alibi for continuing
a deliberaro, arms race, intended to transform Western Europe into a launch pad ~hY
new U.~, missiles targeted against the USSR."9
- /Secondly,/ the United States is pursuing an avowed policy of gaining military
superiority over the USSR and the other nations of ths socialist communlty. This
_ is becoming increasingly an obsession with U.S. ruiing circles. They are seeking
to shift the present rapproximate military balance in their favor, a balance,the
fact of which, we might note, U.S. officfals have re~eatedly acknowledged and con-
tinue to acknowledga. It is a well-known f act that military superio rity has always
been required not for defense. Superiority has always been and continues to be
taday a symbol of aggressive aspirations.
This policy has become particularly dangerous in connection with actions by the
Reagan Administration aimed at direct and comprehensive preparations for w.�ir. ~Con-
�irmation of this is the substantial increase in U.S. budget appropriations for
t:he development and execution of new weapons programs, the forming of new military
contingents, rapid deployment forces in particular, and plans calling ~or "addi-
tional arming" ["dovooruzheniya"] of NATO with nuclear missiles and stepped-up
military preparations in varioua regions of the world.
Direct U.S. military appropriations have reached staggering figures in peacetime
conditions: more than 180 billion dollars for the 1981 fiscal year, and more than
220 billion for 1982. And in the next five years, up *_0 1986, U.S. military ex-
pen~itures planned just for the Department of Defense total 1.5 trillion dollars,
that is, an average of 300 billion dollars a year. Just what are these billions
going to be spent on?
First of all, plans call for further buildup of strategic nuclear forces at a
~riority pace. These include new "Ohio" class missile-carrying nuclear submarines,
MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, the new B-1 an~. "Stealth" strategfc
bombers, the multirole Space Shuttle, long-range air-launched, sea-launched, and
land-based cruise missiles, plus other weapons. Planning to begin the mass
production and deployment of cruise missiles, the United States intends to create
for itself considerable additional nuclear potential for accomplishing strategic
missions, and thus to tip the present strategic balance in its own favor, both in
individual regions and throughout the world. A buildup of military power is
being carried out not only by the United States but also by the NATO bloc as a
whole. One should note thereby that the NATO countries have serious differences of
opinion with their leader, the United States, on certain questions of economic and
sociopolitical development. On the main thing, however in their anti-Sovietiam
and anticommunism, in the struggle against socialism, democracy and social
progress, they basically adhere to a common policy. Under heavy pressure by
Washington, the Western European countries ratif ied at the Rome meeting of the NATO
Council (in May 1981) the NATO decision on "additional nuclear arming" [o "yadernom
dovooruzhenii"] of Western Europe adopted in December 1979, calling for deploying
in Western Europe an additional approximately 600 Pershing II missile launchers and
cruise missiles in order to achieve military superiority over the Warsaw Pact
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~ countries. The FRG displayed particular zeal in adopting this decision. And for
- some reason France also is working intensively to build its own nuclear "umbrella,"
something akin to a new "nt~.clear Maginot," which iiicrease.~ the overall nuclear
potential of the Western European nations and NATO as a whole.
Substantial appropriations are being desig:~ated for maintaining the U.S. milit2ry
presence in various parts of the world. Hundreds of large U.S. naval and air
bases are deployed around the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations. U.S.
regular troops totaling approximately 500,000 men are stationed in more than 15 dif-
f erent countries.
Permanent forces are being established in the Near and Middle East for purposes of
. aggressior.. Under the pretext of monitoring the "truce" between Egypt and Israel,
the United States is planning to station American troops on the Sinai Peninsula.
The network of supply depots at which additional stocks of heavy weapons and equip-
_ ment are stored for dual-based U.S. troops in the FRG, Luxembourg, Great Britain,
Norway, and other countries in Western Europe is t~eing exganded at an accelerated
nace.
Quite recently the United States, by 1LS reckless decision to commence full-scale
production of neutY~on weapons, threw a direct challenge to the peoples of the
world with undisguised cynicism. This decision, together with implementatior~ of
plans to build and deploy other types of nuclear missile weapons, is a component
part of the U.S strategic policy of preparing for war with employment o� the entire
arsenal of weapons and clearly attests to Washington's far-reaching aggressive
schemes.
Once again, and for the umpteenth time, U.S. ruling circles haye assumed their
- customary role of inventor of barbaric means of waging war, of instigator of
another round of the arms race. The world co~?unity is particularly alarmed by
the fact that in this case we are dealing not si.mply with an increase in the
quantity of a~ready existing weapons but rather a qualitative leap forward in this
area, for neutron weapons, even tactical weapons, can play the role of detonator
of a thermonuclear world war.
J~'~h~.tdly,/ the United States has elevated to the status of national policy brazen
iriterference in the internal affairs of sovereign nations and aggressive
struggle against national liberation movements.
The United States is undertaking enormous efforts to crush such movements in the
countries of Central America. They are engaged in outright intervention in the
internal affairs of E1 Salvador. The threads of conspiracy are constantly being
~ woven, and all kinds of subversive actions are being undertaken against Nicaragua,
inclu~ling from the territory of neighboring countries. Intensive arms deliveries
are being made to the military junta ruling Guatemala. To achieve its aggressive
aims in Latin America, Washington is attempting to establish so-called inter-
American forces, consisting of subunits and units of regular troops of the United
States and countries with antipopular, police regimes Guatemala, Honduras,
- Paraguay, Uruguay and Chile.
Outright acts of provocation, sabotage and threats directed against socialist Cuba
are continuing. Mexico and a number of other countries in this region which do not
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desire to follow subm~ss�ively in the wake of U.S. aggressive policy have also
become the targets of blackmail and threats.
:hP next most important region of U.S. hegemonist aspirations incidentally, the
U.S. assessment agrees ~zith this is Africa. White House off icials have operily
stated that they will offer support and supply arms to the UNITA terrorist grouping
in Angola. Giving every encouragement to bandit-like military incursions by South
_ African troops, they seek to undermine the revolutionary achievements of the people
of Angola, to destabilize the situation in Mozambique, and to crush the national
liberation movement in Namibia. The United States devotes special attention to
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, seeking to establish bases in these countries and to ar-
range for permanent stationing of U.S. regular military units on their territory.
- Arming Israel at an accelerated pace and encouraging its aggressive piratical ac-
tions, the United States is making every effort to escalate tension in the Near
East. In the 1970's the Americans supplied Tel Aviv with more than 8.5 billion
dollars worth of weapons and military equipment. It was recently announced in
Washington that U.S. military aid to Israel will reach an annual figure in excess of
2 billion dollars.
The Middle East is also now the center of heightened attention on the part of U.S.
imperialism. The President himself aYinounced that the United States will.continue
arming counterrevolutionary bands in Afghani.stan, for the most part via Pakistan,
which is viewed as a bridgehead for carrying out hegemonistic schemes in the Middle
East and Persian Gulf area. Toward these ends the Americans intend to give
Islamabad more than 3 billion dollars in military-economic aid.
The situation developing in the Far East is also cause for concern. China's
present leaders are continuing to pursue a malicious ant~-Soviet course of policy.
We must state that the Chinese leaders were the only ones in the world to voice
_ strong approval of the decision by the U.S. administration to commence the
production of neutron weapons. The partnership between imperialism, and particular-
ly the United States, and Beijing hegemonism is a new and dangerous phenomenon in
world politics, presenting a threat to all mankind.
In their nearsighted policy of escalating military tension, reactionary circles in
th~ United States and other Western powers have found a"worthy" partner the
Chinese hegemonists. By giving them various assistance, including military, the
U.S. imperialists seek to play the "China card" to turn China into an anti-
Soviet shock f orce, into a gendai:ne and the main support of reaction in Asia.
- Apparently the strategists across the ocean as well as certain Western European
strategists have forgotten those fatal consequences to which the actions of r.heir
courtries' ruling circles led on the eve of World War II. Such a policy can
boomerang in presP^.~-day conditions as well, striking precisely and primarily those
who have undert~~ken and are playing this dangerous game.
Expansion of military-political ties between the United States, China,and Japan,
which is increasingly proceeding in the direction of militarization, is creating a
long-term military threat to peace in the Far East. China, with U.S. approval,
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is artificially maintaining a focal point of tension in Kampuchea and along China's
border with Vietnam and Laos.
~
Thus world imperialism, and particularly U.S. imperialism, is seeking to extend its
tentacles into every part of the world. Militant U.S. circles have openly adopted
a course of policy aimed at undermining d~tente, engagement in a massive arms race,
~ and vigorous [aktivnuyu] preparations for nuclear war. The various actions and
acts of sabotag~ against the USSR and the other nations of the socialist comuu-
nity a n d against progressive forces throughout the world which they are presently
! conducting are of a coordinated nature and are joined together by a common scheme.
The main goal which the U.S. imperialists have set for themselves is gradually and
sequentially to weaken and undermine socialism as a system, using any and all
~ methods and means, and ultimately to establish their world domination.
This is not a new phenomenon. History has seen many claimants to world domination.
Napoleon persistently sought to achieve world domination, as did Hitler at a later
time. The outcome of their ambitions is well known. An even harsher outcome may
- await these latter- d ay claimants.
The White House administration's most sinister schemes against peace, against
very life on earth, and especially its decision to build neutron weapons have un-
leashed a huge storm of public anger on all continents.
Public oui.cry against Washington's plans is assuming a particularly large scale in
Europe, which the Pentagon's strategists intend to turn into an arena of nuclear
war, leaving U.So soil untouched. Millions of people, broad segments of the public,
~ many statesmen and political leaders are more and more clearly realizing that the
~ root interests of the countries and peoples of Western Europe are totally at
variance with the militarist aspirations of the United States.
Differences between the United States and its NATO allies on many military-political
problems, including the production of neutron weapons and deployment of U.S. nuclear
! weapons in Europe, are becoming increasingl;~ deeper and assuming an undisguised
character.
In the present-day situation caution, we{.ghing of actions and, at the same time,
; vigorous efforts toward achieving a radical improvement in the world political
-i climate are more needed than ever before. The Soviet State and its allies are
~ displaying precisely such a high-principled and flexible approach to resolving
internatio~nal problems.
Vivid evidence of this are the new peace initiatives advanced by the Soviet Union
, at the 36th Session of the UN General Assembly, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's replies
to questions put by the editors of the magazine DER SPIEGEL, and his statements
made during hia viait to the FRG. They are simed at preserving and further
strengthening world peace and placing a barrier in the path of the dangerous
militaristic plans of the imperialist forces.
At the same time, realistically assessing the international situation and the
~ danger of military preparations on the part of imperialism, the Communist Party and
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Soviet Government are taking necessary st~ps in order reliably to protect the
vital interests of our people. "In the period under review," stated Comrade L. I.
Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, the party and government have not failed to
bear in mind every single day matters pertaining to /strengthening the defense
tnight of this country and its Armed Forces."/10
FOOTNOTES
1. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], page 4.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 37, page 248.
3. Ibid., Vol 27, page 388.
4. Ibid., Vol 17, page 187.
S. "Programma Kommunistich~.skoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Program of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union], Moscow, 1976, page 52. ,
6. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 39, page 343.
1, PItAVDA, 3 November 1981.
- 8. "Materialy...," op. cit., page 20.
' 9. PRAVDA, 3 November 1981.
10. "Materialy...," op. cit., page 66.
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Chapter 'Itao. DF�VELOPMENT C1F THE ART OF WARFARE AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL
~ DEVEI,OPMENT OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES
The question of war and peace is one of the most acute questions in the affairs of
, man. In addition, it is becoming espec~ally important in present-day conditions as
a consequence of the enormous qualitat;.ve leap forward which has c~.curred in the
last decades in development of weaponry. Employment of this weaponry can wreak in-
calculable ca~.amity on the peoples of the entire world. "...The very nature of
modern weapons has become such," stressed CPSU Central Committee General Secretary
Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, cha.irman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Saviet, at
Che Sth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, lOth Convocation, "that if they were
~ unleashed, the future of all mankind would hang in the balance."1
The Leninist Communist Party, on the basis of a profound scientific analysis of the
i disposition of class forces in the world arena and developmental trends in interna-
tional relations, has reached the well-substantiated conclusion that it is possible
to prevent a world war in present-day conditions. Today the nations of the social-
ist community, other peace-seeking nations, the international worker class, and
all those who champion the cause of peace have great forces and resources at their
disposal.
But the objective possibility of preventing war cannot simply become a reality.
For the sake of peace it is necessary, as practical experience demonstrates, to
wage a persistent and vigorous struggle against warmongers of various ilk. The
CPSU, the brother Communist and worker parties, and all progressive mankind view
precisely this as their most important and urgent task.
Our party teaches that the Soviet people and their Armed Forces should not forget
for a single minute that the aggressive nature of imperialism has rem~~.ined un-
changed, and therefore it is necessary to display constant vigilance and to
appraise in a realistic manner the actions of reactionary circles ir_ the capitalist
countries, for whom, according to the blasphemous statements of their leaders,
there are things more important than peace.
i The effectiveness of scientific cognition of a potential war and theoretical sub-
~ stantiation of optimal modes of conducting such a war and preparing this country ~
~ and its Armed Forces for such a war is determined first and foremost by the nature
of the methodological principles applied by Sovie~ military science, which are
based on the firm foundation of Marxist-Leninist theory.
I
~
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Unity of scientific objectivity and Communist party-mindedness is a most important
principle of Marxism-Leninism, which military cadres of the socialist state take as
their guide. "The main thing in a Leninist approach to societal phenomena and
processes," stated the CPSU Central Committee Theses on the V. I. Lenin Birth
Ce~itennial, "is an organic unity of scientific objectivity and a high-principled
assessment of these phenomena and processes from the position of the worker class.
~'or M~:rxist-Leninists and for all genuine revolutionaries Leninism is a methodology
of revolutionary thini:ing and revolutionar.y action."2
Scientific objectivity presupposes cognition of the military-political situation and
occurring military processes such as they exist in reality, revealing the con-
flictive trends in their development, without allowing any elements of one-sidedness
and subjectivism. Communist party-mindedness demands disclosure of the class con-
tent of occurring phenomena, an appraisal of these phenomena from the position of
~ strengthening socialism and defending revolutionary achievements, and elaboration
of modes of military activity which would make it possible to accomplish these
tasks with the greatest degree of effectiveness.
At the same time Marxism-Leninism constitutes a general methodological foundation
of scientific foresight, which~makes it possible not only to understand the past
and present but also to predict the future.
V. I. Lenin noted that the teaching of K. Marx possesses significanae "not in the
sense of inere explanation of the past but also in the sense of fearless prediction ~~3
~ of the future and bold practical activities directed toward bringing it to pass....
We know that the foundeYS of Marxism-Leninism themselves displayed model examples of
scientific forecasting of societal events, including in the area of military af-
fairs. That great connoisseur of military affairs F. Engels, for example, foresaw
almost 30 years before the outbreak of World War I, basing his conclusions on a
profound analysis of trends in the development of capitalism and its root conflicts,
economics and weaponry,that in Europe today no other war is possible but a world
war. And it would be a world war of unprecedented magnitude and unprecedented
force... only one result is absolutely indisputable: general exhaustion and the
C~~gtion of conditions for the final victory of the worker class."4 The subsequerit
events of World War I fully confirmed his scientific predictions.
V. I. Lenin, leader of the proletarian revolution and founder of our party and the
Soviet State, trod the arena of history not only as the greatest political leader
and statesman but also as a gifted military leader, an outsta:~4~ng strategist,
with a brilliant understanding of matters pertaini~g to war and the army. r~roceed-
ing from the character and features of the new historical era, V. I. Lenin in-
novatively developed and substantially enriched the theses of Marxism on military
questions and created a teaching on defense of the socialist homeland. In his
works he made a most profound analysis of the fundamental laws, patterns and
features of wars of the era of imperialism, elaborated the principles of organiza-
tional development of the army of a socialist state, and laid down the foundations
of Soviet military science.
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The practical military activities of V. I. Lenin and his strategic leadership
during the period of the civil war and military intervention (1918-1920) still
remain today an inexhaustible source of experience in the area of the art of warf3re.
Leni~'s guidance of defense of the Soviet Republic constitutes an example of g~k~3.1-
ful combination of revolutionary theory and practice and innovative solving of
J complex problems raised by history for the first time. V. I. Lenin demonstrated
model examples of deep penetration into the essence of the developing situation at

~ the fronts and scientific prediction of the enemy's plans and the development of
events.
In October 1918, for example, V. I. Lenin exposed the plans of military ;ntervention
on the part of the Anglo-French imperialists. Vladimir 11'ich commented in one of
his speeches that the British and French imperialists, following their defeacs in
Siberia and at Arkhangel'sk, "are now directing their efforts toward attackin;
Russia from the south, either from the Dardanelles or from the Black Sea, or by
land across Bulgaria and Romania."5 Thls was indeed the case. A month later a
memorandum of the general staff of the high command of allied armies of the Eutente
specified the necessity of intervention in Southern Russia (the Ukraine-Donets)
simultaneously via Romania and the Black Sea.6
A special place in the arsenal of Marxism-Leninism is occupied by materialist
dialectics, which V. I. Lenin called "the soul of Marxism."
/Materialist dialectics teaches that different objects, phenomena and processes,
both in nature and in society, do not exist isolated, by themselves. They are
_ orggnically linked and are continuously interacting with one another and are in a
cc~nCinuous process of development./ "In order truly to know a sub~ect," wrote
V. I. Lenin, "it is necessary to encompass and thoroughly study all its aspects, all
its relationships and 'indirect elements' ['oposredstvovaniya'~. We shall never.
completely achieve this, but the demand of comprehensiveness ~rill caution us against
errors and against loss of sensitivity [omertveniyaJ."~ Military affairs are no
exception.
The scientific character of military theory and the results of practical activity
are determined first and foremost by the degree to which are cognized and taken in-
to consideration the entire diversity of links and relationships of war, the combat
capabilities of the branches and arms of service, the interaction of material
and spiritual factors, etc. It is essential thereby to elucidate first and foremost
external and internal important and unimportant linkages and relationships.
i
Such factors as a country's economic system, 1eve1 of development of science and
technology, etc, are external in relation to war. The relative strengths of the
belligerents, interactions of the branches and arms of service, plus other elements
- are internal linkages and relationships of war.
An understanding of the external factors which influence the character of a war, its
course and outcome is a most important prerequisite for a scientific analysis of the
' internal linkages and relationships of war, which determine victory and defeat as
well as the modes of conduct of military operations.
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Elucidation of the important linkages and relationships of war and military orga-
- nizational development enables one to determine the main element in the complex
chain of~events, by seizing which one can pull out the entire chain, that is, suc-
cessfully resolve the entire aggregate of practical problems which arise. Point-
ing to the importance of accomplishing this task, V. I. Lenin stated: "We must
firmly keep in mind that the fa~t that we always concentrated on the main, prin-
cipal thing was the source of the successes and miracles which we have achievPd in
military affairs... "8
At the same time Marxist-Leninist methodology proceeds from the position that the
future always follows from the present, which has its roots in the past. "Whatever
societal phenomena we examine in the process of its development," commented V. I.
Lenin, "it will always prove to contain vestiges of the past, foundations of the
present, and rudiments of the future... "9
The dialectical principle of development requires that one approach each phenomenon
from the standpoint of how and under what condttions it arose in the past, what it
is at the present ti;^e, and what it will become in the future.
The history of ~ars and the art of warfare persuasively attests to the fact that
changes in military affairs are dictated b,y changes which take place first and fore-
most in weapons and military equipment. "...Advances in technology," wrote F.
Engels, "if they became applicable and in fact were applied in military affairs, im-
mediately almost forcibly, and often against the will of military command
authorities they have produced changes and even revolutionary changes in the mode
of wa~ing combat...."10 As we know, radical trans~ormations took place in the
art of warfare as a result of tha appearance of gunpowder and ~irearms in the 13~h .
century. Large-scale changes in the military realm were produced by the develop-
ment of rifled-barrel weapons in the 19th century, and especially by the invention
of automatic weapons at the beginning.of the 20th century, and subsequently by the
development of weapons of offensive exploitation--tanks, airplanes, submarines and
other new military hardware. '
A profound revolution in the full meaning of:the word is taking place in rnilitary
affairs in our time in connection with the development of thermonuclear weapons,
rgpid advances in electronics, development of weapons based on new physical prin-
ciples, as well as in connection with extensive qualitative improvement of con-
ventiunal weapons. This in t~trn is influencing all other aspects of military af-
fairs, particularly the development ar.d improvement of forms ~nd modes of military
- operations, and consequently the organizational structure of ~he troops (forces)
and of the navy, and the improvement of weapons systems and control agencies.
Awareness of this dialectical process is especially important at the contemporary
stage when, on the basis of advances in science and technology, principal weapons
systems are virtually renewed every 10-12 years. In these conditions belated updat-
, ing of views and stagnation in development and implementation of new matters per-
taining to military organizational development are fraught with serious con�-
sequences. The following example can be cited as confirmation of the fact that any
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particular problem, taken separately, should be examined in a linkage with other
questions pertaining to military affairs.
In the period between World Wars I and II various viewpoints on the potential
character of a future war were expressed, and a persistent search was in progress
for. ways to escape from the so-called "impasse of static warfare" ["pozitsion4tbgo
tupika"] which hud developed during World War I as a consequence of superiarity of
~ defensive over off ensive weapons. We must state that bourgeois military theory,
' which at the time advanced a number of one-sided concepts J. Fu11Er's "tank
warfare" and Douhet's "air war" was unable due to its inertta correctly to
solve this pxoblem.
It was only Soviet military science, our sciantists and military command cadres
who in the prewar years, guided by Lenin's statement that "one must have the
ability to change thP methods of combat against the adversary when the circumstances
change," predicted in a well-substar.tiated manner the character of World War Il,the
forms and modes of its conduct. With a great lead over bourgeois military thinking,
our military science elaborated, on the basis of a profound analysis of development
trends in military affairs, a theory which was advanced for the times, the theory
of the operation in depth a fundamentally new mode of conduct of aggressive of-
fensive actions by technically-equipped mass armies.
In conformity with this, in 1932 the world's first large combined units [soyedine~iya)
of armored troops mechanized corps began to be formed in the Soviet Armed
Forces. By 1936 there were four of these, which later were reorganized into tank
- corps. Subsequently, however, for a number of reasons incorrect conclusions were
reached on the employment of tanks, conclusions grounded only on the limited
experience of combat operations in Spain. As a result, by 1939 the tank corps were
disbanded, and once again cavalry was specified as the exploitation echelon in opera-
tions. This situatien was subsequently corrected, and in 1942 not only tank corps
were established in the Soviet Army but tank armies as well, although it would have
been better to have had them before the war began.
Or take, for example, the question of development of the organizational structure
Of grmed forces. As we know. the armies of the majority of states up to the 16th
century consisCed primarily of regiments. Subsequently, as military affairs
~VClved, brigades began to be formed (17th century), and subsequently divisions as
well (18th century). The rapid development of weapons, military equipment and linea
~ of communication at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century, caused
by tha increased economic capabilities of many countries, inevitably led to a
substantial growth in the numerical strength of armed forces. And this in turn
had an immediate effect on the problem of control of large masses of troops in a
theater of military operations. For this reason ground forces were organizationally
divided into armies, with the objective of increasing efficisncy of control and
achieving full utilization of increased combat and mzneuver capabilities. Armies as
. ground troops operational formations [operativnyye ob"yedineniya] first appeared in
Russia just before the Patriotic War of 1812, and subsequently in other countries
as well: in France (1813), Prussia (1866), and Japan (1904-1905). ~
Subsequently, with an increase in the number of arciies in a single theater of mili-
tary operations, increase in the scale of combat tasks, and further increase in the
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scope, intensity and duration of military operations, there arose the necessity of
centralizing control of the even larger masses ~f troops participating in military
- operations. Therefore several armies began to be combined into fronts [fronty]. The
The idea of forming fronts appeared in Russia in 1900 and was confirmed by the ex-
,perience of the Russo-Japanese War. Fronts experienced development during Wotld
War I and particularly during World War II. ~
Increase in the numerical strength of countries' armed forces led in turn to an
- increase in the spatial scope of military operations. As a result there arose a
new form of military actions the operation [operatsiyaJ as an aggregate of
battles [boyev] and engagements [srazheniy], separated in time and space but ur?ified
by a common concept and directed toward accomplishing a particular war objective.
- A war now began to consist not of a series of battles and engagements but of an �
aggregate of operations and campaigns [kampaniy]. Of course the operation as a form
- of military actions did not develop instantaneou~ly. Its rudiments or certain
elements were present as early as the Patriotic War of 1812 and in the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870-1871. The most important engagements in the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904-1905 can, with certain reservations, quite definitely be called opera-
tions. Operations on the scale of the army, and subsequently the front as well,
however, did not take shape until World War I, and experienced their full develop-
ment in World War II.
We know that during the Great Patriotic War the front operation was the principal
_ form of military actions by our armed forces on an operational scale. The front
_ would advance in a zone averaging 200-300 kilometers in width and ranging from
100 to 300-400 kilometers in depth. Upon completion of a front operation a pause
would usually occur, and frequently a protracted period of preparations for the
next front operation. At the time this was justified and was in conformity with
_ the weapons and means of locomotion then available. .
In the course of the Great Patriotic War, however, especially in the second and
_ third periods of the war,the manpower and weapons of a single front frequently
_ proved insufficient to achieve large-scale military-political ob3ectives. In con-
nection with this it was necessary to combine the efforts of several two or
more fronts. There correspondingly arose the necessity of planning several
front operations executed simultaneously, unified by a common`concept and under the
unified control of the Supreme High Command [Verkhovnogo GlavnokomandovaniyaJ.
Thus a new form of military operations was born, which differed significantly from
- the front operation the operation of a group of fronts. A number of such
operations were prepared for and brilliantly executed during the Great Patriotic
War. They include the Stalingrad, Kursk, Belorussian, Iasi-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder,
Berlin, Manchurian and other operations, which have taken their rightful place in
the treasure house not only of Soviet but of world art of warfare. Operations of
a group of fronts experienced further development in the postwar period.
The dialectical-materialist principle of development has been graphically mani-
- fested in evolution of the forms of military operations in present-day conditions.
Today the command authorities of fronts can have at their disposal weapons (mis-
siles, missil~-armed aircraft, aircraft with a considerable combat radius, etc)
- the combat capabilities of which substantially exceed the framework of front
- operations. Troop mobility and maneuverability have sharply increased, the time
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_ required to concentrate battle groups has decreased, and the conditions a._d modes
of accomplishment of operational and strategic missions by combined units and forma-
tions of the various uniformed services have changed. And with the establishment
~ of strategic nuclear forces, the top-echelon military ~.~adership has acquired the
capability significantly to influence the achievement of strategic and militarj?-
political war aims and objectives. As a result, the previous forms of employment
of combined units and formations of the different armed services have in large
measure ceased to correspond to present-day conditions.
In connection with this one should evidently consider as the principal operation in
the war of today not the front but rather a larger-scale form of military opera-
tions the th~ater strategic operation [strategicheskuyu operatsiyu]. In the
course of such an operation each front (fleet) can conduct two or more front
operations in succession, with brief pauses and even without pauses.
All this convincingly reconfirms how important it is that all scientific investiga-
tions of the processes and phenomena of military affairs be performed on a solid
Marxist-Leninist methodnlogical foundation. Only under these conditions will they
produce an effective result. The party teaches us to free ourselves more boldly
from the prison of inertia and narrow parochial interests, more resolutely to over-
come sluggishness in our views, to note the emerging shoots of the new and
progressive in a timely manner, and at the same time not to become detached from
reality, to reach conclusions in a thoughtful manner, without undue haste, on the
basis of thorough, practical verification, for practical application is a criterion
o~ truth.
Profound knowledge and skilled, innovative application of the dialectic method
enabled Soviet military cadres to reveal in each concrete phenomenon of military
affairs the source of its development, to gain knowledge of the ~echanism of birth
of the new in the bosom of the old, evolutionary and revolutionary changes, as well
as to elucidate trends and foresee the direction of development.
/The basic idea of a dialectical interpretation of the development of society and,
consequently, the development of military affairs is expressed by the law of unity
and struggle of opposites./ It is the struggle of opposites, of contradictions
which constitutes the source, the motive force of development of the entire
diversity of phenomena of armed combat and war as a whole. V. I. Lenin empha~ized
that "in the true sense dialectics is the study of contradiction /in the very
e~sence of obj ects [it. ] . . . ."/11
It is a well-known fact how complex and contradictory armed combat is in its es-
sence. We are dealing here first and foremost with interrelationships and conflicts
between the opposing sides, their political and strategic aims; between offense ad dde~
between concentration of inen and weapons in limited areas in order to establish the
requisite superiority on the axes of advance and the capability to destroy them
with fires, and today nuclear fires as well; between armed forces need of modern
~ weapons and combat equipment and the economic capabilities of nations to produce
them, etc. ,
The experience of past wars persuasively attests to the fact that the development
of new offensive weapons has always inevitably led to the development of corresponding
~
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countermeasures, and ultimately to the development of new modes of fighting
battles, engagements, operations, and a war a whole. With the rapiu development
of tanks, aircraft, and submarines, for example, antitank, antiaircraft and anti-
eubmarine weapons appeared and experienced equally rapid development, along with
Corregponding methods of protection against these weapons and combat equipment,
and consequently forms and modes of military operations.
This also applies in full measure to nuclear missile weapons, the development and
rapid growth of which compelled military-scientific theory and practice to work
vigorously to develop means and methods of countering these weapons. The develop-
ment of ineans of protection against weapons of mass destruction in turn prompted
the improvement of offensive nuclear missile weapone. All this confirms the con-
clusion that the constant and continuous contest between means of attack and
means of defense and protection, that is, weapons and combat equipment, is one of
the leading sources of development of military affairs as a whole.
A dialectical contradiction is manifested particularly vividly today in such a
complex process as troop control [upravleniye voyskami]. At one time preparations
for military campaigns took years, while in World War II it took months to prepare
for front operations. In present-day conditions, where the potential adversary
- possesses weapons which make it possible to launch surprise attacks and execute
swift maneuver and redeployment of troops, only a few weeks or even a few days can
~ be allocated for preparation. Therefore in conditions of increasingly more highly-
dynamic combat operations and nontypicalness [netipichnost'] of combat situation,
greater flexibility and efficiency [operativnost'] of leadership are demanded of
commanders and staffs than ever before.
Flexibility and efficiency, stability and continuity of control in turn depend in
large measure on the degree of preparedness of commanders and staffs to exercise
skilled leadership of subordinate troops and forces, on the validity
[nbosnovannosti] of their operational-tactical calculations, the practicability
[Y~~1'nosti] of concepts and plans, and on their ability to respond flexibly to
situation changes. Combat readiness at all echelons of command and of the entire
command, control and communications system, which should be greater and more
_ mobile than the overall readiness of the troops (forces) [voysk (sil)] is today
assuming exceptional importance.
Speaking of troop (forces) control, we must direct attention to the steadily in-
- creasing role of staffs. Today staff functions have become more responsible and
multifaceted than ever before. It is quite understandable that the one-man com-
mander [komandir-yedinonachal'nikJ makes the decision and bears responsibility for
accomplishment of missions, but his staff is the principal organizing and linking
element in the entire great aggregate of command and control activities. All this
demands of the staff a high degree of teamwork, efficiency and knowledge.
In recent years automation of troop (forces) control has been increasingly more
extensively applied to the activities of command cadres and staffs. The prin-
cipal purpose of automation is to improve efficiency of command and control of
subordinate troops (forces), efficiency und eff ectiveness [effektivnost'] of
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employment of weapons and military equipment, and troop (forces) combat readiness
as a whole, as well as sharply to reduce expenditure of the time and resources of
commanders and staff officers on technical tasks. Successful employment of new
, management and control hardware in turn predetermi~s the necessity of raising the
! level of military-technical training of co~nanders and staff officers, scientifiC
organization of work, precise and reliable communications at all echelons of troop
control. Even at the very highest level of automation, however, the commander re-
mains the central figure, and his staff remains the principal agency in troop
(forces) control.
_ Thus investigation, discovery and resolution of contradictions and conflicts
[protivorechiy] in military realities are a most important condition for advances
in military theory, the task of which consists precisely in promptly spotting '
imminent contradictions, seeking the moat effective measures to resolve them,
and thus influencing the development of military affairs.
Materialist dialectics helps our military cadres reveal not only the source but
also the corresponding forms of development of a given phenomenon in the military
domain. /Soviet miZitary science determines the character and forms of development
of the Armed Forces, their modes of conduct of military operations and ways of
resolving other problems taking into account operation of the dialectical law of
transition from quantitative to qualitative changes./
This law states that development of all objects and phenomena of nature, society
and intellectual process [myshleniya] takes place by means of gradual accumulation
of quantitative changes and their transformation at a certain stage into radical,
qualitative changes.
For example, development of new weapons and military equipment, as already noted,
leac~s to corresponding transformation in the modes of conduct of military.opera-
tioris. But this by no means takes place immediately upon the appearance of new
; wea1~ons, but only when they begin to be employed in a quantity which inevitably
induces a new qualitative state of the phenomenon. As long as new weapons and com-
ba.t equipment are employed in limited quantity, most frequently they are merely
adapted to existing modes of combat or at best introduce only certain partial
; amendments [korrektivy].
y
; We know, for example, that tanks and airplanes appeared and began to be employed
~ during World War I. However, in connection with the fact Lhat they were few in
number and lacked technical perfection., this could not and in fact did not lead to
qualitative changes in the character of combat operations. Infantry, artillery and
' cavalry continued at that time performing the principal missions in battles, opera-
tions, and in the war as a whole. Subsequently, however, when mass production of
tanks and airplanes was started up and large tank and aviation combined units and
formations began to be established in the armed forces, the character of military
operations changed qualitatively.
And this was reflected in the theory of the operation in depth, which consisted es-
sentially in simultaneous suppression and neutralization [podavlenii] of the ad-
versary's defense to its entire depth by m~ans of artillery fire and airstrikes,
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in a determined attack an~~l penetration of the tactical zone of defenae by massing
personnel and weapons on selected axes [napravleniyakh] and in awift development
of tactical into operational success by committing to action powerful mobile
combined units of tanke, m~torized infantry, cavalry, and delivery of airborne
gas~ult forces. ~
In the course of the Great Patriotic War theory and practice of the operation in
depth, both as a whole and individual elementa, were being continuously improved
and developed. In particular, quantitative growth of air forcea made it poasible
substantially to expand the missions of aviation in offensive operations.
Aviation, ~uat ae artillery, transitioned from sporadic support to continuous
support of ground troops in the offense. Employment of aviation acquired the
form of the air offensive [aviataionnogo nastupleniya], which included preliminary
and immediate preparation for the assault phase [predvaritel'nuyu i
neposredstvennuyu podgotovku atakiJ and cloae support of infantr3? and tanks during
combat deep in the enemy's defensive positions.
In the postwar period the material-r_echnological foundation of Soviet aviation
made a large advance in its qualitative development. Piston-engine airpl'anes were
replaced by jet aircraft. Aviation units began to receive supersonic all-weather
aircraft equipped with diversified artillery, rocket-missile [raketno-] and bomb
armament, and capable of reliably hitting and destroying (porazhat'] various
ground and air targets at considerably greater depth than had been the case in the
past. In addition, helicopters have experienced rapid development'in recent
decades, and are capable of performing a wide range of missions in the battle and
operation: destroying various eaposed and sheltered enemy ground targets, including
tanks, delivering airborne assault forces, transporting troops, military equipment
and various supplies, performing radiological and engineer reconnaissance, laying
minefields, providing control and communications, plus others. ~
- The gradual accumulation of quantitative changes in these new and improved existing
weapons logically led to further development of existing and development of
_ qualitatively new forms and modes of conduct of combat operations.
Operation of the dialectical law of transition from quantitative to qualitative
changes was also manifested in full measure in the evolution of views on the em-
ployment of nucl~ar weapons. In the mid-1950's, for example, when nuclear weapons
existed in limited quantity, and aircraft were the principal mea~ns of delivering
them to the target, they were viewed only as a weapon capable of sharply increasing
_ the firepower of combat troops. An effort was made to adapt these weapons to
existing forms and modes of military operations, primarily strategic. In connection
_ with this, the principal role in accomplishing combat missions continued to be
played by the troops engaged in combat directly on the battlefield.
Subsequently the rapid quantitative growth of nuclear weapons of various yield and
their extensive adoption in all branches [vidy] of the U5SR Armed Forces and the
developmen~t of rockets, incluaing intercontinental, as a means of delivering
nuclear weapons to the target, led to a radical revision of the role of thess
weapons and an abrupt change in former views on the place and signif icance ~~f each
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military service in war ar~d on modes of conduct of the battle, operation, and a
; war as a whole.
~ Substantial quantitative changes on the basis of scientific and technological ad-
vancea also took place in the postwar period in the Ground Forces and Navy, which
1ed to profound qualitative changes in their state and condition [sostoyanii]. A8
a result of radical changes in armament, technical equipment, and organizational
structure of the branches of service, the combat arms [vidov Vooruzhennykh Sil,
rodov voysk) and special troops, their combat readiness and that of the Soviet Armed
Forces as a whole was brought to a higher level. Soviet art of warfare experienced
further development, in particular in the forms and modes of modern strategic =
military operations, which began to assume on the whole the character of combined
operations of the Armed Forces services and the combat arms.
It is quite natural that with the quantitative and qualitative changes which are
taking place in military affairs, preparation for and execution of complex modern
operations predetermine new content for the'sy~;:~m of all types of support, es-
~ pecially rear services and technical. The scale of such support is in no degree
_ comparable with the operations of the past war. Today requirements in materiel
have increased 10-fold and more. At the same time one must bear in mind that with
today's weapons, troops can sustain heavy losses in combat equipment and weapons
in the course of combat operations. This results in a manifold increase in volume
of repair and maintenance of combat equipment and weapons, as well as a change in
the charactpr of repair and maintenance act~,vities. And this in turn requires a
new, improved organization of technical support of modern operations. In these
; conditions the performance of the home front (tyla strany] acquires particular im-
i pvrtance, for the home front must more rapidly replenish losses of an enormous quan-
tity ot combat equipment an~l weapons, ~ithout whsch it is virtually impossible to
' maintain the war-fighting capability [boyespo~obnost'] of the Armed Forces at the
j requisite level.
i
_I Not only changes in the material and technological foundation of war exert a sub-
stantial influence on the development and improvement of military affairs. An
enormous influence on all aspects of military affairs is also exerted by qualitative
~ changes in army and navy personnel. The profound sociopolitical and spiritual
~ transformations in the life and affairs of the Soviet society and a high level of
_ Marxist-Leninist preparation and professional knowledge an the part of our military
cadres create favorable conditions for successful military-scientific cognition and
practical solving o~ the problems of development of military affairs.
i The dialectical law of transition of quantitative into qualitative changes demands
heightened attention to those changes which are taking place in the armament and
organizational structure of troops, in the quantitative ratios of new weapons and
military equipment adopted by the military, as well as prompt and timely determina-
tion of the qualitative prospects dictated by these quantitative changes. In
i present-day conditions only comprehensive jkompleksnyye; also "combined"]
_ theoretical and practical research makes it posaible to determine most correctly the
requisite ratios among the different Armed Forces services and arms, the requisite
correlations between the quantitative and qualitative indices of the various
weapons systems and military equipment, as well as armed forces groupings
[gruppirovok] in the theaters of military operations.
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/The chaYacteristic development trends in military affairs are revealed by Soviet
military science on the basis of the dialectical law of negation of the negation./
Characterizing the essence of this law, V. I. Lenin wrote that dialectical negation
is "not bare negatiion... but negation as an element of linkage,�as an element of
development, with retention of the Positive..."12
As experience indicates, the depth of negation can vary. In some cases elimination
of that which is outmoded, obsolete, impeding further progress is accomplished
while retaining the foundation of the existing. A graphic example of this is the
evolution of the organizational structure of troops. As we know, such organiza-
tionaL units as the regiment, division, and corps were born a long time ago and
have continued to exist up to the present day. Their structural content underwent
change and improvement over a protracted period of time, in relation to development
~ of weaponry, by means of negation of obsolete, outmoded elements of forms of or-
ganization in the interest of fuller and more effective,,efficient utilization of
the performance characteristics of new weapons and military equipment, while retain-
ing the fundamentals of the organizational structure proper. Today's motorized
rifle division, for example, while differing radically in its content and combat
capabilities from the division which existed at the time of the Great Patriotic
War, nevertheless has retained the general form of structure of the rifle division
of ttiat period.
In other instances negation is accomplished more profoundly and thoroughly. There
occurs departure from the very foundation of the existing and the formation of a
new quality on a fundamentally different basis, since no modifications of the old
foundation can produce the desired result. For example, smoothbore weapons ap-
peared in Europe in the 14th century and existed through the span of several cen-
- turies. The rapid development of industry and advances in science and technology
in rhe 19th century made it possible to produce r.ifled-barrel firearms. Possessing
etlp2tior performance characteristics, they almost totally supplanted smoothbore
wegpons, that is, negation of one type of weapon by another took place. During
World War II, however, and especially in the postwar period, a totally new kind of
weapon began to be provided to troops and naval forces on an ever increasing scale
smoothbore (rocket launchers, antitank guided missiles, and all other types of
rockets and missiles). Possessing excellent combat performance and mobility
characteristics, these weapons are already beginning to replace and even in certain
measure to eliminate rifled-bore weapons. In other words, we are obser~?ing opera-
tion of the law of materialist dialecti~s; we have here a dialectical chain of
negation, where one type of weapon is negated by another, although all positive
elements which were inherent in the old weapon are retained and are continuing to
imprnve.
An analogous situation is occurring in development of the branches of service and
combat arms. In the era of feudalism a cavalry of mounted knights, in which the
horsemen were protected by suits of armor, while their mounts were also covered by
protective metal armor, was consideredthe main striking power in t~e armies of the
European countries. With the invention of firearms when, to use the graphic ex-
pression of F. Engels, "bullets from burghers' guns pierced knights' suits of armor,"
this cavalry lost its striking power, and its negation took place. It was
replaced by cavalry freed of heavy protective gear which had lost its sig-
_ nificance. Cavalry became more mobile, highly maneuverable, wh.ile firearms enabled
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- cavalrymen to wage battle successfully not only mounted but dismounted as well.
- Such cavalry was widely used in this country in World War I and especially during
the civil war, for off ensive exploitation, �or mounting counterthrusts in the
_ defense, as well as actions behind enemy lines and disrupting the enemy's lines of
Coit~unication.
- With the development of rapid-fire automatic weapons, however, and in connection
with the rapid development of aircraft and tanks, the role of the cavalry began
to diminish sharply, and during World War II it could not longer utilize its combat
characteristics with the past success. The cavalry had exhausted its potential as
a combat arm. It is therefore quite logical that it was supplanted by a new combat
arm armored and mechanized troops, which possess a qualitatively different tech-
nical foundation and incomparably greater firepower, striking power, and mobility.
In other words, what took place was negation with replacement of the very founda-
tion of the existing. Of course the process of negation does not end with this,
however. As we know, at the present time diversified means of combating tanks, in-
cluding air weapons, are experiencing rapid development. They have already
achieved a quantitative and qualitative state which imp~ratively demands a
ca;reful study of the trends in and consequences of their development. And it is
dangerous to ignore this trend.
Operation of the law of negation of the ne~;ation can also be clearly traced in the
example of the navy, which evolved from oar -powered to sail-powered vessels, from
sail to steam power, diesel power and, finally, to modern nuclear-powered guided
- missile warshipe.
An analysis of development of the art of warfare in the postwar period also
enables one to identify a number of general characteriatic patterns, among which
- are the following.
First, the scientific and technological revolution, which imposes heightened
demands on the qualitative characteristics of military equipment and weapons and on
the search for new modes and forms of conduct of combat operations, is exerting
increasing influence on the evolution of military affairs.
Second, there is taking place an acceleration in the pace of development of
military equipment and weapons, with a shortening of the time intervals between
qualitative leaps forwaid in the development of various areas of military affairs,
which in turn is affecting the pace of development of military affairs as 3 whole.
Third, there is taking place an increase in the importance of strategic
weapons, which are today capable of exerting direct influence on the course and
outcome of a war, and consequently the importance of operational-strategic command
and control agencies [organov upravleniya] is also increasing.
Fourth, troop control processes are becoming more complex, which requires a
fundamentally new approach to the organization of structurally precise control
systems and providing them with the requisite modern control hardware [tekhnika
upravleniya].
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- And finally, the air domain [vozdushnaya sfera], which gives modern opera-
tions a three-dimensional character and depth, is assuming an ever increasing role
in combat actions. and operations.
2'hUS development of military affairs takes place in strict conformity with the
demands of the objective laws of materialist dialectics. /In connection with thie
it is extremely important that our military cadres thoroughly master Marxist-Lenin-
- ist methodology and on this basis be able comprehensively to analyze the develop-
ment of military affairs in the past, in the present and, most important be
_ able to see and understand the futurc prospects of military affairs./ One should
bear in mind thereby that the development of each phenomenon of military affairs
takes place not in an isolated manner and is determined by the operation not of
some one law of dialectics. but as a rule by the entire aQQreQate of laws. for
eactl law exerts its own specific characteristic. Therefore each
process in the military area must be examined in an interrelationship as a link
in tt~e overall chain of forward development of military affairs as a whole.
We know, for example, t:1at bourgeois military-political circles, of fascist Gerinany
in particular, when making preparation.s for World War II, counted princip~lly on
the element of blitzkrieg. In contrast to this, Soviet military science, innovative-
ly applying Marxist-Leninist metliodology in elaboration of questions pertaining to
defense of the socialist homeland under new conditions, in the 1930's reached the
valid conclusion that a future war which the imperialists might unleash against the
USSR would be of a protracted nature and would demand maximum exertion of all .the
nation's material and spiritual resources, that aggressive and highly-mobile forms
of combat would predominate in such a war, and military operations would take
place over vast expanses of territory. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union
against fascist Germany fully confirmed the correctness of this conclusion. A
correct answer to the question of the potential character of this war enabled the
Communist Party and Soviet Government to determine in a prompt and timely manner the
appropriate directions of organizational development of our Armed Forces, prepara-
tion of the Armed Forces and the na.tion as a whol~ for the future war against the
forces of imperialism, and to lay down the foundations of our great victory.
In the 1970's, as a result of the consistent and unswerving struggle by the Soviet
Union to implement the Peace Program advanced at the 24th and further developed
at the 25th CPSU Congress and the coordinated foreign policy activity of the
brother nations of the socialist community, Lhrough enormous efforts on the part
of all progressive mankind success was achieved in channeling the development of
international relations toward d~teate and peaceful co~peration between countries
with differing social systems. A tragic cycle a world war ~ollowed by a brief
respite of peace followed by another world war was brok~n precisely in those
years.
The absence of a fatal inevitability of war, however, by no means sigr.ifies
elimination of the possibility of a war or_curring in the contemporary era, the
- principal conflict of which is the conflict between socialism and capitalism.
"'ihe trans~~~~~ from capitalism to communism," wrote V. I. Lenin in 1918, "is an
entire historical era. Until it ends, the exploiters will inevitably retain a
hope of restoration, and this /hope [it.]/ is transformed into /attempts [it.]/at
- restoration."13
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Tl~is has once again been quite clearly confirmed at the beginning of the 1980's,
wt~e~i imperialist circles in the United States and certain other NAT~J countries
have sharply complicated international affairs with their reckless, militant policy,
and today are continuing to push peoples toward a world thermonuclear catastrophe.
The spearhead of the aggressive course of policy on the part of imperialism and .
its accomplices has been and continues to be aimed chiefly against the Soviet Union
and the brother socialist nations.
Under these condxtions the CPSU, following Lenin's teaching on defense of the
socialist homeland, is continuously and purposefully working to strengthen the
defense might of the USSR and to achieve further development of the Soviet Armed
Forces. It proceeds thereby from a scientific analysis of the potential character
of a war which imperialism, contrary to common sense, may force upon our nation.
/In present-day conditions a war, if the aggressive forces of imperialism succeed
in unleashing a war against the USSR and the other nations of the socialist com- .
_ munity, will become a decisive armed conflict between two diametrically
apposed social systems capital.ism and socialism./ In
order to carry out their aggressive schemes, the imperialist nations have es-
tablished in peacetime and are continuing to establish and strengthen a system of
military blocs, particularly NATO. Therefore if it does come to war, it will
assume a coalition character from the very outser and will pursue decisive political
and strategic aims. On the part of the USSR an3 the brother socialist countries
it will be a war in defense of the socialist homeland, the freedom and independence
of thei,r peoples, and therefore it will be a profoundly just war. On the part of the
forces of imperialism and reaction, a war started by them, as a continuation of
their aggressive policy aimed at the elimination of socialism and enalavement of
the peoples of the nations of the socialist community, will be of an unjust,
predatory character to the highest degree.
ln discussing the scale and scope of contemporary wars, we should emphasize that a
dialectical trend can also be seen here, which can be fairly clearly traced in his-
torical facts.

~ The Russo-Japanese War is considered to be the first major war of the era of im-
perialism. This was an imperialist, unjust war on both sides. It was fought in
a limited area of the Liaodong and Siiandong peninsulas, the Yellow Sea and the Sea
of Japan by two nations. By war's eiid the total number of participating troops
amounted to approximately 1.5 millio~i men. The war lasted more than a year and 'a
lialf .
- World War I, which began among eight European nations (Germany and Austro-Hungary,
and their adversaries Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia, and
- hlontenegro), gradually involved 38 countries. In the course of the war approximate-
ly 70 million men were mobilized into the armies of the belligerent nations. The
war lasted more than four years.
A total of 61 countries and more tha~i 80 percent of the Earth's population were
_ drawn into World War II, the largest war in history, prepared for and initiated by
the forces of international reaction. Military operations were conducted on the
territory of Europe, Asia, and Africa (40 countries),and on the vast expanses of
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the Atlantic, Arctic, Pacific, and Ir.~iian oceans. In the course of the war more
than 110 million men were called into the armed forces of the belligerent nations.
The war ~asted 6 years.l4
~s we know, in the war of today [v sovremennoy voyneJ imperialist circles are
counting primarily on nuclear missile weapons in their various modifications, ~n-
cluding neutron weapons. Employment of modern weapons can result in military
operations encompassing all continents of the world from the very outset. Many
hundreds of millions of people will inescapably be drawn into the the maelstrom of
such a war, initiated by imperialism. It cannot be compared with any wars of the
past in its fierceness, scale of human casualties and possible physical destruction.
As we know, the Sovie*_ Union possesses nuclear missile weapons in its arsenal.
But it threatens nobody with these weapons and does not seek to employ nuclear
blackmail. On the contrary, since the very inception of nuclear weapons it has
been the USSR which has waged and continues to wage a persistent campaign for
reduction and total elimination of nuclear arms. "...We are against the employment
of nuclear weapons," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has stated repeatedly, "but ext:er?e
circumstances [chrezvychaynyye obstoyatel'stva] and aggression against our country
or its allies by another [drugoy] nuclear power and could [mogut] force us to resort
- to this extreme means of self-defense. The Soviet Union is doing and wi11 continue
to do everything it can to prevent a nuclear c~ar, so that peoples do not become
victims of nuclear attacks neither. the first strike nor subsequent strikes."15
At the same time the Communist parties and governments of the USSR and the other
nations of the socialist community are closely watching development of the interna-
= tional situation and the intrigues of world imperialism and are taking all neces-+
ary measures to strengthen th~ir defense and to ensure that any aggression is
reliably repulsed.
The Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole presently possess an
adequate defense potential to defend their interests against encroachments by,im-
perialism. A unity of political and economic goals, integration of economies, co-
ordination [soglasovannost'] of foreign policy and measures in military organizational
development, the moral-political unity and frat�ernal alliance of the peoples of our
countries, the guiding and directing activity of the Communist parties all this,
blended together, comprises an enormous force which enables us r'eliably to withstand
any aggression.
In connection with the substantial changes which are taking place in weaponry and
in modes of preparing for and conducting combat operations, naturally many of the
fundamental theses which guide our military cadres in the practical business of
operational, combat and political training of troops and naval forces are being
further refiiied on a systematic basis. In other words, the organizational structure
of troops and control agencies is being continuously~improved and ~ilitary-
- theoretical thought ~s being continuously developed on the basis of chan.ges in the
material and technological foundation of the Soviet Armed Forces and its further
development prospects; training of military cadres and field, air and sea training
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of Army, Air Force and Navy personnel. are org~nized and constructed taking this
into account.
/Development of our Armed Forces is being carled out in a planned and orderly manner
[plaromernoye] in order to ensure reliable national defense, prompt and expeditious
repulsing of an aggressor./ Special attention is devoted thereby to tho.se forces
and weapons jsily i sredstva] which ensure the combat power of the army and navy to
the greatest degree.
The chief component of this power in present-day conditions arethe strategic
_ nuclear forces, which serve as the principal factor restraining the aggressor and
which possess the capability, in case the aggressor initiates against the Soviet
Union and the other nations of the socialist community a war with the employment of
nuclear weapons, of immediately deli�vering a crushing response strike. Firing of
land-based and sea-launched ballistic missiles is automated. Their performance
characteristics provide the capability to strike enemy targets situated in virtually
- any part of the world and with a sufficiently high degree of accuracy.
The Ground Forces the most numerous and esse~itially the principal [osnovnoy]
branch of our Armed Forces are con5tantly being iffiproved. Toc~.ay their firepower
is comprised of tactical and operational-tactical rocket-artillery weapons, which
3re capable of hitting and destroying targeCs at distances of from tens to hundreds
of kilometers. Today there is no infantry in the ol.d definition of the term in the
USSR Armed Forces. Inf~ntry is fully motorized and protected by armor. In today's
motorized rifle division the ~ai~~o throw weight and total engine horsepower are tens
of times greater than those at the time of the Great Patriotiic War. A division has
hundreds of tanks, hundreds of infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel
carriers, and a Iarge number of trucks. Modern tanks are capable of hitting virtually
with the first round moving armored~targets at ranges of several kilometers.
Airbarne troops have.experienced further development. All this ensures the conduct
of r.,peraticn~ snd battles with a rapid rate of advance and rapid deep exploitation.
The Air Forces, as a highly-mobile branch of the Armed Forces, are equipped with
supersonic aircraft with automated weapon ~nd flight control systems, with powerful
propulsion units, and are armed with diversified rocket and bomb armament. The
principal frontal aviation [frontovoy aviatsii] combined unit is the division, ~ahich
contains approximately the same number of combat aircraft as was contained in the
aviation corps during the ~reat Patriotic War.
- The Air Defense Forces [voyskakh PVO] are equipped with sophisticated means of
warning of a missile attack, multichannel surface-to-air missile systems with a.
high degree of resistance to jamming and effectiveness in hitting air targets with-
in a broad range of altitudes, as well as first-class air intercept systems .
[aviatsionnyye kompleksy perekhvata] and radiotechnical [radiotekhnicheskiye; radar-
and other electronics] systems.
The Naval Forces have been developing particularly rapidly in the postwar period.
Today nuclear-powered submarines carrying a diversified arsenal of missile and
torpedo weapons, as wel'1 as missile-armed naval a.viation comprise the foundation
of the combat power of the Naval I'orces. Modern surface units and submarines carry
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powerful armament, possess incomparably greater speed capabilities than in the past,
and possess greater endurance (avtonomnost`yu plavaniya] several months. Capabil-
iCics to put amphibiou~ assault forces ashore have also increased greatly.
'The character and features of today's nuclear missile �aar impose heightened demanda ~
on the combat, moral-political and psychological training of army and navy peYsorinel. ,
The basic principle of this training h.:.s remained and continues to remain unchanged.
To learn that which.is necessary in war, to learn to defeat a powerful, technically-
equipped adversary in any and all conditions of modern war. Thorough knowledge and
consummate mastery of weapons and combat equipment, excellent intellectual quali-
ties, firm ideological-political conditioning, deep conviction of the rightness of :
the party's cause, and the ability to withstand unprecedented moral and physical ~
stresses, to retain the will to achieve victory over the enemy in any and all con-
ditions have assumed increased significance today. These qualities are developed
in servicemen in the course of intensive peacetime combat and political training,
on the basis of Lenin's demands that "intensified military training for a serious l
~ war requires not the burst of enthusiasm, not the shout of encouragement, not the ~
fighting slogan, but protracted, intense, highly persistent and disciplined work
on a mass scale."16
Training of officer cadres is a most important factor in boosting the level of army
and navy combat readiness. Tne Soviet officer is first and foremost a patriot of
the homeland, who is deeply convinced of the correctness of the ideas of communism,
a highly skilled and qualified military specialist, and leader of a military col-
lective [voinskogo kollektiva]. A statement ma.de by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev from
the speaker's stand at the 26th CPSU Congress, on the necessity of each and every
~ leader developing "a work style in which efficiency and follow-through
(ispolnitel'nost'], discipline, bold initiative and enterprise are organically com-
bined, in which practicality and businesslike efficiency [delovitost'] are or-
ganically combined with a striving toward large goals,"l~app]ies in full measure to
our military cadres. At the same time the specific features of military service
also impose on officer cadres many additional' specific demands, the principal
demands among.which are the following: commander volition and organizing ability,
a high level of professional proficiency, general and military-technical know-
ledge [kul'tura], the ability to t~ach and indoctrinate subordinates, plus
others. Only if he possesses all these qualities wi11 each officer be able to
ensure a high level of combat and mobilization readiness of the troops (forces)
, under his command.
Tow~ird tliese ends an entire aggregate of activities are conducted each year in the
Armcd I'orces, at which commanders, staff officers and political agency officers,
in complex conditions approximating actual combat, learn to organize and eonduct
modern operations and battles, as well as troop control.
A special place in organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces is oc-
~;ipied l~y party-political work, which encompasses literally all areas of military
liie ar.d activities. V. I. Lenin attached exceptional importattce to party-political
work. He considered it to be an integral part of general party work and demanded
~ that it be conducted steadfastly, without relaxing effort for a single day. Every-
one is familiar with his statement that "wherever party policy is implemented most
xigorously... wherever discipline is most firm, where~~2r political work in the
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troops is conducted most conscientiously... there will be no slackness in the army,
there will better smartness and spirit, and there will be more victories."18
A central position in party-political work is ~ccupied by ideological work,
ideological-political indoctrination of personnel, the forming of a Marxist-Lettiniat
philosophical outlook and profound Communist conviction in personnel. Strengthening
of military discipline as one of the most important components of the combat readi-
ness of units and combined uni.ts is a focal point of daily concern on the part of
political agencies and party organizations.
,
Matters pertaining to strengthening the nation's defense capability, further
- development and comprehensive improvement of the armed forces continuously occupy
the center of attention on the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government and are
handled through the joint efforts of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the ministries
o~ the defense branches of industry, many scientific establishments, party and
soviet agencies of the republics, krays and oblasts, all branches of service and the
combat arms.
FOOTNOTES
_ l. PRAVDA, 24 June 1981.
2. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK"
[The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central
Committee Plenums], Moscow, 1972, Vol 10, page 145.
3. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 26, page 75.
4. K. Marks and F. Engel's, "Soch." [Writings], Vol 21, page 361.
S. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 37, page 118.
6. 5ee "Iz istorii grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR" [From the History of the Civil War
in the USSR], Moscow, 1960, Vol 1, page 58.
7. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 42, page 290.
8, Ibid., Vol 40, pp 284-285.
9. Ibid., Vol 1, page 181.
10. Marks and Engel's, op. cit., Vol 20, page 176.
.11. L~nin, op. cit., Vol 29, page 227.
12. I1>id., Vol 29, page 207.
13. Ibtd., Vol 37, page 264.
14. See "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Mos-
cow, 1978, Vol 6, page 265; Moscow, 1976, Vol 2, pp 409, 417.
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15. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom: rectii, privetstviya, stat'i,
vospominaniya" [Following a Leninist Course: Speeches, Messages of Greeting,
Articles, Reminiscences], Moscow, 1979, Vol 7, page 300.
15. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 36, page 325.
17. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], page 51.
18. Lenin, op. cir., 401 39, page 56.
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Ctiapter Three. DEFENSE OF THE SOCIALIST HOMELAND THE CONCERN
OF ALL THE PEOPLE
Defense of the socialist homeland is an objective historical necessity and a most
important condition of building communism. "...Having comnenced our peacetime con-
struction," stated V. I. Lenin, "we shall make every effort to ensure that it con-
tinues without interruption. At the same time, comrades, be alert: guard the
~ defense capability of our country and our Red Army as the apple of your eye...."1
History has fully confirmed the correctness of the precepts of our great leader.
The ideas of defense of the socialist homeland elaborated by V. I. Lenin form the
basis of Soviet military doctrine.
As we know, /military doctrine is def ined as the system of views adopted in a given
country for a given (specific) time, on the objectives and character of a potential
future war, on preparation of the country and its armed forces for such a war, and
on the modes of its conduct./ The military doctrine of any nation answers the
following fundamental questions: what is the degree of probability of a future war,ard
with what adversary will one be dealing? What character may be assumed by a war
which a country and its armed forces would be fighting [predstoit vesti]? What
goals and tasks can be assigned to the armed forces in anticipation [predvidenii]
of such a war and what armed forces must the country possess in order to achieve
the stated goals? Proceeding from this, how should one accomplish military organi-
zational development and prepare the army and country for war? Finally, if a war
breaks out, by what modes and methods [sposobami] should it be fought?
As is evident from the above, a nation's military doctrine contains two closely
interlinked and interdependent aspects the sociopolitical, and the military-
technical aspect. The sociopolitical aspect encompasses questions pertaining to
� the methodological, economic, social and legal foundations of the political ob--
jectives of a war. It is determining and possesses the greatest stability, since
it reflects the class essence and political goals of a given nation, which are
relati-~ely constant during an extended period of time. The military-technicaT
aspect, in conformity with the political goals, includes questions pertaining to
direct accomplishment of military organizational development, technical equipping
and training of ~he armed forces, and determination of the forms and modes of
donduct of operations and a war as a whole. The political and military-technical
views expressed in military doctrines are not permanent. As the international
situation changes and as society and military affairs evolve, they are periodic~lly
refined.
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Mil.i.t~ry doctrine is a historical category. Originally it was formed empirically,
~~~~t un "~i~~ basiti uf ~i proCound analysis of the objective laws of war. In the ~
cu~~r.se ol rhe socioeconomic development of society and military affairs, especially
wittt the appearance of mass regular armies, individual theses and principles of
preparing a country and its army for war and the modes of its conduct began to be
elaborated and classified, taking amassed combat experience into account. One must
note thereby that bourgeois military thought, correctly noticing the general trends
in development of military affairs, at the same time in most cases is unable deeply
- to reveal and comprehend the ob~ective laws of war, let alone consider their
influence on the conduct of war.
In World War~I, for example, Germany, grossly ignoring the objective laws of war,
set as its objective divieion of the world by force and.the seizure of colonies,~
clearly failing to take into consideration that country's actual military-economic ~
capabilities. The military doctrine of czaris.t Russia of that period was also ex-
_ pansionistic and of a contradictory character: military tasks were to be accom-
plished by numerically large armed forces, but with an inadequate quantity of
weapons and a poor level~of arms technology.
Prior to World War II.Hitlerite Germany was openly pursuing an extremely reactionary
policy aimed at gaining world domination, which was expressed in Germany's military
doctrine, which specified the surprise attack, "blitzk.rieg" conduct of military
operations, seizure of vast territories of other countries, their natural and other
resources, and mass annihilation of the civilian population. The hostility to the
people and adventurism contained in this doctrine, overestima.tion of Germany's
own military-economic capabilities and underestimation of the political, economic
and military capabilities of its adversaries, the Soviet Union in particular, \
ultimately brought fascism to defeat.
- As we know, the military doctrines of the United States, Great Britain and France
in World War II, reflecting the interests of the ruling classes, pursued a principal
goal of defeating their economic adversaries ~ermany and Japan of weakening "
to the greatest possible degree their anti-Hitler caalition ally the Soviet
Union and thus seeuring for themselves a position of world domination. In con-
formity with these views, the strategic plans of these countries were ambivalent
and conflictive throughout the entire war.
After World War II the milit~ry doctrines of the leading capitalist nations, the
United States in particular, underwent a number of specific changes, i.n relation
to the correlation of forces in the world arena. All of them, however, inalterably
were and continue to be of a clearly-marked aggressive nature, reflecting the
reactionary political'.aims of ~nperialism. Containing an anti-Soviet, anti-
democratic thrust, the military doctrines of the United States and the other NATO
countries specify achieving at all costs military-strategic superiority over the ~
Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist community, dictating their will
OI1 the peoples of the world from a position of strength and ruling their destiny as
the United States and the NATO countries see fit.
\
Thus there is expressed in the military doctrines of the capitalist nations a
- desirP to perpetuate the rule of the exploiter classes within their countries, to
destroy or maximally, weaken the world socialist system, and economically and politi-
~ cally to enslave other nations.
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/Sov.iet military doctrine/ is a system of guiding principles and scientifically
s4bstantiated views of the CPSU and tha Soviet Government on the essence,
character and modes of fighting a war which may be forced by the imperialists on
the Soviet Union, as well as on military organizational development, training and
preparing the Armed Forces and the nation to crush the aggressor.
'Che ideological-theoretical foundation of Soviet military doctrine is Marxism-
Leninism. Its content proceeds from the objective necessity of defending the so-
cialist homeland against imperialist aggressors. Soviet military doctrine is
grounded on the laws and theses of historical and diale~tical materialism, Marxist-
Leninist teaching on war and the army, and the conclusions of Soviet military sci-
ence.
- Tl~e military doctrine of the USSR and the other nations of the socialist community
_ is grounded on progressive, just ideas of defense of the socialist achievements of
the workers, peace and security of peoples.
Proceeding from this, one can easily see that the directional thrust of the
doctrines of countries of opposing sociopolitical systems is fundamentally different
cind is always of a class character.
/'~he sociopolitical content of Soviet military doctrine/ is grounded on Marxist-
l,eninist teaching and proceeds from the character of the governmental and societal
:~ystem of the USSR, the policy of the party and Soviet state, and the root in-
~erests of the Soviet people. Also proceeding from this are the fundamental prin-
ciples of military organizational development in the USSR, which is carried out in
~~trict conformity with CPSU policy in the military area, taking into account
development of this country's economic, scientific, and moral-political potential,
the cultural level and national traditions of the Soviet people. It is precisely
this which in the final analysis always has determined and continues to determine
the character of the Soviet Armed Forces, their power and invincibility.
The sociopolitical content of our military doctrine fully takes into account the
radical changes in the correlation of forces in the international arena, the so-
- ciopolitical, economic and military capabilities of the countries of the socialist
community, and the necessity of collective defense of these countries from Foten-
~ial aggressive aspirations on the p~irt of the forces of imperialism and reaction.
l.t includes points which reveal the sociopolitical essence of the contemporary war
wiiich ~he aggressor may force upon us, and it is expressed extremely clearly and
~~reciscly by the fullowing statement by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev: "...We do not
~:~ek military superiority. It has never been and is not now our intention to
c.hreaten any other country or group of countries. Our strategic doctrine has a
E~:~rticularly defensive directional ttirust."2
~cientifically substantiated theses on the moral-political and psychological
~~reparation of Soviet citizens constitute a most important component part of the
:;ocio~>olitical content of the military doctrine of the Soviet State. Our military
~lor_tr.ine views the forming of a high moral-political potential in the Soviet
~~eople, alongside the advantages of the economic and political system of the so-
ciety oF developed socialism, as one of the life-giving sources of its superiority
uver the forces of aggression.
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/'rfie military-technical content of Soviet military doctrine/ encompasses a broad
range of questions pertaining to organizational development, training and main-
taining the Soviet Armed Forces at a high degree of combat readinesv. It in-
cludes questions pertaining ~o improving and perfecting their technical equipment,
or~gnizational striicture, and control system; improving the field, air and sea
proficiency of troops, air and naval forces taking into account the character ~nd
_ specific features of the war of today; further development of Soviet art of war-~
fare [voyennogo iskusstva]. In other words, this aspect of doctrine defines the
ways, cneans and methods of accomplisY~ing tasks pertaining to reliable defense of
the socialist homeland, tasks assigned to the Armed Forces by this country's politi-
cal leaders.
One of the main directions in increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces
is a high level of their technical equipment, that is, furnishing the troops and
~ naval forces with modern military equipment and weapons. The presently achieved
level of development of the socialist economy enables us successfully to accomplish
the most technically complex defense tasks and to design and build [sozdat'] in
short order any weapon [vid oruzhiya] on which the enemies of peace would seek~to
place titeir hopes [sdelat' stavku].
A most important point of the military-technical content of Soviet military doctrine,
dictated by ttie rapid development of nuclear missile weapons and the possibility of
a surprise attack by the enemy employing these weapons,is the demand that the USSR
Armed Forces be maintained at a high state of combat readiness, ensuring their
prompt and expeditious deployment in order to repulse an enemy sneak attack, tc
deliver powerful response strikes on the enemy, and to achieve successful accom-
plishment of the assigned missions pertaining to defense of the socialist homel~and.
The point is to be able not simply to defend oneself, to oppose the aggressor with
appropriate passive means and methods of defense but also to deliver devastating
response strikes on the aggressor and to defeat the enemy in any situation condi-
tions.
Thus the content of Soviet military doctrine :n its most general form reduces to
the following: predatory wars are alien to the Soviet Union as a socialist state;
it never has attacked and is not now planning to attack any nation, either in the
West or in the East, in the North or South to establish its own dominion or to
change the existing societal system in other countries. 1Vor does the Soviet Union
have any need to extend its borders. But it will defend with full resolve,
vigorously and uncompromisingly that which belongs to the Soviet people and has
been created by their labor. For this reason the peace-loving character of the
Eorei~;n policy of the Soviet State and its constant readiness resolutely to repulse
any aggressor are coalesced in the military doctrine of the USSF.
As w~ know, it is inadvisable [netselesoobrazno; also inexpedient] to maintain in
pe~icetime Armed rorces which are fully deployed in the strength required in case
oC war. No nation is economically capable of doing this, nor is there any
particular need to do so. Therefore in this country, in conditions of peacetime
development [mirnogo stroitel'stva], just as in other countries, a certain portion
of the ~rmed Forces is in a continuous state of readiness, that is, is at full
strength in personnel and military equipment, while another portion is ready for
ra~i~i mobilization deployment. Hence /a high degree of combat readiness of troops
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:~ii~ iuiv:il Corc~s is inconceivable without well organized mobilization preparation,/
directed toward ensuring prompt and timely shifting of military forces from a
peacetime to a war footing. If an aggressor initiates war, the trained and
prepared personnel and equipment resources assigned to the various combined units
and units should reach them quickly and without delay. Therefore the task of
achieving continuous preparedness for the immediate mobilization deployment of
troops and naval forces, prompt and expeditious shifting of the Armed Forces and
the entire national economy from a peacetime to a war footing [voyennoye polozheniye]
is assuming particular national importance.
In most countries mobilization as a system began to be employed with the establish-
ment of mass ar,nies at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century, as a
_ rule on the basis of universal compulsory military service. The wars of the
beginning of the 20th centu.ry introduced substantial changes into matters pertaining
_ to mobilization, especially w'arld War I, which required the inflow of enormous man-
power resources into the armies of the belligerent nations as well as great exertion
on the part of a country's economy. Railroads, communications, shipyards and steam-
ship companies, the financial system, the achievements of science and techbnology
had to be placed in the service of the war effor.t. In other words, there was a
sfiarp increase in the dependence of direct military capabilities on a country's
econa~-~y.
The beginning and the course of World War II brought additional changes into the
concept of mobilization and revealed to an even greater degree the direct link
between carrying out mobilization and deployment of armed forces and shifting the
entire economy over to a war footing and reorganizing nations' political, social,
scientific, and other institutions. The greater part of the economy and a nation's
resources was enlisted to provide for the direct needs of the war effort. Suffice
it to cite the following example. In the last war approximately 90 percent of the
material requirements of the armed forces of the belligerent nations was met with
goods produced after the war began, as a result of mobilization of the economy. Thus,
reducing the time required to accomplish mobilization and ensuring an orderly
- changeover of the economy to a war footing became most important problems.
As we know, in previous wars the question of mobilization deployment was not so
acute. The weapons at nations' dispos~l and the comparatively low degree of troop
- mobility and maneuverability, even in the case of a sneak attack, essentially could
not thwart an army's mobilization deployment [mobilizatsionnoye razvertyvaniye],
let alone predetermine the course and outcome of a war.
The situation has become sharply altered in present-day conditions. The element of
surprise [vnezapnosti] already played a certain role in World War II. Today it is
becoming a factor of the greatest strategic importance. The question of prompt
_ and expeditious shifting of the Armed Forces and the entire national economy to a
war footing and their mobilization deployment in a short period of time ij much more
critical today. Therefore capability to furnish the troops and naval forces with
rrained and prepared resources of personnel and equipment and prompt changeover of
~1~~ ~conomy to the productiun of goods according to a wartime plan predetermine
tlie necessity of precisely planned measures in peacetime and coordinated actions on
Lt~e part of party, soviet and military agencies locally. The success of organized
entry by the Armed Forces into a war and defeat of the aggressor will depencl in
large measure on full and high-quality execution of a11 these measures.
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_ In tt~e i;~terests of increasing the nation's defense capability, coordination
l~~tween mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces and the national economy as a
wliole is required today as never before, especially in utilization of manpower
resources, transportation, communications, the power industry, and in ensuring
the stability and survivability of the nation's entire vast economic mechanism.
Essential in connection with this is a constant search in the area of improving tlie
system of co-production among enterprises producing the principal types of weapons,
making them more self-reliant [avtonomnosti] in energy and water supply, securement
of requisite stockpiles, and establishment of a reserve supply of equipment and
materials in case of war. Further improvement is also needed within the system of
- mobilization readiness of the national economy, proceeding from the position that
a close interlinkage between the mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces, the
national economy and Civil Defense is a most i.mportant condition for maintaining
~ at th~e proper level ~ur country's defense capability as a whole.
Concentration of all resources for achieving }he stated goals, taking into account
the ~reatly changed conditions of modern warfar..e and the complexity of mobilization
deplcyment, is impossible without a stable system of centralized leadership of the
country and the Armed Forces. Our country has certain experience in this area.
Our country's State Defen~e Committee [Gosudarstvennyy Komitet Oborony] as
well as the defense committees in cities in the combat zone, established during the
Great Patriotic War, fully proved themselves. In a war today, if the imperialists
force a war upon us, there will quite naturally be the need for ~n even higher
concEntration of leadership (management and control [upravleniya]), and evidently
not only in combat-zone areas as was the case in the la,~t war. In connection with
this there is a substantial increase in the role and significance of corresponding
local agencies [mestnykh organov], which in �~ime of war could be in charge of aTT
work conneeted with handling mobilization matters, territorial defense
[territorial'noy oboronyJ tasks, execution of ineasures pertaining to civil defense,
- plus others.
Devoting constant attention toward providing the Soviet Armed Forces with modern
weapons and combat equipment, our party does not forget for a single minute the
precepr of V. I. Lenin that the Soviet people are the most important component
part of the combat power of the Armed Forces and the principal author of victory.
It is precisely they who appear before the world as bearers of the insuperable
moral strength of the Soviet society and its enormous spiritual potential. There-
fore consolidation in the consciousness of the working people, especially the
y~~uiigc~r generation, of the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism,
pT-i.~c in tlie Soviet land, in our homeland, readiness (gotovnosti]
to stand to the defense of the achievements of socialism has been and continues to
be one of our main tasks.
A hig}~ level of technical equipment of the army and navy imposes tough demands on
quality of training and preparation [podgotovkiJ of induction-age youth, for the
combat readiness of our Armed Forces and the nation's overall defense capability
depei~d to a considerable degree on the availability and quality of military-trained
reserves. One must bear in mind and take into account thereby that for a number
of reasons not all induction-age individuals are conscripted into the Armed Forces
in peacetime; there always remain on reserve status a substantial number of
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catiztns who have not gone through active military service. In Wnrld War I, for
example, the percentages of such individuals in relation to the total number of mili-
t3zy regis~ed persons were: in Russia approximately 80 percent, in Germany
approximately 60 percent; in France 54 percent. In addition, in recent years
the term of active military service in this country has been substantially reduced,
while equipment and weapons have become substantially more complex. It is frankly
difficult today to find a suitable job assignment for an uneducated individuaZ in
military units and on naval ships. Only persons with an adequate general educa-
tional level and sufficient technical training are capable of operating today's
complex, in most cases crew-served combat equipment and weapons.
In this country preparation and accumulation of military-trained reserves is accom-
plished chiefly by having young men go through active military service in the USSR
Armed Forces. In addition, young people receive appropriate basic military train-
ing [nachal'nuyu voyennuyu podgotovku] at secondary schools and higher educational
institutiuns, wit:~in the vocational and technical training system, and in DOSAAF
organizations.
The continuous development and improvement of weapons and combat equipment and
their relatively rapid replacement by new generations of equipment also dnmand
that reserve-status officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned off.icers, and en-
listed personnel study them in a prompt, timely and thorough manner and learn to
operate them with an adequate degree of skill.
The question of training and preparing the reserves essential for reliable defense
of the socialist homeland is organically linked with preparation of Soviet youth
for military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces. The enormous importance of
national defense is emphasized in the USSR Constitution, which states that defense
of the socialist homeland is one of the most important functions of the state and
is the concern of the entire people, the sacred duty of each and every citizen of
the USSR. The Fundamental Law also states that military service in the ranks of
the USSR Armed Forces is the honorable obligation of Soviet citizens.
Also proceeding from this are the corresponding obligations not only of local party,
soviet and military agencies, their responsibility for matters pertaining to
reliable defense of our country, but also the personal responsibility of each and
every Soviet citizen for the fate of the homeland.
An important role in this respect is played by the basic military training which
youths receive prior to induction into the military at general-curriculum schools,
vocational and technical schools, at training facilities juchebnykh punktakh] of
enterprises, establishments [uchrezhdeniy], kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and in DOSAAF
organizations. Amassed experience in conducting such traini~ig indicates that young
people wtio have received basic militar.y training adjust more rapidly to the
_ g~neral routine of military service, more successfully master combat equipment and
- weapons, become excellent performers [otlichnikami] in combat and political train-
ing, as well as proficiency-rated specialists [klassnymi ~ etsialistami]. Therefore
- many officials of party and soviet agencies, enterprises, organizations and educa-
tional institutions, together with military cammissariats, show constant care and
cuncern for selection of militar.y training officer [voyenrukov] cadres, for estab-
lishment and improvement of training facilities [uchebno-material'noy bazy], and
exercise regular oversight over the organization and conduct of classes within the
basic military training system.
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.
_ '1'lie conditions of military labor in peacetime, and especially in time of war,
c?emand of Armed Forces personnel aliigh degree of physical conditioning. The fact
that the army and navy are equipped with sophisticated hardware, transport vehicles,
and diversified mechanisms by no means lessens demands on the physical conditioning
of aervicemen. These demands increase to an even greater extent if ~ue addition~lly
consider psychological stresses.
We must state that in the majority of our republics, krays and oblasts much is being
~lone to improve the overall physical conditioning of our young people. Great at-
tention is devoted to organization of activities connected with meeting the per-
formance standards of the "Prepared for Labor and Defense of the USSR" All-Union
= Sports Complex and the holding of championships in GTO [Prepared for Labor and
DefenseJ multiple competition. Unfortunately, however, this is not the case every-
where. In some areas ard localities they piefer to work only with those who have
already achieved a high sports performance category, and fail to show adequate
interest in mass military sports activities and in training those who should be in
good physical condition for the defense of our homeland. Therefore it was quite
correctly noted at the 26th CPSU Congress that asine from the outstanding achieve-
ments of Soviet athletes, for the majority of our citizens sports remain merely an
armchair spectacle, and that the situation must be rectified. Propagandizing of
sports frequently boils down merely to demonstrating their beneficial effect on one's
health, but at the same ti.me it is insufficiently stressed that sports also possess
enormous applied military [voyenno-prikladnoye] significance and help form the
character and personality [lichnosti] of the serviceman defender of the homelard.
Nor is it mere hap~~nstance that the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of
Ministers, in the decree entitled "On a Further Increase in Mass Participation in
Physical Culture and Sports" (September 1981), stress that "the main task of the
physical culture movement and the entire physical education system is to promote
in every possible way strengthening of the health of Soviet citizens, improving
their work efficiency and labor productivity and preparedness to defend the home-
land and the achievements o� socialism, and forming of excellent moral quali-
ties...."3 In conditions of developed socialism, physical culture should in every
possible way promote growth of the nation's economic and defense potential.
In examining the question of preparing youth for military service, one should
particularly note the importance of a good knowledge of the Russian language. Un-
fortunately a good many young people are still entering the military today with
a poor knowlege of Russian, which seriously impedes their military training. t1s
we know, in the Armed Forces all regulations, field manuals, training manuals,
equipment and weapon instruction, operating and maintenance manuals are in Russian.
Orders, instructions and commands are also given in Russian. It is quite under-
standable that if young men have a p~or knowledge of Russian, it is more difficult
tor t}iem to master the weapons and e~uipment entrusted to their care, achievement
of: smoot}~ teamwork on the part of we:ipon, equipment and vehicle crews praceeds much
more slowly, and all this also has to some extent a negative effect on the degree
of continuous combat readiness of subunits.
The interests of strengthening national defense demand further intensification of
work in the area of indoctrinating working people, and especially youth, in a
spirit of Soviet patriotism. In conformity with the CPSU Central Committee decree
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entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Indoctrination
Work" (April 1979), the tasks of military-patriotic indoctrination of the Soviet
people, army and navy personnel have recently been ~.arried out in a more practical
and purposeful manner. In many republics, krays a:id oblasts military-patriotic
wo'tk is being conducted in conformity with long-range plans extending beyond a
year's time. Party, soviet and military agencies, Komsomol and DOSAAF committees
are taking part in drawing up these plans. They provide for accomplishment of such
important tasks as improving organization of military-patriotic work taking amassed
ex~perience into account, improvement of basic military training and training of
speciali.sts for the army and navy, raising the general educational level of pre-
inductinn youth, development of physical culture and sports, and improvement of
medica_i care and health-related activities. Al]. this makes it possible to con-
solidate and coordinate the efforts of government agencies and publ:~c organizations
on achieving the stated goals.
At the same time there remain unresolved questions in this important matter. Mili-
tary-patriotic work is usually focused primarily on indoctrination of young geople.
This is due to the fact that it is young people who are conscripted into the mili-
tary. Indeed young people comprise, if one may be permitted the expression, the
human foundation of tomorrow's defense. This is all true, but it would be a mistake to
forget that rhere are millionsof people who are not serving in the military but who
" tomorrow, in case of enemy aggression, may be called on by the Communist Party and
the homeland to enter active service. Nobody will give us additional time for
their military-patriotic "finish-up indoctrination" ["dovospitaniye"]. Con-
sequently this work must be conducted today not only with young people but with all
- categories of the population. '
It was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress that the sons and grandsons of the par-
_ ticipants in the Great Patriotic War are serving in the military today. Who will
pass on their combat experience to these young people? Obviously people who have
experienced the harsh school of war and who possess a wealth of labor and life
experience. They can do this better than anybody else. Therefore it is necessary
to work more with war and labor veterans, more extensively to enlist them in youth
indoctrination activities and to assist them in organizing and preparing presenta-
ti~ns.
While we are discussing military-patriotic indoctrination, we should Iike to
stress a feature wtvct~~ believe has become typical of the present generation of
youth, and not only of young people. More than 40 years have passed since the
eiid of the Great Patriotic War. During this time practically two generations of
So.viet citizens have grown up wlio do not know through their own experience what war
is and wtio have not experienced the difficulties of wartime. Peace for them is the
usual state of society. Some of them believe that continuation and strengthening
of peace require no efforts from them personally. Therefore at times they fail to
perceive and underestimate the danger of war, which has not ceased to be a harsh
reality of our time.
And is this not one of the reasons wh~~, as was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, ~
some young people, while educated and well informed, are at times politically
~:9ive, while preparedness to pursue one's profession or occupation exists side by
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side with an inadequately responsible attitude toward labor? Underestimation of
- the thr.eat of war today and, as a consequence of this, unconcern, complacency, and
calm placidity is a dangerous phenomenon which is fraught with serious consequences.
TheYefore it is the common duty and most important task of all party, soviet, tt~de
union and Komsomol organizations, by means of vigorous ideological and indoctrina-
tion work, to prevent the occurrence of complacency, calm placidity and elements
of pacificism, and to combat them resolutely wherever they occur. It is essenr'_..~ ~o
convey to Soviet citizens more thoroughly and in a well-reasoned manner the tr.th
about the steadily increasing aggressiveness of imperialism and the threat of war
which imperialism presents. Of course it should not.be overly dramatized, but the
- full seriousness of the international situation should definitely be shown. An
implacable attitude toward all manifestations of political unconcern and com-
placency, a firm and high-principled assessment of these phenomena and struggle
against them is one of the most important obligations of all Communists and the
diity of each and every Soviet citizen, regardless of where he may be and regard-
3 less of his area of work.
It is important to work more vigorously and purposefully to develop in young people
a feeling of Soviet pat.riotism, to develop a clear-cut class position in assessment
of events, awareness of a high sense of personal responsibility for defense of the
homeiand, and a striving to strengthen its economic and defense might through one's
- selfle3s labor, The Lenin Komsomol is called upon to make a large contribution to ~
the military-patriotic indoctrination of youth. The Komsomol Rules [Ustav] state:
"It is the sacred duty of the Komsomol to prepare young people for defen~e of the
socialist homeland and to indoctrinate selfless patriots who are capable of reso-
lutely repulsing an attack by any.foe."4
Party and soviet agencies and public organizations of republics, krays and oblasts
are faced with a very important task to raise even higher the level of
responsibility both for improving the quality of preparation of persons subject to
military service and for further imFroving the system of basic military training
of induction-age youth and mass-defer.se activities. The basic thrust in improving
the quality of this work is to bring activities closer to regular military training
Eacilities and bases, and to conduct special training activities at these facilities
wittiin the framework of the overall amounC of time allotted for military training
and refresher training [perepodgotovku].
Various forms of military-sponsored activities [voyenno-shefskoy raboty) have become
- quite widespread in this country in recent years. Get-togethers are held between
representatives of work forces, educational institutions, people active in the
areas of science and culture with Soviet Army and Navy servicemen. Many production
enterprises and kolkhozes maintain contacts with the military units in which thei~
_ workers or kolkhoz farmers are servi ng. At many enterprises portraits of s~rvice-
men wlio have been rated excellent in combat and political training han~ side by
side on the Board oF Honor with portraits of leading-performance workers. Delega-
tions From enterprise work forces and organizations visit military units.
Tlie patron relations established between the wor~~ f~i=e of Leningrad's Kirovskiy
Plant production Association and the men of the T,eni.n Komsomol Motorized
Rifle Regiment, which was formed of workers from tris plant during the civil war
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years at V. I. Lenin's instructions, can serve as an example of such work. The
workers of the Ural oblasts maintain close patron ties with a tank combined unit
= in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany which was a volunteer tank corps during
the Great Patriotic War. In the Belorussian Military District there is a combined
nnit which was once formed of workers from the Donbass. The miners still maintain
close contacts with this combined unit. Friendship has linked the Komsomol organi-
zation of the Altay with the men of the cruiser "Sverdlov" for more than 2 decades.
riany work forces send the best conscripts to units whose fighting history is
linked to their home areas.
This work is very important. In the course of this work the Leninist principle of
indissoluble unity of the army and people is implemented in a practical manner.
Mutual patron relations promote the birth of patriotic initiatives in military
collectives and a desire on the part of servicemen to take active part in building
communism following their military service. It is naturel that working people,
when they come into contact with life in the Armed Forces, also more deeply per-
ceive their own co-participation in strengthening defense. It is well known that
the Soviet Armed Forces, in addition to their primary function reliably to
defend the socialist homeland also perform an important social task they:
indoctrinate ardent patriots of our homeland, convinced internationalists, and ac-
tive builders of communism.
The indoctrinational role of the Armed Forces has been highly praised at recent
Communist Party co~resses. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has repeatedly stressed its
enormous importance in his speeches. "Military service in this country," he
~ stated, "is not only a school of combat skill. It is at the same time a
fine school of ideological and physical toughening, discipline and organization."S
On the whole the entire vast aggregate of ineasures connected with strengthening our
Armed Forces and increasing the nation's defense capability depends in large
measure on the efforts performed by local party, soviet, trade union, Komso mol
and economic organizations jointly and in a common direction with the army and
navy. This task always has been and rema?ns a task of enormous national im-
portance.
Defense of the socialist homeland is the concern of each and every Soviet citizen,
the concern of the entire people.
FOOTNOTES
1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 44, page 300.
2: L. 1. Brezhnev, "Leninskim ]cursom: rechi, privetstviya, stat'i" [Following a
Leninist Course: Speeches, Messa~;es of Greeting, Articles], Moscow, 1981,
Vol 8, pp 144, 145.
3: PRAVllA, 24 Sept 1981.
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4. "Ustav Vsesoyuzuogo Leninskogo Kommunisticheskogo Soyuza Molodezhi" jRules of
the All-Union Lenin Young Communist League], Moscow, 1981, page 4.
5. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom: Rechi i stat'i" jFollowing a Leninist Course:
Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1972, Vol 3, page 285.
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CONCLUSION
- The Great October Socialist Revo~ution ushered in a new era in the history of man-
kind the era of the collapse of capitalism and consolidation of socialism, which
became the highroad of social development for many countries in Europe, Asia and
Latin America and the banner of the revolutiona.ry movement of the worker class and
the national liberation struggle throughout the world. Imperialism irrevocaUly
lost its power over the majority of mankind and is inexorably continuing to lose
~its positions in the world, one after the other. It is doomed. Its aggressive ~
nature, however, not only has failed to diminish as a reault bf ti~is Ixt has increased to
an even greater extent. Imperialist reactionary circles in the West, and par-
- ticttlarly in the United States, are resorting to war with increasing frequency,
hoping in this manner to hold back the forward development of history and to escape
from the clutches of the general crisis of capitalism.
The international situation has become even more complicated at the begin~ing of
the 1980's, as a result of the adventuristic course of policy taken by militarist
circles in the United States and their NATO partners, a policy of undermining
detente and of escalating the arms race with the aim of shifting the present world
strategic balance in their favor and gaining military superiority.
1'he USSR and the other nations of the socialist community are placing in opposi,tiot~
to the policy of militant circles in the West, aimed at aggravating the interna-
tional situation, a clear, consistent policy directed toward strengthening peace,
curbing and cessation of the arms race, development of relations between nations of
differi~g social systems on principles of peaceful coexistence, and expansion of
mutually beneficial peaceful cooperation. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev clearly ~
stated the foreign policy of the nations of the social3st community, " Our common
credo in foreign policy is peace, peace for all, a reliable, just and indissoluble
pcace."1
Steadfastly and consistently implementing a Leninist peace-seeking foreign policy,
the Soviet Union at the same time objectively assesses the genuine danger of war
emanating from imperialism. The party and government are guided by the well-known
instructions of V. I. Lenin that "we should accompany our steps toward peace with
inaintaining maximum military preparedness, under no circumstances disarming our
army. Our army is a genuine guarantee that the imperialist powers will refrain from
the slightest attempts, the slightest e*:croachments...."2 ~ '
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- 'L'f~anks to the tireless concern and solicitude on the part of the CPSU Central Com-
mittee and Soviet Government, today the combat potential of the Soviet Armed
Forces comprises a solid fusion of a high degree of technical equipment, mili- �
~ tary expertise and indomitable morale. This was once again clearly demonstrated
by the "West-81" ("Zapad-81"] exercise held in the fall of 1981.
'1'I~e source of the inexhaustib]_e strength and might of the Soviet Arred Forces
lies in the undivided leadership and guidance by the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union. Under the wise guidance of tt~e parry, they nave trod a heroic path and
tiave covered their combat banners with the glory of unfading victcries over the
numerous enemies of our homeland, and today they :iave reached new heights in their
development. "It is extremely fortunate," stressed USSR Minister of Defense Mar
SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, "that the Armed
Forces are guided by such a tried and tested strategis*, organizer and indoctrir~tor
as the glorious Communist Party alid its Leninist Central Committee."3
'I'he Soviet Armed Forces, from soldier to marshal, true to the precepts of the great
Lenin, totally dedicated to their pe~~ple, ranked solidly behind the Communist Party
and its fighting headquarters the Central Committee are ever ready to rise to
~ the defense of their socialist homeland. Marching shoulder to shoulder with the
armies of the brother socialist nations, they are serving and will continue to
serve as a reliable bulwark of world peace.
FOOTNOTES
1. PRAVDA, 8 September 1981.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 40, page 248.
' 3. D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles],
Moscow, 1979, page 325. ~
i
COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1982
3024
CSO: 8144/0886 END
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