JPRS ID: 10416 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040062-4
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 62
• Content Type: REPORTS

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~ JPRS L/10416
~ 26 March 1982
~ Ne~r East North Africa Re ~rt
p
~FOUO 12/82)
_ FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFQRA/IATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/10416
26 March 1982
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 1.2/82?
CONTENTS
AFGHANISTAN
Kabul Seen Following Stalin's Nationalities Policy
(THE ECON~MIST, 13 Mar 82) 1
I ftAN
Briefs
Alleged Divisions Within Tudeh 2
~LEBANON
- Article Reviews Issues To Be Discussed by Next Arab ~iummit
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 27 Nov 81) 3
MOROCCO
_ Moroccan-French Relations Examined
(Editorial, Simon Malley; AFRI~UE-ASTE, 15-28 Feb 82) 9
SYRIA
Regime's War on Muslim Brotherhood Expected To Be Renewed
(AIrWATAN AL-'A~BI, 4-10 Dec 81) 13
Ha.mah Incidents Said i'o Presage Regime's Demise
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 26 Feb-~+ Max 82) 16
~ TUNISIA
Tunisian Solution to Problems Could Be Model for Others
(Habib Boulares; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 24 Feb 82) 20
Leader's Deteriorating Hea~th, Successi~~n Considered
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 22-28 Jan 82) 22
- a- [III - NE & A- 12 1 FOUO]
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Premier Discusses Future Diplomatic Steps
(Florence Ra'd; AZ-WATAN AI,-'ARABI, 22-28 Jan 82~ 28
W~,'STERN SAHAR~
Resolutions on Western Sahara Examined
(Ks~.mel Djaider; AFRIQL.~-ASIE, ]_5-28 Feb 82) 32
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ARGHANISTAN
r
KABUL SEEN FOLLOWING STALIN~S NATIONA,LITIES POLICY
~ London THE ECONOMIST in English No 7228, 13 Mar 82 p 50
~ TeXt ~ ~e Russians are using a subtle new tactic -
to try to control Afghanistan. They are ccrostiwtc abnut half thc p~~~+uls~tum of
Aighanistan and are the h:+ckbcmc uf ihc
encouraging local caltwe and traditions resistance. Thc ministry is said t~ be
in different parts uf the country ia the P~anning the crcation of a Pathan repub-
hope that Afghans wiU turn away from ~~c divided into sub-regions on trihal
thoughu of national identity, which is the ?~nes. OfEe.ials are out to underminc the
mainspring of iheir resistance to Soviet pathans' sense of common identity. Each
occupation. This policy of divide-and- tribe wi:l have its own administration.
rule worked well for the Soviet Union Tribal chiefs will in effect be commissars
itself in iu e,arly days. The Afghan minis- and their children will be offered privi-
try of tiibes and nati~nalities is now ~eged education.
becoming a r~plica of the Soviet depart- 'I'he ministry's tribal department is also
mc:nt of nationalities founded ~n 1917, thought to f~ave the job of organising
with Stalin at its head. militias to defend governmcnt-con-
The Bolshevik government, under Le- trolled villages against guerrilla attacks.
nin, believed that the Moslem areas of ~y~thin the department is a group known
central Asia were a particular t}ueat to a as Akhwan which tries to stir up trouble
communist state ruled from Moscow. It ,
s~t out to destroy the reG~ous and racial on Afghanistan s border with Pakistan, in
~ the hope of cutting the guerrillas' supply
bonds linking ethnic ~rou~s. Local por- rouLes. Akhwan would like to see the
- sonalities were used to play up local ~rder sealed and Pakistan put on the
values. That is what is now happening in defensive by tribal unrest and the resur-
Afghanistan. rection of Pakistani Pathans' demand for
Afghanistan's ministry of tribes has a homeland. .
two departments. The nationalities de- 7'here is also a semi-regular force
partment deals with settled ethnic groups known to the government as the "loyal
such as the Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Turko- resistance". It includes many former
~ mans and Hazaras. Their mother tongues agents and informers f:
om the Afghan
" are being made official, their cultures are secret service, Khad, who have been
encouraged and much is made of their forced out of guerrilla-controlled areas.
_ affinities with their cousins across in the During a recet~t Russian-Afghan opera-
Soviet Union. The sim, it seems, is to tion in Parwan province, north of Kabul,
create units which can, where appropri- their 7oca1 knowledge led to the deaths of
ate, be merged with their counterparts in ~veral hundred opponents of the gova: n-
Turkmenia and other Soviet areas. ment. The guerrillas are still trying to
The tribal department in the ministry recover from that setback.
deals primarily with the Pathans, who
COPY~tIsHT: The Economist Newspaper Ltd, London 1982
CSO: 46~0/323
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IRAN
BRI EFS
ALLEGED DIVISIONS WITHIN TUDEH--Divergences F*ith3.n the Iranian co?nmunist party,
the Tudeh, are becoming accentuated because of the increasingly bloody repres-
sion practiced i;y the Khomeyni r~gime. According to progressive diplomatic
circles in Tehran, the possibility that the lead~~rship of the party might
explode under the vigorous pressure of grass-roots militants caunot be excluded.
These militants reject the complicity of some of ~t:~eir leaders with the re-
gime's most reactionary elements. Moreover, many former Tudeh leaders, who
- were excluded from the party in 1979, are now conducting a vigorous campaign
in Europe against the present leadership, denouncing its activitie5 favoring
the repression of Iranian progressive elemer.~ts. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE
in French No 260, 1-14 Mar 82 p 31] [COPYR.TGHT: 1982 Afrique-A.sis]
- CSO: 4619/64
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LEBANON
7
ARTICLE REVIEWS ISSUES TU BE DISCUSSED BY NF;XT ARAB SUrAtIT
_ Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic N~ 250, 27 Nov 81 pp 21-22
- [Article: "Fez Documents: This Is How Lebanese Army Will Be Rebuilt; $100
Million Required as First Installment to Implement Military Service"]
[Text] The 12th Arab summit has four ma3or issues: The issue of South ~ebanon,
the Palestinian issue, inter-Arab relations and Arab-interna~ional relations.
The preparatory meeting of the Arab ministers of foreign affairs which will
- conc~ude its ~i~oceedings with the publication of this edition has discussed
four very confidential working papers prepared by the Arab League General
Secretariat on the four issues. AI~-WATAN AL-'ARABI correspondent in Fez has
r�ead the four papers, with their supplements, in full and has gather~d the
warking papers and the Lebanese, Jordanian, Palestinian, Iraqi, Syrian,
Sudanese and Libyan progosals to present them in this exclusive report.
We begin with the first paper on South Lebanon. The very confidential report
- prepared for the rulers and presidents says that the Israeli enemy is
occupying the border strip area with some of its military forces, that it
prevents the UN emergency forces from carrying out their tasks and reaching
- the international borders and that it shells the southern villages, coastline
and Palestinian resistance locations scattered there with its field and
naval artillery under the pretext of fedayeen operations at times and the
pretext of attacks with Katyusha rockets against ~tR settlements at other
times. The enemy is also engaged in constant air reconnaissance operations
and in air raids against civilian and military targets--raids tt?at have
reached as far as Beirut, the capital. The enemy has also been carrying out
small--scale commando operations against specific military targets, beg3nning
~n the South and extending to the heartland of Lebanon.
The forces safeguarding the peace and obstructing an Israeli sweep are the
UN emergency forces and a group of the Lebanese Army working within the
framew~rk of these forces. These forces are currently facing the Israeli
aggressi~*~ against the boider areas and Israel's obstruction of
implemeneation of the UN resolutions concerning Lebanon. This is at a time
when the Palestinian resistance forces ar2 dengely p:esent in the South and
when they carry out artillery and rocket attacks against Israel. These forces,
= and South Lpbanon alon~ with them, are exposed to the Tsraeli retaliatory
operations.
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At pr~sent, a real cease-fire is prevailing between Israel on the one side
and the PLO on the other. The collapse of this cease-fire may lead to
exposing the South to several possibilities that may re-kindle the war of
, attrition which erupted in the middlP of 1981 and which may develop into a
storming operation that could expose the South to occupation.
The position of the farces facing the Israeli aggression against South
- Lebanon can be con~idered a position of non-defense because it is aot a stable
position and because it lacks discipline and control. The presence of armed .
~ forces with an unstable defensive structure, lacking contrals and operating
in the absence of a Lebanese army capable of shouldering the burdens of
defense against Israel constitut~s a situation that fails to secure a
constant defense of the South 3nd a situatioii which will inevitably lead ro
the outbreak of a war as a result of which South Lebanon will be lost. A
Stable defense in the South requires bolstering the defensive capability of the
Lebanese army against the Israeli aggression in its capacity as a regular
force. It also requires enabling tt~is army to shoulder the burden of defense
and of filling the existing vacuum resulting from the absence of an effective
- legitimate and regular military presence capa~le of obstructing the outbreak
of any surprise war whose t~ming is controlled by the enemy.
Plan to Rebuild Lebanese Army
- The study report deals with the present condition of the Lebanese army with
precise details, beginning with the land forces, ~hen with the air forces and
- then with the naval forces. The report reviews the conditions of the
inhabitants in the operations area and the Souti~'s defense needs. It is
evident from reading these details that the plan to rebuild the Lebanese army
: ca11s for the foT:mation of seven mechanized infantry brigades, along with
their general support units. The nucleus for these brigades has been formed.
Some of the equipment of this nucleus is modern and some is old and needs to
be completed [renewed]. The general completion percentage is 50 percent for
light equipment and 30 percent for heavy equipment. The training level and
the morale are good and can be made excellent if Arab support and confidence
- are achieved.
As for the air fcrces, they include tiwo squadrons of intercepter Mirage and
Hawker Hunter aircraft. The riirage squadron needs to undergo maintenance.
. These squadrons also need to l~,e reinforced with new aircraft. The naval forces
also need to be reinforced t~~ enable then to carry out their recor~naissance
and interception operations so as to insure a minimum degree of observation
- and control of the Lebanese coastline within the framework of a complete
_ coastal defense system. As for the sir defenses, they must be rebuilt
through conventional means and a combat brigade within the antiaircraft:
division must be bolstered immediately until a miasile network is built
within the framework of a complete air defense system intended to safeguard
Lebanon and its field formations.
The report also recommends that the steadfastness of the inhabitants of the
- border areas of South Lebanon be bolstered by training these inhabitants in
. ~
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developmental, hunan and military terms to carry arms in the face of the
~ Israeli aggression within the framework of a legitimate or~anization
controlled by ~:he Lebanese authorities concerned and compatible with the
complete defense plan.
' Generally, the report says that the South needs the have border control anci to
insure reconnaissance and infiltration-prevention operations with a force
consisting of a reinforced brigade stationed south of al-Litani-Rashayya line
and a reinforced brigade stationed north of a1 Litani-Rashayya line to
confront any possible land aggression against the south. `Phere is also the
need to insure the engineering require,nents of the operations area with a
force consisting of one field engineering battalion and to reinforce the
frontline air defense units with an air defense regiment for every brigade.
There is further the need to reinforce the coastal defenses with a number of
coastal guard boats, to reinforce anti-armor defense in the face of the enemy's
superior armors and to insure air defense for the vital util�~ties in the
interior, along with tt.e need for the capability to replace three brigades'by
three similar brigades and to re-station the army forces in Tyre, al--Nabatiyah,
_ Hasbayya and Marj'uyun.
Regarding ~the PLO, the report proposes coordination within the framework of
the concluded agreements, the Security Council resolutior~s and the Tunis summit
resolutions, within the framework of the Lebanese sovereignty and through the
- Joint Arab Command which will determine the method of coordination and the
method of action in the common Arab confrontation against the Israeli enemy.
As for the other A�rab countries, the military situation in South Lebanon may
a.ake it necessary to request field support according to the development of
the battle.
Th.us, in an immediate initial phase, it is necessary to complete equipping the
three mechanized brigades and to provide some of the support they ~equire,
either in the form of in-kind aid of financial aid or in both forms. In-kind
aid is preferred in order to reduce ~he time requared for equipping the
brigades and to save the long periods of time needed for the delivery nf arms.
It is also required to strengthen the steadfastness of the southerners and to
conscript at least 6,000 southerners and then to complete the parallel plans
to reinforce the other forces. This is in addition to contributing to the
aid needed to implement the military service law that is scheduled to be
applied in order to complete the personnel and to absorb the conscripts,
beginning with the Sauth.
'The report is coupled with detailed atatistical charts demonstrating the needs
for the various kinds of equipment and weapons and munitions (enough for 3t
least 5 days of combat). The financial aid required to build the three
infantry brigades is estimated at $900 m~llion and the aid to implement the
- military service law at $100 million as a first installment and then at $60
_ million annually. The aid .required to train the southerners is estimated at
$50 million as a first installment and then at $25 million annually.
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The report recommends that in-kind weapon aid be advanced within a period not
exceeding 1 February 1982 and that the equipment for the basic training he
supplied within a period nct exceeding 1 April 1982. The report also requests
that financial aid for other defensive purposes and for the purchase of
muhitions be supplied by 1 January 1982 as a maximum. The report concludes by
urging the need to bolster the internatio~nal operations area, to insure the
deployment of the UN forces up to the borders and to insure stable security
by deploying the Lebanese army in the Tyre, the port, al-Nabatiyah, Arnun,
Hasbayya and Marj'uyun barracks before 15 December 1981.
A number of documents are attached to this report. The first concerns the
damage sustained by both the Lebanese and Palestinian sides as a result of
- the Israeli attacks in July 1981, such as the destruction of bridg~s, buildings,
vital economic installations and nea�r1y 540 homes in Beirut and the South.
The report then enumerates those killed and wounded, listing 336 Lebanese and
252 Palestinians killed and 938 and 503 Palestinians wounded in the period
from 1 December 1981 to 1 July 1981, in addition to 50 other killed and
wounded persons from vaYious nationalities.
The second 3ocument re~ounts the e~rer_ts t~ ~?hi~~ j,~~i~t~non has been exposed and
the third document is a confidential Lebanese memorandum on "the confrontation
- to replace the peaceful efforts." The memorandum is based on the defense
policy approved by the Lebanese Council of Ministers on 15 March 1980 in
implementation of the army law. This policy calls for fighting the Israeli
occupation, for coordinatior_ with the ~Arab sisters and for abidance by the
joint Arab defense treaty, Security Council resolution No 425 (March 1978) and
. by the subsequent resolutions. This docimient points out clearly that Lebanon
alone is shouldering the burdens of the Arab-Israeli war even though it is
not a confrontation state and is not in a legal state of war with ?srael.
Lebanon is shouldering the burden because the real confrontation is confined
to what is happ~ning ori its territories in the form of Israeli violations of
the truce agreement and of the Security Council resolutions despite Lebanon's
abidance by them and despite the Palestinian resistanc.e's declaration of its
readiness to abide by the agreement and the resolutioYis, especial.ly by the
latest actual cease-fire.
The memorandum also contains a reference to Lebanon's determination to regain
its territories and to cooperate with the Arab countries and the PLO to
safeguard its safety and imity. It also contains a reference to Lebanon's
readiness to accept all military aid, both in-kind and financial, from any
source whatsoever as Iong as it is not conditional and is compatible with
I~ebanon's needs and plans, keeping in mind that the Lebanese defense budget
has allocated nearly 10 billion Lebanese pounds to equip the land forces in
the immediate initial phase.
The fuurth supplement attached to the document is the Lebanese draft
resolution submitted to the Security Council ir, connection with the Israeli
attac.ks and published on 20 July 1981.
The fifth supplement is Ambassador Philip Habi'�~'s statement on 24 .July 1981 on
suspension of the military operations. Ther.~ are other supplements connected
wirh the report of the UN secretary general on Security Councii resolution
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No 490 (1981) and the Security Council xesolution of ~9 Jun~ 1981 which put
its finger on the issue of South LAbanon. The supplements alsi~ include a
copp of resolution 490 itself, a copy of the resolutions of the second session
of the Joint Arab Def~nse Council which was convened at the Arab League in
Cairo on 5 February 1975. These resolutions specify the kinds of weapon~
which each of Syria, Egypt, Libya and Saudi Arabia had pledged to supply to
_ Lebanon and the sums of money wl~ich each of Kuwait (1.89 pounds sterling),
Saudi Arabia (5 million), UAE (1.5 million) and Qatar (2 million) had pledged
to give th~e Lebanese Government so that it may purchase the necessary weapons.
This is in addition to another reference to an Egyptian pledge and an Iraqi
pledge for financial and reconstruction aid.
Israeli Invasian
The report concludes by asking: What if the cease-fire in South Lebanon breaks
down?
It answers: The off icial sources expect an Israeli invasion of the UN forces
operations area. Af ter striking tr~e Palestinian resistance, evicting the ,
southerners, occupying the South and forcing the UN forces to depart, another
West Bank will emerge. TEie official sources also expect a penetration
operation beginning with the gap existing in the UN forces zone and
proceeding in the direction of Jizzin and al-Shuf wi"th the aim of expanding
the Israeli control area and of touching off an axplosion in Lebanon and
another penetration operation along the Marj'uyun-al-Biqa' axis in the
_ direction of al-Biqa' to threaten Syria's safety from the west and to lure the
Syrian forces operating in Lebanon into a direct confrontation which will
' lead not only to touching off an explosion in Lebanon but also to an all-out
Arab-Israeli wa.r. There is also the possibility of resumption of the war of
attrition at varying degrees of intensity, along with commando operations of
which the Lebanese capital itself will not be safe. This is a situation that
blocks the path in the face af any ~ust solution to the Palestinian issue
within the framework of the United Nations. Moreover, this situation
undermines the Arab stability on the one hand and, on the other hand, wipes
out the possibilities of restoring peace to Lebanon, which is what the Arab
League is trying to do through the Arab Followup Committee.
Lebanese Paper
What does Lebanon propose to face all this?
~Lt proposes five basic measures which it has submitted to the conference in a
written memorandum:
= l. Lrge the UN secretary general to form a U13 liaison, coordination and
documentation committee within the framework of Security Council resolution
No 488 to take charge of reinforcing the cease-fire established in accord~nce
with resolution No 490 in cooperation with the UN forces, the UN Observers
Committee and the parties concerned in the South.
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' 2. Insist on the fu11 implementation of resolution No 425, including complete
Israeli withdrawal in accordance with the (1949) truce agreement, on
restoring the Lebanese sovereignty and on establishing the state's authority.
3. Assist the Lebanese army, reinforce it with the aid it needs and enable
it to gain the minimal reasonable degree of the capability to shoulder the
burdens of defense in the face of Israel.
_ 4. Exert a~ll kinds of political and economic pressures to comnel the
governments concerned to implement th.e S~curity Council resolutions, to deter
Israel and to compel it to proceed on the path of a comprehensive solution.
S. Establish a practical plan to begin reconstructing the South immediately
with the Arab funds allocated on a defensive basis--a reconstruction in which
the Lebanese army and the international organizations participate.
The Lebanese memorandum says that this plan gains its effectiveness from a
general tendency toward peace coupled with readiness for war should a war
- erupt, provided that the timing of such a war is not in the hands of the
_ enemy and provided that there is full preparation for it while the dialogue
for peace remains open and continuous.
Therefore, a plan must be formulated to strengthen the Leba~tese army and a
careful military plan must be drawn up to provide immediate field support in
case hostile Israeli operations are carried out, provided that the decision
remain in the hands of Lebanon and that a timetable be set up to work within
- the framework of the UN and of bilateral and collective relations wlth the
countries supporting Israel.
Lebanon also proposes assessing the possibilities of an aggression, the
possibilities of. moveffient, the means of pressure available, the possible
join~ measures and the mili~ary and economic capabilities. It also proposes
assessing the objective conditions required to insure the independence of the
- Palestinian decision in harmony and coordination with Lebanon's sovereignty
and with realizing peace in the South as a starting point for peace in the
area.
- After reviewing a number of Arab and international resolutions concerning
- Lebanon, the memorandum concludes with the working paper concerning the latest
Lebanese call for a summit to deal with the issue of South Lebanon.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Ai-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8494
CSO: 4404/175
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- MOROCCO
MOROCCAN-FRENCH RELATIONS EXAMINED
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 259, 15-28 Feb 82 pp 8-9
[Editorial by Simon Malley: "Morocco-France: Hassan's Blackmail"]
[Text] "Officers, we know what you are thinking. We are aware of your disillu-
sionment, your bitterness, your discouragement, your impatience. We also know
that some look to desperate solutions in order to try to rectify the military
situation in the Sahara and that others are even thinking of resorting to attempts
at coups in the hope of changing the economic and social situation. I know all
that and I know which ones of you are thinking along these lines. But I beg you
to have patience a little longer! I promise you that you will soon learn news of
considerable historic importance, news that will shake international public
opinion and make our country the ob~ect of the admiration and respect of all
nations in the world...."
- It was substantially in these terms that King Hassan II addressed the higher
officers of the Moroccan Armed Forces (FAR) three weeks before flying to Paris,
- where he was to meet with President Francois Mitterrand.
Actually, things are going very badly in the Moroccan kingdom. Not only is there
deep malaise within the army following its successive defeats at the hands of the
POLISARIO Front and as a result of its inability to crush the war of liberation
_ waged by the Saharan peaple, but neither the massive military, economic and
financial aid programmed by Washington nor the repression, torture and assassina-
tion of Moroccan patriots have succeeded in puttin~ down a peo~le in revolt.
President Ronald Rea~an mav well have assured the Moroccan sovereiQn that the
United States will never let him fall, but can the kinr~ forQet the fatal destiny
of the Shah of Iran, despite the oft-repeated commitments of presidents Nixon,
Ford and Carter? When the domestic situation surldenly grew worse in Tehrar_,
was the American ambassador himself not personally instructed to insist that the
_ Shah abdicate in order to protect his life and prevent his country from being
carried away in a"radical" revolution?
~ The Weinbergers, Haigs, Carluccis, Wests, even the boss of the CIA, William
Casey~will proclaim in vain that Washington will never allow the "Free World"
to lose Morocco as it lost Iran. And yet, the backing and protection of an
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administration whose imperialist, racist, war-mongering policies arouse popular
indignation are more of an obstacle than an asset to the Moroccan monarchic
regime, which heads a starving population overwhelmed by unemployment, poverty,
misery and the rapacious exp?oitation of the feudal lords and comprador bour-
geoisie that have tasted of the delights of corruption which they enjoy as a re-~
sult of their status as the subcontractors and agents of the multinational com-
- panies that are expandin~ throughout the country. The Moroccan people, ac-
quainted with the horrors of colonialism and the absolutism of a decadent monar-
chv havinQ experienced thp~ in person know that it is not under the umbrella
of American imperialism that they will find freedom, democracy and prosperity.
King Hassan II thc~refore needed a new ''trick," another maneuver in order to gain
time~, deceive his people once more, divert their attention fro~m the evils and
suffering they endure.
Yesterday, it was directed against Algeria the holy alliance in which the
parties of the "legal" opposition became involved in the hope both naive and
stupid of "catching'.` the king in a war aimed at weakening him and at creating
the conditions that would lead to his ouster. In'their prisons, dungeons, holes
and oblivion, those who had those thoughts are undoubtedly bitterly meditating
upon the foreseeable failure of such calculations. They have even become virtual
targets for killers at the right time, killers who have already been tested in
the "clean liquidation" of opponents deemed to be beyond hope. One must hope
that intern~tional opinion is sufficiently alert so that their lives may be safe.
Likewise, one must hope that these "opponents," whose responsibility is equally
great for the prolongation of a murderous war, will demonstrate the necessary
political courage to recognize that the king, that imitator of Guy Mollet
who thought that by overturning President Nasser he would eliminate the Algerian
FLN is and will remain th~ main enemy of his own people, the incorrigible
adversary of their rights and freedom.
The new "trick" was easily dreamed up by King Hassan II. Was he actually its
author or was the idea given to him by certain American or other advisers? What
difference could it make! The thing to remember is that the monarch thought that
~ the only way to capture the imagination of Moroccan and international public
opinion, now disabused and no longer believing in him or his r~:gime, was to
_ repeat the "gesture" of Anwar Sadat when, to the almost general consternation of
the Arab world but to the acclamation of a West "astounded by the fine gesture~
he landed in Jerusalem on 19 November 1977! Naturally, it was not to Jerusalem
that the king of Morocco intended to go but to Algiers! Yes, to Algiers, with
which he had broken off diplomatic relations and against which he had ceaselessly
waged a destabilization campaign for nearly 20 years.
But in order for the Algerian Government to agree to receive him, in order that
his offer not be rejected and that a summit meeting with President Chadli Bend-
jedid take place, he needed one or more inter~mediaries. He first of all tried
Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed M'Zali, who, in an interview grante.i to LE MONDE,
launched the idea of a Chadli-Hassan meeting. ThP test balloon was rapidly de-
flated by Algiers and the head of the Tunisian government backed down. The atten-
tion and efforts of royal diplomacy then concentrated on Paris.
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_ "Ima~ine, if you will," the king and his emissaries hinted, "what a fine role
I'resident Mitterrand could play if he were the sponsor of auch a reconciliation!
I make no condition. I do not even ask that during my trip we discuss the Sahara
question. All I want is for Algiers to accept me. We can leave it up to destiny
- tn do the rest."
"Destiny" or rather, the unleashing of the psychological services of the Western
powers allied with or friends of Morocco? "Destiny" or the pressures of press
campaigns controlled, financed and inspired by the West and especially in the
Third World? "Destiny" or the mobilization of all those who want to save the
~~oroccan throne ~nd who will exploit the event in order to emphasize the "feat"
and the "courage," the "temerity" and "shrewdness" of His Majesty? Just as they
did on the day when Sadat l~nded in Jerusalem and pronounced his speech in the
Knesseth.
The ploy was obvious, too obvious, so obvious, in fact, that only the naive could
be taken in by it. As if chose Moroccan sorcererTs apprentices and their insti-
gators could for a sir_gle minute believe that those statesmen or better, the
simple Algerian citizens, could be mistaken about the real meaning and under-
lying significance of the trap in which Hassan II and his allies wanted to force
them to step.
Indeed, who would not understand in Algiers as well as among progressive
opinion groups all over the world that by saying he was willing to go to A1-
giers, the king was pursuing a single objective: consolidating his prestige and
dealing a blo~,r to the POLISARIO Front by sowing trouble in relations between
Algerians, Libyans and Saharans? Who could doubt for an instant that by trying to
involve President Mitterrand in such a maneuver, he was killing two birds with
one stone? If his "initiative" should pay off, he would isolate Algiers on the
~ international scene and give the French chief of state a"historic" role. If it
failed, he would turn to world opinion and say: "See the sacrifice I made? But
you can do nothi.ng with these Algerian hegemonists!"
Machiavellian? Some will say so, would say so, especially if the Moroccan sover-
eign had succeeded. But from his very first talks, he understood that President
Mitterrand had no intention of lending himself to such a plan. One cannot learn
precisely whether the king pulled the plug from the very time he submitted his
plan personally and directly to the French president. The fact is, however, that
the latter, forewarned and undoubtedly alerted by the leaders of the French
Socialist Party (who do not hide their feelings of hostility for the tyrannical
Moroccan regime), adopted a totally unambiguous attitude: keeping to strict neu-
trality in the Saharan conflict, while supporting the SahaLan people's right to
self-determination. Furthermore, he supposedly stated that he would only inter-
vene if the parties directly involved would ask him to do so. It was clear that
_ Francois Mitterrand had no intention of getting his fingers burned in an affair
in which world opinion is on the side of the Saharan fighters in their national
liberation struggle.
Hassan therefore fail~d, but he did not thereby have to lose the challenge to
the higher officers in the FAR. He could not return empty-handed, especially
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given the imminence of the signing of the Algerian gas agreement that he had
futilely tried to sabotage and that was going to make Algeria a privileged partner
of France. He therefore had to give pledges to Francois Mitterrand in the hope
that the latter would not undergo the preponderant influence of the Socialist
Party, its leaders, cadres and members. A kind of blackmail thus began.
Superbly ignoring the official positions of the Arab League, Hassan II went
- against the current and supported the visit by the French chief of state to Israel,
which he considers, unlike the 21 other members of the League, to be positive.
Disdaining any preliminary consultation with those involved, he promised that he
"would prevent" (sic) the Gulf states from withdrawing their funds from French
banking institutions. Feigning to ignore his military agreements with Washington
for the rehabilitation and utilization of Moroccan bases by the American Air Force
and Navy, he lied to Mitterrand, insinuating that he would be willing to reject
- the political-military strategy drawn up by the Reagan administration in.the
Atlantic, the Arab world and Africa if.... Totally forgetting about his support
for the Fahd Plan, he pledged not to call the Arab summit conference in Fes be-
fore Egypt's reintegration into the Arab League.
In exchange for what? For Francois Mitterrand's announcement that he would visit
Morocco before the end of 1982. That he would agree to have lunch with him at
his chateau at Betz in Oise. That Fran~a would remain open to future efforts to
normalize relations between Rabat, Algiers and Nouakchott. That the Elysee
would abstain from contradicting the statements or plots of Moroccan spokesmen on
the results of his visit and the state of relations between the two countries in
order to give "off icial" Moroccan prapaganda free rein.
Consequently, when the king "defied anyone to find the slightest cloud" between
him and President Mitterrand, when he asserted that Mitterrand was in perfect
agreement with him about his analysis of the Saharan conflict and the way to re-
solve it, when his spokesman and cousin Ahmed Alaoui wrote in his daily that "in
the eyes of Francois Mitterrand, Hassan II is a loyal ally who is loyal in his
commitments, hoiiorable in his conduct and respect for his word," it was not sur-
prising that the Elysee should remain totally although uncomfortably dis-
creet.
On the other hand, one can well imagine the comments of thousands of Moroccans
if they were free to make them who have suffered and continue suffer the crimes
of the tyrant in Rabat, what the parents and families of the thousands of torture
victims, those who gave their lives to defend their rights as free and dignified
men and women, think of that "loyalty," that "sense ~f honor," that "respect for
his word."
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie
11,464
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SYRIA
REGIME'S WAR ON MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD EXPECTED TO BE REIVEWED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 251, 4-10 Dec 81 p 23
[Article: "Black Sunday in al-Azbakiyah; Lebanese Hours in Heart of Damascus;
Is Regime Preparing for New Round of Oppression A.gainst Bratherhood"]
[Text] Beirut--Damascus, which has ~one to Lebanon to prevent the Lebanese
war from coming to it, experienced last Sunday a storm of flames and fire in
- the Lebanese style. As usual, the Muslim Brotherhood is accused. But the
dimension of the new events carries further political indications that the
flaw in the ruling political establishment is intensifying ana that troubles
are acciunulatiiig in the face of the regime with all its structures, as well
as other indications.
This t{~c, the outcome has been weightier than the outcome of the familiar
incidents which are summed up in clashes between Syrian patrols and groups of
opponents. It is true that the Syrian authorities have committed terrible
atrocities inside and outside the cities and the prisons, or the cities which
_ they have turned into something similar to.prisons, to stifle the opposition
_ voices. But "Black Sunday" has left official and popular circles fearful
- that internal turmoil will be renewed on a large scale in the coming phase.
One hundred killed, moz~e than 150 wounded, three buildings turned into debris
and a 3-meter hole on a main street--these are the outcome of the mined car
which exploded in al-Azbakiyah quarter in front of the military police
headquarters. As usual in such incidents, many popular stories are mixed
with the official reports. But the first threads of the incident itself can
be sort~d as follows:
At 1130 on Sunday, an ordinary tourist car was proceeding at high speed
through the crowded Baghdad Street in the center of Damascus which separates
- the city's old quarters from its new quarters. The car tries to stop in
front of the military police com~?and. As usual in such cases, the guard on
duty proceeded toward the driver and asked him in no uncertain terms to move
elsewhere. The driver did not obey the order and got into an argument with
the guard, inten~.ionally seeking a clash with him. Bullets were then heard
and it is said that they were a~imed at the driver.
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At the same moment, the car exploded unexpected].y through, it is assumed, the
use of an electronic control located at a close distance. When smoke
started to rise from the nearby buildings and from the police building
itself, the security forces surrounded the quarter. Firefighrers and
- gmbulances were allowed to pass. But because the ambulances were not enough,
the army was forced to send helicopters. The operation to evacuate the
casualities lasted more than 3 hours.
~ Liberation of Lebanon?
In Beirut, an organization calling itself the Organization to Liberate Lebanc+n
Fron Aliens (most probably an intelligence branch) hastened to claim
responsibility for the incident. This organization had previously claimed
responsibility for similar incidents in the Syrian deterrence zones and fn
some Palestinian zones. But the Syrian media, which have shown the incident
with a11 its uglir~ess, h3ve hastened to accuse the Muslim Brotherhood. This
accusation has been interpreted to mean two things: First, to undermine the
siz~ of the internal national opposition by depicting it as no more than
religious opposition and, second, to prepare the ground for a new round of
- oppression against the Brotherhood itself by preparing the domestic and
foreign public opi.^.ion for such a campaign.
Because it hasn't yet been proven whether the Organization to Liberate Lebanon
From Aliens exists or not, the assumption that a certain Lebanese circle is
the one which ca~ried ttie latest operation in Damascus continues to be present.
War Against Brotherhood
The Syrian authorities had previously accused the Muslim Brotherhood of being
responsible for the explosion aimed against the headquarters of the Soviet
experts in Damascus last October. The Soviet TASS agency contributed to this
accusation. The explosion in the Soviet headquarters was previously one of
four announced explosions witnessed by Damascus in the past 4 month3. The
first of these explosions occurred at the governmenr headquarters, the second
at the headquarters of the air forces command and, the third at the military
police headquarters. By reviewing the four incidents, it is noticed that they
have been aimed against sites that are presumably the safest in the Syrian
capital. This means that those who take part ~n or carry out these operations
are not far from the ruling Syrian "house!"
The persistent question is: Will the war between Damascus and the Brotherhao~
be resumed?
The answer is most probably "yes." The years 1979 and 1980 witnesse3 a series
of pursuits and successive operations between the Muslim Brotherhood and t:~.e
special forces entrusted with protecting the Syrian regime and the ruling
family. The oppression exercised by the authorities in Hamah, Aleppo and Homs
at the end of last year and the first quarter of this year resulted in the
death of at least 3,000 elements of the special guard and of the opposition.
In June 1980, Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad was exposed to an assissination
attempt in which a hand grenade was throwm in his direction in the middle of
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a st~eet. In tne wake of the attempt, the president issued a law providing
for the execution of any Syrian belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood
organization. However, the law pardons those members who surrender to the
authorities before 27 August 1980. Official Syrian sources say that 700
members of the Muslim Brotherhood surrendered before that date and that the
war against this erganization ended with the end of last year.
But "Black Sunday," regardless of whether created by the Brotherhood or 'by
the regime itself with the purpose of pursuing the Brotherhood, means that
the Syrian opposition is growing in a manner that threatens the ruling
establishment from witihin and fram outside ana that the coming phase in Syria
will not be a calm one.
- COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8494
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SYRIA
AAMA~i INCIDENTS SAID TO PRESAGE REGIME' S DEMISE
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic N o 263, 26 Feb-4 Mar 82 pp 25-26
[Unattributed article: "Damascus at the nay of Reckoning. Syrian Regime Under
Oxygen Tent"]
[Text] Is Hamah calm? The official Syrian comment issued by the Ministry of
Information last Monday--the only comment on the bloody events in 20 days--
said that everything had become quiet by the end of the week and that inter-
rogations of the accused were continuing. Statements by the Syrian opposition
confirm that complete sections of the city were destroyed before it became
"calm." While Washington and the Western media remain mysteriously quiet,
diplomatic reports wfiich have arrived in Paris and other European capitals
in the last few days indicate that the Syrian regime, which regained the upper
hand by force, is only left with options of force on a huge scale in the near
term on both the domestic and foreign levels if it seriously wants to avoid
being overthrawn in a civil war.
A long period will pass before all the circumstances that caused Qvents in
Hamah to explode are revealed and before the num~er of victims who fell in
[government] operations using heavy weapons is revealed. These operations were
such as an Arab city has never known before, excepting some in the Lebanese
: war, under various conditions of relations between a regime and its people.
Yet a_ong time will not pass before repercussions of the Hamah massacre are
felt on the entire Syrian domestic scene because any milit~ry dictatorship,
rega~`dless of how much it exaggerates in striking popular uprisings, is a
candidate for decay from within, though it be a silent decay not expressed by
- the media due to official censorship of information.
In any case, there is a consensus among strategic political observers in all
Arab and foreign capitals that the Syrian regime has lost, for the first time
since its inception, its impregnability which up until now has formed its
protective umb rella. These observers also agree that the Syrian role in Leban-
on and its temporary continuation have become prime candidates for basic:
reconsideration in light of the evaluation by officials themselves of the
events of the last 2 months, events which are naturally linked to the size of
the internal opposition, and not to interference by intelligence organizations
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from either side. The Syrian regime--:~nd thi.s is well-known--has depended
since it was established on direct Sovi~*_ dupport and hidden American support.
These two types of support are what has ensured, until now, conditians for
[Syria's] survival, at the expense of thousands of victims from among the
5yrians as well as the Palestinians and Lebanese. Since the battles of Hamah
the regime itself has entered a stage of increased dependence. It now neede
intravenous feeding and oxygen bottles more than it needs the help of intell-
igence agencies or oppressive weapons. For no intelligence agency, no matter
how effective, can undermine any third world power which enjoys firm popular
support.
Before the full "harvest of Hamah" is reaped on the domestic and foreign levels
in Syria, there are five significant spontaneous conclusions which must be
drawn :
1) The Arab and Islamic reaction to what transpired in Syria was not, in any
capital, sympathetic with the Syrian Government. The Syrian leadership is
isolated regiona].ly and internationally due to a nu~ser of sociclogical, poli-
tical and economic factors which, in the end, are sufficient to cause a domes-
tic eruption.
2) The massacres which were ~er}aetrated in F:amah and other Syrian cities
- removed the las t fig leaf covering the Syrian regime's genitals and r~vealed
- the truth to various international and Islamic organizations Concerned with
human rights. The issue today is not a matter of searching for the "missing"
- in the darkness of Syrian 3ails, but rather one of searching for the "legality"
~ ~f the Syrian regime itself and its right to survive under international law
_ and accepted [human] rights agreements.
3) Syrian adherence to Soviet strategy and the manuevering it practices within
the context of this adherence vis-a-vis American is something which cannot
continue. There are demazds which have become clear, which cannot be delayed ~
and w'~ich the Syrian regime muat answer ~o since it has lost the majority of
the "trump cards" which it had to play in. the past.
4) The infection which spread to the Syrian deterrent forces in Lebanon and
cause the clashes in Tripoli in northern Lebanon to erupt ia another indica-
tion that the internal make-up of the Syrian army is not healthy. It is also
an indication that this army, which the regi~ne attempts to clothe in sectar-
ian garb, is ripe for an uprising or perhaps a series of uprising before set-
tling on a final formula based on national pan-Arab concepts of utilizing the
military establishment for more than j ust to serve the narrow internal poli-
tical goals of one family.
Four Thousand
Let us return to Hamah to say that Western sources estimate that the number of
civilian victims of the clashes is 4,000 dead while the number of military dead
is estimated at 400 from among those who were charged with quelling the popular
_ uprising.
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, The veracity of this number can be demonstrated by a recent statement issued
_ by the "Islamic Revolutionary Command in Syria" and by stories carried by Arab
- and foreign newspapers about people who escaped from the encircled city.
_ Z'he statement by the Islamic leadership said that the main axes of the fight-
; ing were: the northern part of 8 March street, both sides of which w~re total--
ly destroyed; the Mati~~ir district; and the 'Alamin district. Military opera-
tions destroyed four mosques, felled the large clock tower building as well
- as the government resider~ce building, destroyed houses along both sides of the
- 'Alamin district and a number of house~ in the Bayadah quarter and the Mahatah
quarters. Seventy tanks and pieces of equipment were destroyed, as ;aere the
'Abaysi bridge and the may~r's home. All the defense company cente�rs were
~helled, and these include the Halb street center, the national hospital center
and the municipal playing field center.
The statement also said that the mayor of Hamah's brother was one of the vic-
tims as well as Abu-'Um~r Tallas, the nephew of Major General Mustafa Tallas,
= the Syrian minister of defense. He worked ~s a aupervisor at the central tele-
phone exchange. Also amon g:he victims was 'Uthman 'Addi, chairman of thh youth
of the revolution. Those who escaped from the defense company centers were
forced to take refuge in the al-Baytari medical college where they were pursued.
- The total extent of the killing and plundering has not yet been determined.
- American and British newspaper reports say that Syrian tanks eliminated entire
sections of the~city and th3t tanks supported by artillery and forces numbering
- an estimated 12,000 along with party militia and intelligence agents turned
- the old section of the city into rubble. After 2 weeks of fighting the odor
of dead bodies was permeating the city and government forces were opening fir.e
on anything that moved. ~
Rescue Hamah
- As with other Syrian cities the "infection of Hamah" spread last week to the
' Lebanese city of Tripoli. There were about 100 dead and injured in clashes
between the deterrent forces and the public as well as internal clashes within
th e deterrent forces.
The "Higher Security Committee" was activated to strengthen the cease-fire,
which had broken down three successive times, in cooperation with political
parties in the city, the Falestinian resistence and the leadership of the
dete.rrent force. Lebanese security reports indicated, however, that the city
was still brimming with rumors and that graffiti and placards had been spread
_ throughout the city calling for the "rescue of flamah."
Other reports say that the events in Tripoli began as a result of division
in the ranks of the deterrent force itself, one side wanting to go to Hamah
to help the rebels there, and the other side trying to thwart this effort.
- At the same time that clashes in Tripoli were intensifying and that certain
northern districts of Syria were experiencing partial strikes, the Syrian
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opposition carried out an operation in the heart of Damascus. One of the rebels
_ took a car carrying a large package of dynami.te into the Ministry of Informa-
- ti.on building which is used for the shipmer.t a~d distribution of the newspaper
AL-BA'TH. It exploded, causing a great deaJ. of damage to the building and
leaving 76 dead and 135 wounded. The operation was intended to punish and warn
the Syrian propaganda apparatus, which promotes the regime domestically and
abroad and which covered up the clashes of Hamah and the massacre perpetrated
there ~y the government.
React ioas
Reactions to the evsnts in Syria have spread through the vari~us world capitals,
particularly the Islamic ones. The International Islamic Commission for Human
Rights chaired by former Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella has condemned
the "collective annihilation carried out by the Syrian regime's speci~l for-
= ces and defense companies."
A letter signed b} the secretary general of the Islamic front in Syria, Muha~
mad Abu-al-Nasr al-Bayanuni and addressed to Ben Bella indicated that Syrian
forces had blockaded the city for 3 weeks $ttsLhad bombed it with planes, heavy
artillery and missiles. The letter implored other human rights organizations
to bear, along with the Islamic commission, "its responsibility in defending
the persecuted people of Syria against their executioners and to form delega-
tions to enter Hamah and look into the practices and acts of the regime against
the defenseless public.
Acting for the commission, which he chairs the former Algerian president sent
a long letiter to the Syrian president affirming the commission's concern over
what was taking place in Syria and condeming it for the undemocratic authori-
tarian and violent way in which the regime quelled the public's rights.
The letter said that it was not acceptable for Syria, which rests on a rich
heritage of spiritual and humane civilizations, to carry out the likes of this
terrible tragedy. The letter also called for the withdrawal of the regime's
forces and the release of political prisoners including the former president
Nur- al-Din al-Atasi, Ma3or General Salah Jadid, Yusuf Za'in and tens of other
previous leaders who have been arrested. The letter also called on the regime
to restore respect to the basic human rights of humans and citizens in Syria.
Has Damascus entered the great day of reckoning? The weeks ahead will have
the answer.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL WATAN AL ARABI
CSO: 4404/343
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'rtJNIS IA
TUNISIAN SOLUTION TO PROBLEMS CQULD BE MODEL FOR OTHERS
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French :~0 1103, 24 Feb 82 p 28
[Commentary by Habib Bou~ares: "A 'Tunisian Model'?"]
[TextJ Nearly ].3 years ago, Tun3sia reversed its economic policy. In
September 1969 suddenly abandoning the policy consisting of generalizing
the establishment of cooperatives in tr~de and especially ir.. agriculture,
Tunisia embarked on a liberal cour~e.
Mr Ah.med Ben Salah, responsible for tt-~e economy in the 1960's, paid dearly
for it. Arrested, prosecuted and ser.tenced to 10 years imprisonment in
1970, he escaped in 1973 and has been living in exile in Europe ever since.
In the following years, the new prime minister, Mr Hed3 Nouira, greatly
advanced a liberalism thai. allowed bold businessmen and many parasites to
prosper. The parvenus in the industrial sector and especially those in
- the service sector became the target of criticisms, and the real differences
in incomes caused reactions among the working classes, which were exaggerated
by the.feeling of frustration af one group and the ostentatious behavi~r
of the other.
What is happenin~ in Tunisia is not unique, and many countries in the Third
World have gone or are going through this del3cate phase during which the
passag~ from a state of need to that of relative well-be3.ng is accompanied
by an exacerbation of social c~nflicts. These conflicts become seriou~ when
- the state brings to bear the whale we3ght of its apparatus to silence tne
demands and at least give, the impression to be on the side of the wealthy
against the frustrated even if, aca~emically, it can justiPy its step
- because of the need to consolidate a national capital zble to take up the
challenge of underdevelopment.
The attack on Gafsa i.n January 1980, by a commando group coming from Libya
- via Algeria, was certainly an act of aggression conceived outside of Tunisia.
This drama, however, was only possible, and the Tunisians did not doubt this
for a moment, because of the political and social deterioration of the
internal situation. Mr Mohamed Mzali who succeeded Mr Nouira did not fail
to insist on the urgent need to reduce the differences between the classes
and the regions of the country. After a relative quiet, marked by a gradual
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normalization of relations bQtween the government and the 4nions, the social
tensions, which reappeared 3 months ago, have become more ar_', more unbear-
able. The feeling of frustration is aggravated by real d3fferences between
the different activity sectors and by the disappointment caused by the
setback suff..ered by the political democrati:ation process during the
- elections of 1 November 1981. From thia to saying that the actual strikes
also take on a political dimension is a short step quickly taken by many
Tunisians. It spems evident that social and political partners are embarking
on a dead end courae in Tunisia. Not to meet the legitima.te social demands
is to face the risk of letting tensions degenerate into clashes. To meet
all demands makes sense only if both the policy of development and the
administrative structures of the national economy are radically modified.
It also seems that the time has come to g~ther around the table not only to
representatives of the production forces but also the representatives of
- the political trends to start d broad exchange of ideas on the theme that
is the main point of all these tragmentary debates, namely: "The position
of th e worker in a developing society."
The answer that Tunisia could give to this crucial question ~~uld contribute
to avert the troubles that threaten it by bringing about a minimum national
- consensus. The answer could also serve as an example, since these diffi-
culties are common to numerous countries that are trying to balance the
imperatives of egalitarianism and the requirements of the returns on invest-
ments. The answer is still within reach as long as the forces that face
one another ha~e organizations that can speak for them. It will be purpose-
less if th e conflicts degen erate into confusion. This is not excluded and
it would be a pity.
COPXRIGHT: .~eune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982
CSO: 4519/142
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- TUNISIA
LSADBB'S DETBRIOItATING HSALTIi, SUCCBSSION CONSID$RSD
Paria AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Ar.sbic No 25$, 22-28 Jan-82 pp 24-25
/Article; "Bourguiba to ~niaias 'You Are Amazed at My Illness--The Amazing Thing
Is My Good Health'!'/
/Text/ The increasing burden of illneas on gabib Bourguiba is provoking anxiety
among Tuniaiana at s critical period which ia marked by interasl social tension
and the difficult circumstances the Maghrab ie going through as a consequence of
the Sahara conflict gnd Libya's radical policies.
Once again, Presideat Habib Bourguiba, 79, has became accustomed to illness. To-
day he is in the United States for medical analyses and axaaniaatione in numerous
hoapitale and eanatoriums in Philadelphia and Florida, in which a number of major
American doctora are taking part.
Acconqxaaying him on his trip are hie wife, Mme Majda Wassilay and hia foreign min-
ister, Mr B~eji Caid es-Sebsi, who will be holding important conversations with
American officials bearing on the general eituatiosi in the Middle Eaet, develop-
ments in the Maghreb, bilateral relations between the two countriea, and Tunisia's
role in the area in tha foreseeable future, in the light of probable damestic
_ Tunisian developments.
_ The presidential declaration issued Monday 11 January e~cknowledged the president's
delicate physica.l condition and stated that it required the utr~Qat rest and care.
- This acknowledgment is in keeping wfth the official tendency to inform the people
of the atate of the president's health, in order to forestall rumor and gossig.
Anxiety over President Bourguiba's health hae afflicted eenior offici~la aince
last November. On the feW nccasions when he has appeared or talked at public cel-
ebrations, he has seemed ta be euffering froon a difficuYty in apeaking. The lat-
est official declaration po~.~.~ed out that the preeideat was suffaring from a
swollen inflammation in the gums and jaw, accampanied by pain in the right hand.
The facts, which are no secret to ths Tuniaiana, are that President Bourguiba has
a long hietory of atruggling with illnesa, owing to his auffering during the period
of the fi~ht for independenc~, the exhauation reaulting from hia grave responeibil-
ities in the 26 years that have elapsed since Tunisia's independence, and his
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advanced age. With him, the words of our Arab poet, "You are amazed at my illneae--
. the arnazing thing ie my good health" holda true.
In spite of that, very few people indeed know specifically what President Bourgiba's
illness is. The most likely thing, though, is thr~t he hae been suffering since
1967 from heart problems in the form of a gradual hardening of the arteries and a
disturbance in the circulatory syatem. In 1975 he started suffering fram a nervous
ailment which he himself has spoken about at times, saying that it aometimea keepa
him from sleepiag for days at a time.
President Bourguiba's health problems have made him an almost permaaent customer
of famoua European spas, especially in Fraace a~cl Switzerland. In addition, he
has regularly been visited at hie official residence in the Carthage Palace by a
number of famcus Europeaa an~; American doctors. During hie la~est v:".sit to the
United States, he ~topped in Paris for 48 hours, where he held quiclt medicai con-
sultations with his French doctors.
It is no eecret, either, that health problema have pro~Ced President Bourguiba to
follow a careful program in hie diet activity and treatment, and to be extremely
sparing in the time he allots to pureuit of his official responsibilities. However,
at the same time, he hae amazed all Qbeervers with his ~exceptional ability to hold
himaelf tog~ether and surmouat these troubles. Today, after Ring Husayn, among Arab
rulers, he has seniority in tenure, while illness has caused presidents younger
than him~ such as hia Algerian neighbor the late president flouari Bou~ouediene, to
pasa away.
The increased burden of illnese on Preaident Bourguiba and his prolonged absence
from the country come at a etage which is of utmost iunportance for this small Arab
country. Although the president's interveation in the details of everyday politi-
cal and official life has diminished, he atill daminates the general course of
- Z~nisian politics through the ~orce of his personaliCy, his historic stature, and
his broad powers in a mannar that no one disputes. Consequently, his decisioas,
which are not subject to preview or change by any body besides him, always leave a
strong mark on the course of events, ~iomestic affaira and Tunisia's Arab and inter-
national reiations.
The reason for ~nisia's anxiety is that the president's t~mporary or permanent
absence will leave a large political vacuum, and vacuum with the people, espaci-
ally since Bourguiba hae no known euccesaor. In rncer~t years he himself has pre-
vented the emergence of power centers in the government and party and has withheld
hie blesaings and endorsement of the succession of any of his senior aides and
party leaders.
Perhaps President Bourguibe, as a far~ighted atatesman, through past experience
with people and hia aesietants, in failing to designate a particular person to
. succeed him, has the aim of having power invested and deliverad in a quiet manner
through legitimate and constitutional channels, after a long life, and then of
leaving it up to the people to choose the right person.
Adding to the Tunisians' anxiety for the future is the fact that the domestic sit-
uation is characterized by some of the negative manifestations of features of
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~ ,
- development in the third world. T'ae=e is sacial aad political tenaion atieing
_ from the fact that all thinga change with time while the sulin~ ~nstitution contin-
ues to atand on the firm ~oundatione on which it was established close to a quart-
er century ago: political and religious cusrents and trends have risen to promin-
ence that are totally at variance with the philosophy of the Destourian Socialisti
Party, in its domastic golicy asd applications of it or ia theix view of Z~nisia's
- role on the Arab and interaational atage.
The majority of young people stand ia bewilderment in the maze of such contradic-
tione, and the ruling party, in apite of its attempts to liberalize itself, has
not, by the adnnission of officials, accom~naiated all the young ps~ople's powers and
_ activities. Me~nwhile other appositior. currents an~d treads are ia a state of
great diviaion and fragmentation, deprivia~g them of the ability to absorb and ac-
corrmo,date the new generations.
Prom the economic standpoint, while the liberalizati.on policy followed ia the
iaevent~es led to the f lowering of the bourgeaie class, a quarter of the population
still lives below the internationally-recognized paverty level. There is 14 per-
cent unemployu,ent in the labor force, and 30 gercent of the unemployed are young
people under 30. Inf lation is rising, especially with respect to basic commodi-
ties; the country's phoaphate, oil and olive oil reaour~es are not enough to cope
with import requirements, and the balance of payroents deficit comes to about $1
billion a year.
The decade of the seventies opened lhniaia up to foreign investment, which was in-
deed successful in establishing industries and providing job opportuaities; how-
ever, France, in particular, cloaed the doors once again in the mid-seventies to
imports fro~ Tunisia, and the crieis of recession returned.
There is an urgent need for rapid economic reforms, and the curr~nt cabinet of
Mr Mohamed Mazali is aware of this. Three quartere of taxes are indirect and de-
volve upon the working classeg. Foreign investment muat be directed toward agri-
culture, housing and the fight against inflation and unemployment instead of being
confined to tourist service8 or easy projects writh a guaranteed rapid payout in
the investors who benefit.
The circumstances the whole Maghreb is going through are also a source for anxiety.
~nieia has always been a factor for peacaful coexistence amung socially and
politically differeat regimes which has imparted a practicel coloring to the slogan
of Maghreb unity. flere ia where Tunisia's awareness of t~e dangers of the struggle
- in the Sahara and Prasident al-Qadhdhaffi's adventurea in the area comes iu.
The attainment of a sort of reconciliation between Morocco and Algeria has been
one of the perennial objectives of Tunieian policy. It appears that Mr Mzali re-
cently participated in quiet diplamatic efforte aimed at the attainment of recon-
ciliation between the two fratern~l countries and that he has not ceased offering
Libya an olive branch, in spite of ite position, which ie not unde~$tood hare,
and recently resulted in dapriving 1~niaia of inembership in the Arab organization
- QAPEC. The Tunisiane aspire ~co a rapid solution to the problem of the determina-
tion of the continental offshore ~helf in territorial watera eo that thay can ex-�
ploit oil uLd gas resources.
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While Tunisia�s Arab rola has been steadily grawing, because of its accomnwdation
of the League of Arab States and its aolid relatians with conservative countriea,
its relations with the West are marred by arguments on ecoa4mic questiona, especi-
ally with France. There is a feeling that Tt~aisia is ia greater need of assietance
to alleviate ite economic crisis ~d diepel the causes of social tensiryn theui of a
flow of modern weapons, on the premise tk~at Tunisis's stability is connected more
to its economic progress th8n to the development of its defence and security
syst~.
On this point apecifically there is consensus among politieal leaders that develop-
ments of the armed forces in the event aF President Bourguiba's departure will pave
the way for probable interference by the army in politics and that ~nisia will
succumb to the vicious circle of the ~ilitary tha~t hae impaired the future of a
large number of third world countries.
The Tuniaian conatitution itself is not totally clear on determining how the pres-
ident is to be chosen. It atipulates that in the event of resignation, total dis-
ability or death the prime minister will asatmoe the position uatil the electoral
term of the National Asaembly ends, when a new president will be elected.
On the basis of this conatitutional provision, Mr Mohamed Mzali is in line to as-
sume the taeks of the presidency, in view of his position as prime minister. Pro-
ceediag from that, Tunisians are monitoriag Mzati's damestic and foreign policies
- closely and are studying the features of his peraonality in order to became acquant-
ed with the man who msy aomeday become president of the country and make sure that
he will guarantee them the relative atability they have known in Bourguiba's era.
Mzali's personality e~dears him to peaple and to members of the nppoaition. He is
calm, modest, an experieaced administrator and a well-educated graduate of the
Philosophy Department of the French Sorbonne University. Aa made his way up in
administration ae a teacher, a qouth and sports director, and a radio and tele-
viaion director, then moved about in various miniaterial positions until he became
prime minister in 1980.
Mzali is the loyal son of the ruling institution; he is the product of its think-
ing and attitudes and he believes in the distinctive particular Tunisian character,
in its Islamic Arab context. Hence his support for Arabization, through his maga-
zine AL-FII~, which he has been issuing for mor~ than a quarter century.
Meali's failure to be zealous in ex~ressing his party affiliations has msde him
acceptable to other political and social currents aYtd he has friends in the religi-
ous current and the labor unione and among employers. His relatic~na with Tunisian
intellectuals in particular amd with intellectual and aultural curreata in the
Arab world in g~neral are also strong.
Mzali occupies a praminent poeition alongaide his official one; he is the secretary
general of the ruling Destourian Socialiat Party. However, eome observere~ ~ay that
same wings of the party personnel are opposed to the liberal policy of openness
that he has followed and td his call for party and political pluralism to end the
single-party monapoly.
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However, Mzali consolidated his position in the party when he gambled on challeng-
ing the opposition in free general electio~na. He won the gamble when all the ap-
position parties failed in t~fovember to obtain a single seat in parliament and the
Destourian Party won 9k.6 percent of the votes.
However, while the election victory supported his position ia the party, it had
little effect on the opposition currents~ view of his call for liberalization,
- which made them doubt the serioueneas of the party's liberal policy.
In spite of all that, Mzali sti11 is a factor for peace, concard and stability
both within the party, since his cabinet includes representatives of various tend-

- encies, and within the main opposition currente, wl~ich coneider him to be a posi-
tive factor for dialogue, which Mzali has always beea an~dous to stresa. Since
asauming his poeition, he has been set aa introduciag changes into the policy of
his predeceseor Hedi Nouira; hs has limited the spread of the influeace and power
of bueinessmen, has allowed the emergence of new papers, has carried out legis-
- lative electians, and has entered into a national front with the General 1~nisian
Federation of Labor (workers' unions) in a national front which ran in the elec-
tions in the face of the other opposition currents.
In responee to criticiam, Mzali eays, "Pereonall~ I wanted to aee some opposition
members win seets in parliament, but it was not ia my power to help them." fle then
- assert~, in a television interniew, "Pluralism wil~ continue and grow fn Tunisia
from aow qn and "the opposition that took part ia the alectiona ia recognized in
fact, arid I do not rule out the poseibility that in days to come Preaident Bourguiba
may decide to recognize theae organizatioas, which are perasitted now."
Other Names Preeent~d
The fact that Mzali's name is being circulated vigorously as a caadidate to succeed
Preaident Bourguiba doea not keep oae fram eaying that other names have beea raised;
if they have not been raiaed as vigorously, eurprieas and new developmeats can gen-
erally play a role in matteza of this sort.
In any event, there are prominent personalitiea ~,n the heart of the ruling organi-
zation. Mr Munji E1 Raali has stood out siace his resignation fram his min~sterial
- position, when he demanded more f lex:Lbility in dealiug with the General Tunisian
- Federation of Labor. Ae returned as director general of the pr?rtq as a successor
- to Mr Mohamed Sayah, leader of the hard-line wing.
There is Beji Caid es-Sebsi, minister of foreiga affairs, who returned to the party
fold after a short period of cooperation with Mr Ahm~d Mestiri, leader of the Move-
ment of Democratic Socialists.
In addition, there are Driss Guiga, Tahar Belkhoja, Mohamed Sayah, Aabib Bourguiba
Jr and Taieb Bacaouche, aecretary geueral of the General Tunisiaa Federation of
Labar.
OutiBde the ruaing organization, there ia Ahmed Heetiri, who played a major role
in the party and in power toward the end of the sixties aad the early seventies,
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then was definitively cast out ia 1974 when he worked as a lawyer and issued the
newspaper AL-MUSTAQB9L, which he turned into the organ of the Movement of Democrat-
ic Socialists.
Mestiri says that his mavPment in fighting far greater liberalism and independeuce
in the labor union nwvement and ~or implantatioa of a system of party pluralism.
He also calls for assertion of the ~nisian identity, like his former colleague~
in the ruling party.
Among these people, there are others who might not become candidates for the presi-
dencybut could by virtue of their status and ceatrality play a great role ia sup-
porting and backing one candidate or another. Among them perhaps are Majda Wassila
- and Mr Habib Achaur, chair�~an of the ~ni.sian General Federation of Labor.
Majde Wassila, because of the atatus ehe enjoys through her husband and her social
and political interests, playe an influential role in Tuaisian public life and
_ events, although she hae always atresaed that ehe has no political aanbitions and
says that the only thing that concerns her is the f~xture aad etability of Tunisia
and its yonng people and the role of Tuniaiaa women. She hae some reservations
about the notion of party~ pluralism.
Mr Achour may perhaps have been a strong caadidate for the presidency were it not
for his age; he is over 70. Achour has lin3ced his trade uaian struggle with that
of hia old friead Bourguiba, and his labor leadership went under the banner of the
single party after independenc~ in 1956.
However, that has not inhibited the emergence of disputes between him and the re-
gime, which have caused hf.m to draw close to and. back away from the circles of de-
cisioimtialcing. This dispute reached its peak during the General Labor Ferleration's
protest against Hedi Nouira's policiea in the seventies, then the bloody clash
with the authorities in 1978, his appearance ia person at trial, his aenCencing to
prison, then the reduction of the sentence and his release last year, when he was
permitted to return to the presidency of the federation.
Thus Achour, by vi~tue of hig Iabor leaderahip and the historic active role the
labor movement enjoye in the country, could play the role of "kingmaker" when the
time comes to choose.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
11887
CSO: 4504/196
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- TITNISIA
PRBMIEB DISCUSS$S FUT[TxE DIPLQ~lATIC STEPS
Parie AL-WATAN AL-~ARABI in Arabic in Arabic No 258, 22-28 Jan 82 pp 24, 25
/Article by Florence ~,a'd: "Mohsmed Mzali to AL-WATAN AL-'ABABI: A Second Fez
Before Next June!'/ .
/Text/ The Tunisian prime minister, Mohamed Mzali, expects that the aext Arab sum-
mit conference �~aill be held in the city of Fez aext May. He expre8sed this predic-
tion to AL-F7ATAN AL-'ARABI at a meeting it held with him ia Paris. He also dealt
with a number of new developments on the Arab and interaational eCages.
~
In his lateat visit to France, the Tunisian prime minister, Moh~mooa~ Klzali, held a
series of ineetings with aenior French officiala, moat conapicuously his meeting
with the French president, Freacois Mitterranci, and the prime minister, Pierre
Mauro~y.
The importance given to Mr Mohamed Mzali'a visit to France, which took no more than
24 hours, can be attributed to the role Tua~iaia is anticipated to play in Fraace's
relations with the Maghreb countries and in the coutext of the t~tiddle East.
The visit is not the first contact between socialist France and the ~`unisian gov-
ernment. Mzali previously met with President Mitterrand last 5 Nove~er and Premier
Pierre Mauroq is also preparing to visit 1~nieia neat 4 November.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learaed from circles on both sidee that France's relations
with the Maghreb countries and the Middle Bast crisis were the most important sub-
jects discueaed in the talks. Just befora his trip to Paris, Mzali said "The
Maghreb caa play a big role in relationa between France and the Areb werld." He
also refrained fram all criticism of the French posi.tiou on the Middle East, con-
sidering that French policy "ultim4tely has the goal of the establistmnant of a
,Palestinian atate on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip."
We met with Premier Mzali and put a number of questions Co him on the results of
his discusaione with the French party and the most recent developmenta on the
Arab stage.
/Question/ European and Arab public opiaio~,having follo~wed the ex~eriment in
pluralism, has drawn negative canclusions following the discloaure of the election
results. What ie your evaluation of this experiment?
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/Answer/ That is now an old isaue.
~ /Question/ But we in AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI have criticized what toolc place, and we ~re
interested in knowing your opinion on the subject.
/Answer/ The importaat L~ai.ng about the elections that took place in ~nisia is the
new state of affairs embodied first in the existence of a recognized opposition
party, the Caur~nist ~arty, and then in the prese~nce of such active new organiza-
_ tions as the Un~ty of the Peo~ple (tem~orary board), and the Democratic Socialista.
Then, in the past, there was no questiou that opposition newspapers would be isaued
while today the number of oppoeition papera in French and Arabic exceeds the number
of regime papers.
We respected the law an the democratic gama in the course of the elections and made
~ood on all the promises we made regarding the electian carr~�aign, in terms of giving
- people equal time to appear on televiaion and talk on the radio. The citfzens saw
opposition candidates discuse their ideas, opinions and alteraative poli.~cies. Not
only that, but they criticized and condeumed without c~nsorehip. I do aot think
this sort of thing exista in countries of the third world or the Arab countries.
I als6 believe that ou~r orgaaization (the National Front) , which irccl~ule~ .leaders
from the Destourian Party, which is nresent ev~xywhere aad has iCs tr~ditions,~ i~s
- psblic, and a his~dry of 50 years of esiatence, alongside the Tunisian General
Federation of Labor, the Federation of Employers, the Wamens' Federation, and same
independents, has reduced the chances of the other organizations.
What one a~et say is that we ~mbarked on the electoral campaign with zeal and have
made rapid achie~ementa in a year and a half and �n all fields. I caa atress that
in numerical terms ;no opponent obtained enough votes to entitle him to win.
/Question/ Does tbat mean that tl~e assembly will remain as it was?
/Answer/ Personally I do not beli~ve eo. There are numerous political forces in
che frunt. First, there are th~ labor forcea, represented by 27 deputias; the
secretary general of the Labor Federation declared before the elections that would
Constitute a bloc of voters. The~e is also a bloc of independents who have ex-
pressed their opinions most seriously and frankly in a discussion ou the current
general budget. Moreover, the door is not closed to recognitioa of the othe~
organizations for the next S years.
My convictien is that politics is alway8 chara~terized by dynamism. There is a
possibility that t~ese oxganizations will be recognized, and I believe that we
have taken an advanced atep along the road to liberalization and progress, cow-
- bining socialism, which is the raeistance of exploitation '~or the sake of respect
for man, and democracy, which means addreasing oneself to freedom and dignity
without succumbing to the uneven procea,s we see ia some coun~riea or elipping into
the political fragmentation which is the prelude to foreig:~? intervention and chaos.
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Tunisia an~d France
/Question/ It has been observed that samething alcin to a revolution has occurred in
relations between France and the Maghreb countrits. The France of Giscard was
cloaer to Morocco while the France of Mitterrand is drawing close to Algeria,
Polisario and Libya at the expense of its relations wi.th M~rocco. Where doee
- 1~nisia etand in theae relations?
/Answer/ First one muat aote that relatione betweea Fraace aad Morocco have not
gotten worse in President Mitterraad~s terne; the Ring of Morocco is going to visit
Pasis shortly. Franco-Algeriaa relatioas were not in decline in the previous
period; although they were char~cterized by some etagnation, President Mitterrand's
visit to Algeria eliminated much misunderstaading.
Tunisian-French relstions are good and their fouadatione are being deepened in the
cultural and ecoziomic contexts. We recently signed a cultural, ecientific and
technical cooperation protocol. The teat of the protocol specifiea the tasks
which must be carried out in varioue cultural, technical and ecientific fields.
Attention is being concentrated oa the issue of determining the technical fields
to receive priority and progra~iag within the sixth development plan. Agreement
has also been reached on the subject of grants and eschanges of visits between
university personnel and artists aad preparation of joint programs. Agreement has
- also been reached on the subject af promoting the Arabic laaguage aad seeking to
promote the foundations of Arab civilixation. The preferred iastrument for
activities of this sort will be the In^~+tute of the Arab World, which will soon
- open in Paris.
_ A Tun~.sian-French agreement for the establishmeat, use and maintenance !,f an under-
sea cable coa~miunications system between ~aisia and France, has also been signed.
That is the third of ita kind; it will be ready in 1983 and will contain 280 lines
in addition to the 600 existing ones.
A Suami t in May
/suestion/ Have the recent inter-Arab contacts reached a point which can permit
the setting of a fixed date for the second Fez eummit? What is Tunisia's official
poaition on these efforts?
/Answer/ I have already declared Z~nisia'a official positioa in this regard. This
may be su~~arized as agreement on the unification of Arab ranks behind a united
initiative which would be an alternative to Camp Davia. Prince Fahd presented his
initiative at the first su~nit. Bowever, thia initiative will not become a
practical plan until the Arab suioovit endorses it, even if that is done by editing
and rounding out soma aspects of the plaa. At the Baghdad Summit, an agreement
- was made that we would not present individual country plans, but rather a nation-
wide one, and I think that iater-Arab coatacts have helped elimiaate aome obstacles
in the way of this initiative by developiag eame of its sections to allow for aa
- invitation to a aecand meeting ia Fez ia the mon"sh of Hay or Jwae.
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/suestion/ Day after day l3eirut ie turaing more aad more into a cesnetery of dip-
lomats, from the Americaa ambaeeador Maloy (1975) to the French aombaeaador Delamare
(1980), from the Iraqi embassy disaster to the aseasainaCioa of the Algesian minie-
ter without portfolio. Eow do you view the war in Lebanon, in this stage specifical-
ly7
/Answer/ We are really sad over the use of these wethods, especially the phyaical
elimination Qf diplomats, who are considered messengers on their missions. In any
_ event, these inhumsae eliminatioa acts are the result of the exi.stence of a
Palestinian cause which has not yek been resolved.
Camp David Is the Obstacle
/Question/ What is your conception of the stage follawing the withdrawal fran
Sinai as far as Arab-Egqptian relations go?
/Answer/ Former President Anwar al-Sadat affronted the dignity of individuals in
the Arab world in the past, havin~ transgressed against the digaity of the Arab
nation by signing the ~amp David treaty. President Husni Mubarak has at least not
affronted these feelings and still retainr his camposure and balance. Egypt has
chosen its own path and has alienated itaelf from the Arabs by continuing along the
Camp David line and through its position regarding the Palestinian cauae. While
al-Sadet has bequeathed personal and political hoatility between himself and the
Arabs, no obstacle remains aow thati he has gone except the politfcal aspects, which
is the Camp David line. If Egypt retreats from these agreements it will find its
place in the Arab ranks, although so far the matter aeems out of the question.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
11887
CSO: 4504/196
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WESTERN SAHARA
RESOLUTIONS ON WESTERN SAHARA EXAMINED
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 259, 15-28 Feb 82 p 10
[Article by Kamel Djaider: "Nairobi I, II, III"] ~
[Text] The OAU is once again confronted with the question of the Western Sahara.
The 18th Summit Conference in Nairobi precisely defined the role and duties of its
implementation coBnnittee. The highest African organization had entrusted it with
the task of organizing and carrying out a free, general, regular referendum
- throughout the Western Sahara in order to enable the Saharan people to exercise
their inalienable right to self-determination.
What then has happened since that summit conference? With the sense of theater
for which he is known, Hassan iI had nevertheless solemnly accepted the organiza-
tion of the ref~rendum. He even pledged, before his African peers, to see that
- the Saharan people would make their decision as soon as possible. And yet, as
_ everyone knaws, no measure, no move has yet been taken in the direction of
negotiations with the POLISARIO Front by the king. On the contrary, Rabat has
only intensified its efforts in the sense of continued war and internationa.liza-
tion of the conflict, accentuating even further the very grave threat weig'~iing
over Northwest Africa and the entire Maghrebian regi~~,z.
The danger is now greater than it has ever been, due to the commitment of one of
the supergowers in this case, the United States alongside Morocco. And it,
can only warded off by a peaceful solution that will necessarily mean negotiations
between the i~wo parties to the conflict.
Washington Involvement ~
The OAU, which constantly ca~ls for a ceasefire, must impose negotiations in
order to be successful. It is very obvious that in order for there to be a
ceasefire, there must be agreement between the two belligerents, which presumes
that the latter will decide it together, through negotiations. Rabat and the
POLISARIO Front must therefore sit down at the same table and discuss the prac-
tical terms of a halt in hostilities, necessary for the organization of any
referendum. T.he POLISARIO Front does not view a ceasefire as an end in itself.
The Saharan soldiers will not put down their arms�until they have adequate guar-
antees, such as the withdrawal of Moroccan troops from the territory of the
Western Sahara and their replacement by an interim international administration.
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Among the members of the implem~ntation committee, there are some who believe
that by giving too much weight to the idea of the ceasefire, it is totally possi-
ble to remove the means of reaching it. It is not any coincidence that Washington
so ardently supports both the Moroccan occupation and the "concerns" of the imple-
meritation cammittee.
Political observers who closely follow the evolution of the situation in the
region confirm the view of the Saharans, who state that a"pax americana" is
being imposed on them.
In 3 months, Rabat successively received American Deputy Secretary of Defense
Francis West, Ronald Reagan's security adviser, Gen Vernon Walters, the No 2 man
in the CIA, Bobby Ray Imman, the very influential Senator Charles Percy, and
finally, before Hassan II's trip to France, the secretaries of commerce and
agriculture, Malcolm Baldridge and John Brock. This entry in force (oil research
off the coast of Tarfaya, a study of the bituminous schists, the coming adoption
by Parliament of an "adequate" investment code), mainly aimed at consolidating
the throne, is expressed by an accelerated "South Americanization" of the coun-
try. Washington will very soon be able to decide the fate of Morocco 100 percent.
Alexander Haig's visit to Rab.at on 11 February is undoubtedly significative of
the American determination to get a solid foothold in Northwest Africa.
In the hierarchy of the new concerns of the White House in Africa, Morocco occu-
pies the privileged place of the future regional policeman and support base for
the Near East. Furthermore, the country arouses even greater interest since the
changes in France on 10 May. On this subject, the trip that Hassan II made to
France last month revealed the extent of Moroccan concerns over the commitments
made by the French Socialist Party during the election.campaign of candidate
Mitterrand and in the.face of the prospect of the political act which the opening
of an office of the POLISARIO Front in Paris represents. The king of Morocco
tried during his stay to advance only those points of ~agreement existing between
him and the president of the French Republic. Consequently, with enthusiasm
contrasting with the reserve observed by all other Arab chiefs of state, he ap-
proved the visit which I'rancois Mitterrand plans to make to Israel and confirmed
the coming official visit by the French chief of state to Morocco.
Responsibility of OAU
As for the Moroccan-Saharan conflict, he mentioned it or.~y in order once more
to refuse to recognize the evidence: His adversary is the POLISARIO and not Al-
geria. By shutting himself up in this attitude, Hassan II "links peace to his
fate," as Fadel Ismail, the POLISPRiO's representative in France, emphasized.
It is nevertheless certain that this "Nairobi III" will have pointed up the re-
sponsibility of certain countries in the OAU, whose ob~ective is to give Morocco
the respite it needs to step up its economic and military potential through the
United States.
� Even better, in certain African diplomatic circles, it is not excluded that mem-
bers of the implementation committee, Trojan horses of Washington and Rabat,"
want to engage the committee, in separate negotiations with the POLISARIO Front,
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1 ~
on the one hand, and Morocco, on the other. The operation would enable the imple-
mentation committee to take Rabat's place, which would ha~*e the effect of gaining
time once again for Hassan II.
We can therefore understand the insistance with which the POLISARIO Front con~
stantly underlines its refusal to see "any fragmentation or atomization of what
must be an overall agreement." "The ceasefire is not only a technical measure,"
one high Saharan official recently told u~. "It is an eminently political mea-
sure that requires political, military and diplomatic guarantees Proceed-
ing in any other fashion is to put the cart before the horse," he added. �
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie
11,464
CSO: 4519/129 ~ ~D
~
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