JPRS ID: 10430 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050006-5
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ i 0430
1 April 1982~
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F( ;AL U :.Y
JPRS L/10430
1 April 1982
~ WEST EUROPE REPORT
c~oUO ai/s2)
-
~ I.ONTENTS
POLI TI CAL
N E ~iE RLANDS
Van Traa on Labor Party's In ternational Relations
(Maarten van T~aa In te rview; VRIJ NEDERLAND, 20 Feb 82)....... 1
GENBRAL
FRAN CE
Arianeapace Plans Launches, Receivea Orders, Improves Rockets
(P ie rre Lange reux; AI R ET COSM06 , 2 Jan 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Orders, Laiaich Calendar, Military Uge
Rockets in Production, Manufacturers Inwlved
Sackground, Stockholders of Arianespace
Launch Site Diagram
Competition With Ame rican Iaunchers
Technical Aspects of Ariane 2, 3, 4
- a- ~2II - WE - 150 FOUO]
Cnn ncarr+~ . r r tcr, n*rT v
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POLITICAL NETHERLANDS
VAN TRAA ON LABOR PARTY'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ~
Amsterdam VRIJ NEDERLAND in Dutch 20 Feb 82 p 13
[Interview with Maarten van Traa, international secretary o~: PvdA (L�abor
Party), by Jan Stoofs "Yes, Eh, Nos 'In My Campaign I Said ~emagogically
I Would Go by Train with a Sleeping Bag, but that isn't Right. date and
place of interview not given.]
~ [Text] Of all the Dutch political parties there is one
which can boast an international secretary with a full-time
job: the Pvd~.. Moreover, this functionary elected by the
party congress is also included in the executive committee
of ~the party. As such he also has to concern. himself with
thF: general duties of that executive committee.
The international aspect rredominates, however. The diplo-
matic attache case of the current man, Maarten van Traa, is
provided with a durable nam2tag supplied by a large travel
r~gency. Bonn, Paris, Helsinki, Tel Aviv, I:atin Am~erica;
that attache case has been almost everywhere.
Much of the work of PvdA's international secretary is con-
cerned with maintaining contacts with sister parties, mem-
bers of the Socialist International. The international la-
bor movemtnt for a long time past has looked beyond national
borders; the yoke of capitalism was always pushing every-
where. The c~ncept of the ~rorld-wide importance of initia-
ting the 8-hour work~:.y, just to mention a 19th century con-
troversy, led to the establishme nt of the First International
in 1864. Karl Marx attended it. This organization existed
for 8 years.
In 1889 the Second International was founded in Paris, an or-
ganization of the various n3tional socialist groups. Periods
- of great prosperity and sharp decline alternated. In 1951
it even had to be refounded in Frankfurt Amongst r,thers,
the PvdA was represented there.
� International secretaries of the PvdA were, consecutivelyt
Alfred Mozer and Max van der Stioel (who were n~t part ~~f the
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executive committee), Piet Dankert, Relus ter Beek,
Harry van den Bergh, Wim Bogaard, Relus ter Beek again,
and since 1979, Maarten van Traa.
The international secretary of the PvdA does more than
just maintain contacts with rhe other members of the Inter-
national. Sometimes he prepares standpoints of the party
on matters such as NATO membership, the desirability of
placing cruise missiles in the Netherlands, the attitude of
the Israeli government toward the Palestinians,and the op-
pression in Argentina, just to mention a few topics. Further
he maintains contacts between the party executive and the
commission for foreign affairs of the parliamentary group of
the Second Chamber, speaks at demonstrations and demonstra- �
tion days and writes angry letters to evil dictators who
keep kindred spirits locked up. It's a dog's life, but
never uninteresting.
The discussion on the socioeconomic policy of the second
Van Agt cabinet seems to have pushed to the background some-
what the discussion which was raging, especially within the
PvdA, on NATO and nuclear arms and on various foreign coun-
tries in general. Sometj~mes a matter comes into the lime-
light again, such as the oil boycott of South Africa only
last week, and shortly, the Dutch troops in the Sinai. And
then Maarten van Traa will be speaking again, in privat~,
at party council meetings, in the media, and with activist
groups.
Harry van den Bergh said to me "When Maarten came, there was absolu~ely no
foreign land for the PvdA."
Maarten van Traa, the foreign secretary of the pvdA, lights his pipe for the
umpteenth time. He gives me an inquisitive looks "Did Harry say that? And
(distrustfui) does he think it is the re now?"
[~:!pstion] He told mes "Maarten is doing rather nicely."
Van Traa smiles weakly: "When I came, no; there were primarily a few dossiers
on the back burner which had to be sorted out. I spoke for an afternoon with
my predecessor, Relus ter Beek, and then I got started. Oh, yes, that after-
noon Relus ter Beek called the eternal collea~ue of the SPD, Hans Eberhard
Dingels, in order to introduce me to him. Two weeks later I went to Spain, and
there I introduced myself to the ladies and gentlemen of the Spanish socialist
party. Well, that was that."
Relus ter Beek, foreign specialist for the PvdA in the Second Chamber, became
interim foreign secretary after Wim Bogaard had given up. Van Traas "Relus
had kept things rolling, had kept them better rolling than his predecessor who,
well, eh, who didn't really know how to do it. Let me put it this way: he had
both underestimated the job and, moreover,he had another half-week job. Thus I
found something without direction, and little by little I gave it direction in
my own way."
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[Question] Weren't you surprised (I asked as PvdA dues-payer) that the foreign
secretariat was so easily put on a back burner?
[Van Traa] "Yes, a little, indeed a little. I had wondered on occasion what
exactly was going on there, but of course there is always a sort of secrecy
involved You think a lot .ias to be done, and the documentation has to
exist. I wa.s somewhat surprised about it, yes. Relus had the general outlines
in his head, but they were not worked out on paper. There were some letters,
some dating back 2 years, those ?cinds of things. But everything now has been
pulled together."
[Question] When you took office you said that the international secretariat
must again become a center where ideas come together which stimulate discussion
on the long term. That did nQt tuxn.ot~x._as well as expected.
[Van Traa] "at that moment we had an entirely different pattern of expectation
with respect to the power of the party. Officially we were still involved in
the Forward program at that time, which in practice had been abandoned by mem-
bers. In that program, foreign policy more or less was composed of phrases such
as "take care of comma," and "or in such an event to advocate etc.
Therefore the debate had become somewhat unclear, especially within the party.
_ Of course there was the debate on NATO and, more than now, on North-South rela-
tions. But not on the Soviet Union, the problems of human ~ights, and relations
with the United States. At that time we lived ~ith an election platform which
- read that NATO was actually a threat to world peace. That had been included by
mistake, or perhaps by amendment, but no one found it very important; it was
more in the sphere oft you have to incl ude twice the volume, so that half of
it will get done. I never found that a good approach, although sometimes it is
easy to understand that it was resorted to out of integrating considerations,
to put it fastnonably."
~Question] Do you means to keep the party together?
[Van Traa] "Yes.11
[Question' Since 1979 the discussion on peace and security and on NATO has be-
come considerably less abstract; the decisions which were asked for were rather
concrete. Moreover, Den Uyl's threat in 1979 to give up his candidacy if the
party were to insist on the rejection of all nuclear tasks put the party on the
ground r~iL.h both feet.
[Van Traa] "S*emerdink, and Klaas de Vries and Relus in the parliamentary
group, brought'the discussion to a prac*ical level with respect to the conse-
quences of that American modernization decision. There was an enormous accelera-
tion at that time which led to practice and the party getting closer together.
And although Den Uyl still had a diff icult time when he had to speak at the
manifestation against the modernization in Utrecht in November 1979, it did
~ bring credit to the party; it was a successful operation, for due to that, the
fact that we do not want to place them was in any event accepted in wider
circles. I'm still thinkings if we had not done that at that time, we would
not be in the cabinet now and ultimately that is the objective."
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[Que stion] It seems the discussion on nuclear arms will never stop
~Van Traa] "No, and I think tha~'s good
- [Question] and shortly the nuclearization of the F-16 and, woops, there the
party goes again, on its hind legs
[Van Traa] "Yes, but we'll have to avoid that. I think a plan should come
about. We must not distance ourselves from the minister; there is little sense
in that if one doesn't make good on it; I have also learned that meanwhile."
[Que stion] What plan?
[Van Traa] "A: which nuclear tasks you reject the F-16 has to be included in
that, and B. why you do it. Recently I discussed this problam with a few high
officials of Defense, and there is really no one who can indic3te why those
things have to be kept around exactly. There are general political reasons,
_ but you should have a foreign policy with it, and that still doesn't exist.
Thus, for example, at one point we will have to explain what kind r,f link ex-
- ists between the United States and Europe, for that has sometimes been a mis-
take of the PvdA; it always ac:.ed as if the United States did not exist in
re:ation to Europe."
~Question] Isn't L~e ~arty driven to some extent by the desire to resist the
United States, cost what cost?
[Van Traa] "Look, a lot has been said about the position of the PvdA in the
Netherlands, at least the position we thought we had: if the socialists are
the biggest party in the Netherlands, then we should be able to do what we want
- to do. In itself that still is the correct attitude, only one is confronted
with the data that outside of the Netherlands power politics play just as much
a role and that therefore one is forced to make all sorts of compromises, first
as a party and then as government."
[Question] Helding, in the NRC [Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant-Handelsblad] recent-
ly accused you of not being clear on that
[Van Traa] Because of my daily political work, it has unfortunately not been
possible to ,write a thorough article in Heldring's magazine, the respectable
"Internati.onal Spectator." But Heldring dce s give somewhat the impression ofs
how can a decent guy not agree with my standpoint?"
Alternatives
"His position is esseiitiallyt we are in NATO, the United States are the most
powerful in that, and that puts iimits on what is possible and what isn't; any
alternatives that could be developed in Europe come to nothing anyway. That's
why I believe he wrote after the Polish coup that we should give Jaruzelski the
benef~t of the doubt. In other wordsc that we should not have the illusion in
the Net'~erlands that we can change even an iota in foreign policy. I disagree
with that.Socialists also must find room and strength for a different view of
society where they are the strongest. That is within Europe."
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- [Question] Haven't you had a difficult time with ths Soviet Union in the
last 3 years?
[Van Traa] Yes. First Afghanistan, then Poland, and in betweeii the SS-20.
I don't think we're out of our difficulties yEt. I think that in the
Netherlands we are going through a process which also took place in France
to a more violent degree. We are wondering exactly what the sociological
development of that state is. Officially, that was already covered in our
declaration of policy, for that states that democratic socialism differs in
principle from state socialism, but that simply means the Soviet model as
compared to the American, the capitalist model.
We have of course been a little too long under the influence of well-meaning
clergymen who, without any dialectical knowledge, adopted the attitude of 'it
can't be all t}~at bad' in NCSV [Dutch Christian Students' Union] camps, and
who were of course very much influenced by the pressure to eliminate anti-
communism." ~
Teach-in
"Look, if you are from a party which in 1952 let Koos Vorrink go to the SPD to
persuade the comrades in Bonn to agree to German re- armament with the Atlantic
Alliance and whatever else, and through Dr De Jong at that, then a prominent
PvdA member whom I can still see defend the position at a teach-in together
with Hiltermann that the regime of Mr Diem offered tY:e best guarantees for
L Patijn who saw
a democratic development in South Vietnam, and through Mr C. .
the regions of Pomerania and East Prussia as natural German territory in the
debate on th:. DDR, then you really have to swallow a loou needed timettoS not
so strange, in an historical respect, that as a party y
digest the Gulag the 10 or 15 million dead of Stalin.
"But we have indeed made mistakes in the analysis, and I have indeed changed
in that respect. But what I am. always being accused of with respect to
Poland is that I did not do anything worthwile, and that is not right.
Solidarity did not want direct contact; we tried it but they did not want con-
tact with any socialist party in the West because they clearly understood they
should not do that. Now they want it, and now it's too late."
[Question] Harry van den Bergh, at the time his re-election came up, was re-
proached for spending too much time in airplanes and too little in the party
branches. Wim $OVan Traa~alsodhasnthesinternationaleamrntrafficWSChedulenat
he was elected.
his fingertips.
[Van Traa] "I also use airplanes. In mYba~pbutnthatais not~thelcasey~~that
I would travel by train, with a sleeping g,
[Question] The international home port for the international secretary of a
socialist partartieshfromcsuchSdivergingtcountries as thebNetherlands,IFinland,
natior.al are p
the FRG and Senegal. How does that work?
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[Van Traa] "Sometimes it works smoothly, but sometimes not so smoothly.
Brandt was very irritated about the course o� events with respect to Poland.
I can easily understand that from his point of view; he is the ar~hitect of
the Ostpolitik. Sometimes things don't go too smoothly. I know that Brandt
said to Mitterand but that was not in an S�] jSocialist Youth] ~
meeting--: '�Do you know we have many more missiles stationed in the FRG than
there are in your republic, and do you also know that you will use the
weapons you have first in Germany and not in France, and that we do not have
the same power of decision on that as you do?'"~ Mitterand answered to thats
'Well, yF;, that is one uf the nasty consequences of World War II; I can't
help that either.' Well, that doesn't promote communication.
"Often things go much better in smaller groups than in large meetings which
sometimes threaten to become a type of small United Nations."
[Question] Who are the greatest contributors?
[Van Traa] "Kreisky, Palme, Jospin, Joop den Uyl also when he feels like it,
Karel van Miert, Michael Harrington because he always has a very fine and good
analysis of what is happening in the United States, and Brandt himself, al-
though he does not participate too much in the debate, but he dce s all sorts
of things in connection with it. The Italians; not many people listen to them
excQpt to Craxi when he comes himself, but he usually doesn't come. Felipe
Gonzales, Soares to a lesser degree; that is somewhat of a past glory, but
Gonzales is one of our few younger forces who have a very great tactical
~ capability. He has a ~cry good analytical capacity. And he is also a nice,
ordinary man. Some of those people no longer act like mortal men. That is
part of the difficulty."
[Question] Who?
[Van Traa] "Mitterand, very much so. I spoke with him 5 times in my life, but
only o~ce, after a dinner in Santo Domingo, was I able to simply talk with him
for an hour. Not that he will remember, but I find something like hat im-
portant, because I still have the normal Dutch notion that you have to know
the person you're dealing with."
[Question] Eternal feuds?
[Van Traa] Yes, the Israelis and Kreisky, of course, but that is known. But
in general things are done diplomatically, and it should be that way in order
to get down to business in such a large group."
Direct Power .
[Question] In that International you are concerned with re~l international
giants, such as the West Germans, people who have cabinet responsibility such
as the French, and people who are truly in the midst of the struggle, such as
the Israelis. What exactly is the weight of the PvdA in such a group? �
tVan Traa] "Of course it is not a matter of power as such, but more of the
dynamics of such a Socialist Internationa~'-- the image they have of it in
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~Latin America and in the United States rather tk?an of the precise content
of our discussions. But sometimes you have direct power, as I did during the
1980 congress when I was chairman of the resolutions commission; 'tlien, of
course, you have influence on such a declaration. It is also a matter of
just being everywhere, of presence. And via the secretariat o� the Socialist
International, you can organize something, such as last year when I wanted to
go to Argentina. I phoned and said: "Can't we make a mission of it?" And t
went there, and walked on the square with those women. We were there also in
connection with the situation around the Argentine socialist party, which had
discredited the Socialist Interzational by cooperating too much with the
junta. Now, after our report on that trip, the y are being suspended."
[Question] Thus you get to see rulers who are not always kindly disposed
towards you. Have you ever been thrown out?
[Van Traa] "No, but sometimes something likes 'That's enough, sir.' I always
try to act properly and start with a long introduction. Sometimes it is dif-
ficult when people really want to start a discussion with you. The clas-
sical counter question iss 'You had the Moluccans, didn't you? You took steps
against them, didn't you? There were casualties, weren't there?'
"In Argentina we wanted to discuss the missing persons. We asked if we could
submit a list with 6000 missing persons. We were told: 'No, we don't want that,
that matter has been closed.' ~`But,' we resur.~ed, 'arer~'t there special cases
of people who either completed their punishment or who were never convicted
and who have permission to enter four or five countries?' 'Well, which people
do you mean, exactly?' Do you understande firsr it is the general principle,
and afterwards a choice. And then you still don't know if it will work.
"But thrown out, no, not that. There wer~ some tricks, however. Last year we
were in Uruguay, three of us the Spanish party, the French one and we. I
was chairman. And the minister of foreign affairs wanted to talk only to the
French because he had studied in France and had such good memories of that.
Actually, he did that of course because Mitterand had just been elected "
[Question] Have you ever had the feeling that you're being driven up a wall?
Kurds, Nicaraguans, Afghans, Turks, South Africans, they alt knock on your
door, and then the nuclear arms and milk prices in the Common Market7
[Van Traa] "Yes, eh no, that is the advantage when you have been a journalist,
so that you have an idea of everything you have to do with so many duties.
And as to all ~hose people, I think you have to give them time if they are
at least somewhat bona fide. The only thing I hesi'tate about sometimes is
solidarity by signature sending another telegram. Then you sometimes
think: you're getting off too easily."
[Question] ~The IKV [Interchurch Peace Council] determir~ed the atmosphere at
a few congresses. The whole discussion almost cost the party its primary can-
didate, and now it has gone so far that the IKV is invited to weekend retreats
of the party leaders.
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[Van Traa] "Recently we talked at length with Ben ter Veer again. That was '
in ~he framework of the discussion with the IKV and I indeed saw somewhat of
~ a shift in the direction of more attainable standpoints. Look, the frus-
tration evoked by the cry /The Netherlands Free of Nuclear Arms/ is that the
IKV used that slogan to make us reflect on a different security policy in
general. A lot of people thought, however, that it was not a means, but
precisely the goal. Well we did not agree with that goal, and then they
started to call us 'Joop ~Den Uyl] Atom and his pals.' Therefore we asked
Mient Jan Faber [IKV secretary] just how importa.zt making the Netherlands
free of nuclear arms is to him in the framework of the European approach
pf the peace movement. Then he saidt 'In itself that is not so important.'
Look, sometimes we act as if such an activist group wr~nged us, but we also
call ourselves a party of action, and we should not show an attitude of rejec-~
tion toward a group such as the IKJ. For that matter, we put ourselves be-
hind the IKV slogan in 1979."
[Question] Doesn't it surprise you that after 21 November a party such as
the PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party] isn't making greater gains than it is?
[Van Traa] "No, we have already seen that people are running off to the right,
primarily because of the socioeconomic problems. They think that the left
won't succeed ultimately, but in the end they will~find out that it does make
a difference to the armament policy that we are here. TY:ey will notice that
when the government comes to a decision, that it will be opposed, or that
there will be a cabinet crisis."
[QLestion] Will there be one, the n?
[Van Traa] "Yes, tha.t will happen. You won't believe it, but it will happen." _
[Question] Do you find that, as foreign secretary, you are helping to govern
the party as a whole?
[Van Traa] "I find less and less that I am responsible only for foreign mat-
ters; I also like to participate in Dutch politics; look, otherwise you be-
come a type of technocrat who sa~yss 'I have nothing to do with that health
insurance act.' I don't want it that way. The first thing I do in the morning
is look to see how many lay-pffs there are. You have to fight daily against
the image that tYHe PvdA is making a mess of things. Thus, raging inwardly,
I can easily phone Ferdinandusse about a headline in VRIJ NEDERLAND such as
'The Healthy National Perception of Minister Van der Louw,' without an s.
As though unconsciously we have to be associated with national-socialism. Then,
use a term such as the silent majority Ar something similar. What nonsense."
[Question] From our discussion it is continually obvious that the nuclear arms
discussion is a theme that dominates almost everything. It keeps you busy al-
most daily; it has brought Den Uyl to the edge of the party; the parliament-
ary group is continually queried on that matter. Is all that not too much for
a party with a broad interest?
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[Van Traa] "It's not that bad, really. I am involved in it, it does deter- '
mine a great deal of my work and perhaps that of one or two members of the
parliamentary group, but not of others. And look, if the government is able
to: a. give an idea of how it intends to reject nuclear tasks and in what
framework, and b. ultimately still is able to make a decision on those mis-
siles, we'll have made great progress.
"If it does not happen, yes, then it will indeed come back. For then the term
'pushing back of nuclear arms' can be relegated to the rummage attic of
false clains. If we are not able to show that something is happening, I do
not see much hope for the party."
COPYRIGHT 1982 v1V/BV Weekbladpers
8700
CSO: 3105/117

~
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GENERAL FRANCE
- ARIANESPACE PLANS LAUNCHrS, RECEIVES ORDERS, IMPROVES ROCKETS .
Orders, Launch Calendar, Military Use
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 2 Jan 82 pp 22-26
[Articles by Pierre Langereux: "F3.rm Plans for 27 Ariane Launches Through
1985"]
[Text] The ESA [European Space Agency] and Arianespace now have f irm orders
for the launching of 25 (soon to be 27) satellites, from Europe and abroad.
These are made up of the 12 satellites for which the ESA took responsibility--
- 3 satellites during the flight tests in the APEX free-launching program and 9
in the promotional series--as we11 as the 15 satellites next assigned to Ariane-
space for operational launchings to take place from the middle of 1983.
These 27 satellites will be placed into orbit for 13 customers, including 7
from Europe (15 satellites) and 6 from abroad (12 satellites), among whom are
3 large U.S. companies--GxE Satellite Corp., Southern Pacific Communications
Corp., and Western Union--and the international organizat~on Intelsat. Five
Intelsat 5 satellites are now assigned to Ariane. The Board of Governors of
Intelsat, meeting in Washington on 11 December 1981, 3n fact decided to order
two more Ariane launches to place its last Intelsat 5 satellites (F14 and F15)
into orbit in March and June 1985. This new contract with Arianespace, total-
ing about $93 million for the two launches, should be signed in January 1982.
We should remember that the first three Intelsat 5 satellite launchings
(F6 to F8) have been ordered from the ESA at prices (indexed) of from $27.5
million to $28.2 million each. These are, in fact, launches planned to take
place between October 1982 and July 1983 and benefit from the ESA "promotional"
rates.
- Operational launches ordered from the ESA and Ar~.anespace extend f rom the
- beginning of 1982 pract3cally to the end of 1985. (See the table.) Some
scheduling conflicts between Arianeapace and a number of customers whose
launch orders are firm are not yet resolved.
Thus, Arianespace has scheduled the launchings of the French Telecom lA and 1B
telecommunications satellites for September and December 1983 respectively,
whereas a recent official co~unique 3ointly released by the CNES [National
Center for Space Studies] and the DGT [General Dir~ctorate fox Telecommunica-
tions] pointed out that the customers had planned the launchings for Suly and
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Table 1. Arianespace Customers (as o~ 31 December 1981)
Firm Orders
1 APPLE Tndia
1 METEOSAT 2 ESA
2 MARECS A and B ESA for TNMARSAT ,
1 SIRIO 2 ESA
2 ECS 1 and 2 ESA for EUTELSAT
1 EXOSAT ESA
1 GIOTTO ESA
1 AMSAT/OSCAR Radio Amateurs (Germany)
3 INTELSAT 5(F6 to F8) INTELSAT
2 INTELSAT 5(F14 and F15) INTELSAT
2 TELECOM lA and 1B DGT (France)
1 SPQT 1 CNES (France)
1 VIKING SSC (Sweden)
1 TV-SAT BmFT (Ger.many)
1 TDF 1. TDF France
1 ARABSAT 1 ASCO (Arab League)
1 WESTAR 6 Western Un~on (U.S.)
2 SPACENET 1 and 2 Southern Pacific (U.S:)
2 GSTAR 1 and 2 GTE Satel.lite (U.S.)
27 Launchings 13 customers
Options
2 ECS 3..and 4 ESA for EUTELSAT
1 L-SAT ESA
1 SPOT 2 CNES (France)
' 1 TEI,EX SSC (Sweden)
2 SATCOL 1 and 2 PTT (Colombia) .
2 SBTS 1 and 2 PTT (Brazil)
2 AUSSAT 1 and 2 PTT (Australia)
1 CLT 1 CLT (Luxembourg)
1 SPACENET 3 Southern Pacif ic (U.S.)
1 GSTAR 3 GTE Satellite (U.S.)
1 STC 1 Satellite TV (,U. S.)
1 ARABSAT 3 ASCO (Arab League)
1 MARECS C BADG
TELSAT 1 BADG for�TELSAT (Switzerland)
17 options 12 customers
Under Negotiation
6 INTELSAT 6 (F1-F6~) INTELSAT
2 ERS 1 and 2 ESA
1 Hipparcos ESA
1 CBS 1 CBS (U.S.) ~
1 DBS 1 Direct Broadcasting (U.S.)
[continued]
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~Iable 1 continuedj
1+ RCA RCA (U.S.)
1+ ANIK TELESAT (Canada)
3-4 OPMET EUMETSAT
2 SKYNET 3 Ministry of Defense (Great Britain)
1 NATO 4 NATO
1+ SAMRO Ministry of Defense (~rance)
20+ Under negotiation 10 customers
October 1983 respectively. But the launch window of July 1983 is at present
reserved by the ESA for its ECS 2 satellite or an INTELSAT 5(F8).
On the other hand, the launch windows between the end of 1984 and the begin-
~ning of 1985 which, up to now, had been firm are now f ree because of the delay
- (about 6 months) of the direct television satellites, the German TV SAT and the
French TDF 1. Their. deliveries, in f act, are now planned for 15 February 1985
and 15 May 1985 respectively, which defers the launching of the TV SAT until
May 1985 and of the TDF 1 until September 1985. Teledi~fusion de France
[French Television Network] reportedly wished to launch its sacellite in
July 1985 but that window is reserved for the ESA camet probe, Gi�otto, which
must nect5sarily be launched on 10 July 1985!
Seventeen Options
Some 12 customers, of whom 5 are ~'rom Europe (7 satellites) and 7 from over-
seas (10 satellites), now have options from Arianespace for 17 satellite
launchings between 1984 and 1986 with the new Ariane 2, 3, and 4 rockets.
These include an option for the ESA's ECS 3 telecommunications satellite in
April 1984 and no fewer than 13 options for 1985. Among the latter one notes
the ESA's ECS 4 telecammunications satellite, SATCOL 1 and 2 for Colombia,
SBTS 1 and 2 for Brazil, AUSSAT 1 and 2 for Australia, CLT 1 for Luxembourg,
and ARABSAT 3 for the Arab League, as well as SPACENET 3 of the Southern
Pacif ic Co~nunications Corp and GSTAR 3 of GTE Satellite Corp., already
Arianespace customers. The British firm, British Aerospace Dynamics Group
(BADG) has also taken an option for launching e3ther the MARECS-C satellite
or the TELSAT 1 which it hopes to build for the Telsat firm (Switzerland).
Three additional options for 1986 involve the CNES earth observation satel-
1ite, SPOT 2, the television broadcasting satellite TELEX of the Swedish
Space Corp. (Sweden), and the European experimental direct TV satellite,
LSAT, whose placement into orbit has been deferred from 1985 to 1986. Be-
sides, Arianespace has potential orders which are practically certain but for
which contracts have not yet been signed. Then there are th~ ECS 3 and 4
satellites whose placement into orbit by the Ariane is planned on dates which
remain to be specified.
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Table 2. Schedule of Firm Launchings With the Ariane Between Now and 1986 .
Flight No Date Payload Rocket
Test Flights ;
L O1 24 December 1979 None Ariane 1
L 02 23 May 1980 FIREWHEEL + OSCAR 9* Ariane 1 ~
L 03 15 Tune 1981 METEOSAT 2+ APFi.~ Ariane 1 ~
L 04 19 December 1981 MARECS A Ariane 1
Operational I?lights
L 5 April 1982 MARECS B+ SIRIO 2 Ariane 1
L 6 July ECS 4+ AMSAT/OSCAR Ariane 1
L 7 October EXOSAT or INTELSAT 5(F6) Ariane 1 ~,g
L 8 December EXOSAT or INTELSAT 5(F6) Ariane 1~�~
L 9 February 1983 INTELSAT 5(F7) Ariane 1~~ a
L 10 May ECS 2 or INTELSAT 5(F8) Ariane 1~'
L 11 July ECS 2 or INTELSAT 5(F8) Ariane 1 ~
Entry into Service of the New Ariane 2 and Ariane 3 Versions (mid 1983)
L 12 September TELECOM lA Ariane 2 ~
~ L 13 December TELECOM 1B + Westax 6 Axiane 3 w
L 14 February 1984 SPACENET 1+ ARABSAT 1 Ariane 3 ~
m
L 15 April GSTAR 1+(ECS 3)** Ariane 3 y
L 16 June SPOT 1+ Viking Ariane 2 ~
L 17 August GSTAR 2+ SPACENET 2 Ariane 3 ~D
L 18 October Open Ariane 2/3
L 19 December Open Ariane 2/3
L 20 February 1985 (SBTS-1 + SATCOL 1)** Ariane 2/3
Entry into Se~-vice of the "ELA 2" Second Launch Pad (March 1985)
L 21 March INTELSAT 5(F14) Ariane 2/3 ~
L 22 May TV-SAT Ariane 2/3
L 23 June INTELSAT 5(F15) Ariane 2/3 ~
L 24 July GIOTTO +(STC 1)** Ar3ane 2/3 b
L 25 September TDF 1 Ariane 2/3 ~
L 26 October First firing, Ariane 4+? Ar3ane 4 ~D
L 27 December Open
Entry into Service of the Ariane 4 Rocket (March 1986)
* Failure: launcher exploded in flight and satellites were lost
**Option to be confirmed
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Twenty Launchings Being Negotiated
Negotiations in progress with Arianespace involve 20 launches with~the Ariane
for 10 cust~~ers.
Thus, Arianespace notes negotiations with Intelsat for the new Intelsat 6
(F1 to F6) telecommunications satellites whose compatability with the~new
Ariane 4 rocket is planned in the specifications. Co;~tracts are being drawn
up with the Canadian Telsat firm for launching the ANTK telecommunications
- satellites as well as with several American companies for telecommunications
and direct television satellites, among them the CBS Hetwork (one satellite),
the Direct.Broadcasting Satellite Corp. (one satellite) and RCA (several ~
satellites after RCA H), For its part, Grumman Aeroapace also believes that
other potential customers, such as S~S, AT&T, American Satellite, and so
forth, may a7.so be interested. Europe also contemplates launching three or
four OPMET oparational meteorological satellites as successors to the METEOSAT
satellites now in orbit; but that program is linked to an agreement among the
member countries to establish EUMETSAT, a new European organization responsible
for exploitation of operational meteorological satellites.
On the other hand, even though options have not yet been taken, the launching,
in 1986, of the European scientific satellite,.Hipparcos, and the first
teledetection satellite, ERS 1, of the ESA--which also plans an ERS 2 a little
later--can be considered certain.
This adds up, therefore, to at least 35 certain launches for the Ariane between
now and the middle of the decade, of which 27 are firm, plus 5 launches under
option, and 3 more in negotiation, to count only the satellites whose construc-
tion is certain and whose launchings are necessarily planned with the Ariane.
Military Satellites
For the first time, Arianespace is also.counting upon negotiations with defense
organizations for launching of military satellites between now and the end of
the decade. The launching of such "nonaggressive" satellites (telecomnunica-
tions, observation, navigation, and so forth) is actually compatible with the
objectives of Arianespace, which is committed to "peaceful" launc.hings.
Thus negotiaticns are undeYway with the British Ministry of Defense for
launching two SKYNET 3 military telecommunications satellites. These launch-
ings are being negotiated by Arianespace in competition with the Space Shuttle
at "military" prices. The company is also proposing.to NATO the launching of
a NATO 4 satellite built in the United States.
Arianespace also makes mention of contacts with the French Ministry of Defense
for launching several SAMRO military reconnaissance satellites, construction
of which has been under study for several yeare. These satellites will
utilize the platform of the CNES observation satellite, SPOT, fitted out with
new instruments for taking pictures.
COPYRIGHT: A & C 1981.
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Rockets in Production, Manufacturers Invo_lved
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 2 Jan 82 p 27
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "Twenty-four Ariane Rockets in Production"]
[Text]. Construction of 24 Ariane rockets for launchings planned during the
~ first 5 yc.ars of its utilization, up to the middle of the decade, is now
committed.
~ These include the four rockets of the development program utiiized for the
flight tests (L O1 to L 04) from December 1979 to December 1981, as well as
the first 20 rockets of the series ordered for operational flights (L 5 to Y. 24)
from the middle of 1982 to the middle of 1985, that is, during the first 40
months of commercial exploitation.
For the first operational launches--"the promotional series"--a first lot of
six rockets in the series (L 5 to L 10) was put into production by the ESA in
- April 1978. This operational series, which initially comprised five rockets,
was later expanded to six, to include one spare which was recently allocated
to an operational launch for the Intelsat organization. These six "promo-
tional" launches are thus intended to place three INTELSAT 5(F 6 to F 8)
satellites into orbit, as well as the European MARECS B, SIRIO 2, EXOSAT and
ECS 1 and AMSAT/OSCAR, the German radio amateurs' satellite. Launching of
the French TELECOM lA telecoimnunications satellite, to replace the SPOT 1
satell.ite, is also contemplated for 1984. All these launches are planned
between the beginning of 1982 and the beginning of 1983.
Arianespace next assumed responsibility for building the xockets in the
series intended for succeeding operational.launches. A second lot of four
rockets in the series~(L 11 to L 14) was ordered in April 1979 f or launches
planned between the middle of 1983 and the beginning of 1984. Recently a
third lot of five rockets in the series (L 15 to L 19) was placed in produc-
tion for succeeding launches planned up to the end of 1984.
From 1982, Arianespace begins long term stockpiling for a fourth lot of
five serially produced rockets (L 20 to L 24), which should be ordered dur-
ing the third quarter of 1982, or perhaps sooner, considering the very favor-
able development of the market. These rockets will serve operational launches
up to the middle of 1985. ~
The first 11 rockets produced, for the flight ~ests and promotional series
will all be of the present Ariane 1 type, which will be used up to the middle
of 19a3. Starting then, in fact, the new Ariane 2 and 3 veraions, with im-
proved perfortnance, which will be built within the scope of the second serially
produced lot (L I1 to L 14) and subsequent lots, will be placed in service.
Only starting with the fourth in the lot series {L 20 to L 24) will the new
Ariane 4 rockets, which ha~~e still higher per~ormance, be built; the first
flight test of this series is planned for the end of 1985 (Octaber or December)
so that they may go into operational service in March 1986.
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The Arianespace firm has been delegated manufacturing supervision of production
by the ESA. For this Arianespace depends on seven European aerospace firms
with which it has contracts as manufacturing general contractors. These are
Aerospatiale (France) for tasks of manufacturing design and providing the first
and third stages; SEP (France) for propulsion units; MATRA (France) for equip~
ment compartment; Air Liquide (France) for the third stage tanks; ERNO
(Germany) for the second stage; Contraves (Switzerlaad) for the nose; and
Dif esa e Spazio (Italy) for the solid fuel boosters. This industrial organiza-
tion will be involved wit:i the present (Ariane 1) and future (Ariane 2 and 3)
versions.
At present pruduction rate of the Ariane launchers--about five rockets a year--
building on a new rocket should begin every 2'~ months. This rate, considered
ambitious yet a short whilE ago, is going to be revised upward as the marketing
effort h~s taken otf very favorably.
Arianespace, now in charge of production, will draw up the schedule of launcher
orders at the end of the third quarter of 1982 in order to ~etermine how much
to increase the production rate.
The present status of firm orders booked (27) and those potential orders which
are quite certain (8), or 35 satellites to be launched between now and the
middle of the decade, necessitates increasing the production rate to at least
6 rockets annually and perhaps more right now. The manufacturing investments
to be made to attain a rate of six to eight rockets a year are practically of
the same order of magnitude, about 80 million francs, according to Ariane-
space. Moreover, European industry is ready to go to a rate of eight ~cockets
a year. However, it must be noted that thera is a limitation--unforeseen--on
the production rate of Ariane rockets: simply stated, it is the time (18 months)
required for delivery of the rolled sheet metal for the structure and the
tanks. In fact, it requires special rolling mills (Sendzimir) which, in
- France, are limited in number and are at presenC working at full capacity to
meet the great demand.
Manufacturers in the Ariane Program
The Ariane rocket development progra?n of the European Space Agency (ESA) ~.s
being carried out with the National Center for Space Studies (CNES) as
general contractor, with the following principal contractors: Aerospatiale,
SEP, Matra and Air Liquide (France); Contraves (Switzerland); and ETCA-ACEC
(Belgium). The ONERA has provided technical asaistance.
The other manufacturers participating in the progrsia are:
In France--Artus, Aubert et Duval, ACMfi, B1oIIane, BSR, C11-Honeywell Bull,
Bronzavia, Cegedur, Clemessy, Comsip Enterprise, Crouzet, CSEE, Dassault-
Breguet, Dembiermont, Deu~:sch, Dumez, Daher-Hugonnet, Tndustria, Tntertech-
nique, Forgeal, Le Bozec et Gautier, Measier-Hispano, Motorola-Fxance, SAFT,
SAT, Sfena, Sfim, SILAT, Sintra, Sodeteg, Souriau, So~rair, Snecma, Starec,
Steiner, Socitec, Sofrance, Societe Commentryenne des Aciers Fins, Societe des
Produits de 1'Azote, SGE, Sarma, La Technique Integrale, Thomson-CSF;
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J
rvn vrr~~,ana, voa: vi~a.i
. In Germany--Bosch, Dornier, DFVLR, MAN, MBB, ERNO, Hansa;
In Belgiian--Bell Telephone, FN-Herstal, SABCA, Valcke;
Yn Italy--Aeritalia, CGE-FIAR, Laben, Selenia, SNIA-Viscosa;
In the Netherlands--Fokker-VFW, Philips, NLF, Rosscher;
In the United Kingdo~--Avica, British Aerospace, Ferranti, Marconi, Simon;
In Sweden--SAAB-Scania, Volvo;
In Switzerland--Battig, CIR, VFW F~?en-FFA-Pilatus, Cryophysics, AGIE;
In Denmark--Dannebrog Elektronik, Kampsax, Rovsing, Terma, Logstor, Bruun
Sorensen;
~ In Spain--CASA, Duro, Sener
COPYRIGHT: A & C 1981
Background, Stockholders of Arianespace
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 2 Jan 82 pp 30-31
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "Arianespace, First Space Txansport Company"]
[Text] Arianespace is the world's first commercial space transport company.
Established 26 March 1980 on the initiative of the National Center for Space
Studies (CNES), Arianespace is responsible for financing, production, and
marketing of launchings for the Ariane rocket in its present version (Ariane 1)
and for future improved models (Ariane 2, 3, and 4). It is a private corpora-
tion organized under French law which was entered upon the commercial register
at Corbeil, Department of Essonne, on 8 April 1980. Its headquarters are at
Evey, near Paris. It now has about 70 employees, but there will be about 115
by April. 1982. The president�-general manager of Arianespace is Frederic
d'Allest, director of the "launcher" division of the CNES and by virtue of
that fact the official responsible for the Ariane program. He iFS assisted
by a secretary general, Roland Des.champs, and two deputy general managers,
Klaus Iserland, for technical and comm~ercial matters, and Herve' Loiseau, for
administrative and f inancial matters.
The board of directors of Arianespace comprises 18 members, including the
president-general inanager and 10 directors of 7 companies (Aerospatiale, SEP,
Matra, ERNO, Volvo, SABCA, Contraves) and of the CNES (2 representatives), as
well as 6 auditors (ESA, CASA, Dornier, SNIA Viscosa, British Aerospace, and
Credit Lyonnais). [Sentence as publishedJ
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Fifty-One French and Foreign Stockholders
The Arianespace company now has 51 French and foreign stockholders, including
the CNES, which is the largest stockholder (34 percent) as well as 36. European
aerospace firms which, together, hold 61.9 percent of the capital stock, and
14 European banks whose total participation amounts.to only 4.1 percent.
French stockholders, public and private, hold a ma~ority of the stock (59.25
percent). However, all th~ leading manufacturers of 11 countries participating
in the Ariane program are re~~:resented more or less in proportion to their�g~r-
ticipation in the development .qnd production of the European ].auncher.
Arianespace has avai~.able a capitalization of 120 million francs, subscribed
by the 51 European stockholders who are also committed to lend the company,
if necessary, 30 million francs in the form of restricted current accounts.
Besidc~s, the special stockholders meeting held on 26 June 1980 un~nimously
autho�cized Arianespace to contract a loan of 29 million francs with six French
banks: BNP, Credit Lyonnais, Societe Generale, Banq,ue Vernes, Paribas and
Banque Francaise du Commerce Exterieur [French Foreign Trade Bank]. Thua the
company has 179 million francs of its own funds available.
In addition, a combined meditnn and long-~erm l~an of 150 million francs in-
tended to finance the building of a spare launcher has been agreed to by four
European financial organizations: Credit National (France), Banque Eur.opeene
d'Investissements (Luxembourg), Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau [Bank for Recon-
struction] (Germany), and the Societe Nationale de Credit a 1'Industrie in
Belgium. That loan is intended for preliminary basic f~nancing of the company's
operations. The first installment of 75 million francs has been drawn, which
makes available to Arianespace 254 million francs of permanent working capital
(with the 179 million francs of its own funds) for its activities.
This basic financial structure enables Arianespace then to limit itself to
short term "construction" loans depending on its product3,on schedule and
_ accounts payable or receivable. Methods of payment in the form of inedium
term "purchaser credit" are also being proposed by Arianespace, its principal
bankers and the specialized organizations for foreign trade (COFACE) to help
customers finance their orders.
Arianespace's order backlog, which at the end of 1980 (6 months after the
company's founding) was still only 1.4 billion francs, now amounts to 2.4
billion francs in firm, signed contracts, of which 40 percent are "exports"
(that is, outside the EEC). This correaponds to launching 3 heavy satellites
of the Ariane class at $50 million each and 6 mediimm "semi-Ar~.ane" class
satellites at $24-25 million each. 3mong the 13 firm launching orders now held
by Arianespace. To these there will very soo.n be added Intelsa~'s new oxder,
amounting to $93 million, for launching two more Tntelsat 5 satellites in
1985, which will increase the total orders on the company's books to nearly
3 billion francs.
Arianespace predicts that the financial break-even point will be attained
during the second year of ita launching activities, that is, during the 1984
fiscal period. Arianespace will in fact assume xespons3bility ~or Ariane
rocket launchings in the middle of 1983, beginning with the llth launcher
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,
(L 11), the first four test rockets being part of the development program
managed by the CNES and the f irst six serially produced rockets being the
responsibility of the ESA in the scope of the "promotional series." All
operational launchings thereafter effected will be the responsibility of
Arianespace. Frederic d'Allest, the president-general manager predicts that
the company will realize an annual business volume of 1.4 billion francs ir!
1984 and on the order of 2 billion francs in 1985 (current francs).
Arianespace has already forged the first links of a vast coannercial network
which extends over practically all the continents: certainly Europe, but also
India, Australia, Latin America (Brazil, Colombia and so forth), the Arab
cvuntries and especially the United States. Arianespace has delegated to the
Ameri~an Grumman Aerospace Company responsibility for promot~on of the Euro-
pean launcher in the United States and.it has assigned to the OFEMA jFrench
Office for Export of Aeronautical EquipmentJ reaponsibility for repreaenting
its interests in other countries.
Twenty-five to 30 Percent of the Worldwide Launching Market
Arianespace actually expects to capture 25 to 30�percent of the worldwide
market for satellite launchings during the 1983-1990 period, in which launch-
ings ot about 200 satellites are contemplated worldwide (excluding the coun-
tries of the East) for installation or replacement of space systems (see AIR
ET COSMOS No 791). About 20 percent of those are launchings into low orbit
of from 600 to 1,200 lan for scientific or obaervation satellites, both civil
and military, and 80 percent of the launchings are for geostationary satel-
lites (at 36,000 lan) for meteorology, telecommunications and direct television
(starting in 1985)~ Telecommunications satellites which have experienced an
explosive expat~sion (25 percent annually for Intelsat) dominate the present
market. Now, Arianespace is in an optimwn position pr.ec3sely for geostationary
launches.
The market is divided geographically as follows: 36 percent of launchings
for the United States, 29 percent for Europe (ESA and two-~country programs),
14 percent `or international organizations (Intelsat, Inmarsat, Einnetsat, and
so forth), 10.5 percent for developed countries (national programs) and also
10.5 percent for developing countries (nati.onal or regional programs). In view
of the fact that the European market by itself already constitutes a third of
the worldwide market and knowing that naw an Ariane option is required in prac~
tically all international fnvitations to bid, Arianespace's ob~ectives there-
fore do not appear unrealistic.
A 25 to 30 percent share of the worldwide market should represent, for Ariane-
space, 50 to 60 satellite launchings in 8 years, that is, a business volume of
$1.5 to $1.8 billion out of a$6 billion market. Moreover, the company already
has practically realized a quarter or a third of this ob~ective,since at the
beginning of 1982, it can count on 15 firm launches, even though the European
launcher is only completing its qualification tests.
It therefore appears quite probable that between now and 1990 Arian~.pace will
attain--indeed even surpass--its planned ob~ective.
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Table 1. Participation of Arianespace's Stockholders
[in percent] [in percent]
France 59.25 Belgium 4.40
- CNES ~~4.00 SABCA 2�4
Aerospatiale 8.50 ETCA-ACEC 1.3
SEP 8.50 FN
MATgA 3.60
Air Liquide 1.85
Comsip 0.10 I~aly 3.60
Crouzet 0.10
Deutsch 0.10 SNIA-Viscosa 1.6
Intertechnique 0.10 Selenia 0.90
SAFT 0.10 d~e~c~tal~.a 0.90
Sfena 0.10 Iaistituto San Paolo di Turino 0.20
Sfim 0.10
Sodeteg 0.10 Switzerland 2.70
Credit Lyonnais 0.50
gNp 0.01 Contraves 2�15
Paribas 0.40 CIR 0.15
Banque Vernes 0.20 FRA 0.10
Societe Financiere Auxiliaire 0.49 Union des Banques Suisses 0.30
Valorind 0.40 United Kingdom 2.40
Germany 19.E0 British Aerospace 0.95
Ferranti 0.95
~ 7,9 Avica 0.30
ERNO 5.2 Midland 0.20
Dornier 2�$ Sweden 2.40
~ p,Bg 2.8
Dresden Bank 0.3 Volvo 1.60
Bayerische Vereinsbank AG 0.30 SAAB-Scania 0.80
Westdeutache Landeabank Netherlands 2.20
Girozentrale 0.30
Fokker 1.90
Spain 2.5 Allgemene Bank Nederland 0.30
Dernnark 0.70
CASA 1�9 Rovsing 0.50
Sener ~�6 Handel~bank 0.20
Ireland 0.25
Adtec 0.15
Aer-Lingus 0.10
COPYRIGHT: A & C 1981
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Launch Site Diagram
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 2 Jan 82 p 35
[Article by Pierre Langerewc: "ELA 2--A Second Launch Pad in Service in
March 1985"]
~Text] The rate of operational launchings now planned, counting only firm
orders, will grow f rom four annually in 1982 to five annually in 1983, six
in 1984, and then six or seven, or even more, starting in 1985. Actually there
are already 6 firm launchings and no fewer than 10 options for 1985.
Bp the middle of the decade, this planned workload wi.ll have saturated the
present capacity of the ELA 1 launchi.ng enaemble at Kourou, even when the
launch preparation time is reduced (from 3 months at present to 7 weeks in
1984) and taking into consideration numerous double launches and increased
launching capacity of the European rockets.
Theref ore it will be absolutely necessary to have available a second launch
pad--the ELA 2, whose entry into service is now set for March 1985, which is
a year later than originally planned, taking into account the comparable delay
experienced by the clevelopment program (see AIR ET COSMOS No 814).
It will be possible for the second launch ensemble, the ELA 2, to attain a
steady rate of 10 launches a year, but that will require additional invest-
ment: human (launching teams) and equipment (payload preparation bays, fuel
storage facilities, transport f acilities, and so forth). Therefore, in the
beginning one can count on only three launches a year froin the ELA 2, in
addition to the five or six a year made possible by the ELA 1(which will
remain in service until 1987). This should make it possible to easily meet
the predicted demand in 1985.
The possibility of some customers withdrawing and inevitable delays in satel-
lite readiness must be considered. However, to avoid excessive laxity in ob-
serving the launch dates stated by customers Arianespace is introducing
- into its contracts a"penalty" clause which varies, deperiding upon the date
at which schedule modifications are announced.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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COPYRIGHT: A & C 1981.
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Competition With American Launchers
- Paris PIR ET COSMOS in French 2 Jan 82 pp 33, 35
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "Arianespace Proposing Launchings To Order"]
[Text] Under present circumstances potential customers have a choice among
three launchers for their satellites, Arianespace's president, Frederic
d'Allest, explained recently:
--To ~rely on the American Shuttle which will offer the lowest price ($16 to
$18 million with~launching services) during the first 3 years of operational
service (from October 1982 to October 1985); but which also during that tine
wi11 present serious risks of delay and operational unavailability because
of the large reduction in the number of flights (only 28 between now and 1985);
or
--To stay with a proven launcher such as the American Delta (more than 140
launchings) which is more readily avzilable than the Shuttle but whose price
is distinctly higher ($25 million at the beginning of 1982) than that of the
Shuttle or the Ariane for equal performance. The Atlas-Centaur launcher
has also proved itself but that rocket is now at the end of its career: it
has few customers (except Intelsat and perhaps the U.S. Air Force also) be-
cause its performance has not evolved sufficiently and its price is very high
($61 million per launching); or
--To choose the Ariane, which is beginning its career but whose conventional
- design limits the technical riaks and whose price is intermediate ($25 to $30
million for a medium satellite of "semi-Ariane 3" class or $45 to $50 million
for full capacity) between that of the Delta and the Shuttle, with comparable
performance, and in addition, with better availability and a potential for in-
creased perfoYmance and cost reduction which is highly advantageous in com-
- parison with the U.S. rockets.
The advantages of the European launcher, moreover, are already being demon-
strated since it has just won three important contracts in the United States
in less than a month in the face of competition from the Shuttle and the Delta.
The Ariane 3 rocket which has been ordered in fact off ers performance superior
to that of the new Delta 3920, whose entry into service is planned for the
middle of 1982, by about 100 kg of additional payload, which is decisive for
customers. This actually makes it possible to add redundant channels and am-
plifiers for increased reliability or to carry more �uel to incr~ease service
life, as was explained by Roger P. Vallo, president of GTE Satellite Corp., an
Arianespace customer.
Ttie European launcher's trump cards in the face of competit~on f rom the
Shuttle, the only one which will remain at the end of the 1980 decade, are at
the same time technical, commercial, and financial, d'Allest explains.
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The Ariane's Trump Cards
~ The Ariane has numerous technical trumps to play against the Shuttle which is
poorly suited to high orbit missi'ons, especially launchings into geostationary
orbit.
The Ariane makes possible a process of direct injection into geosynchronous
transfer orbit, the passage into geostationary orbit being provided by the
apogee motor incorporated in the satellite. In contrast, the Shuttle neces-
sitates, in addition, a perigee motor which is put into ope'ration in accor-
da~ce with a relatively complex procedure: first, the entire assembly must be
deployed out from the hold and then moved away from the Shuttle before ignition
of the propulsor wt~ose guidance is generally gyroscopic (except in the case of
the expensive IUS with inertial station); the entire phase of placement into
orbit by the Ariane is controlled by an inertial station. In addition, con-
sidering the relative distance of Cape Canaveral (28.5�) from the equator
compared with that of Kourou (5�) injection by the Shuttle must also include
a large correction of the plane of the trajectory (for example, by means of
reignition of the perigee motor in flight), all things which affect the reli-
ability of launchings and precision of injections. Arianespace's president
thus believes that geostationary satellites are penalized by more than a year
of service life when they are launched by the Shuttle instead of the Ariane.
Ariane facilitates incorporation of satellites in the rocket even if they were
designed for the Shuttle or Delta. In fact, Arianespace has made special study
of the methods of incorporating payloads in the Ariane (explaa.ned in the
"Customer's Manual") in order to reduce interface problems.
The European rocket permits double launches, which considerably reduces the
price for ].aunching medium satellites (of "semi.-Ariane" class) i.n comparison
with the Delta, and this while retaining ease of incorporating each satel-
lite, thanks to the special adapter (SYLDA [Ariane double launching system])
made by Aerospatiale, which enables each satellite to be treated completely
independentiy.
In addition Ariane provides a favorable envirornnent for satellites as far as
payloads in flight are concerned (acoustics, acceleration, vibration,
pollution and so forth). This results in lower stresses upon the satellite's
(light~ structures,hence a gain in the payload), which influences costs.
Arianespace estimates that double launching of Delta class satellites with the
- Shuttle is about $4 million more expensive than with the Ariane.
These constraints of incorporation and flight are important for customers.
Intelsat has in fact abandoned launching its Intelsat 5 satellites with the
Shuttle because of the technical difficulties and hence the additional cost
(not to mention delays) which they represented (see AIR ET COSMOS No 886).
Arianespace is also careful to stay abreast of developments in the market;
that is, to adapt Ariane rocket performance and services to satellite develop-
ment at the technical and commercial levels. Hence, there is the development
- undenaay of an "Ariane family" which, in 4 years, will enable the launching
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capacity to be doubled at proportionately lower costs. And this withouL recon-
sideration of the launcher's design, and therefore with minimimm risks.
The performance in geostationa.ry transfer orbit will thus increase from 1.75
- tons with the present rocket (Ariane 1) to 2 and 2.4 ton.~, respectively, with
the improved models (Ariane 2 and 3), and then to 4~.3 tons with the new Ariane
4 rocket which will enter service in the beginning ~f 1986.
Ariane at present also offers greater availability although this advantage is
going to grow less diatinct in the next few years with the entry into service
of a fleet of four or five Shuttles as NASA plans. However, the fact remains
that the Shuttle has not passed the hurdle of a major technical problem which
will prevent the flight of the entire Shuttle fleet for some time, as can be
seen now with airplanes. Moreover, this has led to the decis3on by NASA to
form a"mixed fleet" of Shuttles and conventional launchers (see AIR ET COSMOS
No 887).
The European launcher's commercial advantages are also decisive. Arianespace
- is actually a commercial company where "the customer is king" according to the
policy reiterated by d'Allest, who proposes to sell rockets like airplanes,
that is, with consideration given to the problema of customers, particularly,
as far as launching windows, schedules, and facilities for payment and so forth
are concerned. In this regard the company is greatly aided by its banker stock-
holders who may, in certain cases, offer "easy" payments (COFACE credits),
which will, for example, enable a customer to pay for launching its satellite
over 5 years with revenues from exploitation!
Arianespace also guarantees to all its customers, in the event of a launching
failure, priority for relaunching another saCellite within a maximum of 10
months after demand has been made by the customer. Zn addi.tion, clients may
take out an insurance policy of guaranteeing the costs in the event of failure
for a premium of about 10 perc.ent of the launching price. But the Ariane's
reliability is supposedly guaranteed at the same level as that of American
rockets whose average success rate is about 87 percent. Ariane is allowing
for an average of T~.failure ~.out of 10 firings.
Such is the entire difference between the "made to order" se~rvice offered by
a coimnercial company like Arianspace and the "take it or leave it" service
provided by a[goverrunent] administration like NASA, d'Allest explains.
The financial advantages of the Ariane, in contrast, are leas obvious. The
European rocket at present is more expensive than the Shuttle, although the
prices proposed in 1980 for launching Intel.sat 5 satellites were comparable.
But the Shuttle prices are going to be substantially increased at the end of
the "promotional" period (October 1985), NASA has in fact given a glimpse of
an increase on the order of 64 percent in the launching rates of the
Shuttle in order to.absorb operating expenses fully.
The launching prices for the Ariane are also going.to change.. In particular,
the prices for launching by the new "Ariane 4" model European launcher will be
renegotiated, d'Allest announced.
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The Ariane is nevertheless not on a parity with the Shuttle. Both launchers,
as a matter of fact, have the benef it of government financial support, but
each to a very different extent. In order to promote the Ariane rocket on the
international market, the European countries have agreed to pay a little more
for their launchings than non-Europeans will pay. In contrast, the Shuttle
benefits from very large subsidies f rom the U.S. Government: construction of
the Shuttles ($1 billion each) is in f act entirely financed by NASA, that is,
- actually by the American taxpayers and that enormous expenditure is not in-
cluded in the price of Shuttle launching services.
It is only under such conditions that the Shuttle is at present comgetitive
with conventional rockets, American and European!
It remains to be seen whether that policy will be maintained in the future or
whether, on the contrary, the Americans will come around to establish a"true
price" for their recoverable launcher which would result in a corresponding
conformity of the prices of European launchers with the true market price for
launchers.
COPY RIGHT: A& C 1981
Technical Aspects of Ariane 2, 3, 4
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 2 Jan 82 pp 37, 39, 41, 43
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "Ariane 2 and 3 Rockets in 1983 and Ariane 4
in 1986"]
[Text] Europe has undertaken development of an Ariane family of launchers
which, between now and the middle of this decade, will permit tripling of per-
formance and reduction by 60 percent of the price of launchings compared with
the present basic version (Ariane 1).
Development of the new Ariane 2 and 3 versions was decided upon in 1980 to
improve the European launcher's performance 50 percent) and xeduce the price
of launchings (-25 percent), which may be still further lowered (-10 percent)
if recovery of the first stage proves feasible and useful.
The Ariane 2 and 3 models should enter service at the end of 1983, in Septem-
ber or December (L 12 or L 13 launchings). The first Ariane 3 f~.ring could
take place with the launching of the French Telecom lA satellite now planned
for September 1983 (L 12). It is planned to build at least 12 of these new
models for launchings up to 1986, when the Ariane 2 and 3 will be succeeded by
a new and more powerful model, the Ariane 4.
The Ariane 2 and 3 incorporate several improvemenCs over the basic launcher
(Ariane 1): ~
--A 9 percent increase in the thrust of the Viking 5 motors of the first stage
to 66 tons at takeoff and 72 tons in space (compared with 61 and 66 tons,
respectively for Ariane 1), and of ~the Viking 4 motors o~ the second stage to
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76 tons in space (compared with 70 tons) by increasing the combustion pressure
of the motors to 58.5 bars (compared with 53.5-54 bars);*
--An increase of more than 25 percent in the masa of cryogenic fuels of the
third stage, which will carry 10.5 tons of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen
(compared with 8 tons) by lengthening the tanks by 1.3�~eters;
--An increase of 3.5 to 4 seconds.in the specif ic impulse of the third stage
HM 7 motor by raising the combustion pressure to 35 bars (compared with 30
bars) and lengthenitZg the divergent cone of the nozzle by 150.millimeters,
which raises the sectional ratio to 80 (campared with 60). The thrust of the
motor remains the same (6 tons) bult the burn time reaches 700 seconds (com-
pared with 540 seconds);
--Expansion of volwne available for the payload by modificat3.on of the upper
portion of the nose (semicones) which, however, retains the sante diameter
(3.2 meters) and length (8.7 meters).
In addition, the Ariane 3 version has two solid fuel boosters, 8 meters long
and 1 meter in diameter, weighing 8.7 tons, of which 7.3 tons are solid fuel
(Flexadyne), each delivering thrust of about 70 tons (maximum o� 770 kilo-
newtons) during burn time of 28.3 seconds. They are ignited at takeoff and
jettisoned during the subsonic flight (250 meters per second). These boosters
are constructed by Difesa e Spazio (Italy) with the collaboration of MAN
(Germany) in the separation system and reinforcement of the motor support
necessitated by the additional stresses.
The Ariane 3 launcher's performance in. geosynchronous transfer orbit has thus
been increased to 2,420 kilograms, or 2,460 kilograms for a single launch.
But, taking into account results achieved during the Ariane 1 flight tests the
CNES has recently decided to reduce the "guidance reserve" (remaining fuel
planned for compensating variationsin the operation of the motors), which re-
sults in a weight gain of 200 kilograms. It is also planned to lighten cer- '
tain elements (equipment compartment, batteries and so forth) which will re-
sult in a further gain of 15 to 20 kilograms.
This is manifested by a significant increase in the payload which the Ariane 3
can place into geosynchronous transfer orbit--a payload which now reaches
2,560 kilograms for a single launching, and two times 1,190 k~lograms for a
double launching with the SYLDA (180 kilograms). The Ariane 3 will thus have
a launch capacity distinctly greater than that of competitive launchers for
payloads of these kinds (Shuttle or Delta-PAM D).
The Ariane 2 rocket, which incorporates the same isnprovements as the Ariane 3,
less the solid fuel boosters, will be able to pla::e about 2,100 kilograms into
geosynchronous.transfer orbit. ~
* The combustLon�pressure of the Viking motors of the Ariane 1 in the faur test
firings were, successively, 54 bars (I~ O1 and L 02), 53 bars (L 03) and 53.5
bars (L 04). It will remain at this 53.5-bar level for all operational flights
of the Ariane 1.
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The most powerful A~iane 3 will weigh 233 tons, with a thrust of 404 tons at
takeoff, whereas the Ariane 2 will weigh 214 tons and develop thrust of.264
tons .
Ariane 4: Competitor of the Shuttle
Development of the new Ariane 4 rocket, upon which Fraace decided on
15 October 1981 (see ATR ET COSMOS, No 878), 3s at present sub~ect to the
other European countries, which have declared themselves very f avorable to
the project, ~oining in. At that point the ESA will have no dif~iculty in
amassing the quota contributions necessary to begin the pro3ect--cost of which
is estimated at 1,500 million francs (1981 prices) with 20 percent contingency
margin in 1982. This also includes fabricat3on of a first Ariane 4 launcher
for the flight test planned in October or December 1985 for a payload which
will be open for bidding (see boxed text). The ArianE 4 rocket should enter
service in March 1986 to compete with the Shuttle more effectively than the
foregoing models, up to 1992 at least. It is even foreseeable that the Ariane
4 rocket will remain in service for at least 10 years.
This new version of the European launcher, the most powerful, will be char-
acterized by very great flexibility of use. Depending upon the configuration
it will in fact be able to place from 2 to 4.3 tons in geosynchronous
transfer orbit, it will have an assortment of nose cones (contraves) of
large diameter (4 meters) and lengths adapted to the payloads (9.6, 11.8 or
13.1 meters), and also a new adapter for double launchings, the SPELDA (Ex-
ternal Support Structure for Ariane Launchings) a part of which functions as
aft neck of the nose cone. Construction of SPELDA, estimated at about 30
million francs, was ths sub~ect of an invitation for beds, which were sub-
mitted by the British Aerospace Dyn~nics Group (Great Britain), Dornier
_ (Germany), and Aeritalia (Italy). Selection of the manufacturer will be made
in the beginning of January 1982, taking into consideration the willingness
of the British to increase their participation in the Ariane 4 program to 4 or
5 percent instead of the present 2.4 percent.
The Ariane 4 launcher is directly derived from the preceding Ariane 3, whose
three stages .it retains--the f irst being lengthened--and to which there are
added solid fuel and/or liquid fuel boosters. This configuration was adopted--
in preference to the addition of a fifth motor to.the first stage--in order to
reduce technical risks while still further improving performance. However,
this launcher configuration requires modification of the launch pad of the new
ELA 2 launching station which, in every way will be adapted in particular to
the Ariane 4.
The two stages are precisely those of the Ariane 3 with, however, structural
reinforcement to sustain the additional stresses.
The first stage of Ariane 4 resembl~s that of Ariane 3 with four Viking 5
motors, each with 66 tons of thrust at takeoff, operating under combustion
- pressure of 58.5 bars. But Che tanks are lengthened by more than 6 meters
(the length of the stage increases from 21.7 to 27.9~meters) ~or a 50-percent
increase ~in the amount of fuel (UDMH [unsymometrical dimethylhydrazine] and
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N204~[nitrogen tetroxide]) which thus comea to 210 tons (instead of 140 tons
as in the preceding versions). The first stage burn time is thus brought to
200 seconds (compared with 148 seconds).
Irt addition the new launcher wi.ll be selectively equipped, depending upon the
_ mission, with solid fuel and/or liquid fuel boosters attached to the first
stage and ignited at takeoff and then ~ettisoned in flight. This has entailed
~ reinforcement of t~he first sta,ge motor support to sustain the additional
thrust of the boosters and an increase in the surface of the stabilizers to
improve pilotability with liquid fuel boosters.
The solid fuel boosters initially are to be the same as those of the Arian~ 3.
But Italy offered to increase its participation in the program by improving
the Ariane 4 solid fuel boosters which will henceforth be loaded with 8.3 tons
of solid fuel (instead of 7.3 tons). These boosters are ignited at takeoff
and each provides thrust of about 70 tons. Like the previous ones they are
being made by Difesa e Spazio, in cooperation with MAN.
The liquid fuel boosters are entirely new. They are propulsors of 2.3 meters
_ diameter and 16 meters length which carry 37.5 tons of storable liquid fuels
(UDMH and N20q) and each has a Viking 5 motor (with fixed nozzle) which
delivers thrust of 66 tons at takeoff (like the first stage). The liquid fuel
boosters are ignited at takeoff; they function for 135 seconds and are ~etti-
soned at about 40 kilometers altitude (and are possibly recoverable).
Incorporation of the liquid fuel boosters has been assigned by the CNES to
ERNO (Germany), the motors being supplisd by the SEP [European Propellant
Company] (France). The selection of other manufacturers responsible for
structures (tanks, skirts, and so forth) and equipment will be made in
January 1982. Complete tests of the first stage with the liquid fuel booaters
are planned for 1984. ~
In the most powerful configuration, Ariane 44L with four liquid fuel boosters
coupled to the first stage, the new rocket will weigh about 460.tons, of whicil
415 tons are fuels, double the present launcher, with a total thrust of
nearly 530 tons (8 Viking 5 motors of 66 tons each) and a launching capacity
2.5 times that of the launcher. [Sentence as published] Depending upon the
configuration, the launcher will be from 56.9 to 60.4 meters long (compared
with the present 47.4 meters).
The Ariane 4 launcher can thus--dependin,g upon the number and type o~
boosters--be used in six different configurations, in order to launch any
satellite whatsoever into low orbit (polar) and medium and heavy satellites
into geostationary orbits. In particular, Ariane 4 will be able to place a
large Intelsat 6 class satellite of 3,550 kilograms into transfer orbit and
still have a reserve of 700 kilograms available for launching the improved
Intelsat 6A whose construction is planned. It will also be able to launch
a double payload consisting, for example, of a direct television satellite
(five channels) of 2,450 kilograms and a telecammunications satellite of
1,450 kilograms with the SPELDA adapter (375 kilograms).
The maximum performance predicted for the Ariane 4 is at least 4.3 tons
(guaranteed performance) into geosynchronous transfer orbit (180-35,900
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kilometers, inclined 7�) from Kourou, or 5 tons into heliosynchronous orbit
(circular at 800 kilometers, inclined 98.6�).
New Studies for Future Launcher
The configuration of the future European launcher which will replace the
Ariane 4 at the end of the 1990 decade is now under study a~ the CNES which,
incidentally, has ~ust formed, with the DFVLR, a French-German task force to
conduct this study 3ointly, and in liaison with the ESA, which is also conduct-
ing studies of this sub~ect in the perspective of servicing a future European
orbiting station derived (or not) fram the Spacelab.
The problem of the future European launcher is indeed much vaster than simple
def inition of a successor to Ariane 4. The definition of the future European
launcher is in fact tantamount to definiti~~n of future European space activi-
ties in the next 20 years. It is reasonable to believe that ability to com-
pete with the Shuttle for access to geostationa.ry orbits will remain the
dominant element in the 1990 decade. It is also necessary to plan increased
ability to compete in low orbit missions. The future European launcher mu~t
therefore do better than the Shuttle in geostationary orbit and nearly as well
in low orbit. It is also possible that Europe will decide to give itself some
independent capability for launching manned (and therefore recoverable) vehi-
cles. The end result would thus be a]:auncher in two versions: one for con-
ventional missions (possibly with an automated shuttle) and the other with in-
creased reliability for flight of human crews with, necessarily, a recoverable,
pilo ted shuttle.
Up to now, a two-stage Ariane 5 launcher, derived from the Ariane 4 but equipped
with a new second stage having a large cryogenic motor of 60 to 80.tons thrust
(HM 60 and HM 80) to place 10 tons into low orbit and 5.5 tons into geosyn-
chronous transfer orbit has been contemplated for that dual purpose.
That study is continuing but with more ariabitious objectives. Now it is a
matter of placing 7 to 8 tons into transfer orbit and 15 tons into low orbit,
particularly to launch a manned minishuttle of the H~RMES class, or an
automated orbiting station of the SOLARIS class.
The conception of the future European launcher has even evolved toward con-
figurations very different from that studied up to now under the designation
Ariane 5. However, the key element of that future rocket remains a large
cryogenic motor, but of 90 to 100 tons thrust. The design of this motor now
under study by the SEP, moreover, has been fixed. It will be a turbopump
motor with branched flow (440 to 445 seconds specif ic impulae), less complex
to develop than an integral f lux motor.
~ao schools of thought are at present competing to define the future European
launcher. One involvea a launcher "of Russian type" (Soyuz launcher) with four
stages in a cluster, each with a cryogenic motor of 90 to 100 tons and a small
solid fuel booster. The other concerns a rocket "of t~ineri:can type" (HLLV
class) with attached elements, including two large solid fuel boosters of _
100 tons thrust and a stage with cryogenic motor of 90 to 100 tons surrounding
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a large fuel tank (liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen). These launchers may be
more or less recoverable.
These studies of future launchers are going to continue and be refined in the
next few years, the ob3ective being to offer a precise pro~ect to the European
member countries in 1985 in order that the future launcher may be available
about 1995, taking into account the time required for development (10 years).
~ I
~
~
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The Ariane 4 can be uaed in six configurations, depending upon the
boosters coupled to the first stage.
TEXTS OF BOXED MATERIAL
Box 1. Satellite for the Ariane Open to Bidding
A payload is now planned for the Ariane 4 rocket during the first flight test
launching set for October or December 1985 from the ELA 2 launch~,ng field at
Kourou. The launcher version foreseen is the hybrid Ariane 44 LP with two
- solid fuel boosters and two liquid fuel boosters which can place 3.8 to 3.9
to~ into geosynchronous transfer orbit.
This launch capacity will be offered by the CNES and ESA "to the highest
bidder," that is, to competitive bidding, which has never before been done in
connection with a launcher.* There may be three or four "passengers" for this
launching. The CNES is thus contemplating launching its geodesic satellite
GRADIO along with several technological experiments (magnetic sensors, bear-
ings, and so forth). The GRADIO satellite (1 ton) is said to be equipped with
four ultrasensitive accelerometers of the ONERA [National Office for Aerospace
Studies and Research] to improve, by an order of magnitude (1 to 2 milligals),
gravimetric resolution of the entire globe.
*RCA recently sold the repeaters on one of its satellites at auction.
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For its part the ESA contemplates launching its solar probe, DISCO, on tliis
occasion. That project, which was the sub~ect of a new study with a view to
providing support for the extra-ecliptic TSPM solar probe, concerns observa-
tion of the sun's luminous variat~,ons in visible infrared and ultraviolet over
a period of 6 years, the probe separating at 1.5 mi113.on kilameters f rom tl~~
earth.
Eox 2. Hydrazine Hydrate for the Viking Motors '
After the failure of the second test flight (L 02) the in~ectors of the Ariane
rockets Viking motors were modified and manuf acturing quality improved. Now
"reduced dispersion" injectors are used and they are, in addition, subjected
to a"hot" acceptance test by bench firing.
The principal modification in the Viking injectors, to eliminate recurrence
of the combustion instability phenomenon at high frequencies (2,300 to 2,700
hertz) consists quite simply of enlarging (by some 1/10 millimeter) the injec-
tion port diameter. This has enabled combustion to be stabilized, but at the
cos t of degraded performance.
To restore performance to the original level, and even improve it for the
f uture Ariane 3 and 4 rockets (combustion pressure 58.5 bars instead of 53.5
to 54 b.ars) without having recurrence of the previous 3ncidents, it was de-
cided to effect Viking combustion stabilization by chem~cal ~neans. This time
it was a matter of adding hydrazine hydrate to the unsy~aetrical dimethylhydra-
zine (UDMN), which will also permit better cooling of the divergent cone of
the nozzle. Thus, it is planned to add about 3 to 4 tons of hydrazine hydrate
in the tanks but the CNES is awaiting the conclusion of tests--in particular,
the study of possible secondary effects--bef..~re definite adopt~.on of the
procedure, tentatively in the first quarter of 1982.
Complete model studies of the combustion phenomena (and of instability) in
turbopwnp motors at low pressure, moreover, have been pursued for.a year at
ONERA [National Office for Aerospace Study and Research] in cooperation with
the SEP [European Propellant Company]. But the conclusion of the work must
be awaited--in 2 years, perhaps more--before judging the results.
Box 3. Ariane First Stage Recovery Test in 1982
The CNES has awarded manuf acturing contracts for construct~.on of the recovery
system for the first stage of the Ariane 1 rocket. The contract to function
as general contractor has been given to Fokker (Netherlands), already parti-
cipating in the Ariane program by fabricating the third stage motor support
and interstage skirts. Fokker is at present responsible for design and fabri-
cation of the system of recovery by parachutea with the Trvin firm (Great
Britain) and Autof lug (Germany) as subcontractors to furns.sh the flotation
cushions.
The problem consists of braking the descent of the 13-ton ~irst stage (18.4
meters long and 3.8 meters in diameter), separated at about 53 kilometers
altitude at speed of 2,100 meters per second, which causes it to reach a peak
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1�va~ vi�a'aa.ana. vJaS vi\Ll
altitude of 87 kilometers along a ba].listic tra~ectory which ends with impact
on the sea at about 340 kilomsters from the launch site.
Recovery consists of fitting the stage with a cluster of parachutes located
in the first-second interstage skirt. The operation proceeds in several
stages: An extractor parachute will enable the pointing parachute to be
deployed at about 6,000 meters altitude, then the main par.achutes (2,600
square meters surface) will deploy at about 1,500 meters alt~tude, in order to
reduce the speed at impact to only 10 to 15 meters per second. The stage
should then float, thanks to inflatable balloons, until recovery ships arrive.
During the fourth test fl.ight (L 04) of the Ariane rocket which ~ust took
place on 19 December 1981 the CNES had already tested the fizst phase of the
operation; that is,tracking the stage (not braked) during its descent and
locating it at sea. The descent was tracked by the Adour radars at Kourou and
by telemetry stations aboard several ships, including the "Francis-Garnier" of
the French navy (see AIR ET COSMOS, No 886). The ships were easily able to
spot the stage, which was still floating although broken, its tanks apparently
intact.
The CNES now conte~nplates proceedings with a complete recovery test with the
braking system fabricated by Fokkexs during the seventh Ariane launching (L 07)
supposedly planned for October 1982.
The recovered stage will be decontaminated in Guiana before being sent to
Europe for detailed analysis of the condition of the elements to be recovered
(tanks, turbopumps, and so forth). The objective is to be able to reuse ele-
ments sufficiently without excessive expense for reconditioning, in order to
reduce the price of a rocket launc.hing by about 10 percent (or 2 million
accounting units).
If the operation succeeds the recovery of the firet stage �.~ill be a regular
practice, starting in 1984.
But it is not at all obvious that with only a single test of recovexy as
planne3 the reliability and attractiveness of the operation will be definitely
demonstrated, if one~is to judge by the recovery of the Shuttle boosters which
was not conclusive in the first attempt!
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COPYRIGHT: A.& C.1981
11,706
CSO: 3100/235 END
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